Month: September 2013

  • The Victorian Postmodern

    Jason Camlot

    English Department
    Concordia University
    camlot@vax2.concordia.ca

     

    John Kucich and Dianne F. Sadoff, eds., Victorian Afterlife: Postmodern Culture Rewrites the Nineteenth Century. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2000.

     

    Consider the following “true” story as an exemplum for approaching the idea of the Victorian postmodern: in the mid-1990s, artist and critic Todd Alden asked 400 art collectors to deliver to him canned samples of their feces for an art show. The idea for the show, as explained in the letter he sent to the collectors, was to represent “a historical rethinking of the Italian artist Piero Manzoni’s epoch-making work, Merda d’artista,” in which Manzoni “produced, conserved, and tinned ninety cans of his own feces, which he sold by the ounce, based on that day’s price of gold” (Alden 23). Alden noted that cans of Manzoni’s shit, which found few buyers back in 1961 when the work was first “made,” were “now being sold for as much as $75,000”; he proposed to make some of the cans he collected available for sale, and, further, “as a courtesy, each collector/producer [would] be offered the option to retain one of his/her ‘own’ cans at an amount that is one half of the initial offering price” (24). In May 1996, Alden’s display featuring eighty-one such cans was scheduled to open in Manhattan, but the New York Observer revealed Alden’s claim to be a hoax since only one collector had actually contributed as instructed. Now, the briefest consideration of Victorian art critic John Ruskin’s notion that “consumption absolute is the end, crown, and perfection of production” (217) in relation to Todd Alden’s proposal for Collector’s Shit will reveal how distant a postmodern notion of critique is from that of the nineteenth-century critic of culture and especially from the life-centered conceptions of culture and value promoted by the likes of Ruskin and William Morris.

     

    Ruskin continues, in the passage cited above, to say that “wise consumption is a far more difficult art than wise production” (217), and the Ruskinian question that arises in relation to Alden’s art proposal is how does one best consume it (in Ruskin’s sense, meaning use it, employ it, live with it–promote life with it)? The initial answer is that the act of purchasing it is the sole means of consumption available in this particular transaction. Subsequently one can only own it, have it, but not live with it in any other way. Admittedly such passive ownership does represent a means of action, for the “collectors” (with their single bargain-tins) and especially the artist/owner himself, in owning the tins, are actually “sitting on them” as investments that they hope will rise in monetary value over a period of time. Value here depends almost exclusively upon the second of the two conditions that John Stuart Mill deemed necessary for a thing to have any value in exchange, that is, the “difficulty in its attainment” (544), and it is upon this principle that the limited edition, the autographed novel, or the signed can of feces will bring its monetary return, or so the collector hopes. I say that the cans’ value depends upon this condition almost exclusively because, although the first of Mill’s two conditions for a thing to have value in exchange (“it must be of some use”) may seem glaringly absent from such an object, the counterargument may be made that the tins (hoax or not) are responsible for a valuable chain of critical thoughts about art, value, utility, culture, and history. The apparent uselessness of the tins of feces is arguably useful in that it leads one to consider the relationship between use value and exchange value, and in doing so it brings us to one of the key conundrums arising in an attempt to theorize the relationship between a Victorian past and a postmodern present. That is, it is often the distinction between an artifact’s inherent value (of which shit, no matter whose it is, has little to none now, although it was worth something in the time of Henry Mayhew’s “pure”-finders and mudlarks [142; 155]) and its marginal or institutional value (of which canned shit can have enormous value) that we are grappling with when we try to understand how the Victorian period (which is already a vexed formulation) continues to live in the present.

     

    An exploration of how we live with culture now as compared to how Victorians lived with culture in the nineteenth century, and how we can best pursue “a historical rethinking” of the Victorians in our present cultural endeavors, is the primary focus of the articles collected under the title Victorian Afterlife. John Kucich and Dianne F. Sadoff state in their editors’ introduction that the contributors of the fifteen essays in this collection “construct a history of the present by writing about rewritings of the Victorian past” (xiv), but this collection does not really construct a history of now so much as provide a diverse sampling of some kinds of historical knowledge that are deemed possible or warranted in contemporary cultural studies. I am not suggesting by this distinction that the latter project is less valuable than the former. It is perhaps more valuable and certainly is more tenable. Besides, by the end of this introductory essay, Kucich and Sadoff relinquish the idea that their volume constructs a history of the present and say that they “hope to provide instead multiple ways to measure the ideological motives and effects of a postmodern history that inevitably ‘forgets’ the past, or remembers it by trying to imagine it as present, or fashions its past by retelling the history of its present” (xxviii). They see the debate that structures their anthology “as an opening for the profoundly important analysis of the conditions of postmodern historicity and of postmodernism itself as a reflection on historical knowledge” (xxviii). I think this is a fair assessment of many of the essays in the collection, although some of them focus on how postmodern culture rewrites or has rewritten the nineteenth century without really theorizing the ideas of historicism or periodization that inform their methods of reading. Nor does a strong sense of the meaning of the term “postmodern” emerge from this collection, in which we find nothing like the barrage of attempts to develop a working framework for this concept that we experienced in the mid-1980s. The subtitle of the collection is “Postmodern Culture Rewrites the Nineteenth Century,” and probably it should come as no surprise that “culture” is a more comfortably handled term than “postmodernism” in this collection, since about two-thirds of the book is authored by scholars who specialize in the nineteenth century.

     

    Again, as the subtitle of the book suggests, many of the essays in the collection consider rewritings either of key Victorian texts or figures by contemporary authors, artists, and filmmakers, such as, for example, the cinematic afterlife of Dracula; contemporary representations of Oscar Wilde, Jane Austen and Lewis Carroll’s Alice; and A.S. Byatt’s “ghostwriting” of the Victorian realist novel. Tracing specific intertexts across a century, these essays at their best suggest hypotheses about the significance of how Victorian texts have been rewritten (Hilary Schor’s essay on A.S. Byatt is a case in point). At their weakest, they fall into the genre of the catalogue, listing the various instances of rewriting without truly developing a thesis about the implications of the various contemporary manifestations of Victorian figures they have compiled.

     

    Jonathan Culler has remarked that “intertextuality is the general discursive space that makes a text intelligible,” which ultimately “leads the critic who wishes to work with it to concentrate on cases that put in question the general theory” one brings to the table in the act of interpretation (106-7). Hilary M. Schor’s essay, “Sorting, Morphing, and Mourning: A.S. Byatt Ghostwrites Victorian Fiction,” is one of the stronger instances of the more specifically analogical essays in Victorian Afterlife because she approaches the idea of intertextuality as something that provides a frame of meaning requiring analysis and not as a predetermined assumption. She poses from the outset a large and valuable question about the status of realism in contemporary fiction and then explains that Byatt is less a “postmodernist” than a “post-realist,” in that she “invents a contemporary version of realism that can reanimate the complicated literary genres of the past” by approaching the novel as “a ‘literary’ device for giving forms form” (237). The specific strategies that Schor finds in Byatt–those of “sorting, morphing, and mourning”–are strategies borrowed both from the Victorians and from contemporary technologies, from Victorian science fiction and sociology, “to our computer-generated fascination with morphing and transformation, to cinematic and other technological ways of drawing attention to form itself” (239). In identifying this diverse range of strategies used by Byatt to generate her own version of realist narrative, Schor establishes a truly useful means of considering how a Victorian mode of inquiry (Darwin’s naturalism, in this case) can find a strange sort of afterlife via the nature shows on television (to which Byatt attributes the genesis of her novella Morpho Eugenia) and in contemporary fiction.

     

    Again from Culler, we get a sense of what is most important in approaching a work as a rewriting of a previous one, the main problem of interpreting a text according to such a framework becoming “that of deciding what attitude the [text] takes to the prior discourse which it designates as presupposed” (114). Schor’s essay does a good job of showing how Byatt grapples with the implications of Victorian realism as a seemingly transparent mode of organizing experience–by her use of the “sorting” mechanisms of other nineteenth-century genres and of twentieth-century media–and thus spells out the Victorian novel that Byatt presupposes in composing her own novella. Some of the essays in this collection do not spend as much time on this question of the attitude of a contemporary text toward its Victorian analog and subsequently fall into cataloguing shared themes, figures, and forms without developing enough of an argument about the significance of the similarities and coincidences that are being traced. So, while Shelton Waldrep’s “The Uses and Misuses of Oscar Wilde” and Kali Israel’s “Asking Alice: Victorian and Other Alices in Contemporary Culture” offer many, many examples of Wilde and Alice reincarnated on the contemporary screen, stage, and page, we end up with something more like a pile of specifically described instances than an attempt to analyze the combined meaning of these instances. And when we do get such attempts, for example, when Waldrep concludes that “Wilde’s current popularity has much to do with his proto-postmodernism,” or that “our nostalgia is for him, but our representations of him betray our own anxieties about our origins and structures for knowing ourselves” (62), they are not very satisfying.

     

    Other essays tracing specific intertexts offer more in the way of theses about why we in the 1990s seemed so fascinated by the cultural artifacts of the 1890s and earlier. Mary A. Favret’s “Being True to Jane Austen” shifts effectively between a close textual analysis of Austen’s novels Persuasion and Sense and Sensibility and film versions of these novels by Roger Michell and Ang Lee, respectively, which Favret says “are uncannily attentive to the sorts of fidelity currently demanded of Austen’s faithful” (64). Favret’s reading sketches out the connection between an ethos of sexual fidelity in Austen’s novels an the fidelity of the film to its source text and argues that “at the heart of these films is the question, made redundant by the plot of each novel, of whether or not being true is an animating or mortifying process” (64). Favret concludes that the intimation of death characteristic of the film versions of these novels represents a sense of the ultimate inaccessibility of the past and of “our own postmodern inability to conceive in any substantial way of immortality–even for Jane Austen” (80). Ronald R. Thomas develops an interesting thesis about the “irrepressible haunting of contemporary visual culture by the specters of nineteenth-century novel culture,” arguing that the nostalgia and anxiety informing films based on Bram Stoker’s novel Dracula come from the sense that we have “lost a nineteenth-century conception” of autonomous “character” and “the modern belief that the forces of the past drain the life from the present even as they sustain it” (289). This last part of Thomas’s thesis is enlarged into a truly interesting reading of Dracula as cipher for the nexus of new media and subjectivity. Thomas’s reading of Dracula could be seen to interestingly augment that of Friedrich Kittler (see, for example, Kittler’s “Dracula’s Legacy”) but there is no reference to Kittler in Thomas’s essay.

     

    Not surprisingly, many of the essays in this collection focus on the theme of technology. Jennifer Green-Lewis’s “At Home in the Nineteenth Century: Photography, Nostalgia, and the Will to Authenticity” considers Victorian photography in order to explain the particular kind of nostalgia that we have for the period. She argues that “the Victorians are visually real to us because they have a documentary assertiveness unavailable to persons living before the age of the camera” (31). Green-Lewis goes on to assess the kind of Victorian things we give visibility to and want to see, noting the popularity of pastoral over urban photographs, and pictures of Victorians “pretending to be something other than themselves” (39), dressed in costumes of an earlier era, and thus replicating our present desire to find ourselves in these figures of the past. Both Judith Roof’s “Display Cases” and Jay Clayton’s “Hacking the Nineteenth Century” draw connections between computers and Victorian systems of knowledge, although the trajectories of their arguments move in opposite directions. Roof compares present-day computer graphics and layout to the typological tactics of Victorian print culture and the organizing techniques of Victorian museums, arguing (more by analogy than from a historically grounded genealogy) that “Victoriana links new technology to an older tradition, making it seem safe and familiar” to us (101). She smartly suggests that the Victorian exhibit and the modern computer are both representative of “the development of a technology of display designed to attract visitors to a vision of mastery and national wealth” (104). Again, despite her reading of the Macintosh “trash can” as a metaphor that transforms “metonymic computer logic into [a] trite, vaguely humorous, familiar” metaphor (113), Roof does not engage Kittler’s work on how the material particularities of “sound and image, voice and text” inherent in specific Victorian technologies “are reduced to surface effects, known to consumers as interface” (Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter 1). Clayton examines William Gibson and Bruce Sterling’s historical sci-fi novel The Difference Engine, its interest in how Victorian technologies (such as Charles Babbage’s Analytical Engine) troubled the human/machine binary way back in the 1830s, and the possible disjunctions between technological advance and ethical advance. He argues that “to hack the nineteenth century in a literary work means altering the temporal order of events, deliberately creating anachronisms in a representational world” (195) and then shows us, through an interesting reading of The Difference Engine with respect to Benjamin Disraeli’s Conservative condition-of-England novel Sybil, that the climax of Gibson and Sterling’s novel is an anachronistic “throwback to the days when English engineering and empire reigned supreme, when few challenged the marriage of technology and the police, and when masculine power and the erotics of vulnerable femininity were widely approved norms” (198). His general argument suggests that the two main ideological assertions of postmodern fiction’s fascination with Victorian technology are “escapism” and the articulation of “a politics of the future” that challenges the present with the past.

     

    Other essays engaging explicitly with Victorian politics and their afterlife are Ian Baucom’s “Found Drowned: The Irish Atlantic,” which considers how Paul Muldoon’s poetry invokes traumatic Victorian events (like the Irish famine) to rethink present-day Irish political identity, and Simon Gikandi’s “The Embarrassment of Victorianism: Colonial Subjects and the Lure of Englishness,” which begins by wondering how native anti-colonialists could promote dominant colonialist values, and then demonstrates that the seeds of colonial liberation existed in the most traditional of Victorian moral codes. Together, Laurie Langbauer’s essay “Queen Victoria and Me,” which draws parallels between the political scripts of female power performed by Queen Victoria and the public roles that contemporary feminist academics must assume, and Susan Lurie’s reading of Jane Campion’s rewriting of Henry James’s desexualized Victorian heroines, in terms of the relative political worth of the unconventional Victorian sexualities revived by postmodernism, represent an interesting meditation upon feminism’s Victorian origins.

     

    Finally, the two essays in the collection that most explicitly engage in thinking about what the “Victorian Postmodern” means as a critical concept are John McGowan’s “Modernity and Culture, the Victorians and Cultural Studies” and Nancy Armstrong’s “Postscript: Contemporary Culturalism: How Victorian Is It?” These two essays frame the book as a whole; McGowan’s text opens the discussion and Armstrong’s closes it, and together they may represent the most valuable line of thinking that the book has to offer. When, in 1985, Jean-François Lyotard curated an “art and technology extravaganza” at the Georges Pompidou Center in an attempt to chart “the new order of our postmodern condition”–this from a flyer distributed at the exhibit–Lyotard had the visitors work their way through a labyrinth of electronic gadgetry, “old” art juxtaposed with “new” art juxtaposed with “non” art, all the while donning headphones and listening to “great” modernist writers reading from their works (Rajchman 111). Lyotard’s exhibit, titled “Les Immatiriaux,” forwarded the curatorial argument that the very idea of postmodernism has emerged from and continues to play itself out according to the soundtrack of modernism. McGowan and Armstrong’s essays articulate the general insistence of Victorian Afterlife upon a version of the present that thinks its way out of that early and powerful version of the postmodern. McGowan does this by acknowledging that the concepts of periodization, Zeitgeist (the idea that ages have spirits or conditions), and our proclivity to situate ourselves and to characterize eras are inherited from “a group of German-influenced English writers who were the first literary (or artistic) intellectuals cum social critics,” people like Mill, Carlyle, Ruskin, Arnold, Harriet Martineau and William Morris (3). His essay first connects the idea of “Zeitgeist” to concepts of “the modern” and “culture,” then sketches out how all of our categories of political orientation are derived from these three terms, and finally tries to “speculate on what the critical enterprise would look like if we somehow managed to dispense with the ‘modern’ and ‘culture’ as signposts” (4). As it turns out, the critical enterprise under this dispensation looks a lot like a Nietzschean will to consider “what elements of the past can mean in relation to our purposes in the present” (24). McGowan articulates the results of such a conditional line of thinking: “Instead of viewing things that appear as indices of who they (the Victorians) were and/or who we (postmoderns?) are . . . we would see in stories of the past images of being in the world that tell us there are multiple ways to be human and that we are engaged in the project of living out some of those ways” (24).

     

    Similarly, Nancy Armstrong argues that the critical work of Victorian Afterlife renders “obsolete the whole question of whether postmodernism represents a break from modernism or just another version of it” (313), and suggests instead that “postmodernism is a consequence and acknowledgment of the Victorian redefinition of the nation” (312) and of the nineteenth-century sense of acculturation as a praxis of decorum. The main connection she draws between then and now has to do with the status of the idea of “the real” or of authenticity as a defining aspect of identity. She says, “postmodernism asks, what if the most oft-repeated and banal aspects of our culture . . . are the only basis for our selves” and “just another cultural formation that we happen to consider most primary and real?” (319). In asking this question in relation to a notion of Victorian culture that was already aware of this, Armstrong suggests that, “in this respect, postmodernism is perhaps more Victorian than even the Victorians were,” and its focus on the details informing genres of action represents “an extension of the Austen principle that decorum–which for the novelist was the accumulation of rather small but absolutely appropriate details–is what we really are” (319).

     

    So the afterlife of the Victorians exists, according to the postscript of this collection, in the realist’s attention to minute details that ultimately provide a script for behavior and an actual sense of being. Armstrong’s account of the Victorian qualities inherent in our postmodern present seems to take Carlyle’s key sign of the time–the assumption of his age “that to the inward world (if there be any) our only conceivable road is through the outward” (70)–and presents it, not as the symptom of the “mechanical” malady, but as the status quo of our postmodern condition. Going back to the nineteenth century, Armstrong remarks, “commodity culture created a world in which virtually anything spontaneous and natural about . . . life could be bought up and resold in a predictable commercial package that would in turn elicit only canned responses” (315). The Victorian sense of “the real” that emerged from this commodity culture has now moved so far in the direction of a commercially packaged and canned experience, Armstrong says, “that how people are represented may well be who they are” (323). Viable cultural criticism, then, must approach the canned world as the real one “if the material conditions in which people live and die are going to improve” (323). This idea is not so distant from Carlyle’s definition of cultural criticism back in 1829 as that which critiques “our own unwise mode of viewing Nature” (83). “Because our [Victorian] forebears were so successful in establishing their picture of the world as the world itself,” Armstrong tells us, “cultural theory is not just a legacy they bequeathed to us, but one of the most effective means of intervening in the reproduction of that picture” (323-24). This confidence in the transforming potential of cultural theory is probably the most Victorian thing about this collection of essays as a whole, and it is an intimation worthy of a long and healthy afterlife.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Alden, Todd. Letter. “Rear-Action Avant-Garde.” Harper’s Magazine 286 (May 1993): 23-4.
    • Carlyle, Thomas. Selected Writings. New York: Penguin Books, 1980.
    • Culler, Jonathan. The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1981.
    • Kittler, Friedrich A. “Dracula’s Legacy.” Trans. William Stephen Davis. Stanford Humanities Review 1.1 (1989): 143-73.
    • —. Gramophone, Film, Typewriter. Trans. Geoffrey Winthrop-Young and Michael Wutz. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1999.
    • Mayhew, Henry. London Labour and the London Poor. Vol. 2. New York: Dover, 1968.
    • Mill, John Stuart. Principles of Political Economy. Ed. W. J. Ashley. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1909.
    • Rajchman, John. “The Postmodern Museum.” Art in America 73 (Oct. 1985): 110-17.
    • Ruskin, John. Unto This Last and Other Writings. New York: Penguin, 1985.

     

  • Saussure and the Grounds of Interpretation

     

    David Herman

    Department of English
    North Carolina State University
    dherman@unity.ncsu.edu

     

    Roy Harris, Saussure and His Interpreters. New York: New York UP, 2001.

     

    The author of a 1983 English translation of Ferdinand de Saussure’s Cours de linguistique générale, as well as two previous books centering on Saussure’s theories of language (Reading Saussure and Language, Saussure, and Wittgenstein), Roy Harris brings a wealth of expertise to his new book on Saussure. More than this, as is amply borne out in the early chapters of Saussure and His Interpreters, Harris is deeply familiar with the various manuscript sources (i.e., students’ notebooks) on which Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye relied in producing/editing what became the Course in General Linguistics, the first edition of which was published in 1916. 1 Added to these other qualifications is Harris’s stature as an expert in the field of linguistic theory more generally. 2 From all of these achievements emerges the profile of a commentator uniquely positioned to interpret–to understand as well as adjudicate between–previous interpretations of Saussure.

     

    To be sure, Harris’s background and research accomplishments–his knowledge of the origins, details, and larger framework of Saussurean language theory–are unimpeachable. 3 But while Harris’s credentials are unimpeachable, there remains the question of whether those credentials have equipped him to take the true measure of Saussure’s interpreters, i.e., those who claim (or for that matter disavow) a Saussurean basis for their work. This question, prompted by the tone as well as the technique of a book cast as an exposé of nearly a century’s worth of “misreadings” of Saussure, is itself part of a broader issue exceeding the scope of the author’s study. The broader issue concerns the exact nature of the relation between ideas developed by specialists in particular fields of study and the form assumed by those ideas as interpreted (and eo ipso adapted) by non-specialists working in other, more or less proximate fields. Also at issue are the nature and source of the standards that could (in principle) be used to adjudicate between better and worse interpretations of source ideas imported into diverse target disciplines–that is, into domains of study in which, internally speaking, distinct methods and objects of interpretation already hold sway. Indeed, even within the same discipline in which the ideas in question had their source, interpretations can vary widely–as suggested by Harris’s chapters on linguists who in his view misunderstand or misappropriate Saussure (the list includes such major figures as Leonard Bloomfield, Louis Hjelmslev, Roman Jakobson, and Noam Chomsky). Although these deep issues sometimes surface during Harris’s exposition, they do not receive the more sustained treatment they deserve. The result is a study marked, on the one hand, by its technical brilliance in outlining the “Rezeptiongeschichte” of Saussurean theory, but on the other hand by its avoidance of other, foundational questions pertaining to the possibilities and limits of interpretation itself. The salience of those questions derives, in part, from the transdisciplinary legacy of Saussure’s own work.

     

    It is worth underscoring at the outset that Harris’s account of Saussure and his interpreters is not merely a descriptive one. Granted, the author carefully traces the transformation and recontextualization of Saussurean ideas as they were propagated within the field of linguistics and later (or in some cases simultaneously) migrated from linguistics into neighboring areas of inquiry. 4 But Harris does not rest content with pointing out where an intra- or interdisciplinary adaptation differs from what (in his interpretation) is being adapted. Persistently, in every chapter of the book, and sometimes in quite vituperative terms, Harris construes this adaptive process as one involving distortion, i.e., a failure to get Saussure right. 5 I discuss Harris’s specific claims in more detail below. For the moment, I wish to stress how this prescriptive, evaluative dimension of the author’s approach is at odds with what he emphasizes at the beginning of his study–namely, the status of Saussure’s text as itself a construct, a constellation of interpretive decisions made by those who sought to record and, in the case of his editors, promulgate Saussure’s ideas.

     

    Indeed, Harris’s meticulous analysis of the textual history of the Course invites one further turn of the Saussurean screw: if the very text on which all subsequent interpretations have been built is itself the product of students’ and editors’ interpretations, then who, precisely, is in a position to interpret Saussure’s interpreters? Or rather, where is the ground on which one might stand to distinguish between the wheat of productive adaptations and the chaff of non- or counter-productive misappropriations, whether these borrowings are made within or across the boundaries of linguistic study? 6 In this connection, there is a sense in which Harris seeks to have his cake and eat it, too. The author advances the claim that, in the case of Saussure’s text, interpretation goes all the way down, meaning that no feature of the Course is not already an interpretation by Saussure’s contemporaries. But he also advances the claim that at some point (is it to be stipulated by all concerned parties?) interpretation stops and the ground or bedrock of textual evidence begins (2), such that those of Saussure’s successors who engaged in particular strategies or styles of interpretation can be deemed guilty of error, of violating the spirit (if not the letter) of Saussure’s work.

     

    As demonstrated by the early chapters of Saussure and His Interpreters, no writer is more aware than Harris that the book often viewed as the foundational document of (European) structuralism was in fact a composite creation, a portmanteau assemblage of more-or-less-worked-out hypotheses by Saussure himself, re-calibrated for the purposes of undergraduate instruction; notes taken by students not always consistent in their reports of what Saussure actually said in class; conjectures, surmises, extrapolations, and outright interpolations by the editors of the Course; and, later, interpretations of Saussure by linguists, anthropologists, semioticians, and others–interpretations because of which later generations of readers came to “find” things in Saussure’s text that would not necessarily have been discoverable when the book first appeared. As Harris puts it in chapter 1, “Interpreting the Interpreters,” “the majority of Saussure’s most original contributions to linguistic thought have passed through one or more filters of interpretation” (2). As Harris’s discussion proceeds, the emphasis on Saussure’s ideas as inevitably interpretively filtered gives way to a series of attempts to dissociate Saussure’s theories from a group of filters that seem to be qualitatively different from those falling into the initial group (i.e., students and editors). Harris distinguishes between the two sets of filters by dividing them into contemporaries and successors (3-4), although by Harris’s own account neither group can be exempted from the process by which Saussure’s ideas were actively constructed rather than passively and neutrally conveyed. Given that (as Harris discusses in chapter 3) Saussure’s editors took the liberty of writing portions of the Course without any supporting documents, it is not altogether clear why the parameters of distance in time and intellectual inheritance (4) are sufficient to capture what distinguishes a successor’s from a contemporary’s interpretations. An editorial interpolation is arguably just as radically interpretive as any post-Saussurean commentator’s extrapolation. In any case, in interpreting Saussure, neither contemporaries nor successors have stood on firm ground, whatever their degree of separation in time and tradition from the flesh-and-blood “author” of the Course.7

     

    Indeed, Harris’s concern early on is with the difficulty or rather impossibility of getting back to the solid ground of Saussure’s “true”–unfiltered–ideas. In chapter 2, “The Students’ Saussure,” the author remarks that two separate questions must be addressed in considering the students’ notebooks as evidence concerning Saussure’s ideas: on the one hand, whether the students understood their teacher’s points; on the other hand, whether what Saussure said in class always reliably indicated his considered position on a given topic (17). With respect to the latter question, Saussure may have sometimes been unclear, and he also may have sometimes oversimplified his views for pedagogical reasons. The challenge of reconstructing the Saussurean framework on the basis of student notes is therefore considerable. Moreover, Saussure’s decisions about what to include in his lectures were in some cases dictated by the established curriculum of his time, rather than by priorities specific to his approach to language and linguistic study. Assuming as much, Saussure’s editors expunged from the published version of the Course the survey of Indo-European languages that he presented in his actual lectures (18-23), to mention just one example.

     

    As for the editors themselves, Harris discusses their role in chapter 3. The author notes that, in statements about the Course written after the publication of the first edition, Bally and Sechehaye came to quote their own words as if they were Saussure’s (32). The publication of Robert Godel’s Les Sources manuscrites du Cours de linguistique générale de F. de Saussure in 1957, however, revealed that many of the editors’ formulations lacked any manuscript authority whatsoever. They were imputations by Bally and Sechehaye rather than, in any nontrivial sense, reconstructions of the student notebooks. Also, in selecting which Saussurean materials to include in the Course and in making decisions about which ideas should be given pride of place in the exposition, the editors were inevitably biased by their own linguistic training and theories. The editors’ biases came into play in their choices about how to present such key distinctions as those between signification and value, synchrony and diachrony, and “la langue” and “la parole.”

     

    In chapters 4-10, Harris’s focus shifts from contemporaries to successors, with chapter 11 attempting to take stock of “History’s Saussure.” As the first group of interpretive filters, Saussure’s contemporaries already impose a layer of mediation between the linguist’s theories and modern-day readers’ efforts to know what those theories were. But the second group of filters imposes what often comes across as an even thicker–and somehow more reprehensible–layer of intervening (mis)interpretations on top of the layer already there because of the contemporaries’ (mis)interpretations. Thus, the chapters in question portray a process by which a series of filters get stacked one by one on top of Saussure’s already-filtered ideas, according to the following recursive procedure:

     

    Filter 1 (Saussure's ideas filtered through students and editors)
    Filter 2 (Filter 1(Saussure's ideas filtered through students and editors))
    Filter 3 (Filter 2(Filter1(Saussure's ideas filtered through students and editors)))
    etc.

     

    As each successive filter gets pushed onto the stack, Saussure’s ideas (at least as they were interpreted by his contemporaries rather than his successors) recede farther in historical memory. Even worse, the filters continually being loaded on the stack are the handiwork of commentators guilty of carelessness (Chomsky), incomprehension (Bloomfield, Jakobson, Claude Lévi-Strauss), confusion (Roland Barthes), or even meretricious slander (Jacques Derrida), as the case may be.

     

    Again, though, this compilation of misreadings seems strangely at odds with Harris’s earlier emphasis on the instability of the Course as itself an assemblage (one might even say stack) of more or less plausible interpretations. Does Harris mean to imply that, in shifting from contemporaries to successors, the interpretations of the former become “evidence” on which the latter must base their own, later interpretations? If so, by what mechanism (and at what point on the continuum linking contemporaries and successors) does an interpretation or set of interpretations achieve evidential status? Though centrally important to Harris’s study, these questions about validity in interpretation are never explicitly posed (let alone addressed) by the author.

     

    To take the linguists first, Harris identifies a host of misinterpretations of Saussure on the part of scholars who, as specialists in Saussure’s field of study, apparently should have known better. None of the linguists included in the author’s scathing series of exposés emerges in very good shape. In “Bloomfield’s Saussure,” Harris suggests that the famous American linguist misunderstood the distinction between synchronic and diachronic linguistics, the Saussurean conception of the sign, and, more generally, the relationship between Saussure’s theoretical position and his own. “Hjelmslev’s Saussure” characterizes the Danish linguist’s theory of glossematics as one that claims to be the logical distillation of Saussurean structuralism but ends up looking more like a “reductio ad absurdum” of Saussure’s ideas: “Glossematics shows us what happens in linguistics when the concept of la langue is idealized to the point where it is assumed to exist independently of any specific materialization whatever” (90), and thus stripped of the social aspects with which Saussure himself invested the concept (93). 8 In “Jakobson’s Saussure,” Harris notes that whereas Jakobson presented himself as a Saussurean, the Russian linguist rejected a number of Saussure’s key tenets, including the crucial principles of linearity and arbitrariness (96-101). More than this, Harris rather uncharitably discerns a careerist motive for the fluctuations in Jakobson’s estimates of Saussure’s importance over the course of his (Jakobson’s) career. Harris’s argument is that while Jakobson was still in Europe, he felt obliged to pay tribute to Saussure; but when Jakobson emigrated to the U.S. and tried to establish himself as a linguist during a time when anti-mentalist, behaviorist doctrines were the rule, he shifted to an attack mode.

     

    Even harsher than his comments on Jakobson, however, are the remarks found in Harris’s chapter on “Chomsky’s Saussure.” In the author’s view, “far from seeing himself as a Saussurean, from the outset Chomsky was more concerned to see Saussure as a possible Chomskyan” (153). But though Chomsky tried to map the distinction between “la langue” and “la parole” into his own contrast between competence and performance, and also to conscript Saussure’s mentalist approach into his campaign against then-dominant behaviorism,

     

    Saussure's apparent indifference to recursivity showed that being a "mentalist" did not automatically make one a generativist, while at the same time Saussure's view of parole raised the whole question of how much could safely be assigned to the rule-system alone and how much to the individual. Thus Saussure's patronage brought along with it certain problems for Chomsky. (155)

     

    In criticizing Chomsky’s attempts to extricate himself from these problems, Harris seems to abandon constructive debate in favor of sniping: “Chomsky’s much-lauded ‘insight’ concerning the non-finite nature of syntax turns out to coincide–unsurprisingly–with his poor eyesight in reading Saussure” (166). This barb reveals a degree of animus not wholly explained by even the worst interpretive slip-up vis-à-vis Saussure. Why is it that Bloomfield’s incomprehension of Saussurean ideas merits a far less severe reprimand than what appears to be a careless misappropriation of Saussure on Chomsky’s part? Again, the criterion for determining degrees of fit between interpretations and Saussure’s theories–the ground from which better and worse interpretations might be held side-by-side and adjudicated–is never explicitly identified in Harris’s study. Hence it remains unclear why Chomsky should be subjected to much rougher treatment than Bloomfield, since both theorists are (according to the author) guilty of misjudging the relation between Saussure’s ideas and their own. 9

     

    The chapters devoted to nonspecialist interpreters of the Course–i.e., scholars working outside the field of linguistics–raise other questions pertaining to Saussure and the grounds of interpretation. At issue is whether a commentator based in the host discipline from which a descriptive nomenclature, set of concepts, or method of analysis originates has the license or even the intellectual obligation to point out where others not based in that discipline have gone wrong in adapting the nomenclature, concepts, or methods under dispute. At issue, too, is just what “going wrong” might mean in the context of such inter-disciplinary adaptations. I submit that such considerations, barely or not at all broached in Harris’s account, in fact need to be at the center of any account of Saussure and his interpreters.

     

    Chapter 7 is devoted to “Lévi-Strauss’s Saussure”; chapter 8 and chapter 10 concern “Barthes’s Saussure” and “Derrida’s Saussure,” respectively. Already in 1945 Lévi-Strauss had begun to characterize linguistics as the “pilot-science” on which the fledgling science of anthropology should model itself, but it was not until 1949, in Lévi-Strauss’s article on “Histoire et ethnologie,” that Saussure’s Course was celebrated as marking the advent of structural linguistics (112). As Harris points out, however, although both Lévi-Strauss and Lacan regarded the development of the concept of the phoneme as the crucial breakthrough made by modern linguistics, Saussure cannot be given credit for this idea (117). Lévi-Strauss for one placed great emphasis on the phoneme as a kind of paradigm concept, famously adapting it to create the notion of the “mytheme” (or smallest meaningful unit of the discourse of a myth) (Lévi-Strauss, “Structural”). The problems with this particular recontextualization have been well documented (see Pavel); Harris subsumes those problems under a more general “anthropological misappropriation of the vocabulary of structuralism” (126). Lévi-Strauss’s misappropriation encompasses not only the idea of phonemes but also Saussure’s opposition between synchronic and diachronic and the very notion of system or structure. Thus, “although [Lévi-Strauss] constantly appeals to the Saussurean opposition between synchronic and diachronic, he is manifestly reluctant to accept Saussure’s version of that crucial distinction” (126). More broadly, whereas “both [Saussure and Lévi-Strauss] use terms such as langage, société, and communication, their basic assumptions with respect to language, society and communication differ widely. For Saussure, it seems fair to say, Lévi-Strauss would be a theorist who not only shirks the definition of crucial terms but constantly speaks and argues in metaphors in order to evade it” (130-31).

     

    In conformity with the stacking procedure described in paragraph 8 above, the sometimes “wooly thinking” of which Harris accuses Lévi-Strauss (131) becomes a deep, abiding, and unredeemable confusion by the time Barthes embarks on his own neo-Saussurean program for research. (Sure enough, although Lévi-Strauss’s misinterpretations looked bad in chapter 7, in chapter 8 [140, 142] they come across as less pernicious than Barthes’s.) Commenting on Barthes’s proposal for a translinguistics, which actually assumed several forms over the years (135) and which Barthes seems to have based on Hjelmslev’s suggestion that a “broad” conception of linguistics would accommodate all semiotic systems with a structure comparable to natural languages (134), Harris notes that for the French semiotician Saussurean linguistics stood “at the centre of a whole range of interdisciplinary enterprises in virtue of providing a basic theory of the sign and signification” (134). Yet because Barthes (b. 1915) probably did not read Saussure until 1956, his interpretation of the Saussurean framework “was an interpretation already shaped from the beginning by the glosses provided by such linguists as Jakobson, Benveniste and Martinet and, outside linguistics, by Lévi-Strauss and Lacan” (136). The implication here is that Barthes’s subsequent willingness to “tinker” with the structuralist model (e.g., in the “simplified version” of the Saussurean framework offered in Éléments de sémiologie [1964]) resulted from Barthes’s relatively high position on the stack of interpretive filters and his proportional distance from the historical Saussure. More than this, Harris suggests that Barthes adopted the label of “trans-linguistique” for self-serving reasons: to block criticism from bonafide linguists, and to present Barthes’s approach as being in advance of contemporary linguistics (146). But from Harris’s perspective, in a work such as Éléments Barthes only succeeds in “demonstrat[ing] his own failure to realize that the ‘basic concepts’ he ends up expounding are, at best, lowest common denominators drawn from quite diverse linguistic enterprises, and at worst incoherent muddles” (148).

     

    Harris’s greatest scorn, however, is reserved for Derrida, whose position among the non-linguist interpreters is parallel with (or even worse than) that of Chomsky among the linguists. Focusing on De la grammatologie and beginning with Derrida’s efforts to link Saussure’s with Aristotle’s conception of the sign, Harris affiliates Derrida’s expositional technique with what as known is the “smear” in political journalism:

     

    Rather than actually demonstrate a connexion between person A and person B, the journalist implies connexion by means of lexical association. This technique is all the more effective when the lexical association can be based on terms that either A or B actually uses. This dispenses with any need to argue a case; or, if any case is argued, its conclusion is already tacitly anticipated in the terms used to present it. (173)

     

     

    But the dominant metaphor deployed by Harris in this chapter is that of Derrida as unscrupulous prosecutor and Saussure as hapless plaintiff, whose words and ideas are taken out of context and used against him, but for whom it is physically impossible to mount a proper defense.

     

    After critiquing Saussure indirectly on the basis of his philosophical and other “associates,” Derrida, says Harris, finally puts “the accused himself…in the witness box,” with “some twenty pages of Heidegger-and-Hegel” intervening between the insinuations concerning Saussure’s Aristotelianism and Derrida’s direct examination of the linguist himself (176). It is not just that Derrida gratuitously blames Saussure for the concentration on phonology found in the work of his successors (177). Further, when faced with statements from the Course suggesting that sound plays no intrinsic role in “la langue,” “Derrida attempts to present them as symptomatic of a conceptual muddle” (178). What are we to make of the alleged contradictions, the supposed “web of incoherence,” that Derrida purports to discover in Saussure’s text?

     

    As regards the web, it unravels as soon as one begins to examine how Derrida has woven it. The [Course], as commentators have pointed out, proceeds--in the manner one might expect from an undergraduate course--from fairly broad general statements at the beginning to progressively more sophisticated formulations. In the course of this development, the terminology changes. Qualifications to earlier statements are added. By ignoring this well-crafted progression, Derrida finds it relatively easy to pick out and juxtapose observations that at first sight jar with one another. (179)

     

    Much of the remainder of this chapter (183-87) is devoted to an account of how Derrida quotes “selected snippets” of Saussure’s book out of context, in order “to make Saussure appear to say in the witness box exactly what Derrida wanted him to say” (183). When, four years later, Derrida denied that he had ever accused Saussure’s project of being logocentric or phonocentric, Harris calls this claim an “astonishing display of Humpty-Dumptyism” (187) and a confirmation that “Derrida’s interpretation of Saussure is academically worthless” (188).

     

    Harris himself reveals a strong prosecutorial flair in his account of the nonspecialist adaptations of Saussure, impugning Lévi-Strauss’s anthropological misappropriations, Barthes’s incoherent muddles, and Derrida’s academically worthless interpretations. These are strong words, and they invite questions about the interpretive criteria or canon on the basis of which Harris’s charges might be justified. Harris waits until his concluding chapter on “History’s Saussure” to sketch some of the elements of the canon that has, up to this point, implicitly guided his analysis of the specialist as well as nonspecialist interpretations. Remarking that he does not share Godel’s confidence in being able to discern “la vraie pensée de Saussure” (the true thought of Saussure), the author does think it possible to recognize when a given interpretation of Saussure is “in various respects inaccurate or mistaken. If there is no ‘right’ way of reading Saussure there are nevertheless plenty of wrong ways” (189-90). Whereas the first part of this claim (there is no right way of reading Saussure) squares with some versions of relativism, the second part of the claim (there are in fact wrong ways of reading Saussure) is a corollary of Harris’s avowedly anti-relativistic stance. For the author, “relativism has made such inroads into historical thinking that it is nowadays difficult to pass judgment on interpretations of Saussure (or any other important thinker) without immediately inviting a kind of criticism which relies on the assumption that all interpretations are equally valid (in their own terms, of course–an escape clause which reflects the academic paranoia that prompted it)” (190). By contrast, “Saussure himself… did not belong to a generation accustomed to taking refuge behind relativist whitewash”–i.e., “a generation who supposed that any old interpretation is as good as another” (190).

     

    Readers familiar with the work of Stanley Fish, for example, will recognize here a caricature of the relativist’s actual position. Relativism is not, except in Harris’s straw-person argument, tantamount to the view that any interpretation goes. Rather, it suggests that some interpretations should and do win out over others because of the way they “gear into” more or less widely agreed-upon standards of argumentation and proof procedures. What therefore need to be spelled out, in a relativistic as well as a non-relativistic model, are the criteria by which some interpretations can be evaluated as less correct or less useful than others. In the present case, one possible criterion, i.e., degree of faithfulness to Saussure’s actual formulations in the Course, is ruled out by Harris’s own account of how the text was saturated with extra- or at least para-Saussurean interpretations before it ever made it into print. But as I have already emphasized, the author advances (in explicit terms at least) no other criterion or set of criteria for successful or useful interpretation in this context. 10

     

    At this juncture, I am brought back to another of the deep questions that needs to be explored in any study of Saussure’s reception history, but that is not considered by Harris: do the criteria for successful or useful interpretation (whatever they might be) remain the same for both intra- and inter-disciplinary adaptations of Saussure’s descriptive nomenclature, operative concepts, and methods of analysis? This question is a necessary one because Saussure’s work actually has had two contexts of reception, two historical series of interpretive adaptations, which have sometimes converged, intersected, and even been braided into one another, but which should be kept distinct for analytical purposes in a study such as Harris’s. That is to say, Harris’s chronological arrangement of his chapters, by intermixing specialist and nonspecialist interpretations of Saussure, obscures another, arguably more important pattern subtending the reception of Saussurean theory over the past one hundred years. This pattern, rare in modern intellectual history, is the result of the peculiarly dual status of Saussure’s discourse–a status that the account of “transdiscursive” authors developed by Michel Foucault in “What Is an Author?” can help illuminate.

     

    Recall that, for Foucault, the so-called “founders of discursivity” need to be distinguished from the founders of a particular area of scientific study (113-17). Like scientific founders, the initiators of a discourse are not just authors of their own works, but also produce the possibilities and the rules for the formation of other texts–texts that relate by way of differences as well as analogies to the founder’s initiatory work. However, in the case of scientific founders, their founding act “is on an equal footing with its future transformations; this act becomes in some respects part of the set of modifications that it makes possible” (115). Thus, “the founding act of a science can always be reintroduced within the machinery of those transformations that derive from it” (115). Newton’s theory of mechanics, for example, is in some sense continuous with any experiments I might perform (e.g., using wooden blocks and inclined planes) to test the explanatory limits of that theory. By “contrast,” argues Foucault, “the initiation of a discursive practice is heterogeneous to its subsequent transformations” (115). To expand a type of discursivity is not to imbue it with greater formal generality or internal consistency, as is the case with refinement of scientific theories through experimentation, “but rather to open it up to a certain number of possible applications” (116). In this Foucauldian framework, clearly, a successful or useful interpretation will not be the same thing across the two domains at issue–i.e., types of discursivity and types of scientific practice.

     

    Saussure, I suggest, was a Janus-faced founder. He was the initiator of scientific (specifically, linguistic) discourse on the nature of signification and value within synchronic systems of signs, on the study of “la langue” versus “la parole,” and on the concept of the linguistic sign itself, among other areas within the study of language. Successful linguistic interpretations of Saussure’s ideas about these topics, it can be argued, will adhere to a particular set of interpretive protocols (which I have suggested remain underspecified in Harris’s account). But Saussure was also the founder of a type of discursivity that came to be known as structuralism, whose practitioners across several disciplines made constant returns to Saussure in their attempts to test the limits of applicability of his theories. This sort of return, as Foucault notes, is part of the discursive field itself, and never stops modifying it: “The return is not a historical supplement which would be added to the discursivity, or merely an ornament; on the contrary, it constitutes an effective and necessary task of transforming the discursive practice itself” (116). Accordingly, interpretations of Saussure viewed as a founder of discursivity, and in particular as the initiator of structuralist discourse, can be deemed successful if they bring within the scope of structuralist theory phenomena that were heterogeneous to that discourse at the time of its founding. Thanks to the efforts of the nonspecialists “returning” to Saussure, myths, narratives more generally, fashion systems, and other phenomena were brought under the structuralist purview. Again, however, this is not tantamount to saying that any interpretation of Saussure as the founder of structuralist discourse will be as good as any other. The goodness-of-fit of such an interpretation will depend on a complex assortment of factors, including its internal coherence, its relation to previous attempts at broadening the applicability of the discourse, and its productivity in terms of generating still other interpretations.

     

    For his part, Harris develops what might be termed a contextualist explanation of “why, outside the domain of linguistics, Saussure’s synchronic system was such an attractive idea” (194). Specifically, the author argues that “synchronic linguistics was eminently suited to be the ‘new’ linguistics for an era that wanted to forget the past” (195), especially the barbarity of the first world war and its negation of “virtually every Enlightenment idea and ideal of human conduct” (195). In other words, Saussure’s synchronic approach could be construed as a “validation of modernity” (196), “for the values built into and maintained by the synchronic system are invariably and necessarily current values: they are not, and cannot be, the values of earlier systems” (195). Harris thus selects historical context as a ground for interpreting Saussure’s nonspecialist interpreters, at least.

     

    Although this contextualist explanation perhaps identifies historical conditions that necessarily had to be in place for the Saussurean revolution to have taken hold, it does not suffice to account for how Saussure’s ideas (and not those of others similarly positioned in history) have functioned as a magnet for (re)interpretations anchored in such a wide range of disciplinary fields. It is just possible that the rare, synergistic interplay of Saussure’s “scientific” and “discursive” foundings were required to generate the extraordinary level of interpretive activity directly and indirectly associated with the Course. More than this, Saussure’s dual status as a scientific and a transdiscursive author have arguably led to a rethinking of the very concept of interpretation–a rethinking that should be a major focus of any study of Saussure and his interpreters. If claims about the ideas of one and the same author must be judged in accordance with different interpretive protocols, depending on the context in which the claims were formulated, then validity in interpretation becomes a matter locally determined within particular domains. To put the same point another way, in the still-unfolding Saussurean revolution, the necessity to interpret becomes the constant, whereas the grounds for interpretation vary.

     

    Notes

     

    1. Harris himself edited for publication the notebooks of one of the students who attended Saussure’s Third Course (see de Saussure, Saussure’s).

     

    2. In particular, Harris is a proponent of “integrational linguistics,” an approach to language-in-context that seeks to overcome the limitations of both structuralist and generativist models. See Harris, Introduction, Harris and Wolf, and also Toolan.

     

    3. Jonathan Culler’s Ferdinand de Saussure provides an excellent introductory overview of Saussure’s main ideas, a familiarity with which Harris’s study presupposes.

     

    4. Harris is careful to distinguish the term Saussurean idea from the term idea attributable to Saussure, construing the latter term as narrower in meaning than the former. I do not make this distinction here, particularly since, as Harris himself shows so effectively, it is not altogether clear which ideas are attributable to Saussure and which ideas are the product of interpretations by the students and editors. Harris’s third chapter portrays this interpretive filtering of Saussurean doctrine as ineliminable, i.e., built into the very process by which readers try to make sense of Saussure’s Course. Hence, by Harris’s own account, the distinction in question, although valid in principle, is one that proves difficult to maintain in practice.

     

    5. Harris’s remarks concerning a passage about Saussure in Fredric Jameson’s The Prison-House of Language are not unrepresentative of the tone adopted by the author in some of his more biting critiques: “This gives the impression of having been written by someone who had many years ago attended an undergraduate course in linguistics, but sat in the back row and whiled away most of the time doing crossword puzzles instead of taking notes” (10-11).

     

    6. For accounts of the porousness (i.e., historical variability) of the boundaries of linguistic inquiry vis-à-vis other fields of study, see Herman, “Sciences” and Universal.

     

    7. As Harris points out (3), even apart from his ideas about language, the name Saussure denotes three different entities, sometimes conflated by scholars and critics: “the putative author of the [Course], even though [a]ttributing a certain view to the Saussure of the [Course] is in effect little more than saying that this view appears in, or can be inferred from, the text… as posthumously produced by the editors… (2) the lecturer who actually gave the courses of lectures at [the University of] Geneva on which the [Course] was based… (3) the putative theorist behind the… lectures [themselves]… trying out [his] ideas [in] a form that would be accessible and useful to his students” (3). As his study unfolds, however, many other Saussures come to populate Harris’s universe of discourse: Oswald Ducrot’s Saussure (2, 5-7), René Wellek’s and Robert Penn Warren’s Saussure (8-9), F. W. Bateson’s Saussure (9-10), Antoine Meillet’s Saussure (54-58), Bloomfield’s Saussure, Barthes’s Saussure, etc.

     

    8. Interestingly, as Harris points out (90), it was Hjelmslev who coined the term paradigmatic relations as a substitute for Saussure’s “rapports associatifs.” Part of his attempt at an overall formalization of Saussure’s ideas, Hjelmslev’s coinage was designed to replace a focus on mental associations with a focus on definable linguistic units and their relations. Later, in his famous essay on “Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances,” Jakobson used Hjelmslev’s terminology, mistaking it for Saussure’s (95).

     

    9. Internal evidence (cf. 106-7, 169-70) suggests that Harris objects to the early version of Chomsky’s transformational generative paradigm mainly because of its postulate that language can be treated, for descriptive and explanatory purposes, as a univocal code shared by an idealized speaker and hearer, viewed in abstraction from their status as social beings deploying a socially constituted and enacted language system. If this conjecture is warranted, then in turn an implicit criterion or ground for judging interpretations of Saussure seems to emerge from Harris’s account: given two or more candidate interpretations of Saussure’s approach, then ceteris paribus the interpretation that most closely adheres to Saussure’s insight that “la langue” is a social fact will be the best, most appropriate, or most correct of those interpretations. My point is that, because his book centers on the practice of intra- as well as inter-disciplinary interpretation, Harris is obliged to engage in argumentation along these lines–i.e., to make explicit the protocols for his own interpretive practice.

     

    10. The “justification of the method” offered in the final chapter does not in fact articulate Harris’s criteria for successful interpretation of Saussure’s ideas, but rather explains why the author draws together in one book a set of interpretations that he deems erroneous: “questionable or flawed interpretations, precisely because they are questionable or flawed, can be important as historical evidence. Particularly if, as in the cases that have been considered here, what emerges from studying and comparing them is that they were not the products of random error or personal idiosyncrasy, but are related in a coherent pattern” (190-91).

    Works Cited

     

    • Culler, Jonathan. Ferdinand de Saussure. Revised edition. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1986.
    • de Saussure, Ferdinand. Course in General Linguistics. Ed. Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, in collaboration with Albert Riedlinger. Trans. Wade Baskin. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959.
    • —. Course in General Linguistics. Ed. Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, in collaboration with Albert Riedlinger. Translated and annotated by Roy Harris. London: Duckworth, 1983.
    • —. Saussure’s Third Course of Lectures on General Linguistics (1910-1911), from the Notebooks of Emile Constantin / Troisième cours de linguistique générale (1910-1911) d’après les cahiers d’Émile Constantin. Ed. and trans. Eisuke Komatsu and Roy Harris. Oxford: Pergamon, 1993.
    • Fish, Stanley. Is There a Text in This Class?: The Authority of Interpretive Communities. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1980.
    • Foucault, Michel. “What Is an Author?” The Foucault Reader. Ed. Paul Rabinow. Trans. Josué V. Harari. New York: Pantheon, 1984. 101-20.
    • Godel, Robert. Les Sources manuscrites du Cours de linguistique générale de F. de Saussure. Geneva and Paris: Droz, 1957.
    • Harris, Roy. Introduction to Integrational Linguistics. Oxford: Pergamon, 1998.
    • —. Language, Saussure, and Wittgenstein: How to Play Games with Words. London: Routledge, 1990.
    • —. Reading Saussure. London: Duckworth, 1987.
    • Harris, Roy, and George Wolf, eds. Integrational Linguistics: A First Reader. Oxford: Pergamon, 1998.
    • Herman, David. “Sciences of the Text.” Postmodern Culture 11.3 (May 2001) <http://www.iath.virginia.edu/pmc/text-only/issue.501/11.3herman.txt>.
    • —. Universal Grammar and Narrative Form. Durham: Duke UP, 1995.
    • Jakobson, Roman. “Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances.” Fundamentals of Language. Ed. Roman Jakobson and Morris Halle. The Hague: Mouton, 1956. 52-82.
    • Jameson, Fredric. The Prison-House of Language: A Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian Formalism. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1972.
    • Lévi-Strauss, Claude. “Histoire et ethnologie.” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 54 (1949): 363-91.
    • —. “The Structural Study of Myth.” Critical Theory Since 1968. Ed. Hazard Adams and Leroy Searle. Tallahassee: UP of Florida. 809-22.
    • Pavel, Thomas G. The Feud of Language: The History of Structuralist Thought. Trans. Linda Jordan and Thomas G. Pavel. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989.
    • Toolan, Michael. Total Speech: An Integrational Linguistics Approach to Language. Durham: Duke UP, 1996

     

  • Documentary Prison Films and the Production of Disciplinary Institutional “Truth”

     

    Janet Holtman

    Department of English
    Pennsylvania State University
    jmh403@psu.edu

     

    Power "produces reality" before it represses. Equally it produces truth before it ideologizes, abstracts or masks.

    –Gilles Deleuze, Foucault

     

    In The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act, Fredric Jameson distinguishes between a “properly Marxian notion of an all-embracing and all-structuring mode of production…and non-Marxist visions of a ‘total system’ in which the various elements or levels of social life are programmed in some increasingly constricting way” (90), thus setting his own totalizing theory apart from the “monolithic models” of the social body which, he claims, do not allow for an effective “oppositional or even merely ‘critical practice’ and resistance” but rather “reintegrate” such resistances “back into the system as the latter’s mere inversion” (91). One of the primary targets of this apparent criticism is, of course, the theory of Michel Foucault, whose “image” of the social “gridwork,” according to Jameson, provides for an “ever more pervasive ‘political technology of the body’” (90). 1 Of course, one of Jameson’s goals is to show how such theories may be subsumed under the umbrella of his own Marxist discourse in order to reopen pathways for such “resistance;” thus Jameson points out Foucault’s totalization but then is able to include his theory in an overall plan that manages to account for such “disturbing synchronic frameworks” (91). That Jameson’s theories and perspective have been enormously influential hardly needs to be (re)stated, but I would like to point out the fact that Jameson’s reading of Foucault has perhaps colored the reception, perception and manipulation of Foucault’s theories, particularly in terms of how the technologies of Discipline, often figured by the panopticon, have become a sort of metaphor of the “total system” that seems to shut down a useful deployment of Foucault’s theories of social force while enabling their subsumption within discussions that deploy very different theories.

     

    My interest in bringing up this influence, and in touching upon some current appropriations of Foucauldian theory tinged by it, is to provide a foundation from which to offer an alternative conceptualization through an extended example of the application of Foucauldian theory to a type of discourse, one that might be expected to be particularly rife with possibilities for such an analysis: the documentary prison film. While it is, of course, not possible or useful to trace out completely the Jamesonian influence on contemporary cultural studies, one may at least note certain uses of Foucauldian theory that bear a strong resemblance to Jameson’s incorporation of Foucault, or at least seem to owe a debt to Jameson’s conceptualization of disciplinary power as a progression of ever more oppressive technologies of the body that call for a Marxist dialectical framework to free it from a sort of political “grid”lock. Mark Poster’s Foucault, Marxism and History immediately comes to mind as employing a similar strategy if a somewhat different reading of Foucault. 2 And in film criticism, one sees occasional conscriptions of Foucault into the theoretical service of cultural studies analyses that are to a greater or lesser degree inharmonious with his poststructuralism due to their primary grounding in Marxist discourses. This is perhaps done best by such able critics as Toby Miller, whose discussion of Frederick Wiseman’s Titicut Follies in Technologies of Truth, while informed by a notion of Foucauldian discipline, nonetheless seems to rely upon fairly traditional cultural studies strategies of interpretation and ideology critique. It is done worst by those critics whose references to, for instance, the panopticon as a central figure for all of Foucault’s theories are fatuous at best.

     

    But regardless of their level of rigor, the few film studies that do take up Foucauldian theory seem to make use of it primarily in terms of thematic operations, a use that subsumes the Foucauldian question “what does it do?” into the ideology critique question “what does it mean?” In his essay “Disciplinary Identities; or, Why Is Walter Neff Telling This Story,” David Shumway, for instance, employs a Foucauldian notion of disciplinarity in order to read Double Indemnity as a text exemplifying the manner in which discipline shapes subjectivities, particularly the subjectivities of those positioned within an institutional apparatus, such as academics. Shumway’s discussion, relying as it does upon the idea of hegemony and the “internalization” of discipline by the subject, is firmly rooted in the assumptions as well as the methods of ideology critique. But I do not set out here to advocate a sort of postmodernist purism nor to offer a corrective to the strategies of past and recent contemporary film criticism; rather, I merely offer another way to think Foucault with filmic discourse, one that may answer the familiar (and still pervasive) Jamesonian criticism of the “total system” while offering an alternative use for Foucauldian theory in discussions of filmic discourses that still, in spite of some worthwhile postmodern counterdiscourses, tend to be dominated by treatments based on notions of ideology and representation.

     

    Before proceeding, however, it seems necessary to clarify the theoretical platform from which this discussion will proceed and which parts of Foucault’s discussion of discipline as a complex and fluid set of forces provide the most relevant grounding. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault provides a detailed definition of “discipline” as it arose in the nineteenth (and early twentieth) century: It is “a modality for [power’s] exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a ‘physics’ or an ‘anatomy’ of power, a technology” (215). It is important to note that discipline cannot be reduced to any one of its techniques or instruments, but rather describes any number of social forces, including various techniques for gathering and producing knowledge. Foucault’s later description of the disciplinary society helps to make this clear, in addition to stating his revolutionary theory about the productive nature of power:

     

    "the circuits of communication are the supports of an accumulation and a centralization of knowledge; the play of signs defines the anchorages of power; it is not that the beautiful totality of the individual is amputated, repressed, altered by our social order, it is rather that the individual is carefully fabricated in it, according to a whole technique of forces and bodies." (217)

     

    Discourse and forms of knowledge, then, according to Foucault, do not form anything like a repressive ideological structure, as some Marxist cultural studies critics have understood and suggested–in spite of the forbidding words “discipline” and “power” that Foucault uses to describe the ways in which social force shapes institutions and individuals. Rather, knowledge and the play of signs are involved in productive processes within society; they are involved in the formation of subjects. In a later chapter, Foucault makes clear that the production of subject positions, such as “the delinquent” (the criminal defined not by his actions but by his life history and position within the socius), came about through the flow of various forces of power within the social body. Popular discourses comprised a portion of these forces, of course, from the newspapers that reinforced the partitioning of society by juridical power to the crime novels and other media that served to place, define, and popularize “the delinquent” as a special form of identity (286). Foucault does not spend much time discussing the role of such popular discourses, choosing, rather, to make them secondary to his discussion of prominent humanist social scientific discourses such as psychoanalysis and criminology. But he does make clear that popular discourses also enact social force and that they derive much of their content and direction from dominant modes of humanist thought.

     

    Of course, if the late twentieth and early twenty-first century social organization is a refinement or intensification3 of Foucault’s disciplinary society, a social body that produces and controls subjects according to the dispersion and interaction of a myriad of forces, then popular discourses such as film and television documentaries necessarily continue to take part in the production of subject positions within the social body. This is the case in spite of the fact that the forms of the popular media today differ from those of the nineteenth century, not only in that they are more numerous and specialized but also in that they are dispersed throughout a higher percentage of society and occupy a place of greater importance socially. Even so, Foucault’s brief, localized discussion of the newspapers and crime novels of the nineteenth-century can still offer us some possible directions for speculation about how power works through certain modern media productions today. For if the nineteenth century newspapers engaged with and distributed questions and responses to criminality that derived from, and, in turn, took part in humanist discourse, how much more effective might modern media productions be at the dissemination of similar kinds of force?

     

    As mentioned above, and for perhaps obvious reasons, the documentary prison film is a type of discourse that seems to offer particularly interesting possibilities for analysis in terms of Foucault’s theories. It is perhaps here that one might look to find a discursive formation whose effects are clearly recognizable on Foucauldian terms; an analysis of this particular cultural production as a type of truth-production may evidence the ways in which filmic discourses perpetuate humanist values such as the movement toward prison reform, the continuation of the social construction of subjectivities such as “the delinquent,” and the normalization and implementation of some of the social scientific technologies of discipline that Foucault describes, such as the examination and the case study. A key question here, in other words, is “what do documentary prison films do?”

     

    We can begin to answer this question by recognizing, first of all, that cinematic presentations of prison life coincide with, perpetuate and intensify the types of discourses that, according to Foucault, have proliferated since imprisonment became the primary form of punishment for crime: “Prison ‘reform’ is virtually contemporary with the prison itself…. In becoming a legal punishment, [imprisonment] weighted the old juridico-political question of the right to punish with all the problems, all the agitations that have surrounded the corrective technologies of the individual” (Discipline 234-235). Discourses and political movements that sought to reform prisons and the subjects they housed did not arise, then, from a recognition of the failure of the prison, or from an impetus to move, eventually, beyond imprisonment to a better means of punishing crime; rather, they arose as an integral part of the institution itself (234). According to Foucault, such humanist discourses go hand-in-hand with the disciplinary institutional apparatus; disciplinary power seeks to improve itself by becoming both more efficient and more humane. Therefore, it is not surprising that prison environments are usually presented in filmic discourses as throwbacks to earlier forms of power, to the inefficient forms that acted directly on bodies and did not know how to create subjects who discipline and monitor themselves: such presentations serve the humanist reformatory project which is integral to disciplinary power.

     

    But in what ways do such narratives support disciplinary power, and how do they contribute to the social perception of institutions and the construction of subjects? One way that they accomplish these effects is by reproducing and distributing, in a mass register, the “official” discourses that have become imbedded within the social grid. Social scientific discourses like psychoanalysis, sociology, and criminology, as well as various systems of humanist ethics, are all interwoven and reproduced in the prison narrative. Consequently, these films may be read on several different “levels,” and with varying interpretations, by cultural critics who may see them as either perpetuating ideology or as calling for subversion, while still enacting much the same social force throughout society through their connection with these “higher” discourses. Just as the newspapers and crime novels of nineteenth-century France circulated various definitions of the delinquent but nevertheless assumed (and furthered the notion) that there was such a subject who needed to be defined, so do documentary prison films, which are shaped by and redistribute various definitions and conceptions of “the criminal,” “the prisoner,” and “the disciplinary institution.”

     

    At this point, though, it becomes necessary to provide a basis for clarifying the ways in which documentary prison films produce sets of intensities at a different pitch from those of more mainstream Hollywood productions. The production of truth by documentary films should not be set up in opposition, then, to the truth-production of mainstream Hollywood films. They both, in fact, rely upon similar strategies. A Deleuzian notion of intensities, then, as in “there are no negative or opposite intensities” (A Thousand Plateaus 153), is a more productive concept here because it will allow for a more thorough understanding of the fashioning of truth by each without relying upon a false binary. It also allows for a good deal more precision in accounting for the various processes involved, especially as it allows us to build upon the understanding of the operations of cinematic discourse established by postmodernist thinkers like Steven Shaviro, whose use of certain Deleuzian concepts in discussing the simultaneously bodily and textual stresses of cinema can offer an important bridge from film to Foucault.

     

    But in order to understand better the distinction between mainstream films and documentaries, one must first understand the documentary form, its discursive mode, its reliance upon social scientific discourse, and its reception by audiences. Documentaries are historical records, and as such, they attempt to produce certain types of knowledge. In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault distinguishes between “history, in its traditional form” which “undertook to ‘memorize’ the monuments of the past, transform them into documents, and lend speech to those traces which, in themselves, are often not verbal” and archaeology, which is “a discipline devoted to silent monuments, inert traces, objects without context, and things left by the past” (7). “In our time,” Foucault says, “history aspires to the condition of archaeology, to the intrinsic description of the monument” (7). This distinction is important in terms of the effects produced by each version of historical inquiry. Traditional history produces meanings, is interested in interminable commentary, transforming the monumental into that which can be interpreted, especially in terms of some larger worldview. Mainstream prison films utilize much the same type of significatory narrative force, situating the subject within a larger framework of humanist meaning. But archaeological history produces discontinuous, dispersed studies, serial and specific, incompatible with a transcendent signification. And documentary films aspire to this second type of history; they attempt to be asignificatory recording projects: “Whatever else viewers expect from a documentary, they consider that one of its most important tasks is to tell us something about the workings of the socio-historical world–the sights, sounds and events in the external world before they are transposed into a representational form” (Kilborn and Izod 4).

     

    In drawing this crucial distinction, however, it is important to note that mainstream films do not operate in a merely textual manner. In The Cinematic Body, Steven Shaviro discusses the popular cinematic apparatus as a “technolog[y] of power” (21), in the Foucauldian sense, which acts directly on the body: “The flesh is intrinsic to the cinematic apparatus” (255). Audiences’ reactions to film, according to his theory, are largely visceral and involve a complex interaction of sensation and meaning. Shaviro does not deny that films are, to some degree, textual, but he insists that film viewing is not a strictly intellectual and symbolic process. 4 Cinematic images are, rather, “events” that involve a simultaneous effacement of the viewer’s own subjectivity as s/he is acted upon immediately and physically by the film and a possibility for “self-assertion and self-validation” that can be a form of resistance to the insubstantial flickerings of “meaning” presented on the screen (Shaviro 23-27). The bodily nature of film viewing is that which, for Shaviro, enables the hybrid process by which the truth of a film is produced through the interaction of film and viewer(s). These theories fly in the face of both film theory’s distinctly psychoanalytic roots (the “truth” of psychoanalytic discourses having been called into question by Foucault in the The History of Sexuality) and Neo-Marxist cultural studies’ insistence upon the ideological role of cinema.

     

    According to Shaviro’s theories, a film does not merely deposit ideology into the brains of passive individual viewers; rather, it negotiates “truth” with viewing subjects through their bodies. It presents, through emotion-laden images that act directly on these bodies, popular discourses that may resonate with their own subjectivity. We can fairly easily see such a process at work in a popular prison film such as The Shawshank Redemption, in which the incarcerated hero undergoes a physical and emotional trial by fire and finally effects his own inspirational escape from prison by literally carving out a space within its walls. Film critic Brian Webster summarizes a typical audience response to the film: “When the film’s conclusion starts to unfold, you suddenly realize that this is one of the more inspiring films you’ve seen in a long time–yet you don’t feel the least bit manipulated.” Of course, Shaviro posits a Foucauldian variety of resistance within such a process: “[The] body is a necessary condition and support of the cinematic process: it makes that process possible, but also continually interrupts it, unlacing its sutures and swallowing up its meanings” (257). This notion complicates and perhaps redefines the production of “truth” by cinema, but it does not eliminate or deny it. Certain reinforcements of social assumptions, definitions, and meanings, such as the necessity for prison reform and “the delinquent,” respectively, are still enacted by film texts, through the very pleasure of bodies that Shaviro discusses.

     

    Contrary to what one might think at first glance, however, documentary films rely on the body in ways somewhat similar to those of mainstream film, but they usually do so at a lower level of physical intensity (for instance, viewers are often warned in advance at the approach of a graphic scene, which serves to control their physical response by way of a mediating authority). Viewers’ expectations of the documentary involve, instead, a greater reliance upon the fact-value of the filmic text and the authenticity of its authority. In his essay on documentary and subjectivity, Michael Renov notes, “few have ever trusted the cinema without reservation. If ever they did, it was the documentary that most inspired that trust” (84). Renov locates the impetus for such public trust of the documentary in its involvement with, or derivation from, scientific discourse: “It is the domain of nonfiction that has most explicitly articulated this scientistic yearning; it is here also that the debates around evidence, objectivity, and knowledge have been centered. I would argue, then, that nonfiction film and the scientific project are historically linked” (85). Evidence of such a linkage between scientific discourse, especially social scientific discourse, and documentary film may be seen in some of the cinematic techniques of documentary filmmaking.

     

    One of the most frequently utilized is the “documentary interview,” which presents to the audience a focus on certain individual subjects not unlike that which we find in psychoanalytic case studies. In documentary prison films such as Liz Garbus’ The Farm: Angola USA, viewers hear several inmates relate their stories as well as their fears and hopes. Thus, the prison film interview resembles the psychiatric/criminologic interview, which is, as Foucault has shown, a form of the confession, which “governs the production” of true discourse, and the examination, which allows a body of individualizing knowledge: “The examination that places individuals in a field of surveillance also situates them in a network of writing; it engages them in a whole mass of documents that capture and fix them” (Discipline 189). The documentary interview, then, fulfills the audience’s expectation of a subject-centered presentation, but it also fulfills the expectation of a sort of social scientific authenticity by relying on the interview/examination so familiar and useful in social scientific discourse. Consistent with this observation is the fact that the documentary, unlike mainstream popular films, often allows the filmmaker’s voice to be heard off-camera asking questions. This goes far in establishing both a scientific authenticity and a sort of self-referential realism. Such documentary techniques call attention to the fact that the film is not a mere representation but a “real case,” and the camera is an acknowledged part of it. Of course, the ostensible purpose of such a case is to inform and to teach. And it is the didactic quality of documentary films, run by the engine of social scientific discourse, which causes their failure in terms of the work of archaeology–they end up working a lot like regular, entertainment-driven films, producing meaning in similar ways, reducing a monument to a document.

     

    It is perhaps not surprising, then, that conventional documentary films such as The Farm, while portraying some of the harsh realities of prison life are, nonetheless, welcomed by prison officials and social administrators: “The Farm has been roundly praised by both Louisiana prison officials–who want to use it for guard-training programs–and the governor’s office” (Lewis). Filmmakers like Liz Garbus, who may believe that their films are transgressive due to their sympathetic portrayal of rehabilitated-yet-still-imprisoned inmates, are puzzled by such reactions of acceptance by administrators: “‘Now that really surprised us; I won’t even try to explain it,’ says Garbus. ‘I suppose that everyone takes what they want into a film’” (Lewis). But it is not difficult to see how these significatory documentaries are easily compatible with, and appreciated by, a bureaucracy and a society5 that places value on the reform of delinquents and the accumulation of individualized knowledge about them, the same values and technologies of discipline that have, according to Foucault, been emphasized since the rise of the prison. Thus, by attempting to subvert the institution of the prison by enacting its own discourse of reform and employing the disciplinary tactics of information-production, Garbus’s film merely acts as another social scientific node by which the disciplinary power of the prison functions. Of course, here one might pause and ask a rather Jamesonian question: doesn’t this example demonstrate the manner in which Foucault’s theory constitutes a vision by which attempted resistance is “reintegrated” into a total system? On the contrary, this example simply demonstrates the manner in which Foucault can provide a cautionary strategy that enables a clearer perception of the way in which projects of humanist “resistance” such as Garbus’s documentary cannot act as levers against disciplinary power, situated as they are within it, and clearly cannot make progress in terms of the subversion of dominant discourses, reproducing as they do those very discourses.

     

    Documentary films, then, rely upon authentic technologies and discourses as well as upon bodies. The audience’s expectation is to be informed, taught, and possibly moved and motivated. Documentaries, usually through their production of images, impact bodies, and the audience is anticipating a process of truth-production, one that relies upon both the scientific objectivity of the documentary filmmaker as a sort of authentic popular social scientist and the documentary itself as a significatory text. Can such expectations, and the frustration of those very expectations, be a possible explanation for the extreme negative reaction by social scientists and officials to a film like Frederick Wiseman’s Titicut Follies? What is the relationship of Wiseman’s film to other films, both mainstream and documentary? How does his film produce not a document of disciplinary institutional truth but a monument that refuses not only such truths but also the processes by which they are produced?

     

    Titicut Follies

     

     

    The film product which Wiseman made [Titicut Follies]...constitutes a most flagrant abuse of the privilege he was given to make a film.... There is a new theme--crudities, nudities and obscenities.... It is a crass piece of commercialism--a contrived scenario--designed by its new title and by its content to titillate the general public and lure them to the box office.

     

    –from the ruling by Judge Harry Kalus in Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 1968 (Anderson and Benson 97)

     

    In their detailed narration of the events that arose around the filming and banning of Titicut Follies, Carolyn Anderson and Thomas Benson explain that Frederick Wiseman was given permission to shoot a film at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Bridgewater because the facility’s administrators assumed that his film would enact the usual sort of documentary social force:

     

    Superintendent Gaughan was particularly eager to educate the citizenry about the variety of services at Bridgewater and the difficulties the staff encountered in providing those services adequately. At that time, both Wiseman and Gaughan assumed that heightened public awareness would improve conditions; both subscribed to the Griersonian notion that a documentary film could be a direct agent of change. Both saw opportunities in the documentary tradition of social indignation. (Anderson and Benson 11)

     

    This notion that Wiseman’s film might contribute to reformation of the institution is further revealed by Wiseman’s testimony that the superintendent had claimed “that there was no film [he] could make…that could hurt Bridgewater” (qtd in Anderson and Benson 11). Obviously, the assumption that even a film that depicted the grim conditions at the Bridgewater facility could only be beneficial to the institution is deeply rooted in the humanist disciplinary discourses that assume the ultimately beneficent possibilities of the rehabilitative institution and the continual need to reform it. But something went wrong. Wiseman’s film failed to live up to the expectations of the social scientists, prison administrators, etc. who had hoped that the film would further the process of reform. Shortly after its limited release, they rushed to have it banned. Perhaps the reason for this turn of events is that, instead of taking part in familiar social scientific discourses, Wiseman’s film seemed to disrupt them. Instead of providing the hope for institutional reform so commensurate with a humanist progress narrative, Wiseman’s film seems to call the facility’s various forms of institutional discipline and rehabilitation, and even the “truths” upon which they are based (such as the possibility of, and need for, “rehabilitation” itself), into question.

     

    One of the first things that one notices upon viewing the film is the absence of narratorial voice, which some viewers find immediately disconcerting. French documentary filmmaker Jean Rouch has said: “I would like [Wiseman] to say something, say what his thesis is…. In Titicut Follies there isn’t any [commentary or ‘guiding hand’], it’s a certified report, which could perhaps be interpreted as a cynical and sadomasochistic report” (qtd in Anderson and Benson 39). Wiseman foregoes the usual directorial voice (removing from the film the disciplinary quality of a “certified report”) and the documentary interview, dismantling the documentary film’s role as a technology of individualizing knowledge, a social scientific documentation of, definition of, “the external frontier of the abnormal” (Discipline and Punish 183). Rather than utilizing such techniques as the interview/examination, Wiseman’s film simply presents them as the institution employs them. Hence, in one shot, we see a traditional Freudian psychiatrist grilling an inmate about his past sexual experiences, asking him how many times a day he masturbates and whether he has had any homosexual experiences, carefully noting the information. Later, we see confrontations between a patient and his doctors, as the patient doggedly and lucidly argues for his own sanity and for the fact that the facility is actually “harming” him. Wiseman captures the smug, clinical condescension of the doctors along with a sense of the absurdity of their attempts to “rehabilitate” the patient through the use of strict discipline, drugs, and psychoanalysis.

     

    Wiseman also rejects any pretence to scientific objectivity, editing the film in such a way that the prison’s disturbingly comic musical “follies” frame the film, creating a sense of parodic disjunction with the film’s primary content. Regarding the role of the documentary as a scientifically impartial text, Wiseman says:

     

    Any documentary, mine or anyone else's, made in no matter what style, is arbitrary, biased, prejudiced, compressed and subjective. Like any of its sisterly or brotherly fictional forms it is born in choice--choice of subject matter, place, people, camera angles, duration of shooting, sequences to be shot or omitted, transitional material and cutaways. (qtd in Miller 225)

     

    Wiseman doesn’t even refer to his films as documentaries, preferring, instead, to call them “reality fictions,” apparently as a sort of “parody” of the documentary form (Anderson and Benson 2). Instead of reinforcing documentary’s aspirations to social science by categorizing and recording individuals, Wiseman’s film creates disjunctions by utilizing some of the conventions associated with the most mainstream cinema. For instance, he uses cutaways for ironic effect and portrays bodies in such a way as to create intense discomfort for the viewer, as when the film cuts away from the view of Mr. Malinowski being force-fed to Mr. Malinowski’s corpse being shaved and groomed for burial. The body in its relationship to the restraining, training, and marking by institutional power is one of the primary foci of the film; the nude, abject bodies of the prisoners provoke uncomfortable sensations in the audience in scene after scene.

     

    Such a use of bodies, those of the film’s subjects and those of the audience, recall Shaviro’s conceptualization of the production of cinematic truth as a negotiation between discourse and subjectivity through the mediation of the physical sensations brought about by images. Toby Miller quotes Christopher Ricks as saying that “‘Wiseman’s art constitutes an invasion of privacy,’ the privacy of the viewers, their right to be left undisturbed” (222). Of course, Miller is primarily interested in a more traditional critique of the film that involves the ways in which Wiseman’s art re-positions or challenges the gaze of the spectator (227). He says, “Titicut Follies provokes an uncomfortable gaze at the self by the spectator” (227). But such a view sets up a relationship between audience and film that relies upon notions of the subject and social awareness that do not seem particularly useful in an analysis of this film. Titicut Follies does not so much provoke social awareness as it disrupts it as a concept. Shaviro’s theories may prove a more effective tool for analyzing Wiseman’s film and the reactions to it. It may be the bodily element of Wiseman’s filmmaking, for instance, that provoked the somewhat bewildering criticism by Judge Kalus during Commonwealth v. Wiseman that the film was titillating and obscene, “excessively preoccupied with nudity” and “a crass piece of commercialism” (Anderson and Benson 97).

     

    That Titicut Follies could in any way appeal to the prurient interests of its audience is, of course, the height of absurdity, but Judge Kalus’ comments are, perhaps, revelatory of his perception that the film does utilize some of the physically oriented techniques and stresses of mainstream cinema, but without the reassuring signification which normally accompanies them. Kalus’ outrage, then, and the outrage of the social scientists, administrators, and guards who opposed the film’s release was largely a response to the fact that the film did not enact the type of social force that it was supposed to do. Instead, it combined “authentic” documentary with the audience-based methods of truth-production of mainstream cinema, subjective presentation, and physical provocation. In other words, by rearranging the intensities of mainstream cinema and documentary and by reneging on its “promise” of social scientific objectivity, Titicut Follies actually accomplished the (usually unaccomplished) work of the documentary film project by creating an asignificatory monument.

     

    What is perhaps most interesting about the response that Titicut Follies provoked is the fact that juridical power was actually called in by the purveyors of social scientific discourse to prohibit the distribution of this monument, except (after a number of legal appeals) to those who possessed the proper training and subjectivity to view the film: “Titicut Follies could be shown in Massachusetts to qualified therapists. Screenings had to be accompanied by a statement that Bridgewater had been reformed” (Miller 224). That the screenings were accompanied by the statement of reform demonstrates clearly the manner in which the film was re-situated as a significatory social scientific project. Judicial authority specified the audience (one that had been extensively trained to perceive the film in the proper manner) and thus redefined the discursive mode of the film. If it could not change who was speaking, or perhaps, the fact that no one was speaking, it could use the audience as a substitute speaker, bringing the film in line with the sort of authoritative enunciative modality that Foucault discusses in the Archaeology of Knowledge:

     

    Who is speaking? Who, among the totality of speaking individuals, is accorded the right to use this sort of language (langage)? Who is qualified to do so? Who derives from it his own special quality, his prestige, and from whom, in return, does he receive if not the assurance, at least the presumption that what he says is true? What is the status of the individuals who - alone - have the right, sanctioned by law or tradition, juridically defined or spontaneously accepted, to proffer such a discourse? (50)

     

    In other words, and put simply, it was an attempt to turn the “monumentary” Titicut Follies into a document, one that was to be written and read by authorized viewers. 6 Interestingly, many scholars and critics continue to refer to the film as “subversive” (Anderson and Benson 38), in much the way that Garbus’s The Farm: Angola USA is “subversive,” in a similar mode of documentary critique, one that makes claims for the film’s significatory value. These attempts to interpret the film as a project of social critique are perhaps not surprising given the sort of juridical response that the film provoked. But it is interesting that critical responses to Titicut Follies seem to have focused on precisely what is not most relevant to an understanding of what the film does. And it is doubtless worthwhile to note that the initial audience response, which might be described as a somewhat halting inability to speak in the face of the monument, or at least as a bewildered struggle to find a relevant point of signification from which to begin an interpretation, eventually transmuted (in the hands of institutionally sanctioned cultural critics) into later broad claims for the film’s subversive meaning.

     

    Of course, it is clear from Foucault’s work that it is never a question of subverting ideology but merely a question of producing a counterdiscourse to a discourse, a force to oppose another force. This is something that Wiseman’s film certainly does by “investigat[ing] how discourses and institutions produce and oversee identity” as Toby Miller claims (225). On the Museum of Television and Radio’s Documentary Films of Frederick Wiseman A to Z videotape (1993), Wiseman remarks that “the real subject of documentary filmmaking is normalcy,” a comment followed by the force-feeding sequence [in Titicut Follies] (Miller 225). This notion is more than a little reminiscent of Foucault’s assertion that “to find out what our society means by sanity, perhaps we should investigate what is happening in the field of insanity. And what we mean by legality in the field of illegality” (“Afterword” 211). But if Wiseman’s film produces a monument that differs substantially from the documents produced by mainstream feature films and social documentaries, it is not because he produces a different version of “truth,” but because he, like Foucault, “strips society to the relationships of forces” (Wexler qtd. in Miller 225).

     

    For Foucault, the production of “truth” involves the various mechanisms by which discourses define and organize our social world; some discourses become dominant or accepted versions of reality and others become marginalized, according to the interactions of power. In both Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality, Foucault enumerates the ways in which humanistic, social scientific discourses are imbricated within the web of power relations, the social grid. Psychoanalysis and criminology constitute forms of social scientific discursive “truth” that are still dispersed in various forms throughout the social body. Today, the mass media, including the film industry, are perhaps the most extensive set of apparatuses for the distribution of definitions and concepts perpetuated by social science. And one of the most “authentic” discursive forms within this industry is the documentary film. But as a film like Titicut Follies demonstrates, documentary film is also one of a number of points of resistance within power which “play the role of adversary, target, support, or handle in power relations” (Sexuality 95). Documentary films such as Wiseman’s darkly absurd “reality fiction” may not be subversive or transgressive in a Marxist sense, but they may number among the many “odd term[s] in relations of power…inscribed in the latter as an irreducible opposite” (Sexuality 96).

     

    Notes

     

    I would like to thank Jeffrey T. Nealon for his encouragement and insightful commentary during the revision of this essay.

     

    1. Jameson also points out Foucault’s “totalizing dynamic” in Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (5). It should probably be noted here once again, though it has doubtless been noted before, that Jameson’s reading of Foucault’s discussion of disciplinary power’s various technologies in Discipline and Punish does not attempt to account for the localized specificity of the techniques of power in question, tending, instead, to use the umbrella term “technologies of the body” to stand in for a number of forces and specific developments in the rise of disciplinary power.

     

    2. In what I would call a more careful and rigorous reading, Poster reads Foucault’s “technologies” as “technologies of power” which, he says, “suggests that discourses and practices are intertwined in articulated formations,” an observation that he follows up with the somewhat baffling claim that this notion is “not fully conceptualized in the works of Foucault” (52).

     

    3. See Deleuze, “Postscript.”

     

    4. Shaviro uses Deleuze’s conception of the “double articulation” to clarify this apparent duality between the bodily and the intellectual. For Deleuze, the double articulation operates as a double doubling that involves “intermediate states between” through which “exchanges” pass (A Thousand Plateaus 44).

     

    5.The Farm: Angola USA won a National Society of Film Critics Award and was nominated for an Oscar for Feature Documentary in 1999.

     

    6. In recent years, of course, much of Wiseman’s work, including Titicut Follies, may be viewed in limited exhibition at major art galleries or museums in urban centers such as Boston or Washington, D.C. Always difficult to situate as a social scientific text, the film now seems to have been placed with a view toward establishing artistic and “high cultural” merit, a suitably amorphous signification, and one that is likely to be accepted by the audiences high in cultural capital and educational training who would constitute the primary audience for a documentary in such a venue. For more on educational level, cultural capital and film viewing, particularly in urban areas, see Bourdieu’s Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. Of particular relevance here is Bourdieu’s assertion that “any legitimate work tends in fact to impose the norms of its own perception and tacitly defines as the only legitimate mode of perception the one which brings into play a certain disposition and a certain competence” (28).

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Anderson, Carolyn, and Thomas W. Benson. Documentary Dilemmas: Frederick Wiseman’s Titicut Follies. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1991.
    • Bourdieu, Pierre. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. Trans. Richard Nice. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1984.
    • Deleuze, Gilles. Foucault. Trans. Sean Hand. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1986.
    • —. “Postscript on Control Societies.” Negotiations. New York: Columbia UP, 1995. 177-82.
    • Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1987.
    • The Farm: Angola USA. Dir. Liz Garbus and Jonathan Stack. Co-dir. Wilbert Rideau. Narr. Bernard Addison. Firecracker Films; Gabriel Films, 1998.
    • Foucault, Michel. “Afterword: The Subject and Power.” Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. Ed. Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow. 2nd ed. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1983. 208-226.
    • —. The Archaeology of Knowledge. 1969. Trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith. New York: Pantheon, 1972.
    • —. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. 1977. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage, 1995.
    • —. The History of Sexuality: Volume I, An Introduction. 1978. Trans. Robert Hurley. NewYork: Vintage, 1990.
    • Jameson, Fredric. The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1981.
    • —. Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1991.
    • Kilborn, Richard, and John Izod. An Introduction to Television Documentary: Confronting Reality. Manchester: Manchester UP, 1997.
    • Lewis, Anne S. “The Farm.” The Austin Chronicle 9 Nov. 1998. 23 Apr. 2000. Online. <http://desert.net/filmvault/austin/f/farmthe1.html>.
    • Miller, Toby. Technologies of Truth: Cultural Citizenship and the Popular Media. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1998.
    • Poster, Mark. Foucault, Marxism & History: Mode of Production versus Mode of Information. Cambridge: Polity, 1984.
    • Renov, Michael. “New Subjectivities: Documentary and Self-Representation.” Feminism and Documentary. Ed. Diane Waldman and Janet Walker. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1999. 84-94.
    • Shumway, David. “Disciplinary Identities; or, Why Is Walter Neff Telling This Story?” symploke 7.1-2 (1999): 97-107.
    • Shaviro, Steven. The Cinematic Body: Theory Out of Bounds, Vol. II. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1993.
    • Titicut Follies. Dir. and prod. Frederick Wiseman. Wiseman, 1967.
    • Webster, Brian. “Apollo Leisure Guide’s Review of The Shawshank Redemption.” 1998-2000. 23 Apr. 2000. Online. <http://apolloguide.com/mov_fullrev.asp?CID=1866>.

     

  • “You Have Unleashed a Horde of Barbarians!”: Fighting Indians, Playing Games, Forming Disciplines

    Christopher Douglas

    Department of English
    Furman University
    christopher.douglas@furman.edu

     

    We are about four or five years into the formation of a new discipline, digital game studies. Though by one account computer games have been around for more than four decades (Aarseth), and by another computer and video game sales in the United States are rivaling movie box office sales (Frauenfelder), academic attention to the medium has come relatively recently. At this early stage, digital game studies is necessarily and self-consciously concerned with its own formation, and is heavily engaged with an argument about whether this new phenomenon is to be swallowed by already existing disciplines, or whether it needs to and could develop into a discipline of its own, with a coherent object of study and institutional support. 2001 was an interesting year in this regard. Espen Aarseth, whose Cybertext: Perspectives on Ergodic Literature aims to unseat “hypertext” as the paradigm for studying electronic literature, editorializes in the inaugural issue of the new online journal Game Studies that “2001 can be seen as the Year One of Computer Game Studies as an emerging, viable, international, academic field.” As editor of Game Studies, Aarseth notes “the very early stage we are still in, where the struggle of controlling and shaping the theoretical paradigms has just started.” His editorial both invites and warns, however, as he cautions against the “colonizing attempts” of other disciplines: “Making room for a new field usually means reducing the resources of the existing ones, and the existing fields will also often respond by trying to contain the new area as a subfield. Games are not a kind of cinema, or literature, but colonizing attempts from both these fields have already happened, and no doubt will happen again.” The problem, Aarseth argues, is the kind of methodological blindnesses that would be imported into digital game studies along with other baggage. While “we all enter this field from somewhere else, from anthropology, sociology, narratology, semiotics, film studies, etc., and the political and ideological baggage we bring from our old field inevitably determines and motivates our approaches,” Aarseth envisions “an independent academic structure” (of which Game Studieswould surely stand as one institution) as the only viable way for digital game studies to avoid obscuring its object through inappropriate lenses borrowed from other fields.

     

    Also in 2001, the October issue of PMLA contained an article on the “new media” by influential cinema studies critic D. N. Rodowick. Rodowick argues that, for reasons of an “aesthetic inferiority complex” and a sustained debate about both the medium-object and a “concept or technique” that might ground film studies, this discipline “has never congealed into a discipline in the same way as English literature or art history” (1400). While the “great paradox of cinema, with respect to the conceptual categories of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century aesthetics, is that it is both a temporal and a spatial medium” (1401), Rodowick argues that “the new digital culture” is not emerging in the same “theoretical vacuum” that film did; rather, that good digital culture studies, including the study of games, already

     

    recirculates and renovates key concepts and problems of film theory: how movement and temporality affect emerging forms of image; the shifting status of photographic realism as a cultural construct; how questions of signification are transformed by the narrative organization of time-based spatial media; and the relation of technology to art, not only in the production and dissemination of images but also in the technological delimitation and organization of the spatiality and temporality of spectatorial experience and desire. (1403)

     

    While seeing film studies as having grappled for a half-century with spatial-temporal images, thus providing us with the beginnings of a vocabulary with which to approach digital gaming, Rodowick nonetheless notes gaming’s different status, saying that “interactive media promote a form of participatory spectatorship relatively unknown in other time-based spatial media” (1402).1

     

    One can see the gap here between Rodowick’s optimism at the prospect of refitting existing conceptual categories for the study of new digital media, including computer and video (console) games, and Aarseth’s pessimistic assessment of how such moves amount to a sort of hostile takeover of what might have been a theoretically and institutionally independent new field. These positions seem to me to characterize the current state of digital game studies. (And we might, following both Rodowick’s and Aarseth’s attention to institutions and power, wonder if it’s not coincidental that the optimistic position is articulated by an influential–perhaps even powerful–chair of film studies at King’s College, London in a prestigious print journal–itself a disciplinary emblem 116 years old–while that of the pessimists is articulated by the author of the iconoclastic Cybertext in an online journal in its infancy.) While it is likely that much of the actual work getting done in digital game studies falls somewhere between Rodowick’s ideal of adaptability and Aarseth’s nightmare of ignorant misapplication, I hope in this paper to show what a broadly conceived literary studies might offer the new digital game studies, and so highlight both Aarseth’s warning and Rodowick’s invitation. Games are not, as Aarseth says, literature, but they can sometimes be productively approached with conceptual categories borrowed from literary studies. Indeed, it may be that what we find most useful in approaching this new cultural phenomenon is the disciplinary baggage accumulated along the way.

     

    Aarseth’s concerns are articulated a little more fully in the same inaugural issue of Game Studies in an article by the journal’s co-editor Markku Eskelinen.2 In “The Gaming Situation,” Eskelinen, using Aarseth’s image of colonization, also mourns the way conceptual categories improperly imported from other fields are misused to study digital games: “if and when games and especially computer games are studied and theorized they are almost without exception colonised from the fields of literary, theatre, drama and film studies. Games are seen as interactive narratives, procedural stories or remediated cinema.” Eskelinen’s answer to the methodological problem that he and Aarseth delineate is to begin the “necessary formalistic phase that computer game studies have to enter” by developing a complex though introductory taxonomy of the different possible gaming situations. This taxonomy confronts “the bare essentials of the gaming situation: the manipulation or the configuration of temporal, spatial, causal and functional relations and properties in different registers.” In the preliminary taxonomy that follows, Eskelinen develops a system for understanding games as “configurative practices” rather than interpretive ones, and draws extensively on the narratology advanced by those such as Gerald Prince and Seymour Chatman. Insofar as it goes, and keeping in mind Eskelinen’s own admission that he is initiating a “necessar y formalistic phase” in order to name the parts of a new phenomenon, Eskelinen’s approach is a useful hermeneutic grid by which we can categorize and understand the real and potential forms that games take. Though one might not always agree with some of Eskelinen’s preliminary thoughts on the gaming experience–his taxonomy seems to overemphasize the movement from start to finish, ignoring the ludic pleasures of side-plots or repetitive play–this style of formal functionalism will help us get a grasp of the variety of digital gaming experience.

     

    That said, what becomes apparent in Eskelinen’s critique of other disciplines’ colonizing moves is the danger attending any transdisciplinary academic enterprise: the tendency to misconstrue what other disciplines do, or to regard them as monolithic, neglecting their many internal debates and divisions. For example, Eskelinen condemns literary studies for seeing games as “interactive” stories or for misapplying “outdated literary theory.” While both of these missteps are certainly possible, they don’t exhaust the possibilities for a literary studies approach to computer games (as even Eskelinen’s own use of narratology shows). I will use two examples here to illustrate my point. First, it is the lack of a story that provides a useful way into the player’s experience of first-person shooters such as Half-Life or countless others; Eskelinen’s useful narratological tools notwithstanding, it is the very repetition of the same sequence and the experience of storied intention that might be worth noting from a literary studies point of view. Second, with other games in the tradition of Sid Meier’s Civilization series, literary studies’ methodologies (as well as its baggage) can help us grasp the way games come into being as repetitions of traditional cultural-semiotic formations.

     

    In Joystick Nation, J. C. Herz makes a distinction between a game’s “two stories superimposed. One is the sequence of events that happened in the past, which you can’t change but is a very good story. The other is the sequence of events that happens in the present (e.g., you are wandering around trying to solve puzzles), which is a lousy story but is highly interactive” (150). But this split–a good background story that you can’t affect and a poor excuse for a plot that you perform as you interact in gaming space–is rarely true for first-person shooters. In typical shooters such as the Quake or Duke Nukem series, there is no interesting background story. Typically, aliens have invaded or monsters have sprung up and you need to shoot ’em. That’s it. Half-Life develops this theme a bit by having the player’s avatar be a dorky, spectacled, theoretical physicist who inadvertently aids the accidental opening of a dimensional rift that allows all kind of baddies through to our world, but even this is still a rather rudimentary and clichéd background story.

     

    On Herz’s other level, however, there’s even less “story,” and in this sense, shooter games make very poor interactive narratives. Things move, you shoot them. Try to find the right door and make the right jump. There are some more things–shoot them too. This episodic series of encounters does not make an interesting tale, and here one would have to agree with Eskelinen that interpreting computer games of this genre (at this stage of development) as “interactive fiction” would be woefully misguided and wouldn’t tell us a whole lot about the game or the experience of playing it. Or, rather, testing narrative against Half-Life reveals an interesting lack. Peter Brooks formulates his inquiry into plot as the “seeking in the unfolding of the narrative a line of intention and a portent of design that hold the promise of progress toward meaning” (xiii). What’s interesting in many games is the combination of, first, a plot rarely interesting enough to create in the player a narrative desire for meaning, and, second, a sense nonetheless of design in the world, design that promises absolute meaning. If Half-Life does not enplot me as the character-operator in an interesting way, it is nonetheless existentially soothing in that shooter games (and other genres) encode a kind of narrative of design that is created in part through repetition. That is, I can replay scenes endlessly for a better outcome. Most shooter and adventure games in particular contain several or even many such scenes that necessitate this, such as a particularly difficult jump or a sudden ambush–I must play it several times before I even know what tactic will get me out of a situation into which I am “thrown,” and then several more times before I get it right. This might sound like cheating, but it isn’t. This is the experience structured into the gaming process–the multiple tries at the same space-time moment. Like Superman after Lois Lane dies, we can in a sense turn back the clock and replay the challenge, to a better end.

     

    In view of this systemic repetition or déjà vu built into a game, one might remember Albert Camus’s attraction to the figure of Sisyphus, doomed in hell to eternally roll a heavy stone up a hill, despite knowing that it will tumble back down again. Sisyphus’s repetitive act has no resolution to it–he’s doing the same thing, but won’t be able to figure out a way to do it “properly” eventually, so that the rock will stay put at the top of the hill. In the game world, this would be known as a programming error–I can’t make the big stone stay at the top of the hill so I can get to the next level–and the software maker would promptly send out a patch to fix the bug. In other words, it’s a flaw in the game world’s design. But what attracted Camus to Sisyphus’s situation was its resonance with the essential structure of human experience–absurdity. “Sisyphus is the absurd hero” (89), Camus reports. What is absurd is that, against our desire for order and meaning in the universe, the universe meets us as blank, a fact that does not, however, destroy our desire. Camus defines the absurd human situation this way:

     

    I said that the world is absurd, but I was too hasty. This world in itself is not reasonable, that is all that can be said. But what is absurd is the confrontation of this irrational and the wild longing for clarity whose call echoes in the human heart. The absurd depends as much on man as on the world. (16)

     

    Our world is not reasonable, as Camus says, because it is without design–it carries no mark of having been made with us in mind. By itself, this designless, random, irrational world is not absurd. The absurd’s structure, Camus repeatedly notes, is always double and relational: the world is absurd only by virtue of being perceived by our minds, which desire order and design in it.

     

    In the face of this absurd realization, humans create constructs that help us escape it–which is where narrative comes in, not only in the narratological sense, but in the sense of creating plots, designs, intentions in our world. We look for something that might assure us of design and intention, which is what religion does, but it’s also what games do. Games therefore do not threaten film’s status so much as they threaten religion, because they perform the same existentially soothing task as religion. They proffer a world of meaning, in which we not only have a task to perform, but a world that is made with us in mind. And, indeed, the game world is made with us, or at least our avatar, in mind. As Lara Croft’s creator puts it, “The whole Tomb Raider world is utterly dependent on Lara’s size and animations. The distance she can jump, reach, run forward and fall are set variables. In this way, her world is designed for her to exist in” (qtd in Poole 212). This is true of the gaming world, not just in virtual-physical measurements but also in terms of the lack of autonomy of everything within the world. In the game world there is random chance in the form of computer-generated virtual dice-rolls, but no contingency: I might play a game for 80 hours and arrive at a place where a broken box hides a passage that has been prepared–just for me. Or I might find at the beginning of a game a key, and pocket it with the certainty that after tens of hours of play (sometimes years in game time) the key will be absolutely necessary to open a door I’ve just found. Of course, I might find and pocket a key in this bug-ridden piece of software we call “reality” as well, but it almost certainly will not end up opening a door for me. Such keys represent sheer potentiality. In my life, many millions of such potentialities are never realized–I’ll never know what door this key opens–whereas in the game, most of them are. They come to me by design, not by chance; they are oriented toward my success and enjoyment. Computer games, particularly those with worlds prepared for our exploration like shooters, adventure, and role-playing games, thus existentially soothe us amid the terror that we otherwise feel.3

     

    In these ways, literary studies’ experience with reading designed worlds (fiction) might help us understand how digital games situate their operators, and give us a view onto the pleasurable work that they do. To “read for the plot,” as Peter Brooks puts it, is thus not to see games as stories–even interactive ones that purportedly involve the “reader” more directly than traditional tales or films–but to see the player’s experience as one of unraveling the design inherent in the game world.4 This kind of investigation may, however, differ from what Eskelinen calls “traditional literary studies” which is “based on literary objects that are static, intransient, determinate, impersonal, random access, solely interpretive and without links” (“Cybertext”). Eskelinen foresees a productive “combinatory and dialogic interplay” between literary studies’ interpretive practices and that taxonomic formalism that he advocates, and he’s probably right–though this Anatomy of Criticism for the playing of digital games remains to be written. In briefly investigating a second genre, that of the turn-based strategy games of Sid Meier’s famous Civilization series, I want to show how our interpretive practices are useful in opening up the cultural semiotics of the game. But, just as importantly, it’s the very disciplinary baggage coming with old methodologies, which Eskelinen and Aarseth fear will obfuscate the new object, that turns out to be the source of insight into the medium, not only as a text to be read but as the normative historical rules within which the operator works, and which, in turn, work on the operator.

     

    Civilization III, the latest iteration of Sid Meier’s influential series,5 was published in 2001 to much critical acclaim. It is a turn-based strategy game in which the player-operator plays the role of the (fortunately ageless) ruler of a nascent civilization, from 4000 B.C. to 2020 A.D. As ruler, the player governs the developing civilization throughout six millennia by exploring the world, sending out settlers to found new cities, developing existing cities by building city improvements, coming into contact with other, and eventually rival, computer-controlled civilizations, and setting tax policy (how much of a civilization’s wealth should be devoted to citizen’s consumption, technological research, or to the governor’s coffers). Beyond expanding the territory of one’s civilization, whether through settling, warfare, cultural influence or espionage, one of the most important aspects of the game is researching new technologies. The game involves 82 “technological” advances which are military, governmental, financial, theological, scientific, and theoretical in nature. New technological breakthroughs allow cities to build city improvements, to build new military units, or to embark on what’s called a “Wonder of the World.”

     

    Unlike Civilization II, in which Wonders of the World are unique projects (that is, in any game a Wonder can only be built by one city on the planet) with empire-wide beneficial effects, Civilization III has Great Wonders, which follow the above rule, and Small Wonders, which can be built once by each rival civilization. For example, in both games the discovery of Literature (called Literacy in Civilization II) allows a city to build the Great Library, which in turn bestows upon its owner any technological advance already known to two other civilizations. With the discovery of Electronics, on the other hand, a civilization is allowed to build the Hoover Dam, which puts a hydroelectric plant in each of the continent’s cities (thus improving production). Typically, a civilization further up what is termed in the strategy game genre the “technology tree” has a competitive edge–social, economic, and military–over its rivals.

     

    The bulk of the game’s play in Civilization III occurs around and in the cities. The map of the world is divided into a diagonal grid on which cities are built and over which units move. Once built, cities extend a zone of control two squares in every direction. A city’s population works this area, extracting food, production materials, and trade goods. Cities are the sites of industry, commerce, and research for each civilization, and their relative health is an index to the strength of the civilization as a whole. The game accordingly inscribes an expansionist narrative, whereby one wins only by settling new cities or conquering those of one’s opponents.

     

    Figure 1: A City on a Hill

     

     

     

    When the game begins, the world is shrouded in unexplored darkness, the player has no diplomatic contact with the rival civilizations, and the opening message announces that “Your ancestors were nomads. But over the generations your people have learned the secrets of farming, road-building, and irrigation, and they are ready to settle down.” The first goal is to found a capital city, from which the empire will proceed to grow (Figure 1). There are two phases to this process of expansion: the exploration of nearby terrain, during which the darkness recedes, and the settling of that terrain by settler units, who found new cities. Eventually, the expanding empire comes into contact with rival civilizations, at which time diplomacy begins.

     

    Figure 2: The Virgin Land
    Figure 3: Full of Wild Beasts and Wild Men

     

     

     

     

    What is interesting for the purpose of this paper is the way in which the land appears empty of inhabitants until one runs into the rival civilizations (Figure 2). Once the terrain is revealed, there is no presence other than one’s civilization and its rivals. However, placed at random intervals over the map are village icons (which are not cities; see Figure 3) representing the existence of a “minor tribe”–populations which, according to Civilization III‘s manual, “are too isolated, not organized enough, or too migratory to develop into major civilizations” (Manual 67). In terms of Civilization‘s gameplay, however, these are known as “goody huts” in that exploring them often confers benefits upon the explorer, such as a technological advance, a sum of money, a military unit, or even a new city that joins the player’s civilization. But frequently one encounters a hostile reception when entering a hut square, during which, as Civilization II‘s manual puts it, “a random number of barbarian units comes boiling out of the terrain squares that adjoin the village” (83; see Figure 4). Or, as the game screen expresses it, “you have unleashed a horde of barbarians!” In any event, the village disappears, and the land once again is clear for settlement–provided, of course, you can dispatch the barbarians.6

     

    Figure 4: You Have Unleashed a Horde of Barbarians!

     

     

     

    Civilization III and its predecessors thus posit the land as both inhabited and not inhabited by populations that seem to be on the land yet somehow, paradoxically, don’t occupy it. The Civilization III manual’s explanation of such minor tribes as being “too isolated, not organized enough, or too migratory to develop into major civilizations” must be discounted as the game’s first ideological ruse: no village is any more “isolated” at the start of the game than the player is; the tribes are not “migratory” because they remain fixed on a single terrain square; and since such tribes can offer the occasional technological advance, they obviously are not too “unorganized” to develop into a civilization. In fact, these games posit a fundamental opposition between a tribe’s mere squatting on the land, taking up space, and the civilization’s real tenancy on the land. And here one meets the first paradox of the American national symbolic staged by the game. American mythology has it that the Americas were essentially empty of inhabitants prior to colonization by European powers. What the Civilization series stages is the contradiction between this comforting “national fantasy” (Berlant 1) of the virgin land and the reality of the complex aboriginal societies all over the Americas. In the Civilization series, the barbarians appear to emerge from the land as a kind of terrestrial effect. This effect comes about not only by the exploration of the villages, but from random appearances of several barbarian units in land that has been explored but not settled. This dynamic inevitably takes place on the frontier of the player’s civilization–that liminal place where one’s smallest cities are located, between the center of one’s empire (and its bigger and better-defended metropoli) and the seemingly empty wilderness beyond. It is primarily on this frontier that the logic of civilization finds itself through a meeting with its opposite, the frontier being, as Frederick Jackson Turner imagined it, “the meeting point between savagery and civilization” (qtd in Drinnon xiii). This dynamic, of what the game calls the “boiling out” of symbolic Indians, is enough to strike terror into the heart of the civilization ruler, a terror akin to that American terror of the new world. Our early records of settler conceptualizations of their Indian neighbors give evidence of this terror; early Puritan separatist William Bradford, in Of Plymouth Plantation, wrote in the 1620s of “a hideous and desolate wilderness, full of wild beasts and wild men” (62). For Bradford, “the whole country, full of woods and thickets, represented a wild and savage hue” (62).

     

    The best defense against barbarian-Indians is to “settle” the land by extending one’s cities. In Civilization II, if all squares of what Bradford called the “hideous and desolate wilderness” come within city radii, the “wild men” he referred to never emerge. In other words, the game imagines the indigenous presence as a kind of wildness in the land that simply disappears when the land has been domesticated. In this way, these games arrive at an ideological solution that echoes the one achieved by early Christian settlers of America. The problem is this: how can the pagan Indian presence be accounted for in this land that is understood to have been given by God’s grace to his Christian people? This problem and its resolution are nicely articulated in another early Christian record of settlement, Mary Rowlandson’s 1682 account of her capture, enslavement, and eventual ransoming from the Wampanoag nation in what is today Massachusetts. When Rowlandson is captured during a raid on the settler town of Lancaster, she has to try to make sense of her Indian captor’s presence and agency in terms of the mythology that was currently governing the northeast colonies. In this “the vast and desolate wilderness,” as she calls it (122-23), echoing Bradford, the Indian presence is seen, ultimately, to be a method whereby God tests his people. Why, for Rowlandson, has God seemed to leave His people to themselves? After all, God could annihilate the heathens but chooses not to. The answer Rowlandson comes to is that the Wampanoag are the means by which God teaches His people moral lessons (158-59). This answer takes the agency away from the Indians–it’s not their own knowledge about how to feed themselves during a particularly brutal New England winter that gets them through it (they’ve been there for centuries, after all), but God’s will. As Rowlandson puts it, “I can but stand in admiration to see the wonderful power of God, in providing for such a vast number of our Enemies in the Wilderness, where there was nothing to be seen, but from hand to mouth” (160). The Civilization games pursue a parallel logic–the Indian presence is understood to be a kind of obstacle, the overcoming of which is the register of the civilization’s vitality and superiority. The Indians exist not as a civilization in their own right, but as an obstacle to be surmounted by civilization; in the game, as in Rowlandson’s account, the enemy Indian Other is imagined as being the mechanism whereby the nascent American self is tested and found to be powerful.7

     

    Figure 5: Pink, Pillaging Barbarians

     

     

     

     

    Civilization III transforms this symbolic content and, displaying the result, thereby conceals its ideological commitments. It offers, in other words, a series of interpretive ruses, such as the manual’s explanation of the nature of the minor tribes, to distract our attention. Among the other ruses are the fact that, while the “barbarians” cannot become a rival civilization, the game allows you to play as the Iroquois or Aztecs (or Mayans, Aztecs and Sioux in Civilization II). And indeed there are other ruses as well–such as the visibly pinkish skin of the barbarians that emerge from the land in Civilization II‘s and Civilization III‘s iconography (see Figure 5). It was the iteration in 2000 of Civilization: Call to Power (one of several sequels to Civilization II) that accidentally literalized the symbolic content in its iconography, having the barbarian units (and the player’s early warrior units) replete with headdress (Figure 6).

     

    Figure 6: Blood Shall Run!

     

     

     

    The barbarian units also respond to a player’s commands with the phrase “blood shall run,” spoken in the Hollywood Indian’s characteristic monotone. Sid Meier’s Alpha Centauricame perilously close to literalizing the symbolic when it routinely announced a player’s encounter with the aboriginal fauna using the ominous words, “indigenous life-forms,” the very postcolonial diction of which raises such intertextual, historical echoes.

     

    Figure 7: Culture Tames the Wilderness

     

     

     

    Civilization III adds a new component to this ideological framework, that of national “culture.” In Civilization II, the player’s civilization does not have a border as such: or, rather, its border is in a sense a series of city states whose collective territory is only the map squares that the cities work. Sid Meier’s Alpha Centauri adds a territorial border to the game that exceeds by several squares the immediate land that is worked by one’s cities; this is useful because another civilization can’t then place dozens of troops almost at one’s city gates just before declaring war, since it would have to trespass across the territorial border first. Civilization III adds a logic to this border, and makes it integral to the experience of the game when it introduces the new concept of national culture. In Civilization III, cities can create improvements like temples, cathedrals, libraries, palaces, universities, or Wonders that generate “culture points” every turn; when enough have accumulated, a visible line representing a civilization’s cultural borders extends further outward from the city, beyond the squares that the city can work directly. When each contiguous city’s cultural borders touch together, a national culture is created, represented on the map by a visible line that demarcates one’s territory from that of another civilization (Figure 7). The game also represents the national borders of rival civilizations; in fact, a small city with little culture of its own on the border of a rival civilization with a powerful culture can be swayed to depose its governor and convert to the rival civilization. What’s interesting here too, however, is the role that culture plays vis-à-vis the Indians: first, Indian villages don’t generate culture, and second, they won’t emerge from “empty” land that is within your cultural borders but beyond the reach of your cities. As the manual puts it,

     

    though you might conquer the active tribes in your immediate area, new ones arise in areas that are outside your cultural borders, in areas that are not currently seen. . . . Thus, expanding your network of cities over a continent eventually removes the threat of active tribes, because the entire area has become more or less civilized by your urban presence. (67)

     

     

    In other words, again repeating traditional American mythology, the Natives don’t have culture (because their “villages” don’t generate it like your “cities” do), but they can be tamed by it. Or, to put it yet another way, the absence of Native title to the land they squatted on is betrayed by their lack of real cultural formations that might confer tenancy.

    Figure 8: Barbarians Inside the Gates
    Figure 9: Barbarians Outside the Gates

     

     

     

     

     

    In these games, the fact that the Indians are understood not to occupy the land is linked fundamentally to the Native inability to develop technology. That is, they propose that indigenous populations improperly take up space in the empty land precisely because they don’t develop technology and therefore aren’t nascent civilizations. Conversely, these populations don’t develop technology because they don’t have a meaningful presence on the land–when they are in their “goody huts” they don’t, that is, work the land (as agriculture, mining, trade) as a resource in order to advance along a teleological model of technical progress. Even when the barbarians manage to take over a player’s civilized city (Figure 8), which happens from time to time in Civilization II but which feature has been excised from Civilization III, they work the land in the city’s radius but don’t improve the land (through irrigation or creating mines), they can’t make city improvements (like a granary to store grain or barracks to train troops), and they can’t collect taxes or research new technology (see Figure 9 in contrast). In this way, Civilization II and III construct the indigenous population as another obstacle of the landscape–and one which, like the others, needs to be settled and disciplined. Eradicating the minor tribes and the land’s erupting barbarians is not an unfortunate side effect to the march of progress–it is actually constitutive of one’s civilization.

     

    Thus far I have argued that the Civilization series is infused with an American ideology that is comforting insofar as it justifies genocidal practices and the stealing of land by positing an empty virgin continent that is paradoxically populated by what the game manual calls “minor tribes” that can’t improve the land and tame the wilderness. Literary studies’ strengths in reading semiotic codes, in seeing historical parallels, and in reading for the gaps and fissures, knowing that “what the work cannot say is important” (Macherey 87), are as important as any narratological contribution it might make to digital game studies. But, in this instance at least, it is precisely the disciplinary-institutional baggage of American literary studies that helps bring into focus the problematics through which the Civilization series works without explicitly naming them. In the last twenty or so years, American literary studies has begun to recognize its own historical and ongoing evasion of the United States’s practices of empire and colonization. “The land was ours before we were the land’s,” intoned Robert Frost in the land’s eastern capital in 1961; as his inaugural poem describes America’s spiritual “surrender” to the land, “we gave ourselves outright . . . / To the land vaguely realizing westward, / But still unstoried, artless, unenhanced” (467). Five years before, in his well-known preface to his Errand Into the Wilderness, the influential historian Perry Miller retrospectively discerned the coherence in his work to be, as he put it, “the massive narrative of the movement of European culture into the vacant wilderness of America” (vii). Both Frost and Miller articulate a central tenet of one American mythology: that the United States was founded upon an empty land devoid of inhabitants. As Amy Kaplan puts this problem:

     

    United States continental expansion is often treated as an entirely separate phenomenon from European colonialism of the nineteenth century, rather than as an interrelated form of imperial expansion. The divorce between these two histories mirrors the American historiographical tradition of viewing empire as a twentieth-century aberration, rather than as part of an expansionist continuum. (17)

     

    Though much recent and some older work in American studies has begun to unravel this strand of American ideology,8 the comforting notion of the “vacant wilderness” awaiting European settlement remains essential to this culture’s symbolic self-understanding, even as repressed reminders of the historically vast aboriginal presence in the land continually rise to challenge the empty land hypothesis. In this case, it’s the initial blindness to American empire and colonization in American literary studies–and then a corrective movement, represented by such important works as Kaplan and Pease’s Cultures of United States Imperialism (1993) and Rowe’s Literary Culture and U.S. Imperialism (2000), not to mention the new areas of inquiry opened by postcolonial theory and Chicano and Native American studies–that constitutes the “baggage” literary studies can helpfully introduce to digital game studies. Like the Civilization series, other games might pursue similar strategies of transformation, display, and concealment: strategies now retroactively recognizable within the institutional, disciplinary history of American literary studies. While this baggage is useful, however, the kind of reading of ideology it allows is no different from that which might be performed on Mary Rowlandson, William Bradford, Robert Frost, or Perry Miller, to use my emblematic examples above. But when we turn our attention to the generic status of these texts registering this American ideology, we begin to see how an old style of ideology critique fails to take into account what I have called the “staging” of the ideology in this computer game. By this term I mean not the way the game creates a kind of panoramic representation of a peculiar set of political or social ideals, something that a reader of a book might (more or less) passively receive. Rather, if we, following Eskelinen’s lead, borrow Aarseth’s terminology and see games as configurative (in addition to interpretive) practices, the peculiar status of the computer game is to actually incorporate the player, making us into actors within the ideological staging: we also produce the ideological effects that the game registers each time we play the game.

     

    In this view, computer games could be understood to set the rules of play wherein the human player navigates through particular ideological or social contradictions; as rules, importantly, they naturalize certain historical and cultural contingencies. A game’s rules thus permit a select set of (re)solutions to the conflicts in the national symbolic which the game stages. Among other ideological effects, Civilization III makes inevitable, natural, and universal several Western-centered ideas of technological progress, the use of the land, and the opposition between “civilization” and “savagery.” In this way, historical specificity is forgotten, and the game reinforces the sense that those who have been displaced were only ever natural obstacles erupting randomly from the wilderness to block (American) civilization’s advance. Because these ideas are coded into the game rules they appear as inevitable historical rules. The game places the player in the position of guiding America’s development (even if the name of the civilization we play is different); we reenact the historical-territorial drama. The rules are the natural and naturalized logic of development within which that drama is played out (to a certain end).9 This process goes beyond the audience reacting to an ideological image or representation; instead, the player participates in producing an ideological effect that is not totally explicit anywhere, and that she or he may not fully comprehend. But of course, full comprehension is not the goal of the national symbolic, or of ideology.

     

    Players also learn to literally “play by the rules” in the game, which helps incorporate us into a society in which there will also be rules to be followed. What some games accomplish at an early age is to establish the idea of rules as something that are given, a status akin to that of a natural law. But Civilization III‘s typically adult players10 are taught again that success or failure happens within the rules that create a “level playing field” as the current cliché has it. In board games or computer games, however, players actually do start out in relative equality (although there are some chance elements as well, depending on the game), whereas in real life, so many characteristics of one’s life are already determined before birth, including social and economic standing, political freedom, skin color, gender, etc. What games accomplish is the instilling of the ideology of equality, which postulates that we are born equal and that differences emerge later on; the primary difference to be explained in this way is that of economic disparity, and games help explain that difference as the result of, in America, hard work and effort vs. laziness. Thus gaming helps inculcate the ideology that covers over the fact that, with the exception of the information technology bubble, most of those who are wealthy in the United States were born that way.11 Beyond this narrow ideological function, the game helps create subjects that accept the inevitability of rules as things that are given and must be “played” within–or else there is no game. This process is not total or ever complete, as the current gaming discourse complaining about the rules shows; here, players critique a game’s rules in view of a conventionalized notion of how “reality” works, or, less often, how a game’s playability is compromised by rules that are too “realistic.”12

     

    I would further venture that the game helps rehearse this ideology of equal opportunity not only on the individual level, but also on a national-cultural one. Civilization III posits a similar “level playing field” for different cultures at the dawn of human history. But a recent synthesis of work in several scientific and humanist disciplines suggests that the field was anything but level. In Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies, Jared Diamond advances a biological and geographical study of human history. In probing the ultimate and proximate reasons for why Europeans since the fifteenth century have been able to dominate other peoples in the Americas, Australasia and Africa–why, as he frames the problem in short hand, the forces of King Charles I of Spain were able to subdue the Incan capital of Cajamarca in 1532 instead of the forces of Incan emperor Atahuallpa subduing Madrid that same year (68)–Diamond explicitly and politically frames his work as an answer to the “racist explanations privately or subconsciously” (19) held by many Westerners. Resisting this genetic, and therefore racial, explanation for the fates of human societies, Diamond instead traces the influences of environment on their evolution. To briefly and inadequately summarize Diamond’s thesis, the east-west axis of the Eurasian continent allowed for the spread of wild plant and animal species and resultant biodiversity to a much greater extent than the predominantly north-south axes of the Americas and of Africa. The greater range of wild plant and animal species in the Eurasian/north African continent than in the Americas–with, for example, 33 species of wild large-seed grasses and 13 domesticable large mammals in the former, as opposed to 11 species of wild large-seed grasses and one large mammal in the Americas (140, 162)–meant that more human populations on the Eurasian land mass could become farming communities. Farming societies, as opposed to largely hunter-gatherer ones, tended to produce food surpluses and food storage techniques, allowing for the development of “large, dense, sedentary, [and] stratified societies” (87). These populations selected for resistance to several important epidemic diseases whose origins are ultimately in domesticated animal populations in a way that, obviously, societies without those same domesticated animals were never able to (with catastrophic results for those without the disease resistances). The larger and stratified societies tended to produce hierarchical political systems that were interested in territorial gain, writing, and technological developments that would eventually include oceangoing ships, guns, and steel. In summary, Diamond’s interpretation of the evidence is that European imperial domination of the Americas, south Asia and Australasia, and Africa was based not on a kind of genetic superiority, but on ultimate factors that Europeans had little control over or knowledge of–geographical and environmental traits.

     

    One can see from this inadequate summary that the kind of narrative Diamond is engaging in is similar to the one addressed by the Civilization games and others like them. By bringing these two texts into contact, I am not intending a critique of the games’ failings to accurately represent the dynamics of the growth of and conflicts between civilizations.13 Indeed, such a critique might be anachronistic, at least for the iterations of the series prior to Civilization III, as Diamond claims that his 1999 book is a new synthesis of old and new data, requiring knowledge of

     

    genetics, molecular biology, and biogeography as applied to crops and their wild ancestors; the same disciplines plus behavioral ecology, as applied to domestic animals and their wild ancestors; molecular biology of human germs and related germs of animals; epidemiology of human diseases; human genetics; linguistics; archaeological studies on all continents and major islands; and studies of the histories of technology, writing, and political organization.14 (26)

     

    Rather, the contrasts between the game’s narrative and Diamond’s narrative are interesting in that they highlight the ideologically productive ideas at work in the game’s code. That is, the gaps between these narratives suggest spaces where culturally useful–and ideological–ideas get worked out. This game’s designers did not invent these ideas; rather, they transcribed them from the larger culture into the interactive medium of the Civilization series.

     

    One might argue that Civilization III (and its predecessors) have subversive potential to challenge notions of Western supremacy. The game enables the simulation of alternative histories, recognizable as still being historical because their referents come from real things–names of actual nations and cities and people, and the real things that happen, such as trade, war, peace, exploration. In one sense, these alternative histories can be imagined and simulated, and different historical narratives explored. A player playing the Iroquois nation, or India, for example, might dominate the game, crushing opponents such as the Americans and the British and the Chinese, and win by either defeating everyone else or by sending a colony ship to Alpha Centauri (Civilization II‘s and III‘s other “winning condition”). In a lovely moment of irony and anachronism, a player playing Mohandas Gandhi (the game’s suggested ruler name for one playing as India, whose robed portrait appears during the diplomacy screens), might face down and conquer Elizabeth I of England, Catherine the Great of Russia, and others. What would be revealed in such a narrative is the contingency of human history: that things might have turned out differently to the extent that those nations understood to have been the losers in twentieth-century history (because the “Iroquois” and the “Indians” beat up on other peoples before the “Americans” and the “British” came along) could have in fact been the dominant society. Or, to put this in Diamond’s terms, Atahuallpa’s general might have arrived in Spain in the sixteenth century and sacked Madrid. But though some might find the game’s recognition of historical contingency progressive and liberating, I would argue that its ultimate effect is to reinforce the pattern of interaction between the colonizing power and the aboriginal. That pattern is reinforced not only by the necessary enactment of imperialism’s need to master the native land and its inhabitants, as I have argued above. Rather, a second kind of ideological work this performs is produced precisely because of the possible alternative histories. Things might have turned out differently because the game constructs history as a level playing field. So why didn’t the Iroquois conquer the Americans? Why weren’t the Indians able to colonize London and its outlying areas? Because those colonized peoples didn’t work as hard as–or didn’t have the noble spirit of–we Europeans. The game has abstract radical potential, but it is circumscribed by how things really turned out. That radical potential thus works ideologically to reinforce the notion of cultural and maybe racial supremacy. That things might have turned out differently need not produce existential-national anxiety in Western players, in light of the imaginable histories that include the subjugation of those players on an alternative, virtual earth. Rather, the actual story becomes explicable, when faced with the endlessly replayable historical simulations of civilization, only through reference to a kind of spiritual or cultural rightness of European civilization.

     

    These last observations suggest that computer and video games are indeed “configurative practices” rather than merely interpretive ones, as Eskelinen suggests; however, exceeding his taxonomy, the games are not the only thing configured. In fact, games may work on their operators to configure our expectations of the real, our sense of history, national identity, race and gender, or economic justice, not just in terms of representation, but in the way that rules teach universal laws and routine behavior. This is true not just in the way that the FBI and police agencies recognize when they use shooter-type games to train for shoot/no-shoot responses (see the somewhat hysterical Grossman 312-16), or the way in which the U.S. Army and Marines have teamed up with commercial game publishers to develop squad-based games to train officers and others how to “leverage human resources and information” (“Army”; Riddell). Nor is it only the pleasure of forming what Ted Friedman calls a “cybernetic circuit” or feedback loop with the computer, “in which the line demarcating the end of the player’s consciousness and the beginning of the computer’s world blurs” (137). Even in highly-reflective play, as is intensely the case in fan discourse on games, the ideological procedures of the games may not come to light. On the other hand, the hacker communities and digital game scenario sites suggest that the awareness of game rules–and the urge to rewrite them–often subverts the games’ standing rules governing the way a game can be configured, but they also exceed the rules’ ability to configure the operator’s paths of thought. Such discourse includes discussion of the aesthetic qualities of the rules themselves: why some rules and algorithms are downright beautiful–like the one that recently had a polite, smiling, cooperative Gandhi send an army of 40 or so Indian units across a continent (and many years) and over my peacetime border to launch a Pearl Harbor-like attack on my innocent Persian civilization. This is the two-way process of configuration–operator on game, game on operator–that digital game studies will have to address in the years ahead. We will need all our collective powers.

     

    Notes

     

    I thank Cort Haldeman for his technical help in rendering some of the audiovisual material quoted in this essay.

     

    1. Rodowick’s essay was a preview of his Reading the Figural, or, Philosophy After the New Media, published that same year. As if in example of the “recirculation” of cinematic concepts in new media studies was Lev Manovich’s The Language of New Media, also in 2001. Manovich’s book is fascinating as it traces the history of the screen in the West, suggesting both that the classical cinematic screen has its formal genealogy in Renaissance painting’s frame (80), and that the computer screen (and thus games) have their more proximate lineage not directly in cinema, but in radar screens that presented information in real time (99). The Language of New Media engages the new media, which include “a digital still, digitally composited film, virtual 3-D environment, computer game, self-contained hypermedia DVD, hypermedia Web site, or the Web as a whole” (14), through a history of visual media, primarily cinema and photography. This breadth is of course its strength–as it relates contemporary computer use to the history of visual form–and its weakness for game studies. Manovich, for instance, spends little time discussing actual games; Doom and Myst (both released in 1993) stand in for computer games in much of his discussion, and when he does refer to other games, they are mostly within the subcategory of action games (that is, wherein the user is the “camera” in a first-person perspective). So, for instance, when Manovich discusses 1990s computer games’ debt to the cinematic interface, he argues that “Regardless of a game’s genre, it came to rely on cinematography techniques borrowed from traditional cinema, including the expressive use of camera angles and depth of field, and dramatic lighting of 3-D computer-generated sets to create mood and atmosphere” (83). This is certainly true of many computer and video games (the latter of which Manovich, for an unexplained reason, does not mention in his book), but it is not true “regardless of a game’s genre.” Here, at least, Markku Eskelinen’s warning (and he refers specifically to Manovich’s book) against the colonizing attempts of other disciplines rings true, as the scope of Manovich’s claim about digital games’ lineage in cinema needs important qualifications. For example, Civilization III, discussed below, has its genealogy in board games, while Magic Online has its genealogy in the still-popular fantasy trading card game Magic: The Gathering, and though these two computer games emerged in 2001 and 2002, they both existed in previous iterations in the 1990s. Almost all of Manovich’s examples are first-person perspective action, exploration, or racing games, and when he does refer to real-time strategy games (such as the Warcraft series), one has to wonder how they make use of cinematic perspectives rather than, with Civilization III and other strategy games (sometimes called together “god-games” because of their omniscient visual perspective and the vast power they extend to players), previous board games or tabletop model wargames. Though these facts qualify Manovich’s expansive claims–others are made later when he states that games are experienced as narratives (221-22; always? what about Tetris?), and that “Structuring the game as a navigation through space is common to games across all genres” (248; but what of Tetris and Magic Online?)–they don’t negate the future necessity for game studies to attend in detail to the history of film (and other visual arts) and a cinema-derived analytical repertoire.

     

    2. Indeed, much of the first issue of Game Studies can be seen as a sustained assault against the notion that literary or film studies provide adequate tools for the new phenomenon. Jesper Juul’s “Games Telling Stories?” also uses narratology to refute three arguments that digital games can be considered kinds of narratives. That Aarseth, Eskelinen and Juul question the practice of unproblematically applying literary or film concepts to digital games, as Henry Jenkins also did seven years ago, shows how slowly this new discipline is forming. In the now-famous “Nintendo® and New World Travel Writing: A Dialogue,” Jenkins notes that two earlier books erroneously “presuppose that traditional narrative theory (be it literary or film theory) can account for our experience of Nintendo® in terms of plots and characters” (60), and offers instead a model of narrative for games as movement through space rather than in terms of characters and plots.

     

    3. Furthermore, the player alone has real agency in the game world. There do seem to be other people existing in the world, but they don’t do anything except wait for you and respond to your requests and actions. That is, nothing really happens in the game except through you. The newer games (Half-Life and Baldur’s Gate II) are increasing their use of scripted events, which simulate actions and events independent of you, and which you trigger by walking into a certain area of the game world. In these instances, the game simulates the idea that you come across lives in medias res. But in most of these scripted events, your actions and decisions are why they are there in the first place–they’re meant to give you a clue; or, your own action (which side will you help?) proves decisive in determining the outcome of the event. This is, of course, not the case in massively multiplayer online games, in which thousands or tens of thousands of players simultaneously interact in a persistent online world.

     

    4. And Brooks points to this connection as well, suggesting that “the enormous narrative production of the nineteenth century may suggest an anxiety at the loss of providential plots: the plotting of the individual or social or institutional life story takes on new urgency when one no longer can look to a sacred masterplot that organizes and explains the world” (6).

     

    5. The series has a rich and varied genealogy. Civilization was introduced as a computer game by Sid Meier in 1990, though it was inspired by a board game by Avalon Hill. It was followed up by Colonization for Windows 3.1/95 in 1995, which was a game focused more narrowly on the various European powers colonizing North America, and by CivNet, an online multiplayer version of Civilization for Windows 95 released by Microprose in 1995. Civilization II (for Windows 95) was released in 1996. Since then there have been several different sequels to Civilization II: these include Microprose’s Civilization II: Test of Time (1999), Activision’s Civilization: Call to Power (1999), and, after legal wrangling over the Civilization franchise, a sequel by Activision called only Call to Power II (2000). Another kind of sequel to Civilization II is Sid Meier’s Alpha Centauri (1999), a science-fiction themed game of the same genre designed by Sid Meier which begins where Civilization II ended, with the colonization of a planet around Alpha Centauri; this can be considered an heir to Civilization II in that its gameplay remains essentially the same–even to the point of including barbarians. The “true” sequel is regarded as Civilization III.

     

    6. Thus the Civilization series shares with some Nintendo games the mapping of space, but here, as opposed to the Nintendo games that Henry Jenkins and Mary Fuller analyze in “Nintendo® and New World Travel Writing: A Dialogue,” the colonization is literal and not merely metaphoric, as it is in their assertion that “Nintendo® takes children and their own needs to master their social space and turns them into virtual colonists driven by a desire to master and control digital space” (71). Touring through and thereby “mastering” a game’s digital space is not the same as the simulation of the settlement of land and territory and destroying native inhabitants along the way, as in the Civilization games.

     

    7. Most strategy games center around gathering resources from the land in order to construct units, build base improvements, or research technology (e.g. the Age of Empires series, the Warcraft series, the Command and Conquer/Red Alert series); all these games imply a similar model of the relation between humans and the land. What I have in mind in this essay is perhaps a sub-genre that imagines a role for the “native” life-form: whether the “barbarians” in Civilization II and its sequels Civilization: Call to Power, Civilization: Test of Time and Civilization III; the “natives” in Master of Orion II; or the “mind-worms” of Sid Meier’s Alpha Centauri. In all these cases, these forms that threaten civilization can be tamed and put to work or, untamable, must be destroyed.

     

    8. See, for instance, Kaplan and Pease, including Kaplan’s and Pease’s introductions and the essays therein. Kaplan names William Appleman Williams’s 1955 The Tragedy of American Diplomacy as an early critic of the American exceptionalism thesis, that America alone among the modern powers never developed an empire.

     

    9. When Friedman remarks that “the fact that more than one strategy will work–that there’s no one ‘right’ way to win the game–demonstrates the impressive flexibility of Civilization II,” he is referring to the two possible “winning conditions” of the game–eliminating all other rival civilizations, or sending a spaceship to colonize Alpha Centauri. My point is that though the game permits these two strategies to win the game, one bloody and one peaceful, both depend on the extensive development and mastery of the land by one’s civilization. Only by such mastery can the player achieve the infrastructure necessary for warfare or for the space race to Alpha Centauri. And what the mastery of the land means, as I have argued, is mastery over its barbarian inhabitants as well. This is true even in Alpha Centauri and in Civilization III, where players can pursue diplomatic, scientific, and economic victory paths, although the scientific victory path in Alpha Centauri produces an interesting coda to this paper in that it involves the almost-too-late recognition of the sentience of, and transcendental unity through, the equivalent of the Indians in the game, the “native” life-forms.

     

    10. Demographically, computer game players tend to be older than video (console) game players. Other demographic distinctions can be made according to game genre, by which turn-based strategy games tend to attract older players.

     

    11. In this sense, the Civilization series betrays a specifically American ideology that goes beyond an association with other settler colonies like Canada, Australia, or South Africa, all of which model civilization-savagery binaries. The games also carry the mark of the American Dream–that success corresponds to hard work and effort, not outside determining factors like heredity and geography. Since Crèvecoeur, this idea of America as a place where hard work, not privilege, is rewarded has been part of the national mythology.

     

    12. One example of this “fan” discourse was the demand before its release that the game designers of Civilization III create the more difficult levels of play through a variegated “AI” (or Artificial Intelligence, the optimistic name given to the set of algorithms that manage the computer-controlled rival civilization’s moves in the game), and not merely that the computer-controlled civilizations “cheat” by being able to build city improvements and units for a fraction of the cost of human players. Players recognizing this still play the game, but seem disturbed by the violation of the ideology of equality that the game promotes. It’s challenging to play as the underdog, with the field tilted against you, but we still understand this to be in some way “unfair.”

     

    13. Say, for example, the historical inaccuracy of having every game civilization begin with the technologies of farming, road-building, and irrigation, despite the actual lack of domesticable plant and animal species in many parts of the world. As Ronald Wright remarks, “Ancient America was criticized for lacking things that Europe had–things deemed epitomes of human progress. The plow and the wheel were favorites; another was writing. It never occurred to Eurocentric historians that plows and wheels are not much use without draft animals such as oxen or horses, neither of which existed in the Americas before Columbus” (6). Native Mexicans did invent the wheel–but, lacking draft animals, used them for toys (Diamond 248).

     

    14. But interestingly, the demand for realism and accuracy–whether visual or in games’ models of economics, physics, diplomacy, strategy, tactics, etc.–plays a large role in the reception of computer games. This requirement that virtual worlds be faithful in some sense to real worlds mirrors similar demands on cinema and literature, and can be seen in both printed and online reviews of games, and in the discourse of player websites devoted to particular games. One interesting example of this is a number of projects sponsored by Apolyton.net (a semi-official site catering to the Civilization series and games like them) devoted to the creation of open-source games like the Civilization series. One such project, called none other than “Guns, Germs, and Steel,” aimed for increased accuracy and realism in modeling the development of civilizations, and the debate among the game’s designers centered on ways they might implement some of the specific ideas in Diamond’s book. Though this particular project appears moribund, others continue.

    Works Cited

     

    • Aarseth, Espen. “Computer Game Studies, Year One.” Game Studies: The International Journal Of Computer Game Research 1.1 (2001) <http://www.gamestudies.org/0101/editorial.html>.
    • Activision. Civilization: Call to Power. CD-ROM. Activision, 1999.
    • “Army to Fund Video Games for Aspiring Commanders.” New York Times, October 25, 2001.
    • Berlant, Lauren. The Anatomy of National Fantasy: Hawthorne, Utopia, and Everyday Life. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1991.
    • Bradford, William. Of Plymouth Plantation, 1620-1647. 1856. Ed. Samuel Eliot Morison. New York: Knopf, 1952.
    • Brooks, Peter. Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative. New York: Vintage, 1985.
    • Camus, Albert. The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays. Trans. Justin O’Brien. New York: Vintage, 1955.
    • Diamond, Jared. Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies. New York: Norton, 1999.
    • Drinnon, Richard. Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian-Hating and Empire-Building. 1980. Norman, OK: of Oklahoma P, 1997.
    • Eskelinen, Markku. “Cybertext Theory and Literary Studies, A User’s Manual.” electronic book review 12 (2001) <http://www.altx.com/ebr/ebr12/eskel.htm>.
    • —. “The Gaming Situation.” Game Studies: The International Journal of Computer Game Research 1.1 (2001) <http://www.gamestudies.org/0101/eskelinen/>>.
    • Firaxis Games. Sid Meier’s Alpha Centauri. CD-ROM. Infogrames, 1999.
    • —. Sid Meier’s Civilization III. CD-ROM. New York: Infogrames, 2001.
    • —. Sid Meier’s Civilization III. Instruction Manual. New York: Infogrames, 2001.
    • Frauenfelder, Mark. “Death Match: Your Guide to the Box Wars.” Wired Magazine 9.05 (2001). 7 June 2001 <http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/9.05/deathmatch.html>.
    • Friedman, Ted. “Civilization and Its Discontents: Simulation, Subjectivity, and Space.” On a Silver Platter: CD-ROMs and the Promises of a New Technology. Ed. Greg M. Smith. New York: New York UP, 1999. 132-50.
    • Frost, Robert. “The Gift Outright.” Complete Poems of Robert Frost. New York: Holt, 1949. 467.
    • Fuller, Mary, and Henry Jenkins. “Nintendo® and New World Travel Writing: A Dialogue.” CyberSociety: Computer-Mediated Communication and Community. Ed. Steven G. Jones. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995. 57-72.
    • Grossman, Dave, Lt. Col. On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society. Boston: Little, Brown, 1995.
    • Herz, J.C. Joystick Nation. Boston: Little, Brown, 1997.
    • Juul, Jesper. “Games Telling Stories?” Game Studies: The International Journal Of Computer Game Research 1.1 (2001) <http://www.gamestudies.org/0101/juul-gts/>.
    • Kaplan, Amy. “‘Left Alone with America’: The Absence of Empire in the Study of American Culture.” Kaplan and Pease 3-21.
    • Kaplan, Amy and Donald E. Pease, eds. Cultures of United States Imperialism. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1993.
    • Macherey, Pierre. A Theory of Literary Production. Trans. Geoffrey Wall. London: Routledge, 1978.
    • Manovich, Lev. The Language of New Media. Cambridge: MIT P, 2001.
    • Microprose. Civilization II. CD-ROM. Microprose, 1996.
    • —. Civilization II: Test of Time. CD-ROM. Microprose, 1999.
    • —. Civnet. CD-ROM. Microprose, 1995.
    • Miller, Perry. Preface. Errand Into the Wilderness. Cambridge, MA: Belknap P of Harvard UP, 1956. vii-x.
    • Poole, Steven. Trigger Happy: Videogames and the Entertainment Revolution. New York: Arcade, 2000.
    • Riddell, Rob. “Doom Goes to War.” Wired Magazine 5.04 (1997). http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/5.04/ff_doom.html>
    • Rodowick, D. N. “Dr. Strange Media; or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Film Theory.” PMLA 116 (October 2001): 1396-1404.
    • —. Reading the Figural, or, Philosophy after the New Media. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2001.
    • Rowe, John Carlos. Literary Culture and U.S. Imperialism: From the Revolution to World War II. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000.
    • Rowlandson, Mary. “Narrative of the Captivity of Mrs. Mary Rowlandson, 1682.” Narratives of the Indian Wars, 1675-1699. Ed. Charles H. Lincoln. New York: Scribner, 1913. 112-67.
    • Wright, Ronald. Stolen Continents: The “New World” Through Indian Eyes. Toronto: Penguin, 1993.

     

  • Reading Gravity’s Rainbow After September Eleventh: An Anecdotal Approach

    David Rando

    Department of English
    Cornell University
    dpr27@cornell.edu

     

    Since the September Eleventh airplane attacks on the World Trade Center, it is difficult to imagine American readers responding to the opening sentences of Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbowin quite the same ways as they had previously. “A screaming comes across the sky. It has happened before, but there is nothing to compare it to now” (3). Suddenly these famous words are thrust into new contexts, and yet, I would like to argue that the idea of “comparison” still pervades our ways of understanding. Who can forget the horrifying doubling and déjà vu of the images of the second airplane crashing into the second tower? That scene of doubled impact and destruction at once creates the desire for and, with its sense of radical singularity, denies bases of comparison. Pynchon recognizes that in the face of traumatic or devastating events we seek refuge in the comfort of comparison, in our sense that what bears similarity offers solace.

     

    Indeed, the events of September Eleventh were first brought into sense through frames of comparison, or metaphor. Immediately, evocations of the attack on Pearl Harbor shot through the media. That the movie Pearl Harbor enjoyed recent success at the box-office only helped to prime the American imagination for that easy parallel of surprise attack. Among other functions, the Pearl Harbor comparison helped to locate September Eleventh within an archetypal American loss-of-innocence story. But Pearl Harbor did not offer a metaphor for thinking about the vulnerability of a major metropolis, terms that newly pressed themselves upon the imagination. For this reason, it is fitting that New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani was the first person to invite comparisons between New York and London during the Battle of Britain. “I think people should read about the Battle of Britain and how the people of London lived through the constant daily bombardment by the Nazis,” Mayor Giuliani told Barbara Walters in an interview that aired on September nineteenth. “They took terrible casualties, terrible losses. They never gave up. They never gave up their spirit and they figured out how to go about their lives and they prevailed. There’s nothing wrong with being afraid, but you don’t give in to it.” Mayor Giuliani probably does not have Gravity’s Rainbow in mind when he urges New Yorkers to read about London during World War Two. What Mayor Giuliani’s interview reinforces, however, is how tenaciously the mechanism of comparison occurs to us in the light of contemporary events and how transparently we appeal to the relations between events, texts, and contexts.

     

    In the wake of September Eleventh, the questions that literary criticism has asked about the precise nature of the relationship between text and context, events and history, and narrative and culture take on a new kind of urgency. In this essay, I would like to take seriously Mayor Giuliani’s suggestion that we turn to texts and history in order to make sense of current events. Specifically, I want to set the discourse of childhood and innocence in Gravity’s Rainbow in dialogue with the proliferation of post-September Eleventh anecdotes about children who selflessly break their piggy banks to contribute to relief funds. It seems as though each news organization and each local newspaper has its own version of this familiar kind of story. What is the relationship between these anecdotes of innocence and charity, the devastation at the World Trade Center site, and the United States’ present military campaign in Afghanistan? How are anecdotes such as these poised in an important position at the nexus of event, narrative, and history? How can understanding these recent anecdotes help us to understand Pynchon’s sexualized depiction of children in Gravity’s Rainbow? Conversely, what can Pynchon’s discourse of innocence in that novel teach us about how the recent piggy-bank anecdotes do cultural work in our current war? Finally, how might a new understanding of the function of anecdotes in general contribute to broad efforts in literary criticism to comprehend the connections between texts and history? In the process of addressing such questions, I mean to develop a space within anecdotes and the anecdotal where texts and history can have demonstrable and substantial connections in literary criticism through specific metonymical and metaphorical devices, where other historicist methodologies only project metaphorical connections.1 Anecdotes, which form at the very skin between history and narrative, may illuminate such connections by points of contact as well as by comparison.

     

    The status of children in Gravity’s Rainbow continues to be a problem for critics. How do we account for Pynchon’s graphic sexualization of children such as Bianca, Geli Tripping, or Ilse Pökler? Take, for example, these sentences from Slothrop’s sexual encounter with Bianca on the Anubis:

     

    Her eyes glitter through fern lashes, baby rodent hands race his body unbuttoning, caressing. Such a slender child: her throat swallowing, strummed to a moan as he grabs her hair, twists it...she has him all figured out. (469)

     

    Though this is not one of the more pornographic sites in this passage, these sentences are otherwise typical of Pynchon’s manipulation of childhood and sexuality in this and other scenes. “Baby” and “slender child” function as constant reminders amid sexual depictions that Bianca is a small ten- or eleven-year-old girl. Set off by the word “glitter,” the doubling of consonants in the words “unbuttoning,” “caressing,” “swallowing,” and “strummed” sustain both a sensuous prolonging of sounds and induce a miniaturizing effect through doublings that work similarly to the “-ette” suffix. “Fern” and “rodent” align Bianca first with flora, then with fauna, while the particularization of “lashes,” “hands,” “throat,” and “hair” disperses the subject into diffuse objects in an erotic field.

     

    The second sentence is especially resistant to grounding in sense. Pynchon seems to signal a fundamental violence in the representation of Bianca through the apposition of “strumming” and “twist.” Have we gentle effects (“moans”) from a violent cause (“twisting”), or rather, is the moan a moan of pain? If it is pain, how does the gentle sense of “strum” find expression in the passage? In one sense, at the level of trope, twisting and strumming are irreconcilable images. The strings of an instrument, mapped as hair, cannot be strummed when grabbed in a fist. The gap left in this trope, I suggest, is symptomatic of the scene’s resistance to becoming settled or brought into sense within either discourses of sex or of childhood. Most vexing of all is the final phrase, “she has him all figured out.” This is startling considering that Slothrop seems more the actor or agent as he grabs and twists Bianca’s hair; the switch within the same sentence of Bianca from acted upon to orchestrator prolongs the passage’s unsettled representations. Of course, it matters greatly through whom this final phrase is focalized. Is this Slothrop’s sexual projection onto the little girl or does it express Bianca’s machination and complicity? I believe that the shifting narrative positions and the self-destructing tropes purposefully leave this question unanswered. Pynchon is very careful not to polarize Bianca as either innocent or experienced, victim or seductress, subject or object, though it is not immediately clear why this strategic destabilizing of oppositions is structurally important to Gravity’s Rainbow.

     

    From local scenes like the one between Bianca and Slothrop, it is important to move out and consider the various contexts that frame them. What are the narrative contexts to which we might relate such scenes? One way to answer this question is to place these sexualizations within Pynchon’s larger project of producing a taxonomy of sexual alternatives with which Gravity’s Rainbow is rife. While the episodes with Geli and Bianca share qualities with other sexually deviant scenes in the novel, however, I would like to cordon the children off from this order temporarily and try to understand them in the context of Zwölfkinder. Zwölfkinder, where “Ilse” brings Franz Pökler during her visits, is the state-sponsored construction site of childhood and innocence in Gravity’s Rainbow.

     

    In a corporate State, a place must be made for innocence, and its many uses. In developing an official version of innocence, the culture of childhood has proven invaluable. Games, fairy-tales, legends from history, all the paraphernalia of make-believe can be adapted and even embodied in a physical place, such as at Zwölfkinder. Over the years it had become a children's resort, almost a spa. If you were an adult, you couldn't get inside the city limits without a child escort. There was a child mayor, a child city council of twelve. Children picked up the papers, fruit peelings and bottles you left in the street, children gave you guided tours through the Tierpark, the Hoard of the Nibelungen, cautioning you to silence during the impressive re-enactment of Bismarck's elevation, at the spring equinox of 1871, to prince and imperial chancellor...child police reprimanded you if you were caught alone, without your child accompanying. Whoever carried on the real business of the town--it could not have been children--they were well hidden. (419)

     

    Zwölfkinder becomes a matrix from and to which all of Pynchon’s descriptions of children issue and must return. The “official version of innocence” is both state created and state sustaining. Zwölfkinder resembles a factory where the state generates its innocence, a palpable, deployable cultural construct that may be put to “invaluable” uses. Pynchon does not offer in expository form an explanation of what uses these may be or the mechanism by which constructed innocence serves the state. We may infer, however, from the cultural and historical miniaturization and re-enacting, that Zwölfkinder is the state’s laundering service for its history and its actions. Just as illegal money may be laundered by channeling it through legitimate enterprises, so can the state launder itself innocent by re-enacting itself through the medium of children. The children of Zwölfkinder do not just play “mayor” or “city council.” They do not quaintly copy the institutions of the state. Through the children’s performance of these roles, “mayor” and “city” are actually brought into being, constituted as innocent. Pynchon shows us that the innocence of the state relies upon what only looks like the cultural and historical repetition and secondariness of Zwölfkinder. In fact, the centrality of state and corporate institutions to the function of Zwölfkinder is signaled by emphasis upon the “child city council of twelve,” hence the “Twelve children” of the city’s name.

     

    On some level, Pynchon represents Zwölfkinder as though it were consciously and unproblematically established by the state in order for it to invest itself with an official innocence. Verbs such as “making,” “developing,” “adapted,” and “embodied” seem to attach to unseen agents, a paradigmatic “Whoever” that clenches its fist unseen. On another level, however, Pynchon recognizes that Zwölfkinder can only generate innocence to the extent that it mediates between two different desires, not only the desire of the state but that of the public as well. The public’s desire and pleasure are figured in the recreational and resort-like dimension of Zwölfkinder, crucial both to its function in the fiction and to the efficacy of Pynchon’s figure in the narrative. The public agrees to bear witness to the performative production of innocence because its desires are fulfilled in turn. The accompanying adult visitors enjoy the leisure of a theme park and a reprieve from the all-consuming World War waging outside of the cordoned-off Zwölfkinder. It is a place where state and public desires can meet across a single object, their children. Not to be discounted is the public’s own desire to see its state’s roles and its history laundered in the children’s performances of them at the very moment that the state prosecutes its war. In the children the state sees everything it desires its public to be. In the children the public sees everything it desires the truth about its state to be. The very coincidence of state and public desire establishes a context in which the children’s performances can be contracted as performatives. Without this contract the children’s acts would be mere reenactment or mimicry. Zwölfkinder, like the anecdotes I discuss below, must serve desire at both ends and at every point in between in order to have the generative power that Pynchon insists upon.

     

    It is no wonder that Zwölfkinder serves as the setting where Franz Pökler nearly acts upon his frustration and anger about being used by the state in an act of “incest,” with “Ilse,” who may be his real daughter, or who may just be another invention of the state. In fact, through the state’s appropriation of the innocence produced when children enact the state, in a sense, both the imposter Ilse and the real Ilse are functions of the state. Which is to say that innocence is punctuated with state structures manufactured by Zwölfkinder while the state is riddled with innocence. In Gravity’s Rainbow the two can seldom be disentangled. The complicity of innocence with the state underwrites Pökler’s fantasy of rebellion, dooming it:

     

    He hit her upside the head with his open hand, a loud and terrible blow. That took care of his anger. Then, before she could cry or speak, he had dragged her up on the bed next to him, her dazed little hands already at the buttons of his trousers, her white frock already pulled above her waist. She had been wearing nothing at all underneath, nothing all day...how I've wanted you, she whispered as paternal plow found its way into filial furrow...and after hours of amazing incest they dressed in silence, and crept out into the leading edge of faintest flesh dawn, everything they would ever need packed inside her flowered bag, past sleeping children doomed to the end of summer, past monitors and railway guards, down at last to the water and the fishing boats, to a fatherly old sea-dog in a braided captain's hat, who welcomed them aboard and stashed them below decks, where she snuggled down in the bunk as they got under way and sucked him for hours while the engine pounded, till the Captain called, "Come on up, and take a look at your new home!" Gray and green, through the mist, it was Denmark. "Yes, they're a free people here. Good luck to both of you!" The three of them, there on deck, stood hugging....

     

    No. (420-421)

     

    The startling negotiation of sexuality and childhood in this passage bears remarkable similarity to the scene on the Anubisbetween Slothrop and Bianca. Here again we observe physical violence, miniaturization, and dazed complicity. More remarkable, perhaps, is how Pökler’s supposed route to freedom, Ilse’s body, might be said to compose nothing save figures of enclosure, masquerading in human name and shape. First, Ilse “takes care of,” or contains Pökler’s anger. Then she encloses him as a “furrow.” Next, everything needed for his survival gets “packed” in Ilse’s bag. “Stashed” below the decks of the ship, Ilse “snuggles” Pökler further yet, until, with the vista of freedom finally in sight, Ilse “hugs” Pökler on the deck. Pökler’s fantasy of incest and escape, then, is bound to fail. The more he resorts to violating innocence, the more firmly he is bound in his servitude to the state. Ilse can facilitate neither transgression nor rebellion. It is merely the vulnerable-looking construction of her innocence that makes her appear to Pökler as though she can. In violently rending the innocent mirage “They” have created of his daughter, Pökler fantasizes a route of escape. Realistically, Pökler’s maneuver can never constitute more than a repetition of the innocence-to-experience story, a tale already thoroughly written by the state, both backwards and forwards. Pökler’s desire for rebellion through a temporal movement that passes chronologically from innocence to experience can never hope to elude the state’s spatial sense of the narrative relations of its own story. The resounding “no” that dislodges Pökler’s day-dream is an acknowledgment that the premises of his fantasy–that Ilse is his daughter and that innocence/experience stories indeed exist, with the state’s children in starring roles–are from the beginning illusions cultivated by the state. The character in the dream cannot outdream the dreamer. Pökler’s day-dream cannot function as a source of wish-fulfillment because neither the wish nor its subject are stable or tangible materials. We remember, of course, Slothrop’s second Proverb for Paranoids: “The innocence of the creatures is in inverse proportion to the immorality of the Master” (241). The greater a role innocence plays, the more experienced those who “carry on the real business of the town.”

     

    If it is true that the state produces and consumes stories of innocence and experience, the transgressive hypothesis about such sexualized children in Gravity’s Rainbow begins to unravel. If innocence is already complicit with the state, we are bound to learn as Pökler does that its violation is already a familiar subplot in the state’s narrative structure. In order to understand more fully Pynchon’s sexualization of children, then, it is necessary to examine sites similar to Zwölfkinder, places where innocence is actually produced, in order to establish a narrative context against which to read Pynchon’s scenes.

     

    I would like to suggest that the narrative form most uniquely suited and situated for examining the instantiation of innocence in the state context is the anecdote. Easily mistaken for a miniature or an innocent itself, the anecdote renders the private, gossipy, or hidden in the process of becoming narrative and public as it fills the vacant spaces in more esteemed public histories. The anecdote, though typically imagined as representational and primarily metaphorical, is also composed of a metonymical narrative field where we can read constellations of contiguity as they settle into narrative logic.

     

    Do anecdotes gain currency in times of war? Gravity’s Rainbow argues that they do when Pynchon suggests that “the true war is a celebration of markets” (105) and “information [has] come to be the only real medium of exchange” (258). In the following, I would like to imagine these concepts in both their literal and figurative senses to show that there indeed exists an information market which uses innocence for its currency in the United States since September Eleventh. Like all markets, this market is an instrument that registers the ebb and flow of desire. After September Eleventh, anecdotes about innocent children gained measurable value, beginning immediately with the piggy-bank anecdotes. As a market, multifarious desires drive the stock of children higher, yet each piggy-bank anecdote functions as a miniature Zwölfkinder where innocence is produced around state exigency. Like Zwölfkinder, these anecdotes are mediated by various desires that coalesce around the children that star in them. Though they serve the state’s desire for an innocence that would let it wage war with impunity, these anecdotes are of course not state-issued, nor do they directly serve the state’s interests. Rather, the stories are more directly mediated by various public, institutional, and journalistic desires that can all take their pleasures in the same nexus of childhood and innocence, as the wildly diverse interests of Chaucer’s pilgrims once found fulfillment in the same pilgrimage. The journalists that press the acts of specific children into a predictable form do so because there already exists a public market for patriotism, sentiment, stability, and perhaps even for a willful blindness to the actions of its state. Organizations such as the Red Cross have something to gain in the market as well. These institutions take their pleasure on the anecdotal dimensions of charity while the journalists take theirs in the consumption of the stories. Once again, the public and the state invest their various desires for stability in the object of their children. State and public look up lovingly over the shoulders of their children and their gazes meet, though their fantasies are different. Part of what Zwölfkinder teaches is that the proliferation of certain stories after September Eleventh is neither unique nor unpredictable. As a result of this predictability, however, we can read our own historical condition in the characteristics of this common form that do seem unique or in the formal peculiarities that could not have been predicted. It is precisely because the discourse of childhood that follows September Eleventh is really no exception at all that our close attention to it and its variant in Gravity’s Rainbow can uncover what is peculiar in both.

     

    Although they exhibit important variations, all of the anecdotes of innocence presented here are structurally similar. Typically, a small child between four and eight years old is deeply affected by the disaster and, in what he or she sees as an act of patriotism, contributes his or her savings to relief funds for World Trade Center victims. These stories often demonstrate communal effects in which adult members of the community are inspired by the innocent children’s donations and are thus strengthened in their own patriotic and nationalistic resolve. While these anecdotes were profuse immediately following September Eleventh, I will also try to demonstrate that this structure of anecdote has a history and may be said to constitute a transnational and, to some extent, a transhistorical genre of its own. I treat these little newspaper narratives as anecdotes because each is a private story made public that fills a gap in the “official” narrative of history. They answer to anecdote’s Greek sense of “things unpublished” and the French root of “to give out” or “publish.” As these two nearly contrary senses emphasize, “anecdote” is a word that tends toward and finally subsumes its own opposite meaning in regard to the hidden or the revealed. The anecdote is never wholly free from the pull of either its private or its public pole but oscillates instead suspended between the two. In its form there is always something public about the secret anecdote as there is something that remains private in the form of the published anecdote. Journalism often takes the anecdotal form because of its position between current events and narrative, thus “the secret, private, or hitherto unpublished narratives or details of history” (OED), and because it serves public desire for the kinds of narratives it wants to consume.

     

    By exploring these anecdotes of innocence in the context of state exigency, I hope to demonstrate that the manipulation of children in Gravity’s Rainbow should be read as a means of resisting the state’s long history of appropriating the innocence of its children for its prosecution of war. Certainly, Pynchon entertains no illusions that sexually violating the innocence of children can be a means of eluding or subverting state power (as demonstrated in Pökler’s failure to escape and in his utter servitude). Instead, his insistence on representing children as already startlingly experienced blocks the state’s Zwölfkinder-type production and use of innocence, which is especially useful to the state when it attempts to justify military action. Pynchon’s achievement with respect to this discourse is to have rendered the state’s and the public’s mutual desire for innocence visible by making the representation of that desire literal and sexual. He underscores the investments that the public and the state make in the innocence of children by confronting us with the sexual dimension of desire and by forcing us to acknowledge its resemblance. The discourse of innocent children, though mediated in multiple ways, plays a role in producing favorable circumstances for war whose violence is just as palpable as Pynchon’s discourse of sexual violence. While the latter discourse elicits shock and disgust, the violent aspect of the former discourse remains concealed. The invisibility of violence depends upon the perception that there is indeed an essential difference between sexual and non-sexual desire, a denial of the fact that every desire is shot through with other structures of desire. Pynchon enables us to perceive the violence in both categories of childhood representation through a kind of commutative law that lets the discourses cross at the object of desire. His overturning of sexual innocence provides a means for rethinking the easy stories of innocence in which various interests take their pleasure, finally, by a commutation of our responses to the two discourses. Pynchon challenges us to read the following stories of innocence alongside our shocked and disgusted response to his own experienced children. How do we bring such divergent stories into sense when juxtaposed? What will become evident is how the post-September Eleventh anecdotes constitute and do not merely represent innocence in the first instance. In other words, while I do not doubt that the particular instances reported in these anecdotes actually occurred in some manner or another, I wish to emphasize instead how they already conform to well-established literary and anecdotal forms. Further, there never was a time when the opposite was true, that such anecdotes became structured by events that were unmarked by or innocent of this narrative structure.

     

    The most basic form of these anecdotes of innocence may be expressed in the following four examples:

     

     

    1. John DeCristoforo, in charge of fundraising at the New York chapter [of the Red Cross], said he’ll never forget one of the first visitors to his donation booth.”A 4-year-old girl walked up and opened her Pokemon backpack. She pulled out a matching Pokemon wallet, which she unzipped and dumped on the table,” DeCristoforo recalled. “She donated $4.37 in quarters, dimes, nickels, and pennies to the disaster relief fund. We saw many young people make sacrifices like this, but that little girl was one of the first, and one of the youngest.” (Ward)
    2. Katelyn Riant is broke.Her mother couldn’t be more proud.The 4-year-old Decatur resident carried her piggy bank to the Decatur Fire and Rescue headquarters at Flint and dumped her life savings–$22.30–into a shoebox. She handed it, along with a hand-drawn picture, to a firefighter. (Huggins) 
    3. Flowers and notes left by well-wishers have become impromptu shrines to the World Trade Center victims at area fire stations. Last week, an angel piggy bank was left outside a National City fire station. A child’s note was attached:”My name is AnnaLuz Montano. I am 8 years old. I am very sorry for what happened to New York City. So I’m donating my savings to help the family [sic] that went through so much tragedy. God bless America. I will be praying for all the family [sic] and to the firefighter.” [sic]Inside her bank was $53.17.Touched by her generosity, eight members of National City’s Firefighters Association visited AnnaLuz in her third-grade classroom at Lincoln Acres Elementary Thursday. They introduced themselves, gave her a commendation and proclaimed her a firefighter for the day. She gave them each a hug–and there were tears all around. (Bell)

       

    4. Sami Faqih, an 8-year-old McKinley Elementary School student of Palestinian descent, turned his sadness over the terrorist attacks into action on behalf of the relief effort.On Saturday, Sami went to the Corona Fire Department station of McKinley Street with his father and donated his piggy-bank–filled with $40 to $50 worth of coins–to the New York City firefighters’ relief fund. Sami also gave a firefighter a crayon drawing depicting a frowning sun and a row of tombstones with the inscription: “I wish you can com [sic] back Please.”Sami’s father, Wael Faqih, who emigrated to the United States in 1990 from Palestine, said his son was deeply moved by the terrorist attacks and felt compelled to help.”That’s our civic duty, isn’t it?” Faqih said. “He had a lot of emotions. He wanted to help America.” (Press Enterprise)

       

     

    Anecdote one begins with the adult frame of the story, which is central to this genre of innocence anecdote. The fundraiser occupies a knowing, experienced position with respect to the child. This relationship is requisite if the child’s gesture of patriotic charity is to move him or to spill over into the adult world, as all of these anecdotes are situated to do. They must be so situated because there is a public market that desires this effect, which precedes their service to newspaper, charitable organization, or state. The child must leave an indelible impression upon an adult. There is usually great detail about the child’s precise age, about the dollar amount of the contribution (often about the denomination [1, 2, 3], nearly always some mention of coins [4]), and also about the money container. Citation of age, instead of simply evoking “children,” functions as naturalistic detail and also deploys a specific category of the four or the eight year old that is already marked as small and innocent in our culture. It is provocative to think that Pynchon’s nearly categorical refusal to mark his children with precise ages somehow works to disrupt our recourse to this cultural association. The Pokemon backpack and wallet may be said to function as similar naturalistic and categorical markers, but its naming, like the naming of the piggy banks in the other anecdotes, alerts us to the importance of the actual money container. It is vital that the currency the children donate be as innocent as they are. It must not have previously circulated in markets of exchange, but have grown penny by penny in the cordoned-off space of the piggy bank. As the children at Zwölfkinder launder history, so do these children launder currency by storing it in a non-circulating or innocent space. The precision of dollar amounts, besides affording us unprecedented knowledge about our nation’s piggy banks, reinforces the innocence of both the child and the transaction. The uneven denominations both signal a child giver (adults are more liable to give even, calculated amounts) and tell us that every last penny has been sacrificed. The emphasis on coins, it almost goes without saying, lends a miniaturizing effect to the donation and the child. The focus in the first anecdote on the physical act of “unzipping” and the “dumping” of “quarters, dimes, nickels, and pennies” further establishes the innocence in the child’s unrefined mode of transaction.

     

    The second anecdote exhibits many of the above features but has some interesting variations. For one, while the first child donated in Manhattan, this precisely named child donates in a Decatur, Illinois fire department, reinforcing the idea that the attacks of September Eleventh were a national and not simply a local tragedy. The donation to the Decatur Fire Department assumes a unified civil or state service with national connections, although fire departments are usually thought of in the most local or municipal of terms. That a donation can be made to a universal fire department strengthens the idea of a large state structure that the child can make her innocent contact with. The hand-drawn picture, which also appears in anecdote four, compounds the sense that the children give more than money. The drawing lends a certain emotionality or expressiveness to the dollar amount to create an effect that the money could not accomplish alone. None of these anecdotes, nor any that I found, features solely creative drawings or notes without money, however.

     

    Anecdote three puts extra emphasis on the community impact of the donation when it stages the resultant visit of the firefighters and their conferral of an honorary “firefightership” upon the child. Also of note is the inclusion of the text of the child’s letter, which links to the inscription in anecdote four. In anecdote three, the grammatical mistakes of the letter tend to singularize plural and diffuse entities. The many families of the victims and the many firefighters become a single family and a single firefighter. This note, then, is remarkably articulate, if unwitting, about the general unifying function that these anecdotes perform.

     

    Anecdote four shows the potential in this form for adaptation and for variations upon a theme. Like anecdote three, the ungrammatical note produces real affect, especially when coupled with the disturbing depiction of the “frowning sun” and the “row of tombstones.” It is unclear whether the inscription, “I wish you can com back Please,” appears inscribed on the tombstones, or appears as a caption for the drawing. In either case, the inscription plays on categories of innocence, both in the misspelling of “come” and in the innocent conception of death. The inscription conveys a perfectly adult, or experienced sentiment until the capitalized “Please” suggests that the dead possess the agency to return. Though it is possible to read this inscription with religious emphasis or in innumerable other contexts, in the newspaper sphere the inscription is formulated to produce an affect of innocence.

     

    What seems most striking about anecdote four, however, is that unlike the three previous examples, the child in this case is of Palestinian descent. This anecdote performs many of the moves that the others do, but its improvisation with the form makes it exemplary of the uses to which the form may be put. In the context of the war and other exigencies of national interest, the other anecdotes perform an important unifying and innocence-generating function. Here, the form varies such that it performs very specific work in a specific context while the general effects become peripheral. Before the military campaign in Afghanistan even began, the Bush Administration took every opportunity to reiterate the fact that they were not at war with all Arab people or with Islam. This rhetoric was vital for American and foreign support for the war, regardless of how the Administration may have thought of its goals. The anecdote of the Palestinian child maps innocence onto race and performs the idea that the category of “American” supersedes more refined categories of identity and identification. “Civic duty” cuts across the child’s Palestinian origins (and perhaps his Muslim faith, which I believe we are meant to identify in the form, whether or not this particular Palestinian family is Muslim). Perhaps more disturbing than the fact that this anecdote enacts or performs the rhetoric of the state is that it so transparently situates itself in relation to the rhetoric of metonymy between Arab and terrorist. This anecdote enacts what it supposes is a necessary intervention in this rhetoric by appealing twice to the “terrorist attacks,” each time in opposition to “Palestine” or “Palestinian.”

     

    In order to demonstrate the longevity of the anecdotal form that I have discussed above, I would like to examine the following anecdote of an innocent Silesian peasant girl from an anonymous 1815 book review, which appeared in the Quarterly Review, of Gentz’s On the Fall of Prussia. It is instructive for its marked structural similarity to the above anecdotes and because it wears more plainly the mechanisms of metaphor and metonymy implicit in the World Trade Center charity anecdotes:

     

    An anecdote of a Silesian peasant girl deserves to be recorded, as it shews the general feeling which pervaded the country. Whilst her neighbours and family were contributing in different ways to the expenses of the war, she for some time was in the greatest distress at her inability to manifest her patriotism, as she possessed nothing which she could dispose of for that purpose. At length the idea struck her, that her hair, which was of great beauty, and the pride of her parents, might be of some value, and she accordingly set off one morning privately for Breslau, and disposed of her beautiful tresses for a couple of dollars. The hair-dresser, however, with whom she had negociated the bargain, being touched with the girl's conduct, reserved his purchase for the manufacture of bracelets and other ornaments; and as the story became public, he in the end sold so many, that he was enabled, by this fair maiden's locks alone, to subscribe a hundred dollars to the exigencies of the state. (436n)

     

    I like this anecdote in particular because the first sentence explicitly recognizes the way literary, specifically metonymical, reasoning stands between the representative anecdote and the general “feeling” of Silesia. The anonymous critic divulges the metonymical mediation between the anecdote and the real. It is worth trying to sort out how different discourses and powers exert themselves in complex configurations on the Silesian girl. “Parents” and “neighbors” converge in the second sentence amid a rather elaborate metonymical logic. The familial discourse about the girl’s relationship to her parents slides into apposition with “neighbors” until her relationship to her neighbors can substitute for familial relationships. This is a familiar way of thinking about how the idea of the nation as an extended family gets figured. On the other hand, we have the contiguity of “war” and “expense,” which are cemented to the neighbor and the family through the discourse of “contributing” and “patriotism.” Patriotism is constituted as contributing to the war effort, from within an economic scale of “possessing” and “dispossessing.” “At length the idea struck her,” suggests that the truthfulness of these relations must be arrived at by careful consideration and, conversely, that careful reasoning ensures, rather than interrogates, these metonymies. “Pride” abuts beautiful hair until, under the parental/national value system, the hair becomes currency that can be contributed to the war effort. The hairdresser, a neighbor, completes the metonymy of hair/ornament/capital, perhaps motivated by the same powers that moved the girl, but more probably moved by discursive principles that the girl herself brought into being for him.

     

    As was vital to the function of the post-September Eleventh anecdotes, the child’s innocent patriotism, constructed by the form itself, spills over in the adult world in which a hundred dollars are generated for “the exigencies of the state.” The previous anecdotes do not cite so openly their state affiliations, nor do they so easily lend themselves to obvious analysis. This is so because in the fully modernized present the anecdotes must accommodate greater varieties of desire. They cannot simply direct themselves toward the “exigencies of the state” because, while these exigencies are their cumulative object, the anecdotes must first act as ringbolts for more local desires as diverse as those for sentiment, patriotism, political insulation, financial profit, notoriety, stability, and so on. While this form might be said to recur as a kind of ideological response to war, its formal attributes are deeply historical in character and suit themselves to their own peculiar historical climate. This would account for the distortions of the form in the current anecdotes relative to the Silesian peasant anecdote, which in turn is itself a historical distortion of a prior form. For instance, to take just one example, it seems significant that the Silesian girl’s hair is translated quite causally into money through the economic inventiveness of the hairdresser. This is markedly different from the insistent emphasis that the new anecdotes place upon the child’s direct issuing of funds, innocent and uncirculated in character. This emphasis is perhaps the point in each anecdote marked by the specific historical conditions of our present war in which economic interests and motivations have and likely will continue to be questioned. Perhaps the fact that the September Eleventh disaster occurred quite pointedly at the financial center of the United States also contributes to the necessity for representations of economic fortitude and economic innocence. Still, long before this local detail contributes to the state, it serves the purposes of an organization like the Red Cross that has more uses for money than it does for locks of hair. Further, these stories are less likely to elicit subscriptions of money directly to the state, as in the Silesian peasant’s story, than they are to profit the news media. If these piggy-bank anecdotes do not cite as openly their state affiliations, then, this is because their affiliations are much more numerous and fractured than those of the 1815 anecdote. Anecdotes like these are necessary because local desires and the global desires of the state do not merely line up, one behind the other. They come from multiple angles, directions, and interests so various that it is imperative they all cross at least once at a common point. A stable society becomes adept at finding such points of common desire, and children are perhaps most commonly desired above all.

     

    Despite its historical differences, however, the anecdote of the Silesian peasant girl is very much at work all around us today, and the modes of innocence production remain structurally unchanged. Anecdotes do indeed gain (and become) currency in times of war, especially if we follow Pynchon in imagining war as a celebration of (especially information) markets. Such anecdotes direct our attention to the important line where power leaves its mark on children, whose little lives are pressed into the shape of discourse. Pynchon gives us means for sustaining dialogue with the categories performed and produced at this line with his refusal to ground his children in either innocence or experience. Near the end of Gravity’s Rainbow, the return of the child Ludwig, whom Slothrop found searching for his “lost lemming Ursula,” is representative of Pynchon’s deliberate destabilizing of children’s categories:

     

    It is fat Ludwig and his lost lemming Ursula--he has found her at last and after all and despite everything. For a week they have been drifting alongside the trek, just past visibility, pacing the Africans day by day...among trees at the tops of escarpments, at the fires' edges at night Ludwig is there, watching...accumulating evidence, or terms of an equation...a boy and his lemming out to see the Zone. Mostly what he's seen is a lot of chewing gum and a lot of foreign cock. How else does a foot-loose kid get by in the Zone these days? Ursula is preserved. Ludwig has fallen into a fate worse than death and found it's negotiable. So not all lemmings go over the cliff, and not all children are preserved against snuggling into the sin of profit. To expect any more, or less, of the Zone is to disagree with the terms of the Creation. (729)

     

    Like Slothrop when he finds the long-lost harmonica that he pursued down the toilet years earlier, Ludwig finds Ursula for another unexpected reunion. Even the category of return, however, refuses to stabilize without irony. For Slothrop, the reunion is only another moment of misrecognition: “It happens to be the same one he lost in 1938 or -9 down the toilet at the Roseland Ballroom, but that’s too long ago for him to remember” (622-23). Ludwig’s discovery of Ursula, however, might reify the idea that everything eventually returns (an innocent faith), though from the beginning Pynchon’s string of story-book formulas such as “at last,” “after all,” and “despite everything” cautions against such a reading. In displaying literary formulas that are related to children’s discourse and its various productions of innocence, Pynchon brings them to the fore of our cultural associative consciousness precisely so that the remainder of Ludwig’s story can be read against them.

     

    What has the boy who found his lemming been doing since we last saw him? He has been following Enzian and the Zone Hereros, “watching…accumulating evidence, or terms of an equation…a boy and his lemming, out to see the Zone.” We do not know why or for whom Ludwig accumulates evidence or terms for an equation, but such calculated and precise behavior seems at odds with the last part of the sentence. “A boy and his lemming, out to see the Zone,” plays upon the formulaic “boy and his dog, out to see the world.” This locution connotes carefree wonder and openness, which at once ironizes and is ironized by the calculation of “evidence” or “equations.” The substitution of “lemming” for “dog” enacts similar categorical transgressions and keeps the tone of the passage unstable, allowing neither the clichéd structures of childhood nor the defiance of these structures to dominate it. The syllepsis of “seeing” “a lot of chewing gum” and “a lot of foreign cock” also defies structures and values in both directions. The possibility that the chewing gum may have been Ludwig’s payment for sex acts with men further complicates the assignment of category and value by suggesting that modes of exchange exist between the two dissimilar “markets” of chewing gum and sex. The innocent market overlaps the experienced one. Further, children do not usually “negotiate,” especially not with “fates worse than death.”

     

    All of these suspensions and reversals culminate in the moral of Ludwig’s tale: “So not all lemmings go over the cliff, and not all children are preserved against snuggling into the sin of profit.” The myth of sexual and financial innocence is comparable to the myth of lemming suicide; neither is true, but both are powerful and therefore enduring. Pynchon’s attention to the Zone context in the final sentence of this passage is of great importance. The war created the Zone where the innocence of children like Ludwig is demythologized. As the post-September Eleventh anecdotes and the Zwölfkinder show us, however, the state relies for its very prosecution of war on the production of innocence through its children, though it does so as the cumulative result of diverse and often disparate desires along the way. Pynchon draws this paradox out in his children’s sexual figurations and in the disfigurations of children in the Zone. Thus, by shuttling between fiction, piggy-bank anecdotes, and historical events, we can make the middle term exfoliate and name connections between the former and the latter term. We can allow Gravity’s Rainbow and September Eleventh to call to one another across a narrative and historical divide, over their common points of contact, in the unassuming assembly hall of the anecdote (where plenty of work gets done).

     

    Notes

     

    1. I think specifically of the charge against New Historicism that the untheorized spaces between texts and contexts are bridged by various metaphorical maneuvers. Alan Liu expresses this best:

     

    A New Historicist paradigm holds up to view a historical context on one side, a literary text on the other, and, in between, a connection of pure nothing. Or rather, what now substitutes for history of ideas between context and text is the fantastic interdisciplinary nothingness of metaphor.... What is merely "convenient" in a resemblance between context and text...soon seems an emulation; emulation is compounded in analogy; and, before we know it, analogy seems magical "sympathy": a quasi-magical action of resemblance between text and context.... (Liu 743)

    Works Cited

     

     

  • The Baudrillardian Symbolic, 9/11, and the War of Good and Evil

    Bradley Butterfield

    Department of English
    University of Wisconsin, La Crosse
    butterfi.brad@uwlax.edu

     

    In the end it was they who did it but we who wished it. If we do not take this into account, the event loses all symbolic dimension; it becomes a purely arbitrary act. . . . (A)nd in their strategic symbolism the terrorists knew they could count on this unconfessable complicity.

     

    Terrorism is the act that restores an irreducible singularity to the heart of a generalized system of exchange.

     

    The globe itself is resistant to globalization.

     

    –Jean Baudrillard1

     

    From Princess Diana to 9/11, Jean Baudrillard has been the prophet of the postmodern media spectacle, the hyperreal event. In the 1970s and 80s, our collective fascination with things like car crashes, dead celebrities, terrorists and hostages was a major theme in Baudrillard’s work on the symbolic and symbolic exchange, and in his post-9/11 “L’Esprit du Terrorisme,” he has taken it upon himself to decipher terrorism’s symbolic message. He does so in the wake of such scathing critiques as Douglas Kellner’s Jean Baudrillard: From Marxism to Postmodernism and Beyond (1989), which attacked Baudrillard’s theory as “an imaginary construct which tries to seduce the world to become as theory wants it to be, to follow the scenario scripted in the theory” (178). Did Baudrillard seduce 9/11 into being–is he terrorism’s theoretical guru?–or did he merely anticipate and describe in advance the event’s profound seductiveness?

     

    To Kellner and other critics, Baudrillard’s theory of postmodernity is a political as well as an intellectual failure:

     

    Losing critical energy and growing apathetic himself, he ascribes apathy and inertia to the universe. Imploding into entropy, Baudrillard attributes implosion and entropy to the experience of (post) modernity. (180)

     

    To be sure, Baudrillard’s scripts and scenarios have always been concerned with the implosion of the global capitalist system. But while Baudrillard’s tone at the end of “L’Esprit du Terrorisme” can certainly be called apathetic–“there is no solution to this extreme situation–certainly not war”–he does not suggest that there are no forces in the universe capable of mounting at least a challenge to the system and its sponsors (18).

     

    As in Symbolic Exchange and Death (1976) and Simulacra and Simulations (1981), Baudrillard again suggests that terrorism is one such force, and that it functions according to the rule of symbolic exchange. Terrorism can be carried out in theoretical/aesthetic terms, the terms Baudrillard would obviously prefer, or in real terms, that is, involving the real deaths of real people, a misfortune Baudrillard warns against.2 Though he states clearly “I am a terrorist and nihilist in theory as the others are with their weapons,” he is characteristically ambivalent in relation to “real” terrorism, since the real is always in question, and perhaps also because ambivalence is Baudrillard’s own brand of theoretical terrorism (Simulacra 163). One moment of his thought is the utopian dream of radicality and reversal, a revolution of symbolic exchange against the system, and the other moment is one of profound pessimism: “The system…has the power to pour everything, including what denies it, into indifference.”

     

    In Simulacra and Simulations (1981), Baudrillard wrote that systemic nihilism and the mass media are to blame for the postmodern human condition, which he describes as a combination of “fascination,” “melancholy,” and “indifference.” Against the system and its passive nihilism, Baudrillard proffers his own brand of what might be termed active nihilism, a praxis that includes theoretical and aesthetic “terrorism,” but not, in the end, the bloody acts of actual violence his theory accounts for. The terrorist acts of 9/11, as his theory predicted, were destined to be absorbed by the system’s own narrative, neutralized by the very mass media they sought to exploit.

     

    In “L’Esprit,” Baudrillard nevertheless attempts to explain again the logic, the spirit, of terrorism and to account for its power. Two of the three letters written to Harper’s Magazine after its February 2002 printing of “L’Esprit” would, predictably, take Baudrillard to be an apologist for the terrorists’ means and ends. Edward B. Schlesinger and Sarah A. Wersan of Santa Barbara, California, write:

     

    Embedded in Jean Baudrillard's almost incomprehensible prose is the shocking assertion that terrorism is justifiable, that the threat of globalization, as visualized by Baudrillard, justified the World Trade Center attack. (Kelly et al. 4)

     

    Average Harper’s readers may be spared blame for not comprehending Baudrillard’s theoretical prose, but the point of “L’Esprit” is not that 9/11 was justifiable in any moral sense, but that, as Nietzsche held, true justice must end in its “self-overcoming” (Genealogy 73). Baudrillard explicitly states that “if we hope to understand anything we will need to get beyond Good and Evil” (“L’Esprit” 15). In light of his past writings, I suggest that his unspoken stand on the issue of justice concerning 9/11 would have to be what Nietzsche’s would have been: that there is no justice, only forgiveness, and only the strong can forgive. But Baudrillard does not explicitly state this claim, which I see as an implicit conclusion to his thought. Instead he plays the provocateur by laying claim to the terrorists’ logic, which was their greatest weapon. If, as Kellner would have it, Baudrillard wants to seduce us into following his script, we must be sure to understand the script well so we can decide how to act on it. The fact that 9/11 was arguably the most potent symbolic event since the crucifixion of Christ has inspired Baudrillard to dress up his old ideas about the symbolic and symbolic exchange. To understand what he means by “symbolic dimension” and “strategic symbolism” in the quotation from “L’Esprit” above, let us consult the origins and uses of the concept of the symbolic in his earlier work.

     

    Baudrillard’s Symbolic and Death

     

    Baudrillard’s theory of the symbolic serves as a response to what he saw as the metaphysical underpinnings of the Marxist, Freudian and structuralist traditions. All three, he claims, uphold the fetishization of the “law of value,” a bifurcating, metaphysical projection of the mind which allows us to measure the worth of things. The law of value effectively produces “reality” in each system as both its effect and its alibi. For Marx this reality, this metaphysical claim, was found in the concept of use value, for Freud it was the unconscious, and for Saussure it was the signified (and ultimately the referent). According to Baudrillard, any critical theory in the name of such projected “real” values ultimately reinforces the fetishized relations it criticizes. He therefore relocates the law of value within his own Nietzsche-styled history of the “image”–a term used as a stand-in for all that the words representation, reproduction, and simulation have in common. In “How the ‘True’ World Finally Became a Fable: The History of an Error,” Nietzsche outlines in six concise steps the decline of western metaphysics and its belief in a “True world” of essences, beyond the Imaginary world of appearances (Portable 485). Baudrillard’s four-part history of the image (commonly referred to as his four orders of simulation) closely mirrors Nietzsche’s history of the “‘True’ World”:

     

    1. it [the image] is the reflection of a profound reality;
    2. it masks and denatures a profound reality;
    3. it masks the absence of a profound reality;
    4. it has no relation to any reality whatsoever; it is its own pure simulacrum. (Simulacra 6)

     

    Marx, Freud and Saussure were stuck in the second order, where the critique of appearances was thought to yield a glimpse of a deeper reality. We have since turned from the critique of appearances to the critique of meaning and of reality itself (the third order), and from here can only enter into the fourth order, the hyperreal. This is because we live in profoundly mediated environments, wherein coded images are produced and exchanged far more than material goods, and the more these codes are exchanged throughout the culture, the more erratically their values fluctuate, until at last they can no longer be traced to their origins. Hyperreality thus describes the extreme limit of fetishization, wherein re-presentation eclipses reality. Here the spectacle continues to fascinate, but indifference is the attitude du jour (indifference having long been associated with the postmodern). But Baudrillard’s history, it seems, has one more step to take before it completes its circle. Baudrillard imagines that from within the fourth order, where all metaphysical distinctions of value have disappeared, there will emerge a type of postmodern primitivism (I propose to call it), which he outlines in his conceptions of the symbolic and symbolic exchange.

     

    Baudrillard’s symbolic derives loosely from Mauss’s analysis of the Potlatch, Bataille’s theory of expenditure, and a deconstruction of Lacan’s symbolic/real/imaginary triad. For Lacan, the symbolic marks the adult world of discourse, wherein the subject comes fully into being as it leaves the narcissistic fantasies of the imaginary order to recognize, and be recognized by, the other. Entry into the symbolic, however, also severs the subject from “the real” or material “given,” which always remains beyond the reach of signification. The symbolic for Lacan plays a balancing act between the demands of a lost imaginary and a lost real, while for Baudrillard “the effect of the real is only ever . . . the structural effect of the disjunction between two terms” (Symbolic 133). The real and the imaginary are not lost causes, but rather lost effects of consciousness, and the symbolic is that within a social exchange which is irreducible to the real/imaginary dichotomy:

     

    The symbolic is neither a concept, an agency, a category, nor a "structure," but an act of exchange and a social relation which puts an end to the real, which resolves the real, and, at the same time, puts an end to the opposition between the real and the imaginary. (133)

     

    When we enter the Baudrillardian symbolic dimension, the biased distinctions of Western metaphysics–Cause/Effect, Being/Nothingness, Real/Imaginary, Normal/Abnormal, Good/Evil–are to be considered deconstructed, over-come in the French Nietzschean tradition of the aesthetic turn. The symbolic is Baudrillard’s trope for the revaluation of all values, jenseits von Gut und Bose, a revolutionary theory for the age of digital reproduction and the generalized aesthetic sphere. In the Baudrillardian symbolic, one hears the echo of Nietzsche’s merriment at the end of metaphysics: “pandemonium of all free spirits” (Portable 486). The “death drive” in Baudrillard is therefore not a matter of a repressed instinct (Freud), nor even yet of a universal force within language (Lacan), but of an incipient implosion of “the code,” which stands for all terms and forces valued in opposition within the system. In the wake of his implosionary vision Baudrillard hopes will arise, at least in theory, a liberated and continuously creative new set of relations, governed not by semiotic or economic codes, but by the principle of symbolic exchange.

     

    In For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, Baudrillard harkens back to the “primitive” notion of the symbol as transparent, binding, and potentially brutal in its demands (he does not qualify the term primitive, and after all it is the model that is important to him, whether his generalizations are accurate or a projection of desire3). This would-be dark side of Baudrillard’s symbolic stems from what he himself calls a dangerous allusion to primitive societies in Mauss’s illustrations of the Kula and the Potlatch (Critique 30). Mauss describes the primitive practice of Potlatch as involving an agonistic exchange of gifts between two chieftains in which each one seeks to gain standing for himself and his clan through gift exchange (Mauss 6). Baudrillard clarifies that

     

    the gift is unique, specified by the people exchanging and the unique moment of the exchange. It is arbitrary [in that it matters little what object is involved], and yet absolutely singular. As distinct from language, whose material can be disassociated from the subjects speaking it, the material of symbolic exchange, the objects given, are not autonomous, hence not codifiable as signs. (Critique 64-65)

     

    The symbolic value of a gift or of any gesture depends upon the involuntary consciousness of the fact that the consciousness of the other poses a singular challenge to our own. And we cannot not respond to this challenge, once we have received it, because even ignoring someone or something is a way of responding. The gift represents a qualitative measurement of honor or disgrace between two parties and in that sense is symbolic, but it is also symbolic in Baudrillard’s other sense, that is, as standing only for itself, as a unique and ineluctable challenge to counter give. It takes a certain amount of Orwellian doublethink to ignore the challenge represented by the other once we have grasped the reciprocal nature of our fates. For Baudrillard’s and Mauss’s “primitives,” events such as the Potlatch involve conspicuous consumption and expenditure, a sumptuous wasting of goods that turns out in the end to be essentially usurious and sumptuary (see Critique 30, Mauss 6).

     

    Baudrillard formulates the term “prestation” with regard to Mauss to signify that within our social exchanges which makes us feel obligated to “an irrational code of social behavior,” namely the law of symbolic exchange (Critique 30, n. 4). This mechanism of social prestation, says Baudrillard, adheres to every exchange and is fraught with ambivalence, for in it lies “the value . . . of rivalry and, at the limit, of class discriminants” (Critique 31). Symbolic exchange, at some level, always involves an agonistic struggle for domination and status. Baudrillard does not issue a moral judgment on the matter of social domination, but rather suggests that symbolic exchange will continue to haunt our political economies:

     

    Behind all the superstructures of purchase, market, and private property, there is always the mechanism of social prestation which must be recognized in our choice, our accumulation, our manipulation and our consumption of objects. This mechanism of discrimination and prestige is at the very basis of the system of values and of integration into the hierarchical order of society. The Kula and the Potlatch have disappeared, but not their principle. (30)

     

    The symbolic value of commodities–the connotations of wearing a certain brand of basketball shoe or driving a certain car–are seen here as barbaric in the social relations they imply. And so Baudrillard warns in an interview:

     

    If we take to dreaming once more--particularly today--of a world where signs are certain, of a strong "symbolic order," let's be under no illusions. For this order has existed, and it was a brutal hierarchy, since the sign's transparency is indissociably also its cruelty. (Baudrillard Live 50)

     

    One nevertheless senses in this disavowal of the primitive symbolic order, where signs were singular and binding, a hint of admiration, echoing Nietzsche’s musings on the cruel but proud days when power was signified outright, and not behind the guises of morality.4

     

    Despite this transparent warning, in Symbolic Exchange and Death (1976) Baudrillard went on to sketch several examples of symbolic exchange in relation to death in today’s political economy. The anagram in Saussure, the Witz in Freud, graffiti in New York, the Accident in the media are all treated by Baudrillard as symbolic events wherein death, denied and repressed, poses a challenge to life. From the standpoint of 9/11, his theory of death in primitive and modern cultures is most pertinent. Like Foucault, Baudrillard sees the history of Western culture in terms of a genealogy of discrimination and exclusion:

     

    At the very core of the "rationality" of our culture, however, is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death. (Symbolic 126)

     

    According to Baudrillard, the dead in primitive societies played integral roles in the lives of the living by serving as partners in symbolic exchange. A gift to the dead was believed to yield a return, and by exchanging with the dead through ritual sacrifices, celebrations and feasts, they managed to absorb the rupturing energy of death back into the group. But

     

    there is an irreversible evolution from savage societies to our own: little by little, the dead cease to exist. They are thrown out of the group's symbolic circulation. They are no longer beings with a full role to play, worthy partners in exchange....Today it is not normal to be dead, and this is new. . . . Death is a delinquency, and an incurable deviancy. (126)

     

    Modern Western cultures have largely ceased to exchange with the dead collectively, partly because we no longer believe in their continued existence, and partly because we no longer value that which cannot be accumulated or consumed. The dead have no value by our measurements. We give them nothing and expect nothing from them in return, and yet they remain with us, in our memories, obligating our recognition and response. How do we respond to the symbolic challenge of death and the dead, the challenge they pose to our conscious experience? This is the question of 9/11.

     

    The primitives, Baudrillard maintains, responded to this challenge collectively through symbolic exchanges with their dead and deities. Their belief in the sign’s transparency, its symbolic singularity, can be seen in animistic practices such as voodoo, where the enemy’s hair is thought to contain his or her spirit. If the dead are only humans of a different nature, and if the sign is what it stands for, then a symbolic sacrifice to a dead person is every bit as binding as a gift to a living person. The obligation to return is placed upon the dead, and they reciprocate by somehow honoring or benefiting the living. Most Christians believe in and employ this same mechanism when they pray to the resurrected Christ, but even they do not believe that their symbolic gestures are anything but metaphors. We no longer believe in the one to one correspondence of signifier and signified, and we know the loved one is not really contained in the lock of hair. Americans will doubtless commemorate the deaths of those killed on 9/11 as long as our nation exists, but we know that our gifts to the dead are only symbolic, which for us means imaginary.

     

    Baudrillard’s postmodern-primitive symbolic, on the other hand, aimed to obliterate the difference in value between the imaginary and the real, the signifier and the signified, and to expose the metaphysical prejudice at the heart of all such valuations. His wager was that this would be done through aesthetic violence and not real violence, but having erased the difference between the two, there was never any guarantee that others wouldn’t take such theoretical “violence” to its literal ends. Graffiti art, scarification and tattooing are just the benign counterparts of true terrorism, which takes ritual sacrifice and initiation to their extremes. Literalists and extremists, fundamentalists of all sorts, find their logic foretold in Baudrillard’s references to the primitives. What the terrorists enacted on 9/11 was what Baudrillard would call a symbolic event of the first order, and they were undeniably primitive in their belief that God, the dead, and the living would somehow honor and benefit them in the afterlife. Unable to defeat the U.S. in economic or military terms, they employ the rule of prestation in symbolic exchange with the gift of their own deaths. But Americans are not “primitives”–we do not value death symbolically, but rather only as a subtraction from life. Capitalism’s implicit promise, in every ad campaign and marketing strategy, is that to consume is to live. We score up life against death as gain against loss, as if through accumulation we achieve mastery over the qualitative presence of death that haunts life. Our official holidays honoring the dead serve no other function than to encourage consumption.

     

    When it comes to actually dealing with death and the dead, even in public, we do so in private. As Baudrillard points out, “This entails a considerable difference in enjoyment: we trade with our dead in a kind of melancholy, while the primitives live with their dead under the auspices of the ritual and the feast” (134-35). Because we devalue death and thereby the dead, we view them only as a dreaded caste of unfortunates, and not as continuing partners in exchange. Ultimately, however, it is not so much the dead but our own deaths, our negative doubles, that we insult by denying their value. When we posit death as the negation of life, we bifurcate our identities and begin a process of mourning over our own eventual deaths, a process which lasts our whole lives. The more we devalue our death-imagoes, that is, the greater they become, until they haunt our every moment, as in Don DeLillo’s darkest comedy, White Noise. This leads us, according to Baudrillard, to an obsession with death that can be felt in the media fascination with catastrophes like 9/11. Death “becomes the object of a perverse desire. Desire invests the very separation of life and death” (147). Political economy’s inability to absorb the rupturing energy of death is thus compensated by the symbolic yield of the media catastrophe. In these events we experience an artificial death which fascinates us, bored as we are by the routine order of the system and the “natural” death it prescribes for us. Natural death represents an unnegotiable negation of life and the tedious certainty of an unwanted end. It therefore inspires insurrection, until “reason itself is pursued by the hope of a universal revolt against its own norms and privileges” (162). The terrorist spectacle is an example of such a revolt, in which death gains symbolic distinction and becomes more than simply “natural.” We may not think we identify with the terrorists’ superstitions about honor in the next life, but in events like 9/11, Baudrillard would suggest, we nevertheless identify despite ourselves with both with the terrorists and their victims:

     

    We are all hostages, and that's the secret of hostage-taking, and we are all dreaming, instead of dying stupidly working oneself to the ground, of receiving death and of giving death. Giving and receiving constitute one symbolic act (the symbolic act par excellence), which rids death of all the indifferent negativity it holds for us in the "natural" order of capital. (166)

     

    Violent, artificial death is a symbolic event witnessed collectively. “Technical, non natural and therefore willed (ultimately by the victim him- or herself), death becomes interesting once again since willed death has a meaning” (165). Was 9/11 willed by the victims? Obviously not, and yet, Baudrillard would suggest, in our identification with both the killers and those who died, we ourselves are not so innocent.

     

    Nihilism and Terrorism

     

    Implosion of meaning in the media. Implosion of the social in the masses. Infinite growth of the masses as a function of the acceleration of the system. Energetic impasse. Point of inertia.

    –Baudrillard (Simulacra 161)

    Baudrillard’s most prescient statements regarding terrorism and the spirit that motivates it were issued in the 1981 essay “On Nihilism,” which falls at the end of Simulacra and Simulations. Here he distinguishes the first two great manifestations of nihilism by placing them parallel to his second and third orders of simulation. Recall:

     

    1. it [the image] is the reflection of a profound reality;
    2. it masks and denatures a profound reality;
    3. it masks the absence of a profound reality;
    4. it has no relation to any reality whatsoever; it is its own pure simulacrum. (6)

     

    The first wave of nihilism occurs in the second order of simulation, and corresponds with the Enlightenment and Romantic revolutions against the order of appearances, “the disenchantment of the world and its abandonment to the violence of interpretation and of history” (Simulacra 160). Nihilism is thus first and foremost, for Baudrillard, the signature of the post-metaphysical philosopher. He thus places Nietzsche’s statement that “God is dead” at the center of all modernity, but adds that once the critique of metaphysics has run its course, a new type of nihilism is ushered in. “When God died, there was still Nietzsche to say so,” i.e., after God there is Nietzsche, after Nietzsche, only simulation (159). “God is not dead, he has become hyperreal.”

     

    This second wave of nihilism occurs in the twentieth century and spans the third and fourth orders of simulation, beginning with “surrealism, dada, the absurd, and political nihilism” (159), which sought to reveal the absence of a profound metaphysical reality behind our representations, and ending in

     

    postmodernity, which is the immense process of the destruction of meaning, equal to the earlier destruction of appearances. He who strikes with meaning is killed by meaning. (161)

     

    After discovering the absence of a profound meaning behind the world of appearances, those who seek the true meaning of things end up impaled on the truth that there is no true meaning to be had. Nietzsche’s dilemma. And so Baudrillard boldly declares: “I am a nihilist,” and swears himself to the destruction of both appearance and meaning, the first two waves, but also to the destruction of the appearance/meaning dichotomy altogether, the postmodern phase of the second wave. If western culture can now be characterized by Baudrillard’s notion of a fourth order simulation society, where simulacra dominate our lives and the faith in a “profound reality” has turned radically agnostic, it is here that one must plant one’s (post-) philosophical flag. Rather than take the reactionary approach of a return to metaphysics, Baudrillard affects a nihilistic version of Nietzschean amor fati, accepting the system’s melancholy and pushing to its limit the “mode of disappearance” it effects in everything it touches (162). The melancholy in Adorno and Benjamin, holds Baudrillard, already stems from this recognition that dis-enchantment, dis-appearance, the critique of reason itself are all inherent to the system’s functionality. But their “dialectic” was already “nostalgic,” their melancholy the last healthy pulse of “ressentiment” against the systemization of death, a third order phenomenon. Melancholia today, says Baudrillard, is no longer a matter of disenchantment and demystification: “It is simply disappearance.” No longer an affect one can deploy in a critique of the system, it is now the affect of “the brutal disaffection that characterizes our saturated systems.”

     

    Though Baudrillard does not deny melancholia as our appropriate Zeitgeist, his implicit suggestion in the essay, which Kellner neglects, is that the passive nihilism (inertia, entropy, implosion) produced by the implicitly nihilistic system is the philosophical enemy, which he means to challenge by means of his own brand of active nihilism: “What then remains of a possible nihilism in theory? What new scene can unfold, where nothing and death could be replayed as a challenge, as a stake?” (159). The system has effectively absorbed the first two waves of active, critical nihilism into its own nihilism, and induces a state of stupefied, melancholic indifference in the “receivers” (we are no longer spectators) of its mass mediations. Baudrillard’s strategy, then, is to push the system faster (“revenge of speed on inertia”), to the point of its implosion, by writing theory that is the equivalent of intellectual terrorism (161). All other theory at this point only “assists in the freezing over of meaning, it assists in the precession of simulacra and of indifferent forms. The desert grows” (161). In the desert of the real, no amount of analysis can “resolve the imperious necessity of checking the system in broad daylight. This, only terrorism can do” (163). Terrorism, writes Baudrillard,

     

    is the trait of reversion that effaces the remainder, just as a single ironic smile effaces a whole discourse, just as a single flash of denial in a slave effaces all the power and pleasure of the master. The more hegemonic the system, the more the imagination is struck by the smallest of its reversals. The challenge, even infinitesimal, is the image of a chain failure. Only this reversibility without a counterpart is an event today, on the nihilistic and disaffected stage of the political. Only it mobilizes the imaginary.

     

    This is of course what happened on 9/11, as Baudrillard has since pointed out, but Kellner would also likely point out that Baudrillard, having himself wished for 9/11, begins “L’Esprit” by projecting this wish onto the rest of us (180). Our collective complicity in the wish is of course impossible to gauge, but in “On Nihilism” Baudrillard had already confessed his own complicity with nihilistic terrorism in the most carefully calibrated terms:

     

    If being a nihilist, is carrying, to the unbearable limit of hegemonic systems, this radical trait of derision and of violence, this challenge that the system is summoned to answer through its own death, then I am a terrorist and nihilist in theory as the others are with their weapons. Theoretical violence, not truth, is the only recourse left us. But such a sentiment is utopian. Because it would be beautiful to be a nihilist, if there were still a radicality--as it would be nice to be a terrorist, if death, including that of the terrorist, still had meaning.

     

    Baudrillard gives up on the idea of a radicality in theory, a position of negativity relative to the system, Adorno’s position. But he is at his negative dialectical best in this passage, which is a statement of complicity with the utopianism of the terrorist’s challenge, as well as a statement of the utmost pessimism regarding the subject’s ability to effect a change in the system, which in the end neutralizes every event, no matter how deadly:

     

    The dead are annulled by indifference, that is where terrorism is the involuntary accomplice of the whole system, not politically, but in the accelerated form of indifference that it contributes to imposing. Death no longer has a stage, neither phantasmatic nor political, on which to represent itself, to play itself out, either a ceremonial or a violent one. And this is the victory of the other nihilism, of the other terrorism, that of the system. (Simulacra 163-164)

     

    Did death have a stage on September 11th? Have the dead since been annulled by indifference, caught up in the media’s mode of disappearance? Despite the terrorists’ successful attempt to put death back on stage in a symbolic exchange with “the system,” the majority of Americans have by now assimilated its violence into the broader narrative of a war against terrorism and Evil, one of the many things on TV.

     

    The 9/11 attacks have succeeded, as Baudrillard says, in turning the U.S. into a vengeful police state and in accelerating its attempts to dominate the world through military force, and this in turn has likely accelerated the mood of passive nihilism (with its fascination, melancholy, and indifference). No one can claim that any sort of progressive politics were served by the terrorists’ actions. Baudrillard certainly does not. And the terrorists weren’t even nihilists, they were fundamentalists, a far cry from Baudrillard’s romantic ideal of the philosopher-terrorist. In “On Nihilism,” Baudrillard, like Adorno in the end, prefers theory as praxis to actual praxis. He concludes not on a note of cynicism and melancholy, as Kellner reads him, but on a note of paradoxical idealism:

     

    There is no more hope for meaning. And without a doubt this is a good thing: meaning is mortal. But that on which it has imposed its ephemeral reign, what it hoped to liquidate in order to impose the reign of the Enlightenment, that is, appearances, they are immortal, invulnerable to the nihilism of meaning or of non-meaning itself. This is where seduction begins. (163-164)

     

    Rather than respond with apathy and indifference to the disappearance of meaning now under way, Baudrillard resurrects the once banished realm of appearances, the aesthetic, in a move beyond the nihilism of meaning/nihilism of non-meaning dichotomy. As Kellner writes: “Like Nietzsche, he wants to derive value from the order of appearances without appeal to a supernatural world, a hinterwelt or a deep reality” (120). Kellner, who apparently thinks a more Nietzschean joyfulness, as opposed to Baudrillard’s melancholy, is still preferable at the end of the twentieth century, nevertheless holds to the metaphysics of morality against the aestheticism of the French Nietzscheans. For those who no longer acknowledge a “hinterwelt,” however, the idea that we exist in a world of appearances which are irreducible to true essences (like Good and Evil), is not so far fetched. One thus takes the Nietzschean turn, toward the aesthetic, and this, Baudrillard tells us, “is where seduction begins.” His later work on this concept in On Seduction need not be elaborated here, but we should note that Rex Butler has shown the concept of seduction in Baudrillard to be an elaboration on the concept of symbolic exchange (71-118). “Symbolic exchange,” according to Butler,

     

    is not simply the negation of economic value but rather its limit. It is the thinking of that loss, that relationship to the other, which at once allows exchange, opens it up, and means that it is never complete, never able to account for itself. (81-82)

     

    If seduction is what rules the chasm left by a symbolic exchange between the challenger and the system, what was the direction of the seduction created by 9/11? Were we seduced? Was Baudrillard? Are we being seduced by Baudrillard? Having revisited his perspective on terrorism prior to 9/11–terrorism as the ultimate metaphor, but naïve in its utopianism—let us consider his perspective après le spectacle.

     

    9/11: Morning of the Living Dead

     

    The spectacle of terrorism forces upon us the terrorism of the spectacle.

    — Jean Baudrillard (“L’Esprit” 15)

     

    In “L’Esprit du Terrorisme,” Baudrillard maintains that the U.S. as lone Superpower conjures its own Other; by dominating the globe it creates global resistance. Baudrillard’s opening gambit–“In the end, it was they who did it but we who wished it”–means to implicate us all in a symbolic exchange with 9/11:

     

    It goes well beyond the hatred that the desolate and the exploited--those who ended up on the wrong side of the new world order--feel toward the dominant global power. This malicious desire resides in the hearts of even those who have shared in the spoils. The allergy to absolute order, to absolute power, is universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center were, precisely because of their identicality, the perfect incarnation of this absolute order. ("L'Esprit" 13)

     

    The twin towers, like the twin political parties in the U.S., represent a balance of power, two forces locked in opposition. But like the Democrats and the Republicans, both towers are virtually identical, and their dualistic logic leaves no room for remainders. People rebel, either secretly or openly, against an airtight system, two towers of power representing the same people in charge, the illusion of difference. Finally someone throws a monkey wrench into the works in the form of four jet airplanes, aimed not only at the symbols of American power, but at the American mass media, which serve to broadcast the terror and violence worldwide. By way of our simulation technologies, the terrorists were able to issue a singular challenge to each American, and it is in this way that the event is properly symbolic in the Baudrillardian sense, as a gift demanding return. This is a common motif in Baudrillard, this moment where simulation society is somehow reversed or revolutionized by the symbolic. By insisting on our unconfessable complicity, the assumption that we all have a soft spot for the underdog and a sore spot for the overdog, especially when the latter is on the brink of dominating the global playpen, Baudrillard further challenges us to answer the challenge of 9/11, to enter the debate at the level of a singular exchange. As individuals, our ability to influence what is done in the name of the U.S. is limited, but as intellectuals, we must ask ourselves: what is the symbolic meaning and effect of the event? An essay exam for the whole nation. The twin towers symbolize corporate globalization, the Pentagon the American military, and both together stand for what Baudrillard calls “the system.” The numbers 9-1-1 signal Emergency, and the date marks a number of historical events: the 1989 massacre in Haiti which ousted Aristide; the 1973 overthrow of Allende in Chile; and the 1683 battle of Vienna, where Islam was ultimately defeated by Poland, the beginning of the end of the Ottoman Empire.5 But for Baudrillard the symbolic meaning of the event lies not only in its reducibility to such referents, but in its irreducible, singular, and irrevocable challenge to each and every imagination. Doubtless most Americans would deny any complicity with the terrorists on 9/11, but few would deny that it was the most fascinating day of the century, and this fascination, the product of the system, was what the terrorists counted on.

     

    Baudrillard demonstrates in this essay that what the terrorists carried out is indeed one version–the most literal version–of what he has meant all along by a symbolic death exchange with the system, thus implicating his own theories as those which explain, and in this sense further fortify, the symbolic power of terrorism. His instruction manual continues:

     

    Never attack the system in terms of the balance of power. The balance of power is an imaginary (revolutionary) construct imposed by the system itself, a construct that exists in order to force those who attack it to fight on the battlefield of reality, the system's own terrain. Instead, move the struggle into the symbolic sphere, where defiance, reversion, and one-upmanship are the rule, so that the only way to respond to death is with an equivalent or even greater death. Defy the system with a gift to which it cannot reply except with its own death and its own downfall. . . . You have to make the enemy lose face. And you'll never achieve that through brute force, by merely eliminating the Other. (16)

     

    Certainly the terrorists’ attack on the battlefield of reality was devastating on its own, but their attack on the symbolic battlefield, Baudrillard maintains, was far more devastating in terms of achieving their global aspirations. According to the system’s logic, the Other loses when they only kill one of your soldiers and you kill all of theirs, but according to the symbolic logic of the terrorists, the greater the sacrifice, the greater the symbolic honor. “In dealing all the cards to itself, the system forced the Other to change the rules of the game,” and under the new rules, the strongest power in the world violently decimating one of the weakest powers at the cost of a single life is not honorable, it is only efficient (14). Baudrillard, scandalous as ever, hands the symbolic victory of the war on terror to the terrorists, all but crediting them with recent economic, political, and psychological “recessions” in the West, and with the fact that “deregulation has ended in maximum security, in a level of restriction and constraint equivalent to that found in fundamentalist societies” (18).

     

    Since they cannot not report and sensationalize the event, the media are enlisted in a symbolic exchange that only amplifies the terrorist’s power to terrorize: “The media are part of the event, they’re part of the terror,” and so “this terrorist violence is not ‘real’ at all. It’s worse, in a sense: it’s symbolic” (18). The “real” violence here is thus conducted through the technologies of simulation, which the terrorists have hijacked for their symbolic ends. Baudrillard’s claim that the symbolic violence was worse and hence more “real” than the real violence of 9/11 is typically provocative, and another letter to Harper’s takes him on on this score. 6 The argument over which violence was worse, however, is a dead end, for the question of “the spirit of terrorism” is what is at stake. What the terrorists count on is that

     

    at the level of images and information, it is impossible to distinguish between the spectacular and the symbolic, impossible to distinguish between crime and repression. And it is this uncontrollable outburst of reversibility that is the veritable victory of terrorism. (18)

     

    Here again this motif in Baudrillard, where simulation society (the society of the spectacle) is somehow reversed by the symbolic. The reversibility of crime and repression depends upon the media’s being seduced into working for the criminals, and in effecting this reversal, the terrorists set off a symbolic-atomic bomb. Their physical violence was aimed at the lives of thousands of American taxpayers, but their symbolic violence was aimed at the symbols of corporate globalization, the American military and perhaps all of Christendom. The agencies of the latter are thus forced into the symbolic arena, and must choose how to respond, what appearances to deploy.

     

    In one of the letters to Harper’s, Matthew Kelly writes that “the attack’s symbolic wallop is obvious to a toddler,” but it is not just about recognizing that the twin towers and the Pentagon stand for. Baudrillard means for us also to recognize the primitive symbolic challenge, the sacrifice, the gift of their own deaths, which demands our response if we are to save face. One wonders how many Americans would be willing to sacrifice their lives as a show of support for what the twin towers and Pentagon symbolize. Baudrillard’s point about primitive symbolism is that the symbol represents a unique and binding challenge, a gift that must somehow be returned by everyone it affects. How are we, if we are the U.S., to respond? Our first priority in formulating a response should be to pose the question the U.S. news media have deemed too sensitive to ask, namely: why did they do it? On October 7, 2002, however, Osama bin Laden issued his statement on a videotaped message:

     

    What America is tasting now is something insignificant compared to what we have tasted for scores of years. Our Nation (the Islamic world) has been tasting this humiliation and degradation for more than 80 years. Its sons are killed, its blood is shed, its sanctuaries are attacked and no one hears and no one heeds. Millions of innocent children are being killed as I speak. They are being killed in Iraq without committing any sins. . . . To America, I say only a few words to it and its people. I swear to God, who has elevated the skies without pillars, neither America nor the people who live in it will dream of security before we live it here in Palestine and not before all the infidel armies leave the land of Muhammad peace be upon him. (Andreas 29)

     

    The challenge represented in the gift is clear: “you will not know peace until your military leaves us in peace.” This implies a direct question: why is the U.S. military in Arab countries? The answer, of course, is that the U.S. military is there to protect U.S. economic interests, in accordance with its long-held notions of manifest destiny. But U.S. officials do not respond to this implicit question, their response is no response, which of course is a response in itself in symbolic terms. The terrorists count on the likelihood that the U.S. will make a move the world will view as symbolically dishonorable and aesthetically ugly, in relation to their act of defiance, that the harder it strikes back, the worse it will look, and the greater the global resistance. The U.S. can only win on the aesthetico-symbolic plane, where prestation rules, by staying its hand, for there is no courage or beauty in brute force.7

     

    So does Baudrillard really support terrorism? Do we? Once again playing the devil’s hand, he seduces us to play the avenging angel by taking a moral stand. But suppose we take the Nietzschean turn, with Baudrillard, and view the issue in aesthetic terms: can moral goodness not still succeed in being beautiful if it avoids making metaphysical claims? When morality is conceived in aesthetic terms, it loses its guarantee of universality, but not its symbolic force. And yet by forcing Good on the world, the U.S. only forces Evil to gain strength. “Terrorism,” Baudrillard tells us, “is immoral,” but it is a

     

    response to globalization, which is itself immoral. We are therefore immoral ourselves, so if we hope to understand anything we will need to get beyond Good and Evil. . . . In the end, Good cannot vanquish Evil except by declining to be Good, since, in monopolizing global power, it entails a backfire of proportional violence. (Simulacra 15)

     

    The U.S., if it wishes to be Good, can only win, in symbolic terms, by refusing to play, by refusing to be Good. Baudrillard certainly does not proffer war, which he concludes is simply “a continuation of the absence of politics by other means” (18). What he recommends, without naming it, is the forgiveness of debt, the redemption of “Evil.”

     

    Compare this, then, to Nietzsche’s advice, which might have been directed at a future world power such as the U.S.:

     

    It is not unthinkable that a society might attain such a consciousness of power that it could allow itself the noblest luxury possible to it--letting those who harm it go unpunished. "What are my parasites to me?:" it might say. "May they live and prosper: I am strong enough for that!" The justice which began with, "everything is dischargeable, everything must be discharged," ends by winking and letting those incapable of discharging their debt go free: it ends, as does every good thing on earth, by overcoming itself. This self-overcoming of justice: one knows the beautiful name it has given itself--mercy; it goes without saying that mercy remains the privilege of the most powerful man, or better, his--beyond the law. (Genealogy 72-73)

     

    The triumph of justice, according to Nietzsche, is its self-overcoming; the most moral is the extra-moral, beyond the war of Good and Evil. If the U.S. had gone with its first name for its new war effort–“Operation Infinite Justice”–would Americans have become more readily aware of the ironic fact that their country had in many ways served injustice in the Middle East for a great many years? Would some have been quicker to see that “infinite justice” can only amount to infinite forgiveness? In this passage, Nietzsche taunts America’s wealth and dignity, seducing us with an image of ourselves more befitting our vanity than the image of a vengeful America. Vengeance, ressentiment, always claims morality as its cause, but forgiveness does not have to, because it is a washing away of guilt/debt, because it is a gift. Rather than make claims, it gives them away, which nevertheless poses a challenge to the other to counter-give with a symbolic response. This is for Nietzsche, as for Baudrillard, one would gather, the most beautiful aesthetic/symbolic gesture, an extra-moral gesture, beyond Good and Evil. It is also the only means to peace short of the total annihilation of a virtually invisible enemy. Would a Nietzschean-style forgiveness of debt not entail gestures like the removal of U.S. military bases from the Middle East, the nationalization of Arab oil assets, the discontinuation of all support for dictatorships in the area and around the world, and the promotion of a Palestinian nation? And if such tokens of “forgiveness” were offered, does anyone doubt that a more livable peace would soon be at hand, and that the U.S. would incur its greatest possible symbolic honor?

     

    If we assume, with Baudrillard, that there is a rule of reciprocity between conscious beings, wherein their symbolic standing vis à vis one another depends on what they give in exchange, and if we assume that the recognition of this rule of value runs deeper in humans everywhere than does the recognition of the rule of value imposed by capitalism, and if we assume that the terrorists have appealed to this rule before the world, do we choose to play by the rule, or to ignore it? So far the U.S. has ignored it by refusing to answer the implicit questions: Why do they hate us? Why is our military there? By what right do we exploit their resources, overthrow their elected leaders, and drop bombs on their people? But no response is still a response, symbolically speaking, and the world is listening. What the system did in response to 9/11, or instead of responding to it, was to re-absorb its symbolic violence back into the never ending flow of anesthetized simulation, i.e., it has attempted “to replace a truly formidable event, unique and unforseen, with a pseudo-event that is as repetitive as it is familiar” (Harper’s 18). This is exactly what Baudrillard predicted would happen in “On Nihilism,” this neutralizing of the terrorist event by the system. In “L’Esprit,” he notes that:

     

    In the terrorist attack the event eclipsed all of our interpretive models, whereas in this mindlessly military and technological war we see the opposite: the interpretive model eclipsing the event. (18)

     

    Baudrillard would have us recognize that the attack on 9/11 succeeded in poking a hole in the U.S.’s mighty shield, thus opening a space “where seduction begins,” and in provoking a murderous response. The terrorists therefore succeeded (are succeeding) in making the U.S. look bad on the symbolic battlefield, and in pushing the system further toward its limit and its implosion, a goal Baudrillard expressly favors. It seems most reasonable to conclude, however, that such violent, physical provocations serve no one, not even Baudrillard, and need not be equated with the kind of theoretical terrorism and aesthetic violence advocated by him (though one can always accuse him of being the first to blur the lines between the real and the imaginary). Given his cynicism about the system’s ability to neutralize every opposition, however, Baudrillard sees such dramatic gestures (as 9/11) as naïve in their utopianism. And yet he too has his utopianism, which can be found in the silent evocation of the only decent, beautiful solution to the challenge of 9/11. Unlike naïve terrorists and secondary critics, however, Baudrillard will not speak his utopia,8which in this case is the possibility of forgiveness as a world-historical symbolic event. This utopian moment in Baudrillard, this idea that the U.S. might forgive its debtors, is obviously unrealistic as yet, but every challenge opens up a new space in the universe. This is where seduction begins.

     

    As for death, it is still un-American. We live mostly, as Ernest Becker claimed, in denial of death, which our marketing specialists have yet to fully package. We live in ignorance of the death and misery caused by our military and its industry. No one knows how many lives, or anything about the individuals killed. We see only TV spectacles. We do not see the real, or know the real, but we are a culture fascinated by its simulacrum. Approximately 3,000 more people joined the ranks of the dead on 9/11 and for most of us they were only abstractions, but the fascination we felt, the release, is something everyone is now anticipating, every false alarm a tease. Whether we see it in Baudrillardian or Freudian terms, this is the death drive. The most recent Gallup poll shows 53% of Americans in favor of the U.S. invading Iraq alone. Toward the end of Symbolic Exchange and Death, Baudrillard states what he believes is on all of our minds:

     

    Death itself demands to be experienced immediately, in total blindness and total ambivalence. But is it revolutionary? If political economy is the most rigorous attempt to put an end to death, it is clear that only death can put an end to political economy. (86-87)

     

    Forget waiting for it, let’s have another spectacle; let’s demand death now! Is Baudrillard being sinister when he tempts us with our desire for more death? Is he death’s seducer? Not if we allow for his caveat about the term “death” found in the book’s second footnote: “death ought never to be understood as the real event that affects a subject or a body, but as a form in which the determinacy of the subject and of value is lost” (5, n. 2). Baudrillard uses the term death to signify “the real event” throughout Symbolic Exchange and Death, and only sometimes uses it as a conceptual figure like this, but if he is not talking here about real death, where some subject and some value are certainly lost, what is he talking about? Death, in Baudrillard’s specialized sense, signifies the end of “bound energies in stable oppositions,” but since the system itself is also capable of imposing such deaths, he clarifies that the death of the system can only be achieved by way of its strategic reversal:

     

    For the system is master: like God it can bind or unbind energies; what it is incapable of (and what it can no longer avoid) is reversibility. Reversibility alone therefore, rather than unbinding or drifting, is fatal to it. This is exactly what the term symbolic "exchange" means.

     

    Baudrillard contends that the system cannot reverse itself, but that one might cause it to enact “death” as the form of an exchange in which its values no longer apply, in which its determinations become indeterminate. One does this by giving it a gift it cannot respond to without killing itself in this way, without undermining its own authority. This can be done effectively with words and/or pictures:

     

    Figure 1: The Selling of Joy9
    © Thomas Antel
    Used with permission of photographer

     

    but it can also be done with jet airplanes:

     

    Figure 2

     

    53% of our baser instincts may demand that real death, the “real event that affects a subject or a body” (whether in Baghdad or Manhattan) be experienced now, but Baudrillard does not. Baudrillard is far more nihilistic than most terrorists and warmongers. The capitalist system, he says, will sooner or later reclaim all such “freed energies.” Whether or not we share his pessimism, his conception of the symbolic affords us a view of human relations that is based on recognition and reciprocity, instead of ignorance and domination, which is about what America needs right now. As for his remarks on terrorism and death, however, let us hope Baudrillard does not suffer Nietzsche’s fate and wind up the misread philosopher of murderous thugs.

     

    Notes

     

    1. From “L’Esprit du Terrorisme” (13, 14, 18).

     

    2. See Symbolic Exchange and Death (5, n. 2), which I discuss in the final section of this essay.

     

    3. It is likely that Baudrillard’s theory of the primitive and his whole theory of the symbolic (as gift) derive more from a history of colonial projection than from the truth about the colonized. In The Potlatch Papers: A Colonial Case History, Christopher Bracken argues that the potlatch in twentieth-century European anthropology and philosophy is the invention of a nineteenth-century Canadian law meant to outlaw it. Bracken does not mention Baudrillard, but Lyotard does along these same lines: “How is it that he does not see that the whole problematic of the gift, of symbolic exchange, such as he receives it from Mauss…belongs in its entirety to Western racism and imperialism–that it is still ethnology’s good savage, slightly libidinalized, which he inherits with the concept?” (106). No longer believing in true origins, however, Baudrillard would like to be free of the distinction between the real and the imaginary savage so as to focus on the concept of symbolic exchange, a concept containing a compelling, if understated, ethic: that one must respond, and is responsible, to the other; that one’s honor depends on what one gives; and that the value of the gift is not quantifiable but is symbolic. One will get nowhere trying to verify his speculations about the “real primitives,” and I could not speak for indigenous people as to whether they should value his “gift” to them as a compliment or an insult. See Piper for discussion of Baudrillard’s place in the new primitivist counter-culture, “the drop-out culture of the sixties redefined as both indigenous and postmodern” (177).

     

    4. See for instance “Homer’s Contest” (Portable 32-39).

     

    5. See Stille and Alden.

     

    6. Matthew Kelly of Brooklyn writes “I choked on the quotation marks buffeting the word ‘real’ . . . which, in his view, the September 11 violence was not” (86).

     

    7. As I write, President Bush has declared a new, “preventive” unilateralism in U.S. military policy, and the Senate has authorized the President to proceed with an invasion of Iraq at his own discretion, regardless of international opinion. This current push toward global domination by force must strike all but the most authoritarian Americans as deeply ignoble. After all, it flies in the face of our TV and Hollywood upbringing, which teaches us that it’s only bad guys who want to rule the world and that nobody should end up as “lord of the rings.” Indeed, the contradiction between image and reality is becoming so apparent that, in keeping with the Orwellian nature of the Bush administration, we might almost expect revisionist remakes to start replacing the standard Hollywood movies. We’ll find that Austin Powers and Dr. Evil have somehow changed roles, and that we’re cheering for good guys who rule the world with an iron hand while egalitarian villains plot against them.

     

    8. In The Illusion of the End, Baudrillard cites Adorno to this effect: “Every ecstasy ultimately prefers to take the path of renunciation rather than sin against its own concept by realizing itself” (104).

     

    9. There’s a powerful narrative implied in this photo; an annoyed resident of the so-called “third world” holds a box of Joy for the camera, and suddenly we don’t feel so happy about Joy. When we are made conscious of the implicit, metaphysical insult of a class-based global village, we are made aware of the symbolic standing between the first world and the third. The anti-commercial is a symbolic challenge to the real commercial, posing one image against another, demanding a response. Baudrillardian symbolic exchange is based on this principle of reversal and seduction, and so has much in common with Guy Debord’s and the Situationists’ concept of “detournement” and with what Kalle Lasn and Adbusters call “culture jamming” (see Lasn 103-109).

    Works Cited

     

    • Alden, Dianne. “History is the Root Cause of Everything.” NewsMax.com 11 Oct. 2002. 29 Aug. 2002. <http://www.tysknews.com/Depts/terrorism/root_cause.htm>.
    • Andreas, Joel. Addicted to War: Why the U.S. Can’t Kick Militarism. Oakland: AK, 2002.
    • Baudrillard, Jean. Baudrillard Live: Selected Interviews. Ed. Mike Gane. New York: Routledge, 1993.
    • —. For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign. Trans. Charles Levin. St. Louis, MO: Telos, 1981.
    • —. The Illusion of the End. Trans. Chris Turner. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1994.
    • —. “L’Esprit du Terrorisme.” Trans. Donovan Hohn. Harper’s Magazine (February 2002): 13-18.
    • —. Simulacra and Simulation. Trans. Sheila Faria Glaser. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1994.
    • —. Symbolic Exchange and Death. Trans. Iain Hamilton Grant. London: Sage, 1993.
    • Bracken, Christopher. The Potlatch Papers: A Colonial Case History. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1997.
    • Butler, Rex. Jean Baudrillard: The Defense of the Real. London: Sage, 1999.
    • Kellner, Douglas. Jean Baudrillard: From Marxism to Postmodernism and Beyond. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1989.
    • Kelly, Mathew; Schlesinger, Edward B.; Wersan, Sarah A. “Letters to the Editor.” Harper’s Magazine (May 2002): 4.
    • Lasn, Kalle. Culture Jam: The Uncooling of America™. New York: Eagle Brook, 1999.
    • Lyotard, Jean-François. Libidinal Economy. Trans. Iain Hamilton Grant. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1993.
    • Mauss, Marcel. The Gift: the Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies. Trans. W.D. Halls. New York: Norton, 1990.
    • Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Genealogy of Morals. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage, 1967.
    • —. The Portable Nietzsche. Ed. and Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Penguin, 1954.
    • Piper, Karen. Cartographic Fictions: Maps, Race, and Identity. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 2002.
    • Stille, Alexander. “The Many Meanings of 9/11.” Council on Foreign Relations. (2001). 29 Aug. 2002. <http://www.cfr.org/Public/publications/xStille.html>.

     

  • Notices

     

     

     

    Volume 13, Number 2
    January, 2003
    Every issue of Postmodern Culturecarries notices of events, calls for papers, and other announcements, free of charge. Advertisements will also be published on an exchange basis. If you respond to one of the ads or announcements below, please mention that you saw the notice in PMC.

     


    Publication Announcements

    • Prefiguring Cyberculture: An Intellectual History
    • Hypermedia Joyce Studies
    • Variant
    • PixelPapers 22

     

  • Good Place and No Place

    Susan Laxton

    Art History and Archaeology
    Columbia University
    Sjl16@columbia.edu

     

    Review of: Catherine de Zegher and Mark Wigley, eds., The Activist Drawing: Retracing Situationist Architectures from Constant’s New Babylon to Beyond. New York: The Drawing Center, and Cambridge, Mass.: MIT P, 2001.

     
    How can a drawing be activist?

     
    Can a graphic mark constitute direct, vigorous, oppositional action? Graffiti, at its gouging best, comes to mind. But then, that’s writing. Drawing, traditionally conceived, withdraws from the public sphere, a fugitive trace, mute consort to the creative process. And even considering the historical shifts in drawing’s significance–from its function as ideational armature in the Renaissance to a model of spontaneity and expression in the early twentieth century to recent revaluations based in lability, erasure, and obsolescence–to advance its physical presence as an intervention capable of effecting political change is to take up the question of the efficacy of art in general.

     

    Specifically, it is to ask the dreadful question, “Does art matter?” and to consider further the implications of what it might mean “to matter.” This is the daunting project launched in The Activist Drawing: Retracing Situationist Architectures from Constant’s New Babylon to Beyond, co-edited by Catherine de Zegher, director of The Drawing Center in New York, and architectural historian Mark Wigley. While its authors would not claim to have found conclusive answers (they cannot seem to agree on a common enemy), opening discussion of the Great Unspoken of art historical discourse gives the book its contemporary urgency. Through their examination of architectural drawing as a hinge between the immateriality of representation and the materiality of lived experience, the authors probe the outcome of nearly a century’s effort toward a positive breakdown between art and life, and they address the possibilities of drawing in general as a conduit for revising lived experience. What emerges is a productive examination of the medium itself: drawing’s historical construction and theoretical participation in the vagaries of artistic practice, and the suggestion that the very characteristics of banality, flexibility, and disposability that have produced drawing as marginal to the arts are the grounds for its historical consideration as a site of resistance.

     
    The book is an expanded record of a symposium organized by Wigley and art historian Thomas McDonough; its title, The Activist Drawing, reflects a shift in emphasis from the more monographically named exhibition at the Drawing Center from which it derived–“Another City for Another Life: Constant’s New Babylon” (2 November to 30 December 1999). Rather than merely documenting the “visionary architecture” of the Dutch artist Constant Nieuwyenhuys as it is projected in the drawings and multimedia presentations of his imagined city New Babylon (1956-1974), the participants–Benjamin Buchloh, Rosalyn Deutsche, Elizabeth Diller, Martha Rosler, Bernard Tschumi, and Anthony Vidler, in addition to Wigley and McDonough–subject Constant’s project to a scrutiny that takes seriously the ideological implications of architectural projections, with their dimensionally driven aura of “realizability,” and the historical imperatives that might call for their revision. The critical dimension of the book, which stands out in opposition to the laudatory conventions of the typical exhibition catalogue, is underscored by de Zegher’s focus on New Babylon’s own idealism. In her introduction, she draws attention to the book’s emergence “in the context of a citywide celebration of ‘utopia’” driven by the New York Public Library’s exhibition “Utopia: The Search for the Ideal Society in the Western World” (14 October 2000 to 27 January 2001). New Babylon, as a fully automated city whose inhabitants, freed from labor, “play” by endlessly reconfiguring their environment to suit their individual and collective desires, is recast in this context as a plan for an experimental lifestyle which in retrospect seems to land somewhere between Fourier and Disney.

     
    The Drawing Center’s exhibition and symposium took place a year in advance of the “Utopia” show, so there is no direct reference to the materials or theories made available there. But founding a theoretical critical practice such as Constant’s, in which the inhabitant of New Babylon “will not have to make art, for he can be creative in the practice of his daily life” (qtd. in Constant 9), and establishing that practice as dependent on yet enacted outside of technological support, is a utopian notion which in academic circles today is widely regarded as suspect. The difficulty of attributing an unqualified materialist activism to Constant’s work is first communicated in Buchloh’s introductory conversation with him at the symposium. After Constant’s early assertion regarding his involvement with the COBRA group–“We didn’t consider ourselves avant-garde. The word is never used in COBRA1“(16)–Buchloh leads him, not without resistance, through a succession of encounters with apparently contradictory models of vanguard influence: DeStijl, Giacometti, the Soviet avant-garde. Through an unflinching examination of the problems implied by what de Zegher calls “the dynamic intersection of drawing, utopianism, and activism in a multimedia era” (9), this book emerges as an exploration of the eclipse of avant-garde artistic practice as it is understood from its original, that is, political definition, as Constant and his project are interrogated for foreknowledge of the obstacles to such practices today.

     
    With irony worthy of the postmodern, Thomas More named “Utopia” to signify both “good place” and “no place.” As the symposium participants focus on the problem of how to receive both the virtuality and the technological utopianism of Constant’s project as relevant to the contemporary situation in which, as de Zegher admits, “the imagined homo ludens . . . has not brought about a daily life of invention and action but of leisure and consumption,” the faint outlines of a prognosis for goodness materialize (10). Recasting Constant’s utopian project as artistic practice–a mediated, semiotic intervention rather than a program with ambitions for material realization–shifts the question into the field of representation, where drawing, the point of intersection between the materiality of architecture and the idealism of artistic practice, is advanced as a space of resistance. Yet in a postmodern culture in which the master of détournement turns out to be capitalism itself, it is the “no place” of graphic utopia of which we are made acutely aware: the disappearance in turn of paper support, the analog mark, practical accountability, and political activism.

     
    Mark Wigley takes on the challenge of reconciling the mechanical and the creative by arguing for their ontological presence in drawing itself. In his essay, “Paper, Scissors, Blur,” Wigley establishes drawing as the very ground of architecture’s acceptance as a fine art in the Renaissance, and drawing’s own emergence as “origin” and site of authenticity as having been established only through the sacrifice of paper: a disappearance of the ground in the presence of the graphic mark. This deconstructive observation alone, of an origin based in absence, places drawing at the center of the current theoretical fray over virtuality, simulacra, and digital processes as they relate to representation. But Wigley goes further, to establish the historical “rise” of drawing as utterly coextensive with the mass production of paper and the widespread use of the printing press, that is, as dependent on early modern technological innovation and the appearance of a “cult of reproduction.” For Wigley, drawing at its inception is at once essential and dependent, ideational and expressive, somatic index and symbol of the utterly rational. As he traces drawing historically through the pressures of modernism to the prevailing ideologies of Constant’s postwar context, what emerges is an image of drawing’s inner plurality, of a medium constituted by complementary differences. He writes,

     

    The project turns on the fragility of the line between originality and reproduction, unique unpredictable events and mechanization, spontaneous play and automated machinery. In the very techniques of drawing, Constant encounters the logic of the project that he is trying to represent. As the drawings of New Babylon slide from “mechanical” to “expressive,” the relentless smoothness of the slide, the extremely minor variations from drawing to drawing, and the repetition of the same images in different media, effectively undermine the standard oppositions. A sense of reproduction is embedded in a string of originals and thereby conveys the organizing principle of the project. The effect of a hundred unique works on paper is that vast mechanical structures assume an atmospheric immateriality and expressive flashes assume a structural physical presence. The collapse of the distinction between mechanization and spontaneous originality that is meant to be enacted by New Babylon is first enacted on paper. (41-2)

     

    New Babylon’s political potential is here located in an indeterminacy and play of meaning that finds its ideal medium in drawing. This ideology of infinite flow is identified as a founding principle of the Situationists, the overtly political movement of the 1960s with which Constant was associated at New Babylon’s inception. The Situationist critique of commodity-driven spectacle centered on an idealist revision of urban experience (and the architecture that determines it) through the practice of experimental counter-behaviors such as dérive, aimless wandering in a city designed for productive use. Thomas McDonough’s contribution, “Fluid Spaces: Constant and the Situationist Critique of Architecture,” identifies what he calls a “fundamental misrecognition” at the heart of the project: that the endless mobility and dynamism of New Babylon, set in opposition to instrumental reason, could also strike a blow against capitalism–a movement which is itself dependent on fluidity and incessant change. In its ambition to set in motion the salutary demise of drawing and art in general, New Babylon “forgets” the divisiveness and alienation that results from the vagaries of individual desire (an outcome of which Constant became convinced after the events of May 1968, resulting in a protracted autocritique that produced considerably darker versions of the project in the 1970s). And while Constant’s détournement of architecture–his use of architectural means to critique its static conventions–is meant as an attack on functional space, it ends up paradoxically prefiguring the dystopia of present-day public spaces. This is the theme taken up by Martha Rosler’s untitled presentation of her Airport Series, photographs of the anonymous spaces that characterize the architecture of postmodern transit and mobility. Mobility in the grip of commerce, she argues, relinquishes its activist potential along with its humanist aspirations:

     

    …the closely controlled empty spaces of transit, the terminals and lounges, promised (and symbolized) safety from the urban transients and the threats of disorder they represented . . . . The minimalism of such spaces, which appear to answer to the disjunct needs of modern transit and commerce, mutely promise the giant empty room that Adorno and others used as the presiding metaphor of the modern surveillance society–the society of total administration. (128)

     

    Rosler’s project asserts that global technology and industrialization, which promise unlimited freedoms and the fulfillment of every desire, actually subordinate social relations to quantifiable units of exchange to the extent that they deliver only freedom’s effect. The critique of Constant’s project is never made explicit, but it is clear: New Babylon’s premise of infinite traversal, far from presenting a model for resistance, is the perfect vehicle for the confidence game of pure exchange. Rosler’s position implies that where a century of political action has failed to refract the trajectory of extreme regulation, to consider that drawing, with its overtones of ideational purity and rarefied audience, could possibly succeed in doing so is laughable. Yet in her unflinching account of the unfolding postmodern condition, Rosler insists on drawing as a kind of creative humanist recourse set against the mechanization and homogenization that are equated with technological rationalism.

     
    By contrast, Anthony Vidler finds qualified potential for activism in Constant’s project precisely in its generation from the most mechanical of drawings. In “Diagrams of Utopia,” Vidler examines the New Babylon drawings through the conceit of the “diagram,” theorized here as a drawing with a mandate to action–directions, as it were, for the achievement of a plan. The diagram’s performative, machine-like function, if administered politically, serves not only to alter the internal conventions of architecture, but also to galvanize social change. While Rosler’s and Vidler’s respective positions could be seen as representative of the rift between the pragmatic and the theoretical within intellectual discourse (and consonant with radically divergent notions of line enclosed in the definition of drawing, that is, line as bodily expression and as pure abstraction), Vidler’s characterization of the diagram as the trace of process aligns it with action, effectively breaking down the separation of the practical and the conceptual to produce a third, transgressive category that is essential to the notion of any representation’s political efficacy. Rosalind Deutsche extends this abstraction into the material field in her essay “Breaking and Entering: Drawing, Situationism, Activism” by insisting on the urgency of critical responsibility in artistic practices. Deutsche invokes the urban theories of Henri Lefebvre to demonstrate the importance of critical practices at the formal level in the work of Gordon Matta Clark (who called his “building cuts” drawings)–an instance in which drawing broke with its paper ground to physically assert itself against the homogenization of the city.

     
    At apparent loggerheads with the material activism of Rosler and Deutsche, the essays by architects Elizabeth Diller and Bernard Tschumi present two different facets of theorizing architectural drawing into the “beyond” of the book’s title–the time/space matrix made available by the advent of digital processes. Diller’s “Autobiographical Notes” step off from the moment in the 1970s when architectural drawing became freed from practice, and drawing for its own sake was widely pursued. Diller’s own conceptual projects, reproduced in her essay, are the natural extension of this replacement of the tectonic with the graphic, a trajectory that inevitably resulted in “the denaturalization of building to emulate the abstraction of drawing” (131). That this abstraction, in its withdrawal from material imperatives, would slide easily into the virtual world of digital processes with consequences for social relations that might not have been entirely salutary is suggested in her projects, but never overtly stated. Rather, Diller celebrates the “uncanny disembodiment” marked by the shift from analog to digital drawing as a “new [way] of rethinking the relation between drawing and space” (133). As a result of her neutral delivery, activism seems out of the question in media in which pragmatic realization is eliminated as a possibility.

     
    This is not the case for Tschumi, who also delivers a detached analysis in “Operative Drawing,” yet insists that all of the strategies described in his overview of drawing are deployed in the service of function and utility. While his codification of architectural practices is generated out of a cybernetic matrix that Tschumi seems to take for granted, it is also made clear that he means to subordinate digital processes to an end result that will enter, and alter, the built environment as a functioning structure in the traditional sense. That is, Tschumi’s drawings are ultimately meant to be realized as buildings; drawing for him is a useful means to a higher end. The question of whether buildings generated from a digital medium can escape the imperatives of technological control to the extent that they could critique, rather than reproduce and reinforce them, is not addressed by Tschumi, although it seems clear from the premises of the symposium that it should be. Particularly questionable in this context would be the last of Tschumi’s four drawing strategies, the terrifyingly opaque “interchangeable scalar drawing” (136), described as a universally applicable unit of expression that transforms polar opposites (such as solid and void) into a heterogeneous whole.

     
    Such transcendent expressions of the sublime skate far afield from the populist strategies posited by the other contributors, which tend to preserve difference and happenstance as fields of resistance against the hegemony of standardization. The advantage of the symposium form from which The Activist Drawing is derived is that it stimulates a multivalent, critical dialogue on its subject, generating spontaneous and unexpected exchanges and responses. This sense of the fortuitous is the special potential of collaborative work: the “lucky find,” at the intersection of widely divergent, often unconceivable ranges of experience. Faced with increasing uniformity in the lived environment, the unknowability of the subject emerges as a last recourse to human engagement, if humanity is the figure that is to be set against technology. Likewise, drawing’s value to the arts, as well as its value to activism, lies in its own predisposition to the aleatory, what Henri Michaux has appraised as drawing’s bias toward the unanticipated: “Could it be that I draw because I see so clearly this thing or that thing? Not at all. Quite the contrary. I do it to be perplexed again. And I am delighted that there are traps. I look for surprises.” The aberrant mark, the false start, the doodle or marginalia, the incomplete erasure, all serve the unpredictable, and all are lost to digital processes. This revelation is the trouvaille of The Activist Drawing.

     

    Notes

     

    1. COBRA, the expressionist art group named from the first letters of the three capital cities of the countries of its founders, Asger Jorn (Copenhagen), Corneille (Brussels), and Karel Appel (Amsterdam), was founded in 1948 and disbanded by 1952. Constant was associated with the group in Amsterdam at around the same time that he began to assimilate the tenets of architecture through the work of the radically opposite De Stijl movement.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Michaux, Henri. Henri Michaux. Trans. John Ashbery. London: Robert Fraser Gallery, 1963.

     

     

  • Accelerating Beyond the Horizon

    Rekha Rosha

    Department of English and American Literature
    Brandeis University
    rosha@brandeis.edu

     

    Paul Virilio, A Landscape of Events. Trans. Julie Rose. Cambridge: MIT P, 2000.

     

    Architect, political theorist, and cultural critic, Paul Virilio is best known for his phenomenological critique of technology and militarism. In this work, as in his other writings, Virilio contends that recent developments in technoculture can best be understood by studying changes in military and political transportation and information transmission. “Dromology,” his term for this study, emphasizes the impact of speed on the organization of territory and culture.

     

    Originally published in French in 1996 under the title Un paysage d’événements, A Landscape of Events continues Virilio’s study of “dromocratic culture” and “the disastrous effects of speed on the interpretation of events” (31). Virilio’s major premise in this book is that space has been replaced by time; the Kantian argument for absolute space as the first principle of human experience is no longer applicable because space has imploded. In Kant’s discussions, the coherent visual field in which the multitude of appearances is organized is a consequence of spatiality, which is given a priori to our experience. Today, Virilio argues, what we see is not spatially organized: it is a swarm of fragmented images beamed at us at ever more furious speeds. Cyberspace is not a physical space–there are no coordinates of length, height, or depth; it exists only in time. The Internet is only one example of how space has drifted away from time. Virilio takes as his starting point mathematician Hermann Minkowski’s claim that only a union between space and time will preserve an independent reality and then works through various causes for the implosion of space.

     

    Perhaps it is because Virilio so strenuously advocates for the redemption of space that his book begins in the least redeemed space of all–metropolitan cities. The sun never sets on the urban empires of New York, Paris, and London. Electric lights blaze 24/7; people move through the city at night as if it were daylight, and this gives him pause. In the book’s first chapter, “The Big Night,” Virilio argues that the constant flicker of urban light has prevented our bodies from producing melatonin, a chemical related in the body’s nocturnal phase. Melatonin tells our bodies that night has fallen and we should go to sleep. The increase in the number of prescriptions for melatonin suggests not only that our bodies’ ability to produce necessary chemicals and biological agents on its own is in jeopardy, but also that our bodies can no longer distinguish the difference between night and day. Our twenty-four-hour clock never winds down; we are speeding up, we are always on. The loss of this chemical, Virilio contends, indicates that our adaptation is no longer to our natural surroundings, but to our urban ones.

     

    While our bodies are becoming synchronized with our man-made surroundings, these very spaces are undergoing similarly significant transformations. In Virilio’s view, space is dwindling into time not because of increased urbanization, but because of the increasing importance placed on information–the intangible data, facts, perceptions, interpretations, and propositions that obtain in different cases at different times. In an interview with Andreas Ruby (“Architecture,” 180), Virilio explains this process using the example of a mountain. In this case, the mass and energy of a mountain is linked to a fixed source or foundation: the density of the mountain. By contrast, information is not linked to a fixed source or foundation; it evolves constantly. The mountain’s name, its national location, climate, mineral composition, and topography are all relative to a particular point in time. In this sense the mountain is shaped and formed by technological advances in politics (the nation could change and thus the national location of the mountain could change, too), meteorology, geology, and cartography. Given the real impact of political events and technological developments, the information about the mountain matters more than the matter that composes the mountain.

     

    One could easily insist that the density of a mountain matters less than its name, be it Mount Everest, Mont Blanc, or Kilimanjaro. Privileging the discourse produced about the mountain over its physical reality effectively removes matter from considerations about the mountain’s “meaning.” For Virilio, this demotion of matter signals its disappearance, which he in turn reads as a new mode of appearance. The fluidity of information releases the mountain from any fixed relationship to space. Its only relationship, or reality, is to information. The object (Mount Everest, Mont Blanc, Kilimanjaro) is perceived through information about its location, size, and so on. This dematerialization occurs in multiple ways: “In some way, you can read the importance given today to glass and transparency as a metaphor of the disappearance of matter” (“Architecture” 181). Just as information is used to turn mountains into bits of ephemeral data, and the military turns countries and the people who inhabit them into fly-over space, contemporary architects and artists use transparent materials to construct a world that appears as if it isn’t there. This transparency, what Virilio calls the “aesthetics of disappearance” (Landscape 35), is a mutation of a militarized mode of representation in which matter is untethered from its physical dimension.

     

    This examination of multiple efforts to reduce perceived objects to information, or to seeming nothingness, reiterates Virilio’s long-held interests in war, speed, and perception, and remains at the forefront of his thinking throughout A Landscape of Events. He continues to add provocative examples to his argument regarding the catastrophic effects of technology. In the chapter “The Avant-Garde of Forgetting,” Virilio argues that the small size of the TV screen diminishes the enormity of events. Four-dimensional events are compressed into three–“the temptation of the West is the small format” (26). The TV image thus becomes the format of violence; television provides the formal design and structures the tragic images of military destruction it broadcasts. Television reduces human misery and trauma to a scale far out of proportion to its reality. Re-broadcast documentaries and newsreel footage of historic events such as D-Day transform seismic events into tightly edited, condensed versions of reality. And if this truncated version becomes the official document, tagged and archived, what will become of the war? Once the cinematic version of the event becomes the only trace, when all the participants, victims, agents, and witnesses are gone, what can we know of that event? Like the mountains and glass buildings in the earlier examples, wars and history are also subject to the aesthetics of disappearance. The image, particularly the television image, facilitates the forgetting of events; it does nothing, in Virilio’s terms, to promote the memory of events. This reductio ad absurdum is practiced at an even more insidious level in the military.

     

    Virilio offers a fairly convincing argument that there is no qualitative difference between a beneficent application of technology and a sinister application; technological developments, as well as aesthetic ones, never remain contained or restricted to the purposes for which they were designed. Yet, in spite of such compelling claims, Virilio is really at his best making wildly provocative connections rather than offering persuasive arguments based on proof. While Virilio’s work connects various strands of thinking in a breathtaking intellectual performance, such an approach can sometimes backfire, particularly in his discussion of the triumph of Nietzschean man and the death of God in his chapter “The Near-Death Experience.”

     

    He starts with the claim that in the absence of Judaic etiological stories, science posits its own account of the origins of species. Darwin’s theory of evolution, which assigned to the ape all materials that evolve into man, is similar to current attempts to create androids with artificial intelligence. Virilio argues that the ape, the Ur-human, is later replaced with machines, the über-human: “And so we went from the metempsychosis of the evolutionary monkey to the embodiment of a human mind in an android; why not move on after that to those evolving machines whose rituals could be jolted into action by their own energy potential” (35). The problem is not evolution or artificial intelligence, but that these concepts are routinely used to diminish human agency. So much so, in fact, that Raymond A. Moody’s book Life after Life, which encouraged people to simulate clinical death as a way of achieving spiritual insight, sold 10 million copies (99). Virilio, who cites this book as the reason for the near-death experience movement, takes this fact as an index of something much larger; the quickening of artificial life marks the slowing down and near immobilization of human life.

     

    What is difficult to accept in this account of a comatose human agency is that it identifies the removal of a God-centered account of humankind as its cause:

     

    If one eliminates God and if, soon after, it becomes fashionable to declare Him dead, it is only normal that through successive shifts, one ends up getting a little anxious about the origins of this ‘man’ who, once removed from the Judeo-Christian Genesis, suddenly finds himself robbed of his inheritance, deprived of identity. (34)

     

    Though Virilio implicitly accepts that the biblical narrative provides a template for scientific narratives–he calls it “a substitute faith” (33)–he doesn’t explore the role the prior narrative plays in shaping the succeeding one. To call science a poor reflection of Christianity seems insufficient. (It is unclear why he links two vastly different religions together in the hybrid term Judeo-Christian that functionally dissolves that difference.) More to the point, Virilio doesn’t explain how the theory of evolution supports an agenda similar to that offered in Christianity’s version of human origins. So why does it appear to be the villain here? Perhaps Virilio wants to retain Christian rhetoric as a kind of counter-Enlightenment narrative, but he doesn’t delineate this idea clearly enough to succeed in the task.

     

    Certainly Virilio’s harrowing visions of humans in suspended animation waiting out the end times, of mountains crumbling into data, of buildings without substance, and of wars without trace have apocalyptic overtones that urge the reader to question the influences on his argument. While technology requires sustained, careful critiques, if for no other reason than its mammoth presence in contemporary life, it is unclear what Virilio intends to gain by attaching this sort of millenialism to his critique. Which is also to say: things end badly in this book. Virilio offers no suggestions as to how we might intervene in the processes he describes, or how we might stave off the horrific end he sees for us. In the final sentences of A Landscape, he explains that in fact no intervention is possible: “The countdown has in fact begun. In a few months, a few years at most, there will no longer be time to intervene; real time will have imploded” (96). While the dire tone of this prediction might be meant to galvanize the reader into action, it unnecessarily closes down the efficacy of that action–for what kind of intervention can be accomplished in a few months, a few years? This prompts a second, more cynical question: If the world has become so hostile to humans to the extent that we are barely animate with only months to live, why bother sounding the alarm at all?

     

    Indeed, there seem to be few, if any, means to re-appropriate, re-direct, sabotage, or poach the mechanisms of disappearance that Virilio critiques. Apparently, no subject, neither man nor woman, Westerner nor Easterner, rich nor poor, black nor white can find new ways to connect with one another under the given conditions. While other theorists–Deleuze and Guattari come immediately to mind–have suggested that possibilities for resistance remain even amidst the most limiting of circumstances, Virilio seems unconvinced. At times he seems so committed to his own apocalyptic vision that he does not pursue the possibilities his own arguments make available–that is, if information can dismantle matter, it might also be able reconstitute matter in perhaps radical and useful ways. With the increased, though exaggerated, emphasis on information, bodies disconnected from space might be free to renegotiate certain limitations. Yet in Virilio’s critique, there is apparently no exit.

     

    Virilio’s strength is in identifying overlooked relationships and patterns among disparate domains of contemporary life, such as the military organization of space, human perception, and architecture. In spite of his bleak outlook, he draws important connections that need to be pursued. By jumping from one small consequence of technology (the loss of melatonin, for example) to vast claims (the growing inability to respond to our natural environments), Virilio uncovers unanticipated links between our current condition and its cause. Yet the way he switches from biology, to architecture, then to history, to pop culture and fashion, and back to technology is a little like channel surfing. As a result, the book is both fascinating and unfocused–as dizzying as the landscape he describes. Even so, Virilio demonstrates a fascinating mode of intellectual engagement with the contemporary moment; he places urgent injunctions alongside wordplay and puts serious content into a playful structure. And as for the book’s bleak conclusion: at worst, it is hopelessly discouraging; at best it is a call for a more rigorous explanation of–and intervention in–the relationship between speed and space.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Virilio, Paul. A Landscape of Events. Trans. Julie Rose. Cambridge, MA: MIT P, 2000.
    • —. “Architecture in the Age of Its Virtual Disappearance: An Interview with Paul Virilio by Andreas Ruby.” The Virtual Dimension: Architecture, Representation, and Crash Culture. Ed. John Beckmann. New York: Princeton Architectural P, 1998. 178-87.

     

  • Zizek’s Second Coming

    Char Roone Miller

    Department of Public and International Affairs
    George Mason University
    cmillerd@gmu.edu

     

    Review of: Slavoj Zizek, On Belief. London and New York: Routledge, 2001.

     

    “God is dead,” proclaimed Nietzsche’s madman. Many readers, particularly undergraduate students, have been surprised by the passing of God; Nietzsche’s implication that God once lived does not comfortably fit their sense of Nietzsche as an atheist. More than a century later, Slavoj Zizek surprises readers with his suggestion that God is still alive and kicking in a post-Hegelian/post-Marxist/post-modern world. Zizek’s project shares many elements with Nietzsche’s, in spite of its opposite account of God’s health, including, most importantly, the interest they share in liberating people from their infatuation with the Other that dominates their lives–most significantly for Zizek, from the Big Other that governs the ideological systems of meaning in which our “choices” occur. Zizek, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, and amazingly popular critical theorist, attempts in On Belief to bring Christ back as the herald of a politics by which the choice, the real choice (as well as the choice of the real), of meaning can be faced.

     

    The support for this argument is not easy to follow: Zizek’s language is brisk, lively, and smart, but it is not clearly structured. Nor does his style of writing in pithy aphoristic paragraphs lend itself to broad summary (much like Nietzsche’s style). But this book is clearly an attempt by Zizek to reposition the social meaning and power of Christianity in order to dispose of a range of social hierarchies (race, nation, sex, and class, at least); it is difficult to think of a more challenging yet rewarding political project. Zizek is unwilling to leave the territory of Christianity to the ostensibly Christian institutions and interpretations currently acting to maintain the liberal-capitalist empire. In a way similar to the destruction that Pauline Christianity wrought on the Roman Empire, Zizek wants to use a reconfigured Christianity to ease the grip of liberal-capitalist hegemony. “What Christianity did with regard to the Roman Empire, this global ‘multiculturalist’ polity,” he confides, “we should do with regard to today’s Empire” (5).

     

    This re-imagined Christianity, Zizek claims, is the suppressed truth of Christianity, the liberating power of love for the imperfections of the Other: “the ultimate secret of the Christian love is, perhaps, the loving attachment to the Other’s imperfection” (147). Affection for the sins and weaknesses of others is coupled with the erasure of a final judgment, in part because our attachment to the gap in the perfection of others is exactly what God loves about us. Furthermore, this gap is the way in which humans are created in the image of God. “When I, a human being, experience myself as cut off from God, at that very moment of the utmost abjection, I am absolutely close to God, since I find myself in the position of the abandoned Christ,” explains Zizek (146). Because Christ is like us, an abandoned and imperfect sinner, he is loved by God and by us. “And it is only within this horizon that the properly Christian Love can emerge, a Love beyond Mercy. Love is always love for the Other insofar as he is lacking–we love the Other BECAUSE of his limitation, helplessness, ordinariness even” (146-7). Thus Zizek’s Christianity subverts the idealization we feel toward the Other by filling this connection with not our desire so much as our affection for the empty desire of the Other.

     

    Zizek’s version of Christianity is, he claims, a way to will the return of the repressed as a symbolic act.

     

    The symbolic act is best conceived of as the purely formal, self-referential, gesture of the self-assertion of one's subjective position. Let us take a situation of the political defeat of some working-class initiative; what one should accomplish at this moment to reassert one's identity is precisely the symbolic act: stage a common event in which some shared ritual (song or whatsoever) is performed, an event which contains no positive political program--its message is only the purely performative assertion: "We are still here, faithful to our mission, the space is still open for our activity to come!" (84-5)

     

     

    Zizek wants to keep this space open for positive political action. He is the symbolic voice for the “truth” of Christianity.

     

    Following the logic through, as Zizek attempts (with Hegel and Nietzsche on his team), allows him to expect the return of the repressed within Christianity–or at least to exploit the miraculous return of freedom and choice in a world where it has been crushed and exploited by international corporate power. Hegel’s dialectic allows the suppressed to return in defeat as the significant real. Nietzsche’s debt to Christianity is very similar to Zizek’s program, in that Nietzsche often found himself and his truth-telling about God to be the fulfillment of Christianity. Zizek believes that Christianity can undercut the liberal-capitalist empire in the same way, by demanding that the truth be told. This is in resistance to the great temptation of the postmodern world: that in the way we flit from identity to identity and desire to desire, we will flit from one logic to another. The truth should be told. “Thought,” Zizek writes, “is more than ever exposed to the temptation of ‘losing its nerve,’ of precociously abandoning the old conceptual coordinates” (32). Christianity can provide the coordinates by which the ways we understand good/evil, right/wrong, and valuable/insignificant can be re-coordinated. In this redeployment of Christianity, through the pursuit of the conclusion of its logic, Zizek attempts to make the death of Christ stand for the death of the envy of the Other’s jouissance. From this claim Zizek works out a seemingly endless range of insights and thoughtful observations on culture, society, and politics.

     

    One of the remarkable twists to Zizekian Christianity is its defense and romanticization of sex by filling that romance not with fate but with accidents and fortune. Zizek inquires at one point: “What if sexual difference is not simply a biological fact, but the Real of an antagonism that defines humanity, so that once sexual difference is abolished, a human being effectively becomes indistinguishable from a machine?” (43). Sex and sexuality become absolutely necessary to the continuance of human subjectivity as we know it–a subjectivity that Zizek does attempt to maintain–not because sexual difference and desire provide a firm, “natural” foundation but because they constitute the negative trauma around which human symbolization spins.

     

    The passage from animal copulation to properly human sexuality affects the human animal in such a way that it causes the human animal's radical self-withdrawal, so that the zero-level of human sexuality is not the "straight" sexual intercourse, but the solitary act of masturbation sustained by fantasizing--the passage from this self-immersion to involvement with an Other, to finding pleasure in the Other's body, is by no means "natural," it involves a series of traumatic cuts, leaps and inventive improvisations. (24)

     

     

    There is no given to the human condition, human relations, or human subject. All of what we take to be naturally given to us and naturally ours–tastes, desires, sex, and loves–are the product of a haphazard yet skillful “tarrying with the negative.” Humanity, like Christ, is not at home in this world and will never recover her authentic self, natural desires, or proper place. Our success is our displacement.

     

    On Belief raises many questions: what, for example, is the function of the Others that dominate this text, Hegel and Lacan? In a text that ostensibly attempts to renegotiate the machinery by which others determine our choices, Zizek spends a lot of time defending and deferring his insights to Lacan. I’m highly sympathetic to his defense of Lacan against those who would classify Lacan as overly obscure, willfully obfuscating, ahistorical, and ham-fistedly structuralist, but I’m not sure how it fits within the larger project of Zizek’s writings or his attempts to reduce the authority of the Other.

     

    Additionally, the selection of friends and foes seems rather random and chaotic. Why, for example, the apparently willful disavowal of ideas that Zizek could easily appropriate, such as Gnosticism? Perhaps this is the inverse of the previous question or a way to suggest that there are people missing from this book who could provide useful aides and foils for Zizek, particularly Elaine Pagels (see The Gnostic Gospels). Zizek ridicules Gnosticism without dealing with Pagel’s work, work that in many ways is very similar to his, particularly through its emphasis on the absence of a final judgment.

     

    Finally, what are the stakes in asserting a monotheism instead of a polytheism, or more broadly, how are Zizek’s decisions concerning the true Christianity and its corruptions being made? This reading feels like Freud’s Moses and Monotheism, in which Freud admits that in order to make his point concerning the creation of racial and national identities he is forced to construct an edifice that any fool could knock over. These sorts of choices and assertions seem to be part of the attempt to willfully articulate a new position and organization for the things that give life meaning, a process that would be more effective if made less tentative.

     

    Admittedly, to ask Zizek to play by these rules, by which his choices are fully explained, is to expect more of him than anyone else can give, and probably to miss the point that accounts of the meaning of Christianity really do not have a point of closure. It’s that lack of a point of closure, or determinative point, that makes counter-hegemonic political action possible.

     

    Zizek knows a thing or two about political action; for example, he ran for president of the Republic of Slovenia in 1990. More significantly, as a member of the Committee for the Protection of the Human Rights of the Four Accused in Slovenia in 1988, Zizek worked to free four journalists arrested and brought to trial by the Yugoslav Army in Slovenia and in doing so struggled for the liberation of Slovenia. The strategy was pursued by articulating a demand to change the conditions under which the journalists were arrested, which meant a change in socialism; by pursuing the literal meaning of the commission, Zizek helped to bring down the socialist government. He is working in a similar vein here–by pursuing a literal meaning of Christianity, he hopes to change the ruling linguistic and intellectual co-ordinances of the fictional rules that govern our lives. By asserting the “true” value of Christianity, Zizek and Nietzsche seem like the two most Christian madmen since the one who died on the cross.
     

  • A Poem Is a Machine to Think With: Digital Poetry and the Paradox of Innovation

    Sandy Baldwin

    The Center for Literary Computing
    West Virginia University
    charles.baldwin@mail.wvu.edu

     

    Review of: Loss Pequeño Glazier, Digital Poetics: The Making of E-Poetries. Tuscaloosa: U of Alabama P, 2002

     

     A poem is a small (or large)
    Machine made of words.

    –William Carlos Williams

     

    The odd thing about innovative literature is that no literature is innovative. The familiar but unsolvable paradox of Ezra Pound’s rallying cry to “Make it new!” (147) was exactly what made modernist aesthetics so persuasive and productive for the last century of literature. Pound’s statement is paradoxical from the first: he seems to call for new forms and subjects for literature, for a rejection of tradition, all the while using a quote from the tradition-bound world of Confucius. Of course, the critical problem involved is nothing new. In the simplest sense, the “new”-ness of literary innovation occurs against the background of a tradition that novelty ends up reinforcing. Any literary work will be innovative in purely conventional ways, readable for its experimentation and for its relation to a stable tradition of experiment. On the other hand, the deep thrill of the new remains in its claim on the future, where each innovation opens a temporal difference within the continuities of literary history. Making it new seems to enliven the present with the future. Innovation is always possible, for the odd thing about innovative literature is that all literature is innovative. It is hard to see literary history without Pound’s axiom. Or, better: at once novelty and tradition, surprise and repetition, the paradox of innovation–and the degree to which we resolve or displace it–explains something of the role of literature today.

     

    If we are to take Niklas Luhmann seriously, the paradox of innovation underlies “art as a social system” (199-201). The systematicity of literature, as an institution, is built on this paradox of an innovation that is never more than a repetition. Literary innovation and the modern identification of literature as innovation allow for the observation of processes of historical novelty. This is not the place for an extended exposition of Luhmann’s general social theory, but literary innovation plays a fundamental though paradoxical role in his understanding of modernity as a system of interlocking subsystems.1 The functional differentiation of each closed, self-maintaining subsystem means that theory can only offer partial accounts of system functioning.2 Each theoretical account is focused on the subsystem’s particular mode of differentiation. For systems to differentiate themselves, they must internally copy and reflect the distinction between system and environment. The system of artworks differentiates itself through its concern with innovation. The focus on novelty is the form of self-reference unique to artworks in the social systems of modernity. Moreover, the particularity of the written medium codifies and universalizes the self-referential, auto-telic function of artworks (284-5). As a result, all modern artworks tend toward the medium of writing. Meanwhile, if innovation is central to the self-production (autopoeisis) of all systems, then the specific role of literature is the observation of this self-production “itself” (Roberts 33-5). Literature is how modernity describes the kinetics of its own historical evolution. “Making it new” is a dynamic maintaining the openness of sub-systems to the environment. One implication is that the language-focus of contemporary poetries is less a response to a postmodern loss of reference than a self-referential code within a language increasingly employed as an instrumental tool for exchange and commerce. This is evident in the popular role of literature: it must produce results that are declared to be important but are not taken seriously.

     

    The first-order theories of cybernetics and informatics that underlie Luhmann’s theories already presupposed a concept of literature as information density. While Luhmann’s concern is with observation and differentiation between systems, these “first order” theories approached “control and communication in the animal and the machine”–in the words of Norbert Wiener’s subtitle to Cybernetics–as a matter of coding and transmitting messages within a given information system. For example, Claude E. Shannon’s crucial Mathematical Theory of Communication argued that information was unrelated to meaning (31). The problems of information theory were instead a matter of efficient coding and transmission of messages. For Shannon, the more complex and difficult the encoding of a message, the more information it contained. Inversely, information-dense messages contained little redundancy, that is, little of the message could be lost without compromising the communication involved. Now, the novelty of literature was Shannon’s singular example of information density (56). Literature consistently supplied the limit concept of a message with little or no redundancy. Since information theory addresses systems of coding and transmission, literature remains necessary to the definition of information while lying outside its space of application. Literature is the medium of information “itself.”

     

    From a systems-theory point of view, innovative literature is a meta-code ensuring the stability of the systems through pure self-reference. “Innovation” is the doubleness of a paradox that literature thematizes. The proximity of literature to the root association of poetry as poeisis or “making” suggests a more dynamic role than internal self-maintenance. No doubt Luhmann’s description is accurate enough, though it does little to explain why literary innovation remains so compelling despite all paradoxes. That is, it works well as a description of “art as a social system” but less well as an account of literature “itself.” The insistence on systematicity does not solve but merely displaces the paradox of innovative literature. Rather than take this as a failure of Luhmann’s rather grandiose theory, it should be seen as pointing out the asystematicity of literary innovation. Luhmann’s theory offers a displaced version of literary aesthetics within the rigorous sociological rubric of systems theory. Literature becomes a provisional closure, the institutional site for the introduction and assimilation of innovation. The poetic point of systems theory is that innovative literature–as making, poeisis–rather than simply thematizing the integration of newness into the system, is what creates the dynamism of the system in the first place. So-called digital literature only underlines the point, since it automates processes defined by and identified with modernist innovation: instant surrealism or Burroughsian cut-ups via text generators; instant seriality and collaboration via email or IRC; instant concrete and animated poetry via Photoshop or Flash; instant procedural and concept poetry via hypertext or HTML forms; and so on.

     

    It is exciting, then, to read the persuasive call for “electronic space as a space of poeisis” (5) in Loss Pequeño Glazier’s Digital Poetics: The Making of E-Poetries. Invoking poetry as making or poeisis both broadens the scope of poetic innovation and raises the question of “What are we making here?” (the title of the final section of Glazier’s book). Opening the field while raising the stakes is typical of Glazier’s approach. This is a challenging, sometimes frustrating, but always important book. Digital Poetics fascinates as a reflection of its subject matter, as an attempt to grasp the textuality of e-poetry in the antique textuality of the book.

     

    At first glance, one finds in Digital Poetics an assemblage of diverse essays reflecting disparate occasions and sources, but unified by a singular insistence that innovative poetry practice informs how we might explore digital media. This first reading finds in Glazier a kind of policeman of innovative writing, laying down the law declaring who is in, who is out. As one might expect, such maneuvers produce a reaction. Brandon Barr’s review in Electronic Book Review argues that Glazier’s “prescriptions and descriptions seem to narrowly define precisely where he wants […] expansion to occur.” Other early responses have similarly focused on these efforts to fix and monumentalize a canon and criteria for innovative literature. These critiques confuse particular moments in Glazier’s argument with crippling errors.3 Suspiciously, such readings find Glazier’s book too easily repeating the modernist paradoxes of the new and innovative, too explicitly positing the oxymoron of normative innovation. Let it be said that Glazier is fundamentally committed to an inclusive poetics, open to diverse technologies, forms, and modes of authoring–as his pioneering work as creator and Director of the Electronic Poetry Center (<www.epc.buffalo.edu>) makes clear. In fact, the book is much more subtle in staging the processes of innovation within institutional thematizations of the new. If there is a performative contradiction here, between Glazier’s commitment to innovation and his insistence on distinguishing the innovative from the non-innovative, it reflects the tight, reflexive relation of poeisis to conceptualization. Innovation will be institutionalized, will become part of the dynamics of the system of literary history. Glazier recognizes his book as part of this process: he insists on the radical openness of innovative practice while insisting on its particularity to certain modes and traditions. Glazier’s criticism is as much a result of as an interpretation of its object.

     

    Make no mistake: Digital Poetries is a paradoxical book. Read this book against the grain, but the grain is multiple and branching. Glazier offers an appropriate description of e-text: “Because much or all of your text may not be received, you must, to be successful, create a text that is somehow suspended between various possibilities of reading.” He continues that such a text is “provisional, conditional, and characterized by its multiple renderings,” or better: it is a “program” (15). Glazier’s book is a kind of “program.” Like the web-based poetries Glazier uses as examples, the book oscillates between display and markup, a “dance between possibilities of representation” (15). The skeleton key to understanding innovative literature is not this or that innovative literature but literary innovation itself, and it is this poetic principle with which Glazier dances. Innovation or poeisis occurs. The result is a kind of model of how to read poetry, focused on a background of innovation against which all making occurs. Glazier’s central claim bears close attention: through the over-reaching of poetry as the exemplification of digital media, particularly within the current interest in programmable poetry and codework as literature, innovation shines through as a cultural process within and against literary tradition. Still, Glazier’s exclusionary moves in establishing criteria and a canon for innovative digital poetry are what first get the reader’s attention. These moves amount to three major claims.

     

    First claim: prose and prose concepts dominate discussions of digital literature. This means that the primary examples of digital literature are in prose form and are situated in the prose tradition. A simple reading of the major scholarly works on digital writing shows this claim to be non-controversial. More interestingly, Glazier shows how discussions of digital writing continually adopt prose concepts and terms as paradigms. Prose, with its narrative trajectory and linearity, swallows all other forms of literature when it comes to the digital. Glazier’s alternative is no surprise: innovative poetry.

     

    Second claim: the emergent canon of thinkers and practitioners of digital literature excludes other possible writing practices. These figures largely overlap with the dominance of prose: they are the writers whose work circulates in discussion of digital literature, the texts taught in universities, cited in the press, and so on. The configuration is something like Moulthrop/Joyce/Landow/Bolter. Glazier’s response is to suggest that equally important work emanates from the field of digital poetries. He presents an alternative configuration something like Cayley/Kac/Rosenberg and Glazier himself.

     

    Final claim: innovative writing can be distinguished from non-innovative writing. Glazier argues that innovative writing is marked by two central concerns: 1) it “offers the perspective of the multiple ‘I’” and, 2) it “recognizes the importance of the materials of writing to writing itself, an engagement with its medium” (22). He goes on to identify the non-innovative with specific features: “narrative, plot, anecdotal re-telling of human experiences, logical descriptions, chronological sequences of events, a reliance on factual information, a view of language as a transparent (or at most, tinted) bearer of meaning, and an attachment to a Modernist aesthetic” (47). The innovative lines up very clearly with the poetic, and with a very particular line of poetic tradition.

     

    What are we to make of these three claims? Glazier is persuasive in showing the exclusive focus on digital narratives, and there is no doubt that this focus limits the field of literature and enforces a concern with rules, ordering, and territories. Just as certainly, nothing is gained by replacing one canon with another and one set of rules with another. The point-counterpoint quality of aligning constellations of names must be understood as a tactical maneuver rather than as the absolute declaration of a new canon: it is not that Cayley/Kac/Rosenberg/Glazier must now be read to the exclusion of all others, but that they open the field of digital poetries circumscribed by Moulthrop/Joyce/Landow/Bolter. No doubt, none of the figures on these lists (including Glazier himself) is committed to a single and monumental view of digital literature. Glazier’s targets are instead our easy institutionalization of “major figures” and the almost subterranean assimilation of exemplary works to models for all work.

     

    The criteria distinguishing the innovative from the non-innovative are somewhat more complex. At first they seem easy to dismiss, since any writing can be shown to exhibit Glazier’s criteria for innovation. Adorno’s assertion that “even demystified artworks are more than is literally the case” (45) applies: even the most non-reflexive writing shows, in its resistance to reflection, a concern with its medium and its mode of authorship. The criteria of innovation can be generalized into meaninglessness. Furthermore, there is an arbitrariness to his list of non-innovative features. A “Modernist aesthetic” would describe many of the writers Glazier valorizes as precursors to electronic poetry: Pound, Williams, Stein; who could be more Modernist? Moreover, Modernism is typically seen as challenging the other items in the list (narrative, plot, linearity, etc.). As a tactical approach to reading poetry rather than as an empirical feature of poems, however, “the perspective of the multiple ‘I’” offers insight into writing that emphasizes the conditions enabling voice, the polyphonous messages crossing even the most transparent communication, and the agency of various informational nodes and programs (47-54). Again, looking past the prescriptive rhetoric, Glazier’s criteria function less as restrictions on how to write than as a pedagogy applying equally to the reading of innovative poetry and digital media.

     

    Glazier’s connection between innovative writing and a recognition of “the importance of the materials of writing to writing itself, an engagement with its medium” is complicated by a conceptual slippage. Is the point the materials or the medium? The distinction is not trivial, implying the difference between a focus on the tools of making and the way these tools are reflected in the object. Glazier’s use of “materiality” derives from Jerome McGann’s work on textual “conditions,” situating the poem “within specific conditions of textuality” (20). Glazier further elaborates McGann’s point in terms of the “licensing” of textual experimentation by “the cultural scene” in which it moves. These conditions “not only inform, but facilitate the emergence of specific types of writing” (55).4 The slippage from material to medium is stabilized in the notion of informing “conditions.” Here literature is roughly an example of historically contingent conditions of text production, a mimetic reflex to the cultural scene. In terms of digital media, literary writing remains of interest as a reflexive example of digital media. Poetry works like the doubleness of code (as something to be read and something to be performed). In the background is a rhetorical schema binding the immateriality of digital information and the materiality of particular instantiations. That is, we read digital media, and we do so because they are like innovative literature. The consistency of this reassuring schema rests on the critical gamble of a mimetic likeness between literature and digital media. The slippage between medium and material is indicative of this mimetic relation.

     

    The crucial point–the crux of Glazier’s argument–is the nature of the exemplification involved. Is the poem simply a repetition of the conditions that license it? Does an emphasis on materiality dissolve the poem into its medium? Or can we speak of engagement with the medium as a more complex negotiation? Similarly, does an emphasis on materiality, both in innovative writing and in digital media, materialize poetic innovation? Can innovation be grasped in this way? Is the status of the material in fact a concealed concern with the reception of novelty, that is, with the reading of innovation?5 Curiously, though he invokes McGann and other theorists of textual materiality, close attention to Glazier’s argument reveals a difference between Glazier’s theory of the material and the materialities that he examines. In fact, Glazier’s use of materiality rescues an explicitly poetic materiality, closer to Robert Duncan’s “first permission” (7) than to McGann’s “licensing.” Glazier balances an awareness of the ideological frameworks in which poetry occurs with the material conditions created through acts of poeisis.

     

    The best instance of this conditional making is the work of Jim Rosenberg, invoked by Glazier as “one of the most valuable investigations currently underway” in digital poetry (137). There is as yet no adequate critical discussion of Rosenberg’s poetry–which is as much rooted in mathematics, music, and philosophy as in poetic tradition–but Glazier provides an excellent opening, and with good reason: Rosenberg offers a poetic practice rooted in poeisis or innovation prior to any particular material instantiation. At first this seems paradoxical, given Rosenberg’s tight identification with digital poetry (and his place in Glazier’s alternative canon). In fact, Rosenberg challenges the digital orthodoxy by defining hypertext in the abstract, as a way of representing a network that could represented by “other means than using a computer–on paper, for instance.” At the same time, Rosenberg takes hypertext as a way of thinking not yet possible in any given technology. That is, hypertext is in no way a function of technology but rather a particular approach to writing practice. This resulting provisionality of the poem situates poetic innovation in the reader and not the material text.

     

    Rosenberg’s diverse works share an interest in simultaneity. While we are familiar with simultaneous musical notes or simultaneous visual figures in painting, writing is largely understood as a linear, sequential medium. As Rosenberg is at pains to point out, even such a purportedly multilinear form as hypertext–at least in the dominant link-node model–is intrinsically rooted in the line. While structurally there might seem to be many possible choices for the reader, reading or navigation is a disjunctive process of choice and elimination. The link-node follows a logic of “or.” There are other possibilities. Just as category theory offers divergent forms of mathematical inclusion and exclusion, Rosenberg proposes that the disjunctive link-node is only one of a multiplicity of hypertexts. His work seeks a logic of “and,” rooted in conjunction or gathering.

     

    Rosenberg’s poetic simultaneities are piles of words, stacked clusters of word “skeins,” following his insight in “The Interactive Diagram Sentence” that such juxtaposition is “the most basic structural act.” Mousing over “opens” the simultaneity to reveal an individual skein, a scatter of words and phrases, with “vertical” relations indicated by changes in font. The simultaneity is a poem that emits readable texts. Each text is the outcome of the user’s mouse interactions with Rosenberg’s programmed relations between skeins. Appearances are conditioned by the user’s attention via the structure perception-mouseover-poem. The poem is an opening.

     

    While it is possible to speak of particular textual conditions enabling Rosenberg’s work–the tradition of Mac Low’s simultaneities, the availability of easily programmable Hypercard stacks, and so on–none of these adequately accounts for what happens as individual skeins appear and disappear. The simultaneity remains in a kind of quasi-space and -time prior to the text. Mousing over is the real time of the poem. The resulting words are not inscriptions but transcriptions of the user’s movement and attention. Following Rosenberg’s definition in “The Interactive Diagram Sentence”: the simultaneity is a “fundamental micromaneuver at the heart of all abstraction,” producing a minimal possible world, a phenomenology of momentary objects.

     

    Rosenberg argues that we should think of hypertext as “a medium in which one thinks ‘natively.’” The paradoxical task is to think of the technology that would be adequate to “an individual thought” that “is entirely hypertext.” Rosenberg writes a poem for technology not yet available. In this disjunction of grand conceptual apparatus with its instantiation in digital media, Rosenberg’s work is innovative by means of its own failure. These poems mark the structural relation between a poem and itself as an act of innovation. The poem is innovation’s “mode of disappearance,” as Jean Baudrillard puts it (213).6

     

    The recent convergence of code and writing offers an extended test ground for the notion of provisional materiality developed in Glazier’s and Rosenberg’s work. Glazier’s argument for the structural similarity of poem and code (164) and the assimilation of the poet to programmer (176) comes in the context of emergent writing practices such as Alan Sondheim’s “codework” and MEZ’s “net.wurk.”7 In much of this work, code is invoked as a mode of citation, distortion, and linguistic play; in some cases, the work itself is the outcome of executable code. This “uneasy combination of contents and structures” (Sondheim) would seem to fulfill Glazier’s claims that innovative poetry will inform how we might explore digital media. What makes these works is their thematization of the coupling between code as an artificial language instructing and interacting with a microprocessor, and code as something to be read.

     

    Literary innovation continues to provide the model for what is new about new media. The poem does not exemplify the work of digital media, but we understand digital media through literary writing. Our experience of innovative writing provides the particular, reflexive experience we seek in digital media. In the end, code is a kind of extra or “ternary” sign added to text. To call this sign “materiality” is to acknowledge the conditional, procedural, and rhetorical quality of the material.8 “Code” metaphorizes poetic invention, and it is this metaphor that makes codework so fascinating today. Innovative writing practice makes digital media new.

     

    The value of Digital Poetics is its identification of the systematic relation between innovative poetry and digital media. Digital poetry reflects on processes of organization and development in the systems of communication and media we live in today. Glazier starts his book with the observation that “we have not arrived at a place but at an awareness of the conditions of texts” (1), and in this respect his book seems to mime its object, offering less of a conclusion than a sustained reflection on its own conditions of possiblity. The prescriptive veneer of Glazier’s argument is a reaction to a rigorous attention to literary innovation. The text integrates Glazier’s own poetry with critical reflection and reverie, and further adopts and adapts terminology from UNIX and other computer environments, dissolving the distinction between acts of programming and poetry writing. If this book frustrates, it is in part because it is written through William Carlos Williams’s attitude toward the poem and the program–toward the program-poem–as “active,” where the poem is itself “an instrument of thought” (6). The paradoxical self-reflexivity involved is obvious: the poet “thinks through the poem” (6) to discover the very poem being thought through. Glazier convincingly shows that digital media is a site of just such poetical activity today.

     

    Notes

     

    1. See Rasch on Luhmann as “modernity’s most meticulous theorist” (10).

     

    2. Lyotard’s critique of Habermas, directed at the desire for an “organic whole,” hardly applies to Luhmann. Luhmann’s modernity offers not so much a lack of unity but a unity composed of functions and relations that cannot be surveyed from outside. See Rasch 29-52.

     

    3. See, for example, Weishaus’ review in Rain Taxi and the debates in the archive of the venerable POETICS listserv. Compare Hartley’s review, with its emphasis on poeisis paralleling my own.

     

    4. Compare the influential “media materialism” of Friedrich Kittler where the conditions of information processing are defined as material for a given cultural moment.

     

    5. N. Katherine Hayles’s influential How We Became Posthuman is a parallel example of this presupposition that literary texts provide insight into the material structures of digital media.

     

    6. This concluding chapter of Baudrillard’s Symbolic Exchange and Death is a valuable contribution to the analysis of poetry, often overlooked for his better-known essays on simulation.

     

    7. See Sondheim and MEZ.

     

    8. A useful comparison is Michel Foucault’s analysis of the “enunciative function” that requires a “repeatable materiality” (102) in order to organize those institutions that facilitate possibilities of reinscription and transcription (103).

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Adorno, Theodor W. Aesthetic Theory. Trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor. Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota P, 1997.
    • Barr, Brandon. “Intersection and Struggle: Poetry in a New Landscape.” Electronic Book Review. E-Poetry, 3-24-02. <http://www.electronicbookreview.com/v3/servlet/ebr?command=view_essay&essay_id=barele>. Accessed September 10, 2002.
    • Baudrillard, Jean. Symbolic Exchange and Death. Trans. Iain Hamilton Grant. London: Sage Publications, 1993.
    • Duncan, Robert. The Opening of the Field. New York: New Directions, 1960.
    • Foucault, Michel. The Archeology of Knowledge. Trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith. New York: Pantheon Books, 1972.
    • Hartley, George. “Innovative Programmers of the World Unite!” nmediac: The Journal of New Media and Culture. Winter 2002. <http://www.ibiblio.org/nmediac/winter2002/lossrev1.html>. Accessed September 10, 2002.
    • Hayles, N. Katherine. How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics. Chicago, IL: U of Chicago P, 1999.
    • Kittler, Friedrich. Discourse Networks 1800/1900. Trans. Michael Metteer, with Chris Cullens. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1990.
    • Luhmann, Niklas. Art as a Social System. Trans. Eva M. Knott. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2000.
    • MEZ [Mary-Anne Breeze]. “Net & Codeworkers Inc[ubation].” trAce Online Writing Centre. <http://trace.ntu.ac.uk/incubation/gallery.cfm>. Accessed July 10, 2002
    • POETICS listserv archive. SUNY Buffalo. <http://listserv.acsu.buffalo.edu/archives/poetics.html>.
    • Pound, Ezra. “Canto LIII.” Selected Poems. New York: New Directions, 1957. 262-74.
    • Rasch, William. Niklas Luhmann’s Modernity: The Paradoxes of Differentiation. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2000.
    • Roberts, David. “Self-Reference in Literature.” In The Problems of Form. Ed. Dirk Baecker. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1999.
    • Rosenberg, Jim. “The Interactive Diagram Sentence: Hypertext as a Medium of Thought.” Originally printed in Visible Language. 30:2. <http://www.well.com/user/jer/VL.html>. Accessed July 10, 2002.
    • Shannon, Claude E. and Warren Weaver. The Mathematical Theory of Communication. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1963.
    • Sondheim, Alan. “Introduction: Codework.” ABR 22.6 (Sept/Oct 2001): 1.
    • Wiener, Norbert. Cybernetics: Or, Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991.
    • Weishaus, Joel. “Review of Digital Poetics.” Rain Taxi Online Edition. Summer 2002. <http://www.raintaxi.com/online/2002summer/glazier.shtml>. Accessed July 10, 2002.

     

  • Modernism Old or New?

    Piotr Gwiazda

    Department of English
    University of Maryland, Baltimore County
    gwiazda@umbc.edu

     

    Review of: Marjorie Perloff, 21st-Century Modernism: The “New” Poetics. Malden: Blackwell, 2002.

     

    The title of Marjorie Perloff’s new book seems, at first, a little confusing. Does she mean 21st-century postmodernism? No. Then perhaps she means the idea of modernism in the twenty-first century–our continuing obsession with the series of artistic and literary revolutions that took place almost a hundred years ago mainly in Europe? But why is the book publicized as a manifesto (specifically, as a part of the Blackwell Manifestos series)? Manifestos usually look toward the future, not the past, so what does modernism have to do with today’s (or tomorrow’s) poetic theory and practice? Apparently a lot, judging by Perloff’s subtitle: The “New” Poetics. The book’s final chapter is entitled “Modernism” at the Millennium–the quotation marks again hinting at something both forward- and backward-looking in Perloff’s provocative reappraisal of modernism and its significance for contemporary writing.

     

    Some of these questions are answered for us in the book’s preface. Here Perloff suggests that we jettison “the tired dichotomy that has governed our discussion of twentieth-century poetics for much too long: that between modernism and postmodernism” (1-2). What we normally think of as postmodern poetry–the Projectivists, Beats, San Francisco poets, confessional poets, New York School, and “deep image” school–now appears less revolutionary than it did in the late fifties and early sixties; these poetic schools and movements were “indeed a breath of fresh air” (2), but only so far as they redefined the terms of opposition to the high modernism of Yeats, Frost, Stevens, Moore, later Eliot, and the New Critical orthodoxy that dominated the American poetry scene in the years immediately after World War II. In Perloff’s view, it is the avant-garde modernism of the early twentieth-century that, following a “curious poetic lag” (10), now emerges as a vital precursor to what she considers the most ambitious and adventurous writing of today. “Indeed,” Perloff observes,

     

    what strikes us when we reread the poetries of the early twentieth century is that the real fate of first-stage modernism was one of deferral, its radical and utopian aspirations being cut off by the catastrophe, first of the Great War, and then of the series of crises produced by the two great totalitarianisms that dominated the first half of the century and culminated in World War II and the subsequent Cold War. (3)

     

    Perloff envisages her book as a sort of paradigm shift, a reconsideration of the standard narrative of modernism with four chapters devoted to the poetic praxis of the early T.S. Eliot, Gertrude Stein, Marcel Duchamp, and Velimir Khlebnikov, and the final chapter discussing the importance of these avant-garde modernists to the work of Susan Howe, Charles Bernstein, Lyn Hejinian, and Steve McCaffery. These, and presumably other poets and artists associated with the Language writing movement (broadly conceived), take up the challenge of experimental modernism; it is through their work, rather than the work of, say, Charles Olson or Allen Ginsberg, that the spirit of modernism lives again. As Perloff says in the concluding sentence of the book, “ours may well be the moment when the lessons of early modernism are finally being learned” (200).

     

    Perloff begins her revision of twentieth-century poetics with a fresh look at the early work of T.S. Eliot. In a gesture of critical bravado, she links Eliot’s early poetry (not The Waste Land, it is worth noting, but “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” and other poems from Prufrock and Other Observations) to the main emphasis of Language writing aesthetic: language as the object, rather than the tool, of representation. Perloff suggests a parallel between Eliot’s idea of “impersonality” (with its implied separation of writing and experience) and Charles Bernstein’s call for indirection, artifice, and impermeability featured in his own manifesto “Artifice of Absorption” (published in A Poetics). Both Eliot in the first decades of the twentieth century and Bernstein in the last ones reject the notion of sincerity and explore the idea of language as the site of meaning-making. Eliot’s theory of a poet as a “medium” that fuses together particular impressions and experiences can be said to anticipate, in some ways, the contemporary notion of poetry as a construction, rather than a reconstruction, of experience.

     

    In her discussion of Eliot’s early poetry, Perloff is especially interested in demonstrating how the poet’s Flaubertian quest for le mot juste, or simply his technique, enhances the idea of materiality of language. In her close reading of “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock,” she notes Eliot’s penchant for producing “aural excitement” (21); thus, at the start of the poem, the monosyllabic line “Let us go then, you and I” creates, she says, a note of torpor; in the line “half-deserted streets,” she continues, “the s’s and t’s coalesce in what seems to be a whispered proposition coming from a doorway: ssstt!” (20). The point Perloff is trying to make is this: for the early Eliot, sound pretty much equaled subject matter. Accordingly, his work from the period reveals an ongoing preoccupation with the constructedness of poetic language (Prufrock himself being a composite of various sensibilities). This preoccupation can be seen not only in his effective use of sound effects, but also in the abrupt tense and mood shifts, tenuously interconnected syntactical units, juxtapositions of formal and informal idiom, and borrowings from foreign languages. These strategies, Perloff continues, “relate ‘Prufrock’ to Constructivist notions of ‘laying bare the device,’ of using material form–in this case, language–as an active compositional agent, impelling the reader to participate in the process of construction” (26).

     

    In her attempt to paint two pictures of T.S. Eliot–one before World War I and one afterward–Perloff doesn’t rely on textual demonstration only. Looking at the poet’s correspondence from the prewar period, she describes him as a youthful, carefree student living in Paris, at one point sharing quarters with his close friend Jean Verdenal, and writing some of the most imaginative and experimental verse of the day. The outbreak of the war put a stop to Eliot’s idyllic lifestyle; the correspondence from the war years reveals him as a perpetually worried man living in a “curious form of exile” in London (33), and longing to return to Paris in order to be able to write poetry again. It was in London that the news of Jean Verdenal’s death at the Dardanelles reached him in 1915 (his friend would become the dedicatee of Prufrock and Other Observations, published two years later). In the period following the war, Eliot seemed a changed person. He no longer yearned to return to Paris, and his poetry no longer featured the same propensity for Laforguean playfulness, inventive use of syntax, and explorations of the semantic possibilities of sound. At this point, perhaps in anticipation of potential criticism of her characterization, Perloff says: “I do not want to suggest anything as vulgar or simplistic as that Eliot’s own avant-garde writing died in Gallipoli with Jean Verdenal [. . . .] I am merely suggesting that between Eliot’s radical poetry of the avant guerre and its postwar reincarnation, a decisive change had taken place” (39). A change did indeed take place in Eliot’s poetry, and the chapter by and large succeeds in revealing how “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” and, by implication, the other poems from the period pave the way for, rather than merely precede, the radical parataxis, multivocality, and fragmentariness of The Waste Land.

     

    In the chapters that follow, Perloff offers an extended reading of Stein, Duchamp, and Khlebnikov (all of whom she has discussed in her previous books) as major precursors to late twentieth- and early twenty-first century avant-garde writing. Looking mainly at Tender Buttons, she notes Stein’s preoccupation with the verbal, visual, and aural properties of language, especially her pre-Cubist strategy of rearranging the syntactic parts of a sentence (nouns, pronouns, conjunctions, etc.) so that each equally contributes to the whole. Stein’s endless syntactic permutations emerge as the result of her attraction to Cezanne’s all-inclusive treatment of the canvas surface, but also to Flaubert’s economy of form and subordination of subject matter to style. Perloff continues with a well-informed discussion of some of Duchamp’s readymades (including With Hidden Noise and Fresh Widow), as well as some of his boîtes en valise and verbal objects she calls “texticles,” all of which underscore his conceptual perspective: the constant examination of the medium, the incessant interrogation of the function of art itself. Duchamp’s contribution to twenty-first century poetics lies also in his ability to transform our understanding of visual and verbal language–and of their purported incompatibility. The focus of Perloff’s next chapter is the Russian avant-garde poet Velimir Khlebnikov, specifically his exploration of the graphic and phonic aspects of language. Khlebnikov’s poems reveal his lifelong fascination with word origins and, in a larger sense, his utopian pursuit of what he called the “magic touchstone of all Slavic words”–the first step toward formulating a universal, etymology-based language of beyond-reason or zaum (in Russian “za” means beyond, “um” means reason or mind). Khlebnikov’s fascination with sound-effects, puns, neologisms, and etymologies accounts for his inventive merging of sonic, visual, and semantic characteristics of language. By violating established linguistic norms, Khlebnikov pushes the limits of verbal possibility in a programmatic refusal to treat words merely as names.

     

    A similar position with regard to the transparency of language, and to the long-discredited assumption that language conveys meaning rather than constructs it, informs the poetics of twenty-first century Language writing. In her final chapter, Perloff applies the experimental methods of the four early modernists to four contemporary Language writers, seeing evidence of the early Eliot’s verbal density in Susan Howe’s Thorow, of Lyn Hejinian’s debt to Khlebnikov and Stein in Happily, and of Charles Bernstein’s and Steve McCaffery’s active engagement with Duchamp’s legacy in the former’s dysraphism and the latter’s inventive mixing of the verbal and the visual. These sections are rather brief, spanning only a few pages each, as though in a determination not to steal the spotlight from the real focus of the book–the experimental phase of modernism initiated in the early twentieth century and only now entering into a kind of “special relationship” with contemporary writing (164). Hence Perloff’s use of quotation marks in her subtitle: the “new” poetics is really the return of an older poetics, a millennial extension of the modernism of Eliot, Stein, Duchamp, and Khlebnikov.

     

    Perloff has without question played a key role in shaping our attitudes toward the complex and often contradictory nature of modernism; more than any other critic she has helped to bring avant-garde poetics to the center of today’s academic discourse. In her previous books, starting with The Poetics of Indeterminacy in 1981, Perloff formulated a distinction between two strands of modernism: the post-Symbolist mode initiated by Baudelaire and sustained in the last century by Stevens, the later Eliot, Lowell, Bishop, etc., and the anti-Symbolist mode, originating with Rimbaud and continuing with Pound, Stein, Williams, and their post-World War II descendants (vii). The distinction quickly became a kind of critical dogma, so much so that her astute question “Pound/Stevens: whose era?” (the title of her essay in The Dance of the Intellect) still resonates as a compelling inquiry and elicits new commentaries. A recent issue of The Wallace Stevens Journal, for example, is entirely devoted to a reappraisal of Perloff’s essay, with new perspectives by Perloff herself, Charles Altieri, Alan Filreis, Rachel Blau DuPlessis, and Leon Surette, among others. It is interesting to see how Perloff gives another turn of the screw, so to speak, to her ongoing revision of twentieth-century poetics by separating what she considers the genuine avant-garde impulse of the early modernism, now vigorously resuscitated by Language writers, from the legacy of the postmodern “breakthrough,” which merely questioned the assumptions of high modernism and New Criticism. The final result is an enlightening and extremely thought-provoking book. Paying equal attention to texts and their contexts, her study is historically well-informed and intellectually stimulating. On occasion Perloff makes comments that appear overly dismissive and polarizing, as when she writes about “the unfulfilled promise of the revolutionary poetic impulse in so much of what passes for poetry today–a poetry singularly unambitious in its attitude to the materiality of the text” (5-6). Such statements may be inevitable, considering the oppositional nature of the texts she examines as a critic (and this is, after all, Perloff’s “manifesto”), but eventually they do more harm than good to her book. Here is why.

     

    The poetry that doesn’t seek to foreground the materiality of the signifier is not automatically less “ambitious” or of a lesser order than poetry that does. Much of today’s mainstream poetry can be dull and unexciting, but much of it also can be inventive and inspiring; Perloff’s way of describing the so-called establishment poetry as “tepid and unambitious” is no more useful or critically penetrating than a mainstream book-reviewer calling experimental poetry meaningless and badly written; both kinds of evaluation mean nothing and lead nowhere. Perloff overstates her case when she says that the dominant “epiphanic” mode of the last three decades, which is largely a continuation of the Romantic lyric tradition, “has evidently failed to kindle any real excitement on the part of the public” (4). Evidently? All evidence points to the contrary. Rita Dove, Robert Pinsky, Stanley Kunitz–the Poet Laureates she herself cites in her argument– have produced considerable followings among both specialized and general audiences, and they even sell books. Granted, poetry is still largely marginalized in the United States, but doesn’t the rising number of literary publications, poetry festivals and slams, even poetry workshops (no matter what Perloff thinks about them), testify to the existence of some real excitement among the public? And what about Nobel Prize laureates Czeslaw Milosz, Joseph Brodsky, Octavio Paz, Derek Walcott, Seamus Heaney, and Wislawa Szymborska? Though one wouldn’t call them experimental poets, they certainly manage to attract large numbers of readers in the United States, as well as around the world, something that can’t be said of any of the contemporary poets Perloff discusses in her book. If public enthusiasm is to be the criterion of a movement’s poetic success, as Perloff seems at times to suggest, then it is hard to share her faith in modernist experimentalism as a continuing force in the new century. Referring to the poetic innovations of Eliot and Pound, Randall Jarrell once said that a great revolution is hardest of all on the great revolutionists. This is not always true, for revolutionists may also grow into reactionaries, as Eliot did. But Perloff’s catastrophic reading of the modernist avant-garde as a vibrant movement tragically stopped by the historical realities of the twentieth century makes one wonder, at times, whether its “unfulfilled promise” can ever be realized.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • MacLeod, Glen, ed. Wallace Stevens and Ezra Pound. A special issue of The Wallace Stevens Journal 26.2 (Fall 2002): 131-266.
    • Perloff, Marjorie. The Poetics of Indeterminacy: Rimbaud to Cage. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1981.

     

  • “The World Will Be Tlön”: Mapping the Fantastic onto the Virtual

    Darren Tofts

    Department of Media and Communications
    Swinburne University of Technology
    dtofts@groupwise.swin.edu.au

     

    The world may be fantastic. The world willbe Tlön.

     

    The cartographers of antiquity have left a profound and fearsome legacy. Only now can we speak of its dread morphology. Spurning the severe abstractions of scale, they achieved exact correspondence: the map occupies the territory, an exact copy in every detail. Here, after centuries of vanity, is exactitude in science, pitiless, coincident, and seamless. I have stood on the threshold of the cave, having escaped the bondage of shadows. I have climbed to the top of the mountain and sought out the tattered ruins of that map. I have discoursed with the scattered dynasty of solitary men who have changed the face of the world. I have come to offer my report on knowledge. I have come to tell you that the world will be Tlön.

     

    The figure of the map covering the territory has become an indexical figure in discussions of postmodernism. It has come to stand for a problematic diminution of the real in the wake of a proliferating image culture, obsessed with refining the technologies of reproduction, making the copy even better than the real thing. As Hillel Schwartz, author of the remarkable Culture of the Copy, notes, with untimely emphasis, “the copy will transcend the original” (212).

     

    Preoccupied with the relationship between reality and its copies, postmodernism deflects the idea of an absolute reality in favor of high-fidelity facsimiles. The passage from postmodernism to virtuality involves a shift from copying to simulating the world, from the reproductive practices of photography and film, to post-reproductive or simulation technologies such as telepresence, advanced digital imaging, virtual reality and other immersive environments. This journey from reproduction to simulation involves the disappearance of difference, the breakdown of binary metaphysics and all that we understand by the term representation. The movement from analogue to digital media is a significant event in the diminution of reality’s a priori status. It comes on the heels of a long artistic tradition of exploration into the relationship between reality and its representability.

     

    Fantastic literature is one such mode that has actively explored this nexus of reality and representation, traditionally doing so through the distorting glass of allegory–whether it be in the writings of J.R.R. Tolkien, with his mythical Middle Earth, the dark and insular labyrinth of Mervyn Peake’s Gormenghast trilogy, or the miraculous world of Gabriel Garcia Marquez’s Macondo. In such writing, the creation of imaginary “other” worlds is astonishing, seductive in its realism, in the persuasive weight of presence it delivers. For the time of reading, Mordor’s fire and cobwebs are oppressively real, as is the stench and menace of Swelter’s kitchen, or the jungle’s embrace of a Spanish galleon, festooned with orchids. While fantasy is seen as a discrete form of writing, like science fiction or the gothic novel, it is still an art of fiction, a conjuror’s verisimilitude, all smoke and mirrors, sleights of hand, and verbal prestidigitation.

     

    While the realities of such writing are convincing, they fall short of actually supplanting our own sense of the real. That is, they don’t disturb our sense of what is real and what is not. Like all fiction, they are temporary zones, carnivalesque moments in which anything is possible. Without thinking too much about it we know that they are realistic. But we also know they are not real. This intuitive understanding is the safety valve of catharsis, the limit point of identification within the boundaries of a particular cultural technology, whether it is literature or cinema. This certitude, that we are immersed in realistic unrealities, is the metaphysic that allows us to tune into fantasy, live there for a time, and then re-inhabit the real without believing that the fantasy continues beyond the book or the film. It is fantasy’s exit strategy. Without this strategy, this metaphysical way out, we run the risk of psychosis, certainly as Sigmund Freud had imagined it, as a sustained and problematic over-identification with a fictional character or world. Please allow me to introduce myself: I am Titus Groan, and my quest in life lies somewhere beyond the agonizing rituals of Gormenghast. I must flee its stone lanes and unforgiving walls. Can anyone here help me?

     

    Cultural theorists, such as Umberto Eco and Jean Luis Baudrillard, have given other names to such extreme identifications with fictions, names that defined the cultural climate of the last decades of the twentieth century–terms such as simulacrum, hyperreality, the desert of the real, faith in fakes, the culture of the copy. Not wanting to be seen to lag behind the po-mo cognoscenti of Europe, Hollywood has manufactured a genre of cyber-technology films that equally responds to this perception of the closure of fantasy’s exit strategy, in which there is no longer a way out, a return to the real. Films such as The Truman Show, The Matrix, and Dark City, to name but a few, postulate worlds of hard-wired false consciousness, in which what is taken for reality is, respectively, the most insidious reality TV, the ultimate simulation, the perfect virtual reality. To be outside the deception is not to be mad, as Michel Foucault would perhaps have it, but rather to be all-powerful, in control of reality and its representations, the architect of representation as reality–the auteur, in other words, as demiurge.

     

    This brings us to the qualitative and disquieting difference between the fantastic and the virtual. In the realm of the fantastic, we don’t need anyone to welcome us to the real world, since we reliably know what it is and what it is not. When the exit strategy of fantasy is closed, or denied, we have no way of knowing that we don’t even know there is a difference anymore between fantasy and reality. Unless we are liberated from the simulacrum, like Neo in The Matrix, or find the out-door to a reality we never knew existed, like Truman, it’s business as usual in the real world, where people go to work, go to the football on the weekends and catch the occasional paper at cultural events, such as the Biennale of Sydney. Welcome to the desert of the real.

     

    In the desert of the real you can still find, if you are lucky, ruptures in the seam of things, little tears in the otherwise flawless surface of the map that covers the territory. One of these is in fact a parable about maps and territories, simulation and fabricated reality–a parable about the creation of the world. This artifact is a short fictional text written by the Argentinean writer Jorge Luis Borges. First published in 1940, “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” occupies an important place in the history of twentieth-century speculation on the relationship between fantasy and reality. It is at once a meditation on and an example of this relationship. Indeed, for Borges, terms such as fantasy and reality are in no way absolutes, nor are they dependent figures within a binary opposition. They are rather manifestations of possible worlds, projections of the world as it may be.

     

    We have much to learn from “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius.” Although he died in 1986, Borges is still very much our contemporary. His presence, more than we can perhaps ever realize, or imagine, is everywhere felt but nowhere seen at the start of the third millennium, this year, this day, this afternoon. As we invest more time, money, and metaphysical capital in the cultural technologies of virtuality, we are perhaps closing off our own exit strategies, dissolving the liminal zones of genre and metaphysics that partition the fantastic and the real. We can learn something of how we are doing this, as well as the consequences of doing it, from “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius.” It is worthwhile, therefore, briefly to review the fiction in this context, to refresh the memory of those who are familiar with it, to submit it to the memory of those who are not. For those of you from the border, who have difficulty with me describing Tlön as if it is a fiction–and not an assured commentary on your world–I humbly beg your indulgence.

     

    As with many of Borges’s stories, “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” begins with a found object. It is a single volume, number 46 to be precise, of a pirated edition of the Anglo-American Cyclopaedia, published in New York in 1917. The volume is unremarkable in every way, apart from four extra pages that are contained in this singular volume only and not in any other copy of this particular edition. The superfluous pages contain a detailed account of a previously unknown and uncharted region of Asia Minor called Uqbar. The narrator and his companion, Adolpho Bioy Cesares, search in vain for further references to Uqbar, but nothing in the way of corroborating evidence emerges from their labors, even from hours spent at the National Library of Argentina. The entry on Uqbar contains detailed information on the history, customs, geography, and literature of this mysterious region. One piece of information will suffice to impart a flavor of the piece:

     

    The section on Language and Literature was brief. Only one trait is worthy of recollection: it noted that the literature of Uqbar was one of fantasy and that its epics and legends never referred to reality, but to the two imaginary regions of Mlejnas and Tlön. (29)

     

    After further research, “events,” the narrator observes, “became more intense” (40). It is discovered that the documentation of Uqbar was in fact the aborted precursor of a more ambitious project, undertaken by what is subsequently revealed as a secret society, originating in the seventeenth century–a kind of enlightenment Sokal hoax on a trans-historical scale. More ambitious and sublime in its conception and scope, this society, which included George Berkeley as one of its number, set out to invent the fictitious history of an entire planet, called Tlön. The imprimatur of this society, Orbis Tertius, is found in a similarly unlikely volume–of which there exists, again, only one copy–entitled A First Encylopaedia of Tlön. In this one volume we encounter the eclectic miscellany of detail, the reassuring kind of data and information that adheres reality to representation, the documentary veracity that endows the encyclopedia with the solidity of truth, authenticity, and knowledge:

     

    Now I held in my hands a vast methodical fragment of an unknown planet’s entire history, with its architecture and its playing cards, with the dread of its mythologies and the murmur of its languages, with its emperors and its seas, with its minerals and its birds and its fish, with its algebra and its fire, with its theological and metaphysical controversy. And all of it articulated, coherent, with no visible doctrinal intent or tone of parody. (31)

     

    As James Woodall, Borges’s most recent biographer, has noted, “The discovery of another. . . planet in science fiction is generally a cue for extravagant fantasy; for Borges in this story it was a way of reviewing the world, of offering a critique of reality” (115). In this respect history is everything. Just as Mervyn Peake had used his fiction to explore his time spent at Belsen as a war-time illustrator, so Borges attempted to come to terms with the chaotic horrors of war and the spurious symmetries of the day–dialectical materialism, anti-Semitism, Nazism–in the creation of a harmonious world. But in coming to terms with it he did not attempt to understand it, but rather to replace it altogether. For a world at war, the desire to submit to Tlön, to yield to the “minute and vast evidence of an orderly planet,” was overwhelming (42). But such is the stuff of allegory, the tidy protocols of hermeneutic neatness. What better way to explain the embrace of a fictitious reality that is superior in every way to the wreckage of contemporary history?

     

    But this is not all there is to the story. Borges in fact turns the allegorical mode of fantasy in on itself, closing off its exit strategy and interpolating us, the readers outside-text, along the way. There are a number of things in this fiction that can’t be simply written off as allegorical parallel (that is, the interpretation of Tlön as metaphor, as the projection of an ideal world). The world of Tlön, we quickly realize, is palpable and capable of affecting dramatic outcomes in the real world. The First Encylopaedia of Tlön first makes its appearance in 1937, received, as certified mail, by a mysterious person called Herbert Ashe. Little is known about Ashe, other than the inscrutable, yet forthright detail that in his lifetime “he suffered from un-reality” (30). What is beyond doubt is that Ashe was one of the collaborators of Orbis Tertius, and three days after he received the book of Tlön, the book he helped bring into this world, he died of a ruptured aneurysm. We know, too, that as part of their process of rhetorical corroboration, the society of Orbis Tertius disseminates objects throughout the world that cohere with information to be found in the First Encylopedia of Tlön. Such objects, like the forty volumes of the First Encyclopedia of Tlön, are attenuations, material reinforcements, simulacra that solidify the fictitious detail of the books in memory. We could call these objects “proof artifacts,” like the scattered ephemera of a holiday never actually taken in Philip K. Dick’s 1962 story, “We Can Remember It For You Wholesale” (the text which became the basis of the film Total Recall), or the family photographs coveted by the replicant Leon in the film Blade Runner.

     

    But there is a difference, of a metaphysical kind, between a suggestive corroboration, a simulated mnemonic device, and something that can’t be accounted for in material terms, such as the small, oppressively heavy cone that is found on the body of a dead man in 1942. Representing the divinity in certain regions of Tlön, it is, according to the narrator, “made from a metal which is not of this world,” and is so heavy that a “man was scarcely able to raise it from the ground” (41). No one knew anything of the man in whose possession the cone was found, other than the fact that he “came from the border” (41). Here is an instance of the imaginary made flesh, the uncomfortable collision of worlds that we expect to forever remain discrete. It is a kind of perverse, Eucharistic event, the transubstantiation of the fictional into the material, the crossing over from one border to another, from one ontological realm into another–the “intrusion of this fantastic world into the world of reality” (41). Holding this enigmatic object in his hand, the narrator reflects on “the disagreeable impression of repugnance and fear” it instills in him (41). Here is the nausea of the simulacrum, the supplanting of reality by fantasy. Rachael Rosen encounters this dread in Blade Runner when Deckard exposes her childhood memories as belonging to someone else. The contemporary technological shift from one media regime to another, from reproductive to simulation or virtual technologies, entails a similar ontological blurring of worlds that may not be so easily resolved through allegory.

     

    How do we comprehend, for example, the ability of Neo in The Matrix to “know Kung Fu” without ever having been taught it, without learning its philosophies and techniques as a discipline? The fact is there is little “ability” to his knowing Kung Fu, because he has not acquired it, but rather he has been programmed to know it (together with its cultural resonances and quotations, from Chuck Norris roundhouse kicks to Bruce Lee’s trademark cockiness). His experience of Kung Fu is a simulated rather than an actual thing, akin to the competence that airline or military pilots derive from spending hours in flight simulators. The ability to know how to do Kung Fu, repeatedly and without thinking about it, is an issue of second nature, of acquired habit that has become intuitive. The difference here is that second nature, in Neo’s case, is not preceded by first-hand experience.

     

    Such is the consequence of the shift from one media regime to another. In a fine essay that discusses virtuality in relation to Ray Bradbury’s 1952 short story “The Veldt,” Ken Wark argues that the futuristic, holographic nursery in that text is a technology of the “too real.” This virtual technology–which is a cross between a children’s playroom and the Holodeck from Star Trek–exceeds the real by manifesting simulacra, such as lions, into the real world. Such manifestations are akin to psychiatric irruptions of the unconscious in waking life. They are affects capable of real and, as it turns out, destructive consequences. This is no allegorical wunderkammer, since the logic of representation has ceased to exist within its machinations.

     

    If Bradbury’s holographic nursery has anticipated anything achieved so far in the name of new media, it is not so much the immersive, virtual-reality environment as the new, “total realism” of hybrid cinema (that is, the convergence of film and digital effects). Lev Manovich, in The Language of New Media, describes how the use of digital technologies in the pursuit of greater realism in cinema has created effects that are “too real” (199). That is, the ability to simulate three-dimensional visual realities–such as the dinosaurs in Jurassic Park–has created a perfect visuality that, paradoxically, has to be “diluted to match the imperfection of film’s graininess” (202). For Manovich, digital simulation has precipitated a new order of experience, a synthetic reality that exceeds the limitations of film’s attempts to represent real-world experience.

     

    As evidence of the persuasiveness of synthetic reality, I submit the following image:

     

    Figure 1

     

    This image, created by artist Troy Innocent, represents the kind of fusion of real people with computer-simulated objects that Manovich describes in relation to the formation of synthetic realities. Created at my request, this image beautifully illustrates the point that synthetic realities can blur the distinction between formerly discrete worlds. Bill Mitchell, author of The Reconfigured Eye. Visual Truth in the Post-Photographic Era, would probably refer to this image as a “fake photograph,” an example of the new aesthetic possibilities of digital imaging. I prefer to think of it as a snapshot from Tlön, the infiltration of one world by another. Mitchell is sensitive to the metaphysical implications of digital imaging, noting that “as we enter the post-photographic era, we must face once again the ineradicable fragility of our ontological distinctions between the imaginary and the real” (225).

     

    It is such forecasts of the consequences of our embrace of the virtual that confirm the continued importance of “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” in today’s world. As a “critique of reality,” it not only documents an account in the 1940s of the changing of the face of the world, but also anticipates the technological reinvention of the real. Such reinvention, in the name of virtual and simulation technologies, prompts the question: do we need a reality any more, when multiple realities can be created synthetically? As a synthetic reality, “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” draws us, the readers of Borges the writer, the people outside-text, into its perplexing ontological orbits. That is, our experience of the world is affected by our involvement in the story. Like the inhabitants of Tlön, we find ourselves engaging with metaphysics as if it were a “branch of fantastic literature” (34). Borges defiantly teases the readers’ desire to believe in the reality of the discovered world, secure, as they are, in their assured, known world outside-text. He tests, in other words, the extent to which readers are prepared to forestall their exit strategy, to explore the outer limits of credulity to do with this previously unknown world. After all, all the reference points in the story are verifiably factual, such as the Brazilian hotel, Las Delicias, in which Herbert Ashe is sent the mysterious First Encylopaedia of Tlön, or the narrator’s companion, Adolfo Bioy Cesares, the person who brings the troubling issue of Uqbar to his attention, in reality one of Borges’s closest friends and literary collaborators. Borges’s style is clearly documentary-like in approach: prudent, well researched, and sound, with very few literary flourishes or overt metafictional moments. Indeed, it is more accurate to call “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” an essay rather than a fiction, reading, as it does, with the impersonal, measured factuality of the encyclopedia entry. In the hands of an essayist documenting the conceit of Tlön, Borges’s methods of persuasion–or are they in fact forms of evidence?–are compelling. In reflecting on one of the theories of time subscribed to by the inhabitants of Tlön, for example, he notes that “it reasons that the present is indefinite, that the future has no reality other than as a present hope, that the past has no reality other than as a present memory” (34). Furthermore, he notes, in a footnote, that this question had detained the attention of the great Bertrand Russell, who supposed “that the planet has been created a few minutes ago, furnished with a humanity that ‘remembers’ an illusory past” (34). He identifies the reference as The Analysis of Mind, 1921, page 159. You can pursue the citation if you like, but take it from me, it is not bogus.

     

    This is one of the many troubling moments in which information from outside-text corroborates the collaborative, invented world of Borges’s fiction. That is, facets of this grand guignol can be chased down as referential points in our own world. We can confirm these references from scholarly sources, such as The Analysis of Mind, or volume 13 of the writings of Thomas De Quincey. As with the people within the diegetic world of the story, it is difficult to rationalize the feeling that our reality, or at least my reality, is not yielding to Tlön. In considering the parallels between “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” and The Matrix, I was startled when I re-read the story and came upon one of the doctrines of Tlön: that “while we sleep here, we are awake elsewhere and that in this way every man is two men” (35). The duality of actual self and digital representation in The Matrix is the anchor that smoothes out and reconciles the split between the worlds of meat and of virtuality–the conduit between different ontologies, different metaphysical states. So, in playing around with this parallel, looking for an angle, an opening gambit, you can imagine my concern, when reading of the progressive reformation of earthly learning in the name of Tlön, at discovering that “biology and mathematics also await their avatars” (43).

     

    Figure 2: A Surreal Visitor

     

    Events became more intense as I moved deeper into the vertigo of writing about Tlön. On reading the Melbourne The Age Saturday Extra on the 20th of April 2002, it was with a mixture of fascination and alarm that I came across an account of a little-known visit to Melbourne by Borges in the late Autumn of 1938. Written by Guy Rundle, under the title of “A Surreal Visitor,” the piece took me quite by surprise. My first inclination was to check the date: it wasn’t the 1st of April. To my knowledge Borges had never traveled to Australia, a view quickly confirmed in the pages of the biographies at my disposal. Yet the detail was all here: he arrived on May 16th at the invitation of John Willie, a member of Norman Lindsay’s bohemian circle and admirer of Borges’s work, gave a lecture at the Royal Society entitled “The Author’s Fictions,” and spent much of his time in the domed reading room of the State Library of Victoria. These were all likely, Borgesian places, places that I would expect the great man of letters to frequent if he was in Melbourne, right down to the oneiric epiphany of a set of locks in a Glenhuntly shop window. In all, Borges spent ten days in Melbourne before returning to Buenos Aires, the smell of eucalyptus no doubt still lingering in his mind (a sensation that would seem to have found its way into the remarkable opening line of his story “Death and the Compass,” published in 1944).

     

    On closer inspection, it became clear that Rundle was playing a very erudite joke on his readers, treating Borges by the rules of his own game, so to speak. Indeed, the first line read like a Borges pastiche, citing an author, a prodigious event and an ironic allusion, all within the strict economy of a single sentence: “Devotees of the writings of Jorge Luis Borges will not be surprised by the recent discovery that the great Argentinean writer once spent some time in Melbourne.” The rhythm and balance of the syntax recalls the opening sentence from “Death and the Compass”: “Of the many problems which exercised the reckless discernment of Lönnrot, none was so strange–so rigorously strange, shall we say–as the periodic series of bloody events which culminated at the villa of Triste-le-Roy, amid the ceaseless aroma of the eucalypti” (106). The suggestion that Borges’s admirers “will not be surprised” is the ironic allusion, a rhetorical maneuver gesturing to the fact that a devotee of Borges, well versed in the art of fabulation, would recognize that Borges is the perfect subject for such a fiction.

     

    Rundle’s piece cannily imitates distinctive features of Borges’s writing and, in particular, “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius”–a text famous for its challenge to readers to accept, or at least consider, the reality of a fictitious world. For all we know, Rundle may have written his story with “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” at his elbow, open at page twenty-eight. On that page you will find one of Borges’s own ironic, reflexive allusions, as the narrator and Bioy Cesares discuss the article on Uqbar in the Anglo-American Cyclopaedia. The key detail here is that they found the piece “very plausible” (28). Rundle’s piece is crowded with plausible detail that is very specific and combines known facts about Borges’s life–such as his involvement with Victoria Ocampo and the important literary magazine, Sur–with previously unknown information. It sounds plausible that someone in Norman Lindsay’s bohemian circle would have been aware of Sur and passionate enough to mentor the Argentinean writer’s visit to Australia. Most of all, Rundle exploits Borges’s delight–especially indulged in “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius”–in inviting the reader to trust in evidence that is confined to fugitive or lost documents, missing or unverifiable detail. The record of Borges’s visit, for instance, is “confined to a few notes made for a poem (never written) that Borges made in a notebook, which recently came to light at a house in Cordoba, and some letters written to fellow novelist Bioy Cesares” (5). The reference to Bioy Cesares is a delightful touch, an unquestionable source offsetting the potential unreliability of such fragmentary, incomplete records. Borges’s lecture, presented to the Royal Society is, not surprisingly, “also lost, if ever written down” (5). Nor should we be surprised to detect the occasional flash of audacity as Rundle warms to his work, noting that a vernacular reference to a “strange lecture by a Spanish chap” is attributed to Harold Stewart, who, along with James McAuley and writing under the pseudonym of Ern Malley, perpetrated one of the great literary hoaxes of the twentieth century.

     

    I have reflected that it is permissible to see in this story of a visit never taken a kind of palimpsest, through which the traces of Borges’s “previous” writing are translucently visible. It is especially noteworthy that Rundle exploits the plausible conveyance of tenuous information, or what Borges, in “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius,” refers to as a tension between “rigorous prose” and “fundamental vagueness” (28). This is noteworthy. Of the Borges stories Rundle refers to in the piece–and they are some of his most well known–no mention is made of “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius,” arguably his most famous work. This absence is also a tour de force of citation by omission, implicit in the gesture to a line from “The Garden of Forking Paths,” in which the word “chess” is the answer to the following question: “In a riddle whose answer is chess, what is the only prohibited word?” (53).

     

    One can imagine that such a persuasive piece of writing would be not only plausible, retrospectively writing Jorge Luis Borges into Melbourne’s literary memory, but revelatory to many readers. Once again a line from “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” came to mind: “a fictitious past occupies in our memories the place of another, a past of which we know nothing with certainty–not even that it is false” (42-3). A trip to the Exhibition Gardens or the reading room at the State Library would never be the same again, knowing that the great Borges had left his trace there. But literary hoaxes don’t fool everyone. Nor are they to everyone’s taste.

     

    Figure 3: Disclaimer

     

    On the following weekend, I can’t say that I was surprised to read the following disclaimer:

     

    An article in Saturday Extra on April 20 called “A surreal visitor” about writer Jorge Luis Borges’s apparent visit to Melbourne was in fact a piece of fiction, mimicking Borges’s own style of placing people in imaginary situations. The editor of Saturday Extra regrets this was not acknowledged at the time of publication. (2)

     

    Now this is a real Borgesian test of credulity. I find the idea of Jason Steger, the literary editor of the Saturday Extra, forgetting to mention this fact far less plausible than the idea of Tlön itself. Jason Steger is clearly the Herbert Ashe of this conspiracy. This disclaimer, while predictable, was actually quite dissatisfying and ruined what, for me, was a marvellous piece of invention. I could see it now, many years down the track, my students wondering, with restrained awe, if they had sat where Borges had in the domed reading room of the State library. So out of some peculiar nostalgia for the lost memory of a visit that never was, I decided, in the spirit of Rundle’s piece, to look into the some of the “facts” he assembled, to re-trace and re-claim some of the steps of this sublime, phantom visitation. I didn’t expect to find any corroboration, but I wanted to at least participate in the fiction, to walk in the ubiquitous shadow of this rigorous Latin American genius. Now this is where this story gets really weird.

     

    On the 23rd of April I went to do some research at the State Library of Victoria. Had the domed reading room been open (it was then still under renovation), I would have sought out that imaginary vibe. Mindful of the lessons of “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius,” I suppose I wanted to imaginatively place Borges in the scene, to fill the gaps that I knew, full well, I would find. A strange inclination, I know, but then we are dealing with a writer who, more than any other, has encouraged us to question what we accept as real, as verifiable, as truth. I wanted to find the spaces of his absent presence. After all, Borges was a deconstructionist avant la lettre and he would have known only too well that if there are no traces, there is no presence.

     

    Figure 4: National Register of Shipping Arrivals

     

    My first reference, the National Register of Shipping Arrivals: Australia and New Zealand, was promising, but by no means conclusive. The volume was in fact an index of passenger lists between the years 1924 and 1964, held elsewhere, at the Melbourne Office of the National Archives of Australia to be precise, which is part of the Public Record Office of Victoria. While a deferral, it was at least a start. That reference would have to wait for another day. Cook’s Australasian Sailing List was my next port of call. When requesting the book, I received every indication that it was available, and as the stacks are not open to public access, it was highly likely that I would get a return.

     

    Figure 5: Cook’s Australasian Sailing List

     

    I was disappointed, then, to receive my request slip and no book. The slip indicated that the volume could not be found. The librarian on duty acknowledged that this was indeed unusual, but I was prepared to accept it as part of the hit-or-miss process of library research.

     

    I started to get concerned, though, when my next request also bounced on me. Consistent with Rundle’s imaginary itinerary, I wanted to consult the Author Index of the Proceedings of the Royal Society of Victoria to find no evidence of Borges’s guest lecture there.

     

    Figure 6: Author Index of
    Proceedings of the Royal Society of Victoria

     

    Not only did I receive a note saying that the volume was not found, but on the request slip there was also a handwritten note indicating that the volume was “Not on shelf.” I left the library with nothing to show for my efforts. While, as I had expected, I did not find any positive evidence of Borges’s visit to Melbourne, I did not find, either, any negative evidence to prove that he did not visit.

     

    I returned to the library the following day. On the way there, I stopped off at the Royal Society. The person with whom I spoke, while decidedly brusque and unhelpful, did confirm that a guest speaker would indeed have been registered in their Proceedings.

     

    Figure 7: Proceedings of the Royal Society of Victoria

     

    This time at the library, the exact volume of the Proceedings, containing everything from 1938, was not found. A trip around the block to the Public Records Office was more promising. A database search of passenger ships yielded no records whatsoever of the Koumoundouros, nor did a search of passengers coming into Melbourne as “legal aliens” in 1938 include a Jorge Luis Borges, though, as you will see from this sample of the inventory, the name Borges was not an uncommon one for arrivals in Melbourne that year:

     

    Figure 8
    Click on image for larger view

     

    But what was starting to disconcert me, in an odd, metaphysical kind of way, was that this confirmed evidence sat cheek by jowl with inconclusive, irresolute results. Nothing, it seemed, could be proved false. The whole thing was actually starting to resemble “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius”–real life as an uncanny form of allusion or repetition. It was as if the very task of researching Borges’s imaginary visit to Melbourne had unleashed a kind of strange code or virus, a meme, a Borges meme that had the potential to change the way we perceive reality. But unlike the genetic or ideological connotations of this notion that we find in Richard Dawkins and Douglas Rushkoff, the Borges meme was of a metaphysical nature, short-circuiting all attempts to confirm its unreality, even in the face of other plausible evidence that declared that the whole affair was a fabulation (not the least of these being Jason Steger’s disclaimer printed in The Age). Indeed, for a fleeting instant, the idea did cross my mind that along with Steger, Rundle belonged to the same secret society of intellectuals, Orbis Tertius, who made the world Tlön. Their quest, it could be argued, was an attempt to animate what Rundle called, referring to Melbourne, an “unremarkable and overfamiliar city” (5). This could be achieved through projecting the city anew through the exotic eyes of a “mysterious visitor” (5). The tantalizing possibility that this imaginary event might be real, or the more interesting dynamic of its ambivalent veracity, is the occasion for a kind of belief, a virtual, simulated belief in the reality of the unreal. To paraphrase a line from Borges’s “The Library of Babel,” it suffices that his visit to Melbourne be possible for it to exist.

     

    To conclude, the idea of a Borges meme gets us to the disconcerting heart of this writer’s metaphysics. Unlike fantasy in its allegorical mode, Borges’s metaphysical fictions intrude into what we understand to be real, the obvious world outside-text. Borges writes of the undecidable, the interzone between fiction and non-fiction, documentary writing, and fabulation. It is an unclassifiable space of paradox and contradiction, the sensation, vague yet familiar, that what seems unlikely may be a forgotten reality–a confused sensation akin to the afterglow of a vivid dream, before it vanishes in wakefulness. As we have seen, this is a paradox that we have been confronting for some time in the name of postmodernism and more recently in relation to virtual technologies. In the age of virtuality, we are once again retracing Borges’s footsteps as he guides us, a latter-day Ariadne, through the labyrinthine fantasy that we call the real.

     

    Postscript

     

    In the days leading up to my departure for Sydney, I received a parcel from the Royal Society. Unaccompanied by a letter or note of explanation–they were as perfunctory as ever–I found this photograph.

     

    Figure 9

     

    It is without doubt a photograph of Borges, probably in his late thirties. This would date it around 1938 or 1939. The intriguing detail is the plaque at his feet. On closer inspection–thanks to my friend Chris Henschke–it reveals the State of Victoria coat of arms. The botanical name of the tree on which he is reclining, the Ribbon Tree of Otago, grown in Melbourne since the nineteenth century, can be verified in Guilfoyle’s Catalogue of Plants Under Cultivation in the Melbourne Botanic Gardens, published in 1883.

     

    Figure 10

     

    The only other thing of note about the photograph is that its verso bears an inscription in an elegant copperplate. For some reason this would not scan properly, but I offer the following transcription:

     

    I remember him, with his face taciturn and Indian-like and singularly remote, behind the cigarette.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Borges, Jorge Luis. “Garden of the Forking Paths.” Labyrinths 44-54.
    • —. “Death and the Compass.” Labyrinths 106-17.
    • —. Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings. Eds. Donald A. Yates and James E. Irby. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1970 [1964].
    • —. “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius.” Labyrinths 27-43.
    • “Clarification.” The Age Saturday Extra. May 4, 2002.
    • Manovich, Lev. The Language of New Media. Cambridge, MA: MIT P, 2001.
    • Mitchell, William J. The Reconfigured Eye: Visual Truth in the Post-Photographic Era. Cambridge, MA: MIT P, 1992.
    • Rundle, Guy. “A Surreal Visitor.” The Age Saturday Extra. April 20, 2002.
    • Schwartz, Hillel. The Culture of the Copy: Striking Likenesses, Unreasonable Facsimiles. New York: Zone, 1996.
    • Wark, McKenzie. “Too Real.” Prefiguring Cyberculture: An Intellectual History. Eds. Darren Tofts, Annemarie Jonson, and Alessio Cavallaro. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT P, 2003.
    • Woodall, James. Borges: A Life. New York: Basic, 1996.

     

  • Liberal Multiculturalism and the Ethics of Hospitality in the Age of Globalization

    Meyda Yegenoglu

    Department of Sociology
    Middle East Technical University
    meyda@metu.edu.tr

     

    The increasing political presence of refugees and immigrants in post-Cold war Europe has generated considerable debate about the nature of multicultural society. The demand for the recognition of cultural, racial, and ethnic differences has come to occupy a central place in the forms of post-national politics emergent today. Yet, a closer examination of the juridico-political regulations developed in response to these demands reveals a troubling tendency: cultural/racial difference is translated into an understanding of cultural diversity that treats minorities, to use David Bennett’s term, as “add-ons” (5) to the existing nation form. Thus the question becomes whether such an “additive model” (5) is capable of inducing a radical transformation in the concept of the sovereign position of the national self. This essay addresses the limitations of this procedural multiculturalist valorization and argues that the liberal imperative to tolerate and respect cultural difference is far from displacing the sovereignty of the host society in question. In discussing these limitations, I will situate liberal multiculturalism in the context of today’s capitalist globalization.

     

    When we examine the policies and programs through which the culturally different is valorized today, it becomes clear that liberalism has become the regulative principle in many metropolitan countries. Yet it is far from clear whether such a liberal valorization and the granting of legal rights to non-normative citizens, the ethnically and racially “different,” will prove to be a counter-hegemonic political force. Is the legal codification of respect for identities in their particularity adequate for reinventing a democratic political space? If such politicization does not flourish in particularist liberal multiculturalism, then we need to be vigilant about what is being left intact. In fact, we need to take our vigilance one step further and question the ways in which such codification regulates the destabilizing force of the political and entails its repudiation, suspension, limitation, or foreclosure.

     

    We are witnessing an increasing proliferation of literature trying to understand the new economic, political, and cultural arrangements that are inaugurated by global capital. The accelerating rate of the international division of labor, the extended capacity of multinational production, the development and concentration of global financial and banking services and culture industries, the rapid development in telecommunications, and the growth of a global mass culture have led many to talk about a process by which the world is now becoming a single and unified space. Globalization, according to the advocates of this position, marks the beginning of a process whereby difference is dissolved within the logic of sameness and cultural homogenization. Consequently we are reminded of the hazards and shortcomings of limiting our inquiries with nations and nation-states, for the sovereignty of nation-states has been declared to be undermined in the age of cultural, economic, social homogeneity, and integration.

     

    On the other side of the debate, there are those who emphasize the impossibility of envisioning a unified global culture. For example, in “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy,” Arjun Appadurai suggests that when forces are brought from various metropoles into different societies they tend to become indigenized in some way. To understand the complexity of the process of globalization, he suggests that we examine the fundamental disjunctures between economy, politics, and culture. For Appadurai the global cultural flows occur in and through the disjunctures between five “scapes”: ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, finanscapes, and ideoscapes. Such disjunctures and flows point not only to the fluid and irregular nature of international capital but also constitute the building blocks of the replacement of Benedict Anderson’s “imagined community” with “imagined worlds.”

     

    Those who, like Appadurai, are critical of the global homogenization argument suggest that the globalized world is a contested and contradictory space. These critics point to the increasing proliferation of ethnic and racial struggle to argue that the homogenizing pressure of globalization paradoxically produces cultural heterogeneity. It is the encounter of the local with the global that is deemed to force the recognition of alternative histories, traditions, and cultures that have hitherto remained silent under the ruins of the project of modernity and colonialism. For example, Ulf Hannerz, in “Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture,” points out that cultural differences now exist not between cultures but within cultures and suggests that world culture implies a reorganization of diversity rather than a replication of uniformity. It is no longer possible to talk about the homogenization of systems of meaning; between the different regions of the globe there are now flows of meanings, people, and goods. The globe can be imagined as a homogenized unity only when localities are discarded and when power relations among its constituting parts are ignored.

     

    Thus globalization increasingly reveals the limits of Western modernity: various ethnic and racial minorities, their traditions, memories, myths, and symbols are now woven together in the increasingly dense web of metropolitan culture. In an attempt to understand how particularity and difference are articulated in this global culture, Stuart Hall, in “The Local and the Global,” questions attributing a singular and unitary logic to capital. The notion of the global which is capable of getting hold of and neutralizing everybody and everything and thereby contains all marginality in an uncontradictory and uncontested space does not accurately capture the specificity of this decentralized and de-centered form of globalization. Hall suggests that with the accelerating rate of migration, older unitary cultural formations are now breaking down. The emergent form of globalization simultaneously valorizes the local and the global. Hall does not deny the homogenizing form of this new cultural representation, but he argues that it is a peculiar form of homogenization–one that simultaneously absorbs and recognizes difference. This form of global homogenization does not obliterate difference but rather works in and through difference. While capital is spreading globally, it works through specificity. Although the growing global culture is now located in the West and speaks English, it is increasingly invaded by other languages and accents. It is therefore forced to negotiate and incorporate a difference that it formerly tried to conquer. In a paradoxical turn, as minorities reclaim representation for themselves, marginality has been turned into a powerful space. The identities that have hitherto been excluded now signal the emergence of new subjects, new ethnicities, and new communities, and they have acquired the means to speak for themselves. Although Hall acknowledges that resorting to such localities by retreating into exclusivist and defensive enclaves might become dangerous and can lead to forms of fundamentalism, he nevertheless thinks that ethnicity is the necessary position of enunciation from which the formerly excluded marginality speaks and grounds itself.

     

    As is clear from this brief review of current critical discourse, one of the characterizing features of the debate on globalization is the opposition between homogenization and heterogenization or between universalization and particularization. Moreover, the particular or different is presumed to be endowed with some resistive and liberative capacity in the face of the universalizing tendency of global capital. I would suggest that this is a misleading opposition as it identifies globalization with universalization1 and consequently locates the counter-hegemonic political struggle against the global force of capital in the affirmation of particular identities. In “A Leftist Plea for Eurocentrism,” Slavoj Zizek rightly points out that it is deeply misleading to posit the rising globalization in opposition to particular identities since the true opposition is between globalization and universalism. For him, the new world is global but not universal; it is an order, which, rather than negating the particular, allocates each and every particular a place.2 Therefore, what is threatened by globalization is not particularity but universality itself. Universalism, for Zizek, is the “properly political domain” as it implies “universalizing one’s particular fate as representative of global injustice” (1007). If we want to go beyond the rather simplistic praising of the particular, one of the tasks that awaits us is to develop a conceptual framework that will allow us to rethink globalization and the apparent counter-tendency of valorization of particular identities as a double gesture of capital. What needs to be questioned is whether the particular that is valorized in multiculturalist politics constitutes a destabilizing political force in the wake of global abstraction of transnational capitalism which now operates completely divorced from its specific origins in Europe, as Dirlik argues in “The Global in the Local,” and whose immanent logic remains indifferent to the boundaries of the nation-state, as Zizek suggests in “Multiculturalism, or, the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism.”

     

    The decentering of capitalism, its deterritorialization and abstraction, implies the difficulty of pointing to any nation or region as the center of global capitalism. This has led many to emphasize the qualitatively different nature of global capitalism from its earlier forms. For Dirlik, this qualitative difference of global capitalism can be discerned in the authentic global abstraction capitalism has achieved, in the decentering and production of networks of urban formations without a clearly definable center–a network which is then relinked via transnational corporations (30). Likewise, in “Ambiguous Universality,” Etienne Balibar delineates the transformations created in the geographical and geopolitical pattern of the world and points to the multiplication of centers, which form a network rather than a “core” area (52). Similarly, Zizek suggests that the final moment of capitalism entails the cutting of the umbilical cord of global companies with their mother-nation. It is thus no longer possible to pin down a colonizing agency as in the case of traditional imperialist colonialism. The paradox of this form of colonization resides in the fact that it takes place without a colonizing nation-state, as the colonizing agents now become the global companies themselves (“Multiculturalism” 43-52). Dirlik finds the concern with the local in the wake of global capitalism ironic for the following reason: while disorganizing earlier forms and reconfiguring global relations, global capitalism enhances an awareness of the local so as to be able to render the local manipulable in its hands, pointing to it as the site of resistance to capital (35). Therefore the privileging of the local without the recognition of this context and the concomitant ideological criticism of global capitalism voiced from the presumably resistive site of the local falls prey to the ideological legitimization of the structures which are indeed the very production of global capitalism. For Dirlik, the limitations of such criticism stem from the fact that global capitalism leaves no local that is not already worked over, continually disorganized, reconstituted, or assimilated as part of its universalizing and homogenizing operations (37).

     

    What do we make of the growing liberal multiculturalist dictum to respect and tolerate the racially, culturally, and ethnically different in the wake of the tendency of capital for global abstraction? Can these two trends be regarded as contradictory? In other words, does multiculturalist tolerance for difference, which not only acknowledges the value of each and every group’s cultural characteristics but also tries to amend the wrong each one of them is subjected to through various juridical and legal procedures, signal the emergence of a counter-political force against the global hegemony of capital?

     

    Slavoj Zizek, in his reading of the three different meanings of universality distinguished by Balibar, sees multiculturalist tolerance, respect and protection of human rights, democracy, and so forth as the hegemonic fiction of the real universality of today’s globalization. (“Multiculturalism” 41). The concrete universality of global order is supplanted by allowing each particular lifestyle to flourish in its particularity. For Zizek, the modern era, whose predominant form of concrete universality is the nation-state, worked by seizing the individual directly, restraining his or her freedom as the citizen of a nation-state. Against the de-nationalization of the ethnic into the national of the modern period, the intensification of global market forces entails the ethnicization of the national and renewed reconstitution of ethnic roots. Respect and tolerance for the ethnically different is a reaction to the universal dimension of the world market and hence occurs against its background and on its very terrain (42). Multiculturalism, in Zizek’s formulation, is the form of the appearance of universality in its exact mirror opposite and is therefore the ideal form of the ideology of global capitalism. In A Critique of Postcolonial Reason, Gayatri Spivak also points to the bond between liberal multiculturalism and global capitalism. She suggests that “liberal multiculturalism is determined by the demands of contemporary transnational capitalisms” (397) which secure the means of gaining the consent of developing nations in the financialization of the globe.

     

    Perhaps the originality of Zizek’s argument does not lie in the link he establishes between multiculturalism and the interests of global capitalism. Spivak, Jameson, Dirlik and Hall, in their different ways, have developed similar arguments. But there is more to Zizek’s formulation. Focusing his attention particularly on the implications of the notions of respect and tolerance, he suggests that multiculturalism entails a Eurocentric distance when it respects and tolerates the local and particular cultures (44). In this sense, multiculturalism is based on a disavowed and inverted self-referential form of racism as it empties its own position of all positive content. The racism of multiculturalism does not reside in its being against the values of other cultures. Quite the contrary: it respects and tolerates other cultures, but in respecting and tolerating the different, it maintains a distance which enables it to retain a privileged position of empty universality. It is this emptied universal position which enables one to appreciate (or depreciate) other local cultures. Thus multiculturalist respect for the particularity of the other is indeed a form of asserting one’s own superiority and sovereignty. As David Lloyd cogently describes in “Race under Representation,” the alleged neutrality and universality is at the same time a process that secures a sovereign status for the subject:

     

    The position occupied by the dominant individual is that of the Subject without properties. The Subject with “unlimited properties” is precisely the undetermined subject . . . Its universality is attained by virtue of literal indifference: this Subject becomes representative in consequence of being able to take anyone’s place, of occupying any place, of a pure exchangeability. Universal where all others are particular, partial, this Subject is the perfect, disinterested judge formed for and by the public sphere. (70)

     

    In Colonial Fantasies: Towards a Feminist Reading of Orientalism, I have suggested that it is the centering of the self, which, by setting itself off from the particular, allows its universalizing gesture (103). But, as Zizek suggests, the critical task here is not to expose the truth of multiculturalism, which is presumed to be the concealment of particular roots behind the mask of universality. Rather, the problematic of multiculturalism, premised on the hybrid co-existence of diverse cultural forms, “is the form of appearance of its opposite, of the massive presence of capitalism as universal world system; it bears witness to the unprecedented homogenization of the contemporary world” (“Multiculturalism” 45). Therefore, for Zizek, “the true horror does not reside in the particular content hidden beneath the universality of global Capital, but rather in the fact that Capital is effectively an anonymous global machine blindly running its course, that there is effectively no particular Secret Agent who animates it” (46). Precisely for this reason, the fight for cultural difference and respect for minorities leaves the basic universalizing operation of global capitalism unharmed and intact and hence needs to be seen as symptomatic of the suffocation and regulation of “politics proper” (“A Leftist Plea” 988-999).3 The task, therefore, is to understand the mechanisms by which this regulation, suffocation, and foreclosure are managed. If the institutionalized multiculturalist pluralism that characterizes the post-national global order implies a foreclosure of politics proper and is far from offering a potential for democratic politicization, then where do we locate the possibility of a politics that interrupts this foreclosure? To discuss this, allow me to make a detour through Jacques Derrida’s argument concerning conditional and unconditional hospitality.

     

    HOSPITALITY AS LAW

     

    In Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas, Derrida reads Kant’s writings on cosmopolitan law and draws our attention to his essay “Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project,” particularly the “Third Definitive Article for a Perpetual Peace” which pertains to the “right of hospitality”: “The Law of World Citizenship Shall be Limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality.” Derrida notes that this article is limited by a number of conditions. From the very beginning we are confronted with the question of conditional hospitality. The question of hospitality in Kant’s writings pulls us into the domain of law, citizenship and the relation the state has with its subjects. Universal hospitality here is only juridical and political. Cosmopolitan law is about international agreement and refers to the condition of justice and law that is to be decided by nations. Hospitality is treated as a question of rights, justice and obligation that is to be regulated by law.4 Resting on a juridical and political definition, the Kantian formulation is based not on granting the right of residence but only the right of temporary sojourn. As a juridical regulation, it concerns the rights of citizens of states that are to be regulated and deliberated by a cosmopolitical constitution. As such, it suspends and conditions the immediate, infinite, and unconditional welcoming of the other (87).

     

    Derrida directs our attention to the fact that conditional hospitality is offered at the owner’s place, home, nation, state, or city–that is, at a place where one is defined as the master and where unconditional hospitality or unconditional trespassing of the door is not possible. The host, the non-guest, the one who accepts, the one who offers hospitality, the one who welcomes, is the owner of a home and therefore is the master of the home.5

     

    As I mentioned above, Derrida directs our attention to the fact that in Kant’s essay, hospitality is framed as a question of law, an obligation, a duty, and a right: it refers to the welcoming of an alien/stranger other as a non-enemy. The formulation of hospitality as a question of law weaves it with contradiction because the welcoming of the other within the limits of law is possible on the condition that the host, the owner of the home, the one who accepts, remains the master of the home and thereby retains his/her authority in that place. The law of hospitality is the law of oikonomia, the law of one’s home. Offered as the law of place, hospitality lays down the limits of a place and retains the authority over that place, thus limiting the gift that is offered, retaining the self as self in one’s own home as the condition of hospitality. In making this the condition of hospitality, it affirms the law of the same. Hospitality is a giving gesture. But with the hospitality as law, what this gesture in fact does is to subject the stranger/foreigner to the law of the host’s home. In this way, the foreigner is allowed to enter the host’s space under conditions the host has determined. Hence conditional welcoming entails a way of insinuating a place from which one invites the other and hence lays down the conditions for “appropriating for oneself a place to welcome the other, or, worse, welcoming the other in order to appropriate for oneself a place and then speak the language of hospitality” (15-6). Therefore the law of hospitality is characterized by a limitation. The host affirms the position of a master in his/her own home; in the space and things he/she provides to the stranger/guest, the host assures his/her sovereignty and says: this space belongs to me; we are in my home. Welcome to me. Feel at home but on the condition that you obey the rules of hospitality (14). This gesture affirms one’s sovereignty and one’s being at one’s own home. For this reason, hospitality as law limits itself with a threshold.6

     

    Drawing on Derrida’s deconstructive reading of the contradictions inherent in conditional hospitality, we can suggest that multiculturalist tolerance of minorities within the host nation-state is not for nothing. Welcoming the other in the form of codified multiculturalist tolerance implies a conditional welcoming, as the hospitality offered remains limited within law and jurisdiction. But more importantly, this kind of tolerance does not result in a fundamental modification of the host subject’s mode of inhabiting the territory that is deemed to be solely within his/her possession. Far from laying the grounds for an interruption of sovereign identity of the self, multiculturalist respect and tolerance implies the conditional welcoming of the guest within the prescribed limits of the law and hence implies a reassertion of mastery over the national space as it enables the subject to appropriate a place for itself–an empty and universal and therefore sovereign place–from which the other is welcomed. Thus the place from which multiculturalist tolerance welcomes the particularity of the other, fortified by codifications such as affirmative action and other legal measures, is what precisely enables the disavowed and inverted self-referentiality of racist hospitality which by emptying the host’s position from any positive content asserts its superiority and sovereignty.

     

    The inherent paradox of multiculturalism’s conditional and lawful welcoming of the other as guest can be productively understood as conforming to “the structure of exception” that Giorgio Agamben discusses in Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. In discussing this, I want to refer to the German case where the paradox of the inclusion of minorities within the limits of law can be illustrated. All of the laws that regulate the conditions of arrival, presence, and departure of “guest-workers” in Germany reveal that the overriding concern is that of recruitment of a short-term labor force. For this reason, residence permits are conferred only as work permits. Laws explicitly anticipate that the workers will leave Germany when the needs of capital are fulfilled. The fact that the workers’ presence is regarded as temporary makes clear that the new regulations are seen as an exception: a parenthesis to be opened and eventually closed. The logic underlying these laws is that the acceptance/welcoming of foreign labor is a conditional one, as the workers’ presence, which is expected to be temporary, is deemed to be an exception to the general rule. Tellingly, the term “migrant” is not typically used to name this group. As guests, these workers are accepted as an exception to the general rule of membership in the German polity. Their welcoming is not regulated within the framework of the general rule of law. In accordance with the persistent and widespread sentiment that declares that “Germany is not a land of immigration,” the conditional welcoming or the temporary hosting of foreign labor appears at first glance to be set outside the purview of general law. Hence these regulations are nothing but the name of an interim, an exception.

     

    Following Agamben, we can ask whether as an exception, the conditional welcoming of workers indicates that they are left outside the sovereign law of the host society? It is clear that this temporary foreign labor force has been included in the German territory without being turned into proper members of the polity. Their membership is undecidable from the perspective of the German self and law since their inclusion exceeds membership, testifying to the impasse of a system based on law, which is incapable of making their inclusion coincide with membership. As guests having temporary abode, they are not properly inside. But does this indicate that they are outside the purview of sovereign and general law? One way to approach this dynamic between outside and inside is to see them as a limit figure which brings into crisis the clear distinction between what is inside and what is outside. Surely this not an altogether invalid way of grasping the dynamic between the guest and the host that is structured through the law, but it is a limited one insofar as the paradox of exception is concerned.

     

    Exception, Agamben notes, “embodies a kind of membership without inclusion” (24). What defines the German sovereign claim of ownership of the land can be understood with Agamben’s following remarks: “what defines the character of the sovereign claim is precisely that it applies to the exception in no longer applying to it, that it includes what is outside itself . . . . What cannot be included in any way is included in the form of the exception” (24). It seems that we can talk about a paradoxical inclusion of guest-workers, which is indeed an “inclusive exclusion” (21). For Agamben, the regulation that is exercised by the law is achieved not by a command or prescription, but by the creation of “the sphere of its own reference in real life and make that reference regular” (26). The sovereign claim of the general law is constituted by having a grip over the exception and by articulating it into its domain through an inclusive exclusion. It is through the exception, through the inclusive exclusion of the exception, that the law is able to generate and cultivate itself. The apparent exclusion of the exception is in fact an indication of its paradoxical inclusion in the juridical order.

     

    For Agamben, when we see exception as fundamental to the structure of the constitution of sovereignty, then sovereignty can be grasped neither as an exclusively political nor as a juridical category; it is not “a power external to law (Schmitt)” or to the supreme rule of juridical order (Hans Kelsen): it is the originary structure in which law refers to life and includes it in itself by suspending it” (28). Following Jean-Luc Nancy’s suggestion, he gives the name ban to “this potentiality . . . of the law to maintain itself in its own privation, to apply in no longer applying” (28). The law, in excluding or banning, does not place the exception to its exteriority, but abandons or threatens it on a threshold where the distinction between outside and inside, life and law, becomes blurred. It becomes difficult to say in a definite manner whether the one who is banned is outside or inside the juridical order. The paradox of sovereignty is that it leaves nothing outside the law as it has a hold on life even when it abandons what it interdicts.

     

    In offering hospitality that is conditional, the German national self appropriates a place for himself/herself so as to be able to say welcome. This entails not only maintaining the status of the German national self as master, but more importantly it institutes a welcoming in order to nourish the sovereignty of the German subject that was already in place. To understand the dynamic that is operating here, we can establish a link between Derrida’s understanding of “conditional hospitality” and what Agamben calls “inclusive exclusion.” Though pushed outside, the provisional acceptance of the guest-workers enables the regeneration and nourishment of the German national self, which needs to reconstitute its sovereignty each time anew. Such a sovereign self maintains and nurtures itself not by pushing particular others to its exteriority or outside the purview of general law. On the contrary, it is their inclusive exclusion, which the conditional welcoming enables, that is indispensable for a reassertion of a sovereign German national self. The empty and universal position of the sovereign claim enabled by the general rule of law is capable of instituting conditional hospitality as an exception and this enables the means to codify respect and tolerance for the different and confer upon them rights in the form of law. It is precisely at this point that we need to be vigilant and to problematize this codification by asking what is being negated and foreclosed here. Does this codification entail the opening of the space of politics or does it effectively signal the circumscription of what Zizek calls “politics proper” or what Antonio Negri calls “constituent power”?

     

    POLITICS

     

    In his discussion of the three forms of universality, Balibar gives the proposition concerning human rights as the example of ideal universality (65). Reversing the traditional relationship between subjection and citizenship, ideal universality justifies the universal extension of political (civic) rights by explaining that equality and liberty are inseparable, which Balibar calls “equaliberty.” As such, it introduces the notion of unconditional into the realm of politics: “equaliberty is an all-or-nothing” notion and hence cannot be relativized. It is either recognized or ignored as a principle or as a demand. Balibar links this characteristic of equaliberty to what Hannah Arendt calls “the right to have rights,” which is distinct from having this or that specific right that is guaranteed by law. Nor is it a moral notion. It is a political notion and delineates a process, which starts with resistance and ends with the actual exercise of constituent power (66). For this reason, for Balibar, the “right to have rights” can also be called the “right to have politics.” As an unconditional force, the demand for equaliberty sets in motion a permanent insurrection that can never be gentrified or “fully integrated into the harmonious whole of the concrete universality” (65). But does this mean that constituent power, as the irreducible excess (to use Zizek’s formulation), is allowed to exercise its full destabilizing potential of the political? Certainly not. The question thus becomes: what are the means through which this insurrectionary demand is domesticated, suffocated, limited, regulated, neutralized, or congealed?

     

    To answer this question–to understand the dynamic by which the “right to have rights” or the “right to have politics” of minorities and foreigners is regulated and hence limited through institutionalized multiculturalism and through the granting of a set of rights guaranteed by law–it is useful to turn to (and to revise) Antonio Negri’s conception of constituent and constitutive power as articulated in Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State. I have already suggested, following Zizek, that it is through liberal multiculturalist institutional and juridical regulations that the post-national global order renders its global universalizing tendency indiscernible and thereby forecloses the possibility for a right to have politics or democratic politics. But does the current global management of the conditional and legal hosting of immigrants mean that any change in the law or any attempt to modify the law will by definition play into the hands of the forces of globalization? Can the legal conditions of hospitality or laws on immigration be improved? The analysis that Negri offers regarding the relation between constitutive and constituent power seems to imply that any attempt to improve or change the law is a vain effort; that it’s futile to attempt to replace existing laws with better ones, for any politics that remains within the purview of law is doomed to fail as it implies suffocation of democratic politics through constitutional arrangements. After a brief discussion of the analysis Negri offers and its limitations, I will discuss Derrida’s deconstructive reading of the relation between law and justice on the one hand and conditional and unconditional hospitality on the other hand and suggest that the latter offers a radically different opening of politics.7

     

    For Negri, to speak of constituent power is to speak of democracy for it is constituent power that regulates democracy. It is not only all-powerful, but also has an expansive and unlimited quality. It emerges from the vortex of the void and is characterized by the openness of its needs and the absence of determinations and finalities. Its strength lies in the fact that it never ends up in power, nor its multitude results in a totality. As an open multiplicity, it is always based upon a set of singularities. Its all-powerful and expansive tendency, its strength, which opens a horizon, never results in a vertical or totalitarian dimension. The active elements of constituent power are resistance, desire, and an ethical impulse. It does not seek institutionality but aims at constructing an ethical being. It is for these reasons that Negri emphasizes the strong link between constituent power and democracy. Democracy is the political form of constituent power. The concept of democracy in Negri’s formulation is not treated as a subspecies or a subcategory of liberalism but refers to a form of governability that enables the freeing of constituent power, because it entails a totality without a closure and the exclusion of any sign of external definition. It is a project of the multitude and is a creative force. This multitude is not an ungraspable multiplicity but is the strength of singularities and differences. As a singular multidirectionality it refers to an irreducible concept of the political and to an ethics that recognizes singularities. Like democracy, constituent power resists being constitutionalized.

     

    The opposite of democracy and constituent power is not totalitarianism but sovereignty itself and constitutional power. The establishment of constitutional power presents a closure to the always-open nature of constituent power. When constituent power is articulated in juridical definitions, it is limited, closed, reduced to juridical categories, and is restrained in administrative routines. The State’s constitutionality and its various other regulatory activities bring a form of control, well-defined limits, and procedures to the all-expansive force of the constituent power. Once it is situated in the concept of the nation and absorbed by the mechanism of representation, constituent power is perverted, desiccated, congealed in a static system. Representation is one of the fundamental juridical-constitutional instruments in exercising control and in segmenting constituent power. Its dilution in representative mechanisms manifests itself in political space but is disguised in the activity of the Supreme Court and other organs of the State. These mechanisms restore traditional sovereignty and close the possibility of democratic innovation. The taming and suffocation of constituent power by constitutionalist arrangements entails the mediation of inequalities and hence the neutralization of its strength. The fixing and institutionalization of constituent power implies its de facto termination and negation. And in this way, the sovereignty inverts the ostensible foundation of democratic polity and reconstructs itself as the foundation.

     

    Although Negri’s analysis of the ways in which constitutive power tames and suffocates constituent power is a useful one to think how laws of conditional hospitality limit the unconditional welcoming of foreigners, it nevertheless suffers from certain limitations. Negri does not use the concept of constituent power as a theoretical or philosophical device that enables him to better understand how constitutive arrangements limit a more expansive politics. Rather, he treats constituent power as something that can actually be established as such by its affirmation or as a self-affirming power. Moreover, Negri posits the relation between constitutive and constituent power as an opposition or a dialectical contradiction; he poses the relation between constitutive and constituent power as an either/or question. The heterogeneity between the two is reduced to an antinomy. As such, his analysis risks leaving intact the very structure it aims to criticize; it risks repeating the same desire for a sovereign position, shifted now to the side of the hegemonized second term.

     

    In an attempt to rethink another philosophical and theoretical framework that might help us to envision the possibility of reinventing a political space that is neither locked within the limits and congealments of conditional hospitality nor one that pretends to go beyond the law by simply reversing it, I want to discuss Derrida’s reading of the relation between conditional and conditional hospitality and law and justice.

     

    ETHICS OF HOSPITALITY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF DEMOCRATIC POLITICS

     

    How does Derrida think the relationship between conditional and unconditional hospitality? Are they mutually exclusive of each other and hence standing in a relation of opposition? Does unconditional hospitality simply imply that nation-states make it their official policy and open their borders and unconditionally welcome anyone who wants to come? Does it have the status of a regulative idea and hence constitute the name of a correct politics? Or does it have the status of a deconstructive tool devised to read the limits of conditional hospitality?

     

    While Kant is concerned with hospitality as law and thereby with the conditions and limitations of hospitality, Levinas engages with it as a question of ethics or as the question of ethicity itself. In his reading of Levinas’s formulation of the ethics of hospitality, Derrida orients our attention to the fact that in the lawful admittance of the other as guest there is a level that exceeds and hence cannot be captured by those analyses that take the nation-state and the juridical regulation as the model to work on. Or rather, his question is whether the ethics of hospitality, in Levinas’s thought, is conducive for “a law and a politics beyond the familial dwelling, within a society, nation, State, or Nation-State” (Adieu 20). It is this level that Derrida’s reading of Levinas’s ethics of hospitality brings to the fore.

     

    Pointing to a hiatus between the law and ethics of hospitality, Derrida underlines how the ethics of hospitality cannot be treated as a decree nor can it be imposed by a command. The hiatus between the law and ethics of hospitality also pertains to the fact that it is unthematizable, implying that a particular law or politics of hospitality cannot be deduced from Levinas’s discourse of the ethics of hospitality, for it is irreducible to a theme, thematization, or some kind of formalization. Ethics as such is an attentive intention, a welcome and tending toward the other, an unconditional “yes” to the other. Hospitality as ethicity is infinite (it is either infinite, unconditional or not at all) and cannot be limited in the sense that Kant talks about it; it cannot be regulated by a particular political or juridical practice of a nation and therefore cannot be circumscribed.

     

    Derrida notes that the ethics of hospitality, the welcome made to the other, entails the subordination or putting in question of the freedom of the subject and an interruption of the self as other. But this interruption is not something that can be enforced by a decree or law. It is an interruption produced in the intentional attention to the other. The subordination of the freedom of the subject does not imply depriving the subject of its birth. Rather it implies the subjection of the subjectum and enables the birth of the subject along with freedom: the coming of the subject to itself as it welcomes the other. Responsibility for the other, the being-host of the subject, puts the subject into question; it puts the subject’s being in question. Therefore, for Derrida, “the host is a hostage insofar as he is a subject put into question, obsessed (and thus besieged), persecuted in the very place where he takes place, where as emigrant, exile, stranger, a guest from the very beginning, he finds himself elected to or taken up by a residence before himself electing or taking one up” (20).

     

    Unconditional hospitality entails a reversal, since the owner of the home can perform hospitality on the condition that she is invited to her own home by the one whom she invites, by being welcomed, accepted by the one whom she welcomes or accepts, and shown hospitality in her own home by the guest. Unconditional hospitality or hospitality as ethics implies the interruption of a full possession of a place called home and when its inhabitant becomes a guest received in her home–that is, when the owner becomes a tenant in her place. The inexorable law of hospitality therefore involves a situation in which

     

    the hote who receives (the host), the one who welcomes the invited or received hote (the guest), the welcoming hote who considers himself the owner of the place, is in truth a hote received in his own home. He receives the hospitality that he offers in his own home; he receives it from his own home–which, in the end, does not belong to him. The hote as host is a guest. The dwelling opens itself to itself, to its “essence” without essence, as a “land of asylum or refuge.” The one who welcomes is first welcomed in his own home. The one who invites is invited by the one whom he invites. The one who receives is received, receiving hospitality in what he takes to be his own home, or indeed his own land . . . . (41-2)

     

    Hospitality in this sense precedes property, since home, in this unconditional welcoming, is not owned, or is owned only in a very singular sense. That is, only insofar it is already hospitable to its owner, when the master of the house is already a received hote or a guest in her own home. When home is no longer a property but a place that welcomes its owner, the question of hospitality cannot be reduced to a multiculturalist tolerance, for there is no longer a question of limiting, restricting, or regulating tolerance for the other. As Derrida puts it:

     

    That a people, as a people, “should accept those who come and settle among them–even though they are foreigners,” would be the proof [gage] of a popular and public commitment [engagement], a political res publica that cannot be reduced to a sort of “tolerance,” unless this tolerance requires the affirmation of a “love” without measure. (Adieu 72)

     

    In the hospitality without conditions, the host should, in principle, receive even before knowing anything about the guest. A pure welcome consists not only in not knowing anything or acting as if one knows nothing, but also in avoiding any questions about the Other’s identity, their desire, their rules, their language, their capacity for work, for integration, for adaptation . . . From the moment that I formulate all of these questions, and posit these conditions . . . the ideal situation of non-knowledge–non-savoir–is broken–rompue. (“A Discussion” 9)

     

    Above I have delineated the characterizing features of what unconditional hospitality is. To be able to understand its relation to conditional hospitality, I want to briefly review how Derrida understands the relation between law and justice in “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority,’” as it has a parallel structure with conditional and unconditional hospitality. This will enable us to better comprehend the nature of the relation between conditional and unconditional hospitality and thus better understand how unconditional hospitality is not simply the name of a political program.

     

    For Derrida, there lies an aporia within the drive for justice because it has to respect universality on the one hand and absolute singularity on the other. One faces difficulty in justice precisely because of the necessity to speak in terms of the universal principles when one is deciding about particular cases. Since law includes these two conditions simultaneously, the singularity has to be translated into universality. The aporia resides in the principle of universality which cannot directly speak to the particular case: in the fact that it is not possible to be just for everyone and for every single case. This is what Derrida means in saying that “justice is impossible.” However, justice is the principle in the name of which law is deconstructed; that is, it is possible to change and improve the law, the legal system. Law can be criticized and therefore is deconstructible, but justice is not deconstructible. Thus despite the absolute radical heterogeneity between the two, the relation between them is not one of opposition. Law is not opposed to justice, nor is justice opposed to law. Derrida makes clear that justice and law are indissociable because it is in the name of justice that one deconstructs the law. The relation between them will remain endlessly open and irreducible. To tend to justice one has to deconstruct and improve the law, but it is never just–and it is there, in the space between law and justice, that one negotiates between the universal and the particular.

     

    Like justice, unconditional hospitality is also impossible. But this impossibility does not mean that one does not aspire to pure hospitality. Its impossibility lies in the very structure of unconditional hospitality itself. In principle, it is offered to an unlimited number of Others and to an unlimited extent, without asking any questions. The Other’s welcoming is not to be contingent upon the Other’s identity or the questions asked. The very notion of pure or unconditional hospitality assumes that one must offer to any stranger the right of entry to a territory, home, or nation of which one is legitimately in possession.

     

    With the concept of unconditional hospitality, Derrida is not trying to offer a political program about how a pure hospitality might be implemented; rather, he is trying to expose the presuppositions of conditional hospitality and the series of concepts that it is based upon–such as one’s proper residence, proper identity, and proper cultural identity. For Derrida, there is an essential link between society or culture and hospitality. In every society there is space allocated for those who are invited and this enables the welcoming of the strangers who arrive. In other words, conditional hospitality is what enables one’s being at home. There is no culture, no home, no nation or family without a door. It is the opening of this door that functions as a means of welcoming strangers. When the stranger, the Other, is welcomed on the condition that he adjust to the chez soi, the hospitality that is offered is a conditional one, one of visitation: the stranger is welcome only as long as he respects the order and rules of the home, the nation or culture, and learns to speak the language. In contrast (but not in opposition) to conditional hospitality is unconditional or pure hospitality: the pure welcoming of the unexpected guest or anyone who arrives or visits, the hospitality of invitation. Conditional hospitality of invitation is distinguished from the unconditional hospitality of visitation by the fact that in the former, the master remains the master, the host remains the host at home, and the guest remains an invited guest. As an invited guest, one is expected not to alter the rule and order of the home. Derrida imagines the hospitality of visitation in order to distinguish it from the hospitality of invitation where the stranger is not an invited guest, but one who arrives unexpectedly, where the host opens the house without asking any questions.

     

    Derrida reminds us that the relation between the two forms of hospitality has the same structure between law and justice (and let’s remember that according to Derrida justice is impossible); they are heterogeneous but at the same time absolutely indissociable. These two forms of hospitality refer to the legal and just forms of hospitality. Like justice, unconditional hospitality is impossible as one cannot deduce a rule from it. In other words, it is impossible to make it a rule that nations, families, cultures, or governments should open their house unconditionally to everyone and hence to turn it into an official policy. Although it is impossible, Derrida nevertheless designates with the term unconditional what hospitality should be in principle. Thus the concept of conditional hospitality enables Derrida to conceive of unconditional hospitality. As he puts it:

     

    to think of this conditional hospitality one has to have in mind what would be a pure hospitality to the messianic Other, the unexpected one who just lands in my country and to whom I simply say: come and eat and sleep and I won’t even ask your name. (“A Discussion” 13)

     

    If we have a concept of conditional hospitality, it’s because we have also the idea of a pure hospitality, of unconditional hospitality. (15)

     

    If unconditional or pure hospitality is impossible, then what is the possibility of the politics of hospitality? Like the relation between law and justice, where it is in the name of justice that one deconstructs the law, it is in the name of unconditional hospitality that conditional hospitality can be deconstructed. To tend to unconditional hospitality one has to deconstruct and improve the laws on hospitality (such as immigration laws), but these laws will never guarantee unconditional hospitality as such. The relation between them will remain open and irreducible. As Derrida notes, the law is perfectible and there is progress to be performed on the law that will improve the conditions of hospitality. The condition of the laws on immigration has to be improved without claiming that unconditional law should become an official policy. The very desire for unconditional hospitality is what regulates the improvement of the laws of hospitality.

     

    CONCLUSION

     

    So how, then, can we rethink the forces of capitalist globalization and institutionalized multiculturalism, which I suggested are working hand in hand, in light of the Derridian notion of unconditional hospitality? This essay has not meant to imply that the operation of the forces of globalization are limited by the laws that regulate the welcoming of immigrants or through institutionalizing multiculturalist respect and tolerance. Globalization works on many fronts, and we need to be vigilant: about the complicated links between globalization and the workings of nation-states in the so-called Third World; about the novel ways in which the rural is now accessed by global capital; about the interventions of the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank which impose as international law the laws of the national economies of the global North; about the reinstitution of the repressive powers of the nation-states in the Third World so as to enable the smooth operation of global capital.8My analysis here engages with the question of globalization in terms of its ideological and political presuppositions. The reason for my discussion of how liberal multiculturalism functions as the ideal form of global capitalism and how it is conditioned by its demands is twofold: first, to examine the hegemonic ideological form of global capitalism as it relates to the ethnically and culturally Other; second, to challenge the idea that the valorization of particular identities can be seen as a destabilizing counter-hegemonic political force in the wake of the global abstraction of transnational capitalism. I have suggested that Derrida’s concept of conditional hospitality is a useful philosophical and theoretical apparatus for deconstructing the ideology embedded in liberal multiculturalism.

     

    But let me be clear: I do not mean to suggest that conditional hospitality should be dismantled, that the welcoming of immigrants based on legal regulations should be done away with, or that unconditional hospitality should be substituted as the official policy of the host nations. I do not recommend the concept of unconditional hospitality as a technical application of a rule or norm. Unconditional hospitality is not to be regarded as the name of a counter-political program against the global management of the ethnically and culturally different. Nor is it a command that can be conformed to or deviated from, as it cannot be treated as a rule or an injunction that can organize the nature of the relation with immigrants. Unconditional hospitality is neither a means of determining judgment nor a rule of action. It is, rather, the condition of the possibility of the perfection and improvement of conditional hospitality. Speaking of unconditional hospitality, Derrida notes:

     

    It’s impossible as a rule, I cannot regularly organise unconditional hospitality, and that’s why, as a rule, I have a bad conscience, I cannot have a good conscience because I know that I lock my door, and that a number of people who would like to share my house, my apartment, my nation, my money, my land and so on so forth. I say not as a rule, but sometimes, exceptionally, it may happen. I cannot regulate, control or determine these moments, but it may happen, just as an act of forgiveness, some forgiveness may happen, pure forgiveness may happen. I cannot make a determinate, a determining judgement and say: ‘this is pure forgiveness,’ or ‘this is pure hospitality,’ as an act of knowledge, there is no adequate act of determining judgment. That’s why the realm of action, of practical reason, is absolutely heterogeneous to theory and theoretical judgments here, but it may happen without even my knowing it, my being conscious of it, or my having rules for its establishment. Unconditional hospitality can’t be an establishment, but it may happen as a miracle . . . in an instant, not lasting more than an instant, it may happen. This is the . . . possible happening of something impossible which makes us think what hospitality, or forgiveness, or gift might be. (“A Discussion” 15-16)

     

    This “possible happening of something impossible” can be seen as the condition of a democratic possibility. To use Derrida’s formulation in The Other Heading: Reflections on Today’s Europe, this condition of democratic possibility is something “to be thought and to come [à venir]: not something that is certain to happen tomorrow, not the democracy (national or international, state or trans-state) of the future, but a democracy that must have the structure of a promise–and thus the memory of that which carries the future, the to-come, here and now” (78). It is the introduction of the notion of unconditionality into politics–or to put it in Balibar’s term, the politics of equaliberty, which is an all-or-nothing notion–that can open the possibility of a democratic politics. As we saw earlier, Balibar argues that as an unconditional force, the demand for equaliberty or the right to have rights cannot be relativized. The unconditional nature of equaliberty, like the unconditionality of hospitality, is distinct from this or that specific right guaranteed by law. However neither equaliberty nor unconditional hospitality in themselves are possible. But their impossibility should not be taken as the closure of the possibility of democracy; on the contrary, it is the principle of unconditionality which is the driving force behind the condition of possibility of a democratic opening and, with it, a revision in law.

     

    At this point, it might be useful to situate the demand for equaliberty and the ethics of hospitality in the context of contemporary global capitalism, as my aim is not to theorize them as pure, atemporal and context-independent forces ultimately separated from forces of economy and politics.

     

    From the point of view of politics proper, globalization can be characterized as a contradictory process: on the one hand, the very processes of globalization produce the demand for equaliberty. The globalization of production and other market forces necessarily create the conditions for the welcoming of immigrants as well as the granting of certain rights. These very same groups, as a consequence of the production of new political and ideological needs, make claims that may be against the interests of global capitalism. On the other hand, however, globalization is a law-governed process, and institutionalizing forces such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank absorb the demand for equaliberty through the mechanism of the law. Thus, the ideal of the right to have rights or the demand for equaliberty is necessarily compromised as it becomes articulated within global capitalism. And it is in this regard that Negri’s analysis becomes useful for understanding the constriction of politics proper through constitutional means. Such institutionalization coincides with the direction global capitalism has taken. Demands for equaliberty are always compromised, always diluted and contained by their expression within lawful and institutionalized processes.

     

    In the face of this compromise, where can we situate the possibility of a democratic politics? In the face of this containment of the politics for equaliberty in global capitalism, must we forfeit the desire for unconditional hospitality? In a word: no. But the task is to rethink the very force of the demand for equaliberty not in terms of its full realization–as this would imply a total transcendence of global capitalism, which at the very least will not come any time soon–but precisely in terms of its inevitable containment or dilution by global forces. For unconditional hospitality or the demand for equaliberty is not exhausted by or reduced to the current historical context of the granting of conditional and legal rights. Neither is its full realization contingent upon the transcendence of the capitalist world system. Instead, unconditional hospitality has to be understood as immanent to the present–“the possible happening of something impossible”– demanding, in the present, the immediate transformation of the present conditions of hospitality.

     

    Notes

     

    I am grateful to Kenneth Bar and Mahmut Mutman for their close reading of the essay and for providing suggestions which helped me to clarify the arguments developed here.

     

    1. The distinction Etienne Balibar makes between three forms of universality, namely “real universality,” “fictitious universality,” and “ideal universality,” is a very useful one to rethink the difference between the nature of the universality that globalization implies (which Balibar calls “real universality”). He differentiates it from “ideal universality.” The latter refers to a subversive element and is intrinsically linked with the notion of insurrection and rebellion in the name of freedom and equality. See “Ambiguous Universality.”

     

    2. Balibar designates this “new world order” with the term “real universality.” See “Ambiguous Universality.”

     

    3. For Zizek the term “politics proper” “always involves a kind of short circuit between the universal and the particular; it involves a paradox of a singular that appears as a stand-in for the universal . . . . This singulier universel is a group that . . . not only demands to be heard on equal footing with the ruling oligarchy or aristocracy . . . but, even more, presents itself as the immediate embodiment of society as such, in its universality, against the particular power interests of aristocracy and oligarchy” (“A Leftist Plea” 988-89).

     

    4. Derrida notes that the German word for hospitality is about the stranger’s right, upon arrival to the domain of another, to be treated not as an enemy. Hence hospitality is in opposition precisely to opposition itself, that is, to hostility. The guest, who is hosted as the opposite of the one who is treated as an enemy, is a stranger who is treated as an ally.

     

    5. Kant adds the word Wirbarkeit as synonymous to the word hospitality. The word Wirt(in), Derrida writes, refers to host and guest, the host who accepts the guest. Derrida notes that the word Gastgeber refers to the owner (proprietor) of a hotel or restaurant. Like Gastlich, Wirtlich, also means the one who hosts or accepts. Wirt, Wirtschaft thus refers to the domain of economy, the governing of home.

     

    6. By this way, hospitality becomes the threshold itself. For hospitality to exist there has to be a door. But when there are doors that means there is no (unconditional) welcoming as this implies that someone has the key for the door and thus controls the condition of hospitality.

     

    7. As it will become clear in the following pages, it is legitimate to discuss the relation between these two as they have the same structure.

     

    8. For a fuller discussion of these issues see Yegenoglu and Mutman.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Agamben, Giorgio. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998.
    • Appadurai, Arjun. “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy.” Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity. Ed. Mike Featherstone. London: Sage, 1990: 295-310.
    • Balibar, Etienne. “Ambiguous Universality.” differences 7.1 (1995): 48-74.
    • Bennett, David. “Introduction.” Multicultural States: Rethinking Difference and Identity. Ed. David Bennett. London: Routledge, 1998: 1-25.
    • Derrida, Jacques. Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas. Ed. Werner Hamacher and David E. Wellbery. Trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1999.
    • —–. “A Discussion with Jacques Derrida.” Theory and Event 5.1: 2001. Available: <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and-event?v005/5.1 derrida.html>.
    • —–. “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority.’” Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice. Ed. Drucilla Cornell et. al. New York: Routledge, 1992: 3-67.
    • —–. “Hospitality.” Angelaki 5.3 (Dec. 2000): 3-18.
    • —–. The Other Heading: Reflections on Today’s Europe. Trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael B. Naas. Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1992.
    • Dirlik, Arif. “The Global in the Local.” Global/Local: Cultural Production and the Transnational Imaginary. Ed. Rob Wilson and Wimal Dissanayake. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1996: 21-45.
    • Hall, Stuart. “The Local and the Global: Globalization and Ethnicity.” Culture, Globalization and the World-System: Contemporary Conditions for the Representation of Identity. Ed. Anthony D. King. Binghamton, NY: Macmillan, 1991: 19-39.
    • Hannerz, Ulf. “Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture.” Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity. Ed. Mike Featherstone. London: Sage, 1990: 237-251.
    • Laclau, Ernesto. “Subject of Politics, Politics of the Subject.” differences 7.1 (1995): 146-164. Lloyd, David, “Race under Representation.” Oxford Literary Review 13.1-2 (1991): 62-94.
    • Negri, Antonio. Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State. Trans. Maurizia Boscagli. Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota P, 1999.
    • Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1999.
    • Yegenoglu, Meyda. Colonial Fantasies: Towards a Feminist Reading of Orientalism. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998.
    • Yegenoglu, Meyda, and Mahmut Mutman. “Mapping the Present: Interview with Gayatri Spivak.” New Formations 45 (Winter 2001-02): 9-23.
    • Zizek, Slavoj. “A Leftist Plea for ‘Eurocentrism.’” Critical Inquiry 24. 4 (Summer 1998): 988-1009.
    • —–. “Multiculturalism, Or, the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism.” New Left Review. 225 September/October (1997): 28-51.

     

  • Whatever Image

     

    Zafer Aracagök

    Department of Graphic Design
    Bilkent University
    aracagok@bilkent.edu.tr

     

    The evocative remarks of Giorgio Agamben on the concept of whatever have received relatively little attention. In opening the question of the whatever and its implications for the nature of representation, my intention is to investigate the possibilities for another concept, that is, the whatever image.

     

    Whatever

     

    For Agamben, language depends upon the notion of singularity, a concept he derives from an investigation of the “the Scholastic enumeration of transcendentals” that begins “quodlibet ens est unum, verum, bonum seu perfectum–whatever entity is one, true, or perfect.” Agamben points out that the adjective “whatever,” the Latin quodlibet, is the term that “remaining unthought in each, conditions the meaning of all the others” (1). “Whatever” is that which is neither universal nor particular; it is being “such as it is” (66). I will elaborate this critical notion in a moment, but at this point I would simply point out that, when considering language and writing, Agamben is drawn to the sensation of whatever from the viewpoint of the singularity that this whateverness endows the being with. The whatever singularityin a singular language calls into question the pre-eminence of central linguistic conventions, such as the I and its representations. It is this that enables Agamben to assert that “the perfect act of writing comes not from a power to write, but from an impotence that turns back on itself and in this way comes to itself as a pure act” (36). His figure for the perfect act of writing that is not-writing is Melville’s Bartleby, “a scribe who does not simply cease writing but prefers not to, . . . [who] writes nothing but its potentiality to not-write” (36).

     

    The body has emerged as a subject of much recent critical and theoretical concern, and I believe there is merit in reconsidering the body in terms of whatever singularities. This would entail thinking of the body as the locus or the generator of representation. But if the body is seen as a generator of representation, what happens to art, to image, and to the broader question of representation in art criticism? And what happens to the relationship between art theory and politics, or indeed what happens to the “political” itself?

     

    My intention here is to attempt to draw the possible relationships between the body and the image, understood as the singular experience of a singular language, largely ignoring the difference between visual and verbal language. To that extent the following investigation can also be seen as a contribution to the development of art criticism that will be based on a new community, a coming community of whatever singularities. My discussion will move through Leibniz and his interpreters Benjamin, Deleuze, and Adorno, and then return, at last, to Agamben.

     

    Benjamin and Constellations

     

    “The Epistemo-Critical Prologue” of Benjamin’s Trauerspiel study conceptualizes Adam as the father of philosophy. Adam’s naming of the things foregrounds for Benjamin the linguistic base of representation of philosophical truth. The name before the Fall is thus the linguistic being which captures the intended object in its singularity. The period that comes after the Fall is the one in which names are transformed into words, and now they fail to capture the singularity of the objects to which they refer. For Benjamin, naming refers to a kind of mimesis that is a one-time-only configuration. The name pays attention to the object’s non-identity by identifying it as singular; in this way it imitates nature, whereas the concept or the word subordinates it. Words as concepts can never grasp the singularity of singularities because concepts are formed by means of class names that erase the particularity of the phenomenon.

     

    Given the necessity of the conceptual moment in philosophy, the problem for Benjamin in the Trauerspiel is how to philosophize without falling into the prisonhouse of the concepts or yielding to class names. Or, to articulate this concern in Agamben’s terms, the question is how to move beyond the logic of “belonging,” that is the characteristic relationship between a class name and its subset, between the universal and the particular? Benjamin’s solution in the Trauerspiel is to rely on clusters of concepts in order to get away from the totalizing tendency of the concepts. It means to work with continuous combination and arrangement of words–in constellations–for the representation of philosophical truth.

     

    Philosophical experience, for Benjamin, is concerned with the representation of truth and therefore raises the question of the objectivity of the structure of ideas constituted by the subject. For the structure of ideas to be objective, it should be constituted by the particular phenomena themselves, that is, by their inner logic. Philosophical experience–“the objective interpretation of phenomena”–is a representation of ideas gathered from out of empirical reality itself (The Origin of German Tragic Drama 34). Concepts thus function as the mediators between empirical phenomena and ideas without yielding to a totality. Here the crucial difference between cognitive knowledge and philosophical representation lies in the difference between the concept’s claim to capture the phenomena and the conceptualization process undertaken by a subject for each singular phenomenon–the difference between concepts and conceptualization as such.

     

    In this way, Benjamin inverts Plato’s theory of ideas, in which ideas are transcendental forms whose likenesses appear within the empirical objects as pale reflections of their own eternal truth: he constructs the Platonic absolute (ideas) out of empirical fragments. Here ideas do not constitute a metaphysical first principle; rather, they are derived from various configurations of the phenomena in the form of constellations. In other words, ideas are treated as empirical phenomena: phenomenal elements are the absolutes while the ideas, hence the truth, are historically specific and subject to change.

     

    For Benjamin this was a way of rescuing phenomena from temporal extinction by redeeming them within the name–Utopia for him was the reestablishment of the language of names through a theory of constellations. One-time-only configuration of names meant for him the production of a quasi-objective interpretation of phenomena whose truth is only momentary. When elaborating this theory with respect to a claim for objectivity, Benjamin supported his argument by referring to an infinitesimal calculus, and, unavoidably, to Leibniz. Perhaps this was for him the only way of defeating the conceptual prisonhouse of language, or the Platonic representation of ideas. However, Benjamin’s account of Leibniz deserves special attention at this juncture for it will throw light on both how Benjamin’s claim for objectivity through a theory of constellation leads to a certain production of truth, and also on how this truth is interpreted by him as a means for constituting an image, or rather a total image.

     

    As can be witnessed in Benjamin’s inversion of Platonic idealism, “The Epistemo-Critical Prologue” can be seen as an attempt to ground philosophy on a materialist base. However, toward the end of the “Prologue,” where he discusses the finite number of ideas that deserve to be redeemed by philosophy, Benjamin with a strange move seems to be approaching a phenomenology of essences:

     

    Ideas are displayed, without intention, in the act of naming, and they have to be renewed in philosophical contemplation. In this renewal the primordial mode of apprehending words is restored. And so, in the course of its history, which has so often been an object of scorn, philosophy is–and rightly so–a struggle for the representation of a limited number of words which always remain the same–a struggle for the representation of ideas. In philosophy, therefore, it is a dubious undertaking to introduce new terminologies which are not strictly confined to the conceptual field, but are directed towards the ultimate objects of consideration. Such terminologies–abortive denominative processes in which intention plays a greater part than language–lack that objectivity with which history has endowed the principal formulations of philosophical reflections. These latter can stand up on their own in perfect isolation, as mere words never can. And so ideas subscribe to the law which states: all essences exist in complete and immaculate independence, not only from phenomena, but, especially, from each other. Just as the harmony of the spheres depends on the orbits of stars which do not come into contact with each other, so the existence of the mundus intelligibilis depends on the unbridgeable distance between pure essences. Every idea is a sun and is related to other ideas just as suns are related to each other. The harmonious relationship between such essences is what constitutes truth. Its oft-cited multiplicity is finite; for discontinuity is a characteristic of the “essences.” (37)

     

    I quote this long passage because it is here that Benjamin asserts a strange relationship between materialism and an obscure phenomenology: if from the materialist tradition he borrows the term “objectivity,” he borrows “essence” from phenomenology. And the resolution of this problem–the reconciliation of materialism and phenomenology–rests on the production of a limit which not only frees the rigid boundaries of conceptual knowledge but also marks the reconciliation with a finite multiplicity. “The discontinuous finitude” on which Benjamin bases his resolution is also that which, according to him, is neglected by Romanticists in whose “speculations truth assumed the character of a reflective consciousness in place of its linguistic character” (38). I will return to this “linguistic character” of truth later, but for the time being we must dwell a bit more on how Benjamin makes a move from this question of “discontinuous finitude” to Leibnizian monadology.

     

    If Benjamin resolves the question of limit by introducing the idea of discontinuous finitude, his intention is probably to give flesh to his idea of “objective interpretation” by means of which the truth of a system of constellations could be maintained. In the following paragraphs it is not in vain that he opens his discussion by taking on the question of origins:

     

    Origin [Ursprung], although an entirely historical category, has, nevertheless, nothing to do with genesis [Entstehung]. The term origin is not intended to describe the process by which the existent came into being, but rather to describe that which emerges from the process of becoming and disappearance. Origin is an eddy in the stream of becoming, and in its current it swallows the material involved in the process of genesis. (45)

     

     

    The objective interpretation–that is, the moment of coming-into-being of a constellation and its truth–should therefore be understood not as a moment of “genesis” but as a moment of “origin”: as coming-into-being and going-out-of-being. This characteristic of a constellation is what makes both itself and its truth momentary. Once redeemed under a name, the empirical phenomena are supposed to yield to a truth that is momentary due to its being conditioned by this limit, that is, discontinuous finitude.

     

    Given the limited number of names (essences) in contrast to the infinite multiplicity of concepts or words that attempts to define them conceptually, such moments of reconciliation, or, such momentary moments of coming-into-being of truth, could not be easily maintained by Benjamin without referring to this limit in the form of a discontinuous finitude which he apparently found in Leibniz:

     

    The idea is a monad. The being that enters into it, with its past and subsequent history, brings–concealed in its own form–an indistinct abbreviation of the rest of the world of ideas, just as, according to Leibniz’s Discourse on Metaphysics (1686), every single monad, in an indistinct way, all the others. The idea is a monad–the pre-stabilized representation of phenomena resides within it, as in their objective interpretation. The higher the order of the ideas, the more perfect the representation contained within them. And so the real world could well constitute a task, in the sense that it would be a question of penetrating so deeply into everything real as to reveal thereby an objective interpretation of the world. In the light of such a task of penetration it is not surprising that the philosopher of the Monadology was also the founder of infinitesimal calculus. The idea is a monad–that means briefly: every idea contains the image of the world. The purpose of the representation of the idea is nothing less than an abbreviated outline of this image of the world. (47-48)

     

    However, as can be observed in the paragraph above, what Benjamin finds in Leibniz with a concern for a limit yields to another expression: “image.” One thing that is obvious in this paragraph is that Benjamin’s appropriation of the Leibnizian monad is conditioned by its relation to the visible, to that which is representable in the form of an image. The possibility of redeeming ideas for Benjamin lies in the capacity to represent them, and he is at pains to find a way to establish a relationship between an idea and its representation that is not based on the question of “belonging,” or on the question of a hierarchy of representation. Yet, as Benjamin conceives it, the momentary representation of an idea that is found resonating in a constellation is an image.

     

    I would like to argue at this point that although Benjamin formulates ideas as that which can be derived from empirical phenomena, there is still a relationship between an idea and its image based on belonging, on the hierarchy between an idea and its image. This is so because Benjamin’s theory of constellation still preserves a sense of idealism. For him, an idea is necessarily that which should be represented in the finitude of an image.

     

    Leibniz

     

    At this moment, I think it will be illuminating to divert the question from the relation between an idea and its image to the question of the possibility of such a moment of representation, such an image. For this purpose I would like to compare Benjamin’s reading of Leibniz (of the necessity of a discontinuous finitude, a limit, an image) with Deleuze’s reading of Leibniz. This, I believe, will also foreground why such a moment of visibility is necessary for Benjamin and at what cost he obtains these results that he adopts from Leibniz.

     

    As Deleuze recounts clearly, neither seeing nor the production of an image can be a function of a monad. For Deleuze, a Leibnizian monad is not something whose perception can be projected in the form of an image, not even momentarily: a monad is made of infinite “folds” that cannot be limited. As Deleuze reads Leibniz, there is no “consciousness interpolating images, a third element, between itself and what it thinks.”1 Leibniz’s position does not emanate from a ban put on images, but it develops as a result of his formulation of the monad and its body with respect to perception. The Benjaminian theory of constellation, on the other hand, produces representations, images, finite totalities which are continuous in themselves and yet, although momentarily, have a moment of coming into being.

     

    Every monad in Leibniz contains the entire world: the monad is finite and the world is infinite. However, this opposition between the two does not mean that they constitute oppositional pairs because if the monad contains the entire world then it is itself made of infinite and infinitely small parts. What makes a monad finite is not that it can have or represent the world to itself in clear images but its capacity to have perceptions– clear zones of expression. As Deleuze puts it:

     

    In brief, it is because every monad possesses a clear zone that it must have a body, this zone constituting a relation with the body, not a given relation, but a genetic relation that engenders its own “relatum.” It is because we have a clear zone that we must have a body charged with traveling through it or exploring it, from birth to death. (The Fold 86)

     

    Thus, having a body is a necessary part of having perceptions: either clear or obscure, such perceptions owe their state-of-being-perceived to the body, which is itself made of infinitely small parts. To put both the world and the monad into such an infinite structure of constitution, however, does not lead to chaos but to flux. At this point Deleuze draws our attention to the passage between microperceptions and macroperceptions: microperceptions are those minute, obscure, confused perceptions from which a monad obtains its conscious or macroscopic perceptions. The relationship between the two kinds of perceptions is not of the parts to the whole, but it is structured as a passage from “ordinary” to what is “notable” or “remarkable.” This passage from the ordinary to the remarkable is marked with the constitution of a threshold in the monad. The constitution of this threshold creates a qualitative difference between the sum of minute perceptions and what is perceived as conscious perception.

     

    This is an important move in Deleuzes’s reading of Leibniz because here we observe a consideration of inconspicuous, infinitely small, minute perceptions within the finite monad that will mark the monad’s finitude with a strange obscurity. Having a clear, a conscious perception never means a completely clear zone of expression, for if the monad is finite, it is not because it can have basically clear perceptions out of obscure perceptions but because, given the infinite number of representatives of the world within itself, it can reach only an obscurely clear or clearly obscure perception. Comparing it with Cartesian “clarity” of reason, Deleuze has the following remarks:

     

    What then is the implication of the Cartesian expression “clear and distinct,” which Leibniz nonetheless retains? How can he say that the privileged zone of every monad is not only clear but also distinct, all the while it consists of a confused event? It is because clear perception as such is never distinct. (91)

     

    Rather, it is “distinguished,” in the sense of being remarkable or notable (91).

     

    Once the difference between clear and obscure perception is understood as a question of being “distinguished,” Deleuze stresses that inconspicuous perceptions are included within conscious perception not in a relation of parts to the whole but as a qualitative difference between two heterogeneous parts. The part still remains the part before and after the threshold. Conscious perception is not separated from infinite inconspicuous perceptions: it is only “distinguished” from the latter by simply stressing its heterogeneity which does not only apply to the relationship between parts but also to the ones between “wholes” and “parts.” The moment of heterogeneity is what puts the conscious perception and inconspicuous perceptions into a differential relationship. What would be called a totality in a metaphysical framework is still considered a part here–a part that includes all the other parts within itself and that differs qualitatively from the others without being separated from them.

     

    Fold over folds: such is the status of the two modes of perception, or of microscopic and macroscopic processes. That is why the unfolded surface is never the opposite of the fold, but rather the movement that goes from some to the others. Unfolding sometimes means that I am developing–that I am undoing–infinite tiny folds that are forever agitating the background, with the goal of drawing a great fold on the side whence forms appear; it is the operation of a vigil: I project the world “on the surface of a folding …” [Jean Cocteau, La Difficulte d’etre, Paris, Rocher, 1983, pp. 79-80]. At other times, on the contrary, I undo the folds of consciousness that pass through every one of my thresholds, “the twenty-two folds” that surround me and separate me from the deep, in order to unveil in a single movement this unfathomable depth of tiny and moving folds that waft me along at excessive speeds in the operation of vertigo, like the “enraged charioteer’s whiplash…” [Henri Michaux, “Les 22 plis de la vie humaine,” in Ailleurs, Paris, Gallimard, 1948, p. 172]. I am forever unfolding between two folds, and if to perceive means to unfold, then I am forever perceiving within the folds. (93)

     

    When Deleuze makes us aware of the folds between the finite and the infinite, he is relying on one of Leibniz’s fundamental principles of philosophy: “inseparability.”2 This latter enables Deleuze not only to see an obscure zone of separation between clear and indistinct perceptions but also to make us aware that this ensuing flux of perception in Leibniz leads to one of the most original points in philosophy: a monad’s level of perception is dependent upon its body’s relation to other bodies, that is, to the infinite. However, if this is so, we must first answer the following question: if the monad includes all the monads within its infinite inconspicuous, minute, obscure perceptions, then how can it have an extrinsic possession, such as a body, outside itself?

     

    For Leibniz, as Deleuze puts it,

     

    Every perception is hallucinatory because perception has no object. Conscious perception has no object and does not even refer to a exclusively physical mechanism of excitations that could explain it from without: it refers only to the physical mechanism of differential relations among unconscious perception that are comprising it within the monad. And unconscious perceptions have no object and do not refer to physical things. (93)

     

    Hence, Leibniz, at one stroke, refutes not only the possibility of having one finite perception (for if body cannot be thought without its relationship to other bodies, then what is produced as a perception is never free from echoes that open it to an infinity), but also the question of belonging by denying an exteriority to the monad. Even if one should insist on the exteriority of the body to the monad, this exteriority will be included within the monad because the body is a materiality that has its own monad or, simply, the body is just another monad within which differential perceptions comprise, and which, get into infinite differential relationships with the monad called “I.” Thus, if the monad “I” has a body, this body is related to the “I” not in a relationship of belonging but on the principle of inseparability. Neither the monad “I” nor its body truly belongs to the other because each is already included in the other.

     

    Deleuze’s reading of Leibniz is remarkable in two senses: first, it locates the body in the process of perception and, second, it produces a critique of Gestalt such that the constitution of an image as such is put into question:

     

    That we were always perceiving in folds means that we have been grasping figures without objects, but through the haze of dust without objects that the figures themselves raise up from the depths, and that falls back again, but with time enough to be seen for an instant…I do not see into God, but I do see into the folds. The situation of perception is not what Gestalt theory describes when it erects the laws of the “proper form” against the idea of hallucinatory perception, but what Leibniz and de Quincey describe: When a herd or an army approaches, under our hallucinated gaze …–the event. (94)

     

    Given the limited scope of this essay, I cannot dwell here on the importance of the Stoic concept of “event” for Deleuze’s philosophy; suffice to say that it is through such a dynamic conception of event that Deleuze sees in perception a sense of “becoming.” To look at the relationship between body and perception from the viewpoint of becoming so that none of them truly comes to the fore as such raises questions about the individuation of the “I” and the particular certain body. In other words, if, as everything else, the body does not exist outside the monad, then it is what becomes, or comes into being when the monad perceives it as a difference between at least two heterogeneous parts–or, say, when the monad expresses what happens to its infinity of perceptions. Simply put, here the body is what is perceived or what is expressed through perception where “expression” is understood not only as a verbal activity but also as what appears as conscious perception.

     

    Now, if we return to one of our earlier considerations of Benjamin, there is a special point where Benjamin and Deleuze, or Deleuze’s reading of Leibniz, come closest: this is where we quoted Benjamin saying: “Origin is an eddy in the stream of becoming.” The question of origin that post-structuralist thought elaborated thoroughly seems to be one of Benjamin’s most serious concerns, where the proximity between Benjamin and Deleuze occurs with the latter’s conceptualization of “becoming” based on “event.” However, as we slightly adumbrated earlier, there is a cost that Benjamin pays in concluding his discussion on constellations with a “discontinuous finitude”: forgetting the body, the body as the locus of generator of perceptions.

     

    Adorno

     

    Given the discrepancy between the Leibnizian monad on the one hand, and its appropriation by Benjamin in his theory of constellations on the other, it is interesting, at this juncture, to look at what Adorno might have said about similar issues in Negative Dialectics, and in some of his earlier work.

     

    For example, one can observe such passages in Adorno’s inaugural lecture:

     

    The task of philosophy is not to search for concealed and manifest intentions of reality, but to interpret the unintentional reality in that, by the power of constructing figures, images, out of the isolated elements of reality, it negates questions whose exact articulation is the task of knowledge. (“Die Aktualitat der Philosophie” 95)

     

    What kind of an image is Adorno talking about here?

     

    According to Frederic Jameson, the project of constructing constellations in the form of images led Adorno in Negative Dialectics to put a ban on images, as in the case of the ban on graven images (119).

     

    However, let us look briefly at the context in which Adorno mentions this so-called ban.3 At the end of the second chapter (“Concepts and Categories”) of Negative Dialectics, Adorno critically reconsiders the possibility of representational thinking. Adorno suggests that representational thinking is merely “a consciousness interpolating images, a third element between itself and that which it thinks,” and that the “materialist longing to grasp the thing” aims at the “absence of images where the full object could be conceived” (207). However, his evocation of the body in the same paragraph does not in any sense allow for an interpretation as a ban on images. For Adorno critically maintains this ban only to the extent of formulating materialism at its most materialistic moment where he claims that this materialistic ban has resulted in a prohibition of picturing a positive Utopia. Adorno’s immanent criticism of materialism sees it as the possibility of the “resurrection of the flesh” (207), the body, and it does not necessarily mean that resurrection can take place only within the absence or prohibition of images. As a dialectician without a position, Adorno is silent on whether the reconsideration of the body necessitates a ban on images or requires a new constellation of representation. I believe that Adorno’s position cannot be put into an either/or framework and can best be interpreted as opening up the possibility of reconsidering the body as the locus of representation. At this point I would like to raise the following question: is it possible to formulate an image, a form of representation, without necessarily dealing with the question of its belonging or not-belonging to a body?

     

    Agamben

     

    If Adorno’s thoughts on image resonate well with Leibniz’s monadology, it is because, for both, image is that which cannot be thought of as separate from the body. Yet Adorno does not elaborate this thought in the rest of Negative Dialectics, and Benjamin, as we have seen, closes the matter with a “discontinuous finitude.” I would like to suggest it is precisely in this sense that Agamben’s The Coming Community can be read as the unthought of Benjamin’s theory of constellations and Adorno’s questions about the image. One of the main problems–the question of belonging, which Benjamin criticizes but then reappropriates in his theory of constellations–remains a problem for Agamben; however, the question of belonging is no longer seen within a program of redemption or sublation but is now understood with respect to “whatever.”

     

    Whatever, as Agamben formulates it, is not something that can be logically deduced from a series of properties that condition the belonging of a certain particular to a certain universal. For example, if a class name is constituted by the properties it contains, it is the presence of the properties which makes a class name belong to a universal, whereas the “whatever” is that which, “remaining unthought in each, conditions the meaning of all the others” (1). Consequently, whatever is that term whose inclusion among properties is that which creates the difference between particular and singular, or that which transforms particularity into a whatever singularity. Up to that point, the proximity between Agamben and the Benjamin of the “Epistemo-Critical Prologue” is unmistakable, for in the two accounts of singularity one observes a debt to Leibnizian monadology. This is a question of the “countables” which, as we have seen, is answered differently by Benjamin and Leibniz: discontinuous finitude for Benjamin and discontinuous infinitude for Leibniz. For Agamben, however, the question of the countables is considered in terms of properties that constitute a singularity such that the concepts of property and singularity are put into question. What are those properties that go into the constitution of such entities? Can they be counted as things that have an identity, the summation of which will endow an identity to that which is consequently constituted?

     

    First of all, the whatever, within the context of the questions above, is not only a term whose inclusion among properties can be translated to a “being such that it always matters” (1) but also the whatever is that which “remains unthought” in each singularity. This peculiarity of the term, the whatever, thus opens the thought of singularity to a space where “its being such as it is” (1) is valued as the unthought with respect to properties, or common properties. This means that the space of the unthought puts to the test not only countability but also the definition of the properties of a singularity. One immediate question that concerns the whatever singularity, then, is the one related to the individuation of a whatever singularity. If the properties that go into the constitution of a singularity are put at stake, then, how is it possible to individuate whatever singularities? Such questions also underline the suppositions concerning common nature, or the speculations on form, which Agamben traces in Duns Scotus:

     

    …Duns Scotus conceived individuation as an addition to nature or common form (for example, humanity)–an addition not of another form or essence or property, but of an ultima realitas, of an “utmostness” of the form itself. Singularity adds nothing to the common form, if not a “haecceity.” … But, for this reason, according to Duns Scotus, common form or nature must be indifferent to whatever singularity, must in itself be neither particular nor universal, neither one nor multiple, but such that it “does not scorn being posed with a whatever singular unity” (16).

     

    Agamben builds this argument on a previous introduction of the whatever according to which whatever is that whose addition to a singularity creates the singularity’s difference from others–not because whatever’s addition brings about another, a different identity, to the singularity in question, but because it endows the singularity with an indifference to difference. Thus, with this move, what creates the difference–the inclusion of certain properties within a certain singularity and, also, what went into the constitution of properties–is made irrelevant. This indifference, however, cannot be thought without whatever singularity’s relation to common nature because the moment of addition of the whatever also abolishes the singularity’s concern with common nature or properties in the sense of installing indifference as the main trait of a whatever singularity. In Agamben’s words:

     

    Whatever is constituted not by the indifference of common nature with respect to singularities, but by the indifference of the common and the proper, of the genus and the species, of the essential and the accidental. Whatever is the thing with all its properties, none of which, however, constitutes difference. In-difference with respect to properties is what individuates and disseminates singularities, makes them loveable (quodlibetable). (18)

     

    The whatever is that whose addition does not mean “being, it does not matter which” but “being such that it always matters” (1). Within the context of singularities, what happens to our earlier considerations related to the questions of continuity, discontinuity, finite and infinite–the question of countability? Agamben’s formulation of whatever singularities as “being such as they are” makes irrelevant not only such concerns (because a question concerning countability can only be relevant where entities come into being as such), but also the questions of representability of such moments of being, whether they be in the form of images, concepts, constellations, or identities.

     

    One thing that renders whatever singularity unrepresentable can be found in the parallels that Agamben draws between the unbaptized children in limbo and the location of whatever singularities. Limbo is a non-place, where the inhabitants, lacking a conception of a first metaphysical principle, experience a condition of being lost. This lack of a first principle incapacitates any moment of representation and, thus, any possibility of having a memory and not having a memory, both remembering and forgetting. Since there is no sense of redemption, limbo is also marked by a temporality that is a not-yet-taking place. Time can only take place in the end, at the apocalypse; however, even then the inhabitants of limbo will not be absorbed into it, for they are characterized as “letters with no addressee” with no destination (6). Time is only relevant for those who have a destination to reach, who have committed an act to be punished, or for those who have something to redeem.

     

    If life in limbo describes the whatever singularities’ relation to the first metaphysical principle and temporality, and in this way describes their unrepresentability in terms of an identity, the question of whether language as such can grasp them is explained by Agamben by referring to whatever singularities’ indifference to antinomies such as the universal and the particular, or in short, to class names. Language as such transforms singularities into members of a class. Subsumed under a class name, the meaning of the singular is defined by a common property shared by dissimilar particulars–meaning is a condition of belonging to a name. “Linguistic being,” on the other hand, is different from that which is signified by a name for linguistic being comes into being only by being-called something such as “the tree, a tree, this tree” (8). The being-called of tree, that is, for example, the tree, signifies both one certain tree and also its belonging to a class of trees, and this is why linguistic being is a class that both belongs and does not belong to itself.

     

    Linguistic being in this sense is a whatever singularity that is best exemplified by the concept of the example. Considering a class name and any particular subsumed under it as the example of this class name, the difficulty that arises when giving an example of the concept of example is what endows the latter with a singularity. Here the impossibility of giving an example of the concept of example is due to the concept’s lack of its own properties or its lack of a common property with other examples. In this sense, an example is a singularity that does not have any common property with other examples; that is, it comes into being by being-called, by referring to properties that neither belong to itself nor to the class name it constitutes. Each example in this sense is both a class name and a singularity on its own. In Agamben’s words,

     

    Exemplary being is purely linguistic being. Exemplary is what is not defined by any property, except by being called. Not being-red, but being-called red … defines the example. (10)

     

    If nothing could be tied to a classifying concept–if it were possible to get rid of the linguistic convention, that is the first principle–then everything could be an example. Pure singularities with no property of their own would communicate “without being tied by any common property, by any identity” (11). Singularities would exist with no identities, no selves, no belonging to any class name. In Agamben’s words, this would be “an absolutely unrepresentable community” (24).

     

    Agamben’s theory of such an unrepresentable community, based on whatever singularities, without doubt, is a critique of today’s linguistic situation which he, building on Debord’s theory of the spectacle, describes with a story (Shekinah) from the Talmud. This story, according to Agamben, bears witness to the separation of knowledge and the word with the following risk:

     

    The risk here is that the word–that is, the non-latency and the revelation of something (anything whatsoever)–be separated from what it reveals and acquire an autonomous consistency. Revealed and manifested (and hence common and shareable) being is separated from the thing revealed and stands between it and humans. In this condition of exile, the Shekinah loses its positive power and becomes harmful. (80-1)

     

    For Agamben, this risk transforms language, spectacle, image, or indeed, any representative claim, into an autonomous sphere or, as Adorno puts it, into a third term between consciousness and what it thinks. What has happened to the body is closely related to what has happened to representation in the modern era with respect to language and image, or, to the verbal and the visual.

     

    Describing the process with a chapter entitled “Dim Stockings,” Agamben sees in the commodification of the body–in mass-media reproductions of body images–its redemption from theological foundations.4 The invention of the camera, photographic reproduction, and the ensuing businesses of advertisement and pornography signal the end of a kind of a ban on graven images which has left no part of the body unrepresented in technologically manipulated images. The emergence of such images by the beginning of the nineteenth century held a promise for the body to come: “Neither generic nor individual, neither an image of the divinity nor an animal form, the body now became something truly whatever” (47). The technologically reproduced image of the human body had no resemblance now with its archetypal model formulated in Genesis.5 Still preserving a certain sense of resemblance without having any archetype, now the body severs its ties from an obligation to belonging, or to belonging to a class name. In Agamben’s words, this situation bore witness to becoming-whatever of the body where the whatever should be understood as a “resemblance without archetype–in other words, an Idea” (48).

     

    If the emancipation from an archetypal resemblance had a promise of a whatever-body-to-come, it was because it claimed to abolish the “third term,” any claim of representation determined by belonging; however, the reason why it has never been realized must be sought, according to Agamben, in the failure of technology which technologized only the image, that transformed not the body, but its representation.

     

    To appropriate the historic transformations of human nature that capitalism wants to limit to the spectacle, to link together image and body in space where they can no longer be separated, and thus to forge the whatever body, whose physics is resemblance–this is the good that humanity must learn how to wrest from commodities in their decline. (50)

     

    At this point, it is useful to remember what Adorno offered in the passage from Negative Dialectics that I cited earlier and the critique of Benjamin’s reading of Leibniz. If Benjamin insisted on an image, though a momentary one, we have seen how Adorno defended a position in which the image is questioned by opening the possibility of the “resurrection of the flesh,” the body. Earlier, this question of whether the body can become the locus of representation received a certain explanation in Deleuze’s reading of Leibniz; yet after bringing Agamben’s whatever into our discussion, we are faced with slightly different question: whether the whatever body can lead to a formulation of a whatever image? If there is such a thing as whatever image, can it be said to come between “a consciousness and what it thinks”?

     

    Now, as can be concluded from Agamben’s discussion of the body in “Dim Stockings,” separation of the representation of the body from an archetype not only saves the image from being a third term, but also introduces the “whatever” into the body-as such itself. The addition of the “whatever” to the body-as such does not transform it into another body–does not deepen the body/consciousness distinction–it only gives birth to whatever singularities, thereby blurring such oppositions between antinomies. Addition of whatever, one can argue, brings along an indifference of body and consciousness with respect to whatever singularities.

     

    I mentioned earlier the space of the unthought that the whatever adds to the singularities. Considering such an addition, such an opening to singularities, is it still possible to talk about image as a third term?

     

    If we follow Agamben to the end of the book, there is a passage in which he summarizes this space in the following terms:

     

    Whatever adds to singularity only an emptiness, only a threshold: Whatever is a singularity plus an empty space. . . But a singularity plus an empty space can only be a pure exteriority, a pure exposure. Whatever, in this sense, is the event of an outside. Quodlibet is, therefore, the most difficult to think: the absolutely non-thing experience of a pure exteriority. (66)

     

    Agamben reaches this point, the “non-thing experience of a pure exteriority,” by recounting Spinoza’s concept of extension in relation to the common. “All bodies, he [Spinoza] says, have it in common to express the divine attribute of extension. . . . And yet what is common cannot in any case constitute the essence of the single case” (17). The extension in question here is what opens the singularity to a space, the space of the unthought, to an exteriority. This outside, or “the threshold,” in Agamben’s terms, is determined not by an essential commonality; this is a commonality with neither substance nor no property. “The threshold is not, in this sense, another thing with respect to limit; it is, so to speak, the experience of the limit itself, the experience of being-within an outside” (67). This passage from common form to singularity, or, the limit-experience, which is the “event of an outside,” should thus be understood not as an event accomplished once and for all, but as an experience of “an infinite series of modal oscillations” (19).

     

    If singularities are accomplished in “an infinite series of modal oscillations,” then it means, in a Spinozian sense, that they exist as substanceless extensions–with no property of their own–but it is each singularity’s way of establishing a neighborhood with others that determines its accomplishment. Agamben illustrates the coming-to-itself of each singularity with a life story:

     

    Toward the end of his life the great Arabist Louis Massignon … founded a community called Bahaliya, a name deriving from the Arabic term for “substitution”. The members took a vow to live substituting themselves for someone else, that is, to be Christians in the place of others. (23)

     

    For Agamben, the moment of substitution signifies the interconnectedness of each singularity’s existence. The place where this substitution takes place does not belong to anyone nor to itself: the coming-into-being of each singularity is a common thing. One is singular and common at the same time in the process of its taking place.Hence, the unrepresentability of such a community where there would be no identity, for the latter will be a substanceless extension always in the form of its taking place. For Agamben, this is the space of becoming whatever of each singularity, and he calls this unrepresentable space the “Ease”:

     

    The term “ease” designates, according to its etymology, the space adjacent (ad-jacens, adjacentia), the empty place where each can move freely. … In this sense, ease names perfectly that “free use of the proper” that, according to an expression of Freidrich Hölderlin’s, is “the most difficult task.” (25)

     

    Without doubt, the difficulty of this task arises from the possibility of acting within the space of the Ease where identity and representation as such disappear: or, rather, in the Ease, in this “being-within an outside,” what disappears is the possibility of an image that comes as a third term between a consciousness and what it thinks. The constitution of such an image is determined by the way the passage from potentiality to act is formulated. For Aristotle, as Agamben explains, the decisive potentiality is the “potentiality to not-be.”

     

    In the potentiality to be, potentiality has as its object a certain act in the sense that for it energhein, being-in-act, can only mean passing to a determinate activity …; as for the potentiality to not-be, on the other hand, the act can never consist of a simple transition de potentia ad actum. It is, in other words, a potentiality that has as its object potentiality itself, a potentia potentiae. (34-35)

     

    What happens to the antinomy of “a consciousness and what it thinks” in this framework is that, having the potentiality to not-think, thought turns back to itself and, without having an object, or, without being able to form a pure image, it thinks of its own potentiality to not-be.

     

    Whatever-singularity’s affinity with the potentiality to not-be, with such a limit-experience of “being-within an outside,” eases not only the question concerning the possibility of action within the space of the Ease, but also trivializes the question of the disappearance of representation. Representation, or the image, does not disappear but is absorbed into whatever singularity’s potentiality to not-be.

     

    Given this limit-experience, can one still preserve the body as such at the moment of the potentiality to not-be? Do whatever singularities leave room for a possibility of raising distinctions such as that between body and consciousness? Are we still talking about something visible when we talk about “whatever image“?

     

    Does this potentiality to not-be or this limit-experience point toward a direction where whatever singularities might ask for the abolition not only of the possibility of a politics of identity but also the establishment of art and art-criticism? Our answer would be “yes,” if the whatever image were simply “no image.” But if a character like Bartleby in Melville’s story is still in our heads with “no image,” or if it behaves like a ghost whenever we are put into a position of “preferring not to,” I would like to conclude this essay without an answer.

     

    Notes

     

    1. See Adorno, “Die Aktualitat der Philosophie.”

     

    2. “One of Leibniz’s essential theses consists in positing at once the real distinction and the inseparability: it is not because two things are really distinct that they are separable” (The Fold 107-8).

     

    3. “Representational thinking would be without reflection – an undialectical contradiction, for without reflection there is no theory. A consciousness interpolating images, a third element, between itself and what it thinks would unwittingly produce idealism. A body of ideas would substitute for the object of cognition, and the subjective arbitrariness of such ideas is that of the authorities. The materialist longing to grasp the thing aims at the opposite: it is only in the absence of images that the full object could be conceived. Such absence concurs with theological ban on images. Materialism brought that ban into secular form by not permitting Utopia to be positively pictured; this is the substance of its negativity. At its most realistic, materialism comes to agree with theology. Its great desire would be the resurrection of the flesh, a desire utterly foreign to idealism, the realm of the absolute spirit” (Negative Dialectics 207).

     

    4. “In the early 1970s there was an advertisement shown in Paris movie theaters that promoted a well-known brand of French stockings, “Dim” stockings. It showed a group of young women dancing together. Anyone who watched even a few of its images, however, distractedly, would have hard time forgetting the special impression of synchrony and dissonance, of confusion and singularity, of communication and estrangement that emanated from the bodies of the smiling dancers. This impression relied on a trick: Each dancer was filmed separately and later the single pieces were brought together over a single sound track. But that facile trick, that calculated asymmetry of the movement of the long legs sheathed in the same inexpensive commodity, that slight disjunction between the gestures, wafted over the audience a promise of happiness unequivocally related to the human body” (The Coming Community 46).

     

    5. Here Agamben refers to a phrase in Genesis: “in the image and likeness” (48).

    Works Cited

     

    • Adorno, T. W. “Die Aktualitat der Philosophie.” 1931. Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1: Frühe Philosophische Schriften. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1973.
    • —. Negative Dialectics. London: Routledge, 1990.
    • Agamben, Giorgio. The Coming Community. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1993.
    • Benjamin. Walter. The Origin of German Tragic Drama. London: Verso, 1990.
    • Buck-Morss, Susan. The Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodore W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt Institute. NY: Free P, 1977.
    • Deleuze, Gilles. The Fold. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1993.
    • Jameson, Fredric. Late Marxism: Adorno, or the Persistence of the Dialectic. London: Verso, 1990.

     

  • Stirner and Foucault: Toward a Post-Kantian Freedom

    Saul Newman

    Department of Political Science
    University of Western Australia
    snewman@cyllene.uwa.edu.au

     

     

    Max Stirner and Michel Foucault are two thinkers not often examined together. However, it has been suggested that the long-ignored Stirner may be seen as a precursor to contemporary poststructuralist thought.1 Indeed, there are many extraordinary parallels between Stirner’s critique of Enlightenment humanism, universal rationality, and essential identities, and similar critiques developed by thinkers such as Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, and others. However, the purpose of this paper is not merely to situate Stirner in the “poststructuralist” tradition, but rather to examine his thinking on the question of freedom, and to explore the connections here with Foucault’s own development of the concept in the context of power relations and subjectivity. Broadly speaking, both thinkers see the classical Kantian idea of freedom as deeply problematic, as it involves essentialist and universal presuppositions which are themselves often oppressive. Rather, the concept of freedom must be rethought. It can no longer be seen in solely negative terms, as freedom from constraint, but must involve more positive notions of individual autonomy, particularly the freedom of the individual to construct new modes of subjectivity. Stirner, as we shall see, dispenses with the classical notion of freedom altogether and develops a theory of ownness [Eigneheit] to describe this radical individual autonomy. I suggest in this paper that such a theory of ownness as a non-essentialist form of freedom has many similarities with Foucault’s own project of freedom, which involves a critical ethos and an aestheticization of the self. Indeed, Foucault questions the anthropological and universal rational foundations of the discourse of freedom, redefining it in terms of ethical practices.2Both Stirner and Foucault are therefore crucial to the understanding of freedom in a contemporary sense–they show that freedom can no longer be limited by rational absolutes and universal moral categories. They take the understanding of freedom beyond the confines of the Kantian project–grounding it instead in concrete and contingent strategies of the self.

     

    Kant and Universal Freedom

     

    In order to understand how this radical reformulation of freedom can take place, we must first see how the concept of freedom is located in Enlightenment thought. In this paradigm, the exercise of freedom is seen as an inherently rational property. According to Immanuel Kant, for instance, human freedom is presupposed by moral law that is rationally understood. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant seeks to establish an absolute rational ground for moral thinking beyond empirical principles. He argues that empirical principles are not an appropriate basis for moral laws because they do not allow their true universality to be established. Rather, morality should be based on a universal law–a categorical imperative–which can be rationally understood. For Kant, then, there is only one categorical imperative, which provides a foundation for all rational human action: “Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (38). In other words, the morality of an action is determined by whether or not it should become a universal law, applicable to all situations. Kant outlines three features of all moral maxims. Firstly, they must have the form of universality. Secondly, they must have a rational end. Thirdly, the maxims that arise from the autonomous legislation of the individual should be in accordance with a certain teleology of ends.

     

    This last point has important consequences for the question of human freedom. For Kant, moral law is based on freedom–the rational individual freely chooses out of a sense of duty to adhere to universal moral maxims. Thus, for moral laws to be rationally grounded they cannot be based on any form of coercion or constraint. They must be freely adhered to as a rational act of the individual. Freedom is seen by Kant as an autonomy of the will–the freedom of the rational individual to follow the dictates of his own reason by adhering to these universal moral laws. This autonomy of the will, then, is for Kant the supreme principle of morality. He defines it as “that property of it by which it is a law to itself (independently of any property of objects of volition)” (59). Freedom is, therefore, the ability of the individual to legislate for him or herself, free from external forces. However, this freedom of self-legislation must be in accordance with universal moral categories. Hence, for Kant, the principle of autonomy is: “Never choose except in such a way that the maxims of the choice are comprehended in the same volition as a universal law” (59). It would appear that there is a central paradox in this idea of freedom–you are free to choose as long as you make the right choice, as long as you choose universal moral maxims. However, for Kant there is no contradiction here because, although adherence to moral laws is a duty and an absolute imperative, it is still a duty that is freely chosen by the individual. Moral laws are rationally established, and because freedom can only be exercised by rational individuals, they will necessarily, yet freely, choose to obey these moral laws. In other words, an action is free only insofar as it conforms to moral and rational imperatives–otherwise it is pathological and therefore “unfree.” In this way, freedom and the categorical imperative are not antagonistic but, rather, mutually dependent concepts. Individual autonomy, for Kant, is the very basis of moral laws.

     

    But that the principle of autonomy […] is the sole principle of morals can be readily shown by mere analysis of concepts of morality; for by this analysis we find that its principle must be a categorical imperative, and that [the imperative] commands neither more nor less than this very autonomy. (59)

    The Authoritarian Obverse

     

    Nevertheless, it would seem that there is a hidden authoritarianism in Kant’s formulation of freedom. While the individual is free to act in accordance with the dictates of his own reason, he must nevertheless obey universal moral maxims. Kant’s moral philosophy is a philosophy of the law. That is why Jacques Lacan was able to diagnose a hidden jouissance–or enjoyment in excess of the law–that attached itself to Kant’s categorical imperative. According to Lacan, Sade is the necessary counterpart to Kant–the perverse pleasure that attaches itself to the law becomes, in the Sadeian universe, the law of pleasure.3 The thing that binds Kantian freedom to the law is its attachment to an absolute rationality. It is precisely because freedom must be exercised rationally that the individual finds him or herself dutifully obeying rationally founded universal moral laws.

     

    However, both Foucault and Stirner have called into question such universal rational and moral categories, which are central to Enlightenment thought. They contend that absolute categories of morality and rationality sanction various forms of domination and exclusion and deny individual difference. For Foucault, for instance, the centrality of reason in our society is based on the radical and violent exclusion of madness. People are still excluded, incarcerated, and oppressed because of this arbitrary division between reason and unreason, rationality and irrationality. Similarly, the prison system is based on a division between good and evil, innocence and guilt. The incarceration of the prisoner is made possible only through the universalization of moral codes. What must be challenged, for Foucault, are not only the practices of domination that are found in the prison, but also the morality which justifies and rationalizes these practices. The main focus of Foucault’s critique of the prison is not necessarily on the domination within, but on the fact that this domination is justified on absolute moral grounds–the moral grounds that Kant seeks to make universal. Foucault wants to disrupt the “serene domination of Good over Evil” central to moral discourses and practices of power (“Intellectuals” 204-17).

     

    It is this moral absolutism that Stirner is also opposed to. He sees morality as a “spook”–an abstract ideal that has been placed beyond the individual and held over him in an oppressive and alienating way. Morality and rationality have become “fixed ideas”–ideas that have come to be seen as sacred and absolute. A fixed idea, according to Stirner, is an abstract concept that governs thought–a discursively closed fiction that denies difference and plurality. They are ideas that have been abstracted from the world and continue to dominate the individual by comparing him or her to an ideal norm that is impossible to attain. In other words, Kant’s project of taking moral maxims out of the empirical world and into a transcendental realm where they would apply universally, would be seen by Stirner as a project of alienation and domination. Kant’s invocation of absolute obedience to universal moral maxims Stirner would see as the worst possible denial of individuality. For Stirner, the individual is paramount, and anything which purports to apply to or speak for everyone universally is an effacement of individual uniqueness and difference. The individual is plagued by these abstract ideals, these apparitions that are not of his own creation and are imposed on him, confronting him with impossible moral and rational standards. As we shall see, moreover, the individual for Stirner is not a stable, fixed identity or essence–this would be just as much an idealist abstraction as the specters that oppress it. Rather, individuality may be seen here in terms similar to Foucault’s–as a radically contingent form of subjectivity, an open strategy that one engages in to question and contest the confines of essentialism.

     

    The Critique of Essentialism

     

    The exorcism that Stirner performs on this “spirit realm” of moral and rational absolutes is part of a radical critique of Enlightenment humanism and idealism. His “epistemological break” with humanism may be seen most clearly in his repudiation of Ludwig Feuerbach. In The Essence of Christianity, Feuerbach applied the notion of alienation to religion. Religion is alienating, according to Feuerbach, because it requires that man abdicate his essential qualities and powers by projecting them onto an abstract God beyond the grasp of humanity. For Feuerbach, the predicates of God were really only the predicates of man as a species being. God was an illusion, a fictitious projection of the essential qualities of man. In other words, God was a reification of human essence. Like Kant, who tried to transcend the dogmatism of metaphysics by reconstructing it on rational and scientific grounds, Feuerbach wanted to overcome religious alienation by re-establishing the universal rational and moral capacities of man as the fundamental ground for human experience. Feuerbach embodies the Enlightenment humanist project of restoring man to his rightful place at the center of the universe, of making the human the divine, the finite the infinite.

     

    Stirner argues, however, that by seeking the sacred in “human essence,” by positing an essential and universal subject and attributing to him certain qualities that had hitherto been attributed to God, Feuerbach has merely reintroduced religious alienation, placing the abstract concept of man within the category of the Divine. Through the Feuerbachian inversion man becomes like God, and just as man was debased under God, so the individual is debased beneath this perfect being, man. For Stirner, man is just as oppressive, if not more so, than God. Man becomes the substitute for the Christian illusion. Feuerbach, Stirner argues, is the high priest of a new universal religion–humanism: “The human religion is only the last metamorphosis of the Christian religion” (158). It is important to note here that Stirner’s concept of alienation is fundamentally different from the Feuerbachian humanist understanding as alienation from one’s essence. Stirner radicalizes the theory of alienation by seeing this essence as itself alienating. As I shall suggest, alienation in this instance may be seen more along the lines of a Foucauldian notion of domination–as a discourse that ties the individual to a certain subjectivity through the conviction that there lies within everyone an essence to be revealed.

     

    According to Stirner, it is this notion of a universal human essence that provides the foundations for the absolutization of moral and rational ideas. These maxims have become sacred and immutable because they are now based on the notion of humanity, on man’s essence, and to transgress them would be a transgression of this very essence. In this way the subject is brought into conflict with itself. Man is, in a sense, haunted and alienated by himself, by the specter of “essence” inside him: “Henceforth man no longer, in typical cases, shudders at ghosts outside him, but at himself; he is terrified at himself” (Stirner 41). So for Stirner, Feuerbach’s “insurrection” has not overthrown the category of religious authority–it has merely installed man within it, reversing the order of subject and predicate. In the same way, we might suggest that Kant’s metaphysical “insurrection” has not overthrown dogmatic structures of belief, but only installed morality and rationality within them.

     

    While Kant wanted to take morality out of the domain of religion, founding it instead on reason, Stirner maintains that morality is only the old religious dogmatism in a new, rational guise: “Moral faith is as fanatical as religious faith!” (45). What Stirner objects to is not morality itself, but the fact that it has become a sacred, unbreakable law, and he exposes the will to power, the cruelty and the domination behind moral ideas. Morality is based on the desecration, the breaking down of the individual will. The individual must conform to prevailing moral codes; otherwise, he becomes alienated from his essence. For Stirner, moral coercion is just as vicious as the coercion carried out by the state, only it is more insidious and subtle, since it does not require the use of physical force. The warden of morality is already installed in the individual’s conscience. This internalized moral surveillance is also found in Foucault’s discussion of Panopticism–in which he argues, reversing the classical paradigm, that the soul becomes the prison for the body (Foucault, Discipline 195-228).

     

    A similar critique may be leveled at rationality. Rational truths are always held above individual perspectives, and Stirner argues that this is merely another way of dominating the individual. As with morality, Stirner is not necessarily against rational truth itself, but rather against the way it has become sacred, transcendental, and removed from the grasp of the individual, thus abrogating the individual’s power. Stirner says: “As long as you believe in the truth, you do not believe in yourself, and you are a —servant, a–religious man” (312). Rational truth, for Stirner, has no real meaning beyond individual perspectives–it is something that can be used by the individual. Its real basis, as with morality, is power.

     

    So while, for Kant, moral maxims are rationally and freely obeyed, for Stirner they are a coercive standard, based on an alienating notion of human “essence” that is forced upon the individual. Moreover, they become the basis for practices of punishment and domination. For instance, in response to the Enlightenment idea that crime was a disease to be cured rather than a moral failing to be punished, Stirner argues that curative and punitive strategies were just two sides of the same old moral prejudice. Both strategies rely on a universal norm which must be adhered to: “‘curative means’ always announces to begin with that individuals will be looked on as ‘called’ to a particular ‘salvation’ and hence treated according to the requirements of this ‘human calling’” (213). Is not the individual, for Kant, also “called” to a particular “salvation” when he is required to do his duty and obey moral codes? Is not the Kantian categorical imperative also a “human calling” in this sense? In other words, Stirner’s critique of morality and rationality may be applied to Kant’s categorical imperative. For Stirner, although moral maxims may be ostensibly freely followed, they still entail a hidden coercion and authoritarianism. This is because they have become universalized in the Kantian formulation as absolute norms which leave little room for individual autonomy, and which one cannot transgress, because to do so would be to go against one’s own rational, universal “human calling.”

     

    Stirner’s critique of morality and its relation to punishment has striking similarities with Foucault’s own writings on punishment. For Stirner, as we have seen, there is no difference between cure and punishment–the practice of curing is a reapplication of the old moral prejudices in a new “enlightened” guise:

     

    Curative means or healing is only the reverse side of punishment, the theory of cure runs parallel with the theory of punishment; if the latter sees in an action a sin against right, the former takes it for a sin of the man against himself, as a falling away from his health. (213)

     

    This is very similar to Foucault’s argument about the modern formula of punishment–that medical and psychiatric norms are only the old morality in a new guise. While Stirner considers the effect of such forms of moral hygiene on the individual conscience, where Foucault’s focus is more on the materiality of the body, the formula of cure and punishment is the same: it is the notion of what is properly “human” that authorizes a whole series of exclusions, disciplinary practices, and restrictive moral and rational norms. For Foucault, as well as for Stirner, punishment is made possible by making something sacred or absolute–in the way that Kant makes morality into a universal law. There are several points to be made here. Firstly, both Stirner and Foucault see moral and rational discourses as problematic–they often exclude, marginalize, and oppress those who do not live up to the norms implicit in these discourses. Secondly, both thinkers see rationality and morality as being implicated in power relations, rather than constituting a critical epistemological point outside power. Not only are these norms made possible by practices of power, through the exclusion and domination of the other, but they also, in turn, justify and perpetuate practices of power, such as those found in the prison and asylum.

     

    Thirdly, both thinkers see morality as having an ambiguous relation to freedom. While Stirner argues that on the surface moral and rational norms are freely adhered to, they nevertheless entail an oppression over ourselves–a self-domination–that is far more insidious and effective than straightforward coercion. In other words, by conforming to universally prevailing moral and rational norms, the individual abdicates his own power and allows himself to be dominated. Foucault also unmasks this hidden domination of the moral and rational norm that is found behind the calm visage of human freedom. The classical Enlightenment idea of freedom, Foucault argues, allowed only pseudo-sovereignty. It claims to hold sovereign “consciousness (sovereign in the context of judgment, but subjected to the necessities of truth), the individual (a titular control of personal rights subjected to the laws of nature and society), basic freedom (sovereign within, but accepting the demands of an outside world and ‘aligned with destiny’)” (Foucault, “Revolutionary” 221). In other words, Enlightenment humanism claims to free individuals from all sorts of institutional oppressions while, at the same time, entailing an intensification of oppression over the self and denial of the power to resist this subjection. This subordination at the heart of freedom may be seen in the Kantian categorical imperative: while it is based on a freedom of consciousness, this freedom is nevertheless subject to absolute rational and moral categories. Classical freedom only liberates a certain form of subjectivity, while intensifying domination over the individual who is subordinated by these moral and rational criteria. That is to say that the discourse of freedom is based on a specific form of subjectivity–the autonomous, rational man of the Enlightenment and liberalism. As Foucault and Stirner show, this form of freedom is only made possible through the domination and exclusion of other modes of subjectivity that do not conform to this rational model. In other words, while morality does not deny or constrain freedom in an overt way–in Kant’s case moral maxims are based on the individual’s freedom of choice–this freedom is nevertheless restricted in a more subtle fashion because it is required to conform to moral and rational absolutes.

     

    It is clear, then, that for both Stirner and Foucault, the classical Kantian idea of freedom is deeply problematic. It constructs the individual as “rational” and “free” while subjecting him to absolute moral and rational norms, and dividing him into rational and irrational, moral and immoral selves. The individual freely conforms to these rational norms, and in this way his subjectivity is constructed as a site of its own oppression. The silent tyranny of the self-imposed norm has become the prevailing mode of subjection. While for Kant, moral maxims and rational norms existed in a complementary relationship with freedom, for Stirner and Foucault the relationship is much more paradoxical and conflicting. It is not that transcendental moral and rational norms deny freedom per se–indeed in the Kantian paradigm they presuppose freedom. It is rather that the form of freedom brought into being through these absolute categories implies other, more subtle forms of domination. This domination is made possible precisely because freedom’s relationship with power is masked. For Kant, as we have seen, freedom is an absence from coercion. However, for Stirner and Foucault, freedom is always implicated in power relations–power relations that are creative as well as restrictive. To ignore this, moreover, to perpetuate the comforting illusion that freedom promises a universal liberation from power, is to play right into the hands of domination. It may be argued, then, that Foucault and Stirner uncover, in different ways, the authoritarian underside or the “other scene” of Kantian freedom.

     

    Foucauldian Freedom: The Care of the Self

     

    This does not mean, however, that Stirner and Foucault reject the idea of freedom. On the contrary, they interrogate the limits of the Enlightenment project of freedom in order to expand it–to invent new forms of freedom and autonomy that go beyond the restrictions of the categorical imperative. Indeed, as Olivia Custer shows, Foucault is as engaged as Kant in the problematic of freedom. However, as we shall see, he seeks to approach the question of freedom in a different way–through concrete ethical strategies and practices of the self.

     

    For Foucault, the illusion of a state of freedom beyond the world of power must be dispelled. Moreover, freedom’s attachment to essentialist categories and pre-ordained moral and rational coordinates must at least be questioned. However, the concept of freedom is very important for Foucault–he does not want to dispense with it, but rather to situate it in a realm of power relations that necessarily make it indeterminate. It is only through a rethinking of freedom in this way that it can be wrested from the metaphysical world and brought to the level of the individual. Rather than the abstract Kantian notion of freedom as a rational choice beyond constraints and limitations, freedom for Foucault exists in mutual and reciprocal relations with power. Moreover, rather than freedom being presupposed by absolute moral maxims, it is actually presupposed by power. According to Foucault, power may be understood as a series of “actions upon the action of others” in which multiple discourses, counterdiscourses, strategies, and technologies clash with one another–specific relations of power always provoking specific and localized relations of resistance. Resistance is something that exceeds power and is at the same time integral to its dynamic. Power is based on a certain freedom of action, a certain choice of possibilities. In this sense, “power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free” (Foucault, “Subject” 208-26). Unlike classical schema in which power and freedom were diagrammatically opposed, Foucauldian thinking asserts the total dependency of the former on the latter. Where there is no freedom, where the field of action is absolutely restricted and determined, according to Foucault, there can be no power: slavery, for instance, is not a power relationship (Foucault, “Subject” 221).

     

    Foucault’s notion of freedom is a radical departure from Kant’s. Whereas, for Kant, freedom is abstracted from the constraints and limitations of power, for Foucault, freedom is the very basis of these limits and constraints. Freedom is not a metaphysical and transcendental concept. Rather, it is entirely of this world and exists in a complicated and entangled relationship with power. Indeed, there can be no possibility of a world free from power relations, as power and freedom cannot exist without one another.

     

    Moreover, Foucault is able to see freedom as being implicated in power relations because, for him, freedom is more than just the absence or negation of constraint. He rejects the “repressive” model of freedom which presupposes an essential self–a universal human nature–that is restricted and needs to be liberated. The liberation of an essential subjectivity is the basis of classical Enlightenment notions of freedom and is still central to our political imaginary. However, both Foucault and Stirner reject this idea of an essential self–this is merely an illusion created by power. As Foucault says, “The man described for us, whom we are invited to free, is already in himself the effect of a subjection much more profound than himself” (Discipline 30). While he does not discount acts of political liberation–for example when a people tries to liberate itself from colonial rule–this cannot operate as the basis for an ongoing mode of freedom. To suppose that freedom can be established eternally on the basis of this initial act of liberation is only to invite new forms of domination. If freedom is to be an enduring feature of any political society it must be seen as a practice–an ongoing strategy and mode of action that continuously challenges and questions relations of power.

     

    This practice of freedom is also a creative practice–a continuous process of self-formation of the subject. It is in this sense that freedom may be seen as positive. One of the features that characterizes modernity, according to Foucault, is a Baudelairean “heroic” attitude toward the present. For Baudelaire, the contingent, fleeting nature of modernity is to be confronted with a certain “attitude” toward the present that is concomitant with a new mode of relationship that one has with oneself. This involves a reinvention of the self: “This modernity does not ‘liberate man in his own being’; it compels him to face the task of producing himself” (Foucault, “What” 42). So, rather than freedom being a liberation of man’s essential self from external constraints, it is an active and deliberate practice of inventing oneself. This practice of freedom may be found in the example of the dandy, or flâneur, “who makes of his body, his behavior, his feelings and passions, his very existence, a work of art” (Foucault, “What” 41-2). It is this practice of self-aestheticization that allows us, according to Foucault, to reflect critically on the limits of our time. It does not seek a metaphysical place beyond all limits, but rather works within the limits and constraints of the present. More importantly, however, it is also a work conducted upon the limits of ourselves and our own identities. Because power operates through a process of subjectification–by tying the individual to an essential identity–the radical reconstitution of the self is a necessary act of resistance. This idea of freedom, then, defines a new form of politics more relevant to contemporary regimes of power: “The political, ethical, social, philosophical problem of our days is not to liberate the individual from the State and its institutions, but to liberate ourselves from the State and the type of individualisation linked to it” (Foucault, “Subject” 216).

     

    For Foucault, moreover, the liberation of the self is a distinctly ethical practice. It involves a notion of “care for the self” whereby one’s desires and behavior are regulated by oneself so that freedom may be practiced ethically. This sensitivity to the care for oneself and the ethical practice of freedom could be found, Foucault suggests, among the Greeks and Romans of antiquity. For them the freedom of the individual was an ethical problem. Because the desire for power over others was also a threat to one’s own freedom, the exercise of power was something that had to be regulated, monitored, and limited. To be a slave to one’s own desires was as bad as being subject to another’s desires. This regulation of one’s desires and practices required an ethics of behavior that one constructed for oneself. In order to practice freedom ethically, in order to be truly free, one had to achieve power over oneself, over one’s desires. As Foucault shows, in ancient Greek and Roman thinking, “the good ruler is precisely the one who exercises his power correctly, i.e., by exercising at the same time his power on himself” (“Ethics” 288).

     

    This ethical practice of freedom associated with the care for the self begins, however, at a certain point to sound somewhat Kantian. Indeed, as Foucault says, “for what is ethics, if not the practice of freedom? […]. Freedom is the ontological condition of ethics” (“Ethics” 284). Does this not appear to re-invoke the categorical imperative where, for Kant, morality presupposes and is founded on freedom? Has Foucault, in his attempt to escape the absolutism of morality and rationality, reintroduced the categorical imperative in this careful regulation of behavior and desire? There can be no doubt about the stringency of this form of ethics. In The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self, Foucault describes the Greeks’ and Romans’ prescriptions concerning everything from diet and exercise to sex. However, I would suggest that there is an important difference between the ethics of care and the universal moral maxims insisted on by Kant. The regulation of behavior and the problematization of freedom central to the ethic of care are things that one applies to oneself, rather than being imposed externally from a universal point beyond the individual. Foucault’s practice of freedom is, in this sense, an ethics, rather than a morality. It is a certain consistency of modes and behaviors that has as its object the consideration and problematization of the self. In other words, it allows the self to be seen as an open project to be constituted through the ethical practices of the individual, rather than as something defined a priori by universal, transcendental laws. Moral laws do not apply here–there is no transcendental authority or universal imperative that sanctions these ethical practices and penalizes infractions. According to Foucault, morality is defined by the type of subjectification it entails. On the one hand, there is the morality that enforces the code, through injunctions, and which entails a form of subjectivity that refers the individual’s conduct to these laws, submitting it to their universal authority. This, it could be argued, is the morality of Kant’s categorical imperative. On the other hand, argues Foucault, there is the morality in which

     

    the accent was placed on the relationship of the self that enabled the person to keep from being carried away by the appetites and pleasures, to maintain a mastery and superiority over them, to keep his senses in a state of tranquility, to remain free from interior bondage to the passions, and to achieve a mode of being that could be defined by the full enjoyment of oneself, or the perfect supremacy of oneself over oneself. (Use 29-30)

     

    We can see, then, that Foucault’s notion of freedom as an ethical practice is radically different from Kant’s idea of freedom as the basis of universal moral law. For Foucault, freedom is ethical because it implies an open-ended project that is conducted upon oneself, the aim of which is to increase the power that one exercises over oneself and to limit and regulate the power one exercises over others. In this way, one’s personal freedom and autonomy are enhanced. For Kant, on the other hand, freedom is the basis of a metaphysical morality that must be universally obeyed. For Foucault, in other words, ethics intensifies freedom and autonomy, whereas for Kant, freedom and autonomy are ultimately circumscribed by the very morality they make possible.

     

    So, there are two related aspects of Foucault’s concept of freedom that must be emphasized here. Firstly, there is the practice of freedom that allows one to liberate oneself, not from external limits that repress one’s essence, but rather from the limits imposed by this very essence. It involves, in a sense, the transgression of these limits through a transgression and reinvention of oneself. It is a form of freedom which operates within the limits of power, enabling the individual to make use of the limits in inventing him/herself. Secondly, there is the aspect of freedom that is distinctly ethical–it is a practice of care for the self that has as its aim an increase of the power over oneself and one’s desires, thus keeping in check one’s exercise of power over others. In this way, the practice of care for the self allows the individual to navigate an ethical course of action amidst power relations, with the aim of intensifying freedom and personal autonomy. Therefore, freedom is conceived as an ongoing and contingent practice of the self that is not determined in advance by fixed moral and rational laws.

     

    The Two Enlightenments

     

    In his later essay “What Is Enlightenment?,” Foucault considers Kant’s insistence on the free and public use of autonomous reason as an escape, a “way out” for man from a state of immaturity and subordination. While Foucault believes that this autonomous reason is useful because it allows a critical ethos toward modernity, he refuses the “blackmail” of the Enlightenment–the insistence that this critical ethos at the heart of the Enlightenment be inscribed in a universal rationality and morality. The problem with Kant is that he opens up a space for individual autonomy and critical reflection on the limits of oneself, only to close this space down by re-inscribing it in transcendental notions of rationality and morality that require absolute obedience. For Foucault, the legacy of the Enlightenment is deeply ambiguous. As Colin Gordon shows, for Foucault there are two Enlightenments–the Enlightenment of rational certainty, absolute identity, and destiny, and the Enlightenment of continual questioning and uncertainty. According to Foucault, this ambiguity is reflected in Kant’s own treatment of the Enlightenment.

     

    There is perhaps a Kantian moment in Foucault (or could we say a Foucauldian moment in Kant?). Foucault shows how one might read Kant in a heterogeneous way, focusing on the more libratory aspect of his thinking–where we are encouraged to interrogate the limits of modernity, to reflect critically on the way we have been constituted as subjects. As Foucault shows, Kant sees the Enlightenment (Aufklärung) as a critical condition, characterized by an “audacity to know” and the free and autonomous public use of reason. This critical condition is concomitant with a “will to revolution”–with the attempt to understand revolution (in Kant’s case the French Revolution) as an Event that allows an interrogation of the conditions of modernity–“an ontology of the present“–and the way we as subjects stand in relation to it (Foucault, “Kant” 88-96). Foucault suggests that we may adopt this critical strategy to reflect upon the limits of the discourse of the Enlightenment itself and its universal rational and moral injunctions. We may in this sense use the critical capacities of the Enlightenment against itself, thus opening up spaces for individual autonomy within its edifice, beyond the grasp of universal laws.

     

    This critical stance toward the present, and the practice of the “care for the self” with which it is bound up, outline a genealogical strategy of freedom–a strategy that, as Foucault says “is not seeking to make possible a metaphysics that has finally become a science; it is seeking to give new impetus […] to the undefined work of freedom” (“What” 46).

     

    Stirner’s Theory of Ownness

     

    As we shall see, it is precisely this desire to give new impetus to freedom, to take it out of the realm of empty dreams and promises, that is reflected in Stirner’s theory of ownness. He adopts a “genealogical” approach similar to Foucault’s in making the focus of freedom the self and situating freedom amidst relations of power.

     

    The idea of transgressing and reinventing the self–of freeing the self from fixed and essential identities–is also a central theme in Stirner’s thinking. As we have seen, Stirner shows that the notion of human essence is an oppressive fiction derived from an inverted Christian idealism that tyrannizes the individual and is linked with various forms of political domination. Stirner describes a process of subjectification which is very similar to Foucault’s: rather than power operating as downward repression, it rules through the subjectification of the individual, by defining him according to an essential identity. As Stirner says: “the State betrays its enmity to me by demanding that I be a man . . . it imposes being a man upon me as a duty” (161). Human essence imposes a series of fixed moral and rational ideas on the individual, which are not of his creation and which curtail his autonomy. It is precisely this notion of duty, of moral obligation–the same sense of duty that is the basis of the categorical imperative–that Stirner finds oppressive.

     

    For Stirner, then, the individual must free him- or herself from these oppressive ideas and obligations by first freeing himself from essence–from the essential identity that is imposed on him. Freedom involves, then, a transgression of essence, a transgression of the self. But what form should this transgression take? Like Foucault, Stirner is suspicious of the language of liberation and revolution–it is based on a notion of an essential self that supposedly throws off the chains of external repression. For Stirner, it is precisely this notion of human essence that is itself oppressive. Therefore, different strategies of freedom are called for–ones that abandon the humanist project of liberation and seek, rather, to reconfigure the subject in new and non-essentialist ways. To this end, Stirner calls for an insurrection:

     

    Revolution and insurrection must not be looked upon as synonymous. The former consists in an overturning of conditions, of the established condition or status, the state or society, and is accordingly a political or social act; the latter has indeed for its unavoidable consequence a transformation of circumstances, yet does not start from it but from men’s discontent with themselves, is not an armed rising but a rising of individuals, a getting up without regard to the arrangements that spring from it. The revolution aimed at new arrangements; insurrection leads us no longer to let ourselves be arranged, but to arrange ourselves, and sets no glittering hopes on “institutions.” It is not a fight against the established, since, if it prospers, the established collapses of itself; it is only a working forth of me out of the established. (279-80)

     

    So while a revolution aims at transforming existing social and political conditions so that human essence may flourish, an insurrection aims at freeing the individual from this very essence. Like Foucault’s practices of freedom, the insurrection aims at transforming the relationship that the individual has with himself. The insurrection starts, then, with the individual refusing his or her enforced essential identity: it starts, as Stirner says, from men’s discontent with themselves. Insurrection does not aim at overthrowing political institutions. It is aimed at the individual, in a sense transgressing his own identity–the outcome of which is, nevertheless, a change in political arrangements. Insurrection is therefore not about becoming what one is–becoming human, becoming man–but about becoming what one is not.

     

    This ethos of escaping essential identities through a reinvention of oneself has many important parallels with the Baudelarian aestheticization of the self that interests Foucault. Like Baudelaire’s assertion that the self must be treated as a work of art, Stirner sees the self–or the ego–as a “creative nothingness,” a radical emptiness which is up to the individual to define: “I do not presuppose myself, because I am every moment just positing or creating myself” (135). The self, for Stirner, is a process, a continuous flow of self-creating flux–it is a process that eludes the imposition of fixed identities and essences: “no concept expresses me, nothing that is designated as my essence exhausts me” (324).

     

    Therefore, Stirner’s strategy of insurrection and Foucault’s project of care for the self are both contingent practices of freedom that involve a reconfiguration of the subject and its relationship with the self. For Stirner, as with Foucault, freedom is an undefined and open-ended project in which the individual engages. The insurrection, as Stirner argues, does not rely on political institutions to grant freedom to the individual, but looks to the individual to invent his or her own forms of freedom. It is an attempt to construct spaces of autonomy within relations of power, by limiting the power that is exercised over the individual by others and increasing the power that the individual exercises over himself. The individual, moreover, is free to reinvent himself in new and unpredictable ways, escaping the limits imposed by human essence and universal notions of morality.

     

    The notion of insurrection involves a reformulation of the concept of freedom in ways that are radically post-Kantian. Stirner suggests, for instance, that there can be no truly universal idea of freedom; freedom is always a particular freedom in the guise of the universal. The universal freedom that, for Kant, is the domain of all rational individuals, would only mask some hidden particular interest. Freedom, according to Stirner, is an ambiguous and problematic concept, an “enchantingly beautiful dream” that seduces the individual yet remains unattainable, and from which the individual must awaken.

     

    Furthermore, freedom is a limited concept. It is only seen in its narrow negative sense. Stirner wants, rather, to extend the concept to a more positive freedom to. Freedom in the negative sense involves only self-abnegation–to be rid of something, to deny oneself. That is why, according to Stirner, the freer the individual ostensibly becomes, in accordance with the emancipative ideals of Enlightenment humanism, the more he loses the power he exercises over himself. On the other hand, positive freedom–or ownness–is a form of freedom that is invented by the individual for him or herself. Unlike Kantian freedom, ownness is not guaranteed by universal ideals or categorical imperatives. If it were, it could only lead to further domination: “The man who is set free is nothing but a freed man […] he is an unfree man in the garment of freedom, like the ass in the lion’s skin” (152).

     

    Freedom must, rather, be seized by the individual. For freedom to have any value it must be based on the power of the individual to create it. “My freedom becomes complete only when it is my–might; but by this I cease to be a merely free man, and become and own man” (151). Stirner was one of the first to recognize that the true basis of freedom is power. To see freedom as a universal absence of power is to mask its very basis in power. The theory of ownness is a recognition, and indeed an affirmation, of the inevitable relation between freedom and power. Ownness is the realization of the individual’s power over himself–the ability to create his or her own forms of freedom, which are not circumscribed by metaphysical or essentialist categories. In this sense, ownness is a form of freedom that goes beyond the categorical imperative. It is based on a notion of the self as a contingent and open field of possibilities, rather than on an absolute and dutiful adherence to external moral maxims.

     

    Conclusion

     

    This idea of ownness is crucial in formulating a post-Kantian concept of freedom. Perhaps, in Stirner’s words, “Ownness created a new freedom” (147). Firstly, ownness allows freedom to be considered beyond the limits of universal moral and rational categories. Ownness is the form of freedom that one invents for oneself, rather than one that is guaranteed by transcendental ideals. Foucault, too, sought to “free” freedom from these oppressive limits. Secondly, ownness converges closely with Foucault’s own argument about freedom being situated in power relations. Like Foucault, Stirner shows that the idea of freedom as entailing a complete absence of power and constraint is illusory. The individual is always involved in a complex network of power relations, and freedom must be fought for, reinvented, and renegotiated within these limits. Ownness may be seen, then, as creating the possibilities of resistance to power. Similarly to Foucault, Stirner maintains that freedom and resistance can always exist, even in the most oppressive conditions. In this sense, ownness is a project of freedom and resistance within power’s limits–it is the recognition of the fundamentally antagonistic and ambiguous nature of freedom. Thirdly, not only is ownness an attempt to limit the domination of the individual, but it is also a way of intensifying the power that one exercises over oneself. We have seen that for both Stirner and Foucault, Kant’s universal freedom is based on absolute moral and rational norms that limit individual sovereignty. Foucault and Stirner are both interested, in different ways, in reformulating the concept of freedom: through the ethical practice of care of the self and through the strategy of ownness, both of which are aimed at increasing the power that the individual has over himself.

     

    These two strategies allow us to conceptualize freedom in a more contemporary way. Freedom can no longer be seen as a universal emancipation, the eternal promise of a world beyond the limits of power. The freedom that forms the basis of the categorical imperative, the freedom exalted by Kant as the province of reason and morality, can no longer serve as the basis for contemporary ideas of freedom. It has been also shown by Stirner and Foucault to exclude and oppress where it includes, to enslave where it also liberates. Freedom must be seen as no longer being subservient to absolute maxims of morality and rationality, to imperatives that invoke the dull, cold inevitability of law and punishment. For Stirner and Foucault, freedom must be “freed” from these absolute notions. Rather than a privilege that is granted from a metaphysical point to the individual, freedom must be seen as a practice, a critical ethos of the self, and as a struggle that is engaged in by the individual within the problematic of power. It necessarily involves a reflection on the limits of the self and the ontological conditions of the present–a constant reinvention and problematization of subjectivity. A post-Kantian freedom, in this way, is not only a recognition of power, but also a reflection upon power’s limits–an affirmation of the possibilities of individual autonomy within power and of the critical capacities of modern subjectivity.

     

    Notes

     

    1. See Koch.

     

    2. This rejection of the anthropological foundations of freedom is also discussed by Rajchman. Indeed Rajchman sees Foucault’s project of freedom as an ethical attitude of continual questioning of the borders and limits of our contemporary experience–a freedom of philosophy as well as a philosophy of freedom. My discussion of Foucault’s reconfiguration of the problematic of freedom in terms of concrete ethical strategies of the self may also be seen in this context.

     

    3. See Lacan. In this essay, Lacan shows that the Law produces its own transgression, and that it can only operate through this transgression. The excess of Sade does not contradict the injunctions, laws, and categorical imperatives of Kant; rather, they are inextricably linked to it. Like Foucault’s discussion of the “spirals” of power and pleasure, in which power produces the very pleasure it is seen to repress, Lacan suggests that the denial of enjoyment–embodied in Law, in the categorical imperative–produces its own form of perverse enjoyment, or jouissance as a surplus–le plus de jouir. Sade, according to Lacan, exposes this obscene enjoyment by reversing the paradigm: he turns this perverse pleasure into a law itself, into a sort of Kantian categorical imperative or universal principle: “Let us enunciate the maxim: ‘I have the right of enjoyment over your body, anyone can say to me, and I will exercise this right, without any limit stopping me in the capriciousness of the exactions that I might have the taste to satiate’” (58). In this way the obscene pleasure of the Law that is unmasked in Kant is reversed into the Law of obscene pleasure through Sade. As Zizek remarks in “Kant with (or against) Sade,” the crucial insight of Lacan’s argument here is not that Kant is a closet sadist, but rather that Sade is a “closet Kantian.” That is, Sadean excess is taken to such an extreme that it becomes emptied of pleasure and takes the form of a cold-blooded, joyless universal Law.

    Works Cited

     

    • Custer, Olivia. “Exercising Freedom: Kant and Foucault.” Philosophy Today 42 (1989): 137-146.
    • Feuerbach, Ludwig. The Essence of Christianity. New York: Harper, 1957.
    • Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Penguin, 1977. 195-228.
    • —. “The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom.” Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954-1984. Ed. Paul Rabinow. Trans. Robert J. Hurley. Vol. 1. London: Penguin, 1997. 281-301.
    • —. “Intellectual and Power: A Conversation between Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze.” Foucault, Language 204-217.
    • —. “Kant on Enlightenment and Revolution.” Trans. Colin Gordon. Economy and Society 15.1 (1986): 88-96.
    • —. Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews. Ed. Donald Bouchard. Oxford: Blackwell, 1977. 204-217.
    • —. “Revolutionary Action: ‘Until Now.’” Foucault, Language 218-233.
    • —. “The Subject and Power.” Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. By Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1982. 208-226.
    • —. The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality, Volume 2. Trans. Robert Hurley. New York: Pantheon, 1985. 29-30.
    • —. “What is Enlightenment?” The Foucault Reader. Ed. Paul Rabinow. New York: Pantheon, 1984. 32-50.
    • Gordon, Colin. “Question, Ethos, Event: Foucault on Kant and the Enlightenment.” Economy and Society 15.1 (1986): 71-87.
    • Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbot. London: Longmans, 1963.
    • Koch, Andrew. “Max Stirner: The Last Hegelian or the First Poststructuralist.” Anarchist Studies 5 (1997): 95-107.
    • Lacan, Jacques. “Kant with Sade.” October 51 (1989): 55-75.
    • Rajchman, John. Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy. New York: Columbia UP, 1985.
    • Stirner, Max. The Ego and Its Own. Trans. David Leopold. Cambridge and London: U of Cambridge P, 1995.
    • Zizek, Slavoj. “Kant with (or against) Sade.” The Zizek Reader. Eds. Elizabeth Wright and Edmond Wright. Oxford: Blackwell, 1999.

     

  • Bioinformatics and Bio-logics

    Eugene Thacker

    School of Literature, Communication, and Culture
    Georgia Institute of Technology
    eugene.thacker@lcc.gatech.edu

    Point-and-Click Biology

     

    It is often noted that progress in biotechnology research is as much a technological feat as a medical one. The field of “bioinformatics” is exemplary here, since it is playing a significant role in the various genome projects, the study of stem cells, gene targeting and drug development, medical diagnostics, and genetic medicine generally. Bioinformatics may simply be described as the application of computer science to molecular biology research. The development of biological databases (many of them online), gene sequencing computers, computer languages (such as XML-based standards), and a wide array of software tools (from pattern-matching algorithms to data mining agents), are all examples of innovations by means of which bioinformatics is transforming the traditional molecular biology laboratory. Some especially optimistic reports on these developments have suggested that the “wet” lab of traditional biology is being replaced by the “dry” lab of “point-and-click biology.”1

     

    Figure 1: Production Sequencing Facility
    at Department of Energy’s Joint Genome Institute in Walnut Creek, CA

     

    While current uses of bioinformatics are mostly pragmatic (technology-as-tool) and instrumental (forms of intellectual property and patenting), the issues which bioinformatics raises are simultaneously philosophical and technical. These issues have already begun to be explored in a growing body of critical work that approaches genetics and biotechnology from the perspective of language, textuality, and the various scripting tropes within molecular biology. The approach taken here, however, will be different. While critiques of molecular biology-as-text can effectively illustrate the ways in which bodies, texts, and contexts are always intertwined, I aim to interrogate the philosophical claims made by the techniques and technologies that molecular biotech designs for itself. Such an approach requires an inquiry into the materialist ontology that “informs” fields such as bioinformatics, managing as it does the relationships between the in vivo, the in vitro, and the in silico.

     

    Such questions have to do with how the intersection of genetic and computer codes is transforming the very definition of “the biological”–not only within bioinformatics but within molecular biotechnology as a whole. Thus, when we speak of the intersections of genetic and computer codes, we are not discussing the relationships between body and text, or material and semiotic registers, for this belies the complex ways in which “the body” has been enframed by genetics and biotechnology in recent years.

     

    What follows is a critical analysis of several types of bioinformatics systems, emphasizing how the technical details of software and programming are indissociable from these larger philosophical questions of biological “life.” The argument that will be made is that bioinformatics is much more than simply the “computerization” of genetics and molecular biology; it forms a set of practices that instantiate ontological claims about the ways in which the relationships between materiality and data, genetic and computer codes, are being transformed through biotech research.

     

    Bioinformatics in a Nutshell

     

    The first computer databases used for biological research were closely aligned with the first attempts to analyze and sequence proteins.2 In the mid-1950s, the then-emerging field of molecular biology saw the first published research articles on DNA and protein sequences from a range of model organisms, including yeast, the roundworm, and the Drosophila fruit fly.3 From a bioinformatics perspective, this research can be said to have been instrumental in identifying a unique type of practice in biology: the “databasing” of living organisms at the molecular level. Though these examples do not involve computers, they do adopt an informatic approach in which, using wet lab procedures, the organism is transformed into an organization of sequence data, a set of strings of DNA or amino acids.

     

    Because most of this sequence data was related to protein molecules (structural data derived from X-ray crystallography), the first computer databases for molecular biology were built in the 1970s (Protein Data Bank) and 1980s (SWISS-PROT database).4 Bioinformatics was, however, given its greatest boost from the Human Genome Project (HGP) in its originary conception, a joint Department of Energy (DoE) and National Institutes of Health (NIH) sponsored endeavor based in the U.S. and initiated in 1989-90.5 The HGP went beyond the single-study sequencing of a bacteria, or the derivation of structural data of a single protein. It redefined the field, not only positing a universality to the genome, but also implying that a knowledge of the genome could occur only at this particular moment, when computing technologies reached a level at which large amounts of data could be dynamically archived and analyzed. Automated gene sequencing computers, advanced robotics, high-capacity computer database arrays, computer networking, and (often proprietary) genome analysis software were just some of the computing technologies employed in the human genome project. In a sense, the HGP put to itself the problem of both regarding the organism itself as a database and porting that database from one medium (the living cell) into another (the computer database).6

     

    Figure 2: Commercial bioinformatics application by Celera Genomics

     

    At this juncture it is important to make a brief historical aside, and that is that bioinformatics is unthinkable without a discourse concerning DNA-as-information. As Lily Kay has effectively shown, the notion of the “genetic code”–and indeed of molecular genetics itself–emerges through a cross-pollination with the discourses of cybernetics, information theory, and early computer science during the post-war era, long before computing technology was thought of as being useful to molecular biology research.7 Though there was no definitive formulation of what exactly genetic “information” was (and is), the very possibility of an interdisciplinary influence itself conditions bioinformatics’ possibility of later technically materializing the genome itself as a database.

     

    Against this discursive backdrop, we can make several points in extending Kay’s historiography in relation to contemporary bioinformatics. One is that, while earlier paradigms in molecular biology were, according to Kay, largely concerned with defining and deciphering DNA as a “code,” contemporary molecular genetics and biotech research is predominantly concerned with the functionality of living cells and genomes as computers in their own right.8 What this means is that contemporary biotech is constituted by both a “control principle” and a “storage principle,” which are seen to inhere functionally within biological organization itself. If the control principle derives from genetic engineering and recombinant DNA techniques, the storage principle is derived from the human genome project. Both can be seen to operate within bioinformatics and biotech research today.9

     

    Figure 3: The genetic code.
    Triplet codons each code for a particular amino acid.

     

    To give an idea of what contemporary bioinformatics researchers do, we can briefly consider one technique. Among the most common techniques employed in current bioinformatics research is the sequence alignment, a technique which can lead to the identification and characterization of specific molecules (e.g., gene targeting for drug development), and even the prediction of the production and interaction of molecules (e.g., gene prediction for studying protein synthesis).10 Also referred to as “pairwise sequence alignment,” this simply involves comparing one sequence (DNA or protein code) against a database for possible matches or near-matches (called “homologs”). Doing this involves an interactive pattern-matching routine, compared against several “reading frames” (depending on where one starts the comparison along the sequence), a task to which computer systems are well attuned. Bioinformatics tools perform such pattern-matching analyses through algorithms which accept an input sequence, and then access one or more databases to search for close matches.11 What should be noted, however, is that despite this breadth of expandability and application, bioinformatics tools are often geared toward a limited number of ends: the isolation of candidate genes or proteins for medical-genetic diagnostics, drug development, or gene-based therapies.

     

    Bio-logic

     

    However, if bioinformatics is simply the use of computer technologies to analyze strings, access online databases, and perform computational predictions, one question may beg asking: aren’t we simply dealing with data, data that has very little to do with the “body itself”? In many senses we are dealing with data, and it is precisely the relation of that data to particularized bodies which bioinformatics materializes through its practices. We can begin to address this question of “just data” by asking another question: when we hear talk about “biological data” in relation to bioinformatics and related fields, what exactly is meant by this?

     

    On one level, biological data is indeed nothing but computer code. The majority of biological databases store not biological nucleic acids, amino acids, enzymes, or entire cells, but rather strings of data which, depending on one’s perspective, are either abstractions, representations, or indices of actual biomolecules and cells. In computer programming terminology, “strings” are simply any linear sequence of characters, which may be numbers, letters, symbols, or combinations thereof. Programs that perform various string manipulations can carry out a wide array of operations based on combinatorial principles applied to the same string. The most familiar type of string manipulation takes place when we edit text. In writing email, for instance, the text we type into the computer must be encoded into a format that can be transmitted across a network. The phrase “in writing email, for instance” must be translated into a lower-level computer language of numbers, each group of numbers representing letters in the sequence of the sentence. At an even more fundamental level, those numbers must themselves be represented by a binary code of zeros and ones, which are themselves translated as pulses of light along a fiber optic cable (in the case of email) or within the micro-circuitry of a computer processor (in the case of word processing).

     

    In text manipulations such as writing email or word processing, a common encoding standard is known as ASCII, or the American Standard Code for Information Interchange. ASCII was established by the American Standards Association in the 1960s, along with the development of the Internet and the business mainframe computer, as a means of standardizing the translation of English-language characters on computers. ASCII is an “8-bit” code, in that a group of eight ones and zeros represents a certain number (such as “112”), which itself represents a letter (such as lower case “p”). Therefore, in the phrase “in writing email, for instance” each character–letters, punctuation, and spaces–is coded for by a number designated by the ASCII standard.12

     

    How does this relate to molecular biotechnology and the biomolecular body? As we’ve noted, most biological databases, such as those housing the human genome, are really just files which contain long strings of letters: As, Ts, Cs, and Gs, in the case of a nucleotide database. When news reports talk about the “race to map the human genome,” what they are actually referring to is the endeavor to convert the order of the sequence of DNA molecules in the chromosomes in the cell to a database of digital strings in a computer. Although the structural properties of DNA are understood to play an important part in the processes of transcription and translation in the cell, for a number of years the main area of focus in genetics and biotech has, of course, been on DNA and “genes.” In this focus, of primary concern is how the specific order of the string of DNA sequence plays a part in the production of certain proteins, or in the regulation of other genes. Because sequence is the center of attention, this also means that, for analytical purposes, the densely coiled, three-dimensional, “wet” DNA in the cell must be converted into a linear string of data. Since nucleotide sequences have traditionally been represented by the letter of their bases (Adenine, Cytosine, Guanine, Thymine), ASCII provides a suitable encoding scheme for long strings of letters. To make this relationship clearer, we can use a table:

     

    DNA A T C G
    ASCII 65 84 67 71
    Binary 01000001 01010100 01000011 01000111

     

    In the same way that English-language characters are encoded by ASCII, the representational schemes of molecular biology are here also encoded as ASCII numbers, which are themselves binary digits. At the level of binary digits, the level of “machine language,” the genetic code is therefore a string of ones and zeros like any other type of data. Similarly, a database file containing a genetic sequence is read from ASCII numbers and presented as long linear strings of four letters (and can even be opened in a word processing application). Therefore, when, in genetics textbooks, we see DNA diagrammed as a string of beads marked “A-T” or “C-G,” what we are looking at is both a representation of a biomolecule and a schematic of a string of data in a computer database.

     

    Is that all that biological data is? If we take this approach–that is, that biological data is a quantitative abstraction of a “real” thing, a mode of textuality similar to language itself–then we are indeed left with the conclusion that biological data, and bioinformatics, is nothing more than an abstraction of the real by the digital, a kind of linguistic system in which letters-molecules signify the biological phenotype. While this may be the case from a purely technical–and textual–perspective, we should also consider the kinds of philosophical questions which this technical configurations elicits. That is, if we leave, for a moment, the epistemological and linguistic debate of the real vs. the digital, the thing-itself vs. its representation, and consider not “objects” but rather relationships, we can see that “biological data” is more than a binary sign-system. Many of the techniques within bioinformatics research appear to be more concerned with function than with essence; the question a bioinformatician asks is not “what it is,” but rather “how it works.” Take, for example, a comment from the Bioinformatics.org website, which is exemplary of a certain perspective on biological data:

     

    It is a mathematically interesting property of most large biological molecules that they are polymers; ordered chains of simpler molecular modules called monomers….Many monomer molecules can be joined together to form a single, far larger, macromolecule which has exquisitely specific informational content and/or chemical properties. According to this scheme, the monomers in a given macromolecule of DNA or protein can be treated computationally as letters of an alphabet, put together in pre-programmed arrangements to carry messages or do work in a cell. 13

     

    What is interesting about such perspectives is that they suggest that the notion of biological data is not about the ways in which a real (biological) object may be abstracted and represented (digitally), but instead is about the ways in which certain “patterns of relationships” can be identified across different material substrates, or across different platforms. We still have the code conversion from the biological to the digital, but rather than the abstraction and representation of a “real” object, what we have is the cross-platform conservation of specified patterns of relationships. These patterns of relationships may, from the perspective of molecular biology, be elements of genetic sequence (such as base pair binding in DNA), molecular processes (such as translation of RNA into amino acid chains), or structural behaviors (such as secondary structure folding in proteins). The material substrate may change (from a cell to a computer database), and the distinction between the wet lab and the dry lab may remain (wet DNA, dry DNA), but what is important for the bioinformatician is how “biological data” is more than just abstraction, signification, or representation. This is because the biological data in computer databases are not merely there for archival purposes, but as data to be worked on, data which, it is hoped, will reveal important patterns that may have something to say about the genetic mechanisms of disease.

     

    While a simulation of DNA transcription and translation may be constructed on a number of software platforms, it is noteworthy that the main tools utilized for bioinformatics begin as database applications (such as Unix-based administration tools). What these particular types of computer technologies provide is not a more perfect representational semblance, but a medium-specific context, in which the “logic” of DNA can be conserved and extended in various experimental conditions. What enables the practices of gene or protein prediction to occur at all is a complex integration of computer and genetic codes as functional codes. From the perspective of bioinformatics, what must be conserved is the pattern of relationships that is identified in wet DNA (even though the materiality of the medium has altered). A bioinformatician performing a multiple sequence alignment on an unknown DNA sample is interacting not just with a computer, but with a “bio-logic” that has been conserved in the transition from the wet lab to the dry lab, from DNA in the cell to DNA in the database.

     

    In this sense, biological data can be described more accurately than as a sign system with material effects. Biological data can be defined as the consistency of a “bio-logic” across material substrates or varying media. This involves the use of computer technologies that conserve the bio-logic of DNA (e.g., base pair complementarity, codon-amino acid relationships, restriction enzyme splice sites) by developing a technical context in which that bio-logic can be recontextualized in novel ways (e.g., gene predictions, homology modeling). Bioinformatics is, in this way, constituted by a challenge, one that is as much technical as it is theoretical: it must manage the difference between genetic and computer codes (and it is this question of the “difference” of bioinformatics that we will return to later).

     

    On a general level, biotech’s regulation of the relationship between genetic codes and computer codes would seem to be mediated by the notion of “information”–a principle that is capable of accommodating differences across media. This “translatability” between media–in our case between genetic codes and computer codes–must then also work against certain transformations that might occur in translation. Thus the condition of translatability (from genetic to computer code) is not only that linkages of equivalency are formed between heterogeneous phenomena, but also that other kinds of (non-numerical, qualitative) relationships are prevented from forming, in the setting-up of conditions whereby a specific kind of translation can take place.14

     

    Thus, for bioinformatics approaches, the technical challenge is to effect a “translation without transformation,” to preserve the integrity of genetic data, irrespective of the media through which that information moves. Such a process is centrally concerned with a denial of the transformative capacities of different media and informational contexts themselves. For bioinformatics, the medium is not the message; rather, the message–a genome, a DNA sample, a gene–exists in a privileged site of mobile abstraction that must be protected from the heterogeneous specificities of different media platforms in order to enable the consistency of a bio-logic.

     

    BLASTing the Body

     

    We can take a closer look at how the bio-logic of bioinformatics operates by considering the use of an online software tool called “BLAST,” and the technique of pairwise sequence alignment referred to earlier. Again, it is important to reiterate the approach being taken here. We want to concentrate on the technical details to the extent that those details reveal assumptions that are extra-technical, which are, at their basis, ontological claims about biological “information.” This will therefore require–in the case of BLAST–a consideration of software design, usability, and application.

     

    BLAST is one of the most commonly used bioinformatics tools. It stands for “Basic Local Alignment Search Tool” and was developed in the 1990s at the National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI).15 BLAST, as its full name indicates, is a set of algorithms for conducting analyses on sequence alignments. The sequences can be nucleotide or amino acid sequences, and the degree of specificity of the search and analysis can be honed by BLAST’s search parameters. The BLAST algorithm takes an input sequence and then compares that sequence to a database of known sequences (for instance, GenBank, EST databases, restriction enzyme databases, protein databases, etc.). Depending on its search parameters, BLAST will then return output data of the most likely matches. A researcher working with an unknown DNA sequence can use BLAST in order to find out if the sequence has already been studied (BLAST includes references to research articles and journals) or, if there is not a perfect match, what “homologs” or close relatives a given sequence might have. Either kind of output will tell a researcher something about the probable biochemical characteristics and even function of the test sequence. In some cases, such searches may lead to the discovery of novel sequences, genes, or gene-protein relationships.

     

    Currently, the NCBI holds a number of different sequence databases, all of which can be accessed using different versions of BLAST.16 When BLAST first appeared, it functioned as a stand-alone Unix-based application. With the introduction of the Web into the scientific research community in the early 1990s, however, BLAST was ported to a Web-ready interface front-end and a database-intensive back-end.17

     

    Figure 4: Sequence search interface for BLAST.

     

    BLAST has become somewhat of a standard in bioinformatics because it generates a large amount of data from a relatively straightforward task. Though sequence alignments can sometimes be computationally intensive, the basic principle is simple: comparison of strings. First, a “search domain” is defined for BLAST, which may be the selection of or within a particular database. This constrains BLAST’s domain of activity, so that it doesn’t waste time searching for matches in irrelevant data sets. Then an input sequence is “threaded” through the search domain. The BLAST algorithm searches for closest matches based on a scoring principle. When the search is complete, the highest scoring hits are kept and ranked. Since the hits are known sequences from the database, all of their relevant characterization data can be easily accessed. Finally, for each hit, the relevant bibliographical data is also retrieved. A closer look at the BLAST algorithm shows how it works with biological data:

     

    Figure 5: The BLAST search algorithm.

     

    In considering the BLAST algorithm, it is important to keep in mind the imperative of “bio-logic” in bioinformatics research. BLAST unites two crucial aspects of bioinformatics: the ability to flexibly archive and store biological data in a computer database, and the development of diversified tools for accessing and interacting with that database (the control and storage principles mentioned earlier). Without a database of biological data–or rather, a database of bio-logics–bioinformatics tools are nothing more than simulation. Conversely, without applications to act on the biological data in the database, the database is nothing more than a static archive. Bioinformatics may be regarded as this ongoing attempt to integrate seamlessly the control and storage principles across media, whether in genetically engineered biomolecules or in online biological databases.

     

    Though databases are not, of course, exclusive to bioinformatics, the BLAST algorithm is tailored to the bio-logic of nucleotide and protein sequence.18 The bio-logic of base pair complementarity among sequential combinations of four nucleotides (A-T; C-G) is but one dimension of the BLAST algorithm. Other, more complex aspects, such as the identification of repeat sequences, promoter and repressor regions, and transcription sites, are also implicated in BLAST’s biological algorithm. What BLAST’s algorithm conserves is this pattern of relationships, this bio-logic which is seen to inhere in both the chromosomes and the database.

     

    BLAST not only translates the biomolecular body by conserving this bio-logic across material substrates; in this move from one medium to another, it also extends the control principle to enable novel formulations of biomolecules not applicable to the former, “wet” medium of the cell’s chromosomes. One way in which BLAST does this is through the technique of the “search query.” The “query” function is perhaps most familiar to the kinds of searches carried out on the Web using one of many “search engines,” each of which employs different algorithms for gathering, selecting, and ordering data from the Web.19 BLAST does not search the Web but rather performs user-specified queries on biological databases, bringing together the control and storage principles of bioinformatics. At the NCBI website, the BLAST interface contains multiple input options (text fields for pasting a sequence or buttons for loading a local sequence file) which make use of special scripts to deliver the input data to the NCBI server, where the query is carried out. These scripts, known as “CGI” or “Common Gateway Interface” scripts, are among the most commonly used scripts on the Web for input data on web pages. CGI scripts run on top of HTML web pages and form a liason for transmitting specific input data between a server computer and a client’s computer.20 A BLAST query will take the input sequence data and send it, along with instructions for the search, to the server. The BLAST module on the NCBI server will then accept the data and run its alignments as specified in the CGI script. When the analysis is finished, the output data is collected, ordered, and formatted (as a plain-text email or as HTML).

     

    BLAST queries involve an incorporation of “raw” biological data that is ported through the medium (in this case, computer network code) so that it can be processed in a medium-specific context in which it “makes sense.” The output is more than mere bits, signs, or letters; the output is a configured bio-logic that is assumed to exist above the domain of specific substance (carbon or silicon). From a philosophical-technical perspective, BLAST is not so much a sequence alignment tool as an exemplary case of the way bioinformatics translates a relationship between discrete entities (DNA, RNA, and synthesis of amino acids in the cell) across material substrates, with an emphasis on the ways in which the control principle may extend the dimensions of the biological data.

     

    Translation without Transformation

     

    In different ways, tools such as BLAST constantly attempt to manage the difference between genetic and computer codes through modes of regulating the contexts in which code conversions across varying media take place.

     

    BLAST also aims for a transparent translation of code across different contexts; such software systems are primarily concerned with providing bio-logical conversions between output data that can be utilized for analysis and further molecular biology research. Presenting an output file that establishes relationships between a DNA sequence, a multiple pairwise alignment, and other related biomolecular information, is a mode of translating between data types by establishing relations between them that are also biological relations (e.g., base pair complementarity, gene expression). The way in which this is done is, of course, via a strictly “non-biological” operation which is the correlation of data as data (as string manipulation, as in pairwise alignments). In order to enable this technical and biological translation, BLAST must operate as a search tool in a highly articulated manner. A “structured query language” in this case means much more than simply looking up a journal author, title of a book, or subject heading. It implies a whole epistemology, from the molecular biological research point of view. What can be known and what kinds of queries can take place are intimately connected with tools such as BLAST. For this reason, such tools are excellent as “gene finders,” but they are poor at searching and analyzing nested, highly-distributed biopathways in a cell. The instability in such processes as cell regulation and metabolism is here stabilized by aligning the functionalities of the materiality of the medium (in this case, computer database query software) with the constrained organization of biological data along two lines: first in a database, and secondly as biological components and processes (DNA, RNA, ESTs, amino acids, etc.).

     

    In the example of BLAST, the interplay of genetic and computer codes is worked upon so that their relationship to each other is transparent. In other words, when looked at as “biomedia”–that is, as the technical recontextualiztion of the biological domain–BLAST reinforces the notion of media as transparent.21 The workings of a BLAST search query disappear into the “back-end,” so that the bio-logic of DNA sequence and structure may be brought forth as genetic data in itself. However, as we’ve seen, this requires a fair amount of work in recontextualizing and reconfiguring the relations between genetic and computer codes; the regulatory practices pertaining to the fluid translation of types of biological data all work toward this end.

     

    The amount of recontextualizing that is required, the amount of technical reconfiguration needed, is therefore proportionately related to the way the bio-logic of DNA sequence and structure is presented. In a BLAST query and analysis, the structure and functionalities of computer technology are incorporated as part of the “ontology” of the software, and the main reason this happens is so that novel types of bio-logic can become increasingly self-apparent: characteristics that are “biological” but that could also never occur in the wet lab (e.g., multiple pairwise alignments, gene prediction, multiple-database queries).

     

    This generates a number of tensions in how the biomolecular body is reconceptualized in bioinformatics. One such tension is in how translation without transformation becomes instrumentalized in bioinformatics practices. On the one hand, a majority of bioinformatics software tools make use of computer and networking technology to extend the practices of the molecular biology lab. In this, the implication is that computer code transparently brings forth the biological body in novel contexts, thereby producing novel means of extracting data from the body. Within this infrastructure is also a statement about the ability of computer technology to bring forth, in ever greater detail, the bio-logic inherent in the genome, just as it is in the biological cell. The code can be changed, and the body remains the same; the same bio-logic of a DNA sequence in a cell in a petri dish is conserved in an online genome database.

     

    On the other hand, there is a great difference in the fact that bioinformatics doesn’t simply reproduce the wet biology lab as a perfect simulation. Techniques such as gene predictions, database comparisons, and multiple sequence analysis generate biomolecular bodies that are specific to the medium of the computer.22 The newfound ability to perform string manipulations, database queries, modeling of data, and to standardize markup languages also means that the question of “what a body can do” is extended in ways specific to the medium.23 When we consider bioinformatics practices that directly relate (back) to the wet lab (e.g., rational drug design, primer design, genetic diagnostics), this instrumentalization of the biomolecular body becomes re-materialized in significant ways. Change the code, and you change the body. A change in the coding of a DNA sequence in an online database can directly affect the synthesis of novel compounds in the lab.

     

    As a way of elaborating on this tension, we can further elaborate the bio-logics of bioinformatics along four main axes.

     

    The first formulation is that of equivalency between genetic and computer codes. As mentioned previously, the basis for this formulation has a history that extends back to the post-war period, in which the discourses of molecular biology and cybernetics intersect, culminating in what Francis Crick termed “the coding problem.” 24 In particular, gene sequencing (such as Celera’s “whole genome shotgun sequencing” technique) offers to us a paradigmatic example of how bioinformatics technically establishes a condition of equivalency between genetic and computer codes.25 If, so the logic goes, there is a “code” inherent in DNA–that is, a pattern of relationships which is more than DNA’s substance–then it follows that that code can be identified, isolated, and converted across different media. While the primary goal of this procedure is to sequence an unknown sample, what genome sequencing must also accomplish is the setting up of the conditions through which an equivalency can be established between the wet, sample DNA, and the re-assembled genome sequence that is output by the computer. That is, before any of the more sophisticated techniques of bioinformatics or genomics or proteomics can be carried out, the principles for the technical equivalency between genetic and computer codes must be articulated.

     

    Building upon this, the second formulation is that of a back-and-forth mobility between genetic and computer codes. That is, once the parameters for an equivalency can be established, the conditions are set for enabling conversions between genetic and computer codes, or for facilitating their transport across different media. Bioinformatics practices, while recognizing the difference between substance and process, also privilege another view of genetic and computer codes, one based on identified patterns of relationships between components–for instance, the bio-logic of DNA’s base pair binding scheme (A-T; C-G), or the identification of certain polypeptide chains with folding behaviors (amino acid chains that make alpha-helical folds). These well-documented characteristics of the biomolecular body become, for bioinformatics, more than some “thing” defined by its substance; they become a certain manner of relating components and processes.

     

    The mobility between genetic and computer codes is more than the mere digitization of the former by the latter. What makes DNA in a plasmid and DNA in a database the “same”? A definition of what constitutes the biological in the term “biological data.” Once the biological domain is approached as this bio-logic, as these identified and selected patterns of relationships, then, from the perspective of bioinformatics–in principle at least–it matters little whether that DNA sample resides in a test tube or a database. Of course, there is a similar equivalency in the living cell itself, since biomolecules such as proteins can be seen as being isomorphic with each other (differing only in their “folds”), just as a given segment of DNA can be seen as being isomorphic in its function within two different biopathways (same gene, different function). Thus the mobility between genetic and computer codes not only means that the “essential data” or patterns can be translated from wet to dry DNA. It also means that bioinformatics practices such as database queries are simultaneously algorithmic and biological.

     

    Beyond these two first formulations are others that develop functionalities based on them. One is a situation in which data accounts for the body. In examples relating to genetic diagnostics, data does not displace or replace the body, but rather forms a kind of index to the informatic muteness of the biological body–DNA chips in medical genetics, disease profiling, pre-implantation screening for IVF, as well as other, non-biological uses, all depend to some extent of bioinformatics techniques and technologies. The examples of DNA chips in medical contexts redefine the ways in which accountability takes place in relation to the physically-present, embodied subject. While its use in medicine is far from being common, genetic testing and the use of DNA chips are, at least in concept integrating themselves into the fabric of medicine, where an overall genetic model of disease is often the dominant approach to a range of genetic-related conditions, from Alzheimer’s to diabetes to forms of cancer.26 However, beneath these issues is another set of questions that pertain to the ways in which a mixture of genetic and computer codes gives testimony to the body, and through its data-output, accounts for the body in medical terms (genetic patterns, identifiable disease genes, “disease predispositions”).27 Again, as with the establishing of an equivalency, and the effecting of a mobility, the complex of genetic and computer codes must always remain biological, even though its very existence is in part materialized through the informatic protocols of computer technology. In a situation where data accounts for the body, we can also say that a complex of genetic and computer codes makes use of the mobility between genetic and computer codes, to form an indexical description of the biological domain, as one might form an index in a database. But, it should be reiterated that this data is not just data, but a conservation of a bio-logic, a pattern of relationships carried over from the patient’s body to the DNA chip to the computer system. It is in this sense that data not only accounts for the body, but that the data (a complex of genetic and computer codes) also identifies itself as biological.

     

    Finally, not only can data account for the body, but the body can be generated through data. We can see this type of formulation occurring in practices that make use of biological data to effect changes in the wet lab, or even in the patient’s body. Here we can cite the field known as “pharmacogenomics,” which involves the use of genomic data to design custom-tailored gene-based and molecular therapies.28 Pharmacogenomics moves beyond the synthesis of drugs in the lab and relies on data from genomics in its design of novel compounds. It is based not on the diagnostic model of traditional pharmaceuticals (ameliorating symptoms), but rather on the model of “preventive medicine” (using predictive methods and genetic testing to prevent disease occurrence or onset). This not only means that pharmacogenomic therapies will be custom-designed to each individual patient’s genome, but also that the therapies will operate for the long-term, and in periods of health as well as of disease.

     

    What this means is that “drugs” are replaced by “therapies,” and the synthetic is replaced by the biological, but a biological that is preventive and not simply curative. The image of the immune system that this evokes is based on more than the correction of “error” in the body. Rather, it is based on the principles of biomolecular and biochemical design, as applied to the optimization of the biomolecular body of the patient. At an even more specific level, what is really being “treated” is not so much the patient but the genome. At the core of pharmacogenomics is the notion that a reprogramming of the “software” of the genome is the best route to preventing the potential onset of disease in the biological body. If the traditional approaches of immunology and the use of vaccines are based on synthesizing compounds to counter certain proteins, the approach of pharmacogenomics is to create a context in which a reprogramming will enable the body biologically to produce the needed antibodies itself, making the “medium” totally transparent. The aim of pharmacogenomics is, in a sense, not to make any drugs at all, but to enable the patient’s own genome to do so.29

     

    Virtual Biology?

     

    To summarize: the equivalency, the back-and-forth mobility, the accountability, and the generativity of code in relation to the body are four ways in which the bio-logic of the biomolecular body is regulated. As we’ve seen, the tensions inherent in this notion of biological information are that sometimes the difference between genetic and computer codes is effaced (enabling code and file conversions), and at other times this difference is referred back to familiar dichotomies (where flesh is enabled by data, biology by technology). We might abbreviate by saying that, in relation to the biomolecular body, bioinformatics aims to realize the possibility of the body as “biomedia.”

     

    The intersection of biotech and infotech goes by many names–bioinformatics, computational biology, virtual biology. This last term is especially noteworthy, for it is indicative of the kinds of philosophical assumptions within bioinformatics that we have been querying. A question, then: is biology “virtual”? Certainly from the perspective of the computer industry, biology is indeed virtual, in the sense of “virtual reality,” a computer-generated space within which the work of biology may be continued, extended, and simulated. Tools such as BLAST, molecular modeling software, and genome sequencing computers are examples of this emerging virtual biology. From this perspective, a great deal of biotech research–most notably the various genome efforts–is thoroughly virtual, meaning that it has become increasingly dependent upon and integrated with computing technologies.

     

    But if we ask the question again, this time from the philosophical standpoint, the question changes. Asking whether or not biology is philosophically virtual entails a consideration of how specific fields such as bioinformatics conceptualize their objects of study in relation to processes of change, difference, and transformation. If, as we’ve suggested, bioinformatics aims for the technical condition (with ontological implications) of “translation without transformation,” then what is meant by “transformation”? As we’ve seen above, transformation is related technically to the procedures of encoding, recoding, and decoding genetic information that constitute a bio-logic. What makes this possible technically is a twofold conceptual articulation: there is something in both genetic and computer codes that enables their equivalency and therefore their back-and-forth mobility (DNA sampling, analysis, databasing). This technical-conceptual articulation further enables the instrumentalization of genetic and computer codes as being mutually accountable (genetic disease predisposition profiling) and potentially generative or productive (genetically based drug design or gene therapies).

     

    Thus, the transformation in this scenario, whose negation forms the measure of success for bioinformatics, is related to a certain notion of change and difference. To use Henri Bergson’s distinction, the prevention of transformation in bioinformatics is the prevention of a difference that is characterized as quantitative (or “numerical”) and extensive (or spatialized).30 What bioinformatics developers want to prevent is any difference (distortion, error, noise) between what is deemed to be information as one moves from an in vitro sample to a computer database to a human clinical trial for a gene-based therapy. This means preserving information as a quantifiable, static unit (DNA, RNA, protein code) across variable media and material substrates.

     

    However, difference in this sense–numerical, extensive difference–is not the only kind of difference. Bergson also points to a difference that is, by contrast, qualitative (“non-numerical”) and intensive (grounded in the transformative dynamics of temporalization, or “duration”). Gilles Deleuze has elaborated Bergson’s distinction by referring to the two differences as external and internal differences, and has emphasized the capacity of the second, qualitative, intensive difference continually to generate difference internally–a difference from itself, through itself.31

     

    How would such an internal–perhaps self-organizing–difference occur? A key concept in understanding the two kinds of differences is the notion of “the virtual,” but taken in its philosophical and not technical sense. For Bergson (and Deleuze), the virtual and actual form one pair, contrasted to the pair of the possible and the real. The virtual/actual is not the converse of the possible/real; they are two different processes by which material-energetic systems are organized. As Deleuze states:

     

    From a certain point of view, in fact, the possible is the opposite of the real, it is opposed to the real; but, in quite a different opposition, the virtual is opposed to the actual. The possible has no reality (although it may have an actuality); conversely, the virtual is not actual, but as such possesses a reality. (Bergsonism 96)

     

    We might add another variant: the possible is negated by the real (what is real is no longer possible because it is real), and the virtual endures in the actual (what is actual is not predetermined in the virtual, but the virtual as a process is immanent to the actual). As Deleuze notes, the possible is that which manages the first type of difference, through resemblance and limitation (out of a certain number of possible situations, one is realized). By contrast, the virtual is itself this second type of difference, operating through divergence and proliferation.

     

    With this in mind, it would appear that bioinformatics–as a technical and conceptual management of the material and informatic orders–prevents one type of difference (as possible transformation) from being realized. This difference is couched in terms derived from information theory and computer science and is thus weighted toward a more quantitative, measurable notion of information (the first type of quantitative, extensive difference). But does bioinformatics–as well as molecular genetics and biology–also prevent the second type of qualitative, intensive, difference? In a sense it does not, because any analysis of qualitative changes in biological information must always be preceded in bioinformatics by an analysis of quantitative changes, just as genotype may be taken as causally prior to phenotype in molecular genetics. But in another sense the question cannot be asked, for before we inquire into whether or not bioinformatics includes this second type of difference in its aims (of translation without transformation), we must ask whether or not such a notion of qualitative, intensive difference exists in bioinformatics to begin with.

     

    This is why we might question again the notion of a “virtual biology.” For, though bioinformatics has been developing at a rapid rate in the past five to ten years (in part bolstered by advances in computer technology), there are still a number of extremely difficult challenges in biotech research which bioinformatics faces. Many of these challenges have to do with biological regulation: cell metabolism, gene expression, and intra- and inter-cellular signaling.32 Such areas of research require more than discrete databases of sequence data, they require thinking in terms of distributed networks of processes which, in many cases, may change over time (gene expression, cell signaling, and point mutations are examples).

     

    In its current state, bioinformatics is predominantly geared toward the study of discrete, quantifiable systems that enable the identification of something called genetic information (via the four-fold process of bio-logic). In this sense bioinformatics works against the intervention of one type of difference, a notion of difference that is closely aligned to the traditions of information theory and cybernetics. But, as Bergson reminds us, there is also a second type of difference which, while being amenable to quantitative analysis, is equally qualitative (its changes are not of degree, but of kind) and intensive (in time, as opposed to the extensive in space). It would be difficult to find this second kind of difference within bioinformatics as it currently stands. However, many of the challenges facing bioinformatics–and biotech generally–imply the kinds of transformations and dynamics embodied in this Bergsonian-Deleuzian notion of difference-as-virtual.

     

    It is in this sense that a “virtual biology” is not a conceptual impossibility, given certain contingencies. If bioinformatics is to accommodate the challenges put to it by the biological processes of regulation (metabolism, gene expression, signaling), then it will have to consider a significant re-working of what counts as “biological information.” As we’ve pointed out, this reconsideration of information will have to take place on at least two fronts: that of the assumptions concerning the division between the material and informatic orders (genetic and computer codes, biology and technology, etc.), and that of the assumptions concerning material-informatic orders as having prior existence in space, and secondary existence in duration (molecules first, then interactions; objects first, then relations; matter first, then force).33 The biophilosophy of Bergson (and of Deleuze’s reading of Bergson) serves as a reminder that, although contemporary biology and biotech are incorporating advanced computing technologies as part of their research, this does not necessarily mean that the informatic is “virtual.”

    Notes

     

    1. For non-technical summaries of bioinformatics see the articles by Howard, Goodman, Palsson, and Emmett. As one researcher states, bioinformatics is specifically “the mathematical, statistical and computing methods that aim to solve biological problems using DNA and amino acid sequences and related information” (from bioinformatics.org).

     

    2.The use of computers in biology and life science research is certainly nothing new, and, indeed, an informatic approach to studying biological life may be seen to extend back to the development of statistics, demographics, and the systematization of health records during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This proto-informatic approach to the biological/medical body can be seen in Foucault’s work, as well as in medical-sociological analyses inspired by him. Foucault’s analysis of the medical “gaze” and nosology’s use of elaborate taxonomic and tabulating systems are seen to emerge alongside the modern clinic’s management and conceptualization of public health. Such technologies are, in the later Foucault, constitutive of the biopolitical view, in which power no longer rules over death, but rather impels life, through the institutional practices of the hospital, health insurances, demographics, and medical practice generally. For more see Foucault’s The Birth of the Clinic, as well as “The Birth of Biopolitics.”

     

    3. Molecular biochemist Fred Sanger published a report on the protein sequence for bovine insulin, the first publication of sequencing research of this kind. This was accompanied a decade later by the first published paper on a nucleotide sequence, a type of RNA from yeast. See Sanger, “The Structure of Insulin,” and Holley, et al., “The Base Sequence of Yeast Alanine Transfer RNA.” A number of researchers also began to study the genes and proteins of model organisms (often bacteria, roundworms, or the Drosophila fruit fly) not so much from the perspective of biochemical action, but from the point of view of information storage. For an important example of an early database-approach, see Dayhoff et al., “A Model for Evolutionary Change in Proteins.”

     

    4.This, of course, was made possible by the corresponding advancements in computer technology, most notably in the PC market. See Abola, et al., “Protein Data Bank,” and Bairoch, et al. “The SWISS-PROT Protein Sequence Data Bank.”

     

    5. Initially the HGP was funded by the U.S. Department of Energy and National Institute of Health, and had already begun forming alliances with European research institutes in the late 1980s (which would result in HUGO, or the Human Genome Organization). As sequencing endeavors began to become increasingly distributed to selected research centers and/or universities in the U.S. and Europe, the DoE’s involvement lessened, and the NIH formed a broader alliance, the International Human Genome Sequencing Effort, with the main players being MIT’s Whitehead Institute, the Welcome Trust (UK), Stanford Human Genome Center, and the Joint Genome Institute, among many others. This broad alliance was challenged when the biotech company Celera (then The Institute for Genome Research) proposed its own genome project funded by the corporate sector. For a classic anthology on the genome project, see the anthology The Code of Codes, edited by Kevles and Hood. For a popular account see Matt Ridley’s Genome.

     

    6. In this context it should also be stated that bioinformatics is also a business, with a software sector that alone has been estimated to be worth $60 million, and many pharmaceutical companies outsourcing more than a quarter of their R&D to bioinformatics start-ups. See the Silico Research Limited report “Bioinformatics Platforms,” at: <http://www.silico-research.com>.

     

    7. See Kay’s book Who Wrote the Book of Life? A History of the Genetic Code, as well as her essay “Cybernetics, Information, Life: The Emergence of Scriptural Representations of Heredity.”

     

    8. Kay provides roughly three discontinuous, overlapping periods in the history of the genetic code–a first phase marked by the trope of “specificity” during the early part of the twentieth century (where proteins were thought to contain the genetic material), a second “formalistic” phase marked by the appropriation of “information” and “code” from other fields (especially Francis Crick’s formulation of “the coding problem”), and a third, “biochemical” phase during the 1950s and 60s, in which the informatic trope is extended, such that DNA is not only a code but a fully-fledged “language” (genetics becomes cryptography, as in Marshall Nirenberg and Heinrich Matthai’s work on “cracking the code” of life).

     

    9. Herbert Boyer and Stanley Cohen’s recombinant DNA research had demonstrated that DNA could not only be studied, but be rendered as a technology. The synthesis of insulin–and the patenting of its techniques–provides an important proof-of-concept for biotechnology’s control principle in this period. For an historical overview of the science and politics of recombinant DNA, see Aldridge, The Thread of Life. For a popular critical assessment, see Ho, Genetic Engineering. On recombinant DNA, see the research articles by Cohen, et al. and Chang, et al. The work of Cohen and Boyer’s teams resulted in a U.S. patent, “Process For Producing Biologically Functional Molecular Chimeras” (#4237224), as well as the launching of one of the first biotech start-ups, Genentech, in 1980. By comparison, the key players in the race to map the human genome were not scientists, but supercomputers, databases, and software. During its inception in the late 1980s, the DoE’s Human Genome Project signaled a shift from a control principle to a “storage principle.” This bioinformatic phase is increasingly suggesting that biotech and genetics research is non-existent without some level of data storage technology. Documents on the history and development of the U.S. Human Genome Project can be accessed through its website, at <http://www.ornl.gov/hgmis>.

     

    10. At the time of this writing, molecular biologists can perform five basic types of research using bioinformatics tools: digitization (encoding biological samples), identification (of an unknown sample), analysis (generating data on a sample), prediction (using data to discover novel molecules), and visualization (modeling and graphical display of data).

     

    11. Bioinformatics tools can be as specific or as general as a development team wishes. Techniques include sequence assembly (matching fragments of sequence), sequence annotation (notes on what the sequence means), data storage (in dynamically updated databases), sequence and structure prediction (using data on identified molecules), microarray analysis (using biochips to analyze test samples), and whole genome sequencing (such as those on the human genome). For more on the technique of pairwise sequence alignment see Gibas and Gambeck’s technical manual, Developing Bioinformatics Computers Skills, and Baxevanis, et al., eds., Bioinformatics: A Practical Guide to the Analysis of Genes and Proteins. For a hacker-hero’s narrative, see Lincoln Stein’s paper “How PERL Saved the Human Genome Project.”

     

    12. See MacKenzie, Coded Character Sets.

     

    13. At <http://www.bioinformatics.org>.

     

    14. “Translation” is used here in several senses. First, in a molecular biological sense, found in any biology textbook, in which DNA “transcribes” RNA, and RNA “translates” a protein. Secondly, in a linguistic sense, in which some content is presumably conserved in the translation from one language to another (a process which is partially automated in online translation tools). Third, in a computer science sense, in which translation is akin to “portability,” or the ability for a software application to operate across different platforms (Mac, PC, Unix, SGI). This last meaning has been elaborated upon by media theorists such as Friedrich Kittler, in his notion of “totally connected media systems.” In this essay it is the correlation of the first (genetic) and third (computational) meanings which are of the most interest.

     

    15. See Altschul, et al., “Basic Local Alignment Search Tool.”

     

    16. For instance, “blastn” is the default version, searching only the nucleotide database of GenBank. Other versions perform the same basic alignment functions, but with different relationships between the data: “blastp” is used for amino acid and protein searches, “blastx” will first translate the nucleotide sequence into amino acid sequence, and then search blastp, “tblastn” will compare a protein sequence against a nucleotide database after translating the nucleotides into amino acids, and “tblastx” will compare a nucleotide sequence to a nucleotide database after translating both into amino acid code.

     

    17. Other bioinformatics tools websites, such as University of California San Diego’s Biology Workbench, will also offer portals to BLAST searches, oftentimes with their own front-end. To access the Web-version of BLAST, go to <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov:80/BLAST>. To access the UCSD Biology Workbench, go to <http://workbench.sdsc.edu>.

     

    18. A key differentiation in bioinformatics as a field is between research on “sequence” and research on “structure.” The former focuses on relationships between linear code, whether nucleic acids/DNA or amino acids/proteins. The latter focuses on relationships between sequence and their molecular-physical organization. If a researcher wants to simply identify a test sample of DNA, the sequence approach may be used; if a researcher wants to know how a particular amino acid sequence folds into a three-dimensional protein, the structure approach will be used.

     

    19. A query is a request for information sent to a database. Generally queries are of three kinds: parameter-based (fill-in-the-blank type searches), query-by-example (user-defined fields and values), and query languages (queries in a specific query language). A common query language used on the Internet is SQL, or structured query language, which makes use of “tables” and “select” statements to retrieve data from a database.

     

    20. CGI stands for Common Gateway Interface, and it is often used as part of websites to facilitate the dynamic communication between a user’s computer (“client”) and the computer on which the website resides (“server”). Websites which have forms and menus for user input (e.g., email address, name, platform) utilize CGI programs to process the data so that the server can act on it, either returning data based on the input (such as an updated, refreshed splash page), or further processing the input data (such as adding an email address to a mailing list).

     

    21. For more on the concept of “biomedia” see my “Data Made Flesh: Biotechnology and the Discourse of the Posthuman.”

     

    22. Though wet biological components such as the genome can be looked at metaphorically as “programs,” the difference here is that in bioinformatics the genome is actually implemented as a database, and hence the intermingling of genetic and computer codes mentioned above.

     

    23. The phrase “what a body can do” refers to Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza’s theory of affects in the Ethics. Deleuze shows how Spinoza’s ethics focuses on bodies not as discrete, static anatomies or Cartesian extensions in space, but as differences of speed/slowness and as the capacity to affect and to be affected. For Deleuze, Spinoza, more than any other Continental philosopher, does not ask the metaphysical question (“what is a body?”) but rather an ethical one (“what can a body do?”). This forms the basis for considering ethics in Spinoza as an “ethology.” See Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 122-30.

     

    25. Crick’s coding problem had to do with how DNA, the extremely constrained and finite genetic “code,” produced a wide array of proteins. Among Crick’s numerous essays on the genetic “code,” see “The Recent Excitement in the Coding Problem.” Also see Kay, Who Wrote the Book of Life?, 128-63.

     

    25. For an example of this technique in action, see Celera’s human genome report, Venter, et al., “The Sequence of the Human Genome.”

     

    26. For a broad account of the promises of molecular medicine, see Clark, The New Healers.

     

    27. While genetic testing and the use of DNA chips are highly probabilistic and not deterministic, the way they configure the relationship between genetic and computer codes is likely to have a significant impact in medicine. Genetic testing can, in the best cases, tell patients their general likelihood for potentially developing conditions in which a particular disease may or may not manifest itself, given the variable influences of environment and patient health and lifestyle. In a significant number of cases this amounts to “leaving things to chance,” and one of the biggest issues with genetic testing is the decision about the “right to know.”

     

    28. See Evans, et al., “Pharmacogenomics: Translating Functional Genomics into Rational Therapeutics.” For a perspective from the U.S. government-funded genome project, see Collins, “Implications of the Human Genome Project for Medical Science.”

     

    29. This is, broadly speaking, the approach of “regenerative medicine.” See Petit-Zeman, “Regenerative Medicine.” Pharmacogenomics relies on bioinformatics to query, analyze, and run comparisons against genome and proteome databases. The data gathered from this work are what sets the parameters of the context in which the patient genome may undergo gene-based or cell therapies. The procedure may be as concise as prior gene therapy human clinical trials–the insertion of a needed gene into a bacterial plasmid, which is then injected into the patient. Or, the procedure may be as complex as the introduction of a number of inhibitors that will collectively act at different locations along a chromosome, working to effectuate a desired pattern of gene expression to promote or inhibit the synthesis of certain proteins. In either instance, the dry data of the genome database extend outward and directly rub up against the wet data of the patient’s cells, molecules, and genome. In this sense data generate the body, or, the complex of genetic and computer codes establishes a context for recoding the biological domain.

     

    30. Bergson discusses the concepts of the virtual and the possible in several places, most notably in Time and Free Will, where he advances an early formulation of “duration,” and in The Creative Mind, where he questions the priority of the possible over the real. Though Bergson does not theorize difference in its post-structuralist vein, Deleuze’s reading of Bergson teases out the distinctions Bergson makes between the qualitative and quantitative in duration as laying the groundwork for a non-negative (which for Deleuze means non-Hegelian) notion of difference as generative, positive, proliferative. See Deleuze’s book Bergsonism, 91-103.

     

    31. Deleuze’s theory of difference owes much to Bergson’s thoughts on duration, multiplicity, and the virtual. In Bergsonism, Deleuze essentially re-casts Bergson’s major concepts (duration, memory, the “élan vital”) along the lines of difference as positive, qualitative, intensive, and internally-enabled.

     

    32. There are a number of efforts underway to assemble bioinformatics databases centered on these processes of regulation. BIND (Biomolecular Interaction Network Database) and ACS (Association for Cellular Signaling) are two recent examples. However, these databases must convert what are essentially time-based processes into discrete image or diagram files connected by hyperlinks, and, because the feasibility of dynamic databases is not an option for such endeavors, the results end up being similar to sequence databases.

     

    33. As Susan Oyama has noted, more often than not, genetic codes are assumed to remain relatively static, while the environment is seen to be constantly changing. As Oyama states, “if information . . . is developmentally contingent in ways that are orderly but not preordained, and if its meaning is dependent on its actual functioning, then many of our ways of thinking about the phenomena of life must be altered” (Oyama 3).

    Works Cited

     

    • Abola, E.E., et al. “Protein Data Bank.” Crystallographic Databases. Ed. F.H. Allen, G. Bergerhoff, and R. Sievers. Cambridge: Data Commission of the International Union of Crystallography, 1987. 107-32.
    • Aldridge, Susan. The Thread of Life: The Story of Genes and Genetic Engineering. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998.
    • Altschul, S.F., et al. “Basic Local Alignment Search Tool.” Journal of Molecular Biology 215 (1990): 403-410.
    • Bairoch, A., et al. “The SWISS-PROT Protein Sequence Data Bank.” Nucleic Acids Research 19 (1991): 2247-2249.
    • Baxevanis, Andreas, et.al., eds. Bioinformatics: A Practical Guide to the Analysis of Genes and Proteins. New York: Wiley-Liss, 2001.
    • Bergson, Henri. Time and Free Will. New York: Harper and Row, 1960.
    • —. The Creative Mind. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1941.
    • Chang, A.C.Y., et al. “Genome Construction Between Bacterial Species in vitro: Replication and Expression of Staphylococcus Plasmid Genes in Escherichia coli.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 71 (1974): 1030-34.
    • Clark, William. The New Healers: The Promise and Problems of Molecular Medicine in the Twenty-First Century. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999.
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    • Collins, Francis. “Implications of the Human Genome Project for Medical Science.” JAMA online 285.5 (7 February 2001): <http://jama.ama-assn.org>.
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  • Notices

     

     

     

    Volume 13, Number 3
    May, 2003
    Every issue of Postmodern Culturecarries notices of events, calls for papers, and other announcements, free of charge. Advertisements will also be published on an exchange basis. If you respond to one of the ads or announcements below, please mention that you saw the notice in PMC.

     


    Conferences, Calls for Papers, Submissions

    • 16th Joint Annual Conference of ALLC and ACH
    • Special Issue: Technology and Historiography
    • EnterText 4.1: Animation
    • Transit of Venus: An International Pynchon Conference

    Publication Announcements

    • Culture Machine 5: The E-issue
    • Game Studies
    • Rhizomes
    • Variant

     

  • Virtually Transparent Structures

    Mimi Yiu

    English Department
    Cornell University
    msy4@cornell.edu

     

    Review of: Jean Baudrillard and Jean Nouvel. The Singular Objects of Architecture. Trans. Robert Bononno. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2002.

     

    Structured as two free-ranging dialogues, The Singular Objects of Architecture brings into conversation two of the most thought-provoking cultural innovators of our time: Jean Baudrillard and Jean Nouvel. It is perhaps ironic that Baudrillard, the poststructuralist French theorist best known for such works as Simulacra and Simulation and The Vital Illusion, ponders the very material discipline of architecture, and with a practicing architect to boot. Of course, Baudrillard finds in Nouvel a kindred spirit fascinated by the conceptual intersections of transparency, illusion, and ideology. The creator of such landmark buildings as the Arab World Institute and the Cartier Foundation in Paris, not to mention the Hotel Broadway in New York, Nouvel has received the Grand Prix d’Architecture, among numerous international honors, and was the subject of an acclaimed exhibition at the Centre Pompidou last year. His works are marked by a preoccupation with surfaces, textures, falls of light, and the visual framing of spaces. Both Baudrillard and Nouvel are very much concerned with the status of cultural artifacts as products of contemporary state power and, especially in these dialogues, with the notion of singularity in objects.

     

    The extended discussions found in this book are the result of a series of dialogues between architects and philosophers held at a multi-segment conference entitled “Urban Passages,” which took place in Paris throughout 1997 and 1998. The Singular Objects of Architecture was first published in France in 2000; the present volume, a translation by Robert Bononno, includes a thoughtful introduction by K. Michael Hays, the Eliot Noyes Professor of Architecture at Harvard and editor of Architecture Theory Since 1968. The format that Baudrillard and Nouvel have chosen for their collaboration seems intellectually productive and felicitous, especially considering the fate of a similar joint venture undertaken by Jacques Derrida and Peter Eisenman just a few years ago. Invited by architect Bernard Tschumi to contribute one allotted section to the Parc Villette project in Paris, Derrida and Eisenman met, corresponded, and participated in forums over several years, but never actually contributed anything tangible–architecturally speaking–to the Parisian site. Not surprisingly, considering the theoretical nature of both men’s work, the only result of their collaboration is a book entitled Chora L Works, which documents their futile endeavors at planning a built space that would express their mutual commitment to conceptual experimentation. Eventually, as letters published within the book attest, the whole project self-destructed as personality conflicts arose and their partnership broke up. Baudrillard and Nouvel, wisely, do not even attempt to engage the technical and material side of architecture, opting rather to remain in the purely discursive realm amenable to both thinkers and their disciplines.

     

    Ever the provocateur, Baudrillard claims right off the bat that he has “never been interested in architecture” (4); instead, he cites a fascination with the singularity of built objects and the world they translate as his primary point of entry into architecture. It seems curiously appropriate, then, that Baudrillard cites here the World Trade Center as a question mark in interpretation. Does architecture merely translate its contemporary societal context, or does architecture constitute an anticipatory illusion, a sort of self-fulfilling cultural myth? It is telling that, for Baudrillard, the pre-9/11 towers evoke “two perforated bands” whose architectural truth lies in its context of a “society already experiencing hyperrealism” (4). Of course, this prescient apprehension of the twin towers cannot help but resonate with those of us who first and foremost associate the buildings with those hypperreal television and Internet images of planes puncturing the structures, images that have indelibly inscribed themselves upon the national consciousness. Nouvel’s response–that architecture can unexpectedly convey “things we cannot control, things that are fatal” (6)–seems to echo his interlocutor’s concern with the signifying capabilities of built space and the sense that architecture remains a communal enterprise, reaching far beyond the designs of a single mastermind.

     

    Indeed, what the World Trade Center tragedy reminds us, inevitably, is that buildings have ideological weight, that buildings can be singular and yet doubled, that architecture cannot be divorced from the world of images. Our relationship with architecture, as Nouvel points out, is strongly correlated with our visual impressions and memories of places, which in turn lead to a narrativizing of spatial dimensions. Drawing an analogy between an architect and a film director, Nouvel stresses how the built environment relies heavily upon sequence, narrative, and memory; a peer of Paul Virilio’s from the 1960s, Nouvel is likewise very much interested in the temporal and visual restructuring that has occurred with the rise of postmodernism. In his own work, Nouvel pursues what he calls a “critical architecture” that deflects the hegemonic, panoptic gaze and radically destabilizes space. By playing with the conventions of sightlines and visibility, these subversive structures attempt to erase themselves from the legibility and surveillance of dominant cultural forces. Often, Nouvel’s buildings suspend the viewer between multiple modes of visuality, forming nodes of instability within a given urban system.

     

    Indeed, Nouvel’s architectural philosophy shares two key terms with Baudrillard’s cultural theory lexicon: transparency and illusion. Opposed to the transparency demanded by a hegemonic regime, Nouvel attempts to construct “a space that works as the mental extension of sight,” performing a type of vanishing act that leaves the viewer wondering where the object went (6). Similarly, Baudrillard’s theorizing in such works as The Transparency of Evil ponders ways to subvert the perfect transparency of both individual and system, an ideal that he considers complicit with the powers-that-be in rendering every object legible and classifiable. Reworking Virilio’s notion of the aesthetic of disappearance, in which real objects are gradually replaced by virtual counterparts and individuals evanesce into the network, Baudrillard proposes a type of disappearance that is more a metamorphosis, a “chain of interlinked forms . . . where everything implies its own disappearance” (29). This theoretical notion can be carried out in the practice of architecture, Nouvel implies, through a play of visual accessibility that foregrounds for the viewer the problematics of transparency. In essence, the buildings’ selective opacity and surprising views constitute a refusal to yield to the ideal standard of universal legibility and coherence.

     

    Nouvel’s own architecture is greatly concerned with what he terms “dematerialization”–a reconfiguration of material substance so as to confound traditional notions of the object and its mapping in Cartesian space. Defying the monumental impulse even in his large-scale projects, Nouvel aspires to the legerdemain of making the building vanish, or at least making the vanishing point of linear perspective vanish. As Nouvel explains it, the goal is to render ambiguous the boundary between materiality and non-materiality, between image and reality (62). That is, spaces no longer try to make themselves accessible and thus knowable to the controlling eye, but rather fragment into local sites and illusory dimensions, conflating real and virtual in unanticipated ways. Indeed, dematerialization in this sense often implies a type of demobilization that breaks up regimented formations, both physical and mental. At the same time, however, both he and Baudrillard agree that complicity with the dominant regime is unavoidable, and even essential. After all, an architect must work in tandem with the client, the end-user, and the already-existing social and geographical spaces. Deconstructing the opposition between transparency and a hidden complicity, Nouvel observes that complicity is “the only guarantee that we’ll be able to push the boundaries” (77).

     

    Probing the limits of architecture, Nouvel and Baudrillard discuss such landmark buildings as the Beaubourg in Paris and the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao. For Baudrillard, Frank Gehry’s curvaceously deconstructed Bilbao museum exemplifies the disappearing chain mentioned earlier, where one object merges and transforms into another. Indeed, architectural elements are juxtaposed, recombined, and reinvented in novel ways, so that the finished product transcends the sum of its parts. For Baudrillard, such seemingly serendipitous permutations, which have their beginning in computer manipulations of graphic ideas, constitute the ultimate expression of readymade architecture. As Nouvel adds, the computer revolution allows architects to open “a direct passage from desire to the built reality” (49). Whether these technological shortcuts to creative and indeed psychic fulfillment are seen as positive or negative developments remains unclear from Nouvel and Baudrillard’s dialogues. At times, Baudrillard seems to exult in the proliferating potentialities made possible by virtuality and decentered, destabilized spaces; at other times, we see evidence of the nostalgia that crops up again and again in his other writings on the age of simulacra, as he laments the advent of cloned structures that lack “quality or a sense of nobility” (50). Nouvel, on the other hand, embraces a more practical approach to the technological innovations that have changed the practice of architecture and, indeed, repositioned the architect’s role within the design process. As the architect of a museum space–the Cartier Foundation in Paris–whose glass walls problematize if not downright prohibit the installation of art, Nouvel can never be accused of succumbing to bland corporate utilitarianism, but he definitely comes across here as the more down-to-earth of the two speakers. Although Nouvel is deeply invested in the philosophical implications of dematerialization and the disappearance of the modern object, he nevertheless shows a workmanlike sensibility for what can be built and never strays too far in his thinking from the realm of functional architecture. For Baudrillard, however, architecture remains primarily a vehicle for talking about spatial politics and the postmodern dissolution of stable, material objects. Like a counterweight, then, Nouvel’s responsibility towards the pragmatics of the architecture profession checks Baudrillard’s more effusive and hyperbolic theoretical pronouncements, creating a balanced textual architectonic that is both dynamic and productive.

     

    What is sometimes frustrating for the reader of The Singular Objects of Architecture, however, is the choppy editing of these extended conversations. Although section headings indicate the general gist of the discussion at any given moment, the two speakers occasionally seem to refer to ideas or points raised in dialogue that has not been transcribed and published. These gaps could be considered a postmodern deconstruction of the text, a performative gesture towards the indecipherability and rupture of any speech act, a reminder of the ephemerality of enunciation and the impossibility of total transcription. It is on these grounds that Derrida and Eisenman’s Chora L Works sets out to confound readers’ expectations playfully, by breaking down the structure of the book itself: sections refuse to follow in set order, the table of contents lies buried in the middle of the text, and holes are punched through the entire book so as to obscure or render forever missing specific words. By thus putting into praxis the theory of chora as spatial absence elaborated in the book’s essays, these disjunctures in the material text serve to bind form and content even closer, indeed making the book into an architectural artifact that substitutes for the unrealized Parisian project. Yet in Baudrillard and Nouvel’s work, the textual non-sequiturs seem like just so much sloppy proofreading, especially since the section headings and straightforward layout clearly valorize cohesion and accessibility. Although, in the acknowledgments, the authors claim to have reworked the original dialogues towards a resolution that is also a “radical and necessary incompletion” (xv), the desultory feel of the book appears to have less to do with theoretical provocation and more to do with infelicitous editing decisions. At times, I kept flipping back in the book to see whether some prior referent could be found, but to no avail: while an oppressive drive towards transparency ought not to be the goal, these small slippages in the chain of reasoning are nonetheless puzzling, forcing the reader to a painful awareness of being on the outside. The book is only 80 pages in length, leaving ample space for publishing the dialogues in full or having the authors write more extensive elaborations on a few topics. As it is, the inconsistencies in the text create a sense of unexplained selectivity and complicity–in the negative sense–on the authors’ part.

     

    Despite these occasional overtones of collusion, there are enough moments of genuine collaboration to make the book a joyful and worthwhile read. Baudrillard and Nouvel are complementary thinkers who push each other to new considerations of ideas that both have elaborated in their respective fields. Indeed, although I would gladly dispense with section headings in exchange for the messiness of actual unedited dialogue, these headers do make apparent recurring themes in the two interviews. While the brevity of the sections, which run from one to two pages on average, disallows in-depth meditation on any particular subject, there are flashes of brilliance that gather in momentum as Baudrillard and Nouvel revisit, albeit always from a slightly different angle, concepts of transparency, virtuality, radicality, and, above all, singularity. Paradoxically, singularity in this conversation diverges into a multiplicity of views on the same object, an uncanny thread that keeps emerging persistently in different guises. In the acknowledgments, the two authors explain that the dialogues have been edited to focus on the notion of singularity. Long an important idea in Baudrillard’s other writings, singularity here is applied to buildings that, like the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao, appear almost to float in a vacuum, isolating themselves from the surrounding architectural matrix. Indeed, singular buildings are a challenge to their environment and prevalent ways of thinking; they anticipate future developments rather than merely translate current needs and desires.

     

    By blocking the transparent ideal prescribed by the prevailing cultural regime, these buildings question the norms that force architecture to assimilate and facilitate. Thus disappearing into illegibility even as they frame the buildings around them, singular buildings test the limits of what architecture can signify within its sociocultural context. As Michael Hays puts it in the book’s foreword, the singular object is a “way of access . . . opening onto the determining conditions of its cultural surround” (xii). Because singular buildings both stand out and efface themselves, they slip into the singular vanishing point of the extant ideological and spatial grid, denying perspective its hegemonic power over the interpellated viewer. Thus suspending the order imposed upon the mental and geographical topography, singular structures force us to pose the difficult questions of “what if,” “what now,” and “what next.” Indeed, as Nouvel perceptively points out: “Architecture is always a response to a question that wasn’t asked” (79).

    Work Cited

     

    • Kipnis, Jeffrey, and Thomas Leeser. Chora L Works: Jacques Derrida and Peter Eisenman. New York: Monacelli, 1997.

     

  • A Disconcerting Brevity: Pierre Bourdieu’s Masculine Domination

    Martin Wallace

    English Department
    University of Manitoba
    kaplanrose@hotmail.com

     

    Review of: Pierre Bourdieu, Masculine Domination. Trans. Richard Nice. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2001.

     

    Pierre Bourdieu’s Masculine Domination is the English translation of La Domination Masculine (1998), which was developed from an article of the same name published in 1990 in Actes de la Recherché en Sciences Sociales. It articulates Bourdieu’s theories of gender construction and his analysis of the pervasive and insidious power of masculine domination, which is, in “the way it is imposed and suffered . . . the prime example of this paradoxical submission” through which “the most intolerable conditions of existence can so often be perceived as acceptable and even natural” (1). This domination is effected, subtly, through a form of what Bourdieu calls “symbolic violence, a gentle violence, imperceptible and invisible even to its victims, exerted for the most part through the purely symbolic channels of communication and cognition (more precisely, misrecognition), recognition, or even feeling” (1-2). Despite Bourdieu’s reference to “gentle violence,” symbolic violence is the most powerful weapon in masculine domination’s arsenal, since, despite its virtual invisibility, it creates the conditions of possibility for other, more immediate and explicit forms of violence, whether economic or physical.

     

    At one hundred and thirty-three pages (including notes and index), Masculine Domination is one of Bourdieu’s shortest books. This, moreover, is not the only way in which Masculine Domination is atypical. In books such as Distinction, Bourdieu has shown his ability to examine social structures minutely by producing and interpreting huge blocks of data. At its best, Bourdieu’s work is a potent mix of scientific analysis and literary interpretation, with each of these methods allowing him to reach those places where the other will not take him. A further strength has been his willingness to analyze every available position in the huge “fields” that he examines. In contrast, the sole “data” that informs Masculine Domination comes from anthropological information about the Kabyle society (a Mediterranean ethnic group) that Bourdieu gathered in the 1960s and a reading of Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse. By comparison with the thoroughness of his earlier work, Masculine Domination seems a brisk treatment of a subject that does not have Bourdieu’s full attention.

     

    Bourdieu justifies choosing the “particular case” of Kabylia by pointing out that “the cultural tradition that has been maintained there constitutes a paradigmatic realization of the Mediterranean tradition,” and, further, that “the whole European cultural domain undeniably shares in that tradition,” a contention for which he offers as proof only “a comparison of the rituals observed in Kabylia with those collected by Arnold Van Gennep in early twentieth-century France” (6). Bourdieu uses this tenuous series of connections to establish Kabyle society as a source of examples of masculine domination that he refers to throughout the book. In using Kabyle society in this way, Bourdieu allows a confusion to develop between evidence and illustration. Furthermore, as Terry Lovell (one of Bourdieu’s most frequent and incisive critics) points out, “it is not always possible to know when [Bourdieu] is restricting his observations to the particular case of Kabyle society, when he is extending them to encompass the whole Mediterranean culture of honour/shame, including that of the modern period, and when he is offering universal generalizations” (20). It is therefore difficult to summarize Bourdieu’s analysis of Kabyle society, since he does not proceed in any systematic way. In fact, there are only a dozen or so specific references to Kabyle society throughout the book, many of which are very brief, as when Bourdieu simply states, without mentioning specific details, that it represents “the canonical form” of the masculine/feminine oppositions to which he wants to point (56). At other times, Bourdieu will describe a particular aspect of Kabyle society, only to leave it impatiently in an apparent extrapolation of his conclusions to universal circumstances. Asserting that “it is not exaggerated to compare masculinity to a nobility,” Bourdieu notes

     

    the double standard, with which the Kabyles are very familiar, applied in the evaluation of male and female activities. Not only can a man not stoop without degrading himself to certain tasks that are socially defined as inferior (not least because it is unthinkable that a man should perform them), but the same task may be noble and difficult, when performed by men, or insignificant and imperceptible, easy and futile when performed by women. (60)

     

     

    Bourdieu then points to “the difference between the chef and the cook, [and] the couturier and the seamstress” (60) that operates in our own society, apparently unconcerned that he has made no more than a vague reference to the specific tasks that are designated as male and female in Kabyle society.

     

    Bourdieu can link such apparently disparate objects of analysis as Kabyle society and Virginia Woolf’s To The Lighthouse because he treats them in essentially the same way–as texts that he may pull down from the bookshelf when he wants to make a point and then quickly put back. His analysis of To the Lighthouse focuses mainly on Woolf’s portrayal of Mr. Ramsay, the patriarch of the Ramsay family, who is “a man whose words are verdicts” (70). Despite the masculine power that this would seem to suggest, Bourdieu sees Mr. Ramsay as “a pitiful being who is himself a victim of the inexorable verdicts of the real and himself needs pity” (77). For Bourdieu, Mr. Ramsay is an example of the way in which symbolic violence redounds on those who initially benefit from it, those who are “in Marx’s phrase, ‘dominated by their domination’” (69), who are granted “the double-edged privilege of indulging in the games of domination” (75). While men may enjoy the power that masculine domination permits them, they can wield this power only through a continual self-regulation, “the effort that every man has to make to rise to his own childhood conception of manhood,” in which his own weaknesses are carefully hidden from others. Sympathy for Mr. Ramsay, however, is available from Mrs. Ramsay, who “continuously humours her husband” in a “kind of condescending pity for the male illusio” (77). In Bourdieu’s reading, Mr. Ramsay exemplifies the way in which men are permitted to play games that, while they may grant tremendous power, also carry enormous risks; in contrast, Mrs. Ramsay exemplifies the way in which women are freed from these risks, but only so that they are rendered mere spectators who are “seen as frivolous and incapable of taking an interest in serious things, such as politics” (75).

     

    Since its original appearance in article form in 1990, Masculine Domination has been heavily criticized by feminists (a fact that seems to have motivated the new “Preface to the English Edition”). While many of its flaws are immediately apparent, it wasn’t until my final draft of this review that I finally put my finger on what is often so objectionable about Bourdieu’s work here. Bourdieu’s complicated, yet oddly seductive, style perhaps blinded me to the fact that Masculine Domination is not primarily concerned with analyzing the exercise of masculine power, but rather with analyzing women’s apparent acquiescence to it. This often puts Bourdieu into the position of seeming to lecture “victims” of domination about their complicity in their own victimization.

     

    I don’t want to accuse Bourdieu of suffering from the same malady that he so expertly diagnoses. His suggestions of women’s participation in their own domination are founded on his concept of the habitus, which has proven immensely important for feminist theory. Lovell notes that “habitus names the characteristic dispositions of the social subject. It is indicated in the bearing of the body (‘hexis’), and in deeply ingrained habits of behaviour, feeling, thought” (12). The habitus is thus “not a matter of conscious learning, or of ideological imposition, but is acquired through practice” (12). Bridget Fowler notes the usefulness of the concept of the habitus in collapsing the artificial distinctions “which are barriers to thought–between the dualisms of mechanistic thought and voluntarism, between mind and the body, between coercion and willed complicity.” According to Bourdieu, our social identities are neither imposed upon us, nor voluntarily chosen, but rather acquired as a result of the experiment of living (what “works for us”), an experiment that is not consciously undertaken, but is rather coincident with the practical matter of living in a society. In Masculine Domination, Bourdieu focuses on how “the division of the sexes” is not only present in “the objectified state–in things (in the house, for example, every part of which is ‘sexed’)” but also “in the embodied state–in the habitus of the agents, functioning as systems of schemes of perception, thought and action” (8).

     

    Even as this description makes clear the value of the concept of the habitus for feminism, however, it should also expose the problems the concept raises. While Bourdieu’s work points to the dominated position of women in society as something not natural but rather naturalized, it can nonetheless be seen to counsel pessimism and political inertia. The negative effects of a dominated habitus cannot be overcome by will alone, since the habitus does not operate at the level of conscious thought but rather is reflected in the “embedding of social structures in bodies” (40). Thus Bourdieu is able to easily dismiss the “intellectualist and scholastic fallacy which . . . leads one to expect the liberation of women to come through the immediate effect of the ‘raising of consciousness’” (40). “The symbolic revolution called for by the feminist movement,” insists Bourdieu, “cannot be reduced to a simple conversion of consciousnesses and wills” (41).

     

    I take Bourdieu’s point here, and in general, Masculine Domination is an important reminder to feminists of the strength and insidiousness of the obstacles to be faced. At the same time, there is something frustrating about the ease and briskness with which Bourdieu dismisses whole schools of feminist thought. Bourdieu remarks in a footnote that he “cannot avoid seeing an effect of submission to the dominant models in the fact that, both in France and in the United States, attention and discussion focus on a few female theorists, capable of excelling in what one of their critics has called ‘the race for theory’, rather than on magnificent studies . . . which are infinitely richer and more fertile, even from a theoretical point of view, but are less in conformity with the–typically masculine–idea of ‘grand theory’” (97n31). This might be seen as Bourdieu’s attempt to defend himself, however obliquely, from the charge that he has failed to engage the work of those “few female theorists” in Masculine Domination. However, Bourdieu’s claims that the great deal of attention paid to these theorists is due to their “conformity with the . . . idea of ‘grand theory’” and is an effect of “submission to the dominant models” can be turned against him. One could just as easily accuse Bourdieu himself of ignoring these theorists because, unlike the female authors he cites who stick to areas constructed as “feminine,” they have transgressed upon territory that the dominant model of intellectual pursuit tacitly reserves for men.

     

    That Bourdieu anticipated such criticism is evident in the somewhat defensive quality of many of his comments. In one footnote, for example, Bourdieu refers to a passage in his The Logic of Practice, “if only to show that [his] present intention does not stem from a recent conversion” (3n2). This is to misapprehend the problem, however. What is at stake is not the duration of Bourdieu’s interest in the issue of Masculine Domination, but rather the time that it has taken him to give it the prominence in his work that it deserves. Now that he has finally undertaken this task, his refusal to deal with “those who already occupy the well-tilled ‘field’ of gender studies” is, as Lovell points out, “quite remarkable” (27n1). “Bourdieu’s decision to ignore almost all of this work [of feminist theory],” continues Lovell, “is surely no unwitting exercise of the symbolic violence he knows so well how to analyse” (27n1). Indeed, Bourdieu seems almost impatient with feminist thought. In a footnote to the original 1990 article, Bourdieu dismissed prominent feminist theorists Julia Kristeva and Luce Irigaray as “essentialist.” In the present volume their names are not even mentioned, as if Bourdieu could not even be bothered to expand or clarify his earlier remarks.

     

    Throughout Masculine Domination, Bourdieu deals with important feminist problems by first invoking two “extreme” positions, which he presumably intends to signify the limits of the debate, and subsequently discarding each of them for their failure to confront the true social nature of domination. Here, for example, is Bourdieu on the issue of sexual harassment: “Because differential socialization disposes men to love the games of power and women to love the men who play them, masculine charisma is partly the charm of power, the seduction that the possession of power exerts, as such, on bodies whose drives and desires are themselves politically socialized” (79). He continues in a footnote: “This point is made against the tendency to classify all the sexual exchanges of the bureaucratic universe, particularly between managers and secretaries either as ‘sexual harassment’ (which is probably still underestimated even by the most ‘radical’ denunciators), or as the cynical, instrumental use of female charm as a means of access to power’” (79n44). And thus, Bourdieu impatiently dismisses an entire range of questions concerning power and sexuality in the workplace.

     

    As Bourdieu himself notes, “the idea that the social definition of the body, and especially of the sexual organs, is the product of a social labour of construction has become quite banal through having been advocated by the whole anthropological tradition” (22-3), and, one might add, by a significant number of feminists. But, Bourdieu argues, “the mechanism of the inversion of cause and effect that I am trying to describe here, through which the naturalization of that construction takes place, has not, it seems to me, been fully described (23). Even if we take Bourdieu’s word that such a description has heretofore not been provided, we must then ask why he fails to provide it himself. Bourdieu’s opening remarks about “dismantling the process responsible for this transformation of history into nature, of cultural arbitrariness into the natural” (2) suggest a sociologically based study that will expose the workings of Masculine Domination throughout history, not a brief overview limited to a few unrelated sources of data.

     

    Bourdieu’s decision to use Kabyle society as an object of analysis stems from his desire to extract “everything that knowledge of the fully developed model of the androcentric ‘unconscious’ makes it possible to identify and understand in the manifestations of our own unconscious” (54). Since the gender divisions and dominant practices that Bourdieu wishes to identify are so explicit in Kabyle society, by examining it he hopes to engender in the mind of “the unprepared reader” a form of “disconcertion, which may be accompanied by an impression of revelation or more precisely, of rediscovery, entirely analogous to that produced by the unexpected necessity of some poetic metaphors” (55). Eventually we gain “not the familiarity supplied by the acquisition of a simple knowledge (savoir), but the familiarity gained by that reappropriation of a knowledge (connaissance) that is both possessed and lost from the beginning, which Freud, following Plato, called ‘anamnesis’” (55). This complex explanation of Bourdieu’s methodology (which, in its reference to “poetic metaphors,” contains for me echoes of the “defamiliarization” with which the Russian formalists credited literary language) may be seen as Bourdieu’s attempt to solve provisionally the epistemological problem forever raised by his “reflexive sociology,” a problem that is especially relevant here. If masculine domination is as ingrained in our perceptions, thoughts, and actions as Bourdieu suggests, how may we perceive it? May we not be congratulating ourselves on recognizing some of its more obvious manifestations, only to pass over more hidden, and therefore more important, ones? It seems to me that what is required of “the unprepared reader,” after all, is a kind of intuitive sympathy that by definition partially escapes the more damaging effects of masculine domination. Readers who do not share this sympathy could simply argue that Kabyle society represents an extreme case that has little if anything to do with their own. Bourdieu could have overcome this objection by including in Masculine Domination the sort of detailed sociological data and analysis that is so characteristic of earlier works like Distinction. Instead, much of Masculine Domination takes place on the level of assertion. The universal expression of masculine domination throughout all times and places is simply taken for granted, and so Bourdieu need only make minimal effort to distinguish specific from general cases.

     

    This is not to underplay the value of Bourdieu’s observations here. For example, Bourdieu recognizes that “male privilege is also a trap, and it has its negative side in the permanent tension and contention, sometimes verging on the absurd, imposed on every man by the duty to assert his manliness in all circumstances” (50), noting that “what is called ‘courage’ is thus often rooted in a kind of cowardice” since it springs “from the fear of losing the respect or admiration of the group, of ‘losing face’ in front of one’s ‘mates’ and being relegated to the typically female category of ‘wimps’, ‘girlies’, ‘fairies’ etc” (52). “Manliness,” Bourdieu points out, “is an eminently relational notion, constructed in front of and for other men and against femininity, in a kind of fear of the female, firstly in oneself” (53). Bourdieu, furthermore, incisively points out the way in which this relational notion is the operating principle that lies behind the series of oppositions that structure society, even though the specifically gendered nature of these oppositions may not always be fully recognized. The “fundamental opposition” between masculine and feminine is instead “‘geared down’ or diffracted in a series of homologous oppositions, which reproduce it but in dispersed and often almost unrecognizable forms” (106). Turning briefly to one of his favored topics, the academic “field,” Bourdieu points out “the opposition between the temporally dominant disciplines, law and medicine, and the temporally dominated disciplines, the sciences and the humanities, and within the latter group, between the sciences, with everything that is described as ‘hard’, and the humanities (‘soft’), or again, between sociology, situated on the side of the agora and politics, and psychology, which is condemned to interiority, like literature” (105).

     

    In the present edition of Masculine Domination, Bourdieu has included a postscript on domination and love in which he poses the question, “Is love an exception . . . to the law of masculine domination, a suspension of symbolic violence, or is it the supreme–because the most subtle, the most invisible–form of that violence?” (109). In an uncharacteristically romantic and idealistic gesture, Bourdieu seems to suggest the first answer, calling attention to “the perfect reciprocity through which the circle in which the loving dyad encloses itself, as an elementary social unit, indivisible and charged with a powerful symbolic autarky, becomes endowed with the power to rival successfully all the consecrations that are ordinarily asked of the institutions and rites of ‘Society’, the secular substitute for God” (112). As Lovell remarks of this postscript, “it is difficult to resist a certain feminist cynicism here” since “men do not lay aside their male power when they love, as many women have discovered to their cost” (29n17). Bourdieu’s decision to include this postscript was ill-advised to say the least, since, coming at the end of a text so problematic for feminists, it cannot help but be seen as patronizing or as an attempt to “appeal to women [to] forbear to exercise such power as may fall to them in this manner” (Lovell 27n1). Bourdieu compounds this problem by further including an appendix titled “Some questions on the gay and lesbian movement” in which he credits homosexuals with being “particularly well armed to achieve this task” of destroying the principle of division and of being able to “implement the advantages linked to particularisms in the service of universalism, especially in subversive struggles” (123). Bourdieu’s remarks in this very brief section are particularly cogent, yet one cannot help but notice the generous ease with which he grants the gay and lesbian movement the freedom and ability to effect change that he so insistently denies the feminist movement. It is no wonder that many feminists view Masculine Domination with alarm.

     

    Bourdieu died in 2002, and Masculine Domination is thus one of the final books of his career. Masculine Domination is not the sort of foundational masterwork that Distinction and The Logic of Practice have become. Yet Masculine Domination is useful to feminists as a concise statement of Bourdieu’s thoughts concerning gender construction and as (to use one of Bourdieu’s favoured terms) a “limit case” of social constructivist thought. Ultimately, however, Masculine Domination is most valuable for its status as a conceptual toolkit which feminists can use, as Lovell would say, to think with, against, and, inevitably, beyond Bourdieu.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Bourdieu, Pierre. Distinction. Trans. Richard Nice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1984.
    • —. “La Domination Masculine.” Acts de la Recherché en Sciences Sociales 84 (1990): 2-31.
    • —. The Logic of Practice. Trans. Richard Nice. 1980. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1992.
    • Fowler, Bridget. “Pierre Bourdieu and La Domination Masculine.” Iran Bulletin 24 pages. 8 May 2003 <http://www.iran-bulletin.org/mascul.htm>.
    • Lovell, Terry. “Thinking Feminism with and against Bourdieu.” Feminist Theory 1.1 (2002): 11-32.

     

  • Poetry and the Paleolithic, or, The Artful Forager

    Kevin Marzahl

    English Department
    Indiana University
    kmarzahl@indiana.edu

     

    Review of: Jed Rasula, This Compost: Ecological Imperatives in American Poetry.Athens: U of Georgia P, 2002.

     

    I remember well the March 1984 cover of National Geographic because it seemed that I could look right into it at an iridescent eagle perched on a floating branch within a third dimension that, of course, vanished if the volume was not held just so. The holography that I see today is put to more practical uses (which that Geographic issue no doubt discussed), as an element of credit cards and software authentication certificates. Reading Jed Rasula calls that eagle to mind for the simple, if idiosyncratic, reason that he applauds and practices what he calls a holographic or hologrammatic approach to writing, in which the “argument is . . . not hypotactic–that is, not hierarchically disposed, but radically egalitarian. Its parts are its wholes and vice versa” (This Compost 8). As Rasula explains elsewhere, the “ultimate implication of the holographic method is that the whole book may be derived from a single proposition” (“Brutalities” 772), an effect with considerable appeal given the media environment in which the book must compete and to which it must adapt, largely through cultivating “redundancy in the information-theoretic sense: it is coded to survive the noise of inattention and distraction” (771).

     

    I have been dwelling recently on this method because Rasula has just given us a compelling book, This Compost: Ecological Imperatives in American Poetry, in which this “radically egalitarian” hologrammatic style is supplemented by the practice of dissociative collage (8-9). Whatever Rasula has accomplished with this book (over twenty years in the making1) is ultimately inseparable from these practices, which, taken together, constitute what Rasula calls wreading. As Rasula explains, “‘Wreading’ is my neologism for the collaborative momentum initiated by certain texts, like The Maximus Poems, in which the reader is enlisted as an agent of the writing. Reciprocally, the writer discloses his or her own readerly orientation . . .” (11-12n). The result is a frequently recursive structure organized by headings rather than chapters and supporting a dense tissue of allusion and analogy peppered with utterances–call them holographemes–which are at root identical. At its best, Rasula’s wreading produces memorable assertions that achieve the “pungency” of the dialectical aphorisms that Adorno calls for in Minima Moralia:

     

    Dialectical thinking . . . means that an argument should take on the pungency of a thesis and a thesis contain within itself the fullness of its reasoning. All bridging concepts, all links and logical auxiliary operations that are not a part of the matter itself, all secondary developments not saturated with the experience of the object, should be discarded. In a philosophical text all the propositions ought to be equally close to the center. (71)

     

    The center in Rasula’s case turns out to be nothing less than a new atavism, a revival of the Olsonian muthologos. One of the virtues of This Compost is precisely its return to Olsonian posthumanism2, but its excavations in the open field yield claims entranced, and compromised, by grave archaisms exerting a strong centripetal pull on an otherwise excentric project.

     

    Holography simplifies the task of elucidating this thesis, for if the part contains–in good holographic fashion–the whole, then it should be possible to peer under a single heading of This Compost in the right light to see the whole eagle of Rasula’s argument spread its finely crafted wings. I will choose as that section “The Starry Horizon,” wherein the book’s central liability is as apparent as anywhere, but not before a brief introduction to Rasula’s aims, which he targets in the first place because “certain challenges persist: the need of long-term views, the need to reckon our own wild nature into any consideration of ‘nature’ as such” (10).

     

    Rasula’s radical atavism is immediately apparent from the book’s epigraphs (their collective avant-garde rhetoric and typography inflected with sociobiology), while his deliberately unconventional citation practices necessitate his Preface, much of which is devoted to orienting readers to the book’s unusual structure. This Compost, Rasula tells us straightaway, is first of all “an anthology of sorts, concentrating on the Black Mountain lineage in modern American poetry,” the trailing qualifiers signifying that while there are “tacit limits to the poets included,” his “anthology of sorts” is not grounded in what he has elsewhere called “canontology” (xi).3 If Rasula is not interested in canonizing “a particular set of poets” (xi), he is concerned to secure a place for something much larger than the poets themselves: “this book does not validate aesthetic claims commonly made in literary criticism so much as document a stance toward the living planet, a stance these poets share with many people who know nothing of poetry” (xi). Demonstrating that poets as diverse as Walt Whitman, Louis Zukofsky, Gary Snyder, A.R. Ammons, and Jorie Graham share a common stance will be one burden of his book, or, as Rasula prefers, his “essay,” albeit a lengthy one; there are no “chapters as such” but “headings” that “indicate topoi in the old rhetorical sense: sites of excavation and deliberation” (xi). In the first indication of a centripetal force acting upon this project, Rasula notes that although the book is “arranged to be read chronologically, the method is somewhat circular, so the reader will find certain topoi recurring in a seasonal rotation” (xi). And if the argument proceeds according to a natural cycle, so too “footnotes appear at the bottom of the page because . . . I favor a bifocal prospect, atavistic residue perhaps of hunting and tracking instincts” (xi).

     

    While such circuitousness and a preference for asterisks and daggers, rather than the more-conventional numbered endnotes, may not strike readers as anything more than pleasantly anachronistic, if any practice is likely to engender some confusion it is what I refer to above as “dissociative collage.” Long familiar to readers of postmodern poetry, what this method entails is the in-text parenthetical citation of prose but no such page references–and on the whole not even in-text attributive tags–for the poetry that Rasula collages, sometimes for two and three pages at a stretch (indicating a change of authorship only by a tilde at the far right margin). More often than not, readers must consult a special section at the end of the book if they are curious about the disparate sources from which these collages are composted, but even there Rasula foregoes page references for any poetry published prior to the twentieth century “since there are so many editions” (xii).

     

    In spite of this elaborate apparatus, Rasula tells us that the book “is not altogether a scholarly project” but “represents an intersection of communities,” which remark occasions from Rasula a digression on the project’s origins in not only his “ongoing participation in an extensive network of poets” but also, tellingly, his involvement “in the milieu of archetypal Jungian psychology” and a two-year stint reviewing books on Pacifica Radio’s KPFK from 1979-1981 (xiii). The intersection most important to Rasula is that moment, preserved in the pages of journals like Alcheringa, before the myriad practices and communities enabled by the precedents of Charles Olson and Robert Duncan and company became institutionalized as Ethnopoetics and Language writing. Rasula recaptures this nebulous moment in twentieth-century poetics through his dissociative collages, which are justified thus: “By dissociating the name of the poets from many of the citations, I wanted to restore to the poetics at hand that solidarity in anonymity which is the deep issue of planetary time, for that is the ‘issue’ in several senses of the poetry of This Compost” (9). While he prefers not to speak of what “literary politics has made it misleading to call ‘open’” poetics (6) (which for him is too bound up with careerism and its personae), Rasula does subscribe to the notion of “poetry as ecology in the community of words” (7). Moreover, Rasula wants to demonstrate that this stance grounds the identity of “a poetics-in-process” encompassing most of American radical poetics since World War II, “all documents of a poetics attentive to the poem as mutho-logistical, of psyche’s logos, and cosmographic”; even writers like Silliman, Watten, Bernstein, Andrews, Hejinian, and Scalapino share in “this investigative propensity . . . with some different emphases” (45n). As Rasula himself makes clear, then, his project aims to restore a collective identity, as if such a “solidarity in anonymity” was ever the case, as if it was not so clearly an identity under construction.

     

    The heaping of quotations onto the compost pile begins immediately. The Introduction tosses Snyder alongside Thoreau on top of Melville, shovels on Jolas, Emerson, and Bateson, mixes in Atlan, Maturana and Varela, and Santayana, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries indiscriminately rotting together in a ripe but not altogether unpleasing compilation of the various uses to which the figure of composting has been put over the last couple of centuries. Rasula is particularly attentive to the ways Romanticism and Transcendentalism anticipate contemporary ecology, especially as those traditions inform a postwar American poetics itself engaged in epistemological explorations:

     

    Calling on the imagination as a resource of ecological understanding means calling on poetry in a truly re-creational capacity, one that redefines “recreation” as original participation, much as Coleridge sought a poetry that would propagate a continuum initiated by the divine fiat. Such a prospect has gone in and out of focus during the past two centuries, but its reemergence under the countenance of a so-called “Black Mountain” school was historically congruent with, and sometimes affiliated with, the interdisciplinary matrix gathered around what Norbert Wiener named “cybernetics.” (3-4)

     

    Such reemergences and congruities are the very stuff of Rasula’s compost library. But one has to dig deeper into the essay for the strongest whiffs of his thesis, in holographemes like this: “The biological awareness of human species-life animated by the compost library is a crucial link between dormant animal tact and the metabolism of intelligence as it flourishes in writing” (50). For the baldest rendering of Rasula’s argument, it might be most economical simply to reproduce a series of similar claims as a collage4, both to reveal the implications of Rasula’s position and to provide readers a taste of his method:

     

    The post-human–the posthumous Homo Sapiens–passes from cosmos to chaos. But chaos has always been with us, intrinsic to cosmos if not to cosmology . . . . The subterranean transmissions of composting poetry have been compacted in the compost library, where biodegradable thinking occurs, where we can conceivably speak of an “ecology of consciousness” in which psyche wandering is in touch with human boundaries, noting the logos that forestalls the corruption of cosmos by chaos.

     

    ~

     

    The propioceptive and ecological necessities impinging on the creative act--the psyche acting in the poem on cosmos through logos--are vital to Olson's legacy.

     

    ~

     

    History is inconsequential data unless animated by the old story sense of psyche (a protagonist) working on creation (cosmos) with some tool (logos). To recover the old lore as evidence of a prior logos is insufficient; one's own psyche mingles involuntarily with psyches elsewhere or in other times. Story--logos--stirs and disturbs psyche.

     

    ~

     

    What we have at hand now is a need to reimagine the archaic (soul: the archaic word for human) so that it includes logos (certitude, sign) but is not dominated by it, leaving room also for psyche (our personal bit of chaos, which daily and nightly delivers a recycled portion of our "faculty of tact as members of life").

     

    ~

     

    Myth is amorphous and protean because it so freely changes hands or mouths. Myth is the legacy of biodegradable thought, compost rumination. Myth comes to mouth to make apparent what the eye can't see. It is a means of giving scope to idiosyncrasy and gratuitous beauty--the bounty of gratuity.

     

    ~

     

    The poetry I've been wreading here enacts myth as carnal movement of words within words, seeds of images and story, feeling and thinking, emerging from the muthologistical certainty of all the evidence we can lay claim to as the centrifugal force of our inner inherence. Net and web, ring and circle, coil and labyrinth, whorl and cup: all shapes, forms, insignia of nature . . . . Finding or "experiencing" nature makes no difference at all without the sense of good nature that stamps all force and form with grace and tact.

     

    Chaos, cosmos, logos, muthos, psyche. Rasula is aware of the dangers attendant upon this lexicon: “When we try to imagine the archaic we know neither what we’re looking for nor what we’re seeing. The old lore is at once a body of testimony and an invitation to risk” (46). To what does such “lore” testify, then, and what do we risk for the sake of surprise? I turn now to “The Starry Horizon” to shed some light upon just these questions.

     

    Robin Blaser, Charles Olson, Kenneth Rexroth, and Walt Whitman figure prominently in “The Starry Horizon,” but not so much as Nathaniel Mackey, Paul Metcalf, and Kenneth Irby (whose poem “Delius” furnishes the title of the section). Irby’s poetry, Rasula informs us in his Bibliographic Glossary5, “is intellectually oriented to a sense of open form and geographical space by way of Olson and Dorn,” although he has an “interest in hermetica . . . nourished by his association with Duncan, Kelly, and Lansing, among others” (240). That many readers have probably not encountered his poetry is no surprise since “most of his work has been issued in ephemeral form” (240). In any case, the section is a typical compaction of poetry and mythological studies, all of it in this instance testifying to the universal importance of “star lore” and the terrible consequences of its loss. Recalling Calvin Martin’s assertion that poetry is a means of computing “where, in the deepest sense, one is in the bio-sphere, using words and artifice that have accurately touched the place” (qtd. in Rasula 8n), “The Starry Horizon” begins from the premise that knowledge of the night sky “facilitated imaginal placement as a coordination of mind and map, psychodynamics and geophysics posing together in astronomical apparel” (114). Such “coordination of mind and map” is most assuredly not cognitive mapping in the sense popularized by Fredric Jameson, who appropriated the concept from social geography in order to suggest the possibility of developing an ability “to grasp our positioning as individuals and collective subjects and regain a capacity to act and struggle” (54) over against “the incapacity of our minds, at least at present, to map the great global multinational and decentered communicational network in which we find ourselves caught as individual subjects” (44). Where Jameson seeks to confront our disorientation under late capitalism, Rasula seeks a Paleolithic sublime in his “lore,” here metonymic of muthologistics in general: “Through . . . such burrowings in the compost library we begin to glimpse an ecological import in mythic lore which makes a point of recalling and imagining a world of profundities exceeding comprehension” (114).

     

    I am tempted, given the status Rasula accords C.G. Jung’s Aion “as a charter of compost poetry” (114), to call mythic lore a kind of racial memory. And what anamnesis, from Whitman to Pound to Olson, disinters from the teeming humus or recollects in searching the heavenly firmament, is nothing less than what R. B. Onians calls “the imagined primal cosmic psyche or procreative power, liquid and serpent” (qtd. in Rasula 115). Or as Rasula himself puts it, “pysche is a personal stain, a portable speck of chaos, a gleaming scale of the ouroboros” (115). Lore is a virtual reservoir, the liquid foundation of an ancient identity: “Pysche itself becomes the ocean of wisdom and tact spans the human world as the oceans of water span the globe” (115). It is a proposition that Rasula will go on to formulate in terms suggested by the late Paul Shepard, who went Bruno Latour one better, arguing that We Have Never Left the Pleistocene. His scholarship has obvious appeal for proponents of ethnopoetics, as a passage like this makes clear:

     

    White European/Americans cannot become Hopis or Kalahari Bushmen or Magdelenian bison hunters, but elements in those cultures can be recovered or re-created because they fit the heritage and predilection of the human genome everywhere, a genome tracing back to a common ancestor that Anglos share with Hopis and Bushmen and all the rest of Homo sapiens. The social, ecological, and ideological characteristics natural to our humanity are to be found in the lives of foragers. (173)

     

    One element of hunter/gatherer cultures that Shepard was particularly concerned to recover is a tribal social structure in which the initiation of adolescents into adulthood is given the attention that it deserves. So far as Rasula is concerned, we might even view “our entire acknowledged civilization as nothing but a series of adolescent gang-related incidents” (116).6The loss of the old lore is that serious a matter for Rasula, and Americans bear particular responsibility “as last first men to breed that monstrance, a civilization whose entire institutional propagation has been riddled with profound lapses of imagination” (116-17). This rhetoric culminates in some very instructive examples of a supposedly devastating “disregard for the American past” in a paragraph from “The Starry Horizon” which I quote in full:

     

    Along with the ravaging of natural and human resources in America, there is a corresponding disregard for the American past. We have little dissemination of such basic contradictions to the inherited views as the Bat Creek, Tennessee, Hebrew coins of 100 A.D.; New England engravings in Roman Numerals indicating adherence to Sosigene’s calendric reforms of 45 B.C.; or traces of an ancient Libyan alphabet in the Virgin Islands. Where do we go for such news but to the poets? (117)

     

    This would be news indeed! But the mystery of why such astounding “basic contradictions” (which Rasula finds in the work of Mackey, Metcalf, and Irby) find “little dissemination” outside of obscure poetry is rapidly dispelled when, hunting in the footnotes, one discovers that this lore ultimately stems from the work of Cyrus Gordon and Ivan van Sertima, both of whom are notorious for what anthropologists, archeologists, and paleographers do not hesitate to call pseudo-science.

     

    Take the first claim, for instance: that remnants of the lost tribes of Israel found their way to the center of North America nearly two millennia ago, as evidenced by the discovery in an Eastern Tennessee burial mound of “Hebrew coins of 100 A.D.” In fact, no such coins were ever discovered. What was purportedly discovered “in 1889 by John W. Emmert, a Smithsonian Institution field assistant, during the course of the Bureau of American Ethnology Mound Survey,” is what has come to be called the Bat Creek Stone (Mainfort and Kwas 2). Mainfort and Kwas offer this dispassionate description of the artifact in question: it is “a relatively flat, thin piece of ferruginous siltstone, approximately 11.4 cm long and 5.1 cm wide. Scratched through the patinated exterior on one surface are a minimum of 8, and possibly as many as 9 . . . signs that resemble alphabetic characters” (3). As Mainfort and Kwas go on to relate, these characters were initially mistaken by Emmert’s supervisor Cyrus Thomas as evidence of a Cherokee alphabet predating Sequoyah’s syllabary and thus as proof of Thomas’s pet theory that the Cherokee were responsible for the mounds which so mystified nineteenth-century Americans. The stone did not become well known until the early 1970s when Cyrus Gordon claimed that by “inverting the orientation of the stone relative to the published illustrations” the characters became legible as a Paleo-Hebrew inscription meaning “‘for the Jews’ or some variant thereof” (2). Contemporary scientific opinion, however, is unequivocal: the Bat Creek Stone is a fraud, very likely perpetrated by the alcoholic Emmert (who was recognized even in the late nineteenth century as not entirely reliable) in a bid to curry favor with his superior Thomas in hopes that proof of Thomas’s theory would lead to permanent employment with the Smithsonian.7 Despite such consensus, the Bat Creek Stone remains an object of fascination for amateur archeologists with other agendas.

     

    Readers are probably more familiar with Ivan van Sertima’s contemporary Afrocentrism than with nineteenth-century artifacts of dubious provenance. Indeed, Van Sertima’s most vocal critics have taken on the task of debunking his work precisely because it is an especially tenacious example of cult archeology.8 These critics note that educators have increasingly found themselves confronted by students who want to know “whether there is any truth to the claim that the ancient Egyptians and Nubians might have influenced or might have created the first ‘civilizations’ to emerge in the Americas” (“They” 199). Critics are motivated, too, by the not-inconsiderable concern that such claims about superior Africans importing the seeds of civilization to the inferior peoples of the Americas also “dimini[sh] the real accomplishments of Native American cultures” (“Robbing” 421). It is a charged and polarizing issue; critics who dispute Van Sertima’s scholarship are for their trouble accused of conspiring to silence the truth about civilization’s African origins, of being “academic terrorists” and the like. Readers can judge for themselves the relative weights of the arguments and counterarguments, but the consensus among professional anthropologists and archeologists seems to me as clear in this case as it is concerning the Bat Creek stone: “There is hardly a claim in any of Van Sertima’s writings that can be supported by the evidence found in the archeological, botanical, linguistic, or historical record” (“Robbing” 431). Gerald Early, invited by Current Anthropology to comment upon the debunking work of Haslip-Viera, Ortiz de Montellano, and Barbour, is even bolder: “The authors are right in suggesting that Afrocentrism is Eurocentrism in blackface. One of the serious problems that oppressed people like African-Americans face is dealing with the sometimes destructive tendency to create parallel institutions that copy white ones almost entirely” (“Robbing” 434). That is, as his critics point out, Van Sertima’s narrative is simply an inversion of “the old ‘Heliolithic hypothesis’ that was so popular among racialist scholars in Western society during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In essence, its proponents believed that civilization arose only once, in a ‘white’ ancient Egypt, and diffused from there to the other parts of the world” (“Robbing” 420n7). Afrocentrism solarizes this hypothesis, as it were, while pushing its claims for the diffusion of civilization from an Egyptian center even further.

     

    Does the lack of mainstream attention to such “news” really constitute a “disregard for the American past” comparable to “the ravaging of natural and human resources”? Is there really any question as to why this “news” is not widely disseminated? What is particularly disappointing about the perpetuation of at best controversial and at worst downright fraudulent information under the rubric of “lore” is that it is so unnecessary to making a larger, and more egalitarian, argument here. That our species has its origins in Africa is almost certain. That global migrations and intercontinental trade predate Columbus is not news. After all, as Jared Diamond points out in Guns, Germs, and Steel, there was an extraordinarily improbable cross-cultural exchange between East Africa and Southeast Asia, via Madagascar, long before Europeans came along (381). Now, Rasula knows something about fact-checking (aside from his considerable scholarship, he was once a researcher for Ripley’s Believe It Or Not!), and it seems unlikely that he is unaware of the scholarly consensus regarding fringe archeology. All of which invites the question, why perpetuate such claims, or at least lend them credibility, at the risk of vitiating his own project? But then again, Rasula makes clear in his Preface that “This Compost is not altogether a scholarly project” (xiii). Moreover, in a gesture that evokes one of Whitman’s most famous utterances, Rasula would seem to foreclose any possibility of conventional criticism of the sort I am leveling here: “If holes are found in the ‘argument,’ all the better–they’re for burrowing, for warmth and intimacy” (8). Can we bring “scholarly” criteria to bear upon a book that looks at first like an academic duck but at second glance resembles a rabbit?

     

    The question recalls another commentary from the issue of Current Anthropology discussed above. Anthropologist David Browman commends Haslip-Viera, Ortiz de Montellano, and Barbour for the “thankless” work they undertake in even engaging Van Sertima’s work when most academics simply ignore it; but Browman goes on to suggest that this “quest is in one sense futile, as they attempt to apply academic definitions of ‘knowledge’ in a cultural situation where such standards simply are not seen as appropriate by the members of the group involved” (“Robbing” 432). The problem of incommensurable epistemologies is all too familiar to readers of postmodern theory. And it issues once again from Rasula’s book. I would like in closing to approach this problem by juxtaposing Rasula’s Olsonian posthumanism with the work of two other posthumanist scholars with whom he might be expected to have some affinity, in hopes that the differences that emerge might disclose the contingency of Rasula’s observations. I will turn first to William V. Spanos, who has done so much to enable a philosophical discourse on American poetry, and then to Cary Wolfe, who has been diligently synthesizing developments in posthumanism while revealing the speciesist limits of many of those advances, and whose Critical Environments draws upon some of the same philosophers and theorists whose work informs Rasula’s (particularly William James, Foucault, Deleuze, and Maturana and Varela).

     

    In The End of Education: Toward Posthumanism, Spanos reminds us that for millennia “the logos in the Aristotelian sentence ‘Man is the animal who is endowed with logos‘” has been rendered as some variety of rationality (6). Thus, the “‘onto-theo-logical’ tradition has covered over and eventually forgotten its origin in legein (to talk)” (6). In short:

     

    de-struction discloses that the Western tradition at large, despite the apparent variations, has been a logocentric tradition, one based on a philosophy of presence–the mystified assumption of an original Identity . . . that has been dispersed with the “fall” into time. This logocentric/recuperative interpretation of human being thus results eventually in the total acceptance of the secondary or derived (constructed) notion of truth as correspondence–as agreement of the mind with its object of knowledge . . . . (6-7)

     

    And in a particularly germane passage, Spanos notes that “this diagnosis of the discourse of Western man” is not “restricted to postmodern philosophers,” but is shared by a number of “postmodern writers,” among them Charles Olson, whom Spanos goes on to quote from Letter 23 of The Maximus Poems (“muthologos has lost such ground,” etc.) (11). While Spanos, like Rasula, finds much to admire in early critiques of logocentrism, he argues that they are not sufficient, not least because humanism has been too quick to criticize “the limitations of positivistic scientific inquiry” without acknowledging that the “vicious circularity of technological method has been inscribed in all the disciplines” (19). This is why Spanos ultimately calls for a transdisciplinary practice, one which overcomes rather than reinforces “the false and secondary opposition between the humanities and the sciences” (23). Hence, “the oppositional intellectual,” for Spanos, “must recognize the affiliative bonds between the specific sites of repressed and alienated forms of knowledge” (xxi). He continues, “What is needed is a specifically engaged but collaborative practice” (xxi).

     

    So far this seems very much in tune with Rasula, whose wreading practices are collaborations in the ongoing construction of a poetic counter-memory. And in a statement on the curricular implications for a posthumanist pedagogy congruent with Rasula’s critique of canontology, Spanos writes, “To utilize history to overcome history, the oppositional intellectual, of whatever critical persuasion, has the responsibility of gaining a commanding view of history and its multiple coercions, not in the sense of a panoptic mastery, but in the genealogical sense of their socially constituted origins and ideological ends” (xxii). This is a fit description of what Rasula has accomplished for postwar literary history in The American Poetry Wax Museum. But while Rasula may have begun to chart the genealogy of his own position–that niche in the open field between Ethnopoetics and Language–his “commanding view” does not escape ontotheology’s gravity.

     

    As Spanos shows, logocentrism fuels a “longing for the lost origin, for enlightenment” (11). The nature of that origin may have changed with humanism’s historical rejection of “the Word of God in favor of the mind of mortal Man” (21), the substitution of “the anthropologos for the theo-logos” (22), but the ends of logocentrism’s pedagogical narrative did not change: “human beings exist in some kind of fallen state and therefore . . . the essential purpose of learning is self-evidently recuperative: to regain the heights–and the mental and spiritual well-being–from which they have fallen into the disease of time” (11). Or again: “Western education has thus always reaffirmed a nostalgic and recuperative circuitous journey back to the origin. More specifically, it has always had as its essential purpose the domestication of new knowledge by resorting to the itinerary of the recollective cultural memory” (15). As we have seen, Rasula’s ecological imperatives legislate a project of restoration, although the ouroboros is a recuperative figure activating not so much “cultural” as phylogenetic memory. Humanism may have rejected the theology of a fall from the permanent presence of Identity into diseased Difference, but in its place emerged an anthropology to secure a similar circuit, and now a radically atavistic muthologistics holds that the wilderness of Difference has been tamed by a monoculture, with ecologically disastrous results (to recall the first of Rasula’s epigraphs: “the animal” has been “stolen from us”). This species of posthumanism substitutes the mutho-logos for the anthropo-logos, with a corollary reversal of the poles of Difference and Identity. Of course, not all atavistic theories achieve even this reversal; Paul Shepard seems to find in the Pleistocene a secular prelapsarian moment: “We live with the possibility of a primal closure. All around us aspects of the modern world–diet, exercise, medicine, art, work, family, philosophy, economics, ecology, psychology–have begun a long circle back toward their former coherence” (170, emphasis added). But whether ethnopoetics seeks to recover a primal Identity or an original Difference, it turns to the deep past in the name of our “mental and spiritual well-being.” The center changes, the circle remains intact, or, as Rasula might say, in tact. But even if tact is necessary to any oppositional practice, it is not enough. This, at any rate, is one of the claims that arises in Cary Wolfe’s Critical Environments.

     

    Wolfe is certainly not alone among contemporary critics in pursuing what Spanos calls transdisciplinarity, in the sense of an oppositional intellectual practice that traces “contemporary power relations in terms of a relay extending throughout the indissoluble continuum of being, from the ontological (the anthropologos) through the cultural (the discourse of Man) to the economic and sociopolitical (the practices of consumer capitalism, patriarchy, and racism)” (xxiii). But he has been crucial to the dissemination of systems theory in America. And a comparison between Rasula’s timely but brief nods to cybernetics in his Introduction and Wolfe’s more sustained study suggests that in composting autopoeisis until it is indistinguishable from lore, Rasula’s posthumanism may serve, as Spanos might say, to domesticate this “new knowledge.” At the very least, we can say that there is a very different position vis-à-vis “wisdom” to be derived from systems-theoretical transdisciplinarity, and Wolfe has formulated it succinctly thus: “the only way out is through” (Critical xiv). What Wolfe’s slogan for a reconstructed pragmatism means is that we must “follow through to its conclusion the problem of contingency, to assert that ‘everything that is said is said by someone,’ and to then remember that all such assertions are based on a ‘blind spot’ of paradoxical distinction that not the observer in question, but only other observers, can disclose . . . . Self-critical reflection is thus, strictly speaking, impossible, and must instead be distributed in the social field among . . . a ‘plurality’ of observers” (xviii).

     

    I will forego a lengthy explication of what such a distribution of blind spots throughout the social field entails and how Wolfe arrives at this conclusion. As I noted before we began this detour through other posthumanisms, my hope was simply to disclose the contingency of Rasula’s observations. Or, put otherwise, to show that Rasula sees what he can see, namely a pressing need for “long term views” which “reckon our own wild natures into any consideration of ‘nature’ as such” (10). It comes as no surprise, then, that he feels an affinity for Maturana and Varela, whose biological research leads them (like many of the poets in Rasula’s “anthology of sorts”) to recognize East Asian wisdom. It is an affinity grounded in what Wolfe identifies in Critical Environments as the hope “that ethics may somehow do the work of politics” (80). While Wolfe is careful not to dismiss the explanatory power of mutual causality, he asserts that Maturana and Varela’s “repeated calls for us to heed the wisdom of Buddhist ‘mindfulness’ and ‘egolessness’” are an attempt “to solve by ethical fiat and spiritual bootstrapping the complex problems of social life conducted in conditions of material scarcity, economic inequality, and institutionalized discrimination of various forms” (81). Mutatis mutandis, this discloses quite clearly the limitations of Rasula’s closing endorsement of “the sense of good nature that stamps all force and form with grace and tact” (199).

     

    Fifteen years ago, in a reply to Charles Altieri called “The Politics of, the Politics in,” Rasula noted, with some scorn, that contemporary poets were accommodating “the ascendent public discourse of self-promotion and advertisement” (317), singling out “the Care Bears soft touch of Hugh Prather, the carnival geek antics of Charles Bukowski, and the Age of Aquarius spell-casting of Bly, among others” (317). A few pages on, however, he has a different take on “spell-casting”; following Charles Bernstein, Rasula recalls with approval

     

    a venerated principle germane to the poetic tradition of the high sublime: the hypnotic reverie, the stupefied assent of the reader drugged with bewitching words. As Brecht would remind us, a self-critical method of delivery need not entail a less impassioned spectacle; it simply serves as a way of maintaining a functional perspective that visibly operates alongside the passion it conveys. (320)

     

     

    Holography seems to be Rasula’s own signature accommodation, his sentences no less astute for being enchanting, the lore they transmit by no means irrelevant for being archaic (however much it taxes my credulity). But I get the sense, reading Rasula, that such magic really suffices as an oppositional practice if one adopts the long view of deep history, and this gives me pause.

     

    If, following Wolfe, we measure concepts pragmatically by the work they enable–by the observations they make possible–what can we make of the view that Rasula’s framework affords us:

     

    We face a dilemma unprecedented in the entire epoch of Christian moralism or the preceding age of Greek pride: the danger is no longer wicked tyrants and evildoers, it is the cumulative byproduct of normality, with its increasing disinterest in plants and animals, the earth and the stars; its marginal awareness of economic and political dereliction; and a corresponding hyperattention to mass-mediated fame and fortune. (190, emphasis added)

     

    There is no doubt that we live in the midst of an environmental crisis. But as for the rest of Rasula’s characterization of our situation at the start of the twenty-first century (or, as Gary Snyder calculates it, the fiftieth millennium9), his is not a world I recognize. I recognize the caricature that he has drawn here well enough, to be sure. But where Rasula sees “increasing disinterest” and “marginal awareness” I see burgeoning activism and new practices of everyday life, both owing much to the new media. “Increasing disinterest in plants and animals” does not generate trade disputes over genetically modified organisms or fuel a skyrocketing organic foods industry, and as Wolfe points out in the Introduction to his latest book, Animal Rites, contemporary scholarship is only now catching up to popular culture in interrogating our speciesism (1). “Marginal awareness” does not explain the international movement for global justice, while cultural studies has shown again and again that there is more to consuming mass-mediated products than a distracting or narcotizing “hyperattention”; indeed, the blurred line between reading and writing that Rasula so values has analogues in numerous fan subcultures. If Rasula does not see any of this, then of course poetry will appear most valuable as a vehicle for the transmission of good nature. And if poetry is not equipped for alternatives, like the cognitive mapping alluded to earlier, then we can all join with William Carlos Williams in his refrain from Paterson, Book 3: “So be it” (97-98).

     

    “Foster or debunk. It’s a strategic question,” argues Brian Massumi in Parables for the Virtual. In what may be the most refreshingly direct address I have read in some time, Massumi asks:

     

    why not hang up the academic hat of critical self-seriousness, set aside the intemperate arrogance of debunking–and enjoy? If you don’t enjoy concepts and writing and don’t feel that when you write you are adding something to the world, if only the enjoyment itself, and that by adding that ounce of positive experience to the world you are affirming it, celebrating its potential, tending its growth, in however small a way, however really abstractly–well, just hang it up. (13)

     

    There is no question that Rasula has added, in no small way, to the pleasure that I continue to take in poetry. Rasula’s practice affirms and celebrates the potential of poetry to model careful comportment. All the same, my reservations–neither intemperate nor arrogant, one hopes–stand. Many of us share a desire for what Olson, near the end of The Maximus Poems, calls “the initiation / of another kind of nation” (633). That initiation surely requires the decentering of the human. But it just as surely should not circuitously plant the seeds of another center out of the (masculinist) desire for the Paleolithic which Rasula shares with so many of those who opened the field for those of us working today.

    Notes

     

    1. Rasula himself draws attention to the duration of the book’s composition in his Preface (xiii). One wonders if he does not also have himself in mind when he opens the Introduction with fraternal remarks on Thoreau, whose “instincts were not scholastic, but ecological” and who prepared Walden “with geophysical patience,” thus testifying both “to a composting sensibility: attuned to the rhythms by which literary models decayed and enriched the soil” and to a “reverence for the pagan hieroglyphic divinity of the natural world” (1).

     

    2. Note that this is not a posthumanism avant la lettre but is, at least as early as 1952, an explicit and self-conscious posthumanism; see Olson, “The Present Is Prologue.”

     

    3. Readers may recall this neologism (one of Rasula’s favorite devices) from The American Poetry Wax Museum, where Rasula offers this by way of definition:

     

    Insofar as a canon is more than a roster of names, it is a collocation of attributes, a showcase for modalities of the exemplary. Canontology has to do with sanctioned prescriptions for being, which translates in a given generic setting to styles of belonging. Canontology regulates membership. (471)

     

    And again:

     

    Poetry is at the center of a pedagogic matrix, where it is administratively put to work for canontology. For several centuries, anthologists have labored in the canonical mine at the center of national cultures, separating the purported ore from a murky amalgam of subterranean deposits. I want to suggest by this fanciful analogy that anthologists devoted to the Enlightenment task of sorting the grains of wisdom and beauty have really been working in the dark. (472)

     

    A more comprehensive review would pursue the question of just how far removed Rasula’s project is from this canontological excavation of “grains of wisdom.”

     

    4. The following quotations can be found on pages 43, 45, 46-47, 179, 183, and 199, respectively (all emphasis in the original). If readers imagine each quote as coming from a different author, they will have some sense of what it is like to read substantial sections of Rasula’s “anthology of sorts.”

     

    5. Rasula’s Bibliographic Glossary, an appendix of sorts, would seem to belie his disavowal of canontological motivations, since the “rudimentary contextual data” the Glossary provides is intended to fill lacunae owing to the poets’ not having “been widely anthologized” or not having “received much critical attention” (237). Given these criteria, surely John Ashbery, Robert Creeley, and Gary Snyder have no place in this Glossary.

     

    6. Compare this to Shepard, who suggests that “much of modern angst has its roots in the episodes of failure to mitigate regressive psychological traits in personal development between the twelfth and sixteenth years . . . and the endless social aggression that follows. The lack of appropriate initiation ceremonies for adolescents today is a glaring tear in the fabric of society, patched up by sports, teams, and clubs and exacerbated by gangs, where adolescents create their own identity without the watchful guidance of elders” (160).

     

    7. While the evidence that the Bat Creek Stone is a fraud seems to me incontrovertible, Mainfort and Kwas acknowledge that identifying the culprit is more difficult and that they “have no unequivocal data to present” about the identity of the perpetrator (12). Even though the circumstantial evidence that they marshal against Emmert is quite convincing, it is ultimately moot. There are no coins (as Rasula, following Irby, has it), and the stone has been considered suspect since not long after its appearance; even “Cyrus Thomas and other staff members at the Smithsonian Institution came to doubt the authenticity of the stone” (14). Mainfort and Kwas revisit the entire matter in “The Bat Creek Fraud: A Final Statement.”

     

    8. I am referring to Warren Barbour, Gabriel Haslip-Viera, and Bernard Ortiz de Montellano, who co-authored two major critiques of Van Sertima published in 1997. In order to simplify parenthetical citation, I will hereafter reference Haslip-Viera, Ortiz de Montellano, and Barbour as “Robbing,” and Ortiz de Montellano, Haslip-Viera, and Barbour as “They.”

     

    9. See Snyder. Please note that this parenthetical remark is not meant to disparage Snyder’s call to rethink our calendar according to what he calls “the implicit narrative of Euro-American science” (390). As Snyder notes, “We humans are constantly revising the story we tell ourself about ourselves. The main challenge is to keep this unfolding story modestly reliable” (390). It is precisely the “reliability” of Rasula’s “story we tell ourself about ourselves” which is in question here.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Adorno, Theodor. Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life. Trans. E.F.N. Jephcott. London: Verso, 1974.
    • Diamond, Jared. Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies. New York: Norton, 1999.
    • Haslip-Viera, Gabriel, Bernard Ortiz de Montellano, and Warren Barbour. “Robbing Native American Cultures: Van Sertima’s Afrocentricity and the Olmecs.” Current Anthropology 38.3 (1997): 419-41.
    • Jameson, Fredric. Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Durham: Duke UP, 1991.
    • Mainfort, Robert C., and Mary L. Kwas. “The Bat Creek Fraud: A Final Statement.” Tennessee Anthropologist 18.2 (1993): 87-93.
    • —. “The Bat Creek Stone: Judeans in Tennessee?” Tennessee Anthropologist 16.1 (1991): 1-19.
    • Massumi, Brian. Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation. Durham: Duke UP, 2002.
    • Olson, Charles. The Maximus Poems. Ed. George F. Butterick. Berkeley: U of California P, 1983.
    • —. “The Present Is Prologue.” Collected Prose. Eds. Donald Allen and Benjamin Friedlander. Berkeley: U of California P, 1997. 205-07.
    • Ortiz de Montellano, Bernard, Gabriel Haslip-Viera, and Warren Barbour. “They Were NOT Here before Columbus: Afrocentric Hyperdiffusionism in the 1990s.” Ethnohistory 44.2 (1997): 199-234.
    • Rasula, Jed. The American Poetry Wax Museum: Reality Effects, 1940-1990. Urbana: NCTE, 1996.
    • —. “Brutalities of the Vanguard.” Contemporary Literature 35.4 (1994): 771-85.
    • —. “The Politics of, the Politics in.” Politics and Poetic Value. Ed. Robert von Hallberg. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1987.
    • Shepard, Paul. Coming Home to the Pleistocene. Ed. Florence Shepard. Washington, D.C.: Shearwater-Island, 1998.
    • Snyder, Gary. “Entering the Fiftieth Millennium.” The Gary Snyder Reader: Prose, Poetry, and Translations, 1952-1998. Washington, D.C.: Counterpoint, 1999. 390-94.
    • Spanos, William V. The End of Education: Toward Posthumanism. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1993.
    • Williams, William Carlos. Paterson. Rev. ed. Ed. Christopher MacGowan. New York: New Directions, 1992.
    • Wolfe, Cary. Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist Theory. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2003.
    • —. Critical Environments: Postmodern Theory and the Pragmatics of the “Outside.” Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1998.

     

  • The Measure of All That Has Been Lost: Hitchens, Orwell, and the Price of Political Relevance

    Matthew Hart

    English Department
    University of Pennsylvania
    matthart@english.upenn.edu

     

    Review of: Christopher Hitchens, Why Orwell Matters. New York: Basic, 2002

     

    Orwell Matters

     

    Orwell’s relevance to contemporary political thought dominates recent treatments of his essays and fiction. In his introduction to a recent Penguin Modern Classics miscellany, Orwell and Politics (2001), Timothy Garton Ash asks, “Why should we still read George Orwell on politics?” before providing the comforting answer that his exemplary political essays mean that “Orwell’s work is never done.”1 The same problem motivates much of Christopher Hitchens’s Why Orwell Matters, where the prolific author, journalist, New School Professor of Liberal Studies, and self-described “contrarian” defends Orwell’s “power of facing” as a political and writerly weapon that retains its potency in an age of postmodern thought and post-Cold War geopolitics (13).

     

    It is a pity for Hitchens that he evidently wrote this book, parts of which were originally published as magazine articles, before the events of 11 September 2001. For Orwell’s reputation as a combative left-winger–a man willing to fight fascism in Spain, join the Home Guard in wartime England, and put pacifists to the sword of his rhetoric–has provided the signature note of Hitchens’s promotional interviews for Why Orwell Matters. In the opinion of the writer celebrated by the New York Times as “the Romantic” among a group of “liberal hawks,” there is no doubt that Orwell, too, would have supported war in Afghanistan and Iraq.2 There is little of this language in Why Orwell Matters, but hardly an interview has gone by without Hitchens bolstering his pro-war stance, and defending Orwell’s relevance, by invoking the ghost of European appeasement and Orwell’s consistent opposition to fascist militarism.3

     

    As I write, the British and United States governments are seeking approval for a United Nations resolution legislating the invasion of Iraq. The times are tense, with a constant flow of words dedicated to explaining a casus belli that a confused public appears to find inexplicable, inexplicably simple, or–if opinion polls are to be believed–explicable only by virtue of demonstrably false beliefs.4 Hitchens’s contributions to this torrent of opinion have consistently been received in light of his recent identification with Orwell. In the words of Ron Rosenbaum, Hitchens is an author “in possession of,” in fact, “possessed by, the spirit of George Orwell.” Or, as David Brooks has it, Why Orwell Matters shows us why “Hitchens matters more than Orwell.”5 Or, if you have taken against Hitchens since 9/11, join Alexander Cockburn in dismissing his departure from The Nation as something “inevitable ever since the Weekly Standard said he was more important than George Orwell” (Lloyd C3). Still, you may be relieved to hear that neither “regime change” nor “Islamo-fascism” is the subject of this essay. My subject is twofold: Hitchens’s attitude to Orwell’s left critics, and–most importantly–the way a reading of Why Orwell Matters reveals the ever-increasing distance between the political conjuncture of post-war Britain and the terrorized, incompletely globalized polis of our millennial moment.

     

    I will return to this last point in the final section of this essay, where I argue for an account of Orwell’s contemporary relevance that complicates Hitchens’s argument. In the meantime, another question goes begging for an answer: Why does Why Orwell Matters matter? The short answer is that it doesn’t–much. As postmodern political critique, Why Orwell Matters has little to offer beyond the axiomatic pieties of the “power of facing” and combative accounts of Orwell’s misuse by left and right alike. As a literary study it might, if lucky enough, find a place among other short works of criticism by literary authors, like Muriel Sparks’s fine book on Mary Shelley.6 But even then, Hitchens’s work begins by swimming against the current of recent academic writing, where Orwell’s brand of socialist humanism and self-consciously “transparent” prose is as antipathetic to the theorized vernacular of the modern humanities program as it is manna to an anti-intellectual media (and disillusioned professoriate) that claims to be scandalized by academic obfuscation and pseudo-radicalism.7 My sense is that Orwell’s early novels, including the excellent Coming Up For Air (1939), are constantly in print but rarely the object of serious critical condescension. Meanwhile, the late novels on which his reputation largely rests, Animal Farm (1945) and Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949), are seen as high-school perennials bearing largely symptomatic cultural worth–itself subject to deflation during the post-Cold War 1990s, when totalitarianism appeared briefly to be a defunct political concept.8 Orwell’s nonfiction does a little better: Homage to Catalonia (1938) remains a prestigious artifact of the Spanish Civil War, while essays like “Shooting an Elephant” garner the faint praise of persistent inclusion in freshman composition handbooks.

     

    This point can be made another way by considering Orwell’s place in a growing field of literary studies. Despite the recent expansion and diversification of modernist studies, much of it underwritten by the Modernist Studies Association (MSA), Orwell remains resolutely unfashionable among professors and graduate students pursuing advanced scholarship on literature written between 1920 and 1950 (dates which just happen to capture the period of literary modernism’s first mass readership as well as the span of Orwell’s writing life). The program of the most recent MSA conference lists papers on many a George (Schuyler, Auden, Gershwin, Lamming, and Oppen) but not one on George Orwell.9 Indeed, I can think of only one significant recent book that treats Orwell as an important figure in the evolving history of international modernism, in either its “high-,” “late-,” or “post-” manifestations. That book is Tyrus Miller’s Late Modernism: Politics, Fiction, and the Arts Between the World Wars (1999), which describes “Inside the Whale” as a “brilliant, undeceived examination of the main lines of British twentieth-century writing” (8). Miller takes seriously Orwell’s description of Henry Miller’s Tropic of Cancer as a final exhaustion of both the pre-modernist Whitmanian “democratic vistas” and the reactionary modernist “yearning after lost faith and impossible civilizations” (Collected 1: 548, 558). In Miller’s persuasive reframing of inter-war literary modernism, “Inside the Whale” is key to the periodization of late modernism–and not just because Orwell is so adamant about the depressing social relevance of Henry Miller’s “voice from the crowd, from the underling, from the third class carriage, from the ordinary, non-political, non-moral, passive man” (Collected 1: 549). Orwell’s insight lay in recognizing the “neither-nor” tone implicit in Tropic of Cancer and 1940s Europe alike: “the endgame of modern individualistic culture” (Miller 8-9). As Miller puts it: “Orwell posed the writer with a stark choice of two undesirable positions: the autism of being permanently removed from any effective participation in modern life, or the mutism of not being able to practice the free craft of writing” (38-39).

     

    The periodization of late modernism suggests just one way in which Orwell’s writing is relevant to cultural histories of modernity.10 I think, then, that it is reasonable to share–and make plural–Miller’s frustration with the fact that “few critics have developed in a systematic fashion Orwell’s essayistically formulated insight[s]” (9). Whatever the reasons for this neglect, it is a strange fate to befall a writer who, to quote just a few of the most topical elements from Hitchens’s catalog of Orwellian achievements, can be credited with “work on ‘the English question’, as well as the related matters of regional nationalism and European integration; . . . interest in demotic or popular culture, and in what now passes for cultural studies”; as well as an “acute awareness of the dangers of ‘nuclearism’ and the nuclear state” (11). Why Orwell Matters should be important, then, for the opportunity it affords to look again at Orwell’s contribution to the formation of political and literary discourse in late-modern Britain.

     

    But Orwell deserves better treatment than he receives in these pages: I cannot fully recognize this Orwell who, despite all Hitchens’s righteous bluster, appears strangely anemic and de-radicalized. The value of Why Orwell Matters is mostly unconscious. By denying Orwell’s radicalism, making him safe for millennial left-libertarian criticism, Hitchens tidily underscores the predicament of the contemporary Left and the gulf that separates Orwell’s mid-century socialism from our postmodern conjuncture. Reading Why Orwell Matters affords us a valuable opportunity to return to the scene of so many crimes, in particular the bitter fight–joined, in this case, by Raymond Williams–over the values of left cultural criticism in a half-century dominated by the moral defeat and eventual collapse of Soviet-brand revolutionary socialism. And because, against all the odds, Hitchens’s bleak liberal version of Orwell so strangely resembles Williams’s portrait of Orwellian pessimism, Why Orwell Matters reminds us of what has been lost in the journey from Nineteen Eighty-Four to 2003.

     

    An Orwellian Century

     

    To put it this way is to suggest that Orwell can still teach us an historical lesson or two. In Hitchens’s opinion, however, Orwell’s writing is permanently relevant, since its values are independent of political or aesthetic contingencies, but rest upon the certainties of an “irreducible” writerly ethic. The following comes from his conclusion:

     

    The disputes and debates and combats in which George Orwell took part are receding into history, but the manner in which he conducted himself as a writer and participant has a reasonable chance of remaining as a historical example of its own. (205)

     

    And again, in the closing paragraph:

     

    What Orwell illustrates, by his commitment to language as the partner of truth, is that “views” do not really count; that it matters not what you think, but how you think; and that politics are relatively unimportant, while principles have a way of enduring, as do the few irreducible individuals who maintain allegiance to them. (211)

     

    By themselves these passages suggest that Hitchens has abandoned any defense of Orwell’s ideas. Yet crediting Orwell with developing cultural studies avant la lettre demonstrates that Hitchens is still very much invested in the matter, as well as the measure, of Orwell’s writing. There are, then, two distinct strains to Why Orwell Matters, which do not synthesize as nicely as Hitchens would like. On the one hand, there is an abstract or contentless celebration of Orwell’s struggle for independence; on the other, a defense of Orwell as “uncommonly prescient not just about the ‘isms’–imperialism, fascism, Stalinism–but about many of the themes and subjects that preoccupy us today” (10).

     

    The lever that brings these contradictory virtues together is Hitchens’s description of Orwell as a man who struggled to master strongly-felt prejudices and emerge on the right side of history:

     

    The absorbing thing about his independence was that it had to be learned; acquired; won. The evidence of his upbringing and instincts is that he was a natural Tory and even something of a misanthrope. . . . He had to suppress his distrust and dislike of the poor, his revulsion from the “coloured” masses who teemed throughout the empire, his suspicion of Jews, his awkwardness with women and his anti-intellectualism. By teaching himself in theory and practice, some of the teaching being rather pedantic, he became a great humanist. (8-9)

     

    This insight leads to the most interesting moments of Why Orwell Matters, where Hitchens celebrates Orwell’s existential contrariness: an acquired ideological autonomy that is, simultaneously, the source of his greatest insights and the background against which his unresolved prejudices stand out. Thus Hitchens admits to, while haphazardly defending, Orwell’s “problems with girls”; criticizes the “missed opportunity” of his non-engagement with the culture and politics of the United States; and chastises him for his homophobic dismissal of W. H. Auden. That these passages are comparatively rare testifies to Hitchens’s basically heroic depiction of his writer-sage.11 More generally, it reflects the fact that the tide of liberal opinion has largely vindicated Orwell’s cussedness regarding “the three great subjects of the twentieth century” (5): the lies and massacres of Stalinist Communism; the need to fight Nazism to utter destruction; and the reality–too seldom acknowledged in the socialist circles of Orwell’s day–that “the overwhelming bulk of the British proletariat [did] not live in Britain, but in Asia and Africa” (Collected 1: 437). In Why Orwell Matters the definitive guarantee of Orwell’s relevance is the fact of his personal struggle to face the three “isms” in a resolutely contrary, if incompletely oppositional, manner. Hitchens presents Orwell’s legacy as a testament to the necessity of principled political disillusion.

     

    The reader will recognize the value of this ethic to a writer who, at least since his small contribution to the impeach-Clinton movement, has been the poster-boy for principled political back-stabbing.12 That said, there are parts of his analysis that I cannot disagree with. Hitchens is too quick to universalize Orwell’s “three great subjects,”13 but even Orwell’s ideological opponents tend to grant him the boon of his honesty and the fruits of his remarkable self-analysis. Raymond Williams (to whom I will return before long) begins the “George Orwell” chapter of Culture and Society, 1780-1950 (1958) by acknowledging this quality: “It is not that he was an important thinker, whose ideas we have to interpret and examine. His interest lies almost wholly in his frankness” (285). Hitchens seeks to avoid biography and hagiography; his short chapters are arranged so as to extricate Orwell from the deathly embrace of friends and enemies alike, rescuing “Saint George” from beneath “a pile of saccharine tablets and moist hankies” (3). But though he is generally successful in meeting these goals, there is no getting round the problem that a text so dependent on the hard-won integrity of Orwell’s literary and political vision needs greater socio-biographical weight to explain its subject’s struggles with history and conscience.

     

    Consider, for example, the rather incredible fact that Hitchens offers no comment on the question of how Eric Arthur Blair, hack writer and disillusioned ex-Imperial Policeman, transformed himself, between the writing and the publication of Down and Out in Paris and London (1933), into what Williams identifies as his greatest creation, the character of “Orwell–honest observer” (Orwell 89-90).14 Hitchens writes without even the most rudimentary analysis of the relationship between Orwell’s pseudonymy and his characteristic assumption of ideological neutrality: his strategy of trying “to write as if any decent person standing where he was would be bound to see things in [his] way” (Williams, Politics and Letters 388). I am quoting Williams not because I agree wholeheartedly with his conclusions about Orwell’s work, but because his analysis reveals the essential lacuna in Why Orwell Matters–a refusal to consider “not Orwell writing, but what wrote Orwell” (Williams, Politics and Letters 388). Hitchens’s frame of reference is retarded: Orwell’s personal struggle with prejudice is, finally, an insufficient mediating frame for the job of justifying “why Orwell matters.”

     

    Unless it bears the mark of ineradicable wound or betrayal–the suppression of the POUM or a fascist sniper’s bullet–history in Why Orwell Matters is something to be mastered and exposed by Orwell’s victories “in theory and practice.”15 The historical conjuncture from which Orwell wrote is not mined for clues to Orwell’s present-day relevance. Why Orwell Matters offers no thorough analysis of how Orwell came to occupy a social and intellectual position from which he was able to develop what Hitchens celebrates as an ethically reliable method of judgment. Unwilling to historicize Orwell’s novels, essays, or point-of-view (and surprisingly tentative when it comes to advocating an analogous critique of contemporary culture or politics), Hitchens is reduced to settling scores with his critics. Anyone daring to criticize or misread Orwell comes in for a rough kicking in the typically combative pages of this book–and since Hitchens is such a fine stylist and savage wit, his book is a highly enjoyable read. Still, the wrong-headedness of Orwell’s critics will never prove sufficient for the job of explaining his contemporary relevance. One begins to wonder, then, why Why Orwell Matters fails so completely in its appointed mission. I will seek to answer that question by analyzing Hitchens’s disagreement with Raymond Williams–a rigged fight that helps frame a different account of Orwell’s contemporary relevance.

     

    The Sad Ghost

     

    Of all the left-wing critiques anatomized in the chapter on “Orwell and the Left,” none exercises Hitchens so much as Williams’s lament for the “sad ghost of [Orwell’s] late imagination” (Williams, Orwell 71). After making his debut in a sampler of the “sheer ill will and bad faith and intellectual confusion” that has attended Orwell’s reception by left critics, Williams is later advertised by Hitchens as “my prime offender,” worth “saving up for later” (Hitchens 39, 44). When “later” arrives, Williams is described as “representative of the general [left-wing] hostility” toward Orwell (46). Once granted, this status gives added weight to predictable ad hominem attacks on Williams as an ex-Communist who is alleged to have “formed an organic part” of “Stalin’s ‘community’” (53).16 Among Williams’s other sins, personal and intellectual, are found the unacknowledged borrowing of Orwell’s opinions regarding Gissing and the semi-deliberate loss of the manuscript of Orwell’s essay on Gissing–sent to Williams in 1949, when he co-edited Politics and Letters–thus preventing “George Gissing” from appearing in print until 1960 (49). Besides attacking Williams’s integrity, Hitchens’s strategy is to suggest that his critical readings of Orwell are compromised by envy and bad faith (57-58).17

     

    Williams’s argument with Orwell is ultimately political, originating in what he sees as Orwell’s “substitution of communism for fascism as the totalitarian threat” (Williams, Orwell 67). He sees Orwell as a penetrating and mobile political thinker, committed to essential liberties, but hindered by a social imagination that over-identified “oligarchic collectivism” with communism:

     

    [Orwell] gave most of his political energies to the defense of civil liberties over a wide front. But in his deepest vision of what was to come, he had at once actualized a general nightmare and then, in the political currents of the time, narrowed its reference until the nightmare itself became one of its own shaping currents. (Orwell 68)

     

    Hitchens dissents from any characterization of Orwell as the prophet of Cold War despair (he never met an anti-Stalinist he didn’t like), but the fierceness of his attack on Williams obscures the fact that there are local points of interpretation on which they agree. Indeed, some of Hitchens’s observations appear to have their origin in the texts he otherwise excoriates. Writing on “Orwell and Englishness,” Hitchens comments that Orwell’s famous metaphor of England as a family with the wrong members in control “is notable for having no mention of a father in it” (127), while Williams says of the same passage that “the image, as it happens, admits no father” (Orwell 21). In his chapter on the novels, Hitchens quotes from “Writers and Leviathan” (1948) on the post-war political “compunction . . . which makes a purely aesthetic attitude towards life impossible,” where our “awareness of the enormous misery and injustice of the world” means that “no one, now, could devote himself to literature as single-mindedly as Joyce or Henry James” (Collected 4: 409). Regarding this “curiously adolescent” passage, Hitchens notes that “Finnegans Wake was completed in 1939 . . . and were not George Eliot and Thomas Hardy, to say nothing of Dostoevsky, alive to injustice and misery?” (173). Compare this to Williams’s remarks on the same text: “Finnegans Wake was completed in 1939. . . . Reading Orwell’s account quickly, one might never remember the English novelists from Dickens and Elizabeth Gaskell to George Eliot and Hardy” (Orwell 32). And later in the same chapter, Hitchens’s observation that Orwell’s Trafalgar Square dialogue in A Clergyman’s Daughter gives us “a distant echo of Joyce” (183) appears to owe something to Williams’s account of this scene as “derived from the night-town chapter in Ulysses” (Orwell 43). As Hitchens remarks apropos of Williams’s borrowings from Orwell’s Gissing essay, “it does not take a literary detective” to notice the affinity between these moments of allusion (49).

     

    Given Hitchens’s unstinting scorn for even a hint of intellectual bad faith, it would be disingenuous to deny the pleasure one feels in noticing such correspondences. Still, the significance of Hitchens’s borrowings from Williams cannot be reduced to a matter of authorial ethics. Why Orwell Matters is a popular book, and I do not suppose that its difficulties in achieving a level of scholarly integrity are particularly egregious. I believe, rather, that Hitchens’s non-attributions are symptomatic of his inability to address the ideological basis of his argument with Williams. The basis of that argument–nowhere theorized in Why Orwell Matters but ever-present in the defensiveness of its rhetoric–is over the status of collectivity and exile, community and dissidence, as rival political values. This is an argument which, given Williams’s attachment to an exploded notion of state socialism, should be an easy one for Hitchens to win. The irony–and, I would add, importance–of Why Orwell Matters is that he does not.

     

    Williams’s disagreements with Orwell are remarkably consistent. In Culture and Society he quotes from Nineteen Eighty-Four, criticizing Orwell for omitting any liberating purchase beyond the narrator’s description of the proles “as an undifferentiated mass beyond one, the ‘monstrous’ figure” (294). Thirteen years later, he finds that the same passages evince a “stale revolutionary romanticism” that involves “a dreadful underestimate . . . of the structures of exploitation through which the metropolitan states are sustained” (Orwell 79-80). In Politics and Letters, Orwell’s depictions of the working classes are related to “an extreme distaste for humanity of every kind” that Williams claims to observe “in Orwell’s choice of the sort of working-class areas he went to, the deliberate neglect of the families who were coping . . . in favour of the characteristic imagery of squalor” (390). Throughout these texts, Williams puts the accent on Orwell’s “inhuman” denial of proletarian consciousness and revolutionary possibility (Orwell 73). His judgment, over the years, becomes harsher and more comprehensive; but it is clear, reading these essays and interviews, that one is involved in a debate over the necessary values of a post-Stalinist left cultural criticism: a discourse in which Williams cannot reconcile Orwell’s “power of facing” with his desire for a utopian estimate of human–collective and working-class–potentiality.

     

    This is an argument which Hitchens embraces with gusto:

     

    A phrase much used by Communist intellectuals of the period was “the great Soviet experiment.” That latter word should have been enough in itself to put people on their guard. To turn a country into a laboratory is to give ample warning of inhumanity. (187)

     

    It is clear from Why Orwell Matters, as it is from his recent rejoinder to Martin Amis’s Koba the Dread (2002), that Hitchens has done with even the vestiges of socialist utopianism: “If it matters, I now agree with [Amis] that perfectionism and messianism are the chief and most lethal of our foes” (“Lightness” n.p.). His anger with Williams emanates from the judgment that in Orwell “the substance of community is lacking” and that, having affirmed a principle of autonomy or self-exile, Orwell could not “carry [himself] directly through to actual community” (Williams, Culture and Society 289-90). Hitchens reacts viscerally to comments such as these, and especially to the insistence that “‘totalitarian’ describes a certain kind of repressive social control, but, also, any real society, any adequate community, is necessarily a totality” (Williams, Culture and Society 291). In Hitchens’s estimation, the left need not–pace Amis–apologize for the horrors of the Soviet “experiment.” And yet the only “believing community” that he upholds within the pages of Why Orwell Matters is the one in which he situates Orwell and himself: a community of “dissident intellectual[s] who [prefer] above all other allegiances the loyalty to truth” (52). Against “the torpid ‘community’ loyalty of men like Raymond Williams,” Hitchens poses the Eastern European dissidents who read and reproduced samizdat versions of Orwell’s dystopic novels.

     

    These are points well made, spoiled only by Hitchens’s over-identification of dissidence with liberal anti-Stalinism–a rhetorical move that allows him to ignore the other half of Williams’s argument:

     

    [Orwell’s] attacks on the denial of liberty are admirable: we have all, through every loyalty, to defend the basic liberties of association and expression, or we deny man. Yet when the exile speaks of liberty, he is in a curiously ambiguous position, for while the rights in question may be called individual, the condition of their guarantee is inevitably social. (Culture and Society 291)

     

    If, as Orwell says in “Writers and Leviathan,” the writer must “draw a sharper distinction than we do at present between our political and our literary sensibilities” (Collected 4: 412), then one can see the justice of Williams’s claim that “the exile” fears political “involvement” not only because “he does not want to be compromised” but also because “he can see no way of confirming, socially, his own individuality” (Culture and Society 291). This is the familiar dilemma of liberal individualism, where the guarantee of social identity is framed by a series of negative liberties and identifiers. It is in this sense, then, that Hitchens misrepresents Williams’s comments about totalitarianism, which end with the crucial qualifier that “to the exile, society as such is totalitarian” (Culture and Society 291, emphasis added). I wish to suggest that Hitchens cannot engage with this discourse without exposing the underbelly of his depiction of Orwell’s politics: a left-libertarian Orwell whose commitment to democratic socialism has been reduced to a series of oppositional poses. Hitchens is scornful of postmodern interpretations of Orwell’s writing. His assertions about moral objectivity to the contrary, however, his politics are as postmodern as one could like, being largely a matter of rhetorical positionality, without even Orwell’s tenuous connection to the politics of class, systems, and economic structure.

     

    As Williams points out, Orwell’s political writings lack any cohesive theory of power or class society: “Orwell hated what he saw of the consequences of capitalism, but he was never able to see it, fully, as an economic and political system” (Orwell 22). But here, Williams joins with Hitchens in his failure to engage with the socialist remnant of Orwell’s writing–and it is this remnant that will save Orwell from friend and enemy alike. Orwell’s assault on proletarian pieties was necessarily ameliorated by the persistence of social democratic governments within Europe: “actually existing” welfare-state economies. This is the fact which Williams downplays and which Hitchens ignores completely. In Williams’s account, the “condition of Orwell’s later works is that they had to be written by an ex-socialist. It also had to be someone who shared the disillusion of the generation: an ex-socialist who had become an enthusiast for capitalism could not have had the same effect” (Politics and Letters 390). Here, Williams refuses to acknowledge that Orwell’s lack of “enthusiasm” for capitalism could otherwise be read as a persistent belief in socialism itself. Orwell’s August 1945 “London Letter” to Partisan Review, written days before the publication of Animal Farm and during the composition of Nineteen Eighty-Four, analyzes the general election victory of the Atlee-led Labour Party in terms that holds the mainstream British left to a radical political standard:

     

    A Labour government may be said to mean business if it (a) nationalises land, coal mines, railways, public utilities and banks, (b) offers India immediate Dominion Status (this is a minimum), and (c) purges the bureaucracy, the army, the diplomatic service, etc so thoroughly as to forestall sabotage from the Right. . . . The great need of the moment is to make people aware of what is happening and why, and to persuade them that Socialism is a better way of life but not necessarily, in its first stages, a more comfortable one. (Collected 3: 396-7)

     

    Unless one ignores or reworks Orwell’s definition of the term, it is false to describe him as an “ex-socialist.” Socialism was, for the later Orwell, synonymous with “Social Democracy” and the need to demonstrate that “Social Democracy, unlike capitalism, offers an alternative to Communism” (Collected 4: 397). Reading Orwell’s later political writings one does not only witness a doctrine of despair or outsiderism–there is, also, a tenacious belief in the Western nations’ ability to draw on a “tradition of democratic Socialism” extant in Europe and Australasia (Collected 4: 371). Orwell might not have the vocabulary to reconcile his political program with the need to “[confirm] his social identity” in a fashion that goes beyond the negative identity of liberal democracy, but Hitchens and Williams ultimately share the fault of making him seem a more blighted and pessimistic political thinker than he is.

     

    Reading Williams and Hitchens alongside one another suggests that Orwell the novelist is a more ideological writer than Orwell the journalist. A novel like Nineteen Eighty-Four is less well-attuned to Orwell’s political imagination than are his restless, endlessly inquisitive, error-strewn political essays. In “Writers and Leviathan,” Orwell asserts that “in politics one can never do more than decide which of two evils is the lesser” (Collected 4: 413). This dogma is supposed to free the writerly side of one’s brain for unconstrained truth-telling. Yet in the dystopias of his late novels, the evil of oligarchic collectivism crowds out the petty, everyday struggle for socialist policies in this world. This is Williams’s great observation, but it comes at the price of neglecting Orwell’s journalistic attempts to make liberal values work in the service of collective social policy. Hitchens, meanwhile, finds value only in the negative critique of Orwell’s dystopic side–a fact that can be explained by his greater reluctance to engage with the British left’s historic failure to defend socialism against its extinction by neo-liberalism. “Community” in Why Orwell Matters is not just the condition of being back inside the whale; its anathematization is the price Hitchens pays for rescuing his hero. Re-historicizing Orwell would compel Hitchens to re-radicalize him beyond the bounds of liberal ethics, for only ideas such as “community” can explain the puzzling-through of class and collective action that is everywhere present in Orwell but absent from Hitchens’s reconsideration of his political and literary hero.

     

    It is this which connects Hitchens to the British New Left intellectuals whom he alternately glad-hands and upbraids. And here we can take counsel from a different–and more polite–argument among the theoreticians of the post-Stalinist left in Britain. I want to end with Perry Anderson’s recent retrospective on Eric Hobsbawm’s Age of Extremes, where he argues that Hobsbawm is still prone to a “persistent underestimation of neo-liberalism as the dominant idiom of the period” (Anderson 17). It is the extinction of any existing alternative to neo-liberal political economies, and the concomitant destruction of welfare-state social democracy, that really separates Hitchens and his readers from Orwell and Williams. Anderson writes of two competing instincts in Hobsbawm’s historiography: the “dream of the Popular Front . . . that there was no victory of one party over the other” and the pessimistic realization that

     

    the struggle between revolutionary socialism and capitalism was a fight whose disastrous end, in the death of one at the hands of the other, is the measure of all that has been lost with the elimination of the difference between them. (17)

     

    As long as Orwell is read and a left intelligentsia remains, battles will be fought over where we should situate him amid this difference. The negative value of Why Orwell Matters is that its belated vision of Orwell’s importance prompts us to remember him as a writer from a multipolar age, where the “difference” between Russia and Europe offered some room for maneuver. Why Orwell Matters is proof that this notion now feels like a bad historical memory, a nostalgia not to be contemplated, especially for the contrarian prophet of Islamo-fascism.

     

    Notes

     

    1. These quotations are from an edited version of Garton Ash’s introduction, published online in the Hoover Institution’s Hoover Digest, No. 4 (2001).

     

    2. See Packer.

     

    3. What is inconsistent in Orwell, however, are the means and modality of anti-fascist resistance. It is not beneath notice that Hitchens fails to explain such shifts, never referring to Orwell’s letters and essays from 1939, when Orwell associated the militarism of the anti-fascist Left with a political myopia likely to bring about the kind of “fascizing process” it ostensibly sought to oppose. In a 1939 letter to Herbert Read, entertaining plans for secret anti-war agitation, Orwell wrote that “the fascists will have it all their own way unless there is in being some body of people who are both anti-war and anti-fascist” (Collected 1: 425).

     

    4. I am referring to opinion polls, conducted by media conglomerates like Knight Ridder and AOL/Time Warner, which suggest that fifty percent of Americans believe that one or more of the 9/11 hijackers was Iraqi, and that seventy-two percent think Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was personally involved in planning the 9/11 attacks. See Rubin, A19.

     

    5. See works cited list for full bibliographic details of these online sources.

     

    6. Muriel Spark, Child of Light: A Reassessment of Mary Shelley (Hadleigh, Essex: Tower Bridge, 1951).

     

    7. On this topic, see Miller.

     

    8. A survey of the MLA database confirms this general sense: there is no shortage of work being done on Orwell, but little by leading critics from the United States and the United Kingdom, while the only debate in which he has seemed essential has been the relentless controversy over “bad writing” (see n. 7, above). The most recent article of note in a major scholarly journal is Rita Felski’s 2000 PMLA essay on Keep the Aspidistra Flying (1936), “Nothing to Declare: Identity, Shame, and the Lower Middle Class.” The majority of recent essays on Orwell–some of them very fine–have been published in smaller journals, in essay collections published on the European continent, or in foreign-language journals.

     

    9. See the website for MSA 4 (University of Wisconsin, Madison: 31 October-3 November, 2002) at: <http://msa.press.jhu.edu/NM4sched.html> (accessed October 10, 2002). The “Auden” in question is, I assume, Wystan Hugh Auden’s father, George Auden.

     

    10. There are many other elements of his work that remain insufficiently discussed, including potentially less flattering ones like the link between English patriotism, the essay “Politics and the English Language,” and the racialized models of linguistic reform detailed by Michael North, among others.

     

    11. This quality is measurable both in the extent of Hitchens’s claims for Orwell as an intellectual pioneer and in his habit of ending his chapters with endorsements of Orwell’s positions. Thus, “Orwell and the Feminists” closes: “At least it can be said for Orwell that he registered his participation in this unending conflict” [i.e., “the battle over what is and what is not, in human and sexual relations, natural”] “with a decent minimum of hypocrisy” (154). The chapter on Orwell’s supposed post-war report on Communists and fellow-travelers ends in similar fashion: “In this essential confrontation, Orwell kept his little corner of the Cold War fairly clean” (169). The emphasis, in both these statements, rests on Orwell’s ethical decency, and allows–especially regarding Orwell’s opinions on human sexuality–for a modicum of dissent from his views. But these statements are perorations to chapters that, respectively, find every feminist reading of Orwell wanting in some important respect and describe Orwell’s “List” as insignificant and, anyway, largely correct. Few readers are likely to read Hitchens’s encomiums to Orwellian virtue as merely compensatory.

     

    12. The details of Hitchens’s fights with erstwhile colleagues on the Left and Right will have to await a braver and more dedicated writer than the present author: they go back far beyond the contradiction of Sidney Blumenthal that was Hitchens’s contribution to the Clinton impeachment trial. To be fair to Hitchens, he is candid and (to this unsympathetic reader, convincing) in his public accounting for his more recent renunciation of certain left-wing identities. The following is from one of Hitchens’s many contributions to a discussion of Why Orwell Matters held on Andrew Sullivan’s website. It is dated 30 October 2002: “I stopped identifying myself politically about two years ago, which meant in practice that I no longer thought it worthwhile to say I was a socialist. It doesn’t sting me when leftists accuse me of being a class traitor or a sellout, because that language lost its power decades ago in any case. I would, however, distinguish myself from people like David Horowitz–who has been friend and enemy by turns and whom I respect–in this way. David repudiates his past. I am slightly proud of the things I did and said when I was on the left, and wouldn’t disown most of them. I am pretty sure that I won’t change on this point, and don’t feel any psychic urge to recantation.” See <http://www.andrewsullivan.com/bookclub.php> (accessed 19 November 2002).

     

    13. Imperialism, Communism, and Fascism are not a bad trio, but what about the “ism” of Feminism: the victorious fight for female suffrage in the West, and the struggle–in despotic and liberal states alike–for economic and sexual freedom? Hitchens’s chapter on “Orwell and the Feminists” considers feminist readings of Orwell’s novels and journalism but does its best to imply that Orwell’s failure to engage with feminism (as a mass political movement or as a re-evaluation of the politics of everyday life) should hardly figure in the debit column when we come to assess his twenty-first-century relevance. The defensiveness of Hitchens’s engagement with Orwell’s feminist critics is already signaled in feminism’s erasure from the list of the twentieth century’s “three great subjects.”

     

    14. Hitchens does not, I must add, entirely ignore the question of Eric Arthur Blair’s pseudonymous identity: he brusquely dismisses the whole question. In the midst of disagreeing with Edward Said’s depiction of Orwell as a bourgeois writer, he refers to Peter Stansky and William Abrams, writers of the biographical study, Orwell: The Transformation, as “co-authors obsessed with the Blair/Orwell distinction” (42). This is the closest Hitchens comes to commenting on this matter.

     

    15. On the question of Orwell’s mastery of ideology, the British edition of Why Orwell Matters is more brazen: it is titled Orwell’s Victory (Allen Lane: Penguin, 2002).

     

    16. As it happens, I agree with Hitchens that there’s nothing especially unreliable about ad hominem polemics. I may resent him calling Williams “the overrated doyen of cultural studies” (which is just rude); but I cannot object to him noting that Williams’s “first published work, co-authored with Eric Hobsbawm, was a Cambridge student pamphlet defending the Soviet Union’s [1939] invasion of Finland” (73, 47). As Hitchens says in defending Orwell over his addition of ethnic and sexual characteristics to his “List” of Communists and fellow-travelers: “These things about people are worth knowing” (165).

     

    17. See 53-55 and 71-72 for Hitchens’s treatment of Williams as a critical reader of Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four, respectively.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Anderson, Perry. “Confronting Defeat.” London Review of Books 17 Oct. 2002: 10-17.
    • Brooks, David. “Orwell and Us: The Battle over George Orwell’s Legacy.” The Weekly Standard 23 Sept. 2002. 22 Oct. 2002. <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/001/653xorlj.asp>.
    • Felski, Rita. “Nothing to Declare: Identity, Shame, and the Lower Middle Class.” PMLA 115. 1 (Jan. 2000): 33-45.
    • Garton Ash, Timothy. “Why Orwell Matters.” Hoover Digest 4 (2001). 18 Nov. 2002. <www- hoover.stanford.edu/publications/digest/014/ash.html>.
    • Hitchens, Christopher. “Lightness at Midnight: Stalinism Without Irony.” Atlantic Monthly Sept. 2002. 9 Oct. 2002. <www.theatlantic.com/issues/2002/09/hitchens.htm>.
    • Lloyd, David. “The Reliable Source.” Washington Post 26 Sept. 2002: C3.
    • Miller, James. “Is Bad Writing Necessary? George Orwell, Theodor Adorno, and the Politics of Language.” Lingua Franca 9.9 (Dec-Jan 2000): 33-44.
    • Miller, Tyler. Late Modernism: Politics, Fiction, and the Arts Between the World Wars. Berkeley: U of California P, 1999.
    • North, Michael. The Dialect of Modernism: Race, Language, and Twentieth-Century Literature. New York: Oxford UP, 1994.
    • Orwell, George [Eric Arthur Blair]. Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters. 4 vols. Eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus. 1968. Boston: Nonpareil, 2000.
    • —. The Road to Wigan Pier. London: Victor Gollancz, 1937.
    • Packer, George. “The Liberal Quandary over Iraq.” New York Times 8 Dec. 2002. 13 Mar. 2003. <http://www2.kenyon.edu/depts/religion/fac/Adler/Politics/Liberal-quandary.htm>.
    • Rosenbaum, Ron. “The Men Who Would Be Orwell.” New York Observer 14 Jan. 2002. 23 Oct. 2002. <www.observer.com/pages/story.asp?ID=5326>.
    • Rubin, Trudy. “The Case for War.” Philadelphia Inquirer. 12 Mar. 2003: A19.
    • Stansky, Peter, and William Abrahams. The Unknown Orwell and Orwell: The Transformation. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1994.
    • Williams, Raymond. Culture and Society: 1780-1950. New York: Columbia UP, 1958.
    • —. George Orwell. 1971. New York: Columbia UP, 1981.
    • —. Politics and Letters: Interviews with New Left Review. London: New Left, 1979.

     

  • “A Generation of Men Without History”: Fight Club, Masculinity, and the Historical Symptom

     

    Krister Friday

    English Department
    Michigan State University
    kfriday@msu.edu

     

    There is a brief but suggestive moment in Chuck Palahiuk’s popular novel, Fight Club, in which the first-person, unnamed narrator describes how Tyler Durden splices tiny pornographic frames into film reels. In the scene (dramatized in David Fincher’s largely faithful cinematic adaptation of the novel), the narrator describes how Tyler, working as a projectionist at a public theater, comes to splice the image of an erection into a family film:

     

    You’re a projectionist and you’re tired and angry, but mostly you’re bored so you start by taking a single frame of pornography collected by some other projectionist that you find stashed away in the booth, and you splice this frame of a lunging red penis or a yawning wet vagina close-up into another feature movie.

     

    This is one of those pet adventures, when the dog and the cat are left behind by a traveling family and must find their way home. In reel three, just after the dog and cat, who have human voices and talk to each other, have eaten out of a garbage can, there’s the flash of an erection. Tyler does this. (29-30)

     

    Significant in its brevity, this recollected scene comes as close as any in encapsulating Fight Club‘s narrative logic and its complex, imaginative imbrication of identity and historical self-consciousness.

     

    For what Tyler inserts is a single, subliminal frame that represents a moment of masculine prowess. It flickers for an instant, barely registered, before leaving an afterimage that lingers in the (future) memories of the audience. In sequence and out of sequence, fleeting and memorable, framed and frameless, the afterimage serves as the phallic signature of the novel’s charismatic and mischievous anti-hero–and as such as an appropriate emblem for the text’s conception of masculine identity in late-twentieth-century American culture. Much like Tyler’s subliminal insertion, Fight Club avers and projects a masculine identity it sees as both revolutionary and evanescent, an identity whose arrogated transience raises several questions regarding its historical lineaments and periodic framing. Why is this projection necessary? To whom is it addressed? Not from where, but from when does Tyler insert his image, and against what or when is that image, identity, and time visible? How is the constitutive, performative relationship between identity, narrative, and temporal assertion to be understood? In raising these questions through its narrative and its narrative structure, Fight Club provides one example in contemporary postmodern fiction of how the dynamics of identity formation, the logic of narrative, and the antinomies of historical periodization can be conflated–governed as they are by the same impossible, tautological logic.

     

    In the form of a pornographic intrusion, Tyler’s subliminal frame suggests that Fight Club will code its masculinity in terms of the scandalous and the prohibited, an assumed identity-position that is coincidentally confirmed by at least one hostile reading of the film (and by extension, the novel’s) construction of masculinity.1 Moreover, as a fleeting afterimage, one framed as a recollected moment, the pornographic frame “exists” in the diegesis of Fight Club as a twice-removed ontology–as a memory of something that must have persisted in a (remembered) audience’s memory. Prohibited and temporally removed, this moment of masculine prowess is deliberately projected and framed as the marginal, as the erased, as a form of identity that is as imperiled as it is transient.

     

    Indeed, the excess suggested by Tyler’s pornographic emblem is realized in Fight Club‘s conspicuous, if not exaggerated, theme of besieged and waning masculinity. Early in the narrative, when the unnamed, first-person narrator consults a doctor because of unrelenting insomnia, he is given advice that can be seen as paradigmatic for the text’s overt interest in masculine affliction and its etiology: “Insomnia is just the symptom of something larger. Find out what’s actually wrong. Listen to your body” (19). What the narrator discovers, of course, is that this “something larger” is a crisis of masculinity in contemporary American culture–a crisis that produces conspicuous symptoms and necessitates even more conspicuous remedies.

     

    An insurance adjuster jaded with work and his own endless consumer consumption (“what kitchen set defines me as a person?” he wonders sardonically in Fincher’s film), the sleep-deprived narrator attends a series of support groups for the terminally ill, begins a vexed relationship with fellow support-group addict Marla Singer, and eventually meets Tyler Durden, a charismatic soap salesman and iconoclastic mischief-maker and eventual terrorist. The narrator and Tyler Durden seduce and then rebuff Marla, discover a taste for late-night, masochistic, bare-knuckled brawling between men, and start an underground boxing network as deliberate compensation for the emasculating effects of white-collar work and culture. According to the narrator, “You aren’t alive anywhere like you’re alive in Fight Club” (51). Under Tyler’s leadership the fight clubs acquire an underground popularity leading to their transformation into a more politicized, revolutionary movement: Project Mayhem, a series of escalating disruptions aimed at businesses, consumer consumption, and the financial system itself. Eventually, the narrator, along with first-time readers/viewers, discovers that Tyler Durden is merely the narrator’s alter ego.

     

    Both the novel and the film are structured by an extended flashback with the narrator, holding a gun in his mouth, explaining how he met “Tyler,” joined and then resisted both fight club and Project Mayhem, and now finds himself, at the close of the frame, engaged in struggle with “Tyler” in a financial building wired with Tyler’s bombs. In the novel, the narrator awakes to find himself in a mental institution after having shot himself, and in the film, the narrator shoots himself before reuniting with Marla as the bombs detonate across the financial district.

     

    As this narrative summary reveals, the wounding and masochism of Fight Club are key to the text’s construction of masculine identity, making Fight Club another example of what Sally Robinson has identified as a “dominant or master narrative of white male decline” prevalent in post-sixties, white-male American fiction (2). Robinson argues that such narratives construct a notion of male victimization and its related symptomology as redress for a perceived political and social emasculation–a way of compensating for a sense of disempowerment created by a contemporary culture in which the white male no longer occupies a central, unchallenged, normative position. In the context of the cumulative “threats” of identity politics, minority gains in the academy and in the workplace, the decline of single wage-earner households, and a waning of the white male’s monopoly on political power, these narratives have sublated the aforementioned cultural shifts into a new identity position–the embattled underdog and/or victim. In this way, Robinson argues, these narratives of decline allow white men to “mark” themselves as distinctive, even if that “marking” is only the dialectical obverse of an already eroding identity position. In Fight Club, this marking is achieved through the narrative’s compensatory trajectory. In the juxtaposition of male physicality and male bonding as a revolutionary alternative to emasculating white-collar work, ennervating consumer culture, and even vexing heterosexual relationships, Fight Club certainly stages a narrative of “white male decline,” but it is a narrative in which an atavistic notion of masculinity (i.e., one based on fist-fighting and terrorism) is first recovered and then offered the chance to regain its efficacy and reconstitute itself through revolutionary action.

     

    More importantly, as a biographical flashback of male decline and re-emergence, Fight Club is a narrative of identity, one that explains how the narrator came to be; how a certain identity (“Tyler”) emerges and comes to recognize itself; how the narrator, with the help of “Tyler,” acquires his “revolutionary” consciousness; and how, ultimately, the narrator “now” finds himself with a gun in his mouth. This retrospective structure is foregrounded by the dramatic frame of Fight Club, raising the broader and much more important question of the constitutive relationship between identity and narrative history. For the narrator’s flashback is a history of sorts, and as such it offers an example of the traditional logic of cause and effect that underwrites historical knowledge, especially biography: I am what I am because of what I was, what I did, and what happened to me. Told in retrospect, histories offer accounts of the past, and these accounts are inherently (but sometimes only implicitly) teleological, explaining, as they do, the present. That is why it is a commonplace to say that all (narrative) histories, including Fight Club, are primarily expressions of the present and for the present, and its condition, and its identity.2

     

    To be effective, linear, historical narratives must negotiate between temporal sameness and temporal difference, perpetually oscillating between the two. In order to allow historical transitions to be recognized as such, there must be qualitative differences between beginning and end, or between past and present. Without transition, there cannot be linear history. This means that in traditional histories–especially histories that justify or explain a certain distinctiveness of period, culture, or nation–the present and its uniqueness must be both present and absent in its own historical record or tradition. Similarly, an identity with a narrative history of its origins must be, quite simply, external and internal to its own temporal antecedents and matrices. This identity must be present in the sense that all its constitutive events or elements are now, in retrospect, seen as expressions or harbingers of the same, but identity must also be absent from its past, insofar as its uniqueness came to be and (necessarily) emerged from difference.3

     

    This same logic is foregrounded in Fight Club‘s singular, biographical flashback, but it is precisely this oscillation between temporal difference and sameness that Fight Club‘s narrative both needs and jeopardizes, as if the masochism contained in the text’s theme emanates into an openly self-defeating narrative logic. Although Fight Club‘s biographical structure offers an account in which a schizophrenic identity (i.e., “Tyler”) develops and comes to recognize itself (an account in which the present condition is the cumulative effect of the past), in truth the narrative and its frame, (i.e., the diegetic past and present), are, qualitatively speaking, too similar. They are, ultimately, equivalent expressions of the same condition, the same identity, and the same time. This is inevitable, for the simple reason that biography, like other narrative forms of history, suffers from a fundamental tautology. As Tony Myers explains, the oscillation between sameness and difference is integral to history, but it collapses because the interest of the present inevitably appropriates the past as an extension of itself:

     

    history becomes less a putatively disinterested account of the past, than a project of concatenation which yokes together the past, present, and future in a seamless flow leading to some form of enlightenment. Whether from the point of view of the “moment” of enlightenment or that of the present itself, then, history so conceived becomes a variety of hysteron proteron, ceaselessly maladapting the other to itself and finding only that which it is able to impute in the first place. (35)

     

    In other words, history succumbs under the logic of the same in which the “present” extends and consumes the historical horizon, making history merely a “record of its own inscription, a record that, of course, then succumbs to its own inscription, and so in a vertiginous thrall to the present” (Myers 34).

     

    This tautological relationship between present and narrative past has been well-rehearsed, especially in modern and postmodern conceptions of history, and it is certainly not an exclusive insight offered by a text like Fight Club. However, by casting its biographical flashback as a schizophrenic’s narrative, Fight Club foregrounds the way any history, pressed into service as support for identity, is necessarily both schizophrenic and tautological in the way it figures temporal sameness and difference and in the way it accounts for the fact that narratives about identity and its origins must, according to Zizek, “overlook the way our act [of recollection, of analysis] is already part of the state of things we are looking at” (Sublime 59 ). So, for example, in order for Fight Club‘s flashback to maintain the appearance of a teleological development in which a “new” identity emerges, the flashback cannot be Tyler’s at all. It must “belong” to another, to an unnamed narrator who serves as the precursor or precondition for Tyler’s emergence. What is a first-person narration must be disavowed–projected as it were–into the third person. Despite this, the biography is, ultimately, Tyler’s biography; it is the biography of a schizophrenic, albeit one who knows, at the beginning of the frame, that he and Tyler are the same: “I know this because Tyler knows this,” he reveals at the beginning of the frame (12). Tyler doesn’t “emerge” through a narrative sequence or linear flashback; he is present (present in his own past, so to speak) from the very beginning, even if that “presence” must be denied. In retrospect then, the very existence of this narrative flashback–a narrative that must deny its true presuppositions in order to read like at history at all–is merely a symptom, a narrative index or a narrative testimony to Tyler’s present condition and existence.

     

    Indeed, a closer examination of Tyler’s biography reveals that the frame–the “present” in which the gun is inserted into the mouth–and the historical “explanation” that is the flashback are both simply expressions of the same condition. Although Fight Club‘s narrative trajectory suggests, at first glance, that the crisis of male identity is something that is overcome through a redemptive recovery of male prowess and the development of revolutionary consciousness, the narrative only leads up to a “present” condition–captured in the opening and closing frame–of continued helplessness and the related sense that any male identity that exists is simultaneously on the brink of extinction, not emergence. Moreover, Project Mayhem is a movement that stresses the subordination of individual identity to the collective goal of destroying contemporary consumer culture and “blast[ing] the world free from History” (124). As such, its development represents a dialectical reversal whereby agency and identity (the fight clubs where “You aren’t alive anywhere like you’re alive [there]”) engender their own negation (Project Mayhem). In Project Mayhem, the narrator explains, individual identity exists only retrospectively: “only in death will we have our own names since only in death are we no longer part of the effort. In death we become heroes” (178). In essence, Project Mayhem is a movement that subsumes the identity of the individual subject (including Tyler Durden himself) and acquires an internal momentum beyond the control of the individual. Once he realizes that Marla Singer might be in danger and that the movement will inevitably kill thousands, the narrator tries to stop “Tyler” and Project Mayhem, but he fails. The movement, it seems, has grown beyond him.

     

    Ironically, although it is a movement that aspires to destroy “every scrap of History” (12) and secure a new identity for its participants and adherents, the genesis of Project Mayhem is itself an atavistic, compressed recapitulation of the familiar rhetorics and ideologies of western political history: demagoguery, fascism, and the class politics of the infamous communist parties. Despite the promise of a new, emergent masculine identity that becomes conflated with revolutionary rhetoric, Project Mayhem offers only the same masculine identity positions–the “scrap[s] of history”–it sought to sublate. As the fight clubs grow in popularity, Tyler’s cult status grows, and the fight clubs quickly evolve into an incipient movement structured around Tyler’s fascist-like cult of personality–complete with rules, uniforms, acolytes, militaristic overtones, and a “cell” structure. Eventually, the movement adopts the collective goal of class warfare and revolution, reducing each man to an instrument of the project’s collective will. As Tyler Durden explains, “no one guy understands the whole plan, but each guy is trained to do one simple task perfectly” (130).

     

    All of this should suggest that despite appearances to the contrary, Fight Club is not a teleological narrative. It cannot locate the temporal difference that underwrites its central claim: masculine prowess is an identity or condition that came to be, that is part of the evolution of Tyler Durden. In fact, all that Fight Club represents is the (narrative) circularity of the one condition that remains constant as a source of identity: masochism. Is the masochistic, male violence that informs the practices of the fight clubs a palliative, a vehicle to a new identity (You aren’t alive anywhere like you’re alive in Fight Club), or is it merely another symptom of the powerlessness and crisis of identity it is supposed to redeem? That fact that the fight clubs eventually lose their appeal and are sublated into Project Mayhem suggests that the masochistic violence that informs the fight clubs is merely another symptom to be overcome, another obstacle on the path to an authentic–and stable–male identity. In fact, as the narrator confesses, “You can build up a tolerance to fighting, and maybe I needed to move up to something bigger” (123). Moreover, the fact that Project Mayhem “culminates,” narratively speaking, in the closing frame in which Tyler inserts a gun into his mouth and shoots himself suggests that Project Mayhem is no different from the masochistic fight clubs it purportedly transcended. Ultimately, the culmination of Project Mayhem is merely another act of masochism and therefore, according to the aforementioned logic, merely another symptom. The collapse of the difference between frame and flashback, which is also the collapse between present and past, means that there is nothing, qualitatively speaking, beyond the symptom that is masochism. Although the narrator of Fight Club is advised to locate “something larger” beyond his symptoms, there is no redemptive meaning, no otherness to the symptom that can underpin a new identity for the narrator. Simply put, in Fight Club, symptom and its redress are one and the same, just as Tyler and the narrator and beginning and end are all the same.

     

    This tautology–Tyler is the narrator, the beginning is the end, redress is the symptom–means that in effect, there is no temporal difference in Fight Club‘s narrative. There is only the existence of a singular, a priori, masochistic condition that has no real temporal context or coordinates outside of its own act of self-assertion. Like Tyler’s pornographic splicing in the movie theater, this identity as symptom must be inserted into a (narrative) sequence in order to arrogate the ontology and “appearance” of a masculine identity at all. This act shows how narratives like Fight Club‘s flashback are always, so to speak, “after the fact.” They do not so much explain a condition as they justify or compensate for the condition’s inherent contradictions or impossible premises. As Zizek points out, “narrative as such emerges in order to resolve some fundamental antagonism by rearranging its terms into a temporal succession. It is thus the very form of narrative which bears witness to some repressed antagonism”(Plague11). In the case of Fight Club, this “repressed antagonism” is the fact that the masculine identity celebrated in the text is a performative tautology–one that takes its own act of self-assertion as proof of its “history” and its own ontological and temporal consistency. The logic of Fight Club‘s narrative is precisely this circularity, one that says, I became who I am because of my symptoms, but my symptoms are (already) who I am. However, like Tyler’s act of cinematic sabotage–one that requires a theater, a sequence, and a screen–the notion of masculinity averred by Fight Club is similarly in need of completion: it needs first to create, and then be projected into, a temporal context. It needs, in other words, both a time and, eventually, a history in order to become visible to itself.

     

    The logic of Fight Club‘s central symptom, masochism, raises the question of this temporal/historical dimension to identity, and it shows how Fight Club is much more than a reactionary assertion of masculine, gender politics. As we have seen, the collapse between identity and symptom is both necessary and inevitable, because it is through the symptom that the subject comes to be at all. At least I am a subject who has/needs this, the subject seems to say through his/her symptoms, and according to Lacan, this logic explains why the subject “loves his symptom more than himself” and will cling to it even after it has been interpreted and explained (away) in analysis.4 But the embrace of masochism is itself a temporally indeterminant logic, based as it is on abeyance, postponement, and anticipation. As Deleuze explains in his classic reading of Sacher-Masoch, masochism is a relationship to a pleasure that has not yet come:

     

    The masochist waits for pleasure as something that is bound to be late, and expects pain as the condition that will finally ensure (both physically and morally) the advent of pleasure. He therefore postpones pleasure in expectation of the pain that will make gratification possible. The anxiety of the masochist divides therefore into an indefinite awaiting of pleasure and an intense expectation of pain. (63)

     

    In Fight Club, the “pleasure” of masochism is associated with the new masculine identity it seemingly affords Tyler and his followers (You aren’t alive anywhere like you’re alive in Fight Club). By extension, we can say that this masochism, the very support for Tyler’s identity, is itself an empty form without content: it is an expectation of an identity that is to come. What Fight Club offers, in conflating identity as symptom, is a conception of identity in which abeyance and expectation become themselves the positive support for white male identity.

     

    Nothing underscores the way anticipation itself becomes the form of identity so much as the frame of the narrative itself, a frame which “prolongs” the masochistic act in diegetic time, subordinates all narrative events to itself, and suggests, through these formal indices, that masochism as a process is both the beginning and the end of Fight Club‘s narrative construction of identity.5 As a flashback “leading” to the present, Fight Club betrays the linearity of its narrative form and instead “display[s] the most intense preoccupation with arrested movement” (Deleuze 62) as its notion of identity becomes, in effect, the wait for identity.

     

    In this logic of masochism, it is the future itself that becomes the source of this (absent) meaning of identity, just as in Lacanian psychoanalysis, the inherent logic of the symptom points to the future as the context for the symptom’s interpretation. Although they are “meaningless traces” (Sublime 56) in and of themselves, symptoms presuppose their own interpretation and at least offer the promise, however illusory, that they will be read definitively. As such, the symptom is conceptualized by Lacanians as a message that appeals to the future:

     

    The symptom arises where the world failed, where the circuit of the symbolic communication was broken: it is a kind of ‘prolongation of communication by other means’; the failed, repressed word articulates itself in a coded, ciphered form. The implication of this is that the symptom can not only be interpreted but is, so to speak, already formed with an eye to its interpretation: it is addressed to the big Other presumed to contain its meaning. In other words, there is no symptom without its addressee: in the psychoanalytic cure the symptom is always addressed to the analyst, it is an appeal to him to deliver its hidden meaning. (Sublime 73)

     

    Of course, one of the fundamental Lacanian insights is that “the big Other does not exist”: there is no inherent meaning to the symptom; no self-grounding, signifying logic that can irrevocably redeem it; and most importantly, no final authority or context that can account for and contain all its iterations as instances of the same.6 Nevertheless, despite the Lacanian insistence on the metonymic “slippage” of meaning (and by extension, identity), the identification with the symptom is also a way of presuming or positing just the opposite; it is a way of arrogating at least the promise of such a proper symbolic context for identity even where there is none. Identifying with the symptom is thus a way of misrecognizing the symptom’s inherent metonymy, ignoring the fact that ultimately “perhaps a symptom…is not a question without an answer but rather an answer without its question, i.e., bereft of its proper symbolic context” (Tarrying 185). As a result, in the case of Fight Club, the male subject hinges his transgressive, masculine identity on the symptom, and in doing so, he is then obliged to look for his symptom’s proper context and thereby locate the temporal means to frame his identity as something unique or distinctive.

     

    This proper frame is, of course, history, and because of this we can begin to see why Fight Club displays such a conspicuous concern with both masochism and historical periodization as the twin lineaments of the text’s construction of masculinity. As Tyler’s signature act of cinematic insertion suggests, identity seeks a time that it can call its own, a time that says I am now and not then, a time that can render Heidegger’s temporality of Being into a sameness we call identity. As Bhabha writes in The Location of Culture, time, in the form of continuity and tradition, is frequently invoked as a sameness that subsumes contested space(s) and contested time(s) under the rubrics of national, cultural, and ethnic singularities.7 Bhabha’s study of the temporality of collective signification identifies a long-standing assumption that identity is constituted, ontologically, by the time(s) to which it lays claim. To belong to an era, a history, or a tradition, in other words, is to partake of an essential condition that in many ways marks and shapes us as distinctive, as belonging to this time and not another. The fact that the ontology of any historical condition and the ways in which it (allegedly) marks us are perpetually contested does not challenge the logic itself, but only serves to underscore how crucial time and history are to most conceptions of identity.

     

    What this means is that in Fight Club, the very identification with historical period, along with the essence it is thought to confer, becomes integral to the text’s construction of masculine identity. Periodization become the “screen” against which the text’s projected masculinity can become visible and emerge as itself, even if this “screen” is constitutive of identity rather than reflective. Periodization, in other words, is the promise of the symptom’s final context and the possibility of identity’s ultimate guarantee. As a result, because of the importance of periodization, it is Fight Club‘s historical imagination that is charged with envisioning the final, (historical) context that will “complete” the text’s notion of identity.

     

    An important declaration of Fight Club‘s historical self-consciousness is given by Tyler Durden (and repeated by his acolytes) in his explanations of the significance of the fight clubs. Tyler’s reasons for the necessity of both the fight clubs and then Project Mayhem are explained in conspicuously historical terms: it is not simply that contemporary consumer culture has emasculated men, but rather, the identity crises afflicting the (white) male subject should be read as the result of a postmodern “present” bereft of historical distinctiveness or identity. In other words, Tyler reads the crisis of masculinity and the concomitant need for masochism as imbricated within a larger historical condition. Variants of this “Tyler Durden dogma” (141) are expressed throughout both Fight Club texts, and Fincher’s film wisely condenses them into a manifesto-like speech given by Tyler Durden at the beginning of the first fight club:

     

    We are the middle children of History, man, with no purpose or place; we have no great war, no great depression; our great war is a spirit war, our great depression’s our lives. (Fincher)

     

    It is here that we can first glimpse Fight Club‘s anxiety over historical periodization, or more precisely, an anxiety over the absence of periodization that could serve as the proper context/support for identity. What Tyler announces is a familiar form of postmodern historical self-consciousness–one in which the “present” is conceived in crepuscular terms as an aftermath without recourse to a form of History predicated on the event. It is the event that anchors traditional History and makes periodization possible by negotiating sameness and difference: it is the event that distinguishes one time from another, and it is the event that marks/creates any particular period, which in turn is governed by the logic of the same. Without the demarcation of the event, periodization as a form of sameness is impossible, and without periodization, identity as a form of temporal distinctiveness is impossible.8

     

    According to Tyler Durden, Fight Club‘s deployment of hypermasculinity and masochism should be read as an expression of anxious preterition or “end of History” anxiety.9 The men of Fight Club fear their exclusion from a teleological and/or eschatological structure to History, and as the narrator suggests, this structure of History is personified into religious, patriarchal terms:

     

    We are God’s middle children according to Tyler Durden, with no special place in History and no special attention. Unless we get God’s attention, we have no hope of damnation or redemption. Which is worse, hell or nothing? Only if we’re caught and punished can we be saved. (141)

     

    Clearly, “nothing” is worse, because it is the very absence of periodization and its essence that leaves identity equally void. Bereft of “God’s attention,” an hypostatization of History as a metaphysical presence, the “present” becomes interstitial–not yet eschatological and thus not yet Historical. In Derridean terms, this condition is the “disjointure” that (un)marks the present and (un)marks all related ontologies, including periodization. In contrast to the alleged sufficiency of the present to be itself, to be a distinctive time of the same, Derrida conceives of temporality as characterized by a Heideggerian “in betweenness” that disrupts the boundaries between present, past, and future. In a reading that takes Hamlet’s lament that “time is out of joint” as emblematic of this disjointure, Derrida paraphrases this understanding of time as it is proposed in Heidegger’s “Anaximander Fragment”:

     

    The present is what passes, the present comes to pass [se passi], it lingers in this transitory passage (Wiele), in the coming-and-going, between what goes and what comes, in the middle of what leaves and what arrives, at the articulation between what absents itself and what presents itself. (Specters 25)

     

    Caught in this disjointure as the “middle children of history,” Tyler Durden and his followers await the event and with it, the distinction that periodization supposedly brings. Ironically, Tyler’s very conception of this disjointure–of this diegetic “present” that has not (yet) become a period–precludes the very identificatory closure that periodization allegedly promises. History as a form of identity, it seems, is always to come.

     

    Instead, what remains as Fight Club‘s most consistent condition–in addition to its relentless masochism–is the “perpetual present” described by theorists of postmodern consumer culture.10 The diegesis of Fight Club is precisely this postmodern present, one whose only salient feature is the “simultaneity and instantaneity” (Heise 23) of Western technological, communicative, and consumptive practices. In one notable sequence in Fincher’s film, for instance, consumer items instantly “appear” in the narrator’s condominium as he mentions them by name, and periodically, throughout his narration, brand names intrude, Delillo-like, into his consciousness. Similarly, the constraints on any kind of Jamesonian cognitive mapping of this temporal “present” or space are conveyed stylistically, rendered in Fincher’s film through its somber, caliginous lighting and ubiquitous anonymity. There are no wide-angle, establishing shots that might avail some purchase or perspective, and there are few proper names, locations, or dates. This is, in most respects, a claustrophobically generic city, nation, and time.

     

    Curiously, as Tyler’s description of the “middle men of history” reveals, this postmodern “condition” is perceived to be an inadequate form of distinctiveness and thus a failed lineament of a new, anticipated periodization. Why might this be so? Why does the masculinity/masochism Tyler and his followers embrace belong to another (future) context and not the present? It would be tempting to locate the essence of this masculine identity as akin to the “present.” The narrator, could, in other words, identify with his insomnia as a defining symptom of his own, postmodern time and become one more postmodern subject who laments his Baudrillardian, simulated condition, as the narrator seemingly has the opportunity to do in the beginning of Fight Club:

     

    So I didn’t cry at my first support group, two years ago. I didn’t cry at my second or my third support group, either. I didn’t cry at blood parasites or bowel cancers or organic brain dementia. This is how it is with insomnia. Everything is so far away, a copy of a copy of a copy of a copy. The insomnia distance of everything, you can’t touch anything and nothing can touch you. (20-1)

     

    As we have seen, however, it is because of the logic of the symptom that the narrator looks to a future time in which his identity will become meaningful or “complete.”

     

    This proleptic move is necessary, not only because the masochistic masculinity averred by Fight Club is merely a form of deferral, but also–and more inclusively–because Fight Club‘s narrative needs to identify another time as a possible location of difference and an “outside” to its own narrative presuppositions. It is important to remember that histories of identities suffer from the same tautology that besets histories of periods: the subject is hopelessly conflated with, and implicated in, its (historical) object. In Fight Club the diegetic past is the diegetic present: there is no history of something other than Tyler’s masochistic condition. Analogously, as Tony Myers explains, modernity and postmodernity cannot locate or identify themselves as distinct, consistent historical eras with distinct, consistent antecedents, because each “is of a piece with the history it underwrites, forever repeating itself…in the mirror of inscription at the expense of its object” (37). As a result of this conflation between subject and object, history–in the mode of a diachronic unfolding and a proliferating of difference–disappears as it is transformed into a object/period of study and a temporal frame that supports the present. Without difference or otherness there cannot be temporal change; without temporal change, there cannot be temporal distinction; without temporal distinction, there cannot be the historical “framing” of identity as something unique, even revolutionary. As Myers summarizes, “without the ‘otherness’ of the past we have nothing against which to define the now. We are thus besieged by a ‘nowness’ for which we can prescribe no limits” (34). In order to misrecognize this circular logic as something other than a hopeless, tautological gesture, Fight Club must locate the otherness necessary for its own act of historical framing. It must, in other words, “locate” a history for its identity and tell the story of how a new identity emerges and comes to be. Ultimately, the present, postmodern “condition” will not work as the sole support for identity: it is already too much a part of identity’s tautological gesture and thus too close to the identity it needs to objectify and foreground.11

     

    In the context of this tautology, it is clear that the theater projection that is one of Tyler Durden’s signature acts should be read as an allegory for Fight Club‘s overriding historiographic impulse, representing as it does the desire to “see” oneself historically and to locate–from without, from another time–the contours of one’s temporal identity. This desire is, of course, pure fantasy, but it is also the necessary, imaginative response to an impossibility created by historical self-consciousness. In other words, how can any historically situated act of reflection or discourse–a discourse that is itself a temporal event and part of a diachronic process of cultural production–see the boundaries of its own historicity as the “time” in which similarity inheres but also gives way to difference? According to Lee Spinks, this is the antinomic tension between “genesis and structure” that raises the question of “how a term within a totality could act as a representation of that totality” (2). As the image of Tyler’s unsuspecting theater audience suggests, the “solution” to this historiographic impossibility is to have one’s time and one’s identity (for both are conflated in Fight Club) recognized by the Other. This is a crucial reformulation of the way historiography is usually conceived. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, recognition plays a key role in the formation and support for identity. In this framework, the identity of the subject is equivalent to the subject’s perceived position in the sliding metonymic signification that is the Symbolic order. This process makes subjectivity beholden to the evanescent, shifting logic of the signifier, which, according to Lacan’s famous definition, “represents the subject for another signifier.” Within this metonymic logic, the consistency of identity is achieved through an appeal to the “Big Other” as that which (finally) guarantees identity, and this “appeal” often assumes the form of interpellation: a quasi-Hegelian dynamic of intersubjective (mis)recognition and symbolic identification. As Zizek explains, this interpellation means that the subject assumes a role it plays for the Other, and it is this role that confers consistency on the subject:

     

    the subject is always fastened, pinned, to a signifier which represents him for the other, and through this pinning he is loaded with a symbolic mandate, he is given a place in the intersubjective network of symbolic relations. The point is that this mandate is ultimately arbitrary: since its nature is performative, it cannot be accounted for by reference to the “real” properties and capacities of the subject. (Sublime 113)

     

    Implicitly, the Other is itself an effect of the logic and structure of the signifying network; it is the necessary presupposition that makes symbolic identification–and hence identity–possible. It enables us, according to Lacan, to “make ourselves seen” to ourselves through the process of recognition vis-à-vis the Other.12

     

    For Tyler Durden and the men of Fight Club, the Other can only be a personified History itself, and the Other’s “symbolic mandate,” as theorized by Zizek, is the perceived call to revolution. As the “middle children of history” (141) and “a generation of men raised by women” (50), the men of Fight Club await the return of a figurative, absent father and the historical recognition “he” will bring. The Father qua History is, in essence, the judgment of the future, the final (symbolic) context that will confer meaning on masochism, Project Mayhem, and the masculine identity that pins its hopes on both. For this reason, Tyler and his men don’t care if they achieve “damnation or redemption” (141)–all that matters is that they are recognized as having an historical identity as such.

     

    This identity and the form of historical recognition it requires are complicated by the fact that both masochism and Project Mayhem are asserted as a revolutionary movement bent on creating a revolutionary time that will support a revolutionary identity for its participants. Within the context of Tyler’s conception of eschatological History, how is this revolutionary identity to be framed? Is the new, revolutionary movement related in any way to the emasculating, postmodern context and that context’s cultural/historical antecedents, and if not, how can one frame a decisive break as something not dependent–even in its negation–on those antecedents? How, in other words, can the revolutionary identity be both unique and historical?

     

    In Fight Club, this impossibility is registered in terms of an ambivalent, contradictory relationship to the Other qua History. On the one hand, the men see themselves as bereft of patrimony in a post-historical, post-stadialist present, and this patrimony is figured as a form of parental neglect and/or abeyance. On the other hand, and by virtue of the impossible logic of periodization, that absence of History must become, dialectically, an oppressive presence against which the defining event of the (future) revolution and masculine identity can be framed. It is this contradictory, dialectical “presence” of History that the Other embodies and figures. As a result, Tyler Durden and his followers often imagine themselves as the victims of the Other qua History, victims who must face the accumulating excretions of a History in decline. According to the narrator, “What Tyler says about being the crap and the slaves of History, that’s how I felt,” (123) and similarly, the narrator observes that

     

    for thousands of years, human beings had screwed up and trashed and crapped on this planet, and now History expected me to clean up after everyone. I have to wash out and flatten my soap cans. And account for every drop of used motor oil. (124)

     

    As these passages suggest, the historical imagination in Fight Club oscillates between a rhetoric of orphanhood, neglect, and disjunction and a rhetoric of (oppressive) continuity. In short, there is the perception that there is not enough History and at the same time too much.13As a result, the figuration of the symbolic mandate of the Other becomes equally inconsistent. According to the narrator, if Project Mayhem succeeds in destroying the infrastructure of capital, it will effectively “blast the world free of History” (124). Like all revolutions, Project Mayhem is as much an assault on the past, on the antecedent, as it is a transformation of the present into the future:

     

    Somewhere in the one hundred and ninety-one floors under us, the space monkeys in the Mischief Committee of Project Mayhem are running wild, destroying every scrap of History. (12)

     

    At the same time, however, the revolution needs History, or more precisely, it needs to become History and be assimilated within a transcendent, temporal logic that will someday–finally, irrevocably–recognize the revolution’s significance for what it must really be. Contemplating the imminent bombing of the financial tower in which he stands, the narrator of Fight Clubpresumes the existence of the Other’s judgment, and as a result, he imagines the impending destruction as already imbricated within its future documentation as a Historical event:

     

    The demolition team will hit the primary charge in maybe eight minutes. The primary charge will blow the base charge, the foundation columns will crumble, and the photo series of the Parker-Morris Building will go into all the History books. The five-picture time lapse series. Here the building’s standing. Second picture, the building will be at an eighty-degree angle. Then a seventy-degree angle. The building’s at a forty-five-degree-angle in the fourth picture when the skeleton starts to give and the tower gets a slight arch to. The last shot, the tower, all one hundred and ninety-one floors, will slam down on the national museum which is Tyler’s real target. (14)

     

    Conspicuously, of course, Tyler’s perspective on the defining event of his revolution and the historical “perspective” on that event are literally one and the same. By arrogating the (future) perspective of the Other, Tyler hedges his bets against the judgment of History–imagining that the future, as the Other, will recognize his movement and its attendant masculinity in the same way that Tyler himself sees them.14

     

    As the culmination of Project Mayhem’s revolutionary event and, as such, the support for Fight Club‘s notion of masculinity, the anticipated destruction of the Parker-Morris building brings us back to the logic of the interstitial afterimage. Like the pornographic insertion that will exist only in retrospect, this revolutionary act of terrorism will also only be remembered as a “five-picture time-lapse series” (14) that will exist only for future historians. Both are phallic projections writ large, ones whose physical size compensates for their evanescence and thus for the tenuousness of the masculine identities associated with them. As the earlier description of Tyler’s cinematic sabotage makes clear, both are phallic “towers” that are in danger of not being recognized as such:

     

    A single frame in a movie is on the screen for one-sixtieth of a second. Divide a second into sixty equal parts. That’s how long the erection is. Towering four stories tall over the popcorn auditorium, slippery red and terrible, and no one sees it. (30)

     

    It is against the “screen” created by the Other qua History that Tyler Durden projects and frames his notion of masculinity–an act designed so someone can indeed come to see this figurative, historical erection that is Tyler’s revolutionary time. It is the Other that allows Tyler to disavow his performative assertion and thereby imagine the contours of this time from “outside” of his own narrative and historiographic presuppositions. Just as Tyler “sees” himself through the displaced, split mirror of an anonymous narrator, Fight Clubdramatizes how historical self-consciousness, as a form of (narrative) identity, is necessarily schizophrenic because it is necessarily and inevitably tautological.

     

    Thinking Historically in Postmodernity

     

    In the context of postmodern historiography and the debates over how to conceptualize postmodern historicity, perhaps the complex, historical construction of identity in Fight Club hints at an alternative dynamic at work in contemporary postmodern fiction–one that offers a rejoinder of sorts to those who, following Fredric Jameson, conceive of postmodernity as “an age that has forgotten how to think historically in the first place” (Postmodernism ix). According to Jameson in his now well-known argument, postmodern theoretical and aesthetic practices, as well as the omnipresence of a totalizing, spatial logic of global capitalism, have pre-empted all attempts to “think the totality” of our cultural/material condition and to construct a “genuinely dialectical attempt to think our present of time in History” (46). Jameson’s seemingly contradictory attempts to historicize the “waning of our historicity” (21) should be viewed as part of larger attempt not only to think the totality by critiquing the “present” in historical-material terms but also–and perhaps more importantly–to ground or account for the act of critique itself as it doubles back upon its own temporal matrix. Jameson’s career seems bent on constructing the complex hermeneutic and dialectical frameworks that could answer such a question–namely, how can critique be both “of its time” ideologically while still offering the ability to obtain conceptual purchase on the totality that is the “present.”15 However, what if there is no such position and thus no “outside”–temporally, dialectically, and hermeneutically–that could frame “postmodernity” as a consistent object, time, or material condition? What if, in other words, thinking the totality of postmodernity from within or from without is perpetually doomed to failure, largely because “Jameson’s critique of contemporary cultural production therefore appears destined to become merely the latest effect of a system of conceptuality that he wants to outflank” (Spinks 13)?

     

    What Fight Club suggests is that this failure isn’t as debilitating for historical production as it might seem. In fact, it may be vital to it. With the absence of viable conceptuality to “think the totality” of the present in ontological, historical, or material/cultural terms, we are still left with the exigencies of constructing identities–a process that nonetheless still invokes History and periodization as the necessary, transcendent horizons for framing identity, even if these are largely empty, formal categories without content or closure. For this reason, perhaps Jameson was right to suggest that fictive narrative articulates “our collective thinking and our collective fantasies about history and reality” (emphasis added) (Political Unconscious 34), but only if an emphasis on fantasy obliges further exploration of how psychoanalysis can frame the historiographic impulse, especially as it underwrites identity.16 In other words, “thinking historically” is a process that can never locate its object qua period/identity, but according to Fight Club, what may be more important is the way that this process of failure becomes itself a more fundamental dynamic of identity formation in postmodern historicity.

     

    What texts like Fight Club can contribute is a depiction of the ways a certain kind of figured, historical intersubjectivity informs the historiographic process. Thinking historically is a process whose only consistency seems to be its own perpetual, tautological gesture to frame itself and its own attempts to misrecognize this gesture by imagining an Other and a concomitant symbolic mandate that are, by necessity, “outside” of the temporal frame of what Teresa Brennan has aptly dubbed the “ego’s era.” In its invocation of the Other qua History as the support for identity, Fight Club suggests that maybe Jameson is right to insist on “cognitive mapping” as a means of thinking postmodernity’s material/cultural condition–but only if this form of interpellation is truly, as Jameson announces, part of a “return to the Lacanian underpinnings of Althusser’s theory” (Postmodernism 53). From a Lacanian perspective, historical interpellation is less about identifying the historical/material lineaments of the postmodern “present” and more about creating and securing an identity through a perpetual, imagined form of historical recognition vis-à-vis the Other.17 Although the Other is merely an effect–a necessary presupposition–in the system that produces “identity,” the Other supports the process of identity formation by providing a logic and a structure that explains why identity, historically speaking, is always to come. Just as the meaning of Tyler’s masculine revolution is always to come, the identity of postmodernity–as a period, condition, or a practice–is similarly deferred and unavailable.

     

    Ultimately, the presence of this intersubjective dynamics changes our understanding what it means for a text to be “historical” as a reflection of its time. Texts like Fight Club are not immanently “marked” or informed by their postmodern period or time so much as they assert–performatively, imaginatively, tautologically, in a most Tyleresque fashion–what their time (and identity) ought to be.

     

    Postscript: The Divergent Endings of Fight Club

     

    Fight Club is a wildly compensatory text, one that brims with a decidedly American, white-male-centered version of “our collective thinking and fantasies about History and reality” and one whose historical imagination is imbricated within a graphic celebration of a “deeply conservative articulation of masculinity…[which] is associated with the virility of industrialization and the social assertion of masculine power in physical labor and war” (Giroux and Szeman 33). In its megalomaniacal assumption that a single individual can engender a historically definitional social and political movement, Fight Club clearly expresses the kind of compensatory paranoia Patrick O’Donnell identifies as a defining temporal logic of American postmodern literature and film. Paranoia, O’Donnell argues, is a narrative strategy for recouping the identity of the postmodern, fragmented, rhizomatic subject by, in effect, conflating it with national and cultural identities within a prefigurative temporal framework. Paranoia is, in other words, the use of “destinal” History to consolidate identity, a process that requires “a certain suturing of individuals to the social imaginary in which crucial differences between agency and national or other identificatory fantasies are collapsed” (13).

     

    In Fincher’s cinematic adaptation of Palahniuk’s novel, this paranoia is encapsulated in the final scene of the film, although this scene is, as mentioned earlier, a rare but pivotal departure from the novel. After the film’s narrator shoots himself, his “Tyler” personality vanishes, and he is reunited with Marla Singer as the two survey the detonations that signal the onset of Project Mayhem. As if to underscore the paranoid conflation of psyche and History at work in the scene, the narrator explains to his long-suffering love-interest, “you’ve met me at a very strange time in my life” (Fincher). Not only does the scene aver the paranoid suturing of the narrator’s biography and the revolutionary event, but in doing so it also ends with a metaphysical guarantee: with the beginning of Project Mayhem, the revolution–and by extension, History itself–will unfold according to the logic and plan of Tyler Durden. By implying the “success” of the vision of History announced by Tyler Durden, Fincher’s film demonstrates how the paranoid (narrative) attempt to situate oneself in History results in an paradoxical “elision of temporality” (O’Donnell 25) in which temporal difference is erased in favor of a conception of History in which change can be predicted and future iterations are immanent–and thus “knowable”–by virtue of their origins.18 In other words, Fincher allows Tyler’s vision of History to be the final word on the matter, and this paranoid confirmation of the shape and logic of the future is tantamount to knowing what the judgment of History will be. As a (confirmed) part of History, Project Mayhem will, in the future, be grasped and understood as part of a continuity whose cynosure is the bombing of the Parker-Morris building.

     

    On the other hand, Fincher’s paranoid conclusion is, ultimately, a distortion, if not an outright repudiation, of the Lacanian logic of the novel. If, as I have been arguing, Fight Club provides an example of a psychoanalytic dynamic at work in the way postmodern texts “think historically” and recognize themselves as historical, then the apparent efficacy of Fincher’s ending–its narrative that conflates the subject with a reconstituted, metaphysical Historical logic–would seem to deny the crucial Lacanian insight that the construction of both personal and historical identity is an interminable process in a perpetual state of deferral or impossibility.

     

    In contrast to Fincher’s conclusion, Palahniuk’s novel emphasizes this inevitability of deferral. Because Tyler Durden awakes in a mental institution after his self-inflicted gunshot wound, the onset of Project Mayhem’s revolutionary event is presumably pre-empted, and the reliability of the narrator and hence the ontology of the “revolution” are both thrown into question. Although the existence of bruised and battered orderlies in the asylum, along with their remarks to Tyler, suggest an independent confirmation of the existence of the fight club movement, Tyler’s closing remarks from the hospital emphasize the choice of deferral over the engagement of the movement itself:

     

    But I don’t want to go back. Not yet. Just because. Because every once in a while, somebody brings me my lunch tray and my meds and he has a black eye or his forehead is swollen with stitches, and he says:
    “We miss you Mr. Durden.”
    Or somebody with a broken nose pushes a mop past me and whispers:
    “Everything’s going according to the plan.”
    Whispers:
    “We’re going to break up civilization so we can make something better out of the world.”
    Whispers:
    “We look forward to getting you back.” (207-8)

     

    Critically, Tyler chooses to delay his return to the outside world because it is here, inside the institution, that anticipation–and thus the same logic of deferral that governs masochism–can be endlessly prolonged. Tyler Durden will never “break up civilization,” and Tyler’s postmodern “present” will never achieve its distinctive, revolutionary significance and identity; instead, this impossibility itself is deferred and thereby transformed into possibility. In Zizekian terms, this is a dialectical reversal whereby deferral itself becomes the object of desire and the positive support for identity: “the impeded desire converts into a desire for impediment; the unsatisfied desire converts into a desire for unsatisfaction; a desire to keep our desire ‘open’: the fact that we ‘don’t really know what we really want’–what to desire–converts into a desire not to know, a desire for ignorance” (For They Know Not143-144). Given what we know about the difficulties of figuring and accounting for one’s historical identity, this ending seems preferable to Fincher’s–if only because it reminds us of how thinking and positioning oneself historically is always an act of fantasy that can never end and never succeed. It must wait, in other words, for just the right time.

     

    Notes

     

    1. In what looks to be the only academic review of Fincher’s film, Henry A. Giroux and Imre Szeman excoriate Fincher’s film and by implication, Palahiuk’s novel, arguing that far from a viable, Marxist critique of consumer culture, Fight Club essentially offers merely a “regressive, vicious politics” that “reconfirm[s] capitalism’s worst excesses and re-legitimate[s] its ruling narratives” (33).

     

    2. For example, in The Writing of History, Michel de Certeau argues that historical “knowledge” is more about contemporary interests and identity and less about preserving the Otherness of the past. In this view, history is the means by which one generation expresses its difference from its predecessors and that, as a figurative “dialogue with the dead,” history “engages a group’s communication with itself through this reference to an absent third party” (46).

     

    3. Most historical logics “solve” this problem through the concept of latency, in which identity can be both “present” and “absent” in the tradition or the historical record. For a discussion of the way in which latency serves as the iterative, contentious ground for national and ethnic identities, see Homi Bhabha’s The Location of Culture, especially Chapter 8. See also Slavoj Zizek’s Tarrying with the Negative, specifically his account of how “a nation finds its sense of self-identity by discovering itself as already present in its tradition” (148). For a discussion of how postmodern subjectivity appropriates latency for similar ends, see Patrick O’Donnell’s Latent Destinies.

     

    4. In his discussion of Lacan’s changing notion of the symptom in relation to the sinthome, Zizek concludes the following:

     

    What we must bear in mind here is the radical ontological status of symptom: symptom, conceived as sinthome, is literally our only substance, the only positive support for our being, the only point that gives consistency to the subject. (Sublime 75)

     

    5. In its approach to violence, even if it is largely masochistic violence, Fight Club betrays the same performative logic shared by most mainstream action movies: it positions violence (or masochism) as a vehicle in the service of something else (e.g., a lofty socio/political goal, a resolution facilitating a new identity position, etc.), but its construction of masculine identity depends not upon the goal, but upon the vehicle itself. If it is the vehicle that supports identity, then the vehicle must be prolonged. As Sally Robinson’s work makes clear, the narratives of white male decline operate according to this performative logic: it is not the wounding that leads to its own reversal and a new identity–it is the wounding itself and its perpetuation that confers identity. This is why, according to Robinson, narratives of white male decline have an interest in perpetuating the very conditions they seem to bemoan:

     

    In fact, and in consonance with the logic we’ve already seen many times in this study, that deterioration is necessary to the cultural recuperation of white masculinity–not because wounds are the necessary condition for recuperations, but because those wounds and the impossibility of their full healing are the basis of a new, post-liberationist white masculinity. (89)

     

    6. In other words, according to Lacan, meaning is signification that has not (yet) changed: it is signification that has not (yet) given way to subsequent signs and subsequent contexts. However, the consistency of meaning is inherently menaced by the sliding, metonymic signification that is the Symbolic order and the inherent logic of language. Like words in a sentence whose meanings are only “finished” when the sentence ends (but again always subject to additional sentences and additional paragraphs, and so on), meaning is always and only the process of postponement and revision.

     

    7. In his seminal work, The Location of Culture, Homi Bhabha articulates how historical narratives of continuity, narratives that retroactively create culture, nation and “the authenticating ‘inward’ time of Tradition,” (149) are internally menaced by the logic of iteration and the constant need to performatively transform signs of the present into signs of “Tradition.” For Bhabha, this split between the “pedagogical” and the “performative” means that the postcolonial time of the present and all its attendant identities is always split, always ambivalent, always never present, except in retrospect. As a result, what is modern becomes nothing so much as a contested space of iteration:

     

    The problematic boundaries of modernity are enacted in these ambivalent temporalities of the nation-space. The language of culture and community is poised on the fissures of the present becoming the rhetorical figures of a national past. Historians transfixed on the event and origins of the nation never ask…the essential question of the representation of the nation as a temporal process. (142)

     

    8. In his reading of Foucault’s genealogy of Western mental illness, Derrida explains how any history that invokes the event as a transitional concept at the same time invokes History as a metaphysical presence and continuity:

     

    The attempt to write the history of the decision, division, difference runs the risk of construing the division as an event or a structure subsequent to the unity of an original presence, thereby confirming metaphysics in its fundamental operation. (Cogito 40)

     

    9. In many ways, Derrida’s Specters of Marx is a meditation on what remains, historically speaking, without the event. In a question that has implications for Tyler’s “end of history” speech, Derrida asks,

     

    How can one be late to the end of history? A question for today. It is serious because it obliges one to reflect again, as we have been doing since Hegel, on what happens and what deserves the name of event, after history; it obliges one to wonder if the end of history is but the end of a certain concept of history. (15)

     

    10. According to Jameson, the postmodern “present,” in its erasure of historical difference, is characterized by an intensity that is both overwhelming and euphoric. Jameson writes,

     

    The breakdown of temporality suddenly releases this present of time from all the activities and intentionalities that might focus it and make it a space of praxis; thereby isolated, that present suddenly engulfs the subject with undescribable [sic] vividness, a materiality of perception properly overwhelming, which effectively dramatizes the power of the material–or better still, the literal–signifier in isolation. (Postmodernism 28)

     

    Summarizing contemporary theories of postmodern historicity, Ursula Heise explains how the “perpetual present” of postmodernity impoverishes our historical self-consciousness and, in historiographic terms, precludes the historiographic contextualization of the present as period or object. According to Heise, these theories all emphasize the contemporary focus on a present that is increasingly conceived as taking over both past and future, and the difficulty of envisioning temporal patterns that transcend the present and allow the observer to view it from a distance. (30)

     

    11. The collapse between the present and the self, and the way this collapse inhibits historical understanding, is explained Teresa Brennan’s History After Lacan. Brennan argues that capitalism, especially its commodification of nature, reinforces the ego’s psychotic, “foundational fantasy” in which the ego attempts to assimilate all objects as extensions of the self. Brennan observes that “an objectifying projection is a condition of subjectivity” and that rampant commodification only exacerbates the desire to control as a means of maintaining and expanding the domain of the ego (23).

     

    The fact that the narrator of Fight Club feels emasculated by his own instantaneous consumption and the fact that he yearns for a revolutionary historicity outside of that consumption suggests that his present is in the grips of the “ego’s era” in which the ego reduces what there is to itself, it reduces it ‘to the same place’: to one’s own standpoint, and, in this sense, eliminates the distance between one’s experience and that of the other. By locating these experiences in the same place, by making them spatially identical, the ego’s expansion thus eliminates the reality of distance. In turn, this means that the historical reference point that enables one to say that something is outside or beyond the self’s present experience is also the reference point which would enable a line to be drawn between the here and the now in perception, and images and memories that appear to be immediate but are not. It is this reference point that the ego’s era erases. (39)

     

    12. Zizek makes an important distinction between imaginary and symbolic identification, the latter being the notion of identification I am ascribing to the dynamics of postmodern historical self-consciousness. In imaginary identification, the subject appropriates a flattering image or identity for itself, although Zizek argues that most instances of imaginary identification have a built-in symbolic dimension as well. According to Zizek, this symbolic dimension means that

     

    imaginary identification is always identification on behalf of a certain gaze in the Other. So, apropos of every imitation of a model-image, apropos of every ‘playing a role,’ the question to ask is: for whom is the subject enacting this role? Which gaze is considered when the subject identifies himself with a certain image? (Sublime 106)

     

    It is symbolic identification, then, that creates the possibility of intersubjectivity and thus, the possibility for a historically-mediated relation to the Other.

     

    13. Interestingly, this ambivalent experience of history as both too much and too little correlates with Peter Middleton and Tim Woods’s observation that in postwar American culture and fiction there is “a widespread sense that the past has changed, but considerable disagreement as to whether it has mutated, become foreign, dangerous, been murdered or lost all its power…” (50).

     

    14. Lacanian psychoanalysis argues that identity can only be described and taken as a “complete” object in the past tense or in the future perfect tense. As Lacan explains, the emergence of identity is “a retroversion effect by which the subject becomes at each stage what he was before and announces himself–he will have been–only in the future perfect tense” (306). It is from this perspective, the perspective of the future anterior, that Tyler attempts to “see” himself historically.

     

    15. As Steven Helmling explains, for Jameson

     

    to “historicize” means on the one hand to achieve a narrative awareness of History and of your critique’s own place in it (thus, in good Hegelian fashion, to achieve a self-consciousness indispensable to any hoped-for Aufhebung), on the other to figure and attest History as an “untranscendable” Necessity that critique must suffer as its very condition (thus, in good Marxist fashion, to own that consciousness cannot determine, but is inescapably determined by, material conditions). (91)

     

    16. As a reflection of what Peter Middleton and Tim Woods describe as “signs of changing cultural experiences of the past” (141) in postmodern culture, there are a handful of recent studies that explicitly or implicitly explain the act of “thinking historically” or constructing history in postmodern fiction in terms of psychological/psychoanalytic dynamics.

     

    For instance, in Sublime Desire: History and Post-1960’s Fiction, Amy Elias argues that postmodern historical fiction is a form of “metahistorical romance” that combines a post-empirical, post-narrative skepticism toward historical ontology with a fabulist impulse to rewrite, reshape, and rework a “sublime” history that resists totalizing representations. Elias compares the workings of the metahistorical romance to a “traumatized consciousness” and argues that “history is something we know we can’t learn, something we can only desire” (xviii).

     

    Similarly, in Latent Destinies: Cultural Paranoia and Contemporary U.S. Narrative, Patrick O’Donnell explains how paranoia is the narrative strategy through which (historical) identity is asserted and affirmed in the face of postmodern cultural and theoretical decenterings and dispersions. According to O’Donnell, paranoia is the dominant form of historical self-conscious in American culture today, in part because paranoia offers “fantasies of control and identification” (8) in a postmodern, late-capitalist global network that threatens the integrity and agency of the subject. As a mode of figuring history, paranoia offers

     

    the last epistemology, the final form of human knowledge before knowledge passes away into information. Paranoia is, at root, a way of knowing ourselves in relation to others as having the capacity to be known, to be seen, to be objects of desire and attention. (9)

     

    17. In The Writing of History, Michel de Certeau advances a similar, psychoanalytic account of historiography that has greatly influenced my own, arguing that the Other is integral to the historiographic endeavor itself and, by extension, to the identities of those who write history:

     

    A structure belonging to modern Western culture can doubtless be seen in this historiography: intelligibility is established through a relation with the other; it moves (or “progresses”) by changing what it makes of its “other”–the Indian, the past, the people, the mad, the child, the Third World. (3)

     

    For Certeau, the Other is an impossible object of knowledge: as the very limit of or resistance to understanding, it is the unfailing support for a perpetual hermeneutic endeavor, even though that endeavor is predicated on assimilating–and thus destroying–the otherness it presupposes and the otherness on which it ultimately depends. This is why, in the passage given above, Certeau suggests that the discourse of history must perpetually “change what it makes of its other” and find new otherness in order to support its own activity. By implication, history and the historiographic act need to be prolonged and renewed because they are, primarily, discourses of power and identity. History is, in other words, a means of establishing the identity of the present by invoking the other.

     

    18. Implicit in O’Donnell’s work is an important distinction between temporality and (paranoid) history, a distinction that I have assumed in this paper. According to O’Donnell, paranoia is a retroactive, narrative resignification, but one that must misrecognize its own performative intervention and its own elision of temporality in favor of a seemingly self-evident, “destinal logic” of History. O’Donnell writes,

     

    the consequences of such constructed destinies are inevitably forged in the aftermath of the event itself, but as if the event, in its latency, always possessed this meaning and was always being prepared for by history itself. In this sense, history under paranoia is latent destiny, or history spatialized and stripped of its temporality. (20)

    Works Cited

     

    • Bhabha, Homi K. The Location of Culture. New York: Routledge, 1994.
    • Brennan, Teresa. History After Lacan. London: Routledge, 1984.
    • Certeau, Michel de. The Writing of History. Trans. Tom Conley. New York: Columbia UP, 1988.
    • Derrida, Jacques. “Cogito and the History of Madness.” Writing and Difference. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1978: 31-63.
    • —. Specters of Marx: The State of Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International. Trans. Peggy Kamuf. New York: Routledge, 1994.
    • Deleuze, Gilles. Sacher-Masoch: An Interpretation. Trans. Jean McNeil. London: Faber, 1971.
    • Elias, Amy J. Sublime Desire: History and Post-1960’s Fiction. Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 2001.
    • Fincher, David. dir. Fight Club. 1997.
    • Giroux, Henry A., and Imre Szeman. “IKEA Body and the Politics of Male Bonding: Fight Club, Consumerism, and Violence.” New Art Examiner 28 (2000/2001): 32-37, 60-61.
    • Heise, Ursula K. Chronoschisms: Time, Narrative, and Postmodernism. New York: Cambridge UP, 1997.
    • Helmling, Steven. The Success and Failure of Fredric Jameson: Writing, the Sublime, and the Dialectic of Critique. Albany: State U of New York P, 2001.
    • Jameson, Fredric. Postmodernism or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Durham: Duke UP, 1991.
    • —. The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1981.
    • Lacan, Jacques. Ecrits: A Selection. 1966. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Norton, 1977.
    • Middleton, Peter, and Tim Woods. Literatures of Memory: History, Time, and Space in Postwar Writing. New York: St. Martin’s, 2000.
    • Myers, Tony. “Modernity, Postmodernity, and the Future Perfect.” New Literary History 32.1 (2001): 33-45.
    • Palahniuk, Chuck. Fight Club. 1996. New York: Holt, 1997.
    • O’Donnell, Patrick. Latent Destinies: Cultural Paranoia and Contemporary U.S. Narrative. Durham, N.C.: Duke UP, 2000.
    • Robinson, Sally. Marked Men: White Masculinity in Crisis. New York: Columbia UP, 2000.
    • Spinks, Lee. “Genesis and Structure and the Object of Postmodernism.” Postmodern Culture 11.3. 2001.
    • Zizek, Slavoj. For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor. New York: Verso, 1991.
    • —. The Plague of Fantasies. London: Verso, 1997.
    • —. The Sublime Object of Ideology. New York: Verso, 1989.
    • —. Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology. Durham: Duke UP, 1993.

     

  • Barrett Watten’s Bad History: A Counter-Epic of the Gulf War

    Philip Metres

    Department of English
    John Carroll University
    pmetres@jcu.edu
     

     

     

    More than a decade has passed since the 1991 Persian Gulf War, a war that offered up an “instant history” that effaced the histories of colonialism and empire in the Middle East, thanks to saturation media coverage that covered up far more than it revealed.1 There is little doubt now that mass media sources, from CNN to the local news, acted principally as an extension of the military effort. This media saturation has led critics like Jed Rasula in The American Poetry Wax Museum to suggest that the only proper way to resist the war was to refuse to watch television (376).2 Yet Western intellectuals who opposed this war could reach no consensus about how to resist, or even about the very possibility of resistance within the centers of empire; the war seemed to evacuate the very notion of “centers,” as television coverage of Pentagon news briefings infiltrated homes throughout the world.

     

    The crisis of oppositionality appeared most visibly in the impasse between Jean Baudrillard’s postmodern analysis of the war (captured in the provocative title of his book, The Gulf War Did Not Take Place) and Christopher Norris’s Chomsky-inflected critique (no less provocative in the directness of its attack on what he terms Uncritical Theory: Postmodernism, Intellectuals, and the Gulf War).3 Neither articulates a completely convincing reading of the war, and each, in light of the other, feels somewhat one-dimensional. To overcome the seeming impasse presented by these contrary paradigms requires an analysis flexible enough to value both the productive paranoia of Baudrillard and the hyperrationality of Chomsky. The Baudrillardian mode impels us to: 1) question not only mass media coverage, but information itself, insofar as it becomes indistinguishable from propaganda in times of war, particularly in what Baudrillard calls “the profound immorality of images”; 2) recognize the way in which war itself has become virtualized, simulacral, and based upon the logic of deterrence; 3) describe the war as a Western civilian experiences it, where the media and military use of optical technology merge to a single aim; and 4) pursue a risky rhetorical strategy that mimics the dominant narrative in order to subvert it. The Chomskyan mode, on the other hand, provides us a model that helps to: 1) deconstruct U.S. media coverage of the war by producing an historical narrative of U.S. foreign policy that emphasizes its complicity in the situation it aims to solve by war and by producing an alternative narrative of war resistance, both at the center of empire and in the Third World; 2) investigate the effects of war on the ground in Iraq (not to mention in the United States, where thousands of veterans suffer from Gulf War Syndrome); and 3) suspend the (postmodern?) illusion that just because something is not covered by the press does not mean that it’s not real. Each paradigm seems to supply the perspectives that are absent from the other, and yet something is missing from both. Neither critic manages to capture his own positionality, or rather, his own subjective history.

     

    If intellectuals and activists struggled to find and transmit their positions vis-à-vis the Persian Gulf War, poets seemed half-paralyzed by its televisual brilliance, missile-eye camera perspectives, and obfuscatory debriefing sessions, by its effacement (via media and military censorship) of corpses, and its blitzkrieg speed.4 Perhaps because of its avoidance of traditional poetic modes that rely on subjective immediacy and imagery, Barrett Watten’s Bad History (1998) wrestles with the war in a way that is almost commensurate with the logic of what Paul Virilio calls “Pure War”–the state of preparedness for war that constitutes the real war.5 At its best moments, Bad History articulates a poetic strategy that mediates the theoretical deadlock between Baudrillardian postmodernism and Chomskyan rationalism. By pursuing Baudrillardian immersiveness without fatuously reveling in it and thereby flattening the contested landscape of history, while at the same time laying the groundwork for a Chomskyan poetic critique of the war that does not extract itself from its own subjective position, Watten’s Bad History effects a resistance that moves beyond smug self-congratulatory rhetoric. By invoking, and then countering, a poetic form that itself has glorified wars–the epic–in a poetry adequate to the conditions of postmodernity, Bad History stands out as perhaps the most important poetic engagement of the Persian Gulf War.6

     

    At the same time, to say that the only way to read Bad History is as a poem about the Gulf War would be overzealous. Of the thirty prose pieces comprising the book, only the first seven (Part A of Parts A-F)–a mere 27 pages of a poem spanning 128 pages, with 21 pages of endnotes–centrally concern the event of the war. The range of subject matter–from readings of office buildings to meditations on William Carlos Williams, from reflection on being named his mother’s executor to mulling over the ongoing shifts in area codes and the subject positions of screen savers–belies any reading of this work as simply a “Gulf War” poem. And yet, that Bad History is framed by the language of the art review (“The 1980s”–“Philip Johnson’s postmodern office building”) and the language of a financial prospectus (“The 1990s”) evokes the conditions of postmodernity in which a war like the Gulf War takes place. Bad History, in short, is not simply about the Gulf War; but in its attempt to lay bare the problematics of narration, of subjectivizing the history of the 1980s and 1990s, it actively resists the representation of that war as star-spangled tracers and ticker-tape parades.

     

    Because of its obsessional relation to narration and history-making, Bad History evokes most particularly the tradition of twentieth-century epic initiated by Ezra Pound’s Cantos, itself a counter to the tradition of epics narrating the birth of a nation through the heroism of warfare. Bad History counters its own epic tendencies in three basic ways. First, it problematizes the history-making procedure of epic by enacting a “poetics of interference” and by stretching an account of the Gulf War beyond the forty-three-day television event known as “Operation Desert Storm.” Second, it articulates a subjectivity vacillating between complicity and resistance, creating a text at war with its own positionality. Third, even though it forgoes the rhetorical oppositionality of anti-war verse, it nonetheless resists through form. Using hypotactic sentences, footers, columnar style, and a hefty appendix of secondary sources, it challenges the formal and ideological limits of mainstream lyric poetry through a language-based “poetry for use.”

     

    The Poetics of Interference and the Epic Poem

     

    Figure 1: Decoy #1
    © Michal Rovner
    Used with permission of the artist.

     

    How to frame a poem attempting to cover a subject as virtualized as the Persian Gulf War? The photograph on the cover of the book, “Decoy #1” by Michal Rovner, introduces some of the essential problems with any history of the Gulf War. It is itself an enactment of Bad History. Slightly off-center, the photo depicts a gray, indistinct figure set also slightly off-center, holding both arms above his or her head. Nothing else is visible, and even the ground is indistinct from the sky, creating the impression that the figure could be suspended in utero. The grainy grays of the photo render it, indeed, somewhere between an intrauterine sonograph and the televisual images that were released from the Pentagon, which were replete with target markers and “missile-eye” views of the buildings, bridges, and vehicles to be destroyed. Lacking all context, our “reading” of the image is blocked. We do not even know, for example, whether the figure is American or Iraqi; is the gesture one of victory or surrender? Nor do we know whether the figure faces us or someone else, outside of the picture. We do not know when or where the picture was taken, or even if it is a photograph at all. It seems equally possible that it appeared as a cave sketch of sun worship. But even if Decoy #1 leaves open the possibility that it is an image of an American or an Iraqi, its very inscrutability deprives it of particularity and of affect, blocking a reader’s attempt at identification.

     

    Rovner’s work anticipates the poetics of interference central to Bad History.7 In a 1992 review of Rovner’s exhibition, Watten noted how the artist’s premise was that “where unthinkable events are concerned, interference is as much a form of knowledge as clarity” (“Michal Rovner” 14). In contrast to the tradition of war photojournalism, in which the photograph articulates in its fine detail not only the scene of war but also the position of the journalist-witness–and, hence, the imagined audience at the home front–Rovner’s images, according to Watten,

     

    obstruct and render virtually abstract the faces of war...through the limits of the media, and in Rovner's self-conscious imitation of the gaps in transmission through techniques of reprocessing and reframing, what is depicted is a new relation of knowledge to events.... This knowledge is open-ended, a permanent threat. (14)

     

     

    In other words, Rovner reproduces the war in such a way that it lacks decisiveness, it lacks a narrative, it lacks the fine grain of the hero’s face. And yet, because Rovner’s images enact the very technology of information transmission, in all its gaps, they are themselves an historical record of the Gulf War, insofar as the war was one of information transmission and obstruction, in which the war’s first hero, in the words of a CNN video, was “the Patriot missile.”

     

    Watten, along with others in the “language poetry” movement emerging in the early 1970s, has similarly worked to articulate a poetry resistant to commodification, absorption, and manipulation, countering the image-economy that is the engine of mainstream lyric poetry.8 I will forgo a full examination of language poetry’s history, innovations, and principal agents, since it is the central focus of this essay to show not that Watten is a language poet, but that he is a poet who, by virtue of his experimental approach to language, offers a particularly useful model of war resistance poetry. Further, such an analysis is probably no longer necessary–given the current critical attention on the movement (or, in Ron Silliman’s term, the “moment”)–and perhaps impossible, given its heterogeneity.

     

    However, a brief glance at some of the contours of language poetry might explain how Watten’s experimental tactics emerge precisely from the realization of lyric poetry’s failure as social action during the Vietnam War.9 According to Bob Perelman’s witty definition, language writing was

     

    a range of writing that was (sometimes) nonreferential, (occasionally) polysyntactic, (at times) programmatic in construction, (often) politically committed, (in places) theoretically inclined, and that enacted a critique of the literary I (in some cases) (21).

     

     

    Perelman’s parenthetical amendments suggest the degree to which the writers who found each other in the early 1970s shared a multiplicity of poetic tactics, rather than a single poetic strategy–though this common set of tactics does suggest a distinctive movement. Frequently, those tactics struck out against illusions of poetic transparency: transparency of subjectivity (the lyric self), transparency of language (common language made pure), and transparency of image (the image as window into the real). For example, in their 1988 essay, “Aesthetic Tendency and the Politics of Poetry: A Manifesto,” five language poets, including Watten, offer two proposals: 1) to dissociate the “marginal isolated individualism” of the narrative persona so valued in contemporary poetry (264), and 2) to write a “contaminated” rather than a “pure” language (269).10

     

    These proposals for a new poetry, from a certain angle, address the way in which antiwar poetry such as Denise Levertov’s presumed a position of pristine distance from which one could compose transparent images of U.S. war atrocities on Vietnamese civilians with the pure language of the lyric, without regard for the ways in which American antiwar poets were implicated in the war by their privileged position as citizens of the United States, distant from the scene of battle. In the end, this poetry undergirded the illusion that a “pure” lyric language could resist another “pure” language without consequences–in particular, the bureaucratic language of the Department of Defense, with its technocratic terms such as “body counts,” “collateral damage,” and “friendly fire.”

     

    Watten’s poetry prior to Bad History pursued a rigorously abstract, theoretical, self-distancing strategy of writing that might be considered the absolute negation of the lyric; at times, it is difficult to tell the difference between Watten’s theoretical writing and his poetry. The most evident difference is often simply the publication context–that is, to state one of Watten’s poetic concerns, a frame that tells us “this is a poem.” In a poem alluding, perhaps mockingly, to Pound’s ABC of Reading, Watten’s “The XYZ of Reading” (1988) waxes theoretical about the danger of the lyric as substitute for political action (an implicit attack on the work of Levertov and Carolyn Forché) and anticipates Bad History:

     

    Romantic negativity, the avoidance of any conditions that compromise the subject leading to the subject's lyrical denial of itself, is too easily symptomatic. It's easy enough to feel victimized by the daily news, for example, and that maybe what is intended. Lyrical horror is our "participation in democracy" at the level of violence of compulsory voting in El Salvador. Taken as an assertion, then, such lyricism no longer works even as a form of bondage between writers. (Frame 153)

     

     

    Watten’s language here aggressively provokes the question: how is this a poem? There are none of the poetic devices that one might encounter in a traditional poem; it reads more like a poetic statement or a manifesto than a poem. What we have, at its most stripped down, is the movement of a mind troubled by the poetry of witness, insofar as it appears a symptom rather than a symbolic action. For Watten, poets today can no longer retain any illusions that writing lyric poetry is a kind of (or replacement for) participatory democracy, as writers like Levertov had felt during the Vietnam War. Watten’s remark in Leningrad, a text co-authored by four language poets reflecting on their encounter with the Soviet Union, cuts to the heart of the problems of lyric subjectivity: “Isn’t there a complicity with power, however at odds one may be with it, behind the sense that one is at the center of things?” (110). What Watten pursues is a poetry that might move against expressions of lyrical horror–which often become mere aestheticizations of violence for the purpose of bourgeois consumption–and instead locates itself in a consciousness constantly worrying over its own epistemological limits.

     

    By countering (not only on the cover, but throughout the book) the lyric’s tendency to rely on image, Bad History revises the televisual history of the Gulf War. Below, I will show how Watten filters the “images” of war through a disembodied voice that hyperconsciously details the overdetermined nature of those images. Here let it suffice that this poem resists the war on the level of its illusion of transparency. But Watten does not simply replace the official media representation of the war with a Chomskyan alternative history, or a Forché-influenced lyric poetry of witness.

     

    In his evasion of the image-economy and lineation of lyric poetry, Watten’s poem uses the sentence as his principle formal device. Heralded by Todorov as an “appropriate form…for a thematics of duality, contrast, and opposition,” the prose poem has an extensive tradition as counter-poetry (qtd. in Monroe 18). Unlike mainstream prose poetry, the “New Sentence,” in the hands of experimental poets like Ron Silliman or Watten, has an unsettlingly non-narrative and cross-discursive thrust. Watten’s combinations and deformations of multiple and often disparate discourses move beyond the critique of political language outlined in Orwell’s famous essay, “Politics and the English Language.” Critiques like Orwell’s hold out for a transparent, common-man language, a throwback to Wordsworth. In Bad History, we encounter a poetic subjectivity that cuts diagonally through art criticism, journalism, romantic lyric, dream language, and financial prospectus. The sentences stretch, harry, and perhaps even subvert the discourses they invoke. Poetry is not a kind of language divorced from these various discourses, but rather, to paraphrase Jerome McGann, a complicating procedure toward and within those discourses.11 The poet becomes, at least for the span of certain sections, a dissenting journalist.

     

    Watten, therefore, moves beyond the space-time miniaturization of the lyric (in its private individual moment) into larger, more expansive cross-dimensional spaces, and over longer stretches of time, through a strategic invocation of the epic. This is admittedly a strange subgenre for Watten to choose, since the epic poem emerged as the form of nationalism par excellence–the story of a people’s triumph by battles–and even more so because televisual coverage of the Persian Gulf War resembled an epic in which generals and technological weaponry were equal characters. However, with Ezra Pound’s Cantos arose a new kind of epic, opposed both to the lyric poem that had risen into dominance by the early twentieth century and to the old epic, which required a more unified and univocal society. In Michael André Bernstein’s formulation, Pound’s “modern verse epic” might still court the strategy of articulating a national (or Western) culture, but it does so “in a society no longer unified by a single, generally accepted code of values…justifying its argument by the direct appeal of the author’s own experiences and emotions” (79). Pound’s Cantos opened the way for modernist experimentation in poems that would collage different texts, voices, and narratives into explorations of national (and even international) subjectivity; Muriel Rukeyser, William Carlos Williams, Charles Olson, and many others are indebted to Pound’s opening of the form.

     

    Bad History‘s jacket blurb suggests that the poem both invokes the Poundian epic (it is a poem “including history”) and counters it (“In…Bad History, history includes the poem”) by questioning the notion that the text can somehow exist outside of history while attempting to record history.12 Watten’s “epic,” therefore, is fundamentally at odds with the formal characteristics of epic but not with the project of epic-making, of narrating a subjective (and even national) history. The opening caveat in the book’s acknowledgements page, that “Bad History is a work of literature and makes no claim to factual accuracy,” reverses the docudramatic co-optation of reality for literature, even while in practice Bad History rigorously harries any stable notion of history and factual accuracy. Further, the epigraph, from Mark Cousins’s “The Practice of History Investigation,” alludes to Watten’s cagey approach to history, one equally interested in the problem of trauma and representation as in censorship and representation:

     

    The evident irritation expressed with a concept of event which does not measure up to its canons of evidence, the shock expressed at a practice whose interpretations refer to events which 'historically' may not have happened.... Imagine a practice of interpretation which prefers secondary sources, and unreliable witnesses! (vii)

     

     

    First, we see that Cousins is interested in the “irritation” and “shock” expressed by people (most likely historians) who are confronted with a counter-method that questions the very basis upon which “objective historiography” has relied. Second, we should note the distinction between the event and the evidence of the event, and the blurring of fiction and history. Finally, in a war in which media coverage rendered impossible even the fantasy of secondary witness (that is, mediated witnessing), Bad History foregrounds the difficulty for American civilians in reconstructing what actually happened; any reconstructed narrative must rely, as former Attorney General and activist founder of the International Action Center Ramsey Clark assiduously attempts to do in The Fire This Time: War Crimes in the Gulf, on secondary witnesses and shaky sources. But if we are to take the quotation as somehow representative of Watten’s poem, then the “preference” for secondary sources represents a sort of provocation, since this preference does not imply the “availability of only” secondary sources.

     

    The Gulf War–itself an event to which most of us were secondary or even tertiary witnesses, if witnesses at all–is the ground from which Bad History emerges. For Watten the event of the Gulf War cannot speak for itself alone. Perhaps because of the incredibly brief span of the war, in marked contrast to the Vietnam War, Watten’s text draws backward and propels forward, beginning in the 1980s and ending in the late 1990s. The war isn’t just the war, but the social and historical conditions that yielded its brief, deadly blooms.

     

    Part A, “The 1980s,” begins with something not immediately concerned with the Gulf War: Philip Johnson’s “postmodern office building.” Watten’s art-critical musings, rather than simply avoiding history and the war, actually look awry at both. By suspending an immediate discussion of the War and by focusing on a particular building that signifies the cultural historical (postmodern) spirit of the 1980s, Watten’s move intimates that any discussion of the war must reach backward into the past, rather than toward the particulars of the war’s beginning. The office building becomes a mnemonic for the 1980s; even more, it suggests the way in which structures of monumentality signify a certain way of remembering. The book begins:

     

    Philip Johnson's postmodern office building at 580 California. The combination of facing motifs shows a simultaneous fascination with ironic control and the disavowal of any consequences. Cynically juxtaposing corporate-induced localism with functional office grids, the artificer has reduced all construction to a memorial bas-relief. Each view is a little tomb, complete with signature crosslike prison bars. These bay windows must be our final release! (1).

     

     

    His description indicates how the architecture itself foregrounds “ironic control” and “disavowal of any consequences,” two aspects that marked the position of the television viewer of the Gulf War. In this sense, then, the building anticipates the war–or perhaps even creates the conditions where such a war could be possible. In addition, each window view–“a little tomb, complete with signature crosslike prison bars”–suggests the television screen merging with the crosshairs of a weapon sight. Moreover, the building seems to enact a kind of faux sublime transcendence–“these bay windows must be our final release!”–and becomes instant memoir, just as the Gulf War became instant history. Echoing Baudrillard, each pedestal on the rooftop is a “blank marker for an event that might have been but never took place” (2). The building, in the end, suggests a widespread cultural situation in which events themselves could be mediatized out of existence.

     

    A Homer Who Sees He Doesn’t See: Complicit, with Resistance

     

    Bad History is a counter-epic in another sense, insofar as epics also have traditionally been the founding stories of nations, mythologizing its inner conflicts and external wars from the perspective of an impersonal communal voice.13 Because the media representation rendered the Gulf War–at least for the American viewer at home–an antiseptic affair, a Hollywood fantasy rewrite of Vietnam, Watten’s counter-epic refuses the nationalist narrative and becomes itself a “bad history.” That is, it is a naughty history, an anti-nationalist history that shows bad form, that subjectivizes another history. But rather than a simplistic rendering of Chomskyan oppositionality, Watten’s self-positioning rejects the anti-war argument that there is good and bad history–that we are constantly subjected to the bad history of mass media–and need to articulate a “good history” that accounts for leftist analysis.

     

    Bad History, therefore, is an epic of worried subjectivity, attempting to resist even while knowing its own complicities and limits–all the while refusing to bracket the moment at which the text is being produced. True to Cary Nelson’s articulation of history as a “palimpsest of two durations, then and now,” the writing of Bad History itself is an event essential to understanding Bad History (Nelson 3). In other words, as Watten wrote in an email, “I’m living what I’m writing, not writing about what I experienced.”14 Bad History thereby rejects the tradition of anti-war verse that dominated during the height of the anti-Vietnam War movement, a tradition that relied on a poetry of witness (as in Levertov’s early anti-war poems) and epistemological authority (as in Robert Bly’s deep image poetry of The Light Around the Body and “The Teeth Mother Naked at Last”). It should not be surprising, given that the language poetry movement reached back into another poetry tradition, that Watten’s work evokes another anti-war poetry tradition.15

     

    Informed by his numerous reviews of art exhibitions in the early 1990s, Watten’s Bad History struggles against three prevailing artistic pitfalls that emerge in the art of that period: first, oppositional art frequently responded just to the event itself, not to the conditions that made that event possible; second, oppositional art “preached to the converted”–embracing its own marginality in ways that closed down its possible audience; and third, oppositional art tended to foreground identity politics in ways that limited exploration of its own epistemological limits.16

     

    So even as Bad History refuses the traditional subjective position of the nationalist epic poet, it also is inflected by the successes and failures of oppositional art from the period; rather than simply relying on a self-protective oppositionality, it becomes a subjective history swinging between complicity and resistance. The resistance of Bad History bridles against its own limitations, situated at the “homefront,” distant from the scene of the war.17

     

    After Part A’s postmodern office building, Section I, called “Bad History,” initiates the emergence of this resistant/complicit “I,” puzzling over the language of wars’ beginnings and endings:

     

    A bad event happened to me, but its having occurred became even more complicated in my thinking about it. Even if this event had happened only to me, it was only recently made available for retrospection; it had to be proved as taking place in every other event. Take the War, for example; I no longer know for certain which war is meant.... It is always "the era between two wars." So there was a very long war before a period of time in which that war had just been over for a very long time--even though it took its place as immediately preceding that time. Then a very short war called that very long time to question....All those times even now seem to guarantee each other, as part of an assertion of the reality of the first and only war. (5-6)

     

     

    This is a disembodied, indeterminate, distracted voice, worrying over the problem of language and temporality. The “I” is like a voice in an echo chamber, reverberating until estranged into a flattened affect, as if amnesiac: “a bad event happened to me, but its having occurred became even more complicated in my thinking about it.” But rather than sounding like Fredric Jameson’s postmodern subject, whose affect in the end represents a fundamental loss of historicity, Watten’s “speaker” pursues relentlessly its own flattened sense of time. It is as if the lyric subject had been traumatized by the event, which though distinct, “had to be proved as taking place in every other event.” The War, too, becomes a floating signifier, not attached from any specific war, but somehow including all the permutations of war–the Second World War, Korean War, Vietnam War, Gulf War, Cold War. The Cold War–“always on the verge of ending”–lingers over all the wars. This sense of an ongoing perpetual war echoes Virilio’s notion of “Pure War,” in which the Cold War superpowers engage in a war marked by the constant preparation for war; what Watten’s speaker gropes for is a name for that war’s perpetuity, the war without end.

     

    The subject’s disbelief in the War, necessitated perhaps by the psychic inability to remain in a state of constant crisis, paradoxically leads to a feeling of responsibility for its existence. This stance creates a demonstrably different tone from much war resistance poetry, accustomed as it is to the clarity of oppositionality. When the war ended, “it was a relief–I always doubted the extent to which the poet could just by writing think he could keep it going, even for the space of a lyric poem” (8). Watten’s line reverses the formulation that the war resistance poet writes poems about the war in order to end the war; what this line suggests, rather, is that the lyric poet writes about the war in order to make it real for the writing-self distant from the conflict. These lines seem particularly addressed to the lyric poetry of Denise Levertov, imagining the Vietnam War in poems like “Life at War,” in which Delicate Man

     

    still turns without surprise, with mere regret,to the scheduled breaking open of breasts whose milk

    runs over the entrails of still-alive babies,

    transformation of witnessing eyes to pulp-fragments,

    implosion of skinned penises into carcass-gulleys. (122)

     

     

    Paradoxically, Watten’s lines suggest that the lyric poet who seeks to resist the war through means of imagery does so in order to convince herself of the reality of the war, but ends up initiating a vicious circle of traumatized representation.

     

    The Cold War, with its small and distant wars and its possible path to nuclear armageddon, forced people into a condition of disbelief, “a kind of suspension” (7). Watten’s echo of Coleridge’s famous formulation from Biographia Literaria regarding the reader’s necessary openness toward his “supernatural” poems in Lyrical Ballads suggests the way in which fictional and historical narratives function by the same logic. Watten also references how Robert Creeley’s poem “The Tiger” invokes a “reassuring but freakish monstrosity that would rivet us in our seat, as in a Stephen King movie” (8). At both moments, Watten pursues a Baudrillardian line of analysis that applies both to the Cold War and the Gulf War. The Cold War was the war that lacked overt signs of warfare, and hence could be disbelieved; the Gulf War, experienced by the distant television spectator as a virtual media event, could be believed only insofar as one was willing to enter its fictionalized televisual representation, with Hussein as its Godzilla to be destroyed.

     

    Watten’s notion of disbelief, incidentally, spans both the willing (postmodern?) consumer of the Gulf War as heroic epic and the (Chomskyan) dissenter who sees this representation as frankly “unbelievable.” In other words, by focusing on the problem of disbeliefs, Watten’s poem addresses the dilemmas of being an (American) civilian at the center of empire, distant from the conflict, without choosing the more comfortable, but ultimately less productive, oppositional mode.

     

    In order to believe in the Gulf War, the viewer needed to suspend the disbelief that wars have human consequences, which always requires a faith in technological mastery. In this war, perhaps more so than in any previous war, technology took its place as a key character in the postmodern epic. Here, again, Watten avoids the oppositional mode, trying to retrace the thoughts of a speaker who is haunted by the seeming reality of the virtualized televisual conflict:

     

    each new war being the culmination of our old belief in the supersession of a new technology.... Only later did we find out that the success rate for Patriot missiles was only 6 percent. How can we be so thoroughly trained to disbelieve the evidence of our senses? Didn't I see an incoming missile come down through the sky from the vantage point of a TV crew in Dharan, Saudi Arabia.... while the cameraman tracked the outgoing Patriot to an explosion that was visible proof of its success? (9)

     

     

    The speaker expresses puzzlement at how the information regarding the Patriot’s success rate violates his sense of the images he “witnessed.”

     

    This puzzlement is contrasted with the glee of a certain “poet,” who failed to think about the consequences of all this virtualization: “the poet didn’t want to think about that ground [which would be destroyed by the Patriots and Scuds], so pleased he was with the spectacle of a disbelief that called into question any criterion for an historical event” (10). It is unclear who this poet is; this character experiences pleasure in the totality of the spectacle of a disbelief. If this line read “pleased…with the spectacle,” we might say that Watten is critiquing Baudrillard’s euphoria over spectacles themselves. But the line reads: “the spectacle of a disbelief,” which makes it seem equally possible that it refers to some Chomskyan dissenter who resists the spectacle as well. The poet could be Watten himself. In the end, naming names matters less than acknowledging the speaker’s uneasiness with the way the poet’s pleasure in his stance toward the event seems to distance him further from the brute reality of the bombs.

     

    This section concludes by tracking the very circulation that Watten’s ruminative repetitions of words and phrases have enacted. The “bad event,” obscured by false witnesses and faulty technologies, still remains at a distance. However, its very repetition through representation–particularly in the form of those Patriot missiles hitting their targets–finally instigates the speaker to language: “it was the continuous, circling treadmill of its displacement for a very long time, brought to a single image–obscured, interfered with, reprocessed at a third remove over remote-control channels of communicative links–that got me here to say this” (10). The speaker’s voice, then, becomes an analogue for the virtualization of the Gulf War; only through such a poetics of interference, the poem suggests, might we become conscious of the obscuring workings of interference itself.

     

    Watten’s poem does not rest in its own fascination with the interfered virtualized images, as an eviscerated Baudrillardian analysis might; instead, it pursues the consequences of the “ground.” However, in contrast to a Chomskyan analysis, Watten’s juxtaposes dissident witness accounts of the effects of the bombing to a narrative of vexed American subjectivity. Part III, “Iraqi,” suggests the gulf between the American civilian and the Iraqis (and those other Arab and non-Arab civilians caught in the “crossfire”) who bore the brunt of the bombing. The definition–“Iraqi: various scenarios for wearers of a mark of distinction and/or shame” (15)–that begins the section opens the poem into a consideration of how identification with the other is always complicated by the ease with which we can disown that identification. Watten re-tells the story, told in Ramsay Clark’s War Crimes, of a Jordanian woman whose husband had been strafed by machine-gun fire from American planes; the husband, driving his cab to Amman, becomes an example of “the consequences of appearing Iraqi at a particular moment in time.” Juxtaposed to this story is the (American) speaker’s account of wearing a pin from the Iraqi pin project that identified him as “Iraqi”: “Guys would loom out of the crowd, saying, ‘Hey, an Iraqi!’” (16). The speaker becomes so conscious of his pin that he “always remember[s] to take my pin off for official meetings at work” (16). While the Jordanian man’s misidentification as Iraqi leads to his death, the American maintains distance from his adopted identity for “official meetings at work.” So even though the pin communicates a willingness to stand with “Iraqis,” it also problematizes that relationship, and forces its wearer to acknowledge the gulf between his experience and the Iraqis’. Finally, this section foregrounds the way in which even the story of atrocity comes secondhand, from secondary witnesses and distant sources.

     

    Because the war was not simply the event of war, but the years of cultural and military preparation for the war, what better place to begin than with children’s toys? Section IV, called “Museum of War,” meditates on how the constant preparation for war requires young warriors to be prepared and leads to the inevitable sacrifice of children. This “Museum of War” does not exist in actuality, but rather is a virtual museum of Watten’s imagining, one which perhaps cohabits the literal Museum of Childhood in Bethnal Green, London. Taking his son Asa to the Museum of Childhood, Watten describes an artist’s diorama where “each display is designed to be the perfect miniature of a moment of loss” (17). The diorama described both resembles a child’s toy and invokes the bombing of the Amiriyah shelter during the Gulf War, where “at least 300 children and parents were incinerated in a structure we knew had been built for civilians; now they must reelect the entire PTA!” (19). The absurdity of the non sequitor “PTA” brings us to the insurmountable gap between our experience of raising children and the horror of the Amiriyah bombing. The imagined diorama makes us wonder whether representations of war are always already domesticated by our limited vision of what war is.

     

    Layered into this section’s description of these two museums is the language of statistics and numbers. The language of statistics invokes the military’s (and mass media’s) fascination with weaponry specs and lingo–“Imagine the ‘daisy cutter’ effect of a 7.5 ton superbomb manually pushed from an open end of a C-130 cargo plane–shock waves ripple out in all directions, leveling all structures 500 meters on either side” (19)–and the way the naming of weapons seems to take the place of visualizing their effects.

     

    Watten’s imagined dioramas in the Museum of War also lead to a more disturbing possibility; can one represent (or imitate) the war and yet still resist it? Is the process of representation a kind of repetition, a re-enactment of the trauma? Perhaps representational art might always fail to be oppositional: “Here an online editor objects that imitation of war in rapid displacement of incommensurate remarks is not an argument against war–it could likewise be a form of participation” (19). How, indeed, can one represent war through poetry in a way that avoids merely replicating the war, in which both writer and reader become, willy-nilly, more participants? How to evoke the devastation of the “Highway of Death” so as to re-member it, to make it present, and erase the censored blank spaces? Watten cannot “remember a flatbed truck containing nine bodies, their hair and clothes burned off, skin incinerated by heat so intense it melted the windshield” (20). In the end, Chomskyan arguments notwithstanding, what would having such images represented in the media or in a “Museum of War” accomplish? Perhaps the Gulf War, whose mass media representation was so vigorously censored and therefore de-realized, may actually be a war which art can make real in a way that is not simply repeating the war.

     

    In Section V, “Intellectuals,” Watten yokes together Marxism and Romantic lyric in a piece on the 1991 L.A. riots. Donald Pease has argued that the Rodney King beating, the innocent verdict on the white California police officers, and the resulting riots “activated an alternative memory” (576) that dispelled the illusion of internal consensus against an external enemy manufactured during the Gulf War. The riots interrupted “U.S. spectators’ previous identification with the surveillance apparatus of the New World Order…[and] reversed the effects of U.S. disavowal of neocolonialist brutality in the Gulf…” (561). The King verdict and riots laid bare the unsettling divisiveness within the United States around race and class.

     

    What burns Watten, however, is the distance between the intellectual, in his ever-higher highwire morality act, and the reality on the ground:

     

    Who will save us? Intellectuals--split off from the mass of revolutionary clouds returning from a daily fog bank? The fog moves back to reveal smoky haze rising over burnt-out districts of Los Angeles, ô intellectuals, you who speak as if there were no one to hear you! But this smoky haze has spoken again, as we knew it would.... Ô intellectuals, wheeling back and forth in a conscious morality play--a balancing act of self-undoing moral tightropes, not falling into the waiting gasps of the crowd but spinning always higher, dangerously out of reach, while the crowds below realign your center of gravity for you! (23-24)

     

     

    The ironic call–“who will save us?–mimics the intellectual’s (and, one might add, the lyric poet’s) desire to rescue the masses from the most powerful even as it mimics a more bourgeois voice, wondering who will protect him from the advancing destruction of the crowd. In the second voice, the answer is tautological–the police, whose violence set off the violence of the rioters, will save us. The intellectual, by contrast, cut off from the discontents that led to the conflagration, can only perfect his own hermetic moralism.

     

    The tautological (and fraternal) order of police is also, not surprisingly, a mirror to the larger tautology of Pure War. In Section VI, “Against All,” Watten spins out, in Steinian fashion, a traumatized repetition of battles:

     

    Always already, all wars are ready. But this is the war of all against all. The war has begun again, the war to renew all wars. Everywhere is war. Echoes answer war already--echoes always answering war. "War is not the answer." We need to escalate! (25)

     

     

    In this thickly intertextual passage, Watten deftly weaves theoretical, philosophical, and pop cultural references into a Steinian attack on war: a war of words. Using the Althusserian formulation, “always already,” which designates the illusion that ideological constructs are natural and eternal, Watten suggests that wars, rather than promising to end war, seem only to ensure future wars. The “war of all against all” refers to Hobbes’ philosophical pessimism, and rubs against Marvin Gaye’s plaintive protest song “What’s Goin’ On,” which itself adopts one of the anti-war slogans of the 1960s–“war is not the answer.” But Watten’s poem reverses Gaye’s plea: “Father, father, we don’t need to escalate.” Gaye’s plea is one that has not only domestic implications (Gaye was later murdered by his father), but also racial ones; Gaye’s song is as much about the tumult in U.S. ghettos and the state response as it is about Vietnam.

     

    The Gulf War, which begins the book, therefore, cedes to the race/class war of the L.A. riots, to Waco, and beyond, to global financial war. If what follows in Bad History moves further outward from the Gulf War, one might argue that it moves further inward into the Gulf War as well–the Gulf War as symptom of a cultural-historical situation. However, such a reading might obscure the fact that the permutations of war in Bad History are ultimately subordinate to the problem of national and personal history.

     

    De-Forming the Epic: Footers, Margins and Endnotes

     

    Bad History counters the televisual representation of the Gulf War as an heroic epic not only through its foregrounding of the interfered image, its manifestation of a vexed complicit/resistant subjectivity, but also through its form. In particular, Bad History employs the generic conventions of both newspapers and scholarly texts, with its central newspaper-like column, running footers, and endnotes.

     

    The running footer of dates to the text and the columnar print style evoke the newspaper form. However, instead of quoting and then critiquing the mass media representation of the war, Watten’s text denies any exact relationship between the dates and the text. The dates, in fact, do not speak for themselves, nor do they take control of the text. Here, as elsewhere, Watten acknowledges in his notes his indebtedness to the work of Iranian-born Seyed Alavi. Alavi’s artistic re-workings of newspapers–principally, the removing of the dates–enacts the vexing counterpoint, in Watten’s words, “between two kinds of time: one created by their work in its process of development, and another embodied in the materiality of the encompassing culture that surrounds it and surrounds and threatens to engulf it” (“Seyed Alavi” 15). Unlike the typical manipulation of headlines for political ends, Alavi’s work renders a resistance to the overdetermined language of official history and, in Watten’s formulation, “to replace it with a time of our own.”

     

    Similarly, Watten’s use of historical dates invokes a Chomskyan concern for drawing out an historical counternarrative. The text’s dates begin with 16 January 1991, then skip ahead and back to other dates: 1 March 1991, 28 January 1990, 19 April 1993, and end finally with 27 December 1993. 16 January, of course, marks the beginning of the bombing, but what about the other dates?18 How should we read the connections between the footer-date and the text itself? Watten, in contrast to the Chomskyan mode, leaves these investigations to the reader; part of the reader’s work, perhaps, is not only to figure out the significance of those dates, but also to take part in the construction of the history of the poem. One finds, for example, that 1 March 1991 marks the day after the official ending of the conflict, (even though the war continued long after that date and plainly continues, in different permutations, down to the present).

     

    The choice of 28 January 1990 is not immediately clear. However, Watten has revealed that the date also marked the death of his mother, and that her birthday was 19 April, the day that would later be remembered nationally for the Waco conflagration, and then a year later the Oklahoma City bombing, committed by Gulf War veteran Timothy McVeigh. Watten’s use of this date of personal significance suggests, therefore, the limits of the outworn notion that the language poetry requires active construction by the reader. By introducing something from his own biography not knowable within the text, yet somehow essential to the text’s meaning, Watten shows that he cannot escape the biographical contours of his own subjectivity, however objectivized.

     

    Finally Watten’s dates, particularly the evocation of the official beginning and ending of the war, also enable us to question the very primacy of those dates as markers of conflict. When did the Persian Gulf War begin? If we look at chronological tables from three different sources–1) PBS Frontline‘s Gulf War website, 2) Seeing Through the Media: The Persian Gulf War (1994), and 3) Beyond the Storm (1991)–we note the degree to which the event of the war depends upon what events are seen as having led to the war. For the official history provided by Frontline, the first date provided is 2 August 1990, when Iraq invades Kuwait. But the second source presents an introductory caveat, noting that “in order to understand the historical meaning of the Persian Gulf War, we need to go as far back as World War II and the British reconfiguration of the territorial boundaries of the nations of the Middle East” (307). Thus it begins with 17 July 1990, when “Saddam Hussein accuses the U.S. and the Gulf states of conspiring to cut oil prices” (307), and focuses on the infamous exchange between Saddam Hussein and April Glaspie on 25 July 1990. The third source, Beyond the Storm, provides an even lengthier historical trajectory, beginning in 1869, when “Suez Canal and powered river transport open up Mesopotamia to international trade” (356). It goes on to detail Western oil investment, military intervention, and covert operations in Iraq beginning in 1912, and provides a thorough account of the politics of the Middle East. Obviously, these three examples suggest that how we discuss the war as an historical event can vary significantly, depending on how one frames the events that lead up to war.19

     

    In the material construction of the page, the text is impinged by margins that are almost as large as the text. The white space–the unspoken–lingers on either side of the hypotactic sentences. It is as if we were reading the only column of a newspaper to which we do not have complete access, which we cannot complete reading. In contrast to the slim margins of an industry book, the extensive margins create an eerie effect, the feeling that something is missing. It also gives the active reader much room for marginalia, to make connections with the text. Although it would be easy to overinterpret such a formal gesture, it nonetheless points to Watten’s obsession with frames–his desire to counter the domination of authorial presence, and his humility in the face of what he does not, or cannot know.

     

    The extensive annotations at the back of the book provide a useful archival function, in the mode of a Chomskyan dissenter; at the same time, they show Watten’s indebtedness to a whole range of texts and knowledges–from high literary theory to human rights texts, from chance encounters to unavoidable fate. In contrast to Chomskyan analysis, however, these texts do not stand as guarantors of scholarly integrity and historical truth, but rather create a tangle of narratives from which we must wrestle our own bad histories. Our lives, Bad History suggests, “cannot be lived as ‘one story’ but as stories that overlap, from one to the next, with no final form to hold them together” (74). They overlap with each other’s and with the grand narratives of nations and empires, in ways that are often obscured and unknown to us. History is enacted in a financial prospectus, no less so than in the newspaper or on a calendar, the date marking the death of a mother.

     

    For a poem to be historical and to resist war at the same time is no straightforward task. Bad History‘s limitation as a poem of war resistance lies, perhaps, in how it abandons the investigation of what remains outside its ken and instead focuses on the limitation of its perceptual frame, in all its primordial negativity. For example, continued investigation of the ongoing narratives of the Gulf War in Iraq and of U.S. veterans, or further dialogue with activists and war resisters in the United States, might have enabled the text to function as an agent of further texts and events. But such limitations are built into what it means to be a subject, much less a resister. In the end, Watten succeeds in resisting the tendencies of poems and poets to bow quickly for the emperor’s laurel, or, conversely, for congratulations from the like-minded and already-converted.

     

    Notes

     

    Thanks to Tom Foster for his characteristically helpful suggestions for this essay, which emerged from the ashes of a review that appeared in Indiana Review (Spring 2000).

     

    1. This essay was written prior to the Second Gulf War, “Operation Iraqi Freedom”; however, given that the Iraqi people have lived under a state of economic siege since the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the second declaration of war functioned as a continuation of the first conflict rather than an initiation of an entirely new one.

     

    2. Numerous analyses of mass media coverage have shown the degree to which the media acted as an extension of the military effort. In Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War, John R. MacArthur details how Pentagon front-man Pete Williams cajoled, coddled, and ultimately convinced the major media industry into agreeing to press restrictions, in the form of “press pools,” which assured that all journalists would compete against each other for the same stories, distant from the scene of war, and always mediated and censored by military escorts. In particular, the omnipresence of PAOs (military public affairs officers) compromised journalists’ ability to have even a free interview with a soldier. According to NBC correspondent Gary Matsumoto,

     

    Whenever I began interviewing a soldier, this PAO would stand right behind me, stare right into the eyes of the [soldier], stretch out a hand holding a cassette recorder, and click it on in the soldier's face. This was patent intimidation...which was clear from the soldiers' reactions. After virtually every interview, the soldier would let out a deep breath, turn to the PAO, and ask [something like], "Can I keep my job?" (171)

     

     

    The Pentagon, even after delaying “unilateral access” to the front lines, delayed further coverage with news blackouts during the initial phases of the ground invasion. Unfortunately, “most of [reporters’] dispatches and film took so long to get back to Dhahran [the media base in Saudi Arabia] that they were too dated to use. The Pentagon’s real Phase III was censorship by delay” (189). Intriguingly, media complicity in the military effort during the 2003 war, though far more mutually satisfying, was no less problematic; the innovation of “embedding” reporters with various divisions granted reporters more “access” but paradoxically rendered them even more vulnerable to reporting the war from a partisan, indebted point of view.

     

    3. Jean Baudrillard’s first article on the Gulf War appeared just days before the war, arguing that the war “would not take place.” (Two succeeding articles round out his meditation on the event-ness of the Gulf War.) Christopher Norris directs his critique principally at Baudrillard, though he has larger schools of fish to fry (“postmodernists,” “deconstructionists,” etc.) which largely evade his critical net. A fuller treatment of this debate would, of course, enumerate the ways in which both critics demonstrate their theoretical blindspots. Oddly enough, and contrary to his earlier writings, Baudrillard shows himself at times to be an anti-image moralist. Norris, by contrast, willfully misreads Baudrillard and postmodern theory more generally. For the sake of this article, however, I have limited myself to a consideration of the productive edges of each theoretical analysis of the Gulf War.

     

    4. Despite the obstacles to poetic response, poetry did emerge in response to the Persian Gulf War. Protest poetry–in its embrace of a transient, engaged, anti-nationalist, and performative poetics and its rejection of the modernist lyric’s monumentality, implicit nationalism and detachment–such as June Jordan’s “The Bombing of Baghdad,” Calvin Trillin’s “deadline poems” (appearing in The Nation), Tony Harrison’s Guardian-commissioned long poem “A Cold Coming,” and William Heyen’s book-length meditations on the war entitled Ribbons: The Gulf War–offered an immediate, if perhaps ephemeral response to the machinations of war rehearsed on (inter)national media. While the poetry anthologies responding to the Persian Gulf War (with some notable exceptions in both After the Storm and Rooster Crows At Light From the Bombing) occasionally replicated the problems of lyric poetry–elision of poems’ historical context, often-bourgeois antipathy toward the mass representation of war–they also provided a site for gathering and sustaining war resistance beyond the event itself.

     

    5. Paul Virilio argues that we live in a state of “pure war,” in which the real war is not the battle itself, but the endless (cultural, media, industrial) preparation for war. Though Virilio dates the military-industrial complex from the 1870s, he argues that the postwar era is actually an extension of the Second World War, in which “all of us are already civilian soldier, without knowing it. And some of us know it. The great stroke of luck for the military’s class terrorism is that no one recognizes it. People don’t recognize the militarized part of their identity, of their consciousness” (26). Pure War thus pervades all aspects of culture, from the increasingly violent and technophilic video games like “Duke Nukem,” “Quake,” or “Doom,” that invite young people into the cockpits of fighter jets and to view the world through the target eye, to less immediately violent but no less virulent displays of nationalism such as that found in television coverage of the Super Bowl or the Olympics.

     

    Pure War manifests itself, as well, in what Eisenhower famously called the military-industrial complex. The U.S. military-industrial complex impacts the globe not simply through U.S. military engagements, but also through counterinsurgency and covert operations, military training of Latin American officers in places like Fort Benning’s School of the Americas, military occupation of land in places like Okinawa and Vieques, and in skyrocketing levels of indiscriminate sales of weapons, sometimes to opposing sides in conflicts. Pure War, for Virilio, amounts to “endocolonization” (95)–a situation in which one’s own population is colonized by state power.

     

    6. Interestingly, Watten’s poetic project seems to have found its ideal mediating subject in the Persian Gulf War. His use of poetry as mode of theoretical inquiry; his obsession with the problem of the frame; and his “attempt to articulate a productive negativity” (Friedlander 124). All come to maximum use in “writing through”–(as John Cage’s or Jackson Mac Low’s procedural “writing through” texts)–the Gulf War.

     

    7. During the period before and after the Gulf War, Watten wrote some forty reviews of art exhibitions in the San Francisco Bay area, some of which articulated–or at least provided the inspiration for strategies of oppositionality that the poet would attempt to incorporate in his work.

     

    8. The emergence of the language writing movement during the closing years of the Vietnam War deserves further exploration. Bob Perelman has suggested one way in which the war affected these writers: “language writing coalesced as American involvement in Vietnam was nearing its bankrupt conclusion: this was a significant cause of the unaccommodating nature of its poetics” (13). What is “unaccommodating” about the politics of language writing? The language writers (from Bernstein to Andrews to Silliman) have demonstrated, if not a range of political views, then certainly a range of ways in which to activate a poetry of politics. One could just as easily speak of Denise Levertov’s unaccommodating politics at the end of the war, but her writing could not be confused with “language poetry.” In short, that war (and, doubtlessly, the poetic response to that war) may need further elaboration, to explain the crystallization of the need for avant-garde modes.

     

    9. Watten’s argument is made explicit in his recent essay, “The Turn to Language and the 1960s,” which describes the origins of the language poetry movement as a result of the failure of 1960s political poetry, particularly that of Levertov.

     

    10. Relatedly, Charles Bernstein’s verse essay “The Artifice of Absorption” argues for a poetry that is anti-absorptive–one that is marked by “impermeability, imperviousness, ejection/repellence” (20). For Bernstein, the anti-absorptive poem rejects the transparency of realism and statementalism. Bernstein sees anti-absorption as a positive strategy not simply for its resistance to commodification, but for its ability to address postmodern conditions. In his words, “In contrast to–or is it an extension of?–Adorno’s famous remarks about the impossibility of (lyric?) poetry after Auschwitz, I would say poetry is a necessary way to register the irrepresentable loss of the Second War” (217). In “The New Sentence and the Commodity Form: Recent American Writing” (1988), Andrew Ross argues that language poetry’s strategies for resisting the prevailing powers of commodification include a fourth proposal: in a time when “rhetoric no longer acts as agent provocateur” (377), the language poets challenge through form itself.

     

    11. Watten asserts his poetic use of these discourses: “quite a lot of the impetus for Bad History came from my writing in that [art criticism] medium. For one thing, I was going against journalistic practice by writing long sentences, with tons of hypotaxis, and not breaking them up in small paragraph units” (personal correspondence).

     

    12. The blurb on the back of the book, more so than the blurbs on mainstream poetry texts, which often invoke the most commodifiable and romantic elements of contemporary poetry’s discourse, is essential to understanding the work:

     

    In a famous modern definition, an epic is a poem including history. In Barrett Watten's Bad History, history includes the poem. Begun to mark the first anniversary of the Gulf War, the poem looks back on the decades previous and forward toward--a duration of events, which, because the poem is in history, do not cease to occur. The poem, too, becomes the event of its own recording.

     

     

    At this point, an important question arises: to what degree do we accept without reservation the assertion that this work is a version of epic? In other words, perhaps this statement is simply not true, or even more cunningly, is a ruse. Reading this book with The Iliad, The Aeneid, or even Paterson in mind, one might be hard-pressed to find epic “characteristics.” So perhaps this claim is merely a red herring, a satire on the over-earnest reader. A cursory glance at other language poetry books suggests that, despite critical claims to the contrary, experimental poets do engage the “mainstream tradition” in their pursuit of an experimental future of poetry. To quote one example, just as the blurb for Bad History suggests parallels to the epic, the blurb for Lyn Hejinian’s Oxota suggests parallels to Pushkin’s verse novel Evgeny Onegin. Rather than being a mere Hitchcockian “McGuffin,” these allusions to traditional poetic forms, subgenres, or works suggest that much work needs to be done in articulating the way in which the avant-garde engages–and here the military notion of “engagement” feels right–what might be termed “the tradition.” Clearly, as evidenced in Watten’s text, one way to talk about the project of experimental writing is not as a reinvigoration of these forms and genres (à la the New Formalism), but rather a representation of their exhaustion, both ideologically and poetically.

     

    13. In this way, Watten’s poem participates in the larger literary-historical arc of the verse epic grounded in a particularized consciousness or speaker, from Whitman’s “Song of Myself,” to Peter Dale Scott’s Coming to Jakarta, to more recent verse epics.

     

    14. Watten, a draft resister during the Vietnam War, wrote that his poetics attempts to articulate his traumatic experience of the Vietnam War, which was, in his words, “both totally threatening and a non-event…experienced…through resistance, negation” (personal correspondence). Bad History provides, in this particular way, a revision of the Vietnam War even as it revises the Gulf War.

     

    15. In Watten’s words,

     

    The really effective anti-war poetry, for me, in some sense engages the irrational. Pound's section of Mauberly with its incantations, and the hell canto. Duncan's passages on the war. Sandburg's buttons poem. Ginsberg, particularly "Wichita Vortex Sutra." On the other hand, the kind of liberal position taking one finds in Levertov or Lowell I particularly mistrust. I remember vividly Denise Levertov on the steps of Sproul Hall, acting out her fantasies of revolution, just before the chain link fence of People's Park was stormed (Berkeley, 1969). So the tradition of antiwar poetry I'm engaged with rejects any form of symbolization for a more processual, and temporal account, one that does not simply leave the poet on the higher ground. (Email)

     

     

    16. In his article, “No More War! An Unwanted Animal at the Garden Party of Democracy at Southern Exposure Gallery,” Watten meditates on the problem of oppositional strategies in light of the state of readiness that Virilio had theorized some years before:

     

    Artists concerned with oppositional strategies [during this new war] must therefore take into account that there is well-developed 'state of readiness' for what could be a protracted struggle for the social control of meaning-- a struggle in which art may well have a role. We are not starting at ground zero; the War has been with us for some time. (Artweek February 7, 1991, page 1)

     

     

    Given the state of “preparedness” of the Pentagon for the Gulf War, the art that simply responds to the event itself might fail to be oppositional at all. The war itself would simply be the conclusion of a long argument; to attack it is to miss its body.

     

    17. In contrast, for example, to Levertov’s “Staying Alive,” her notebook of poems cataloguing a history of the Berkeley anti-Vietnam movement and invoking a romantic collective identity in opposition to the government, Watten’s Bad History is saturated with a sense of subjective isolation. Perhaps only in this way, Levertov’s and Watten’s poems are similar in that they most closely articulate the particular epistemological and political limits of war resistance during their respective historical moments, and demonstrate the tremendous differences between Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War.

     

    18. Though Watten’s strategy is to pursue a Zukofskyan “thinking with things as they exist,” the dates cannot represent only the time of writing, since in the section footed by the date 16 January Watten notes that “only later did we find out that the success rate for Patriot missiles was only 6 percent” (9). Watten’s use of the dates may represent an impossible desire for a writing that aims for full awareness of its subjective-historical moment or a method of anchoring a meditation against a specific historical moment.

     

    19. An equally straightforward question–when did the Gulf War end?–also yields three different answers: 1) 8 June 1991: “Victory parade in Washington”; 2) 6 January 1992: “An ABC 20/20 story airs on the deliberate U.S. public relations campaign regarding the false reports on Iraqi soldiers and incubator babies” (321); and 3) 15 August 1992: “UN Security Council votes to allow Iraq six months to sell limited amount of oil to finance civilian needs” (374). Oddly, none of these endings corresponds to the official 28 February 1991 ceasefire; the ensuing rebellions in Iraq by Kurds and Shi’ite Muslims in March does not even appear on the official chronology, even though some of the bloodiest fighting took place during this period. Finally, the policy of economic sanctions against Iraq and bombing sorties against infrastructure might also qualify as a continuation of the war, even though official hostilities ended in 1991. The 2003 war, “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” suggests yet another “end point,” itself perhaps only a point on a much longer vector.

    Works Cited

     

    • Baudrillard, Jean. The Gulf War Did Not Take Place. Trans. Paul Patton. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1995.
    • Bennis, Phyllis, and Michel Moushabeck, eds. Beyond the Storm: A Gulf Crisis Reader. Brooklyn, NY: Olive Branch P, 1991.
    • Bernstein, Charles. A Poetics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1992.
    • Bernstein, Michael André. The Tale of the Tribe: Ezra Pound and the Modern Verse Epic. Princeton, NJ: Princeton, 1980.
    • Clark, Ramsey. The Fire This Time: U.S. War Crimes in the Gulf. New York: Thunder’s Mouth, 1992.
    • —-. and others. War Crimes: A Report on United States War Crimes Against Iraq. Washington, DC: Maisonneuve P, 1992.
    • Davidson, Michael, Lyn Hejinian, Ron Silliman, and Barrett Watten. Leningrad: American Writers in the Soviet Union. San Francisco: Mercury House, 1991.
    • Friedlander, Benjamin. “A Short History of Language Poetry/According to Hecuba Whimsy.” Qui Parle 12.2 (2001): 107-42.
    • Jeffords, Susan, and Lauren Rabinovitz, eds. Seeing Through the Media: The Persian Gulf War. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 1994.
    • Levertov, Denise. Poems 1968-1972. New York: New Directions, 1987.
    • MacArthur, John. Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War. New York: Hill, 1992.
    • Monroe, Jonathan. A Poverty of Objects: The Prose Poem and the Politics of Genre. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1987.
    • Nelson, Cary. Repression and Recovery: Modern American Poetry and the Politics of Cultural Memory, 1910-1945. Madison: U Wisconsin P, 1989.
    • Norris, Christopher. Uncritical Theory: Postmodernism, Intellectuals, and the Gulf War. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1992.
    • Pease, Donald. “Hiroshima, the Vietnam Veterans War Memorial, and the Gulf War: Postnational Spectacles.” Cultures of United States Imperialism. Eds. Amy Kaplan and Donald Pease. Durham: Duke UP, 1993. 557-80
    • PBS Frontline. < http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/teach/gulfguide/gwtimeline.html>.
    • Perelman, Bob. The Marginalization of Poetry: Language Writing and Literary History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1996.
    • Rasula, Jed. The American Poetry Wax Museum: Reality Effects, 1940-1990. Urbana: NCTE, 1996.
    • Ross, Andrew. “The New Sentence and the Commodity Form: Recent American Writing.” Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. Urbana, IL: U of Illinois P, 1988. 361-80.
    • Silliman, Ron, Carla Harryman, Lyn Hejinian, Steve Benson, and Barrett Watten. “Aesthetic Tendency and the Politics of Poetry: A Manifesto.” Social Text (Fall 1988): 19-20, 261-75.
    • Virilio, Paul, and Sylvère Lotringer. Pure War. New York: Semiotext(e), 1983.
    • Watten, Barrett. Bad History. Berkeley, CA: Atelos, 1998.
    • —. Email to the author. 22 Nov. 1999.
    • —. Frame: 1971-1990. Los Angeles: Sun & Moon, 1997.
    • —. “Intention and Identity.” Artweek. 4 Apr. 1991: 18-19.
    • —. “Michal Rovner.” Artweek. 20 Feb. 1992: 14.
    • —. “No More War! An Unwanted Animal at the Garden Party of Democracy at Southern Exposure Gallery.” Artweek 7 Feb. 1991: 1, 22-3.
    • —. “Seyed Alavi.” Artweek 14 Mar. 1991: 15.
    • —. “The Turn to Language and the 1960s.” Critical Inquiry 29 (Autumn 2002): 139-83.

     

  • The Body of the Letter: Epistolary Acts of Simon Hantaï, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Jacques Derrida

    Julie Hayes

    Department of Modern Languages and Literatures
    University of Richmond
    jhayes@richmond.edu


    Editor’s Note: For the original French versions of selected quotations, please mouse over or click on the ¤ symbol.

     


     

     

    “Lire, écrire, affaire de tact”

    J-L Nancy

     

    In the summer of 1999, Jean-Luc Nancy wrote to the artist Simon Hantaï with a request: to produce a work that might be used as the frontispiece of a forthcoming book on Nancy by their mutual friend, Jacques Derrida. Hantaï responded enthusiastically and set to work on a series of “unreadable manuscripts,” meticulously written and re-written on fine batiste, stiffened, crumpled, and folded. Derrida’s Le Toucher, Jean-Luc Nancy, accompanied by black and white photographs of Hantaï’s “travaux de lecture,” appeared in early 2000, but the exchange of letters between Hantaï and Nancy continued for several months. In late spring, Nancy asked Hantaï to consider the publication of their letters; a year later, La Connaissance des textes: Lecture d’un manuscrit illisible (Correspondances) appeared, with the text of the correspondence, full-color plates of Hantaï’s “travaux de lecture,” photographic reproductions of all the letters, and a final letter by Derrida addressed to both correspondents.

     

    I propose a reading of La Connaissance des textes that takes into account its epistolary dynamics: its logic of sending and receiving, its “message strategy,” its complex negotiation of visual and discursive modes, and its relationship to a set of significant pre-texts–the passages from Nancy’s Etre singulier pluriel and Derrida’s Donner le temps that Hantaï laboriously renders “unreadable” in his haunting works–and, of course, Le Toucher itself. Furthermore, I want to look at La Connaissance des textes not only as a “text,” but also as a “book”: a physical object, manifesting production constraints and editorial choices that subtly interact with the dialogue of the correspondents.

     

    Epistolary discourse has long been a site for reflecting on the paradoxical entwinement–particularly, though not exclusively, inasmuch as letters bespeak affect, passion–of bodies and words, embodied words. In earlier forms of epistolarity, the materiality of letters (the physical state of paper and ink, the letter’s trajectory through space) reinforced the impression of incarnation. Even in the apparently abstract medium of fiber-optic-borne email, we concoct means to preserve this connection. Letters intrigue us because they ultimately tell us a great deal about writing, and reading, as such. Epistolary writing is productive, or “machinic,” in a Deleuzian sense; it exceeds attempts to reduce it to a function of absence, to a uni-dimensional communication circuit, or to a univocal meaning. In this reading, I would like to explore first Simon Hantaï’s “unreadable manuscripts” themselves, then the complex folds of the correspondence, its machinic qualities and resistance to closure, the physicality of the letters, and the questions of reproducibility and readership that arise in connection to the production of the published correspondence. Last, I will look at the “late arrival” in the exchange, Derrida’s concluding letter-essay on “intimation.”

     

    I. “Travaux de lecture.”

     

    Born in Hungary in 1922, active in France since the late 40s, Simon Hantaï experimented with different techniques as he engaged first with surrealism and then with the expressionism of Jackson Pollock. 1960 is often seen as a turning point in his work, with the emergence of “folding as method” (le pliage comme méthode) that he has explored in one form or another in the decades since: canvases folded or crumpled, painted or written upon in different ways, stretched or left folded. As Hantaï writes to Nancy,

     

    As I've already written somewhere, something happened through and in painting--line, form, colors united in a single gesture (after the long history of these questions). Scissors and the stick dipped in paint. Folding was an attempt to confront the situation.1 ¤

     

    After decades of successful exhibitions, including a major retrospective at the Centre Pompidou in 1976 and the 1982 Venice Biennale, Hantaï ceased exhibiting for 16 years, preferring to study, to read, and to pursue his art away from public view until the late 90s.2 Of his most recent work, the Laissées, a group of folded and collaged canvases incorporating pieces of earlier work, critic Tom McDonough writes:

     

    “They are perhaps the finest achievement of his career to date, works which embody the great themes of the visible and the invisible, the revealed and the hidden, the painted and the unpainted. . . . The programmatic denial of painterly proficiency evident throughout Hantaï’s mature career reaches its acme in these pieces, where the artist never picks up the brush. Scissor replaces brush, and collage is not, as in Matisse, placed in the service of painting, but is rather instated at its heart, as a challenge to be met.”3

     

    Thus, when Nancy writes to Hantaï inviting his collaboration on Le Toucher (5 July 99; 25), the painter writes back to propose a work of ink on paper, copying passages from both Nancy and Derrida, recalling an earlier project based on la copie, “une peinture-écriture” from 1958: “Copying interminably, one over another, to the point of unreadability, where a few words spring out of the chaos” ¤  (9 July 99; 27). A day later, he writes again with a second proposition involving different techniques of pliage (and enclosing a photo showing a 1997 unearthing, défouissement, of paintings buried in his garden). Nancy responds enthusiastically, noting that “folding is making something touch” ¤  (39). With the approval of Derrida and Michel Delorme, director of the publishing house Galilée, Hantaï sets to work.

     

    The pieces that result are a set of five large “travaux de lecture”4 on batiste that has been treated, folded, and stiffened to become a writing surface on which Hantaï painstakingly copies and recopies passages from Donner le temps: 1. La fausse monnaie and Etre singulier pluriel, stopping just short of the saturation point, in a process bewildering to eye and mind–“disconcerting abracadabra experience,” ¤  as he later calls it (61). One of the five, ultimately, will be unfolded and stretched, so that multiple irregular swaths of white cut through the fields of writing; a detail appears as the frontispiece of Le Toucher.5Nancy’s first reaction to photographs of the work-in-progress emphasizes the dizzying effect of textual dissolution through repetition, saturation:

     

    here is a never-before edited text or a text edited as never before… Or rather, unheard-of, if you definitively bury in those folds the sonority of the voices that would have uttered these words, making the words disappear along with their meaning, their voice (voces), leaving nothing to touch but their crumpled and pressed traces, stuffed into the cloth that ends up eating the text…. Because it’s about Derrida, about a touch among you, Derrida, and me–one could say without forcing it, without giving an illustrative interpretation, that you replay the game of his “writing” but referring it elsewhere, displacing it toward what you’ve just suggested to me: the cloth eats the text (which is itself textile). (15 Aug. 99; 59) ¤

     

    Nancy points out that the project unites Hantaï’s signature pliage technique with the “calligraphic” elements of a painting that is considered a turning point in his career, just prior to the emergence of pliage: his 1958-59 Ecriture rose.6 The passages Hantaï chose to copy–to present and to make disappear–offer important resonances, new folds, and implications both for the travaux and for the correspondence.7

     

    In his initial proposal, Hantaï announces that he will choose to copy “a text already written lending itself (implicitly or explicitly) to dispersion” ¤  (26 July 99; 43). The passage from Donner le temps includes part of a long footnote proposing a rereading of Heidegger’s “Anaximander Fragment” in terms of three interconnected themes: the gift, the hand, and the logos (201n.). The main text is Derrida’s reading of the final part of Baudelaire’s prose poem, “La Fausse monnaie,” the logic of which involves the touching, or contamination, of two economies distinguished by Aristotle as the khrema–that is, limitless (and illusory) potential of commerce–and the oikos–that is, domestic economy of (healthy) finite exchange. As Derrida points out, the “gift” of a counterfeit coin in Baudelaire’s ironic fable points toward a phantasm of limitless power (the khrema), and ultimately to the dissociation of the “gift” and the principle of generosity: “the gift, if it exists, must go against or independently of nature; breaking, at the same time, at the same instant, with all originarity, with all originary authenticity” ¤ (Donner le temps 205). Even in the moment when he believes himself to have understood his friend, the giver–and condemned him as “unpardonable”–Baudelaire’s narrator fails to “see” his own speculation, his own credulity, his own misunderstanding of both gift and pardon.The passage Hantaï chooses from Nancy falls within a discussion of a passage in Heidegger’s Beiträge, through which Nancy develops the possibility of a “co-existential analytic” or pre-comprehension of meaning, sens, in terms of relation, being-with, “the originary plural folding” ¤ (Etre singulier 118). There follows a dense unfolding of what is already a dense passage in Heidegger (Derrida will cite part of it in his afterword to Connaissance, 151-52), elaborating the profound “with-ness” within self, an originary “mediation without mediator” which itself does not “mediate,” but is simply the space between, “half-way, place of partaking and passage” ¤ (Etre singulier 119).8 Ultimately, Nancy argues, the structure of “self” is the structure of “with”; solipsism is singulier pluriel (Etre singulier 120). He will go on to interpret the being of Dasein, être-le-là, in terms of this new value of being, être, as “disposition,” simultaneously separation, écart, and proximity (Etre singulier 121).

     

    In the passage chosen by Hantaï, Nancy announces the need to “force a passage” within Heidegger’s existential analytic in order to give greater prominence to the notion of mitsein that Heidegger subordinates to it. Nancy argues for a rereading–or a rewriting–of the German philosopher that gives primacy to “being with.” His close reading of a passage in the Beiträge is a masterful unfolding, explication, of the text: reading not only “with” Heidegger but also through him, in the interstices, an elaboration of the text that is also a dialogue with it. It is worth noting that Nancy prefaces the discussion in the paragraph immediately preceding Hantaï’s passage by articulating his own relationship to Heidegger (Etre singulier 117), a relation that is neither one of facile antagonism nor docile sectarianism but rather something between or beyond, and always in progress.

     

    Read together–a phrase that takes on new meaning in the context of Hantaï’s work–these texts add to one another in unexpected ways. Both are close readings, replications and explications of other texts: Baudelaire, Heidegger. Both propose, within the textual fold of a footnote, a rereading or rewriting of Heidegger, which neither actually carries out, although Derrida sketches his in further.9 In the course of his correspondence with Nancy, Hantaï suggests several times that he will reveal his thinking on the two passages; he had, in fact, been rereading Etre singulier pluriel prior to Nancy’s invitation, and one of the earliest letters in the series includes a series of questions about specific passages in the book (7 Apr. 99; 19). In the end, however, he confines himself to alluding to a “troubling experience of these modifications in reading” ¤ (12 Aug. 99; 55) and elsewhere to a profound “disorientation” provoked by the “differences” between the two texts (6 Sept. 99; 69).10 Of Hantaï’s experience in copying I will say more in the discussion of the letters, but I would like to linger a bit more on the relation between the two texts, forever embedded in one another in the travaux, yet increasingly distinct from one another in the artist’s mind. Certainly, Nancy’s passage offers a much more “immediate” connection to the works; its complex situating of relation at the heart of identity bespeaks the “with-ness” of the travaux, which visually blur textual boundaries and distinctions even as they maintain them, cohesive yet fragmented, the contacts both reinforced and threatened by the folds in the writing surface. As Nancy writes elsewhere, “no contact without separation” ¤ (Corpus 51). Derrida’s reflections on the gift have a clear, if startling, relation to the travaux which are created in response to friendship and become literally a gift when Hantaï mails all five works to Nancy in Strasbourg in March 2000. Derrida too is concerned with a space between, with the permutations of relationality implicit in the khrema: “to require, to need, to lack, to desire, to be indigent or poor, then duty, necessity, obligation, need, usefulness, interest, thing, event, destiny, demand, desire, prayer, etc ¤ (Donner le temps 201). To which one might add, “intimation,” his term for the disorienting experience of reading the correspondence, as we shall see.In Derrida’s reading of Baudelaire, the khrema is initially introduced as the “mauvais infini” threatening the stability of domestic exchange (Donner le temps 200), but it is quickly shown to be the operative law of exchange, radicalized by a notion of absolute gift. A “gift” cannot be grounded in “generosity” nor pardon in any form of “merit,” for such grounding limits the freedom of the act. As Baudelaire’s narrator condemns his friend for committing “evil from stupidity,” ¤ Derrida nods briefly in the direction of Nietzsche and Bataille (205) and argues that the narrator has taken the side of desire and the will to knowledge, something “closer to the khrema than to the oikos” (212), finally identified as the Kantian Sapere aude, philosophical Enlightenment.

     

    Certainly the initial frameworks of these two passages are quite different: the narrator of “La Fausse monnaie” condemns his sometime friend without appeal, whereas “the violence of current events” lends a particular urgency to Nancy’s being-with, formulated as exposure without alienation, as compassion.11 The arguments are conducted quite differently as well, so that Hantaï would later say that even as he wrote and over-wrote the texts into a blur, they became increasingly distinct in his mind. And yet both the desiring infinities of the khrema and the hovering “singular plural” prior to existence, prior to beings, represent forms of inter-mediacy, or intermediality. And both are contained within the travaux de lecture.

     

    Deleuze saw analogies between Hantaï’s work and Leibniz’s theory of obscure perceptions, according to which experience is composed of an infinity of microperceptions, our internal representation of the plenum, the labyrinth of continuity; our ability to distinguish between objects and events is contingent on “forgetting” continuity, selecting some aspects and letting others remain obscure: “microperceptions or representatives of the world are these tiny folds in all directions, folds in folds, on folds, along folds, a painting by Hantaï…” ¤ (Le Pli 115).12 As we look to the correspondence as a whole we can see a further analogy. The correspondence too is a complex network of question and answer, understanding and confusion, memory and forgetting. If we look closely, it becomes infinite and the act of reading interminable. Each letter is itself a “series” of intersocial and intertextual allusions of infinite depth, yet must remain part of a succession of (other individually infinite) moments. This is the logic of “plis dans plis.” Just as monads obscurely bespeak the entire world, “even if not in the same order” (Deleuze 122), the quotations bespeak the works from which they came, which in turn point to other texts, other conversations; and the letters bespeak both the correspondence and an often obscure network of quotation, allusion, and speculation. Again speaking of Leibniz’s “folds,” Deleuze notes that “the unfold is never the opposite of the fold” ¤ (124); once stretched, the unfolded canvas or cloth could not be reconstituted as folded, as the complexity of the process and the role of chance prohibit an exact repetition. The unfolded work emphasizes its own insertion in temporality and the (time) gap between writing and folding, even as it leaves open the possibility of further physical changes, new writing or folding. In the letters following the production of the travaux, Hantaï seems indeed to be contemplating further action. He refers to a “second phase” yet to come (69, 75) and after unfolding one piece hesitates as to the other four, still waiting, “en attente” (97): should they be further photographed? unfolded? rewritten? He refers to his work not as “finished,” but rather as “abandoned” (n.d.; 119). Having “opened” only one piece and having ceased the work of copying just prior to the saturation point, Hantaï maintains his project “in progress,” in-between, open to possibility, keeping its “with-ness” entire.13

    II. “Comment peut-on lire une correspondance?”

     

    The dynamics of epistolary writing have been much studied in recent years. The implications of reading a missive originally addressed to someone else, while exploited in novels from Laclos’s Liaisons dangereuses to Matt Beaumont’s electronic frolic e: A Novel, also create disturbances for editors and readers of “real” correspondences, who must renounce seeing in letters simple “documents” of a particular time and place, and instead confront them as “texts” that are not always susceptible to complete explication or decipherability, but which nevertheless bear a different relation to the world than, say, the marquise de Merteuil’s Letter 81.14 In any event, the act of reading a published correspondence is inevitably shaped by a series of decisions and affective investments made by the editors and by the letter-writers themselves. In an earlier project I argued that one could see a correspondence as a “desiring machine,” a system of libidinal ruptures and flows constructed from “marking” or selecting a correspondent; interpreting one’s own letters as part of a series; “inscription and distribution” or elaborating interpretative strategies and writing “toward”; and “feedback” or rereading letters, letting their meaning shift recursively in addition to the ongoing processes of marking and inscription.15 The machinic model is useful inasmuch as it provides an enabling conceptual vocabulary for coming to terms with a phenomenon that is both affective and social, patterned but not predetermined, and productive rather than stemming from “lack.”16

     

    We can see these processes in the Nancy-Hantaï exchange as well: the book, La Connaissance des textes, comes into being at a particular moment, in response to a particular set of circumstances. Letters have already been exchanged, perhaps for years, presumably without either participant considering them as an exercise leading to publication. “Marking” takes place in the manner that the correspondents define one another and come to see their correspondence as having its own identity as a body of writing. The sequence of published letters begins in medias res, with Hantaï’s response to an earlier request from Nancy on the eve of a departure for a few days in his country house.17 The interlocutors’ mode of address is amicable, respectful, and collegial; part of the correspondence’s “plot” is however the construction of a zone of more intimate friendship, underscored most notably in the shift, at Nancy’s request, to first names (the significance in the change is underscored by Nancy’s simultaneous expression of concern for the health of Hantaï’s wife, Zsuzsa, “if she will allow me to name her thus” ¤ [15 Aug 99; 59]), but also by expressions of concern about each other’s health, requests for news of family members, etc.18But if in other sets of epistolary circumstances the consolidation of protocols of intimacy is accompanied by a wish for privacy (“Burn the letter!”), in this case the opposite occurs, when Nancy proposes as early as 16 September 1999 to “faire quelque chose” with the letters (71). He returns to the suggestion in March 2000, emphasizing the importance of Hantaï’s letters:

    we could gather our letters since the beginning of the work--"ours," that is primarily yours, the only ones that count (mine would provide the connections) and whose work that you've termed "of reading" is already itself a text and/or an over-script, an overstrike of the work on cloth.*[Nancy’s footnote] If you haven’t kept my letters it’s not a problem–I have all of yours, assuming none has strayed (in general I keep all the mail I receive, absolutely all–it sleeps in the cellar). (123) ¤

    Singling out a thread in his “cellar” of correspondence, it is Nancy who creates the opportunity for the production of Connaissance, which becomes in effect a return gift, a portrait of Hantaï: “I wanted others to read these letters that show the painter-copyist at work” ¤ (Connaissance 9).19The second component of the epistolary machine is the act of reading, interpretation, imbricated within the act of writing. To focus on reading is to bring to light the complexity of the “communication” process, to recall that not all questions are answered, or even understood, that any message encounters scrambling upon entering the zone of associations and responses that constitute the reader. Letters cross in the mail; the disturbances in their delivery alter their messages. Even when the letters arrive in order, their writers may write at cross-purposes, each missing what the other is saying. Connaissance offers not only a “picture of the artist at work,” but also any number of other objects in the room, the significance of which varies according to the spectator. Take for example Hantaï’s typically elliptical reference, in his letter of 6 September 1999, the letter announcing the “end” of his copying: “Seeing the allure, the illuminating tendency (book of Kells) in Derrida, in bricks of material in you” ¤ (69). Nancy, the conscientious reader, asks in his next: “You write parenthetically ‘(book of Kells)’–and I don’t know what that is” ¤ (71), only to receive an even more perplexing answer:

    Book of Kells and etc. are ellipses. I wanted to talk about the differences that appeared in that zone of indifference, once preference, predilection, ground up as well. I couldn’t write about it without getting into a polemic. Experiences before choice, without judgement. Predilections stripped naked. Fields ploughed endlessly, stones and boulders coming up from below, ploughshare running into the singularities of their weight and their voices. (15-19 Sept 99; 77) ¤

    In his next letter, Nancy tries again: “There’s an allusion I don’t understand: ‘Book of Kells etc. etc. are ellipses…’ Is it a title I’m forgetting?” ¤ (n.d.; 81). The answer comes months later, in a long letter that Hantaï dates 28 November-17 December, when under a postscript headed “Retouches,” he picks up this and other loose ends: “Book of Kells, like the Saint-Gall lectionary, manuscripts with pictures, stylized ornamentation, Irish, seventh century” ¤ (103). While banal in appearance–Hantaï realizes only belatedly that Nancy sought not an ontological explanation for his allusion, but merely a gloss–this side exchange shows the fluidity and unpredictability of both reading and writing. What begins as an evocative metaphor–Derrida’s text imagined as an illuminated manuscript–becomes in its repetition an emblem of Hantaï’s physical and mental exhaustion in the weeks immediately following cessation of the travaux, of the impossibility of articulating the differences that he “felt” between the two texts in the course of his work. The initial sketch of a comparison–Derrida as “enluminure,” Nancy as “briques de matériaux”–suggests not, I think, a comparison between “decoration” and “substance” (hardly in keeping with either Hantaï’s or Nancy’s relation to Derrida!), but rather a perception of two very different forms of complexity, different forms of internal organization, as much between the ways of engaging the prototexts Baudelaire and Heidegger as between the manifold khrema and the pliure plurielle de l’origine.

     

    The work of interpretation in Connaissance is given additional depth inasmuch as both correspondents are engaged in “dialogue” with the travaux themselves: Hantaï most directly, of course, but Nancy through the photographs Hantaï sends and the (telephonic) accounts he receives from Derrida and Michel Delorme, both of whom visit Hantaï and observe the work in progress. (Nancy’s one projected visit is cancelled because of illness, prompting Hantaï to ship all five travaux to his home in Strasbourg.) Certainly the heart of the correspondence lies in Hantaï’s accounts of his work: the initial choice of materials (9 Aug. 99; 53); the early stages of the work:

     

    I’m coming to a first stage of saturation that I’ve already told you about. There are threshholds of saturation, tidelines. Time passes, I write, nothing seems to move. But soon signs appear (strokes accumulating on one another, next to one another, heading toward marks, toward another picturality). (12 Aug. 99; 55) ¤

    (Nancy responds to this letter, and its accompanying photographs, with the observation cited above, “le tissu mange le texte,” and the request to call Simon Hantaï by his first name.) On 9 September (the “Book of Kells” letter), Hantaï announces that he’s stopping, although for the moment he does not exclude the possibility of further works in the series, or a “deuxième phase.” This letter and those following, however, emphasize his mental state: “I am also stopping from fatigue and especially from disorientation” ¤(69). A week later: “Coming back to the stop: I was at the end. Uselessness of dancing trinkets. Vacuity. Indifference. Sitting on the doorstep, seeing only the effects of light coming through the holes between the leaves…” ¤ And, describing the act of copying: “At the beginning, in spite of some uneveness in the surface, the pen glides, the eye looks ahead and helps overcome obstacles, the written text is readable. After going back over it hundreds of times, the eye’s no longer good for anything, the pen gropes and bumps almost without interruption, breaks the words and the letters” ¤ (15-19 Sept. 99; 75).20Short exchanges of ideas and photographs follow. In late November, however, Hantaï begins writing a long letter that he will continue over two weeks, a remarkable text recapitulating “the work of the copyist, banal, humble, and stupid, that I undertook at your request” ¤ (28 Nov.-17 Dec.; 95). He describes the camera work on the details to be used for Le Toucher–reproducing, making visible the travaux–even as he explains his project as a “decanonization of the privilege of sight” ¤ (97).21 The disorientation of vision leads to an altered apprehension of the texts and a loss of connections, of meaning: “modification of the articulations touching its matter, rupture and reconnection constantly modified, redislocated, contact interrupted, lost, etc.” ¤ (101). And last: “I don’t know where I am” ¤ (103). Physical illness intervenes in the month that follows; Hantaï writes again in February, his mood bleak following a severe fever, to announce that he is abandoning his project of a book for Gallimard: “Affirmation of a fall. Cutting off, spacing, dislocation, dispersion, the senses unbound, without relation, outside any possible relation, unbridgeable cut, irreparable” ¤ (16 Feb 00; 108). Hantaï’s intense concentration on the two texts that seek to evoke a “space between” appears to have taken him deep into that space, to the point that its “edges,” the point of articulation, are no longer clear.22 While expressing his delight over the new set of photographs, Nancy becomes concerned: “Your note is so painful” ¤ (n.d.; 113). Shortly thereafter, he offers a reading of the travaux that may serve as well to help restore their maker, affirming both the “coupure” and the “lissée” as well as the “faire” in “faire voir,” reading the travaux as “work,” “ouvrage contre l’oeuvre,”23 rather than a space of disintegration, and asking Hantaï to reflect a bit on their “musical” qualities (6 Mar. 00; 118). At this point, Hantaï ships the works to Nancy. Nancy asks again to publish the correspondence (in terms that imply that he has already made plans with the publisher: “I know that Galilée would be ready to do it” ¤  [21 Mar. 00; 125]).The painter emerges from his dolorous withdrawal, or perhaps simply recovers from his earlier debilitating fever (“what was I thinking?” ¤[29 Mar. 00; 129]). His final evocation of his “expérience de copiste” foregrounds connections, not disjunction (“connected worlds, hyphens, lines of synthesis, of communication…” ¤ [133]). From this point on, the letters turn to questions of publication and reproduction. The title–or titles–chosen for the collection, La Connaissance des textes: Lecture d’un manuscrit illisible (Correspondances),24 emphasizes the centrality of reading, and its paradoxes–understanding and misunderstanding, reading and unreadability (or reading as evacuation, even pain, and reading as restorative), the partitions of private experience and their overcoming–all overwrite one another as the two correspondents seek to comprehend their relation to one another and to the work of art.25The third major component of the letter-machine, recursive rereading and feedback, is most evident in correspondences that take place over a long period of time, where the correspondents have occasion to rethink the relation between past and present. A friend tells me, for example, that years earlier he had a life-changing experience, a dream, of which I knew nothing at the time; I reread his letters, weighing them anew, and reconsider the present in the light of the altered past. At its painful extreme this reconsideration becomes what Proust called l’ébranlement du passé pierre à pierre. In the present instance, a simple reading might lead to a simple attribution of meaning: the story of the making of the travaux, for example, or of the painter’s struggle with the fundamental incompatibility of the lissée and the coupure, and subsequent reemergence, whole, but not untouched by the experience.26 Such is the mobility and complexity of the acts of reading within Connaissance, however, that we are deterred from assigning it a single narrative. The recursive reading occurs most clearly perhaps in the letter appended by Derrida–the one letter intended from the outset for publication–that asks the question, “how can one read a correspondence?” ¤ In the process of elaborating–or intimating–an answer, Derrida points to the “literariness” of one of the most unstudied of all the letters, Hantaï’s note of 15 June 1999, written on the eve of his departure for Meun, “to stretch out in the grass and cut a passage through the weeds and treat the quince tree” ¤ (13). The letter is already part of a chain, yet something prompts the correspondents-become-editors to choose it as Letter I, leading Derrida subsequently to marvel over its appropriateness (an appropriateness constructed retrospectively in the light of his own Wordsworthian associations): “how did you know the turn it would take, all the way to publication?” ¤ (148).27 The quince tree, le cognassier, quickly extends its ramifications of metaphorical association and personal recollection throughout Derrida’s essay. At what point does a letter in an indefinitely structured series become Letter I? Only when one is seeking something that responds at some level to that which comes later, and even then the meaning of the individual letters changes with every rereading. The machinic syntheses at work, à l’oeuvre, in a correspondence cast into clear relief the productive nature of epistolary writing, which is not really about absence (as has often been claimed), anymore than a letter can be reduced to a single unvarying meaning or its author to a stable unchanging subject.

     

    A correspondence is also an object, or set of objects and material practices. In a recent study of “the postal system,” Bernhard Siegert has examined how the “materiality of communication” has informed modern subjectivity, transforming knowledge from a set of static “places” into messages sent and received. From the initial marking or delimitation of sender and receiver, through technical innovations such as the rise of delivery services and the invention of the postage stamp, the postal system rationalizes emergent authorial, libidinal impulses and directs their energy into communications networks. As such, the writing of letters (whether love letters, fan mail, letters of condolence or complaint, letters to elected representatives, to Santa Claus, or to Mom) participates in the disciplinary and rationalizing processes of modernity, producing postal subjects who always arrive at their destinations. While I admire Seigert’s work very much for its meticulous reading of cultural history, I do not think that we can discount the unruly and unpredictable potential of epistolarity, the changing labyrinth within the grand system, the letter that contains the potential for not arriving (Derrida, La Carte postale 135). That the rational system contains the necessary preconditions for the emergence of the epistolary subject does not reduce that subject to the “law of the postal system.” Electronic and digitized modes of communication have not radically transformed this situation, though certainly they have provided new sites for reflecting on its wider implications, as we see in The Telephone Book, Avital Ronell’s exploration of the analogies between communications technology and Heidegger’s “call.” Yet, in spite of this work’s startling typographic metamorphoses, its playfulness, cross-chatter, and interruptions, I wonder if the underlying point isn’t ultimately a conventional, reassuring one, in which the message sent is finally received and the visual and discursive anomalies prove to have their elegant conceptual parallels. The postal system, indeed. Even so, Ronell brings out the strangeness of the rational system itself, its schizophrenic core.

     

    While equally as impressive visually, nothing could appear further removed from the graphic eccentricities of The Telephone Book than the exquisitely documented correspondence of La Connaissance des textes, whose material qualities I would now like to consider. Each letter appears both in print and in photographic reproduction, accompanying the superb color plates showing details of the travaux de lecture. During the discussion of publication within the correspondence, Nancy conceives an even more ambitious plan. Under the initial euphoria of seeing the travaux, he comes back to his idea to “faire quelque chose” with the letters: “I imagine a book in which there might be at least one page of batiste thus treated… Is it imaginable?” ¤ (21 March 00; 123). Hantaï’s reply is practical and realistic, asking whether the purpose is to create a collector’s item or a book affordable by all:

    Your wish, as I see it, is to multiply and distribute what you have in front of you. In a sense, there is only one copy, along with the letters. It is yours…. Your proposal comes down to this: a book with limited edition plates, expensive for collectors, originals produced a couple of hundred times, and this time for aesthetic reasons only, lacking the motivations, the unpredictable, copyist. This is impossible for me. (1 Apr. 00; 137) ¤

     

    Hantaï emphasizes that this is not a refusal, simply an attempt to “situate the real questions.” He wonders about other technical solutions: “A piece of cloth folded and written upon, or a piece of cloth simply folded? I have an idea for a folded piece with a photo-engraving printed on it… Let’s leave things be, almost without thinking of them” ¤ (139). It is the final letter in the published exchange.In the end, of course, photography and mechanical reproduction take the place of real cloth, real writing, real folds, in the representation of the travaux. The four folded works, distinguishable by the different colors of their ink, each appear in a series of six two-page color spreads appearing at regular intervals. (The unfolded piece that appears as the frontispiece in Le Toucher is not reproduced in Connaissance.) Each series starts with a photograph of a section approximating life size (see Figure 1); the details that follow successively zoom in at greater and greater magnification, “to go somehow beyond the eye,” ¤ as Nancy puts it in his preface (9; see Figure 2): another form of the unsettling of vision.

     

    Figure 1: Hantaï [blue-green-black]
    (Connaissance 78-79)
    Images courtesy of Editions Galilée
    Click for larger version of image.

     

    Figure 2: Hantaï [blue-green-black]
    (Connaissance 104-05)
    Images courtesy of Editions Galilée
    Click for larger version of image.

     

    If readers of Connaissance are vouchsafed a view unavailable to the natural eye of the precise effects of ink amidst the filaments of batiste, they must nevertheless forego the most obvious part of the experience of an actual viewer of the works, seeing them each as a whole: the book offers only “details.” Each of the letters is carefully reproduced, down to the scribbled legend on the back of a photo. We are able to appreciate Hantaï’s “simultaneously round and angular ductus ¤ (91), the same handwriting that appears overwritten to unreadability on the canvasses, airily slanting up a page (see Figure 3) and contrasting with Nancy’s own neat, concentrated script (see Figure 4).

    Figure 3: Hantaï Letter
    (Connaissance 94)
    Images courtesy of Editions Galilée
    Click for larger version of image.

     

    Figure 4: J-L Nancy Letter
    (Connaissance 112)
    Images courtesy of Editions Galilée
    Click for larger version of image.

     

    Even the afterword, Derrida’s letter-essay on “intimation,” includes two photographed pages, rendering the set of “handwriting samples” complete. The availability of the manuscripts highlights the editorial work of the printed versions and reminds us of the editorial choices present in any published correspondence. Most of the changes are of a practical nature: obvious misspellings are corrected, and Michel Delorme’s home phone number, visible in one letter, is discreetly left out of the print version. On the other hand, the transcription-edition of Hantaï’s letters makes no attempt to render the complexity of their composition, the numerous crossings-out, the insertions, the self-corrections that suggest a constant process of self-reading and internal editing. Nancy’s manuscript letters bear almost no evidence of revision and the reproduced sections of Derrida’s essay similarly appear to have been written in a continuous gesture. The photographs of Derrida’s manuscript point out one intriguing anomaly: whereas the “intimation” essay is punctuated periodically by bracketed ellipses ([…])–the conventional sign of an editorial cut–in at least one instance (and, one suspects, the others, but the entire manuscript is not reproduced) a comparison of print to manuscript versions reveals that no material was deleted.28 The ellipses would appear to function as pauses, spaces between, virtual folds, in the text. Throughout all the letters, slippage, erasures, additions provoke questions but provide no answers regarding the status of the published letter and its relation either to its origin or to “truth.”

     

    Handwriting, perhaps even the “hand” tout court, occupies a central place in Connaissance. Certainly the travaux themselves offer a new twist on Hantaï’s long-established challenge to “the mastery of the gesture” (Pacquement 211) via folding and other techniques. Here, even in the complete abandonment of brushwork, the artist’s hand is more present than ever; Nancy sees a connection between Hantaï’s “retour à la calligraphie” and the great calligraphic traditions of China and the Islamic world (91). Given Nancy’s initial fantasy of a book that would include actual handwritten cloth, the final “mechanically reproduced” result would seem to imply a loss of authenticity, or “aura,” in Benjaminian terms: “a plurality of copies” substituted for “a unique existence” (Benjamin 221). But, as Hantaï pointed out, even the fantasy book is just that, a fantasy, an illusion of authenticity; he rejects the idea not because of the labor involved “a year or two of working with powder in the eyes” ¤ (137), but because the physical effort is no longer connected to “les motivations” that inspired the originals. The original travaux are the record and the product of a particular experience, “des traces de mon expérience de copiste” (137) and as such, irreproduceable (“il existe un exemplaire unique, avec les lettres. Il est à vous . . .” [137]).Even so, reproduction figures at the heart of the project. The originals are already copies and the original experience an “expérience de copiste” in which the artist has undergone a complete evacuation of self and sense, “to the point of dizziness and the exhaustion of indifference… Unforseen and rare gift received” ¤ (95). Even more to the point is the centrality of photography in the unfolding process: “the unfolding of the whole is profoundly linked to photography. The ‘originals’ are of little importance. They’re just a support for other things on the way” ¤ (28 Nov.-17 Dec. 99; 97).29 In spite of his insistence on the aura of the singular artifact, Benjamin nevertheless admired still photography’s ability to capture the specificity of a fleeting moment (226), as well as film’s capacity to focus our attention via close-ups on “hidden details of familiar objects” (a function he likened to Freud’s psychopathology of everyday life [235-36]). By concentrating on a particular moment, the photographs of the travaux evoke hidden potentials within folds, or a past process leading up to the unfolded state. As much might be said of the letters, carefully photographed in such a way as to emphasize the textures of the different kinds of paper and especially the creases: the proximity of the travaux helps us to see the letters, too, as unfolded works. So, if initially it might appear that the printed letters, like the photographs of the travaux, exist in a dependent relation of copy to original (or writing to speech), this relationship is unsettled: first, by the “essential” connection of photography and travaux; second, by the juxtaposition of the letters to the travaux themselves. Hantaï’s manuscript letters are distinct from the travaux because they are more readable and because they represent the artist’s own words, but the presence of the endlessly copied travaux remains to remind us that no word is ever entirely our own. Which is not to say that all letters are reabsorbed into the Postal System inflecting all consciousness. Rather, the travaux send us back to the letters, urging us to focus on the hidden details, the insertions and cross-outs, the perpetual process of reading and revising oneself, on the move, en route.In his footnote reflecting on the relation of the gift and the hand in “La Fausse monnaie,” one of the passages embedded within the travaux, Derrida asks whether the relationship obtains “when money is so dematerialized as no longer to circulate as cash, from hand to hand? What would be counterfeit money without a hand? And alms in the age of credit cards and encrypted signatures?” ¤ (Donner le temps 203n.). To consider the present instance: what is handwriting without a hand? This is one of the key questions of Connaissance, a book that foregrounds–almost provocatively!–handwritten letters in the age of email. Part of the answer comes from the elision of the difference between original and copy that we have seen, the importance of the copy in the constitution of the original, which removes, in effect, the grounds we would have for privileging the actual paper, the actual cloth, of the “exemplaire unique.” The other part comes from the capacity of the letters, of language, to “touch.”

     

    As Nancy observes, Hantaï’s project is about “un toucher entre vous, Derrida, et moi” (15 Aug 99; 59) as much as or more than it is “about” the book Le Toucher, whose progress to conclusion and through production we follow in the letters.30 It is Nancy who has articulated with particular eloquence and “tact” the forms of touch that lie within and through writing.

     

    Whether we want it or not, bodies touch on this page, or rather, the page itself is touch (of my hand that is writing, of yours holding this book). This touch is infinitely detoured, deferred–machines, transports, photocopies, eyes, other hands have intervened–but there remains the infinitesimal stubborn grain, the dust of a contact that is everywhere interrupted and everywhere pursued. In the end, your gaze touches the same outlines of characters that mine touches in this moment, and you are reading me, and I am writing for you. (Corpus 47) ¤

     

    The effect is all the more pronounced in words that flee material associations, whose medium is composed of oscillating digits, fiber optics, pixels; fragile, ephemeral, subject to immediate erasure, power shutdowns: handwriting without a hand.31 Yet a sentence glowing on a computer screen can cause a body to double over in pain. Words touch us, enter into us, become embodied, become flesh. The extreme visibility of the handwriting in Connaissance, available only through photographic reproduction, serves to remind us of its absence, and thereby to remind us that the “touch” of writing is hardly dependent on a paper “base.”32 Hantaï: “painting does not depend on sight, nor music on hearing” ¤ (133).

    “The paper falls away, leaving me with a cursor that turns itself into a tiny hand when it moves over the email address of a distant friend: ‘et vous me lisez, et je vous écris.’”

     

    III. Intimations/Intimations

     

    In his concluding essay, addressed to both Nancy and Hantaï (“Cher Jean-Luc, cher Simon”), Derrida promises to write “on intimation” (143), promising in language drawn from Hantaï’s description of his own work to make the word both “appear” and “disappear”: “disparition par saturation.” Intimation, the “law of intimation,” becomes the guiding trope for Derrida’s position as a reader of the correspondence of his friends. On the one hand, J.D. being “implicated” throughout the letters, his comings and goings noted by both Nancy and Hantaï, “je sens venir quelque intimation,” a call or summons to respond. And yet the correspondence is complete without his intervention: “No reader will ever change anything in this conversation ‘between you’ that will have taken place and that will remain unwitnessed.” ¤

     

    An intimidating situation, J.D. says, adding: “I prefer to stay in my corner.” ¤ The double summons–appear, disappear–is inscribed within the etymology of the word, “to intimate,” which sends us both to juridical Latin, intimare, the injunction to appear, faire acte de présence, to acknowledge the (intimidating) power of the Law, and to the language of the heart, intimus, “l’intime, le dedans, le chez-soi” (145). Shifting between Latin, French, and English (a brief footnote refers us to Wordsworth’s “Intimations of Immortality,” which will play a leitmotivic role throughout the essay [145n.]), “the law of intimation” resonates in more than one language, sustaining both its mobility and its efficacity.33

     

    The scope of the present essay does not allow me to follow every turn of Derrida’s piece, which reflects his position as insider/outsider, reader/respondent, in what is in many ways a very literary reading of the letters, an examination of themes, allusions, structures, as well as the associations provoked by puns on phrases appearing in the letters: Hantaï/entaille (150n.) emerges during a reflection on “la coupure,” and ver-à-soie/ soi takes us straight back to the passage from Heidegger’s Beiträge discussed in the letters (and analyzed in Nancy’s text in the travaux), which Derrida cannot resist citing in German, without further commentary: “Die Selbstheit ist ursprünglicher als jedes Ich und Du und Wir. . . .” (151).34 The commentary takes us into the text from all directions; even the puns ask us to consider a passage into language created by pure sound, just as the travaux require us to “look” without reading.35

     

    I would like to focus on a set of recurring questions asked by Derrida: “How can one read a correspondence? How can one read two friends at once? How can one address two friends at once?” ¤ (153). Despite the apparent specificity of his own implication in the exchange of letters, it should be clear that Derrida’s situation is that of any reader of a correspondence: “excluded third party, late-comer.” ¤ The same is true of any of us, since we need not share memories in common with the writers in order to be interpellated, intimated, touched by their words. How does one read a correspondence? Like this, mindful of the mutual engagement of Ich und Du und Wir, the “pliure plurielle de l’origine.” As for addressing more than one friend at once, J.D. seems only able to alternate throughout the essay between “toi, Jean-Luc” and “vous, Simon.”36 And yet, at the same time, “how not to?” (153), for this is precisely the structure of intimation. “Intimation” is the name for IYouWe, the originary fold that is no static formation, but rather an ongoing injunction, a summons that enables me to read one friend when I am reading another, and to address them both when I address a single one. Although, as Nancy says, “touching on the body, touching the body, touching finally–happens all the time in writing” ¤ (Corpus, 13), this capacity in all writing is nowhere more manifest than in epistolary writing. “Intimation” is the last of the “passive syntheses” of the epistolary machine: the place of the reader. We are different, distinct, but profoundly and irreducibly implicated in one another; in Nancy’s terms, our “dis-position” with respect to one another is inseparable from our mutual “exposure.” When someone enters a room and is instantly situated or “disposed” in relation to all other objects in the same space, that person is also “exposed”: “he exposes himself: thus he is ‘self,’ or in other words he is–or becomes thus–as often and whenever he comes into the disposition” ¤ (Etre singulier, 121). The “existential co-analytic” is vividly present in a correspondence, where both the urge to confess, to explain, and to justify oneself, as well as the opposite urge, the flight from intimacy and exchange, are forms of exposure, intimations, passions…

     

    In closing, Derrida asks two more questions. What happens to “l’intimation qui circule entre nous” once it has passed through “l’élément virtuel et quasiment liquide” of multiple computer screens? I take this as a late variant (“tard venu”) on the question of the “dematerialized hand” in Donner le temps and as such, a question that was answered when the decision was made to photograph the letters. . . or earlier, perhaps, in Nancy’s evocation of the “coming into presence” (“venue en présence”) (and the “glorious materiality of coming”–matérialité glorieuse de la venue) of moving images on a television screen (Corpus 57). Every screen is a “touch screen,” an intermedial limit that simultaneously separates and connects.

     

    Derrida’s second question also echoes earlier queries. Are these letters and travaux really readable, he asks, “readable without the law of the texts therein incorporated, encrypted, vanished, prescribing this or that reading, this or that rewriting?” ¤ (154). In other words, can we read these letters without fully explicating their every fold, every reference from Aristotle to Merleau-Ponty? Derrida answers: “Non. Mais oui.” And he proceeds to offer us a spectacular vision:

    An order might be given us to proceed to a reversibility test: to bring forth, reconstitute, restore, from the transmutation to which you submitted them, Simon, the body of the text, the whole, articulated, readable words, the sentences with their meaning. Unless we were to give the order, without really believing it, to any potential reader. Perhaps that’s the meaning of your titles, The Knowledge of texts.Reading of an unreadable manuscript, or rather, I myself would say, “the quince tree of manuscripts.” (154) ¤

    As we earlier saw in discussing Deleuze’s “plis dans plis” in Leibniz, the series is infinite, including as it does not only the history of philosophy evoked by Derrida, but the full range of textual microperceptions, nuances, events. The infinite series is an invitation to read, a summons or an intimation, to which, as readers, we can only respond.

    Postscript (J.D.)

     

    The book, La Connaissance des textes, could end with the vision of the travaux transformed into a bounteous textual quince tree, but does not. Instead, Derrida tells us a story about his trip to Australia in the summer of 1999 (mentioned by Nancy, 31 July 99; 49) and his leaving a diskette with the rough draft of Le Toucher in the hands of sculptor Elizabeth Presa, who printed out the pages, folded, stitched, and transformed them into an extraordinary piece, an airy, standing garment resembling a Victorian wedding dress, for her exhibit, “The Four Horizons of the Page.” As one critic comments:

     

    Why this book of Derrida’s? No sculptor could fail to be intrigued by a study of touch, for touch is what a sculptor knows intimately when making a work and what a philosopher usually declares to be out of order if one is to talk about art, not the material of art. And why the typescript of his book and not the book itself? Because it contains traces of Derrida’s touch that are silently erased in Galilée’s handsome production. Here a finger lingers for a moment too long on a key, producing an additional “s” on a word, while just there one notices two words run together in a moment of excited typing. So something of Derrida is folded into these sculptures . . . (Hart, “Horizons and Folds”)

     

    Derrida himself concludes Connaissanceby quoting Presa’s artist-statement in English on her aim to “construct garments from and for the horizons of the page–east and west, north and south–horizons achieved within a body of language, my language, spoken with my antipodean accent, formed by my antipodean touch” (156). Derrida’s constant shifting in and out of French is confirmed by Presa’s emphasis on the shift in language from his French to her English, and, within English, from British or American English to English with an “antipodean accent.” It is a graceful and fitting end to the book: we are left to imagine Presa’s work, which is not reproduced, a further “absorption” of text into art, a further rendering of “touch.”

     

    Postscript (J.H.)

     

    Another fruit from the quince tree: two centuries before the Nancy-Hantaï exchange, another correspondence took place between a philosopher and an artist, between Denis Diderot (named in Le Toucher as one of Nancy’s “predecessors” in the history of “touch” [159, 161, 246], but also, we should note, a thinker of relationality, rapports) and Etienne-Maurice Falconet. In his final letter to the sculptor, Diderot writes:

     

    We are where we think we are; neither time nor distance has any effect. Even now you are beside me; I see you, I converse with you; I love you. And when you read this letter, will you feel your body? Will you remember that you are in Saint Petersburg? No, you will touch me. I will be in you, just as now you are in me. For, after all, whether something exists beyond us or nothing at all, it’s we who perceive ourselves, and we perceive ourselves only; we are the entire universe. True or false, I like this system that allows me to identify with everything I hold dear. Of course I know how to take leave of it when need be. (Oeuvres 15:236) ¤

    Notes

     

    I would like to thank Stephen Melville, Michael Newman, and Gary Shapiro for their questions and comments on an earlier version of this piece. I am also grateful to Joanna Delorme for her kind assistance with the images from La Connaissance des textes, which are reproduced courtesy of Editions Galilée.

     

    1. Letter of 9 July 1999 (Connaissance 27; further references will appear with date and/or page number only). Hantaï similarly spoke of pliage as a “solution” to a problem in an interview published in 1973:

     

    An interrogation of gesture becomes necessary. The problem was: how to defeat the privilege of talent, or art, etc…? How to make the exceptional, banal? How to become exceptionally banal? Folding was one way of resolving the problem. Folding came out of nothing. You simply had to put yourself in the place of those who had never seen anything; put yourself in the canvas. You could fill a folded canvas without knowing where the edge was. You have no idea where it will stop. You could go even further and paint with your eyes closed. (Bonnefoi 23-24) ¤

    2. On Hantaï’s career, see Melville, “Simon Hantaï” (112-18); on his influence on French painting in the late twentieth-century, see Pacquement, (Melville, ed. 209-15).

     

    3. See Parent’s discussion of Hantaï’s “denial of painterly proficiency” in terms of Barthes’s essay on the death of the author.

     

    4. Translator’s note. Travaux de lecture: literally, “works”–in the sense of “physical work,” rather than “work of art” or oeuvre d’art–“of reading.” Large construction projects may be spoken of as travaux.

     

    5. A larger section of the same piece appears near the end of the Le Toucher (344-45). Other folded travaux appear 24-25, 152-53, 296-97.

     

    6. Working at set hours, day by day, over the course of an entire year, Hantaï covered the enormous smooth white surface of the work with the liturgical texts associated with the church calendar, as well as philosophical texts, overwritten to illegibility, punctuated by a few significant iconic symbols, a dense and mesmerizing work. Pacquement: “During this period of interrogation into the foundations of pictorial practice, a whole ensemble of processes emerge tending toward the disappearance of mastery, the refusal of the authority of gesture, and resulting in a slowing down of the hand, in effacement” (Melville, ed. 212). See also Baldassari 11-16. Ecriture rose now hangs in the permanent collection of the Musée national d’art moderne, Centre Georges Pompidou. A small-scale image (too small, unfortunately, for the handwriting to appear as anything other than a translucent blur) may be seen on the museum’s web site <http://www.centrepompidou.fr>. (Click “rechercher” and search under artist = hantai.) Several others of Hantaï’s works appear here as well.

     

    7. Hantaï indicates that he intends to copy Donner le temps 203-06, including all or part of the notes, and Etre singulier pluriel 118-19 and part of 120, including footnotes (43). He later indicates that in practice he deviated from this plan to some extent (101); the name “Marx” appearing prominently in one detail (41) would seem to confirm this, as it does not occur within the passages originally specified.

     

    8. Derrida discusses the “rethinking of ‘with’” in Etre singulier pluriel in juxtaposition with Merleau-Ponty’s notion of “coincidence” in Le Toucher, 224-26.

     

    9. Derrida: “Ici s’imposerait une relecture de La Parole d’Anaximandre” (Donner le temps 201n.); Nancy envisions a more sweeping program: “Il faut réécrire Sein und Zeit . . . c’est la nécessité des oeuvres majeures” (Etre singulier 118n.).

     

    10. Elsewhere: “I tried to say a few words, suspended, about the differences that appeared at that stage between the two texts. But I would tell you nothing new” ¤ (15-19 Sept. 99; 75); later he speaks of the “increasingly abyssal differences between the two texts that appeared during the stretch of time of the copying”¤ (28 Nov-17 Dec 99; 95).

    11. Nancy’s vocabulary in Etre singulier pluriel and his recurring use of the term “exposure” (s’exposer, exposition) suggest an implicit dialogue with the work of Emmanuel Lévinas, particularly Autrement qu’être, which Nancy salutes in a note as “exemplary” (Etre singulier 52n.) but does not discuss further per se. In Le Toucher, Derrida refers to “deux pensées de substitution” in Lévinas and Nancy (292), but his primary reference is to Lévinas’s Totalité et infinite, rather than the central chapter on “substitution” in Autrement qu’être.

     

    12. See also Deleuze’s more extended comparison, Le Pli 50-51. Deleuze also mentions Hantaï in Pourparlers 211. (I thank Charles J. Stivale for this reference.)

     

    13. Pacquement: “Hantaï’s painting . . . is not structured in a finalized history, or at any rate, that history remains to be written. There are entire layers (pans) of his work that remain to be discovered, as if the foldings had literally veiled certain parts; or as if the observation of the work, inscribed in a much too linear structure, had sidestepped moments of consequence that remained invisible merely for lack of someone’s eye chancing upon them” (Melville, ed. 210).

     

    14. On historical and methodological questions, see Bossis and Altman (as well as a number of the other articles in the same volume). For a range of contemporary theoretical approaches to the reading of “real” correspondences, see Kaufmann, Melançon, and Abiteboul. Chamayou offers a consideration of epistolarity, real and fictional, that is also sensitive to issues of historicity (see esp. 161-82).

     

    15. See Hayes, “The Epistolary Machine,” Reading the French Enlightenment 58-85. As the phrasing suggests, the model follows the general lines of the “desiring machines” described in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, L’Anti-Oedipe 43-50.

     

    16. See also Nancy’s critique of the notion of desire as lack, L”il y a’ du rapport sexuel (36-37).

     

    17. As an editorial footnote–that staple of epistolary novels–helpfully informs us, “we have retained the letters exchanged just before the beginning of the project of the ‘travaux de lecture’”¤ (13n.). As there is no reason given for this decision, one tends to agree with Derrida that Hantaï’s evocation of bucolic life (“regardant les enfants et ‘l’herbe pousser”) provides the ideal literary setting, “l’installation discrète mais savante d’un décor,” for the text to follow (Connaissance 148).

     

    18. The ongoing references to the bodily states of the two interlocutors create a background music of concern and intimacy. “How is your health, now? I wanted to ask and didn’t dare,” ¤ writes Hantaï in one of his earliest letters (21). The word “maintenant” underscores a recognition of Nancy’s ongoing struggles. Later, Hantaï’s wife Zsuzsa, whose health is also a subject of concern, reads L’Intrus, Nancy’s account of his heart transplant (15-19 Sept; 75). In his afterword, Derrida is unable to resist a reference to the memoir: “l’intrus, c’est moi” (155). In Le Toucher, he returns to L’Intrus and Nancy’s operation on a number of occasions in passages that bespeak both philosophical engagement and friendship (Toucher 113-15, 301, 308-9). See in particular a note on gratitude and “the heart” and evoking a “souvenir presque secret” of a phone conversation between the two held the day preceding the operation (Toucher 135n.).

     

    19. Others have wanted to “do something” with Hantaï’s letters. His lapidary style tends to appear in many of the texts written about him, as if in echo of earlier written or conversational exchanges. A series of letters written from the painter to critic Georges Didi-Huberman between February 1997 and January 1998, was published in the catalog for the major Hantaï retrospective held in Münster in 1999; they have been translated into English and included in As Painting (Melville 216-29). Accompanied by many photographs, but missing Didi-Huberman’s replies, these letters suggest less a “correspondence” than a set of programmatic statements by the artist.

     

    20. Hantaï’s altered consciousness via work on the travaux is reminiscent of the impersonal, quasi-meditative execution of Ecriture rose, which critics have likened to “spiritual exercises” (Baldassari 11-16; see also Didi-Huberman, 32-6). In his essay for Hantaï’s Biennale catalog, Yves Michaud describes Ecriture rose in terms that apply equally well to the travaux: “Here all the elements count: not only the forgetting of self implied by the infinite copy, but also the manner of confiding in others, abandoning oneself to others, implied in making others’ discourse one’s own…. The same manner of forgetting oneself, silencing oneself, acceding to a full silence” (16). ¤

     

    21. A thematics of blindness runs through Connaissance, beginning with Hantaï’s reference to a Hungarian proverb, “Bêche ses yeux” (33), his musings on a possible contribution to the “haptic-optic debate” (85), and so on to his dismissal of one of Nancy’s more ambitious ideas for publishing the letters as “Un an ou deux de travail de poudre aux yeux” (137). The question of blindness extends deep into Hantaï’s career, where it is intimately related to his notions of the hand and of “folding as method.” As Dominique Fourcade wrote for Hantaï’s 1976 retrospective at the Centre Pompidou: “How far we have come from the time of Matisse, when it was just a question of cutting out the tongue! The problem is having nothing left in one’s hands, having to paint with hands behind the back. It seems to be a question of painting with your eyes put out” (n.p.). ¤

     

    22. “One can only touch a surface, that is a skin or the covering of a limit (the expression, ‘to touch the limit’ returns irresistably, like a leitmotiv, in many of Nancy’s texts that we will examine). But a limit, limit itself, by definition, seems deprived of a body. It cannot be touched, will not let itself be touched, it eludes the touch of those who either never attain it or forever transgress it” (Derrida, Le Toucher 16). ¤

     

    23. Translator’s note: both “ouvrage” and “oeuvre” may be translated as “work,” as in “an artist’s works”; the former however implies a single object as well as the physical act of making, whereas the latter suggests a completed (body of) work.

     

    24. Nancy attributes both phrases to Hantaï in his preface (9).

     

    25. A reviewer of Connaissance commented on “l’énigme du titre,” noting that the first subtitle corrects or “retouches” the main title, foregrounding the paradox of reading the unreadable, and calling attention to the use of the plural and to the use of parentheses in the second subtitle as well as to the curious displacement of Nancy’s name to third place in the attribution of authorship on the cover and title page (G. Michaud 13-14).

     

    26. Hantaï’s book project with Gallimard, mentioned in the first letter of the series (13), is abandoned or at least suspended by him in the wake of his bout with fever (108), along with expositions and other “projets longtemps travaillés.”

     

    27. One could read further “foreshadowing” in the first sentence of this “Letter I.” Hantaï is writing to authorize Nancy to make use of a photograph: “the portrait of the artist is at your disposal” (13). ¤ As Nancy explains in his preface, the entire collection shows, in effect, “le peintre-copiste au travail” (9). (The photograph, a close-up of Hantaï’s blue-jean encased knees, appears in Nancy, Le Regard du portrait, plate 13.)

     

    28. A bracketed ellipsis precedes the paragraph beginning “J’arrive donc le dernier,” despite the fact that there is no material missing from the manuscript (152-53). The technique is reminiscent of the “missing lines” from Derrida’s letter-novel “Envois” in La Carte postale.

     

    29. See Didi-Huberman on the role of photography in Hantaï’s recent work, the Laissées (L’Etoilement 100-01). More broadly, on the role of the “copy” within contemporary aesthetics, see Radnòti.

     

    30. Nancy invites Hantaï’s participation in July 1999, saying that Derrida’s book will appear in the fall (25); Delorme visits Hantaï in August to observe the work in progress and gives the artist to understand that “le temps ne presse pas” (55); decisions are being made regarding the format of Le Toucher in September (71); when Derrida visits Hantaï later that month, bringing a copy of the manuscript, “Visiblement rien n’est encore décidé” (75). On receipt of his copy of the manuscript; Nancy admits to being nervous at being “un objet d’investigation théorique” but finds Derrida’s work remarkably liberating (81). Even as he speculates about the creation of a book containing “une page de batiste,” Nancy notes his admiration for the limited-edition Hantaï print in the “exemplaire de tête” of Le Toucher, a gift from Derrida (123).

     

    31. In an interview, Derrida rightly points out that email and other electronic texts hardly exist entirely “without a hand,” but that they nevertheless point to “une autre histoire de la main” within “l’histoire de la digitalité” (“La Machine à traitement de texte” 153-54). As I am arguing, the “touch” of electronic writing, however indirect and redirected, remains part of its phenomenology.

     

    32. See Sobchack for an analysis of “a new perceptual mode of existential and embodied ‘presence’” via electronic and cinematic representation.

     

    33. The echoes of Derrida’s essay can be heard in Nancy’s recent L’ “il y a” du rapport sexuel, which came out a few months after Connaissance. Nancy teases the double etymological thread of intimation in “l’intimité de Thanatos avec Eros”: “the subject of desire is insatiable… because it does not respond to a logic or an economy of satiety. It nourishes itself, but that responds neither to a replication nor to a return to self: rather to an intimation, an imperious need to push into the depths, or its inner depths” (37-38). ¤

    34. The passage from Heidegger referred to by Nancy and cited by Derrida, in English translation: “Selfhood is more originary than any I and you and we. These are primarily gathered as such in the self, thus each becoming each ‘itself.’ Conversely, dispersion of the I, you, and we and the crumbling and levelling off of these are not merely a failing of man but rather the occurrence of powerlessness in sustaining and knowing ownhood, abandonment by being” (225).

     

    35. I have discussed the allure of language’s visual aspect in a different context in Hayes, “Look But Don’t Read.”

     

    36. Impossible not to hear an echo of the conflicted singular and plural address in the phrase attributed to Aristotle by Diogenes Laertius (“O ami” or “O amis”) analyzed in Derrida’s Politiques de l’amitié, where the ethical problem of the address is bound up with a problem of translation Derrida refers to as “le repli” (Politiques 219-52). A reference to the phrase also appears in Donner le temps, a few pages before the passage chosen by Hantaï for the travaux (195).

    Works Cited

     

    • Abiteboul, Olivier. La Rhétorique des philosophes: Essai sur les relations épistolaires. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2002.
    • Altman, Janet Gurkin. “The Letter Book as a Literary Institution, 1539-1789: Towards a Cultural History of Published Correspondences in France.” Yale French Studies 71 (1986): 17-62.
    • Baldassari, Anne. Simon Hantaï. Paris: Centre Georges Pompidou, 1991.
    • Benjamin, Walter. “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” Illuminations. Trans. Harry Zohn. New York: Schocken, 1968.
    • Bonnefoi, Geneviève. Hantaï. Montauban: Centre d’Art contemporain de l’Abbaye de Beaulieu, 1973.
    • Bossis, Mireille. “Methodological Journeys Through Correspondences.” Yale French Studies 71 (1986): 63-75.
    • Chamayou, Anne. L’Esprit de la lettre (XVIIIe siècle). Paris: PUF, 1999.
    • Deleuze, Gilles. Le Pli: Leibniz et le baroque. Paris: Minuit, 1988.
    • —. Pourparlers. Paris: Minuit, 1990.
    • Delueze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari, Capitalisme et schizophrénie: 1. L’Anti-Oedipe. Paris: Minuit, 1972.
    • Derrida, Jacques. La Carte postale. Paris: Flammarion, 1980.
    • —. Donner le temps: 1. La Fausse monnaie. Paris: Galilée, 1991.
    • —. “La Machine à traitement de texte.” Papier machine. Paris: Galilée, 2001. 151-66.
    • —. Politiques de l’amitié. Paris: Galilée, 1994.
    • —. Le Toucher, Jean-Luc Nancy. Paris: Galilée, 2000.
    • Diderot, Denis. Oeuvres. Ed. H. Dieckmann, J. Proust, J. Varloot, et al. 34 vols. Paris: Hermann, 1975.
    • Didi-Huberman, Georges. L’Etoilement: Conversations avec Hantaï. Paris: Minuit, 1998.
    • Fourcade, Dominique. “Un coup de pinceau, c’est la pensée.” Hantaï. Exhibition catalogue. Paris: Centre Pompidou, 1976.
    • Hantaï, Simon, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Jacques Derrida. La Connaissance des textes: Lectures d’un manuscrit illisible (Correspondances). Paris: Galilée, 2001.
    • Hart, Kevin. “Horizons and Folds: Elizabeth Presa.” Contretemps 2 (May 2001). Online at <http://www.usyd.edu.au/contretemps/dir/contents.html> (The website contains images of Presa’s work, including the piece constructed from Le Toucher.)
    • Hayes, Julie C. “Look But Don’t Read: Chinese Characters and the Translating Drive from John Wilkins to Peter Greenaway.” Modern Language Quarterly 60 (1999): 353-77.
    • —. Reading the French Enlightenment: System and Subversion. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1999.
    • Heidegger, Martin. Contributions to Philosophy (from Enowning). Trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1999.
    • Kaufmann, Vincent. L’Equivoque épistolaire. Paris: Minuit, 1991.
    • McDonough, Tom. “Hantaï’s Challenge to Painting.” Art in America 87.3 (March, 1999): 96-99.
    • Melançon, Benoit, ed. Penser par lettre. Montréal: Fides, 1998.
    • Melville, Stephen, ed. As Painting: Division and Displacement. Columbus, OH: Wexner Center for the Arts; Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001.
    • Michaud, Ginette. Review of Hantaï et al., La Connaissance des textes. Spirale 182 (Jan-Feb 2002): 13-14.
    • Michaud, Yves. “Métaphysique de Hantaï.” Simon Hantaï. France. Biennale de Venise. Exhibition catalogue. N.p.: n.p., 1982. 13-22.
    • Nancy, Jean-Luc. Corpus. Paris: Métailié, 2000.
    • —. Etre singulier pluriel. Paris: Galilée, 1996.
    • —. L’ “il y a” du rapport sexuel. Paris: Galilée, 2001.
    • —. Le Regard du portrait. Paris: Galilée, 2000.
    • Parent, Béatrice. “La Peinture réinventée.” La Peinture après l’abstraction: Martin Barre, Jean Degottex, Raymond Hains, Simon Hantaï, Jacques Villeglé. 20 mai-19 septembre, 1999. Exhibition catalogue. Paris: Musée d’art moderne de la ville de Paris, 1999. 43-52.
    • Radnòti, Sandor. The Fake: Forgery and its Place in Art. Trans. E. Dunai. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999.
    • Ronell, Avital. The Telephone Book: Technology, Schizophrenia, Electric Speech. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1989.
    • Siegert, Bernhard. Relays: Literature as an Epoch of the Postal System. Trans. Kevin Repp. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1999.
    • Sobchack, Vivian. “The Scene of the Screen: Envisioning Cinematic and Electronic ‘Presence.’” Materialities of Communication. Gumbrecht and Pfeiffer, eds., Stanford: Stanford UP, 1994. 83-106

     

  • Is There a Subject in Hyperreality?

    Temenuga Trifonova

    Film Studies
    University of California, San Diego
    ttrifonova@UCSD.Edu

     

    The discourse of materiality or objective reality today is, first of all, a discourse of ethics. Objective reality is either treated as a victim that has been wronged by subjectivity (the latter must, therefore, be brought to justice) or is regarded as “fearful,” “fatal,” or “revengeful” (as in Baudrillard’s work). This new discourse of materiality aims at getting rid of subjectivity, which it naïvely stereotypes as a puppeteer grown too controlling and tyrannical, oversignifying the world instead of letting the world express itself. In an attempt to surmount what it regards as the inherent anthropocentrism of centuries of philosophy and aesthetics, contemporary philosophy has taken it upon itself to dissolve subjectivity into something vague, unstable, indeterminate, unidentifiable, fragmented, amorphic, and always impersonal. Hence the lively recent interest in Henri Bergson’s philosophy of becoming. While the discourse of materiality claims to be an attack on metaphysics, Jean-François Lyotard insists that it is actually a revival of the very essence of metaphysics, “which [is] a thinking pertaining to [impersonal] forces much more than to the subject” (Inhuman 6, emphasis added). The question arises: How can the subject annihilate itself completely or, conversely, as Deleuze puts it in Cinema 2: The Time-Image 2, how can the object become a point of view in its own right?

     

    Jean Baudrillard has often been criticized for his bleak interpretation of postmodern culture. In place of Baudrillard’s “‘sour’ post-structuralism,” we are urged to accept “a ‘sweet’ post-structuralism…for example, Derridean post-structuralism, with its emphasis upon the delirious free play of the signifier” (Coulter-Smith 92). Supposedly, Baudrillard cannot be of any help to us in this technological age because he is too scornful of it, too nihilistic, incapable of overcoming his “romantic concern for the loss of the real, the natural and the human” (98), which makes his writing sound both melancholy and apocalyptic. Others feel we ought to be warned against Baudrillard’s seductive but insubstantial ideas and style. It’s been said that too much of the criticism on Baudrillard is written by his devoted fans and that his works can “be regarded as little more than strings of aphorisms, and thus not worthy of critical engagement” (Willis 138). There is a strange incongruity between these two critiques. According to the first, Baudrillard is not sufficiently postmodernist; according to the second, he is too postmodernist, as his fragmented, aphoristic style testifies. Rather than discrediting Baudrillard’s work, these criticisms actually present it as worthy of critical attention, especially now that postmodernism is drawing close to the brink of self-exhaustion. It is far more interesting to ask “What is there beyond the sweet and delirious free play of the signifier?” than to keep juggling the clichés of postmodernism. This is why, as I seek to demonstrate below, it is important to consider Baudrillard’s texts as articulating an ontology rather than an epistemology.

     

    In many respects Baudrillard’s theory of images is a reformulation of Bergson’s imagistic ontology developed in Matter and Memory. Although both Bergson and Baudrillard are interested in the ontological and epistemological significance of light as the prime guarantor of the real, their notions of the image differ significantly. Bergson does not distinguish an image from a thing: things do not have images, and neither do we produce their images. Things, insofar as they are made of light vibrations, are already images. Or, taken more metaphorically, a thing is an image (or a representation) of the totality of images from which perception isolates it like a picture. Baudrillard, however, conceives images as capable of detaching themselves from things and either preceding or following them. What he really means is that things have lost their solidity and have been dematerialized into images, reduced to their pre-given meanings. Images are neither exclusively visual nor exclusively mental; rather, Baudrillard emphasizes their “pre(over)determination,” their extreme proximity to us, which makes them virtually invisible. In Baudrillard’s work, the image becomes a metaphor, and a deliberate misnomer, for the end of visibility. When everything has been rendered visible, nothing is visible any more and we are left with images. The image is a sign of overexposure or oversignification. Whereas Bergson describes the “production” of images as a process of dissociation or diminution (in which the image is dissociated or isolated from something bigger), Baudrillard describes the reverse process: the image is produced through a process of intensification or saturation, which overexposes a thing into an image. Both resort to photography to illuminate the nature of the image: the Bergsonian image is produced by obscuring rather than by throwing more light on the object, whereas Baudrillard’s image is produced by overexposing the object, throwing excessive light on it, making it more visible than visible.

     

    Although Bergson’s critique of cinematographical perception, in Creative Evolution, appears illogical in light of the fact that the description of natural perception in Matter and Memory is precisely a description of cinematographical perception, it is also true that in the same work Bergson underscores the necessity of overcoming the limits of natural perception through the “education of the senses” (49). The “education of the senses” seeks “to harmonize my senses with each other, to restore between their data a continuity which has been broken by the discontinuity of the needs of my body, in short, to reconstruct…the whole of the material object” (49). The continuity of objects of perception is broken by the discontinuity of our needs, by the selectivity of conscious perception. The restoration of the continuity of the object of perception requires a sacrifice of the selectivity and discontinuity of perception. Conscious perception has to be “corrected.” For Bergson, however, conscious perception is the difference that tears apart the original neutrality of matter. To reconstruct the continuity of the aggregate of images is to surrender the difference which, by breaking that continuity, has given birth to conscious perception. Bergson demands that we educate our perception so that it approximates that of a material object. We must reconstruct the totality of external images that our perception (and our consciousness which is born in the delay of perception) has torn apart in being born. We must annihilate the very discernment through which difference enters the material world. We must reconstitute the very continuity whose break we ourselves are. The multiplicity and discontinuity of our needs must be reduced back to the uniformity and continuity of matter. The radical meaning of Bergson’s doctrine of the education of the senses is that the evolution of consciousness is measured precisely by the degree to which our perception approximates that of a material point. To educate our senses is to try to compensate for the limits of perception as a selection and organization of a small part of the actual, to attempt to enlarge our perception. However, given that our perception is a narrowing down of “universal consciousness” or matter (for Bergson they are the same thing), the enlarging of perception would require a descent to matter: “To perceive all the influences from all the points of all bodies would be to descend to the condition of a material object” (49). Precisely those states that are deprived in the greatest degree of the discernment of conscious perception best reconstruct the reality of an object. To carry this line of argument to its logical conclusion: the further away we move from consciousness–for example, in sleep or unconsciousness–the more sides of an image we perceive, until our perception reaches the extreme point where it barely manages not to collapse back into matter. Intermediary states, such as sleep and hallucination, approximate total perception.

     

    Baudrillard, however, does not concern himself with the question of reconstructing the real: the real, he believes, never takes place, since it is determined by, and varies with, the speed of light. The essential immateriality of the world is a result of the very nature of light, which makes things distant or absent from themselves:

     

    The objective illusion is the physical fact that in this universe no things coexist in real time–not sexes, starts, this glass, this table, or myself and all that surrounds me. By the fact of dispersal and the relative speed of light, all things exist only on a recorded version, in an unutterable disorder of time-scales, at an inescapable distance from each other. And so they are never truly present to each other, nor are they, therefore, “real” for each other. The fact that when I perceive this star it has perhaps already disappeared–a relationship that can be extended, relatively speaking, to any physical object or living being–this is the ultimate foundation, the material definition…of illusion. (Perfect 52)

     

    Paradoxically, both the objectivity and the illusion of the world are functions of light.1 Bergson had suggested something similar when he observed that since perception is never pure but always pregnant with memory, there is always a delay between the world and our perception of it so that what we actually see is only the past. From the very beginning things are already absent from themselves (not contemporaneous with themselves) and absent from other things (distant from them). Both time (contemporaneity) and space (distance) are, originally, unreal.

     

    In addition to stressing the role of light in determining the scope of the real, both Bergson and Baudrillard attribute ontological significance to the virtual. However, their ideas of the virtual are strikingly different. From Bergson’s point of view, Baudrillard’s virtual would be a false concept as it relies on the erroneous though common identification of the virtual with the merely possible:

     

    Once, the two terms were linked in the living movement of a history: the actual form emerged from the virtual, like the statue emerging from the block of marble. Today they are entwined in the notorious movement of the dead. For the dead man continues to move, and the corpse of the real never stops growing. The virtual is, in fact, merely the dilation of the dead body of reality–the proliferation of an achieved universe, for which there is nothing left but to go on endlessly hyperrealizing itself. (Baudrillard, Perfect 47, emphasis added)

     

    For Bergson, the virtual is an aspect of the life of the real precisely because the real is never fully realized. The discussion of the difference between the possible and the real occurs in The Creative Mind where Bergson challenges the illusory belief that the possible is less than the real, that the possibility of things precedes their existence “in some real or virtual intelligence” (22). This illusion is almost unavoidable since “by the sole fact of being accomplished, reality casts its shadow behind it into the indefinitely distant past: it thus seems to have been pre-existent to its own realization, in the form of a possible” (23). Nevertheless, the possible cannot be represented before it becomes real since the possible is what will have been: “we find that there is more and not less in the possibility of each of the successive states than in their reality. For the possible is only the real with the addition of an act of mind which throws its image back into the past, once it has been enacted” (118).

     

    It should be emphasized that Baudrillard does not identify the hyperreal or the virtual with the imaginary or the unreal. The latter are forces of negation whereas the pathological involution of the real in the hyperreal puts an end to negation. For Baudrillard, the virtual or the hyperreal is the fulfilling of the dialectic. The imaginary is not produced but destroyed by the surpassing of the real. The virtual/hyperreal results from a reversal of causality, the introduction of the finality of things at their origin, the accomplishment of things even before their appearance. Things become excessive when they appear as already accomplished, when there is no gap between their appearance and their realization. However, Baudrillard describes the constitutive illusion of the world also in terms of a disturbance of causes and effects. The event is not determined: it appears as an effect without a cause. Just as the world is illusory insofar as it is uncaused, unintelligible, the hyperreal does not have a cause either: its end functions as its cause. Baudrillard clarifies the difference between illusion and hyperreality/virtuality thus: “The great philosophical question used to be ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’ Today, the real question is: ‘Why is there nothing rather than something?’” (2). Although in both cases the cause as such no longer exists, the results are different. The illusory is that which exists though it could have just as well not existed (the possibility of disappearance, of nothingness) whereas the virtual is that which has always already existed and cannot be destroyed (the impossibility of disappearance). In the first case, nothing is given that could not be taken away at any moment; in the second case everything has been given from the beginning and, therefore, nothing remains to be given. It is essential, however, that there always be something to be revealed because the real exists only as long as it reveals itself as illusion.

     

    The virtual/hyperreal threatens to destroy illusion precisely through its perfection:

     

    Virtuality tends toward the perfect illusion. But it isn’t the same creative illusion as that of the image. It is a “recreating” illusion (as well as a recreational one), revivalistic, realistic, mimetic, hologrammatic. It abolishes the game of illusion by the perfection of the reproduction, in the virtual rendition of the real. (Baudrillard, “Objects” 9)

     

    The Bergsonian virtual, on the other hand, does not threaten to extinguish the real or to become confused with it. This virtual is also the double of the real but it does not drive the real toward an identification with itself that would attenuate it, collapse it into a perfect reproduction of itself. The virtual is the sign of difference that can always infiltrate the present moment or the real: not to question it but rather to enrich it. Bergson insists on a distinction between images and virtuality, arguing that images themselves are not virtual but are merely the actualization of virtuality and, thus, its degeneration. The virtual cannot be exhausted in an image: one can follow the self-actualization of the virtual in images but one can never reconstitute the virtual from images. For Baudrillard, however, the difference between virtuality and image has collapsed. There is no more virtuality: there are only virtual images, perfect copies of the real which have supplanted the real. The virtual is the annihilation of representation, illusion, distance, time, and memory. Baudrillard’s virtual is the ultimate threat: absolute self-identity, absolute self-contemporaneity, absolute proximity. By contrast, the Bergsonian virtual expresses the fact that everything is larger than itself, that nothing coincides with itself because the past is preserved in everything without being actualized.

     

    That the postmodern notion of the virtual is inconceivable within Bergsonism becomes clear in Bergson’s critique of the concept of absence: “The idea of absence or of nothingness…is…inseparably bound to that of suppression, real or eventual, and the idea of suppression is itself only an aspect of the idea of substitution” (Creative Mind 115). Absence–whether it is the absence of matter or the absence of consciousness–is an illusion for “the representation of the void is always a representation which is full and which resolves itself on analysis into two positive elements: the idea, distinct or confused, of a substitution, and the feeling, experienced or imagined, of a desire or a regret” (Creative Evolution 308). Baudrillard’s virtual foregrounds the impossibility of determining whether an object still exists or has disappeared, leaving behind its virtual ghost. Yet Bergson would argue that even a virtual existence is still an existence insofar as it is thinkable: “Between thinking an object and thinking it existent, there is absolutely no difference” (Creative Evolution 310). The problem with declaring an object unreal or virtual is that we tend to focus on the exclusion of this object from the real when in fact we ought to focus on that which excludes–on the real.

     

    Baudrillard’s description of virtuality stresses the poverty of the virtual, of which one can only say “it exists, I’ve met it” (Perfect 28). The world is virtual or poor because “referential substance is becoming increasingly rare” (29-30). One is reminded of Lyotard’s description of the intrinsic poverty of the postmodern sublime. Like the poverty of the virtual, the poverty of the sublime lies in that it neither signifies nor is it the object of signification. Lyotard notes that the only response the sublime provokes is “Voila!” or “Here I am!” However, it is difficult to differentiate between poverty as excess (something is, and that is already more than what was expected) and sheer poverty (the only thing we can say of something is that it merely exists). It is as if at any given moment the sublime object–the image that does not signify–could slide into the hyperreal/virtual. There are no criteria for distinguishing between the sublime as non-signification and the virtual/hyperreal as non-signification, between “good” self-referentiality (an image drawing attention to itself, thus underscoring its autonomy) and “bad” self-referentiality (the hyperreal drawing attention to its own reality and thus surpassing it, making itself dubious) i.e., there is no way to distinguish between event and simulacrum. In the first case, it is a question of affirming the autonomous existence of something other than the mind by eliminating ourselves as a privileged point of view. In the second case, just the opposite is at stake, the affirmation of the connection between mind and reality. Reality is virtual or hyperreal when it operates independently of us, when we cannot determine whether it is real or not. Whatever exists independently of us has withdrawn absolutely and we can no longer affect it. It develops according to its own laws: it has become “obscene.”2

     

    By “obscenity” Baudrillard means the annihilation of duration, of the slightest delay or lag in the existence of a thing, which makes it different from itself and thus impossible to decode or appropriate. What happens in virtual time is not an event, because it is instantly telegraphable, already containing its double. However, what is memory other than the instant replication or telegraphability of each moment? If, as Bergson argues in Matter and Memory, the photograph is already snapped in matter (perception is already “in” matter), couldn’t we say that the photograph is always already snapped in conscious perception–that is, the memory-image is already inherent in the perception-image? Could the memory-image be simply the unreflective (latent) consciousness of the present moment, while the perception-image is the manifest, reflected consciousness of the moment? Could we conceive the relationship between image and memory-image, or between perception and memory, as that between reflective and unreflected consciousness? According to Bergson, all unreflected consciousnesses are preserved in duration and they are constantly enriching our mental life. However, for Baudrillard it is precisely the richness of memory that is dangerous, the fact that each moment already has its double–the (unreflected) memory-image that accompanies it rather than following it. This preservation of the past in the present threatens the present by making it instantly telegraphable. Unlike Bergson who credits memory as a sign of our transcendence, our difference from matter, Baudrillard holds memory responsible for the loss of transcendence. The difference in their views of memory accounts for their contrasting interpretations of the virtual. In Baudrillard’s texts memory is associated with the de-realization of each instant, the collapse of distance, the turning of the present into a memory. As the memory-image supplants the present, the image becomes a repetition of itself and the past coincides with the present. What Baudrillard’s works record is the obsolescence of time. Time is the indetermination of things, the possibility for a thing to appear and to vanish. The real exists only as a limit. Things are real only as long as they keep crossing the limit, constantly appearing and disappearing. Once disappearance–i.e., illusion–is no longer possible, the world is de-realized.

     

    Baudrillard’s view of illusion remains ambivalent. On one hand, he considers it a resistance to total simulation. Illusion is the possibility of things to disappear, but also to appear: only that which is destructible or which has not appeared is capable of appearing at all. On the other hand, however, “illusion” signifies the possibility of passing beyond matter into the realm of the virtual. Perhaps Baudrillard’s ambivalence toward illusion has something to do with his reconceptualization of the role of memory in perception. If Bergson is right that the duration of a given perception represents the work of habit-memory, and if that work is a variable, then it must be possible to influence or control it, thus controlling perception as well. Indeed, Bergson’s belief that every perception is already a memory is intricately connected to Baudrillard’s idea of the disappearance of the real as a result of the slowing down of the speed of light. Since the real depends on the speed of light, if the speed of light changes–if, for example, it drops very low–images will start reaching us with greater and greater delay that will be impossible to measure precisely because of the change in the speed of light, which was before the criterion for establishing the reality of a phenomenon. While Bergson considers memory a source of spirituality, Baudrillard is much more suspicious of the work of memory. For Bergson, habit-memory works to facilitate perception–that is, memory has a pragmatic significance; however, Baudrillard finds that the work of memory has gone beyond mere condensation: perceptions have become memories in the more dangerous sense of being predetermined (not spontaneously recollected). Perceptions have become neutralized, habitualized, but not in the harmless sense of habit as condensation for the purpose of action.

     

    If the virtual is the pathological involution of the real, the “fatal” is a resistance to the virtual. Toward the end of Fatal Strategies Baudrillard introduces the idea of the fatal object as a way of thinking beyond metaphysics. “Radical” or “fatal” thought assumes the point of view of pure objectivity or what Baudrillard calls “the principle of Evil” (Fatal 182). The object is Evil or inhuman because of its resistance to interpretation, its secrecy or seductiveness. The inhuman is beyond causality and accident, even beyond negativity. In line with the ethical appeal of Lyotard’s idea of the inhuman as a resistance to the tyranny of subjectivity, Baudrillard defines the fatal or the inhuman as an expression of the enigma of the world, its resistance to metaphysics:

     

    Metaphysics…wants to make the world into the mirror of the subject….Metaphysics wants a world of forms distinct from their bodies, their shadows, their images: this is the principle of Good. But the object is always the fetish, the false…the factitious, the lure, everything that incarnates the abominable confusion of the thing with its magical and artificial double; and that no religion of transparency and the mirror will ever be able to resolve: that is the principle of Evil. (Fatal 184)

     

    The “fatality” of things lies in their excessiveness, which can never be represented. Existence is always already a surplus. Only through the threat of annihilation, through the return of the annihilated, and thus ultimately through repetition, does a thing appear at all:3

     

    From a certain moment on, these second comings comprise the very design of existence, where consequently nothing happens by chance; it’s the first coming–which is not meaningful in itself and loses itself in the banal obscurity of living–that happens by chance. Only by redoubling can it make of itself a true event, attaining the character of a fatal happening….Predestination eliminates from life all that is only destined–all that, having happened only once, is only accidental, while what happens a second time becomes fatal; but it also gives to life the intensity of these secondary events, which have, as it were, the depth of a previous existence. (Fatal 187)

     

    For Baudrillard repetition is not an external addition to some original substantial reality; rather, the real is only insofar as it is repeated. What happens only once is merely an accident, but if repeated it is an event. The real is produced, dissociated, repeated, represented, predestined, but none of these terms have their usual negative connotations. For example, “predestination” does not signify unfreedom or overdetermination; on the contrary, it underscores the irreducible singularity of the predestined object or event. More generally, representation–a key metaphysical concept–is no longer a “bad word.” Representation–the second coming of something–makes it significant in itself, absolute, singular. Representation is not an act performed by the subject on the objective world but a law presiding over all beings. Baudrillard challenges metaphysics by enlarging the concept of representation well beyond the realm of subjectivity and turning it into an ontological law: everything (both subjects and objects) is a representation. Refusing to think representation in terms of agency, he implicitly posits an impersonal force that indiscriminately represents everything. From this point of view, the image is not a threat to the real but its ground.

     

    Such a positive interpretation of the image, however, is the exception rather than the rule in Baudrillard’s work, which generally treats the image as an epitome of the simulacral or the hyperreal. The critique of obscenity in The Perfect Crime is based on a notion of the simulacrum as transparency, excessive visibility, overexposure, supersaturation of the real with itself, which leads to the production of the hyperreal. In The Ecstasy of Communication Baudrillard notes that the “simulacra have passed from the second order to the third, from the dialectic of alienation to the giddiness of transparency” (79). The notion of the simulacrum as a threat to the material illusion of the world is based on a still-existing belief in a subject and its discourse, while the idea of a third-order simulacrum constituting the illusion of the world, its infinite reversibility, is already developed from a point of view beyond that of the subject and its discourse, from the point of view of the object itself:

     

    The object itself takes the initiative of reversibility, taking the initiative to seduce and lead astray. Another succession is determinant. It is no longer that of a symbolic order…but the purely arbitrary one of a rule of the game. The game of the world is the game of reversibility. It is no longer the desire of the subject, but the destiny of the object, which is at the center of the world. (Ecstasy 80)

     

    While transparency is the absolute proximity of the object to the subject, the object rendered more visible than visible, fatality is the absolute inaccessibility of the object, which is “always already a fait accompli…In a way, it is transfinite. The object is inaccessible to the subject’s knowledge since there can be no knowledge of that which already has complete meaning, and more than its meaning, and of which there can be no utopia, for it has already been created” (Ecstasy 88-89, emphasis added). The illusion of the world is preserved even in a simulacral world, though with a slight twist: originally, illusion is the possibility of meaning (things are meaningful insofar as they are different from themselves), but in a world where things have become themselves, illusion exists only as the absolute meaninglessness of everything, as indifference and inertia. Even after the disappearance of the subject there still remains a world, the world of pure events (70), in which the subject appears and disappears, following the rules of the game just like any other object (Forget 76). At this stage, there are only effects, no causes; things metamorphose into other things “without passing through a system of meaning” (78). Baudrillard refers to this process as “panic,” “ecstasy,” or “speed.”

     

    Although in Forget Foucault Baudrillard calls “ecstasy” the liberation of effects from causes, the originary meaninglessness (or the objective illusion) of the world, in The Ecstasy of Communication he uses the term “ecstasy” as a synonym for “simulation,” placing it on the side of the virtual/hyperreal. From Baudrillard’s point of view, the postmodern sublime–as theorized in Lyotard’s The Inhuman: Reflections on Time–is an example of “ecstasy” in this second sense of the term. The sublime is a kind of simulation, because it draws attention to the sheer existence of something, “verifying to the point of giddiness the useless objectivity of things” (Ecstasy 31-32). The intentional poverty of the postmodern sublime might be compared to that of pornography, which desperately draws attention to “the useless objectivity of things” (32). The postmodern sublime is obscene because it tries not to signify or rather to signify only its own existence. But is not the reduction of a thing to its existence, its quod, the most extreme case of the miniaturization of things, the denial of the possibility of transcendence? The impossibility of true sublimity is due to the disappearance of transcendence into immanence, the eclipse of “seduction” by “production.”

     

    Baudrillard’s distinction between “seduction” and “production” in many respects parallels Sartre’s distinction, in Being and Nothingness, between pre-reflective and reflective consciousness and, more generally, poses the question of the relationship of reflexivity or self-referentiality to authenticity. There are two types of non-reflective consciousness. First, there is a pre-reflective consciousness that is immediate and non-signifying from the very beginning. Second, although it sounds counterintuitive, a kind of non-reflective consciousness can be attained through an excess of self-reflexivity or self-referentiality. Even though the gesture of self-reference begins “in” a subject, greater degrees of self-reference eventually tear it away from the subject. Self-reference becomes an absolute, no longer an attribute: it no longer presupposes a consciousness in which it would be reflected. Insofar as self-reflexivity presupposes a self only to tear itself away from it, it is absolutely unreflexive, self-sufficient, operating according to its own laws rather than manipulated by a subject who is now external to it. When the description of an object replaces the object absolutely, when there is nothing left of the real object except the description referring to itself, the object has become virtual (in Baudrillard’s sense): the object is most real precisely when we can no longer tell whether it is still there or all we have is its description.

     

    This virtual object, this absolute self-reference, does not differ from itself. What Sartre missed when he articulated the distinction between pre-reflective and reflective consciousness is that reflective consciousness is capable of producing or at least simulating the pre-reflective or, to put it more broadly, that consciousness is capable of producing the real while hiding from itself this act of production. Baudrillard is well aware of this when he distinguishes subjective from objective illusion. Subjective illusion is the possibility to mistake the unreal for the real or the real for the unreal: “So long as an illusion is not recognized as an error, it has a value precisely equivalent to reality. But once the illusion has been recognized as such, it is no longer an illusion. It is, therefore, the very concept of illusion, and that concept alone, which is an illusion” (Perfect 51). Objective illusion, however, is the very nature of the physical world insofar as it is not what it is: it is never contemporaneous with itself and thus never contemporaneous with our perception of it.

     

    In Sartre’s view, consciousness is the only de-realizing force; the world itself cannot be a source of illusion. Since the image is possible only when its material analogue is absent or non-existent, a material thing can never be transformed into an image. The image, warns Sartre, must not be confused with an aesthetic attitude: one cannot apprehend an existing object imaginatively. When one tries to contemplate real objects, the result is not an image but an intensification of the nauseating disgust that characterizes the consciousness of reality (Psychology 281). The object then appears as an analogue of itself; its materiality or the absence of anything transcendent in the object is underscored. An image, on the other hand, is beautiful precisely because it is not bound by its material analogue, because the analogue points to something transcendent that does not show itself. The doubling (analogue of an analogue) that occurs when one contemplates real objects is the de-realization of the real: the real appears too real and, namely because of that, as falling short of something essential or transcendent that would have made it real. Because it is real, it appears now as only real.

     

    Sartre’s description of the degradation of things to their analogues anticipates Baudrillard’s account of the de-realization of the world as a result of its increasing immediacy. In the same way that one cannot contemplate a real object because it is not sufficiently distant from us (contemplation requires distance), things that are too immediately available are no longer real (we cannot look at them because “looking” requires distance). But while Sartre refuses to call real objects “images,” thus preserving the honorific connotations of the term “image,” Baudrillard describes this degradation of looking–the obscene immediacy of the world–precisely as a proliferation of images. The image, Sartre argues, demands the absence of the material world; the image, Baudrillard objects, epitomizes the inescapable immediacy of the world.

     

    What makes Baudrillard’s theory of the hyperreal problematic is the possibility for confusing the hyperreal with the pure or the impersonal (the fatal) since both are defined as the collapse of the subject/object distinction. On one hand, the pure or the impersonal is the elimination of human perception as an external, privileged point of view. However, the hyperreal is also defined as the elimination of the subjective point of view, the suppression of the look, the fact that the object of perception is always already there, already seen, thus preventing the act of seeing. Obscenity then has two possible and mutually exclusive meanings: it signifies either the absolute triumph of subjectivity (the world has been preempted by consciousness, objects are merely extensions or reflections of the subject) or the complete objectivization of the world (everything becomes objective because what is already seen is, for that very reason, no longer accessible; it cannot be manipulated or relativized by the subject but exists independently).

     

    The difficulty in distinguishing between the Absolute and the hyperreal, between real immediacy and manufactured immediacy, is also evidenced by Baudrillard’s slippery distinction between “seduction” and “production.” “Seduction” designates difference or otherness; thus, a sign that “fall[s] from seduction into interpretation” (Ecstasy 61) loses its otherness, its secret, is completely exposed and, once exposed, can be produced over and over again. The distinction between seduction and production (obscenity) is far from clear since both are a form of immediacy, the only difference between them being that the sign that seduces is immediately undecipherable, whereas the sign that has lost its seductive power is immediately–always already–deciphered. The confusion stems from the fact that both the immediately undecipherable and the immediately pre-deciphered resist us to an equal degree: both appear “unknown” and inaccessible to us. This point is usually missed, since we assume that overinterpretation and reflexivity are always connected to subjectivity, which has produced them and is now in control of them. The truth is that the products of such self-referential acts eventually separate themselves from the subject, assuming an independent existence. In fact, whatever the subject produces in its least self-reflective states remains bound to subjectivity, while the more self-reflexive production becomes, the greater its independence from subjectivity.

     

    As counterintuitive as this sounds, the absolute replacement of things with their descriptions does not make the world subjective. On the contrary, the absolute victory of artifice is the very definition of objectivity and the law of nature is precisely obscenity and self-identity. Nature is obscene since it is too obvious, glued to itself, with no mystery, no transcendence, absolutely transparent, more visible than visible. Only illusion can protect things from the obscenity of absolute resemblance to themselves: “There exists a terror, as well as a fascination, of the perpetual engendering of the same by the same. This confusion is exactly that of nature, the natural confusion of things, and only artifice can put an end to it. Only artifice can dispel this lack of differentiation, this coupling of same to same” (Fatal 51, emphasis added). Nature is always already a threat to the constitutive illusion of the world, which is preserved only through artifice. Baudrillard suggests that nature is obscene and that it takes the highest levels of artifice (self-referentiality, self-reflexivity) to reveal things as they are. Contrary to common sense, the more we manipulate things (through artifice), the more they become pure expressions rather than representations. Nature, insofar as it is the constant engendering of the same by the same–“the natural confusion of things”–is already virtual. Artifice is our only resistance against nature’s inherent obscenity.

     

    The confusion over the real nature of self-reflexivity accounts for a number of inconsistencies in Baudrillard’s texts. For instance, Baudrillard’s privileging of “seduction” as the space of “surface and appearance,” of the “giddiness of reversibility,” over “production” as the space of meaning, depth, truth, is surprising in the general context of his critique of simulation and of the infinite proliferation of images, which are characterized precisely by superficiality, lack of referentiality i.e., by their seductiveness. If production is the space of meaning, signification, referentiality, and if, on the other hand, obscenity is the threat of losing referential material, why does Baudrillard assure us that “THERE IS NEVER ANYTHING TO PRO-DUCE” (Ecstasy 64)? If there is nothing to produce, nothing to refer to, then the world is devoid of illusion from the very beginning. But this is not what Baudrillard has told us about illusion, which, he insisted earlier, is constitutive of the world and whose disappearance renders the world obscene. This is a fundamental incongruity in Baudrillard’s thought. On one hand, the material illusion of the world makes meaning possible, while simulation seduces us into a world without illusion (hence meaning is “good” and simulation “bad”). On the other hand, the production of meaning is “bad” for trying to make everything signify, while simulation is “good” because it resists the mad urge to expose all things. In this second sense, seduction is actually identified with illusion: “Seduction is not the locus of desire…but of giddiness, of the eclipse, of appearance and disappearance, of the scintillation of being. It is an art of disappearing, whereas desire is always the desire for death” (Ecstasy 66).

     

    Accordingly, whereas earlier Baudrillard conceived the image as pure presence, as the death of illusion (32), now he identifies image with illusion, insofar as illusion is the ability of a thing to appear and disappear. The image is now credited as a source of illusion and thus of the real, which exists only as long as it is seduced or challenged by the image: “All these things [the truth, the real, God] only exist in the brief instant when one challenges them to exist; they exist…precisely through seduction, which opens the sublime abyss before them–the abyss into which they will plunge ceaselessly in a last glimmer of reality” (Ecstasy 69). The strategy of the image is absence, not the saturation of the real with itself. Now the image is completely on the side of the material illusion of the world rather than illustrating its degradation into an obscene proliferation of images. Indeed, now Baudrillard suggests that originally the entire world must have consisted of images insofar as things did not coincide with themselves but were infinitely substitutable and reversible (reversibility is the nature of the image, what distinguishes it from a “thing”). Almost imperceptibly, Baudrillard has transformed the image from the epitome of obscene self-identity into a manifestation of originary difference:

     

    The principle of reversibility, which is also the one of magic and seduction, requires that all that has been produced must be destroyed….Seduction is party to this: it is that which deviates…that which makes the real return to the great game of simulacra, which makes things appear and disappear. It could almost be a sign of an original reversibility of things. One could maintain that before having been produced the world was seduced, that it exists…only by virtue of having been seduced. (Ecstasy 71-72)

     

    Here the simulacrum is defined as the originary difference of things from themselves and from one another rather than as the obscene, total realization of the real, the annihilation of originary difference. The world turns out to be, originally, a simulacrum but in the good sense of “simulacrum”–continually dissimulating and dissembling rather than identifying, revealing, or verifying itself.

     

    In its “bad” sense, the simulacrum is the de-realization of the objective world, which has become predetermined, reduced to a mere representation of the subject. Yet this is a one-sided view of the matter because it rests on the assumption that the subject’s de-realization of the world has left the subject itself unchanged. The fact that Baudrillard also uses the term “simulacral” to characterize the constitutive illusion of the world (Ecstasy 71-2) makes sense only if it is acknowledged that by dispersing itself, by making the world coextensive with itself, the subject too has changed: it has objectified itself. Baudrillard’s discourse of the murder of the real is, in fact, a discourse of the subject and its new destiny. The de-realization of reality is the destruction of subjectivity but, as Baudrillard notes, the crime is never perfect. If the real is still preserved–as the trace of what has been murdered–the subject also survives its annihilation or dispersal; its destiny passes into the object. By subjectivizing or de-realizing the world, the subject has revealed its ability to appear and disappear (to lose itself in multiplicity) which is, in fact, the strongest proof that there is still a subject: after all, Baudrillard himself defines the constitutive illusion of the world as the possibility of things to appear and disappear. By disappearing, by eliminating itself as a point of view, the subject has proven itself even stronger and more real than Baudrillard might have expected. Subjectivity includes its own annihilation, its pseudo-sacrificial self-reduction to an object.

     

    To sum up, the simulacrum should be understood not only as the de-realization of the world by the subject but, simultaneously, as the subject’s self-objectification. The “event” is not the absolute annihilation of subjectivity, only its modification. The subject cannot disappear, just as the real cannot disappear. Despite the fragility of the real, it can never be completely negated because negation itself takes place on the foundation of the real. Even in the extreme case that all reality is negated, there will remain the memory of that annihilated reality. The paradox of the real is that it is never real enough–never self-sufficient, never a full positivity–but, at the same time, it is never annihilated and remains to haunt the unreal. The real derives its power from its own powerlessness. Something that never was in the first place remains: this is the real.

     

    Does the real exist only as its own end? Baudrillard considers the real as already sublated in the hyperreal. Although he suggests that the real, whose disappearance he laments, emerges only within a certain time frame as it depends on the difference between causes and effects, he remains fascinated precisely by events that do not belong to a subject and therefore cannot be reduced to causes. On one hand, the real depends on causality, on the lag between causes and effects, on time as a source of difference; on the other hand, the event, which Baudrillard credits with the power to restore the real (the constitutive illusion of the world) is the very elimination of time. The real is possible only if nothing is contemporaneous with itself or with other things but the event, which Baudrillard posits as an access to the real after it has been threatened by the hyperreal, is precisely the negation of time, the triumph of contemporaneity or simultaneity.

     

    Baudrillard cannot decide whether the event is on the “good” side of illusion or on the “bad” side of hyperreality. First, insofar as it collapses time and space, the event belongs to the hyperreal or the virtual: in the event, there is no delay, no distance, and both delay and distance are essential to thought. The event illustrates best the obscenity of the immediate and the contemporaneous. The event cannot be integrated in our mental life, because it has no beginning and end. And since it cannot appear and disappear–precisely because it has no beginning or end–it is also the end of illusion. However, occasionally Baudrillard uses the term “event” to designate the material illusion of the world. The world is illusion only to the extent that it is an event, a creation ex nihilo, which is also to say to the extent it is unintelligible (the assumption being that only that which can be inscribed in a cause-and-effect sequence–that is, that which has a history, is intelligible). The unintelligible cannot be annihilated because it can never be realized, never fulfilled. Things are illusory to the extent that they appear suddenly and without cause. The value of the event lies precisely in this absence of reason, in its absurdity:

     

    This suddenness, this emergence from the void, this non-interiority of things to themselves, continues to affect the event of the world at the very heart of its historical unfolding….Nothing gives us greater pleasure than what emerges or disappears at a stroke, than emptiness succeeding plenitude. Illusion is made up of this magic portion, this accursed share which creates a kind of absolute surplus-value by substraction of causes or by distortion of effects and causes. (Perfect 58)

     

    Yet, how are we to reconcile this glorification of the event as a surplus-value with Baudrillard’s critique of the drive to exhaust all possibilities, a drive that is responsible for the annihilation of all “reserves of uselessness?” “These,” Baudrillard continues, “are threatened with intensive exploitation. Insignificance is under threat from an excess of meaning. Banality is threatened with its hour of glory. The supply of floating signifiers has fallen to dangerous levels” (49). Supposedly, the event’s significance derives from its poverty, and its effect of suddenness from its non-anteriority, from a simple that. But is there anything more banal than the fact that something exists? Isn’t the banality of the quodnow threatened “with its hour of glory”? Is not the event part of the dangerous drive to “greater visibility, transparency and hypercoincidence” (62)? Does not the event announce the end of surpassing insofar as the event declares itself to be a transcendence but a transcendence that is immanent to things or works of art, their very existence or facticity having become a transcendence? Is transcendence in immanence still a transcendence or is it rather an artificial transcendence similar to that achieved by Andy Warhol’s images, which Baudrillard gives as an example of “the elevation of the image to pure figuration, without the least transfiguration” (76)? If the event as a sublime experience attains the absolute, the distinction between real and ideal, between facticity and transcendence disappears, making negation impossible. From Baudrillard’s point of view the postmodern sublime experience is an excess of being as it partakes of the obsession with immediacy he condemns. In the realm of the hyperreal every event has become as inconsequential as a catastrophe:

     

    Beyond this point there are only inconsequential events (and inconsequential theories) precisely because they absorb their sense into themselves. They reflect nothing, presage nothing. Beyond this point there are only catastrophes. Perfect is the event or language which assumes its own mode of disappearance, knows how to stage it, and thus reaches the maximal energy of appearances….The event without consequence–like Musil’s man without qualities, the body without organs, or time without memory. (Fatal 17)

     

    In the event origin and end coincide. The event remains equally indifferent to every interpretation because none ever makes it intelligible. Lyotard interprets the event’s meaninglessness as liberating, stressing not its indifference to various interpretations but rather the fact that it refuses to be explained away (by being made intelligible). Far more reluctant to give up meaning, Baudrillard laments the inconsequentiality of the event. He compares its unsettling immediacy to the sense of instantaneity characteristic of a schizophrenic’s experience:

     

    The schizo is deprived of all scene, open to all in spite of himself, and in the greatest confusion….What characterizes him is less his light-years distance from the real, a radical break, than absolute proximity, the total instantaneousness of things, defenseless, with no retreat; end of interiority and intimacy, overexposure and transparency of the world that traverses him without his being able to interpose any barrier. For he can no longer produce the limits of his own being, and reflect himself; he is only an absorbent screen… (Fatal 69-70)

     

    Like an object or an image in pure perception, the schizophrenic subject is open on all sides to all things: no discrimination, no choice, no discreteness, no conscious perception to delimit or isolate a part of the world of images. Clearly, Baudrillard would like the subject to preserve its boundaries, not to dissolve in the objectivity of the world as the schizo does, but at the same time he celebrates what he calls “the revenge of the crystal,” which is supposed to overthrow the tyranny of subjectivity. This description of the schizophrenic subject corresponds very closely to Deleuze’s account of Bergsonian pure perception or, in Deleuze’s own thought, to the idea of a “crystalline regime of images” in which images exist only for one another without varying for a human consciousness. In Bergsonian pure perception, images are neutral to one another: they do not act on one another, do not appear to one another but merely reflect one another. Similarly, Deleuze’s “time-image” or “crystal-image” is a schizo-image insofar as it does not reflect a privileged point of view but is dispersed amongst multiple points of views across the aggregate of images. Both the schizo subject and the pure object (the “crystal”) are characterized by their anonymity: they are “whatever-subjects” or “whatever-objects.”

     

    It must be pointed out, however, that what Deleuze, in The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, calls “hallucinatory perception” has nothing to do with the schizo subject’s peculiar perception. Rather, it is natural, ordinary perception that Deleuze designates “hallucinatory.” Starting from the premise that consciousness is “a matter of threshold” (Fold 88), Deleuze posits that conscious perception–the perception of qualities–takes place when the “differential relations among…presently infinitely small [perceptions]…are drawn into clarity” (90). The filtering of an infinite number of inconspicuous perceptions results in the extraction of the remarkable or the clear (the finite) from the obscurity of the infinite. This discrimination or selection, however, is never simply a reaction to an external excitation: “Every perception is hallucinatory because perception has no object. Conscious perception has no object and does not even refer to a physical mechanism of excitation that could explain it from without: it refers only to the exclusively physical mechanism of differential relations among unconscious perceptions that are comprising it within the monad” (93). The idea of hallucinatory perception seems to pose Baudrillard’s problem of the impossibility of distinguishing reality from simulacra. Nevertheless, an important distinction should be made between Baudrillard’s notion of the virtual as a perception without object, a perception that reifies the real into the simulacral, on one hand, and Deleuze’s hallucinatory perception, which affirms the indetermination of the subject by material reality, on the other hand. The deep-seated nostalgia for the real that permeates Baudrillard’s description of the virtual or the obscene is completely foreign to Deleuze’s account of the free monad, whose perceptions are not grounded in the objective world. The “resemblance” posited between what is commonly called “the object of perception,” on one hand, and the perceived, on the other hand, is key to understanding this self-sufficiency of the perceived:

     

    In the first place, Leibniz is not stating that perception resembles an object, but that it evokes a vibration gathered by a receptive organ: pain does not represent the needle…but the thousands of minute movements or throbs that irradiate in the flesh….Here the relation of resemblance is like a “projection”: pain or color are projected on the vibratory plane of matter. (95)

     

    Perception is comprised of “affective qualities” or “natural signs” (96), which do not represent a corresponding object but instead resemble the vibrations produced in matter. Any kind of “affective quality,” such as pain for example, is taken not as representing or implying an object in the world but as resembling the vibrations produced in the material body: “Pain does not represent the pin in extension, but resembles molecular movements that it produces in matter” (96).

     

    Deleuze’s seemingly backward way of thinking is made possible by his reversal of the understanding of resemblance whereby “resemblance is equated with what resembles, not with what is resembled” (96). The conclusion Deleuze does not himself draw, but which follows logically from his argument, is that perception is always already virtual–in the sense that it has no object–because the fact “that the perceived resembles matter means that matter is necessarily produced in conformity with this relation, and not that this relation conforms to a preexisting model” (96). Deleuzean perception is virtual or hallucinatory in two complementary senses: first, the perceived resembles the vibrations projected in the material body and, second, these vibrations resemble an object in the world. This is how Deleuze imagines the relationship of the monad to the world:

     

    (1) clear-obscure perception manifests a relation of resemblance with a material receptor that receives vibrations; (2) such receptors are called organs or organic bodies, and as bodies they constitute the vibrations that they receive to infinity; (3) the physical mechanism of bodies (fluxion) is not identical to the psychic mechanism of perception (differentials) but the latter resembles the former. (Fold 98)

     

    To simplify things: the material world resembles my material body, and my material body resembles the soul. Although “the monad draws all perceptive traces from itself” (99), it does not perceive without having a body that resembles what it perceives. Deleuze does not deny the existence of the material world; he only insists that the world does not determine my body, just as my body does not determine the perceived (subjectivity).4

     

    In his Introduction to Deleuze’s Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume’s Theory of Human Nature, Constantin Boundas rightfully notes that Deleuze’s “struggles for subjectivity” (4) and his critique of phenomenology are always “marked by the tension created by a radical critique of interiority and a simultaneous quest for an inside deeper than any internal world” (11). This tension results in the elaboration of “a line of subjectivity” and a “line of objectivity” in Bergsonism. The line of subjectivity is that of memory “which puts us at once into the mind,” while the line of objectivity is that of perception “which puts us at once into matter” (Bergsonism 26). These two “lines” differ in kind. However, Deleuze later posits that all differences in kind fall on the side of subjectivity or memory, while all differences in degree fall on the side of perception or matter. Since the difference between perception/matter and memory/mind is a difference in kind, it falls on the side of subjectivity. Therefore, the line of objectivity (matter, perception) is part of the line of subjectivity or, put differently, the difference between object and subject is subjective: in fact, the subject is nothing else but this difference.

     

    The purpose of The Fold is to reconstruct the line of subjectivity before the constitution of a subject. Deleuze attempts to do this by redefining point of view in terms of the line of subjectivity rather than identifying it with the subject. The tension of which Boundas speaks accounts for the co-existence of two mutually irreconcilable tendencies in Deleuze’s understanding of “perception in the folds”: on one hand, the reconceived notion of point of view (the subject is not a privileged, essentializing point of view on the object; the object itself is undergoing a continuous variation) and, on the other hand, the idea of the perceived as absolutely enclosed in the monad, “the pleats of matter” resembling “the folds of the soul.” Deleuze situates himself in a line of philosophers–Nietzsche, Whitehead, William and Henry James–whose perspectivism he hastens to distinguish from the common-sense notion of relativism: “It is not a variation of truth according to the subject, but the condition in which the truth of a variation appears to the subject” (Fold 20). Indeed, William James’s idea of “pure experience” already anticipates Deleuze’s reconceptualization of point of view:

     

    Experience, I believe, has no…inner duplicity; and the separation of it into consciousness and content comes, not by way of substraction, but by way of addition. . . . Just so, I maintain, does a given undivided portion of experience [whether perceptual or conceptual], taken in one context of associates, play the part of a knower, of a state of mind, of “consciousness”; while in a different context the same undivided bit of experience plays the part of a thing known, of an objective “content.” In a word, in one group it figures as a thought, in another group as a thing, And since it can figure in both groups simultaneously we have every right to speak of it as subjective and objective both at once. (James 7)

     

    Since consciousness “connotes a kind of external relation, and does not denote a special stuff or way of being” (14), pure experience is “only virtually or potentially either object or subject as yet.

     

    Deleuze calls the new object “objectile,” arguing that “the new status of the object no longer refers its condition to a spatial mold–in other words, to a relation of form-matter–but to a temporal modulation that implies as much the beginnings of a continuous variation of matter as a continuous development of form….The object here is manneristic, not essentializing: it becomes an event” (Fold 19). The subject, on the other hand, is never given before its point of view:

     

    Such is the basis of perspectivism, which does not mean a dependence in respect to a pre-given or defined subject; to the contrary, a subject will be what comes to the point of view, or rather what remains in the point of view….Just as an object becomes objectile, the subject becomes a superject. A needed relation exists between variation and point of view: not simply because of the variety of points of view…but in the first place because every point of view is a point of view on variation. The point of view is not varied with the subject, at least in the first instance; it is , to the contrary, the condition in which an eventual subject apprehends a variation (metamorphosis)…. (19-20)

     

    Deleuze attempts to do away with the notion of point of view as belonging to or being embodied in a subject with respect to an object and thereby determining or immobilizing the object. His strategy is to conceive both the object and the subject as going through a continuous variation so that the variation of the object is as much determining the point of view as the point of view is determining the object.

     

    What remains implicit in this new conception of the subject/object relationship is, first, that the object’s variation is a variation from itself (it does not vary for a subject) and, second, that point of view or subjectivity can only be a point within the temporal modulation of the object, since the object is not “essentializing.” Therefore, point of view or subjectivity is only a point in the continuous variation of matter. This conception of subjectivity combines Deleuze’s idea of “a practical subject” (Empiricism 104) with Bergson’s theory of perception as a process of selection and condensation of the aggregate of images that constitutes the material world. Deleuze’s debt to Bergson becomes clear in the example he gives of a point of view on variation which excludes any notion of a privileged center or configuration: “The most famous example is that of conic sections, where the point of the cone is the point of view to which the circle, the ellipse, the parabola, and the hyperbola are related as so many variants that follow the incline of the section that is planned” (Fold 20-21). The point of view from the summit of the cone provides a point of view on a series of variations, instead of a separate point of view corresponding to each figure. Similarly, to illustrate the “architecture” of the human mind in Matter and Memory Bergson chooses precisely a cone turned upside down so that the point of the cone cuts into the plane of perception (the present) while the bottom of the cone recedes in the infinite world of pure memory (the virtual).

     

    Like Baudrillard’s philosophy of “the fatal object,” Deleuze’s redefinition of the relationship between subject and point of view denies the subject its status of a master of representation. Instead, it is the object that imposes on the subject its own random form and discontinuity. Neither Deleuze nor Baudrillard seem to acknowledge the fact that the call to stop signifying, to return to pure perception, to let things express themselves is meaningful only from the point of view of the subject’s destiny. Even if there was “an inhuman”–a pure object–we can only talk of it in human terms: “master,” “power,” “representation,” even “inhuman.” The inhuman is not the end or “death” of the subject but simply another point of view from which the subject can look at itself: becoming-object, becoming-animal, or becoming-inhuman are all human projects. Nothing can eliminate subjectivity underneath these anti-subjective projects, whether the subject disperses itself in a multiplicity of points of view for noble, ethical reasons or just out of boredom. The power of representation is absolute: if the subject has this power when it represents the world to itself (from its privileged, external point of view), it wields the same power when it renounces its privileged position. Power is not to be confused with truthfulness: the subject’s power as a master of signification does not consist in the truthfulness of its representation; conversely, the inhuman point of view cannot be “more” truthful or objective. The notorious “death of the subject” that has been proclaimed on more than one occasion now is nothing more than an outburst of melodrama in a philosophical trend–postmodernism–predisposed to pseudo-apocalyptic generalizations.

     

    Baudrillard welcomes what he believes to be the end of the order of representation, the beginning of a pre-human or non-human reality:

     

    All metaphysics is in effect swept away by this reversal of situation where the subject is no longer at the origin of the process, and no longer anything but the agent, or the operator, of the objective irony of the world. The subject no longer provides the representation of the world (I will be your mirror!) It is the object that refracts the subjects… (“Objects” 14)

     

    Nevertheless, he cannot help but scorn “pure objects” that have been stripped of any secret or illusion (or of any relation to subjectivity), elevated to “pure figuration, without the least transfiguration [by a subject]. No transcendence any more, but a potentialization of the sign, which, losing all natural signification, shines in the void with all its artificial splendour…an image…without quality, a presence without desire” (16). In the end, Baudrillard is not so much concerned with getting rid of the subject as he is with recovering ways in which the world can still affect the subject. The subject must be sacrificed not because the objective world has to avenge itself but because it is necessary to assure ourselves that the subject is still alive. The subject can testify to its existence, to its difference from inanimate things, only by sacrificing itself and thus proving that it is still capable of being affected.5In the end, it is not the object but the subject that is the endangered species in Baudrillard’s philosophy. 

     

    Notes

     

    1. It would be interesting to read Baudrillard’s theory of the simulacrum as the precession of images over things against Einstein’s theory of relativity, to inquire to what extent the phenomenon of the simulacrum (the decline of representation) is due to certain identifiable physical laws, such as the speed of light, for instance. In his novel Einstein’s Dreams, Alan Lightman imagines the different conceptions of time Einstein might have come up with before he formulated the theory of relativity. See also Mullarkey, 112-17, for an illuminating comparison between Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity and Bergson’s theory of time. Mullarkey distinguishes between Einstein’s partial relativism (in Einstein’s theory the idea of a privileged frame of reference is preserved despite the acknowledgement of other frames of reference) and Bergson’s “full-relativism” (117), in which all frames of reference–or as Deleuze will later say, all points-of-view-whatever–are equally valid.

     

    2. Baudrillard is not particularly consistent in his writings on the notion of the virtual, to which he attributes both a destructive and preserving potential. The virtual stands either for total realization or for a strategy of escape from the threat of total realization; it has either already happened or it is a premonition, a warning against the danger of hyperreality.

     

    3. Compare this notion that of repetition in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling/Repetition. According to Kierkegaard, repetition has been wrongly called mediation, whereas in fact it is the liberation of the particular from its subsumption under the universal. Opposing the Greeks’ idea that all knowledge is recollection (what is has been), Kierkegaard claims that being is not immediate or given; rather, things come into existence only through repetition–only through repetition can an event detach itself from the original confusion of things. Repetition is impossible when one seeks it consciously: then it inevitably degenerates into recollection. Recollection inscribes events; repetition is the coming of things into being.

     

    4. It is another question whether the notion of resemblance upon which Deleuze’s whole argument rests is sufficient to overcome determinism. After all, resemblance is not part of the given but a kind of relation that becomes possible only with the transition from mind (associations) to subject (differential relations), as Deleuze argues in Empiricism and Subjectivity. Resemblance does not ground the relation of subject to the world but is simply a relation the subject establishes between its idea of itself and its idea of the world. In fact, in his essay on Hume Deleuze acknowledges that relations are never given but are only established by a subject. Having distinguished between “mind” and “subject”–the former is merely a collection of discernible perceptions while the latter spontaneously establishes differential relations between them–Deleuze notes that “the mind is not the representation of nature either” (88). The positing of a relation with nature–a relation of resemblance–is possible only after the mind has been transformed into a subject, because “the question of a determinable relation with nature has its own conditions: it is not obvious, it is not given, and it can only be posited by a subject questioning the value of the system of his judgments…” (88). Therefore, inasmuch as “relations are external to ideas” (98), resemblance remains a subjective reconciliation of the subject with the world.

     

    5. See Readings, 97-101, for a discussion of the event as “affect”–that which cannot be conceptualized or signified.

    Works Cited

     

    • Baudrillard, Jean. The Ecstasy of Communication. Trans. Bernard and Caroline Schutze. Ed. Sylvère Lotringer. New York: Semiotext(e), 1988.
    • — . Fatal Strategies. Trans. Philip Beitchman and W.G. J. Niesluchowski. New York: Semiotext(e), 1990.
    • — . Forget Foucault. New York: Semiotext(e), 1987.
    • — . “Objects, Images, and The Possibilities of Aesthetic Illusion.” Zurbrugg 7-18.
    • — . The Perfect Crime. Trans. Chris Turner. London: Verso, 1996.
    • Bergson, Henri. Creative Evolution. Trans. Arthur Mitchell. New York: Modern Library, 1944.
    • — . The Creative Mind. Trans. Mabelle L. Andison. New York: Philosophical Library, 1946.
    • — . Matter and Memory. Trans. N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer. New York: Zone, 1991.
    • Coulter-Smith, Graham. “Between Marx and Derrida: Baudrillard, Art and Technology.” Zurbrugg 91-103.
    • Deleuze, Gilles. Bergsonism. 1966. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. New York: Zone, 1988.
    • — . Cinema 2: The Time-Image. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1989.
    • — . Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume’s Theory of Human Nature. 1953. Trans. Constantin V. Boundas. New York: Columbia UP, 1991.
    • — . The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque. 1988. Trans. Tom Conley. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1993.
    • James, William. Essays in Radical Empiricism. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1976.
    • Kierkegaard, Sören. Fear and Trembling/Repetition. Trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1983.
    • Lightman, Alan. Einstein’s Dreams. New York: Warner, 1993.
    • Lyotard, Jean-François. The Inhuman: Reflections on Time. Trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby. Cambridge: Polity, 1988.
    • Mullarkey, John. Bergson and Philosophy. South Bend, IN: U of Notre Dame P, 2000.
    • Readings, Bill. Introducing Lyotard: Art and Politics. London: Routledge, 1991.
    • Sartre, Jean-Paul. The Psychology of Imagination. 1948. New York: Citadel, 1963.
    • Willis, Anne-Marie. “After the Afterimage of Jean Baudrillard: Photography, the Object, Ecology and Design.” Zurbrugg 136-48.
    • Zurbrugg, Nicholas, ed. Jean Baudrillard, Art and Artefact. London: Sage, 1997.

     

  • The Architecture of Information: Open Source Software and Tactical Poststructuralist Anarchism

    Michael Truscello

    Department of English
    University of Waterloo
    novel_t@rogers.com

    Introduction

     
    The traces of power in the network society are equally located in the architecture of bricks and mortar and the architecture of information, the discursive practices that constitute the coding of network topologies. This paper examines the discourse of computer programming through Eric Raymond’s ethnographical account of the Open Source software developmental model. Raymond’s Open Source software manifesto, “The Cathedral and the Bazaar” (hereafter, “CatB”), the infamous text that inspired Netscape to release the source code for its Web browser in 1998 in an attempt to compete with Microsoft’s Internet Explorer, differentiates Open Source software development, which is figured as nonlinear and self-organizing, from Closed Source, which is represented as hierarchical and authoritarian. The Open Source model has been characterized by some as representing a liberatory politics for the information age. Open Source, as represented in the work of Raymond, is a tactical political philosophy whose central architectural metaphors–the bazaar, and its supplementary term, the cathedral–share theoretical homologies with anarchistic poststructuralist statements by Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Lebbeus Woods, and Hakim Bey. The intent of this essay is to examine points of generative convergence between the history and philosophy of software development and certain proponents of poststructuralist thought. In doing so, I wish to initiate a cultural analysis of the historically situated discourse that shapes software development, the texts and practices that inform the coding of the architecture of information. Raymond’s bazaar shares theoretical homologies with Deleuze’s modulations, Woods’s freespaces and heterarchic societies, and Bey’s Temporary Autonomous Zone, but it is in the figure of the programmer especially that the intersecting discourses of electronic and concrete spaces converge and the inescapably cultural base of technology emerges.1 The bazaar programmer loses the distinction of “developer” and becomes a “co-developer,” dissolving the categorical distinction between those who code and those for whom there is a Code.

     

    The Discourse of Software Engineering

     

    Critiques of the information age and the role of cyberspace in the operation of the surveillance society often ignore the fact that “electronic space is embedded in the larger dynamics organizing society” (Sassen 1). Cyberspace is not a separate space, a virtual room of its own, but an embodied architecture of networks and actors situated in disparate geographical, sociological, psychological, and economic spaces. The very history of the Internet and its cyberspatial enclaves is immersed in ideologically antagonistic contexts: the Internet was ostensibly developed by the U.S. Department of Defense but nurtured by the libertarian leanings of early hacker culture. In its originary moment, then, the Internet was emblematic of both control and freedom, the apotheosis of the surveillance society and the dream of anarchistic autonomy.2 In Saskia Sassen’s re-theorization of electronic space, the increasing commercialization of public networks and centralization of power in private networks have created “cyber-segmentations” that are contrary to the Internet’s supposed dream of decentralization and openness (2). The encroachment of multinational postindustrial capitalism, the context in which cyberspace is “embedded,” produces online inequalities centralized in the offline spaces of power (5).

     

    Sassen believes that “a focus on place and infrastructure in the new global information economy creates a conceptual and practical opening for questions about the embeddedness of electronic space” (5-6). Taking a cue from Sassen, the current essay focuses on network infrastructure through the metaphors of architecture; the architecture of places and information; urban design and systems design; and the trace of spatialized power that informs them. Cyberspace is constructed by operating systems and software applications. People often overlook the social conditions of software creation, just as they often ignore the cultural conditions of cyberspace, preferring instead to see cyberspace as the digital perfection of our messy analog desires. The “architects of information” engineer software,3 and just as discourse implicates these architects of information in the latent discursive practices of their particular time and place (in this case, much of the ethos of programmer culture emerges from the West Coast of the United States), the software they create registers in the web of normative practices that constitute discourse. A focus on “place and infrastructure,” as suggested by Sassen, must include a focus on the infrastructure of the code, the architecture of information, which contributes as much to the centralization of power in places as the commercialization of access to information, the emergence of infomediaries, and the prevalence of private corporate networks, Sassen’s primary forms of “cyber-segmentation” (9).

     

    If You Build It, They Will Come: Architecture and Ideology

     

    Architect Lebbeus Woods, whose “anarchitecture” attempts to create “freespaces” through indeterminate structures, identifies the relationship between architecture and ideology: “While architects speak of designing space that satisfies human needs, it is actually human needs that are being shaped to satisfy designed space and the abstract systems of thought and organization on which design is based” (279). Mark Poster makes a similar claim for information architects when he discusses the impact of the Superpanopticon: “Surveillance by means of digitally encoded information constitutes new subjects by the language employed in databases” (Mode 94). Architecture, whether it refers to buildings or databases, constructs subject positions through the spatialization of power. Much has been written about the architecture of bricks and mortar, but very little, if anything, has been written about the architecture of information, the discourse of computer programming; and this is so even as the two architectures become inseparable.4 This essay engages a variety of discourses on the sometimes liberatory architectural models of what Todd May calls “tactical poststructuralist anarchism.” In particular, the model of the software engineer as a subject working within and creating autonomous spaces, a tactical anarchism for the information architect represented by CatB, offers an instance of resistance that defies the monolithic rendering of the surveillance society described by Poster and others, an almost cyborgian moment in which information architects “seize the tools that write them” for the purpose of a tactical, temporary “uprising,” to use Hakim Bey’s preferred term.

     

    A Rebel Without A Cause

     

    “Linux is subversive.” One can only wonder if CatB would have had as much success without its provocative first three words. Raymond, described as “the armchair philosopher of the open source world” and “a hard-core libertarian” (Wayner 106-07), originally wrote CatB to demarcate the factions that existed within the Free Software movement and to establish his camp–the more market-friendly, “open source” camp–as the desirable, though not singular, option. For Raymond, Open Source software development offers significant technical benefits over Closed Source, and this improved product development cycle should be the central motivation behind adopting such practices. However, he does not advocate the prohibition of proprietary software. CatB, which was originally presented to the Linux Kongress on 21 May 1997, convinced Netscape to release its Navigator source code on 22 January 1998, an event that brought much public attention to Raymond’s essay and much private-sector approval to Linux, the enormously successful operating system on which CatB is based. Just how subversive Linux is–politically, philosophically, economically, sociologically–remains unclear, but the architectural metaphors on which Raymond’s essay is based may be considered an exemplary expression of techno-cultural anarchistic politics. The advance of Open Source software development has been described as a modern-day Lutheranism, and Raymond’s Open Source manifesto has been described by FEED magazine’s Steven Johnson as “the Port Huron Statement of the movement.” Raymond told Johnson in an email that what Open Source subverts specifically are “classical software-engineering assumptions about how to do high-quality software. More generally, [Open Source subverts] assumptions about the organization of cooperative work–that it has to be organized on either command-and-control or scarcity-economics principles” (“Whole Web”).5 To which Johnson wondered, “Is Open Source the ultimate expression of the techno-libertarians, or a startling revival of the progressive, anti-corporate sentiments that last flourished with the SDS?” Raymond’s brand of Open Source is certainly not anti-corporate, but it does possess a subversive political philosophy, a philosophy I shall categorize here as “tactical poststructuralist anarchism,” embodied by the architectural metaphors of the cathedral and the bazaar. The architectural metaphor foregrounds not only software engineering as a “situated knowledge,” but also the transformation in software engineering enabled by the emergence of the Internet; that is, the infrastructure of the Internet that evolved in the “real” world enabled a reformulation of the political terms in which the very same technological infrastructure could evolve (primarily, as Raymond argues, in the way the Internet enables “parallel debugging”); the architecture of networked computing created a new space for information architecture (the coding of the code).

     

    Use The Source, Luke

     

    In CatB, Raymond employs his titular metaphor to differentiate his brand of Free Software (Open Source) from other forms of Free Software, such as Richard Stallman’s Free Software Foundation (FSF). Raymond believed that the FSF operated too much like cathedral-style development, with a hierarchical structure of authority in which one central project leader (in this case, Stallman) determined the development path for the source. When Raymond became aware of Linux, a Unix-based operating system created by 21-year-old computer science student Linus Torvalds at the University of Helsinki in 1991, he was immensely impressed by the way it had evolved through an open distribution of the source code over the Internet. This decentralized model of software development took advantage of the collective debugging power of thousands of computer programmers and essentially enlisted “users” as “co-developers.” The first official release of Linux came in 1994, with changes being made and new versions being posted daily. Even though Linux was developed five years after Microsoft began developing Windows NT, Linux has become a competitive alternative to NT with a worldwide user base around twelve million (Moore), a fact that many suggest proves the efficacy of its open development model. A recent Business Week cover story on Linux notes the operating system’s accelerated penetration into the server market, from almost no percentage of the market three years ago to 13.7% of the $50.9 billion market in 2002, a figure expected to reach 25.2% by 2006. For this reason, business experts are calling Linux “the biggest threat to Microsoft’s hegemony since the Netscape browser in 1995” (Kerstetter et. al. 78).6 In the short-term this may, however, be an overstatement. Microsoft revealed for the first time in November 2002 that four of its seven business units are losing money, while its Windows division generates an 85% profit margin. In other words, the Windows OS is still where Microsoft makes most of its money, and it is on the desktop where Open Source projects like Linux have made the least impact. That said, Linux and other Open Source software developmental models have proved to be an effective and widely accepted alternative to various proprietary software.7

     

    The Mythical Man-Month

     

    CatB borrows much of its structure and codification of the principles of software engineering from a classic text in the field, The Mythical Man-Month by Frederick P. Brooks. A twentieth-anniversary edition of Brooks’s text was issued just prior to the composition of CatB, and Raymond makes specific mention of the text in his notes. The central thesis of Brooks’s classic text has become known as “Brooks’s Law”: “Adding manpower to a late software project makes it later” (25). Brooks formulated this law before the age of the Internet, before the advent of a truly scalable form of “parallel debugging.” Linus Torvalds was the first person to refute Brooks’ Law in a demonstrably successful application of what Raymond in CatB famously dubs “Linus’ Law”: “Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow.” Adding manpower by distributing the source code freely over the Internet, as Torvalds did in 1994 just as the Internet was emerging as a cultural phenomenon, can actually improve the quality of a piece of software while maintaining its architectural integrity, and it can do so on time. The focus of Raymond’s manifesto, in an intertextual dialogue with Brooks’s software engineering classic, is not the quality of Torvalds’s code in the Linux kernel, “but rather [Linus’s] invention of the Linux development model” (Raymond).

     

    Raymond also derives the cathedral metaphor from Brooks. In The Mythical Man-Month, the cathedral-builder represents the ideal form of software engineering, an architectural unity of design across generations of builders. However, most cathedrals are problematic, says Brooks, because they bear witness to different architects and different styles that have been applied, a visible legacy of heterogeneity.

     

    It is better to have a system omit certain anomalous features and improvements, but to reflect one set of design ideas, than to have one that contains many good but independent and uncoordinated ideas. (42)

     

    It is important to note that when Brooks refers to the architecture of a system, he means “the complete and detailed specification of the user interface,” something not to be confused with the implementation of these design specifications (45). The system architects, then, are something of an aristocracy in his eyes, granted the noble task of envisioning the system in its entirety, authors of the metanarrative, or autocrats of information. Brooks points to the triumph of the WIMP (Windows, Icons, Menus, Pointing) interface as an example of perfect architectural integrity in software engineering, an exemplar of his cathedral-builder.

     

    The WIMP is a superb example of a user interface that has conceptual integrity, achieved by the adoption of a familiar mental model, the desktop metaphor, and its careful consistent extension to exploit a computer graphics implementation. (260)

     

    Of course, the WIMP interface, which found its way from Xerox to Apple to Microsoft, is now the controlling metaphor of the most popular operating system in the world, and perhaps the emblem of proprietary software and the monopolistic practices of the leading cathedral-builder, Microsoft. Windows may be “a superb example of a user interface that has conceptual integrity,” but it is also a grisly parody of the way in which the computer is always mediated by the space of work (in this case, the central metaphors Windows uses to organize the computer’s content and functionality are metaphors of the workplace: trash cans, files, desktops, and so forth). Brooks’s sense of conceptual integrity becomes a sort of normative principle in computer-mediated communication: the desktop metaphor works because it is “a familiar mental model,” but it is a familiar mental model because it reifies the spatial order of hegemonic discourse. If the system’s architecture is more important than incremental but heterogeneous improvements on that design, then where is the space for adaptation? Or, if one conceives of “the code” as a discourse of subjugation, where is the space for counter-hegemonic discourses, what Steven Johnson aptly calls “user-hostile design” (Interface Culture 227)?

     

    The Cathedral

     

    J. Mitchell Morse describes cathedral building (the brick-and-mortar kind) as an aspect of “the grandiosity-glorification syndrome, an aspect of the fully developed leisure-class authoritarian syndrome,” and, pointing to texts as diverse as Vico’s New Science and Kafka’s “The Great Wall of China,” he characterizes such stories as tales of “secret government” of “an ancient authoritarian habit that afflicts every nation” (104). He also recalls, citing Vico, that many of these ancient societies built their “secret governments” on the foundations of languages, languages–from hieroglyphs to Latin Bibles–indecipherable to the slavish masses who constructed their pyramids, great walls, and cathedrals. The process of governing was “secret” in the sense that these secret languages reinforced the status of the ruling class without the subjugated entirely understanding the terms of their subjugation; in the cathedral, then, resides a form of “false consciousness.” The cathedral-builders of postmodernity have again harnessed a language at once complex and capable of being “hidden” from the masses: the compiled and proprietary source code. The Windows operating system–whose development is driven by market forces and the corporate interests of Microsoft, perhaps the most powerful cathedral-builder in history because of its global imperative–is the monument of Arthur Kroker’s “virtual class,” the “authoritarian habit” of the ruling class of the information age.

     

    The Bazaar

     

    Raymond contrasts the cathedral, an authoritarian and linear model of software development associated by implication with the monopolistic behemoth Microsoft, with the bazaar, an open and nonlinear model of software development whose champion is Linus Torvalds and the Linux operating system. Raymond describes the Linux community as “a great babbling bazaar of differing agendas and approaches . . . out of which a coherent and stable system could seemingly emerge only by a succession of miracles.” As Ko Kuwabara depicts the Open Source community, based largely on Raymond’s ethnographic essays, it behaves much like an emergent system as described by complexity theory. Both Kuwabara and Raymond suggest Linux’s development model succeeded because it obeys certain natural laws governing the evolutionary development of complex systems: “The case of Linux suggests . . . that aggregate behaviors are better understood as emergent properties–properties that emerge out of micro-level interactions among constituents–than as qualities intrinsic to the system and independent of its constituent parts” (Kuwabara). Raymond further compares the Linux community to “a free market or an ecology,” an echo of his technolibertarian ideals; but this representation of “central planning” as the artificial and oppressive antithesis of the more organic and natural evolution of complex systems is too reductive and ignores both certain benefits of central planning and the fact that even Microsoft utilizes Open Source development models some of the time.8 Reductive rhetoric about the natural evolution of “free markets” is especially problematic for those who profit from the Internet because it was originally established and developed by the government. There is a naturalistic fallacy at work here, a troublesome tendency to say the Open Source model is more “natural”–and therefore better–than closed source.9 The bazaar might be better defined by the “tactical poststructuralist anarchism” I discuss below.

     

    First, it should be noted that the primary distinction Raymond makes between the cathedral-builder and the bazaar is the use of “parallel editing.” Raymond writes:

     

    Here, I think, is the core difference underlying the cathedral-building and bazaar styles. In the cathedral-builder view of programming, bugs and development problems are tricky, insidious, deep phenomena. It takes months of scrutiny by a dedicated few to develop confidence that you’ve winkled them all out.

     

    In the bazaar view, on the other hand, you assume that bugs are generally shallow phenomena–or, at least, that they turn shallow pretty quick when exposed to a thousand eager co-developers pounding on every single new release.

     

    This is the essence of Linus’ Law (“given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow”), and it exemplifies the means by which Open Source deconstructs the otherwise stable and antithetical subject positions of “developer” and “user.” According to Linus’ Law, a “user,” formerly the colonized subject of imperialist cathedral-builders, now participates in the development of the code and is an equal “owner” of the code. Instead of “users” and “developers,” everyone is a potential “co-developer.” The bazaar becomes a liminal zone of subject-creation, an interstitial space for the negotiation of identity.

     

    Homi Bhabba, commenting on Clifford Geertz’s use of the bazaar and the English gentlemen’s club as social spaces of diversity and homogeneity respectively, imagines a more “agonistic and ambivalent” relationship between the two, suggesting that “anxious passage” between the two merges “the encounter between the ontological cultural impulse and the memory of the displacements that make national cultures possible” (36). The bazaar has traditionally been identified with oriental exoticism; however, recent studies refute this colonialist historicism and reveal that bazaar markets “can equally be found in developed industrialised economies” (Fansellow 262). The use of the “bazaar” as a metaphor for Open Source immediately performs a sense of otherness and dislocation, but it does not establish Open Source as the binary opposite of cathedral building; while the two might be construed as equivalent terms of comparison–one evoking Christianity, the other Islam–Raymond’s stated intention when employing the “bazaar” metaphor was to invoke the marketplace, not religion. He was originally going to call the essay “The Cathedral and the Agora,” to suggest an open space of public exchange. The convergence of the metaphors occurs on the level of “enclosed” and “open” spaces, the cathedral the epitome of an enclosed space, and the bazaar an open space that for some economists is the “model of the perfectly competitive market” with “the apparent absence of monopolistic competition” (Fansellow 262).

     

    The second central feature of the bazaar model is its adaptive teleology. While Raymond requires some sort of goal for the development community (“When you start community-building, what you need to be able to present is a plausible premise“), it is not a fixed goal. Rather, what makes the Linux model advantageous is its ability to adapt to shifting contexts, a tactical philosophy that contrasts with the strategic philosophy of cathedral-building. This tactical approach “produces a self-correcting spontaneous order more elaborate and efficient than any amount of central planning could have achieved” (Raymond). The adaptive order of the bazaar, with its tactical constitution of “the code,” resembles the poststructuralist construction of the subject through cultural codes and a multiplicity of possible subject positions. This analogy is developed in greater detail below.

     

    Tactical Poststructuralist Anarchism

     

    To this point, I have discussed the representation of Open Source software development in Eric Raymond’s “The Cathedral and the Bazaar,” a seminal work in the public dissemination of hacker culture. Raymond’s essay is an inescapably ideological work, from the provocative opening sentence to the engaging architectural metaphors. The attributes of the bazaar software development model share theoretical homologies with what Todd May calls “tactical poststructuralist anarchism,” and an examination of some prominent forms of poststructuralist anarchism will provide the necessary bridge in this analysis from the discourse of software engineering to the political philosophy of poststructuralist anarchism.

     

    In the introduction to The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism, May attempts to map the migratory space that political philosophy inhabits, and he suggests the tension between metaphysics and ethics (essentially between what is and what ought to be) determines the mutable boundaries of this discursive site. He divides the spectrum of political philosophies into the categories of formal, strategic, and tactical. Formal political philosophy cleaves “either to the pole of what ought to be or to the pole of what is at the expense of the tension between the two” (4). Strategic political philosophy recognizes the contingencies of history and social conditions, often addressing the concrete historical conditions under which the political “strategies” are composed, but never allowing ethical goals to be subsumed by contextualizations; thus the aim is to promote the “assumed justice,” the ethical goals, given the historical context (8). Strategic philosophies graph power onto the world in the form of “concentric circles” which emanate from a central “core problem” (10). This concept of power distinguishes strategic political philosophies from tactical, since tactical philosophies, such as anarchism and elements of French poststructuralism, May argues, remain “in the tension,” where there is no center of power, only intersecting practices of power (11). By remaining in the tension between what ought to be and what is, unlike formal and strategic philosophies which tend to gravitate to one pole or the other, and by conceptualizing power spatially as a network of interconnecting matrices, tactical philosophies reject representational political intervention, such as that of a vanguard, and embrace the decentralization or removal of hierarchical power structures. May believes the move from macropolitics to micropolitics in French poststructuralism, in particular the work of Foucault, Deleuze, and early Lyotard, is analogous in many ways to the tactical philosophy of many early and modern anarchists.

     

    The bazaar model of software development represents a tactical political philosophy through its emphasis on decentralized authority, its spatialization of power dispersed in the networks of the Internet, and its rejection of political intervention through an overtly libertarian endorsement of a free-market philosophy.10 Perhaps most important, the bazaar model emphasizes its adaptability to transient conditions through extensive parallel debugging; so, unlike formal or strategic political philosophies, the bazaar model encourages tactical interventions over strategic, teleological planning. In the following sections, I examine the theoretical homologies the bazaar model shares with other poststructuralist tactical interventions: Gilles Deleuze’s critique of Foucault’s Panopticism, Lebbeus Woods’s “anarchitecture,” and Hakim Bey’s Temporary Autonomous Zone. In each case, the tactical anarchism depends on architecture to resolve the contingent boundaries of electronic space as electronic space is embedded in techno-cultural narratives, and this translation of anarchistic poststructuralist thinking via architecture suggests an emerging discourse for the subject positions of the architects of information in postmodernity.

     

    The Mode of Information

     

    The new linguistic experiences of the late twentieth century have been termed “the mode of information” by Mark Poster. Poster focuses on Foucault’s discussion of the Panopticon, an architectural innovation of the nineteenth century representative of the transformation from sovereign to disciplinary power in Western societies. The Panopticon, Foucault believed, epitomized a technology of power, a general model for power, “a way of defining power relations in terms of the everyday life of men” (Discipline 205). The efficiency of panoptic power derives from its ability to automize and disindividualize its power (202). Foucault writes:

     

    The efficiency of power, its constraining force have, in a sense, passed over to the other side–to the side of its surface of application. He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection. (202-03)

     

    Poster demonstrates how panopticism as a technology of power operates within the twentieth century in the form of state bureaucracy and computer technology. Both the Panopticon as an architectural innovation, and bureaucracy and computer technology, foster the principles of disciplinary control. “Indeed,” writes Poster in Foucault, Marxism & History,

     

    they expand its scope to a new level. With the mechanisms of information processing (the bureaucracy using people; the computer using machines), the ability to monitor behavior is extended considerably. The techniques of discipline no longer need rely on methods of regulating bodies in space as Foucault thinks. In the electronic age, spatial limitations are bypassed as restraints on the controlling hierarchies. All that is needed are traces of behavior; credit card activity, traffic tickets, telephone bills, loan applications, welfare files, fingerprints, income transactions, library records, and so forth. (103)

     

    Disciplinary control in the information age surpasses spatial and temporal limitations through the advances in technology: “Today’s ‘circuits of communication’ and the databases they generate constitute a Superpanopticon, a system of surveillance without walls, windows, towers or guards. The quantitative advances in the technologies of surveillance result in a qualitative change in the microphysics of power” (Poster, Mode 93). Not only does the Superpanopticon erase spatial and temporal restrictions through the immediacy of information exchange, it also challenges the social hierarchy by circumventing the existing methods of domination: “In the mode of information the subject is no longer located in a point in absolute time/space, enjoying a physical, fixed vantage point from which rationally to calculate its options” (15).

     

    Deleuzional Modulations

     

    Open Source may represent a space of resistance for the surveillance society, and the metaphor of the bazaar suggests the mode of resistance. In his critique of Foucault’s panoptic technology of power, Gilles Deleuze contrasts the “spaces of enclosure” in disciplinary societies–Foucault’s hospitals, prisons, and factories–with the “modulations” of societies of control, the ephemeral corporations and databanks that organize contemporary life. Deleuze describes the continuous becoming of the subject in the society of control:

     

    Enclosures are molds, distinct castings, but controls are a modulation, like a self-deforming cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other, or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to point. (4)

     

    In the disciplinary society, resistance is localized, the source of power in the maintenance of molds, fixed spaces. In the control society, power is distributed and adaptive, morphing ceaselessly to the contours of resistance. The cathedral-builder prizes conceptual integrity across generations; the bazaar model adapts to contexts without being led by market forces or corporate visions. The bazaar model is a particularly compelling political philosophy because it translates the architecture of enclosures to the architecture of information, and information, the code, mediates power in the control society.

     

    In the societies of control . . . what is important is no longer either a signature or a number, but a code: the code is a password, while on the other hand the disciplinary societies are regulated by watchwords (as much from the point of view of integration as from that of resistance). The numerical language of control is made of codes that mark access to information, or reject it. (5)

     

    The “numerical language of control,” the parlance of information architects, reaches its apotheosis in the biotech century with the coding of the Human Genome Project, “the code of codes” (Haraway 245). The human genome could represent the metapassword, access to unparalleled control or anarchic freedom. Much of the constitution and subjugation of the subject under this regime is a cultural product of database architecture:

     

    Computerized database design is at the leading edge of genomics research. Design decisions about these huge databases shape what can be easily compared to what else, and so determine the kinds of users that can be made of the original data. Such decisions structure the kinds of ideas of the species that can be sustained. (Haraway 247)

     

    Open Source software development, the free distribution of source code for unlimited revisions, carries serious ontological consequences under this regime, consequences that go beyond the scope of this article. The bazaar becomes, quite literally, a site for the construction and reconstruction of the subject, a potential space for autonomous agents to recontextualize the configurations of power in the networks of the control and surveillance society. The architecture of enclosure gives way to the architecture of universal encoding.

     

    The burgeoning availability and application of Open Source software and its development model, at a time when the “mode of information” and its attendant means of surveillance and control are the dominant discourse, resemble the cultural conditions of what has been dubbed the “Foucault paradox,” a situation in which the emergence of the hegemonic discourse of power being described by Foucault emerges concomitantly with its counter-hegemonic discourse:

     

    In other words, the burgeoning panopticism of nineteenth century institutions emerged hand-in-hand with collective discourses of social rights. They bore a reciprocal relation to one another. (Lyon 672)

     

    It is not surprising that the conditions in which the bazaar model emerges are the conditions in which the cathedral model is dominant. Arguably, Microsoft created the personal computing industry through the widespread adoption of an easy-to-use operating system for non-expert users. Microsoft, through its development of the personal computing market, created subsets of software industries that would not exist without the widespread adoption of its operating system. Without this enormous base of users, there would be no need for the employment of programmers in great numbers, and the code produced would not have the same influence over a large number of users. The number of willing “co-developers” available for Open Source projects would also have been greatly reduced without the home computing revolution created by Microsoft. The “Foucault paradox” informs the twentieth century as it did the nineteenth, and increased attention to these co-emergent phenomena would produce more balanced evaluations of the surveillance society and the resistant spaces within.

     

    Lebbeus Woods’s Radical Reconstruction

     

    The play of autonomous spaces in the architecture of information through the implementation of the bazaar model finds its analogous development in poststructuralist theorizing of space with architect Lebbeus Woods’s notion of “freespace.” Woods proposes that normal architecture prescribes intersubjectivity: “Design is a means of controlling human behavior, and of maintaining this control into the future” (279). Like the cathedral, normative architecture constructs object relations in space that precede and prescribe the constituent agents in the network of social relations: “People come and go, ways of living change, but architecture endures, an idealization of living” (281). Brooks praises this form of architecture in The Mythical Man-Month, but information technology has altered the ideological role of space: the enclosures of discipline no longer suffice. Woods proposes freespaces as spaces with potential for functionality but no prescriptive function; as a consequence, freespaces do not impose behavior. Woods introduced the concept of freespace with the Berlin Free-Zone project, what he calls “a hidden city within the one now being shaped” (286). The Berlin Free-Zone embodies the networked subjectivity of Open Source, the free play of signifiers in the space of computer-mediated communication:

     

    This hidden city is called a free-zone, because it provides unlimited free access to communications and to other, more esoteric, networks at present reserved for the major institutions of government and commerce–but also because interaction and dialogue are unrestricted conventions of behavior enforced by these institutions. (Woods 286)

     

    Woods wishes to alter the role of architecture from a discipline that reifies the social hierarchy to a discipline that enables “heterarchy,” the rule of many. “Heterarchical urban forms” such as the Berlin Free-Zone

     

    are invented in response to increasing emphasis in the present culture on the idea of the “the individual,” coupled with recent technological developments, such as the personal computer and systems of communication that simultaneously weaken the established hierarchies by accessing the information formerly controlled by them, and strengthen the autonomy of individuals. (288)

     

    The heterarchical form of Open Source’s information architecture certainly weakens “the established hierarchies,” namely the cathedral-builders, and returns an increased degree of information access to individuals, the legion of co-developers. Freespace is not new, but its public implementation is, says Woods. Similarly, free source code is not new; the information superhighway was paved with the asphalt of free code. But with Microsoft’s monopolistic hold on the productivity software industry, and with a very public battle with the U.S. Department of Justice revealing Microsoft’s anti-competitive practices to the public, the Open Source movement has accrued momentum and become a public emblem of “heterarchic” software development, software without ends.

     

    The Temporary Autonomous Zone

     

    The “mode of information” measures the linguistic experiences of the surveillance society, and the “anarchitecture” of Woods constructs freespaces for the autonomy of the individual in ideologically suffused spaces. Open Source creates an anarchic space for tactical intervention in the surveillance and control society by making the principal means of control, the code, “visible” to the greatest number of subjects.11 The subject, though participant in its own self-subjugation, is also a participant in its own emancipation. The machinations of surveillance, the operating systems and applications of subject construction, are potentially exposed and reconstructed. Always, whether the Superpanopticon’s architecture of information or Woods’s informed architect, the slippage between concrete and virtual architecture, between buildings and databases, leaves traces of the embeddedness of architectural discourse in the web of technocultural discourses. Perhaps the consummate expression of tactical poststructuralist anarchism and its polyglot of technological, scientific, architectural, economic, and political discourses is Hakim Bey’s Temporary Autonomous Zone (TAZ).

     

    The TAZ is a conceptual configuration of the bazaar as political philosophy. Like the bazaar, the TAZ values transient uprisings over sustained development. Like the bazaar, the TAZ is a freespace for individual autonomy, a state prior to mediation. And like the bazaar, the TAZ is a metaphor for the spatialization of liberation, “a microcosm of that ‘anarchist dream’ of a free culture” (Bey). Unlike the cathedral-builders, who must maintain conceptual integrity across generations, to serve corporate interests, even when it no longer proves adaptive to the environment, the TAZ (and now by extension, the bazaar) forms and reforms without teleological motivations:

     

    The TAZ is like an uprising that does not engage directly with the State, a guerilla operation which liberates an area (of land, of time, of imagination) and then dissolves itself to re-form elsewhere/elsewhen, before the State can crush it.

     

    This is not a revolutionary paradigm with a vanguard and a utopian dream of a classless society. The TAZ is a revolution that fails, but only because success would be the ultimate failure, the denial of future TAZs. In the society of control based on surveillance and simulacrum, where the State is–in the true sense of the Superpanopticon–all-seeing, the TAZ is an enclave of the real that cannot be mapped, simulated, made spectacle. “As soon as the TAZ is named (represented, mediated), it must vanish, it will vanish, leaving behind it an empty husk, only to spring up again somewhere else, once again invisible because undefinable in terms of the Spectacle” (Bey). While the Superpanopticon makes space visible for surveillance, mapping, and control, the TAZ will only exist in open spaces like Woods’s freespaces, spaces without ideological impressions:

     

    We are looking for “spaces” (geographic, social, cultural, imaginal) with potential to flower as autonomous zones–and we are looking for times in which these spaces are relatively open, either through neglect on the part of the State or because they have somehow escaped notice by the mapmakers, or for whatever reason.

     

    Bey believes there are times and places in history when TAZs existed, and still times and places where they may exist. Bey uses pirates as historical examples of an enclave of freespace that for a time evaded the “map” of authority, temporary instantiations of freedom. The nomadic figure of the pirate is one in a series of nomads, whose “psychic nomadism” Bey refers to as “a tactic”:

     

    These nomads practice the razzia, they are corsairs, they are viruses; they have both need and desire for TAZs, camps of black tents under the desert stars, interzones, hidden fortified oases along secret caravan routes, “liberated” bits of jungle and bad-land, no-go areas, black markets, and underground bazaars.

     

    Again, the image of the bazaar surfaces, except this time it represents a congerie of spatial convergences in Bey’s “psychotopology of everyday life,” the rootless desires and tactics of the cosmopolitan subject set adrift in cyberspace, or any space. Bey’s bazaars symbolize the “interzones,” the marginal territories in the networks of intersecting practices of power. These are Woods’s “hidden city within the one now being shaped.” These are Raymond’s free assemblages of the co-developers in the agora. Bey’s TAZs do not exist in either cyberspace or real space but both. He even destabilizes the discursive configurations of cyberspace by playfully proposing new meanings for the now ubiquitous terms “Web” and “Net.” For Bey, the Net is “the totality of all information and communication transfer,” a definition that removes the hermetic place in technoculture for the primacy of the Internet. The Web becomes a counter-hegemonic term:

     

    Generally we’ll use the term Web to refer to the alternate horizontal open structure of info-exchange, the non-hierarchic network, and reserve the term counter-Net to indicate clandestine illegal and rebellious use of the Web, including actual data-piracy and other forms of leeching off the Net itself.

     

    The cathedral embodies the hierarchic structure of information exchange in the Net, while the bazaar is an apt metaphor for the Web, a non-hierarchic network. The counter-Net describes the practices of warez d00dz and pirates. In this mapping of terminology, the cathedral and the bazaar transcend their place as metaphors for software development and become metaphors of political anarchism. No longer restricted to the assemblage of programmers, they now serve as metaphors for the assemblage and communication of all. The Net and the Web both contribute to the TAZ, but the TAZ is an informational potential, something that does not exist in the networks but may be a product of the networks. The TAZ is actually beyond the networks, because it “desires above all to avoid mediation, to experience its existence as immediate.” Similarly, the bazaar, as a metaphor of tactical poststructuralist anarchism, is the model of authenticity, the place where the databanks of postindustrial capitalism can no longer trace your purchases, where technologies of surveillance are not situated, where autonomy is the essence of human communication. The architects of information are operational agents in the disruption of cathedral-building authoritarianism and its hierarchic Net that ensnares us all:

     

    Whether through simple data-piracy, or else by a more complex development of actual rapport with chaos, the Web-hacker, the cybernetician of the TAZ, will find ways to take advantage of perturbations, crashes, and breakdowns in the Net (ways to make information out of “entropy”).

    Looking California, Feeling Minnesota

     

    The counter-hegemonic practice of Open Source software development has registered in the realm of praxis as governments around the world embrace Open Source and Free Software in an attempt to “break free of the United States’ lock on the global software market” (Festa).12 Government legislation, first in Brazil, then in other Latin American countries, Europe, and Asia, is attempting to resist the Microsoft monopoly and reduce state expenditures on information technology by forcing government agencies to use Open Source or Free Software “unless proprietary software is the only feasible option” (Festa). Sometimes the rhetoric of this legislation is openly ideological: the city of Florence, Italy passed a motion warning that the protracted use of proprietary software was contributing to “the computer science subjection of the Italian state to Microsoft” (Festa). In a notable decision, the city of Munich recently chose Linux over Microsoft Office for its 14,000 government computers beginning in 2004.13 These countries and cities recognize the potentially significant political, economic, and sociological ramifications of the large-scale adoption of software engineered by the cathedral-building strategies of Closed Source software developers such as Microsoft.14 In the United States in October 2002, Democrat members of the House of Representatives Adam Smith, Ron Kind, and Jim Davis sent a note to 74 Democrats in Congress suggesting that the Linux GNU General Public License (GPL) was a threat to national security. The note asked members to support a letter written by Representatives Tom Davis and Jim Turner asking the head of U.S. cybersecurity policy Richard Clarke to reject “licenses that would prevent or discourage commercial adoption of promising cybersecurity technologies developed through federal R&D” (McMillan). The letter by Smith, Kind and Jim Davis asks that the cybersecurity plan to reject the GPL. Critics suggested Smith’s endorsement might be related to the large political contributions he receives from Microsoft (which resides in his home state). Bradley Kuhn, executive director of the Free Software Foundation, charged, “the rhetoric [of Smith’s letter] is almost word for word what Microsoft has been saying for 19 months” (McMillan).

     

    Despite the encroachment of the discourses of computer science into everyday life, cultural theorists have neglected the very important work of a discourse analysis of the web of texts and practices that shape computer programmers and their code; in particular, the philosophy, history, and psychology of computer programming, represented in texts such as Brooks’s The Mythical Man-Month, Steven Levy’s Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution, and Gerald Weinberg’s The Psychology of Computer Programming for example, offer cultural theorists textual instances for discussing computer programming as a situated knowledge. The first step toward the understanding of the “network society”15 should involve a critical analysis of the code that forms the infrastructure for this society. Law professor Lawrence Lessig posits the following rallying cry in his popular 1999 book, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace:

     

    We live life in real space, subject to the effects of code. We live ordinary lives, subject to the effects of code. We live social and political lives, subject to the effects of code. Code regulates all these aspects of our lives, more pervasively over time than any other regulator in our life. Should we remain passive about this regulator? Should we let it affect us without doing anything in return? (233)

     

    For Lessig, “open code is a foundation to an open society,” and the architecture of the Internet could make cyberspace more or less regulable (108). “How [the code] changes depends on the code writers. How code writers change it could depend on us” (109). A cultural analysis of the discursive practices that constitute the “code writers,” those I have called “the architects of information,” could contribute to the kind of participatory politics Lessig encourages in this often ignored, but increasingly important, segment of society.

     

     Notes

     

    I would like to thank the anonymous PMC reviewer for suggesting improvements to this paper and especially Andrew McMurry for his insightful remarks on an earlier draft. For CS.

     

    1. On the “inescapably cultural base of technology,” Barbrook and Cameron, in their treatise on the Californian Ideology, make explicit what is often ignored in discussions of the history and philosophy of the Internet revolution, as embodied by texts such as Raymond’s “The Cathedral and the Bazaar”: “Their [the Californian Ideologues’] eclectic blend of conservative economics and hippie libertarianism reflects the history of the West Coast–and not the inevitable future of the rest of the world.” The historicization of the code via the analysis of computer programming history and practices should be a central concern for cultural theorists.

     

    2. Despite some early attempts to theorize the Internet as a space that embodied either surveillance and control or personal autonomy and freedom, the more considered position is that of law professor Lawrence Lessig: “[I argued instead that] the nature of the Net is set in part by its architectures, and [that] the possible architectures of cyberspace are many. The values that these architectures embed are different, and one type of difference is regulability–a difference in the ability to control behavior within a particular cyberspace. Some architectures make behavior more regulable; other architectures make behavior less regulable. These architectures are displacing architectures of liberty” (30).

     

    3. This expression, “the architects of information,” is intended to suggest more than just a resemblance to the information technology sector moniker of “information architect,” a title generously applied to web designers, software engineers, and similar vocations. I use the term “architect” to draw attention to the way software (the code, cyberspace) constructs real space. The term is also used as a metaphor for individual agency, as for instance by David Harvey: “The architect shapes spaces so as to give them social utility as well as human and aesthetic/symbolic meanings. The architect shapes and preserves long-term social memories and strives to give material form to the longings and desires of individuals and collectivities. The architect struggles to open spaces for new possibilities, for future forms of social life. For all of these reasons, as Karatari points out, the ‘will to architecture’ understood as ‘the will to create’ is ‘the foundation of Western thought’” (Harvey 200). Above all, and quite simply, the term “architect” makes explicit (more explicit than, say, “programmer”) the discourse of the codification of space, both real and virtual.

     

    4. As William J. Mitchell says in City of Bits: “In the end, buildings will become computer interfaces and computer interfaces will become buildings” (105).

     

    5. For a recent cultural analysis of the economics of Open Source, see Wershler-Henry. His first chapter contains a brief overview of Mauss, Bataille, Derrida, and the notion of gift economies.

     

    6. While Linux has made serious inroads in the server market, it occupies only 2% of desktops, where Microsoft still dominates.

     

    7. Linux’s success is more evident in the private sector. According to an Information Week survey from March 2002, “more than half of small companies use Linux as an operating system for desktop PCs, as do nearly half of large ones. Nearly 70% of small companies and more than 60% of large ones say they decided to use Linux as an alternative to Windows” (Ricadela).

     

    8. Barbrook and Cameron call Raymond’s brand of technolibertarianism “the Californian Ideology,” a “mix of cybernetics, free market economics, and counter-culture libertarianism that is promulgated by magazines such as Wired and Mondo 2000 as well as the books of Stewart Brand, Kevin Kelly and many others.” Instead of recognizing market forces and techno-cultural discourses as historically situated entities, the Californian Ideology is dogmatic about the inevitable triumph of capital and technology: “Implacable in its certainties, the Californian Ideology offers a fatalistic vision of the natural and inevitable triumph of the hi-tech free market–a vision which is blind to racism, poverty and environmental degradation and which has no time to debate alternatives.”

     

    9. Raymond’s essay is influenced by the techno-libertarian ideas of Michael Rothschild’s Bionomics: Economy as Ecosystem and Kevin Kelly’s Out of Control: The New Biology of Machines, Social Systems, and the Economic World, enormously successful right-wing neo-liberal economic texts. These texts and others trade on the libertarian notion of the markets as “natural” entities that evolved better without government intervention, an amusing contention to be embraced by technology companies on the West Coast since much of the infrastructure that made the dotcom revolution possible was sponsored by the federal government. The most popular distillation of techno-libertarian economics and the naturalistic fallacies they promoted was, ironically, Bill Gates’s Business @ The Speed of Thought: Using a Digital Nervous System. My essay does not have room for a discursive analysis of this genre; however, a continuing study of the historical and ideological roots of the Internet revolution would certainly find these texts of primary importance.

     

    10. This mapping of the transformation of Open Source software development into a political philosophy onto the concepts of poststructuralist tactical anarchism is not intended to be a wholesale exchange of ideas. The intent is, rather, to examine points of generative convergence between the philosophy of software development and certain proponents of poststructuralist thought. The techno-libertarianism from which CatB emerges contains contradictions within it that could never be reconciled with French poststructuralists such as Foucault and Deleuze. As Barbrook and Cameron note of this brand of techno-libertarianism: “the Californian Ideology has emerged from an unexpected collision of right-wing neo-liberalism, counter-culture radicalism and technological determinism–a hybrid ideology with all its ambiguities and contradictions intact.”

     

    11. Lessig argues for the liberatory potential of Open Source from a legalistic perspective, concluding: “Put too simply, everything I have said about the regulability of behavior in cyberspace–or more specifically, about government’s ability to affect regulability in cyberspace–crucially depends on whether the application space of cyberspace is dominated by open code. To the extent that it is, government’s power is decreased; to the extent that it remains dominated by closed code, government’s power is preserved. Open code, in other words, can be a check on state power” (100).

     

    12. It should be noted that perhaps the most important effect Open Source has had on the software industry is less economic than psychological, because for the first time in years a legitimate threat to Microsoft’s dominance seems practical (Wilcox, Gilbert, and Ricciuti).

     

    13. Decisions such as this one may also suggest Open Source is becoming a response to American cultural imperialism.

     

    14. Microsoft Senior Vice President Craig Mundie announced Microsoft’s new “Shared Source” policy in what has become know as the May Day Manifesto, a speech given to the New York University Stern School of Business on 3 May 2001. Mundie described Shared Source as the following: “Shared Source is a balanced approach that allows us to share source code with customers and partners while maintaining the intellectual property needed to support a strong software business. Shared Source represents a framework of business value, technical innovation and licensing terms. It covers a spectrum of accessibility that is manifest in the variety of source licensing programs offered by Microsoft.” Other than revealing that Microsoft may be afraid of Open Source’s potential, Shared Source changes very little about Microsoft’s essentially Closed Source practices.

     

    15. In Manuel Castells’s seminal study The Rise of the Network Society, the logic of “place” is superseded by the ahistorical space of “flows”: “the network of communication is the fundamental spatial configuration: places do not disappear, but their logic and their meaning become absorbed in the network” (443). Castells argues that the “coming of the space of flows is blurring the meaningful relationship between architecture and society” (449). Castells reconceptualizes postmodernism around this point: “In this perspective, postmodernism could be considered the architecture of the space of flows” (449). A discourse of the “architecture of information,” as I have identified it here, might be considered a continuation of this project.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Barbrook, Richard, and Andy Cameron. “Californian Ideology.” Online. Available: <http://services.csi.it/~chaos/barbrook.htm>. 16 Aug. 2001.
    • Bey, Hakim. “The Temporary Autonomous Zone: Ontological Anarchy, Poetic Terrorism.” Online. Available: <http://www.t0.or.at/hakimbey/taz/taz.htm>. 10 Apr. 2001.
    • Bhabba, Homi K. “On the Irremovable Strangeness of Being Different.” PMLA 113:1 (January 1998): 34-39.
    • Borsook, Paulina. Cyberselfish: A Critical Romp Through The Terribly Libertarian Culture of High Tech. New York: PublicAffairs, 2000.
    • Brooks, Frederick P. The Mythical Man-Month. New York: Addison-Wesley, 1995.
    • Castells, Manuel. The Rise of the Network Society. 2nd. ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 2000.
    • Deleuze, Gilles. “Postscript on the Societies of Control.” October 59 (1992): 3-7.
    • Fansellow, Frank S. “The Bazaar Economy: Or How Bizarre is the Bazaar Really?” Man 25: 250-65.
    • Festa, Paul. “Nations Uniting for Open Source.” 29 Aug. 2001. Online. Available: < http://www.zdnet.com/filters/printerfriendly/0,6061,2809001-2,00.html>. 29 Aug. 2001.
    • Haraway, Donna. Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium.FemaleMan©_Meets_OncoMouse™. New York: Routledge, 1997.
    • Harvey, David. Spaces of Hope. Berkeley: U of California P, 2000.
    • Johnson, Steven. “The Whole Web Is Watching.” Online. Available: <http://www.feedmag.com/essay/es1781ofi.html>. 31 Mar. 2001.
    • —. Interface Culture: How New Technology Transforms The Way We Create and Communicate. New York: Basic, 1997.
    • Kerstetter, Jim, Steve Hamm, Spencer E. Ante, and Jay Greene. “The Linux Uprising.” Business Week 3 Mar. 2003: 78-84.
    • Kroker, Arthur, and Michael A. Weinstein. “Global Algorithm 1.4: The Theory of the Virtual Class.” Online. Available: <http://www.ctheory.com/global/ga104.html>. 23 Mar. 2001.
    • Kuwabara, Ko. “Linux: A Bazaar at the Edge of Chaos.” Online. Available: < http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue5_3/kuwabara/index.html>. 29 Jun. 2000.
    • Lessig, Lawrence. Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace. New York: Basic, 1999.
    • Lyon, David. “An Electronic Panopticon? A Sociological Critique of Surveillance Theory.” The Sociological Review (1993): 653-78.
    • May, Todd. The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism. Pennsylvania: Penn State UP, 1994.
    • McMillan, Robert. “Letter: Free Software Hurts U.S.” Wired News 25 Oct. 2002. Online. Available: < http://www.wired.com/news/linux/0,1411,55989,00.html>. 26 Oct. 2002.
    • Mitchell, W.J. City of Bits: Space, Place, and the Infobahn. Cambridge, MA: MIT P, 1995.
    • Moore, J.T.S., dir. and prod. Revolution OS. Wonderview Productions, 2001.
    • Morse, J. Mitchell. “Veblen, Kafka, Vico, and the Great Wall of China.” Yale Review 88:3 (July 2000): 101-10.
    • Poster, Mark. Foucault, Marxism & History. Cambridge: Polity, 1984.
    • —. The Mode of Information: Poststructuralism and Social Context. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1990.
    • Raymond, Eric S. “The Cathedral and the Bazaar.” Online. Available: <http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue3_3/raymond/index.html>. 29 Jun. 2000.
    • Ricadela, Aaron. “The Challenge That Is Linux.” Information Week 6 May 2002. Online. Available: < http://www.informationweek.com/story/IWK20020502S0010>. 13 Mar. 2003.
    • Sassen, Saskia. “Electronic Space and Power.” Journal of Urban Technology 4:1 (April 1997): 1-17.
    • Wayner, Peter. Free For All: How Linux and the Free Software Movement Undercut the High-Tech Titans. New York: HarperCollins, 2000.
    • Wershler-Henry, Darren. Free as in Speech and Beer: Open Source, Peer-to-Peer and the Economics of the Online Revolution. Toronto: Prentice Hall, 2002.
    • Wilcox, Joe, Alorie Gilbert, and Mike Ricciuti. “Open Source Closes in on Microsoft.” 14 Oct. 2002. Online. Available: < http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1104-961903.html>. 15 Oct. 2002.
    • Woods, Lebbeus. “The Question of Space.” Technoscience and Cyberculture. Eds. Stanley Aronowitz, B. Martinsons, and M. Menser. New York: Routledge, 1996. 279-92.

     

  • Notices

     

     

     

    Volume 14, Number 1
    September, 2003
    Every issue of Postmodern Culturecarries notices of events, calls for papers, and other announcements, free of charge. Advertisements will also be published on an exchange basis. If you respond to one of the ads or announcements below, please mention that you saw the notice in PMC.

     


    Publication Announcements

    • Connected, or What It Means To Live in the Network Society
      Steven Shaviro, University of Minnesota Press, 2003
    • Eloquent Images: Word and Image in the Age of New Media
      Edited by Mary E. Hocks and Michelle R. Kendrick, MIT Press, 2003
    • Hypermedia Joyce Studies

    Conferences, Calls for Papers, Invitations to Submit

    • Postcolonial Studies: Special Issue on Postcolonialism and Digital Culture
    • Video Games: CFP for PCA/ACA 2004 National Meeting
    • Powering Up/Powering Down
    • The Postmodern Imagination and Beyond: Call for Submissions for E-Journal
  • Theatres of Memory: The Politics and Poetics of Improvised Social Dancing in Queer Clubs

    Theresa Smalec

    Performance Studies
    New York University
    tks201@nyu.edu

     

    Review of: Buckland, Fiona. Impossible Dance: Club Culture and Queer World-Making. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan UP, 2002.

     

    Scholars who take up Fiona Buckland’s Impossible Dance: Club Culture and Queer World-Making will step into the vastly underexplored arena that Buckland defines as “improvised social dancing in queer clubs” (2). Based on four years (1994-1998) of fieldwork and detailed interviews with New York’s queer club-goers, her book describes the forms of preparation, performance, and politicized exchange that transpire in these volatile sites. As Buckland observes from the start, “the subject of improvised social dancing has been relegated to the sidelines in scholarship, not least because of its perceived impossibility–that is, its resistance to discursive description” (2). Formal, scored modes of social dance such as the tango are difficult enough to translate into words. What, then, about the spontaneous, often ineffable actions and gestures that transpire in queer clubs? How does one forge a theory of value for the affective knowledge that emerges from this seemingly inchoate mode of performance? What promises, possibilities, and ways of relating to others does such movement signify to its diverse practitioners? How does ephemeral dance set enduring politics in motion?

     

    In her first chapter, “The Theatre of Queer World-Making,” Buckland outlines the parameters that will enable her to archive the social worlds and practices encountered in the course of her research. One of her primary tasks is to delineate the forms of collective interaction that she will discuss. Buckland uses the concept of a “lifeworld” to distinguish the diverse constellations of people who frequent queer dance clubs from more conventionally defined communities. She draws upon a definition and distinction made by Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner in their article, “Sex in Public,” in which they argue that a lifeworld differs from a community or group because it “necessarily includes more people than can be identified, more spaces than can be mapped beyond a few reference points, [and] modes of feeling that can be learned rather than experienced as a birthright” (558). This expansive sense of how, where, and why specific people come together in order to dance enables the author to address some key challenges that accompany writing about queer sociality. In short, the “lifeworld” paradigm allows her to focus on particular inhabitants of particular spaces while at the same time contesting facile claims about gay and lesbian “identity,” as well as utopian ideals of “community.”

     

    In an effort to provide readers with a more concrete sense of New York’s evolving queer lifeworlds, Buckland redefines both space and the status of the performers who occupy such spaces. “Lifeworlds” are “environments created by their participants that contain many voices, many practices, and not a few tensions” (4). These are not “bordered cultures with recognizable laws,” but “productions in the moment,” spaces that remain “fluid and moving by means of the dancing body” (4). Similarly, the subjects who produce such mobile environs are hardly static in how they understand and perform the points of interaction between their race, socioeconomic background, and same-sex attractions: “Identity is not fixed, but tied to movement and its contexts” (5).

     

    In reconfiguring space and identity as contingent on movement and contexts, Buckland refers to José Muñoz’s important essay “Ephemera as Evidence: Introductory Notes to Queer Acts.” He defines the ephemeral as “linked to alternate modes of […] narrativity like memory and performance: it is all those things that remain after a performance, a kind of evidence of what has transpired but certainly not the thing itself” (10). Attention to such residue is a key part of Buckland’s methodology, and it is central to understanding how her project diverges from text-based explorations of queer history. In contrast to historians who focus on play texts, reviews, and other forms of printed documentation, her evidence revolves around people’s memories of what happened to them while getting ready to go out, while dancing, while cruising, while having sex, while walking home in the wee hours of the morning. Her analyses draw upon anecdotes, impressions, and lingering experiences that participants recall by means of their bodies. Traditional scholars often disregard such modes of sense-making as “fleeting” or “unreliable;” after all, the stories told by an aging queer twenty years after a memorable night on the town are hardly the stuff of History. Yet Buckland delves carefully into the cultural archives embedded in her subjects’ narratives by means of an ethnographic approach. Throughout her study, she grapples skillfully with this often-criticized approach to gathering data, providing unorthodox revisions to routine practices. One example of this is her departure from asking informants a fixed set of questions in the hope of being told, “This is how we do things around here,” to inviting them to tell her a personal story. Buckland explains that in order to render the specific details of people’s embodied memories more tangible, she asked informants to “remember how they moved around New York City when they first wanted to find and create queer lifeworlds. Where did they go and how did they meet others like themselves. What happened at these places? How did they constitute queer cognitive maps of the city” (21)?

     

    In response to her questions, informants perform “theatres of memory” (18). Though narrated in language, such theatres also reside in the body, as evidenced by an Argentine ex-patriot’s shaking hand as he recalls defending himself against homophobic assailants with a broken bottle in the early 1970s, when walking to Chelsea’s gay clubs meant traversing a tough Latino neighborhood. In tracing memories of past movements, some informants draw makeshift maps of Manhattan on scraps of paper, marking spaces mostly shuttered or demolished now due to the AIDS crisis and the city’s draconian re-zoning of adult businesses. As informants retell their unique yet related stories of the streets they once traveled and the ways queers could meet, they “release the power of events and experiences years after they occurred” (28). To implicate space in this dialectic between the past and its retelling, Buckland compares informants’ theatres of memory with other gay maps of the city, particularly those marketed at the Gay Pride Parade to a largely white, male audience distinguished by its high level of disposable income. Her subjects–people of color, low-income students, teachers, door people, and HIV-positive persons on disability–“deliberately constitute queer life worlds that overlay, complement, and contradict official maps” (28). Their cognitive maps of defunct lifeworlds such as the West Side piers disrupt the Gay Pride Parade’s linear trajectory from ritzy, uptown Manhattan to fashionable Greenwich Village. Their fond appraisals of the glamorous sleaze that once infused the Squeezebox and Saint dance clubs unsettle the parade’s focus on trendy, sanitized sites. Moreover, as informants recall the circuitous detours they once took in order to meet with other gay and lesbian people, Buckland realizes that these stories indicate something important about where queer lifeworlds are forged. In short, queer world-making takes place “at the level of the quotidian: the walk through the city, rather than the riot in the square” (30). As such, attention to seemingly trivial details of the city space is crucial.

     

    The author spends the early part of her book describing walks around the East Village with informants who recall a vivid tapestry of extinct dance clubs, saunas, bathhouses, restaurants, and bars. Many gay businesses in New York are not gay-owned, a factor that puts them at risk of closure whenever the costs of running a club outweigh the revenue taken in, or when political pressure to “clean up the neighborhood” is applied. In short, straight proprietors of queer spaces have less of a commitment to keeping those clubs open; money talks, and when money can no longer be made without hassle, queer spaces tend to fold and come back as straight establishments. Virtually everyone with whom Buckland traverses Manhattan’s queer districts describes a favorite hangout that no longer exists physically, though it continues to thrive in memories and narratives. Her interlocutors show her the remnants of the places they used to go, recounting adventures they experienced inside, explaining why these sites of pleasure are now gone. Interestingly, Buckland posits that these oral performances of the past do not “reproduce a fact” (31), but rather recast lost places and people in the terms by which subjects want to understand them: as heroic absences, as melodramas, as social-political calamities, as provisional sites of queer pleasure always at risk of closure. Though certain accounts are not necessarily accurate, it is through the retelling of these stories that subjects construct meanings for themselves: “These memories were full with the presence of absences, which in itself made meaning, because they were deeply missed” (31). More than just deeply missed, many of the places that Buckland’s subjects mourn are ones they identify as a “vital part of queer education and socialization” (32). In these vanquished clubs, an older generation of queers once carried out embodied acts that were observed, practiced, imitated, and passed along to a younger generation. Both men and women learned about “acting gay” in such spaces: forms of collective knowledge were conveyed and sustained there by means of ritual practices.

     

    While the past haunts Impossible Dance in potent ways, performances preparing for the future are equally crucial to this study. In her second chapter, “The Currency of Fabulousness,” Buckland examines how informants get ready, arrive at clubs, journey to dance floors, and cruise potential partners. We turn from exploring the exterior vicinities in which queer dance clubs are located to entering those intimate spaces with the author as our guide. In the process, we learn about the “currencies of fabulousness and fierceness” valued in queer clubs (36). Unlike the spheres of family and work, where people are typically praised for their skills as team players, the sphere of queer club-going places a high value on individuality. As Buckland puts it, “the clubgoer expected to be noticed and judged on his or her first entrance. Being special or fabulous was a way to enjoy the attention of peers. Entrance was the opening line of nonverbal communication” (55). In short, there is a tremendous amount at stake in the deceptively simple act of entry. Those people who do so simultaneously “appropriate” the physical space that existed prior to their arrival; as Buckland points out, these individuals “realize the club as a queer space” (55). They do so “both by the presence of his or her queer body, and also by queer acts–kissing, touching, looking with desire, celebrating the presence of other queers, and expressing queerness openly and physically through self-carriage and without fear of surveillance or reprisals” (55).

     

    Buckland’s appraisals of how queer dancers appropriate space may seem overly optimistic. In our postmodern age of hidden cameras and undercover monitoring, is there truly such a thing as freedom from fear of surveillance or reprisals? At times, she appears too keen on interpreting the entrances of club participants as radical gestures: “Walking into a club was the opening gambit of speaking queer; a way of expressing, ‘I’m here, I’m queer, I’m fabulous’” (55). This image of club entry as the articulation of one’s subversive magnificence will no doubt ring false to participants who are shy or socially awkward, who view the act of entering a dance club as a tremendous challenge and risk. Nevertheless, Buckland does go on to explain the more nerve-wracking aspects of forging queer lifeworlds out of what is often a foreign, confusing atmosphere: “After entering a club, I found that many were disorienting spaces within which participants had to orient themselves in order to recognize and make a lifeworld” (56). She notes the various obstacles and reference points (staircases, coat-checks, foyers, bars, juice-stops, and chill-out areas) that participants must apprehend before they can stabilize their visual grip on where they are and what’s happening. She also draws attention to “temporal appropriations” of club space, or the ways that diverse groups of people claim the dance floor at distinct yet often overlapping periods of time: “At four a.m. in Arena, I stood watching the dance floor as smartly dressed college girls danced next to a group of gay leather men in body harnesses and chaps. They did not interact, but seeing them dancing in the same recreational space, even for a short time, was a striking juxtaposition” (57).

     

    Buckland is a superb observer, detecting nuances of dress, speech, and humor often ignored in academic texts. An example of how she draws readers into the little-known rituals of social dancing in queer clubs is her focus on what people bring. She observes that many club-goers view chewing gum as an essential accessory. Gum alleviates the tenseness that dancers who take club drugs experience in their jaws; it also freshens breath, offers energy in the form of sugar, and serves “as a medium of friendship” (42). Along with water and cigarettes, gum was “often offered and passed between friends” (42). When offered outside of a circle of friends, “it was a social icebreaker, which was also used in cruising” (42). In short, the author carefully identifies those small yet pivotal details that comprise the unspoken social etiquette of these lifeworlds.

     

    Yet where Impossible Dance truly departs from most dance ethnographies is in Buckland’s ability to treat sound, space, and movement as primary, not secondary, social texts. In “Embodying Difference: Issues in Dance and Cultural Studies” (1997), Jane C. Desmond urged cultural critics to work harder on developing the skills needed to “analyze visual, rhythmic, and gestural forms […] [W]e must become movement literate” (58). Buckland heeds Desmond’s call in complex ways. Her third chapter, “Slaves to the Rhythm,” examines the use of music, space, and composition in relation to ideas about the body. Arguing that “improvised social dancing involves the incorporation and embodiment of self-knowledge, self-presentation, sociality, and self-transformation” (65), the author studies how individual queer subjects create and express themselves on the dance floor. One aspect of her inquiry involves the specific types of music played at different clubs. Does it matter if dancers fashion their identities in the context of hip-hop, as opposed to salsa music? Does it matter whether the rhythms consist of a “bright, happy sound quality” (78), as opposed to the heavy, industrial mono-beats played at clubs like Twilo or Arena? Buckland argues that such factors do affect the relations between an individual and the group. What do individuals get out of dancing in queer clubs? What makes them feel vital and fulfilled? What makes them want to return? In studying moments where the musical beat functions “as a unifying thread rather than as a relentless master” (80), she provides insight into how dancers acquire a sense of personal worth and collective well-being from frequenting queer clubs: “The effect of these dramas was […] to create a community of movement in which the individual’s own movement was essential and valued. There was not only the ‘push’ inherent in the dance music […] there was also the ‘pull’ of participation […] part of the experience of living in a late twentieth-century city” (80).

     

    In exploring a wide range of clubs–some exclusively catering to lesbians or gays, some featuring mixed participation, some open to heterosexuals as well as queers, some composed mainly of blacks and Latinos, others mainly of whites–Buckland discerns some pivotal modes of distinction between social groups. Her fourth chapter, “The Order of Play: Choreographing Queer Politics,” turns from assessing the rhythmical inventions of individual dancers to studying how people move together on the floors of diverse clubs. Based on the physical and verbal articulations “of at least some participants,” she posits that improvised social dancing in queer clubs “did not exist outside of everyday life” (87). Rather, the forms of contact created during the ephemeral hours of the night are informed by the “real lives” people lead at other times of the day. One interesting topic discussed in this chapter is why certain queer subjects reject particular queer clubs: because a place is “not about them” (89). Buckland explains that several of her informants rejected New York’s popular Twilo club for reasons that reflect on the types of communities and modes of political engagement they sought: “Colin was not interested in going to Twilo with its majority of white clientele, Tito because the vast majority were a good thirty years younger than he was, Thomas because he felt he could not be open about his HIV status, and Catherine because it was male dominated” (90). It isn’t simply that any dance space will suffice in uniting members of New York’s queer “community.” Rather, those factors that inhibit relations in other arenas of life also play a major role in determining the types of connections that may happen in the seemingly liminal realm of improvised social dance.

     

    After discussing why her informants will not frequent certain clubs, Buckland turns to examine the forms of interaction that transpire in the clubs they do attend. For example, she compares the musical choices of DJs and movement styles of dancers as indicators of distinctions between social groups. In attending to the specific rhythms and movement repertoires that dancers adopt as grounds for their improvisation, Buckland discerns the racial, gendered, and generational knowledge that particular queer subjects hold in their bodies, how it is used in social settings, and the consequences of this employment. She also compares how intimate people are willing to get in certain spaces: “At clubs such as Escuelita and Krash on Astoria Boulevard in Queens, I noticed different attitudes to dance compared to the relationship of the individual to the mass in clubs such as Twilo and Arena” (98). More precisely, the smaller, predominantly Latino/a clubs in Queens featured “more partnering […] The participants I saw made more contact with each other, both eye contact and physical touching” (98). Dancers decide upon the types of relationships (personal and political) they want to have with other bodies–whether to be closely packed in a tight circle, almost inseparable from the mass movement, or to have more individualized space. In this chapter, dancers also explain the social-political significance of being able to congregate with other queers: “I guess what I want is to be with others like me,” says one young lesbian; “there’s something really powerful about being in a room full of other women” (107). The dancers whom Buckland interviews experience similarity, not only in terms of gender, sexuality, ethnicity, or race, but also “in terms of shared knowledge expressed through movement” (107).

     

    Apart from describing the physical and social dynamics of New York’s queer dance clubs, Buckland’s most important achievement is that Impossible Dance assures the survival of a culture’s ephemeral past. Her final chapter, “Mr. Mesa’s Ticket,” examines the complex reasons why HIV-positive men continue attending queer dances after their diagnoses, and even after they fall ill. More precisely, Buckland describes the physical and political interactions that took place at the The Sound Factory Bar, a Manhattan space where HIV-positive subjects could partake in a special event called the Body Positive T-Dance. These dances began in 1993, when a pair of young HIV-positive gay men decided to set up a tea-dance (called in this instance a “T-Dance”) for themselves and their friends. The author explains the terminology: “A tea-dance is an early Sunday evening dance party form established within the gay male community in New York City” (161). The abbreviation of “tea” to “T” references those precious infection-fighting cells that the retrovirus destroys; it also tacitly suggests that dancing might be a way to increase one’s T-cell count, or at least amplify one’s will to hang on. Sadly, the Body Positive T-Dance no longer existed by the time Buckland finished writing her book; this practice was terminated in 1998, after a series of shuffles from one dance space to another, and after it became difficult to attract enough people on a regular basis to make the dances economically feasible. Nevertheless, the author’s attention to the complex issues raised by these dances provides readers with a lasting memorial to their significance. A central question raised in this chapter pertains to “the relationship between salvage ethnography and the eagerness of participants to have their stories and experiences recorded for the future” (161). In other words, why is it so vital for gay men infected with HIV to tell someone about the ways they used to interact on the dance floor, about what they learned in those fleeting moments, and about the struggles and triumphs they are leaving behind as they prepare to die?

     

    Buckland honors the adamant request that many of her HIV-positive informants made in talking to her: “You must write this down” (179). In poignant and haunting ways, she journeys with these people through the kinetic landscapes and encounters housed in their memories, through the music that once made them feel alive, through the clothes and accessories that helped them understand their gayness. Her older informants explain why they want these stories written down: so that “people would realize that dancing in a club is a privileged pleasure for which people have died” (179). They want the psychic and political benefits of queer social dancing to thrive in the present and future, so that a younger generation might experience the empowerment and liberation that an older one fought desperately to attain. There is something magical in how these men describe social dancing as a way of slowing down time, as a way of making more of the time they have left. Buckland depicts their hopes and desires in ways that help readers grasp the temporal and psychological terrain that HIV-positive subjects inhabit as they dance. In going to the clubs where they are welcome, such dancers transcend the limits of the physical body, surpassing the obstacles that normative culture sets out for them. By means of dancing, they overcome self-consciousness about being too old, too thin, too unattractive, or too sick for the regular club scene. As Buckland argues, these forms of improvisation “may thus be seen as a conversation, not only with other participants, but also with the past” (179). In telling the youthful author about why they continue to dance in the face of death, subjects recall who they once were, and realize that political agency and hope for the future are not impossible after all. In its descriptive detail, analytical sophistication, and compassionate engagement with the subjects whom Buckland studies, this well-researched book inspires new generations of scholars to continue in her footsteps, creating groundbreaking possibilities in the field of dance ethnography.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Berlant, Lauren, and Michael Warner. “Sex in Public.” Critical Inquiry 24 (Winter 1998): 547-66.
    • Desmond, Jane. “Embodying Difference: Issues in Dance and Cultural Studies.” Everynight Life: Culture and Dance in Latino/a America. Celeste Fraser Delgado and Jose Esteban Muñoz, eds. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1997.
    • Muñoz, José Esteban. “Ephemera as Evidence: Introductory Notes to Queer Acts.” Women and Performance 8:2 (1996): 5-18.

     

  • The Speedy Citizen

    Valerie Karno

    English Department
    University of Rhode Island
    karno@uri.edu

     

    Review of: Scarry, Elaine. Who Defended the Country? Elaine Scarry in A New Democracy Forum On Citizenship, National Security, and 9/11. Eds. Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers. Boston: Beacon, 2003.

     

    The collection, “Who Defended the Country,” with title essay by Elaine Scarry and reply remarks by a host of well-known scholars like Richard Falk, Ellen Willis, Antonia Chayes, and others, invites us to re-examine our roles as citizens within a particularly postmodern frame. Scarry argues against the centralized war power now exercised by the U.S. government and encourages the populace to endorse a more egalitarian, distributed form of national defense. Together with her commentators, Scarry analyzes the events of 9/11 in an effort to articulate the duties of individual and collective national citizenship. While thinking about the agency or passivity inherent in American citizenship is nothing new, neither in contemporary nor historical discourse ranging from Tocqueville to Unger, this collection employs some vital, particularly postmodern concepts which not only help us to consider the ways we enact our citizenry, but also invite us to reshape our conceptions of democracy and empire. The collection assists us in asking what it means to be a citizen of a democracy, what constitutes contemporary boundaries between the ordinary and the extraordinary, and what “national ground,” “territory,” and “affiliation” entail in the increasingly blurred spaces of ideological and geographical placement. Ultimately, the text alerts us to the ways our discursive terms highlight the problematic contradictions of democratic forms.

     

    Scarry begins her essay with the observation that the United States had difficulty defending itself on 9/11. Noting that defending our country is “an obligation we all share” (3), Scarry seeks to explore how our national defense systems can be improved through citizen involvement. While Scarry’s impulse to provoke us, as citizens, into participatory governance is laudatory, she serves us even more importantly by inviting us to explore what “we as a country” means. By thinking about the link between individual or group identification and responsibility for the maintenance of the structures comprising the “country” we purportedly need to “defend,” Scarry and the text’s other authors unravel the notion of agency’s relationship to “country” while pondering several postmodern themes already in discursive play: speed, space, and motion.

     

    A main tenet of Scarry’s argument is that the speed with which nuclear war can be initiated without citizen consent stands in stark contrast to the extensive time the government had, and failed, to respond to the hijackers before they flew into the Pentagon. According to Scarry, this disparity demonstrates the government’s inadequate defense of the nation and its inappropriate usurping of control over the potentially more effective populace. Scarry’s concerns about the government’s ability to act hastily, without citizen consent, in the event of a nuclear attack echoes contemporary fears about the irreversible and dangerous levels of speed American culture is already witnessing in multiple arenas. From popular cinematic hits, including one actually titled “Speed,” to research being conducted on faster connections through fiber optics, culture is no doubt reacting to a world that, in temporality and architecture, arguably leaves the human behind and bereft. Scarry’s points about speed are troubling. She claims, for instance, that the Constitution has been bypassed by the country’s doctrine of Presidential First Use of nuclear weapons, because officials argue that the “pace of modern life” does not allow time for consulting Congress or citizens before a nuclear strike. Scarry movingly juxtaposes deadly force with the beneficial potential for communication between the government and the populace in her ironic statement that “with planes and weapons traveling faster than the speed of sound, what sense does it make to have a lot of sentences we have no time to hear?” (5). Noting that the need for speed has been invoked by the government in recent history to explain the centralization of war power as opposed to the distribution of consent across the citizenry (14), Scarry argues that time should not pose as an excuse for refusing to involve the American public in key policy decisions.

     

    Several of the respondents to Scarry embrace the discourse of speed while rebutting her arguments about its impact on democratic practices. In “A Success of Democracy,” Charles Knight argues that Scarry’s reliance on the pace of events as being a large part of the difficulty of defense is “overstated” (58). Claiming that strategic surprise was more to blame for the events of 9/11 than quick pacing, Knight goes so far as to refute Scarry’s version of the facts by offering a few alternative narratives and timetables to those she presented in her argument. While acknowledging the problems of speed in his essay “A Policy Failure,” Stephen Walt asks the reader what other lessons we should learn from the attack on the Pentagon. Unlike Scarry’s conclusion that the government has used speed as an excuse for centralizing what should be a distributed responsibility for defense decisions, Walt asks, “Was the Pentagon struck because we have placed too much emphasis on ‘speed,’ or because we did not emphasize it enough?” (53). Randall Forsberg’s article, “Citizens and Arms Control,” opposes Scarry’s conclusion as well by asserting that the speed of nuclear armed missiles “has not eliminated democratic control altogether” (78). Forsberg claims that Congress has not itself ever attempted to “require administration support” for policies of nuclear disarmament, despite having that opportunity each year (78). Thus, each author accounts for the contemporary phenomenon of technological speed in warfare, yet ultimately leaves the reader wondering about the extent to which speed does or does not affect our democratic forms.

     

    To a degree, then, Who Defended the Country? might be retitled, without reference to subjectivity, “What is a Democratic Form?”. Scarry is indeed calling for an egalitarian, distributed system of defense. She claims that the plane that hit the Pentagon, viewed alongside the plane that crashed in Pennsylvania, “reveals two different conceptions of national defense” (6): the Pentagon crash represents an authoritarian, centralized system of defense that ultimately failed as the Pentagon was struck, while the plane ostensibly brought down by citizen heroes rushing the cockpit represents an egalitarian, democratic form of defense because the constituents, with informed consent, voted and acted. Despite Scarry’s literal, and admirable, sense that a democratic form must not be “top-down” (7), but of, by, and for the people, the collection nevertheless asks us to look further into forms of democratic practice. In “The Realities of War,” for example, Ellen Willis claims that democracy throughout the world has historically (and currently) “always been more aspiration than achievement” (83). While noting that, even as an aspiration, democracy seems threatened in the contemporary political arena, Willis suggests that the process of democratic practice is itself part of its goal. This has certainly been true in American law, where we consistently see gaps between the intent and the fulfillment of justice.

     

    The search for democratic form through process is referenced throughout the collection through numerous and varied metaphors of traveling and motion. Assuming a unified national “we,” Scarry herself uses travel metaphors to urge the populace to act against governmental interference that threatens to prevent our reaching national goals which we, as consumers, have bought into. Worrying about centralized forms of authority blocking “the destination towards which we were traveling together” (33), Scarry cautions that “the destination for which we purchased tickets was a country where no one was arrested without their names being made public, a country that did not carry out wars without the authorization of Congress, a country that does not threaten to use weapons of mass destruction” (33). Contributors to the collection address these metaphors of propulsion and seizure. In “Too Utopian,” Richard Falk maintains that “there were grounds for projecting American exceptionalism as a goal, even if not as an attainment. Such claims depend on the future tense, a sense of trajectory toward a goal that seemed plausible in relation to race relations, the status of women, and sexuality” (40). Despite cautioning that this national trajectory has changed for the worse and condemning Scarry’s vision for being utopian and politically unattainable, Falk is nevertheless invested in imagining an attainable position, even if it cannot be immediately realized. In “Democracy Won’t Help,” Paul Kahn similarly invokes historical democracy to contemplate future imagination and concludes that traveling back to eighteenth-century models of democracy to find solutions for contemporary problems is unlikely to be helpful (47). The historical and traveling metaphors used throughout the text do point us towards examining the ways in which the metaphorical architectures of America have been constructed by temporal and ideological pillars that are increasingly difficult to locate in discrete spaces. The difficulty of this location no doubt helps explain the phenomenon of citizen ignorance and passivity that Scarry and her contributors urge us to overcome.

     

    The spatial analyses offered by the collection’s authors consider democratic practice within postmodern spatial paradigms. One critique directed against Scarry by Falk, for instance, claims that she fails to consider how to counter terrorist activity that “cannot be definitively situated in space” (42). Noting the problem of indefinite location and pointing out Scarry’s spatial omission seems most appropriate, given how Scarry herself anchors her argument in an intriguing discourse which links the geographic with the ideological. She calls planes “the ground,” for example, asserting that each plane was a “small piece of U.S. ground” (6). Knight comments that if the “internal ground” was the plane, then its protection failed (60). Scarry’s notion of ground is even more intriguing, given her similar version of territory. Scarry claims that Flight 93 was a “small piece of American territory” that was “restored to the country when civilian passengers who became ‘citizen-soldiers’ regained control of the ground–in the process losing their own lives” (20). But in a postmodern era marked by diaspora and hybrid identifications, one must wonder at the ability to locate ground and territory so fixedly in a traveling object. Quite clearly, the hijackers of 9/11 wished to do damage to Americans and others on the doomed planes, those individuals residing within U.S. borders, and American ideological tenets housed in the World Trade Center buildings, the Pentagon, and myriad other locations throughout the globe. The collection nonetheless invites us to think further about how our notions of abstract civic involvement are linked to our perceptions of territorial agency across the globe. How do we locate American territory, or ground, when we are heavily responsible for either democracy or capitalism (not to be fused) permeating borders and infiltrating spaces in visible and invisible ways?

     

    Elaine Scarry commends the “citizen-soldiers” who allegedly stormed the hijackers in their cockpit and prevented a larger attack on America for their collaborative work and exercise of informed consent (20, 25, 30). Certainly their self-sacrifice is worthy of considerable praise. Yet even beyond Scarry’s point that our nation needs a consenting public, this collection leads us to question what informed consent entails in contemporary America, and how we might reconcile the inconsistencies of fragmentary knowledge with an agenda for action. Forsberg suggests that the general public’s lack of knowledge about Defense Department spending threatens democratic institutions and the safety of ordinary citizens (79-80). Chayes, however, faults an over-abundance of limited, incoherent knowledge for citizens’ passivity, arguing that “it is an art to piece together a picture from the millions of scraps of data that are available” (64). The oscillation between excessive and insufficient knowledge points towards the oxymoronic inconsistencies inherent in democracy itself–like, as Willis observes, the project of a democratic defense which values surprise and secrecy in strategic war while striving to achieve an open, democratic society (81). The collected essays inspire us to inquire into what we might expect from an innately contradictory democratic practice, as we struggle to understand the norms of and exceptions to democratic forms.

     

    Who Defended the Country? inserts the reader into a dialogue about normativity and exceptionality. Whereas Scarry uses the two different plane crashes on 9/11 as a barometer for the problems with our overall national defense systems, some of Scarry’s contributors don’t agree that these events can be used metonymically. Stephen Walt argues, for instance, that Scarry does not adequately account for the historical record of U.S. decision-making and erroneously uses these plane crashes in overarching ways. Walt writes, “If one looks at the historical record […] rapid responses have been the exception rather than the rule” (52-53). Given the competing narratives the book offers us about the ways we might coherently understand U.S. policy decisions in light of a democratic state which is itself theoretically grounded in contradictions, this collection is most useful not for answering our questions about domestic policies, the role of international law and politics in our domestic policy decisions, or our stances on creating or defending the state of war. Rather, this book motivates us to think about how our architectural and geographic boundaries affect our identifications as national or individual agents. The text moves us to examine the ways our personal trajectories are intertwined with attending to or ignoring the borders of our ideological foundations. Who Defended the Country? splendidly brings us to an examination of the alliances between the three elements with which Scarry concludes: “those who wish to injure its [the country’s] population, its skyline, or its democratic structures” (100). The book leads its readers to consider the relationship between these three foundations of American life, as we must ponder the ways metaphoric and material architectures of our contemporary lives structure and inform the ways we see the ordinary and the exceptional. We must ask ourselves how we might prevent horrific human murders across the globe not only by reinforcing or reconstituting the terms of defense, but also by examining how everyday actions predictably and randomly lead to cruelty.

     

  • Responsible Stupidity

    Diane Davis

    Division of Rhetoric and Department of English
    University of Texas at Austin
    ddd@mail.utexas.edu 

     

    Review of: Ronell, Avital. Stupidity.Urbana: U of Illinois P, 2001.

     

    It takes a lot of courage to write a book about stupidity. And to call that book simply Stupidity, not even bothering to frame the term in a way that signals your own quite intelligent mastery of it–this really takes guts. But Avital Ronell’s remarkable oeuvre is nothing if not gutsy, and Stupidity makes a strong addition to her formidable corpus.

     

    It’s a timely addition, too, given that the events of the last few years have testified, yet again, to history’s “brutal regressions” (44), shattering the serene delusion that “progress” and “understanding” have been attained along the way. Those who before 9/11 still held out hope for Enlightenment values, who still, despite everything, insisted that equivalences might be drawn “between education and decency, humanism and justice” (24), may today be more ready to leave the so-called “unfinished project of modernity” unfinished. As if in anticipation of the violent tragedy that hit while Stupidity was in press, as well as of the terrifying “war on terrorism” that has since ensued, Ronell suggests that it is time to admit it’s not possible to “train thought to detach from stupidity” (23). Indeed, she proposes that the violence to which the world routinely succumbs “is of understanding: understanding itself is at issue” (24). History’s “brutal regressions,” according to Ronell, are to some degree the effect of an understanding that no longer doubts or questions itself. The “dominant form of stupidity,” she says, which is also the most dangerous form, shows up as an unflinching certitude that “doesn’t allow for questions about the world,” or language, or the relations between the two (43).

     

    Stupidity remains always open to such questions, acknowledging that being able to point to various manifestations of stupidity in no way indicates that one has a handle on it as such, as if it were simply knowable, as if it could be pinned (or penned) down and definitively understood. Stupidity is an issue precisely because it evades our grasp, and with her signature style and wit, Ronell affirms its elusive nature right up front: “I hesitate to say here what stupidity is because, eluding descriptive analysis, it switches and regroups, turns around and even fascinates […]. While stupidity is ‘what is there,’ it cannot be simply located or evenly scored” (3). Right away, stupidity is associated both with error, where philosophy scrambles to keep it, and with sheer thought, the near stupor and extreme surrender involved in the poetic act. It is linked both to “the most dangerous failures of human endeavor” and also (via Nietzsche) to the promotion of “life and growth” (3). Stupidity is the ur-curse: “nothing keeps you down like the mark of stupidity” (27). Yet, Baudelaire figures it as a kind of wrinkle cream that preserves youth and beauty (88-89). And Ronell, being Ronell, won’t ignore the fact that sometimes, “in some areas of life, it is [also] what lets you get by” (27), that “sometimes ducking into stupidity offers the most expedient strategy for survival” (43).

     

    Among other things, stupidity’s refusal to come clean, to submit to the movement of comprehension, Ronell observes, also throws into question “the knowledge we think we have about knowledge.” Because, she remarks, “as long as I don’t know what stupidity is, what I know about knowing remains uncertain, even forbidding” (4-5). Given that Ronell names certitude as a basis for horrific acts of violence and terror, this statement may offer an ethical access code to reading Stupidity, which takes the form of a post-critical critique or a nonrepresentational analysis–a Ronell trademark. Rather than closing in on stupidity, attempting to fix and represent its meaning, she traces and amplifies its proliferations in meaning, struggling to hold the work itself in meaning’s open-ing. Rigorously interrogating the conceptual “object” that goes by the name stupidity, she moves you in so close to it that it overflows its object-status, it dis-figures, leaving a radical and inassimilable singularity in its tracks. Ronell engages it in all its singularity, tailing it through its engagements with poets, novelists, philosophers, literary/critical theorists, and preschoolers, but the closer she brings you to it, each time, the less knowable it appears–and so the less representable. Therefore, this approach butts heads with scholarly tradition, which posits and propagates a causal link between rigor and certitude (the former leading to the latter). For reasons that can only be interpreted as ethical, Stupidity breaks this link, offering instead an exceptionally rigorous interruption of certitude.

     

    But let me interrupt myself here, my own futile attempt accurately to represent Ronell’s text, at least long enough to admit the extreme anxiety weighing on me as I write–for, among other things, Ronell points up the limits of Darstellung, which, when it trusts itself too much, “magnetizes stupidity” (71). Still, she reminds us that no one who presumes to write–not even if you’re a Flaubert or a Barthes or a Pynchon–is safe from stupidity’s approach: there is no prophylactic effective against the experience of abjection that writing inevitably sparks. And I can’t think of anyone who has traced out (in writing) the indissociable connections between writing and stupidity more elegantly, more thoroughly, or more humbly, than Ronell herself. There’s really nothing else to do, then, but to take a deep, expropriating breath, and to just get on with it.

     

    So: right up front I want to note Stupidity‘s radically unconventional layout and design–another Ronell trademark, this one thanks to her longtime collaboration with award-winning page designer Richard Eckersley. A powerful nocturnal theme and threat runs through this work, and it is visually depicted via altering typefaces, pitch black pages, and various illustrations of the sun, the moon, satellites, etc. Star constellations, for example, precede the surprisingly revealing autobiographical segments throughout the book, acknowledging that the author herself remains mostly in the dark, even when telling her “own” story: “no matter how strongly rooted in reference a text may be, it still carries the trait of incomprehensibility from which it emerged” (102-3). Ronell’s autobiographical performance in this text is both arresting in its honesty (“I avoided working in close proximity to de Man for fear that he would crush my already nonexistent balls” [120]) and touching in its humility (“I would have liked to tell you more about the experience of stupidity, for I have done a great deal of field work in this area, and have felt stupid most of my life” [93])–but it is far from naïve. Autobiography does not depend on reference, says de Man, but it is productive of a reference that never finally comes clean. We might say, then, that a non-totalizing autobiography, as allegorical performance par excellence, defies “the sham of reappropriation” and shares with “true mourning” the tendency to “accept incomprehension, to leave a place for it” (108). The nocturnal images opening onto Ronell’s non-totalizing autobiographical segments mark precisely this acceptance of nonknowledge, of the inability to totalize even self-understanding.

     

    The book opens with the dramatic image of a full solar eclipse, and most of the four chapters and three satellites are separated by images of the progressively emerging sun. The Introduction, “Slow Learner,” and Chapter 1, “The Question of Stupidity: Why We Remain in the Provinces,” thus proceed under the sign of completely obscured light, which forecasts what Ronell describes in this section as the “sheer stupefaction,” the collapse into opacity, to which “the poet’s courage” testifies. Chapter 2, “The Politics of Stupidity: Musil, Dasein, The Attack on Women, and My Fatigue,” is preceded by an image of the sun barely emerging from behind the moon, thus anticipating the presumption of light, however dim, necessary to sustain the apotropeic rituals designed to ward off an ever-encroaching stupidity. In the case of Robert Musil’s “On Stupidity” (“Über die Dummheit”), these rituals include unreflectively nailing the other (woman) as stupid and selecting a title that covertly serves as a conceptual prophylactic: “Über die Dummheit” already implies that Musil is on top of it, over or beyond it; his title, in other words, offers a semblance of mastery over this topic, which Ronell feels compelled philosophically and ethically to decline.

     

    Roughly half of the sun shines on Chapter 3, “The Rhetoric of Testing,” an explosive chapter on Paul de Man, Friedrich Schlegel, Georges Bataille, and the ways in which language’s improvised positings out us all as stupid. The unexpected administration of witty and impossible Test Questions closes this chapter, illustrating the fact that the light can play tricks on you, can lead you to believe you have safely detached from a stupidity that quietly grounds your experience of knowing. To fully grasp the ethical, political, and intellectual stakes of Chapter 3, one would first (among other things) need a firm grip on the material covered by these Test Questions, each of which would demand a near book-length response–and even then, really answering them would require the examinee to “play stupid,” to “instrumentalize the moment of the question” so as to “escape the anguish of indecision, complication, or hypothetical redoubling that would characterize intelligence” (43). Truly, who could cling to a cocky sense of certitude in the face of this Pop Quiz from hell?

     

    Test Questions

    1. If Paul de Man undermined the possibility of true autobiography, why does the author include autobiographical material about herself?
    2. What is the relationship between stupidity and unintelligibility?
    3. Does the author establish a link between singularity and unintelligibility? If so, how would this link affect Gasché’s argument?
    4. Can Schlegel’s kick in the ass be read allegorically?
    5. What is the author’s point of view concerning de Man’s disciples?
    6. What is the relationship between allegory and history?
    7. How can the author imply that de Man both refused to offer a reading of stupidity and was responsible for inscribing its implications and performance?
    8. What is at stake in the works of Schlegel, Bataille and de Man in terms of the figure of testing?
    9. Why does the author make claims for the democratic underpinnings of scholarly and philosophical journals? Are these principles upheld today? Give an example.
    10. A) Discuss the relationship of friendship and nonunderstanding, using the instance of Schlegel and Schleiermacher as your starting point;
      B) show how Friedrich Schlegel’s anti-hermeneutics of friendship illuminates what Blanchot and Derrida have to say about the politics of friendship. (162)

     

    The “Kierkegaard Satellite” also falls under this half-shining sun, which then emerges three-fourths of the way to introduce Chapter 4, “The Disappearance and Returns of the Idiot.” This three-part chapter offers a sustained and very moving reading of Dostoevsky’s The Idiot across a Levinasian-inspired ethics, which is situated at the very edge of consciousness, preceding and exceeding all intentionality. Here the ever-expanding light of the sun is aligned with the “solar systems of cognition,” which, no matter how bright, are (over-)exposed in this chapter as inadequate grounds for responsible responsiveness. The “Wordsworth Satellite” falls under this image of three-quarters of the sun, as well, tracing with rigor and tenderness the inarticulable adventures of Wordsworth’s beloved Idiot Boy. Though the “story” takes place, in this sense, in broad daylight, it remains a “story” that cannot be told: where Johnny’s gone, what he’s seen and experienced, is not available for articulation. The poem itself remains a “perplexingly sustained thought where utterance is reduced to repetitive hoots and stammers” (6). Yet, “part of the poem recognizes itself in Johnny’s nonsignifying language,” Ronell suggests, “and holds with him vigilance over the silent experience of poetry.” What “The Idiot Boy” does as a poem, Ronell observes, “is to relate to [Johnny’s] flight without relating; it cannot tell what has happened–it cannot become a story–but can only tell of an ungraspable event, a missing present, the enigma of its source” (275). The poem tries “to articulate singularity, the absolute singularity for which the idiot stands and stutters […]. What could the idiot have experienced or lived? it asks us.” The poem cannot say; it can’t go there. And yet, says Ronell, it “must go there, indeed, has already been there. […] poetry is the idiot boy” (276). What poetry lights up, in other words, is precisely the eclipse in cognition that is at its source–its light sets out to expose the utter deprivation of light.

     

    And finally, the Kant Satellite, “The Figure of the Ridiculous Philosopher; or, Why I am so Popular,” which closes the book, begins with a double-page spread featuring the full (smug) face of the sun, the moon fading out of sight. In this satellite, Ronell bounces Kant’s dry, laborious, and “manly” writing requirement off French theory’s rigorous and poetic style, which “carries thinking elegantly, with rhetorical finesse” (283), in order to suggest that the “entity” called French theory “is a way of avoiding having to decide between literature and philosophy” (282), a way of embracing the linguistic (that is: stupid) ground of (even philosophical) thought. Stupidity thus moves the reader steadily from darkness to light, from the nocturnal communications of Hölderlin and other courageous poets, who affirm and share the “secret experience of stupidity” (9), toward the “solar systems of cognition” (248) that found Kant’s obsession with “clarity,” his struggle to protect philosophy from literature, knowledge from style. What becomes apparent as one is moved through the text, however, is that the light of “clarity” cannot be opposed to the night of stupidity; the latter is the former’s very condition of (im)possibility. This is what Stupidity exposes and embraces from beginning to end, in content and in layout.

     

    All we really can claim to “know at this juncture,” Ronell tells us in the opening pages, “is that stupidity does not allow itself to be opposed to knowledge in any simple way, nor is it the other of thought” (5). “Stupidity is not so stupid as to oppose thought” (23), she observes, but instead consists “in the absence of a relation to knowing” (5). It is therefore discovered right at thinking’s origin: it names the wonder or stupefaction (thaumazein) that inspires thought. On the other hand, stupidity also names the limit of all knowing and comes very close, Ronell observes, to “Blanchot’s sense of nullity–the crushingly useless, that which comes to nothing.” Still, the “bright side of nullity” (29) is that all possibility originates in it: indeed, it is the “secret experience” of the poets, who “know from stupidity, the essential dulling or weakening that forms the precondition of utterance” (5).

     

    The poet, “holding back the values associated with the intelligence of doing, the bright grasp of what is there” (6), rides the work of language (figuration) all the way (back) through to its un-working (de-figuration), where it drops him/her into the abyssal impossibility or nullity that precedes and exceeds all possibility. “Poetic courage consists in embracing the terrible lassitude of mind’s enfeeblement,” Ronell writes, “the ability to endure the near facticity of feeblemindedness” (6). It involves an utter surrender to “the dispossession that entitles as it enfeebles the writer, disengaging and defaulting the knowing subject who enters into contact with the poetic word” (7). Reading Hölderlin’s “Dichtermut” and “Blödigkeit,” Ronell suggests with Benjamin that the poetic act involves a “self-emptying” in which the poet “yields entirely, giving in to sheer relatedness” (8). The poet’s courage appears to consist in letting go of all tropological security systems, in dropping even the figural shield of the “I”: it consists, Ronell says, in “taking the step toward […] pure exposure” (9), toward the “pure indifference” that is “the untouchable center of all relations” (8). From here, “the poet is not a figure,” she writes, “but the principle of figuration.” Thus, the poet/poem begins in “nonlife” (9), in an essential nullity that names a sort of transcendental stupidity: stupidity, then, is located at the very origin of “life,” of “world.”

     

    Ronell suggests that the poet testifies to a fundamental stupidity that operates structurally, at and as the very ground of our being and being-with, to an existential structure of exposedness that precedes and exceeds the bounds of the subject–which indicates that the relation to stupidity is pre-originary: “we” are with it even before “we” are with our Selves. Stupidity is what “throws us,” Ronell says, “marking an original humiliation […] that resolves into the everyday life trauma with which we live” (11). So whereas Robert Musil acknowledges that we are occasionally given over to stupidity, Ronell’s formulations indicate that we are never not given over to it–even our moments of path-breaking brilliance are grounded in it. Heidegger taught us that language is the house of Being, but what Ronell demonstrates in this work is that a transcendental stupidity is the house of language.

     

    And if there is “a moment when the thing of stupidity sparkles with life,” when “the prohibitions on stupidity are lifted” so that you can finally be stupid, Ronell suggests that it may be when you’re in love. Jean-Luc Nancy is an important interlocutor for Ronell throughout this text, and his essay “Shattered Love” may have been one inspiration for this thought. Love, according to him, is an exposition of exposedness in which “the singular being is traversed by the alterity of the other.” Blowing the notion of immanence right out of the water, love, he writes, “re-presents I to itself broken,” irremediably open to and broken into by an inappropriable exteriority. Testifying to a structure of exposure that marks the failure of immanence, love signifies a kind of finite transcendence in which an outside announces itself inside–indeed, love “is this outside itself,” Nancy writes, “the other, each time singular, a blade thrust in me, and that I do not rejoin, because it disjoins me” (97). Inasmuch as love kicks off an “upsurge of the other in me” (98), introducing (me to) an internal alterity, it also assures me that “my” heart, the very heart of “my” singular being, cannot be totally my own. The philosophical subject comes into being by appropriating its own becoming through the dialectical process; however, it is not completed by this process, he reminds us, because, for one thing, its very heart remains exposed and so radically inappropriable. Love is always “the beating of an exposed heart,” says Nancy, and it is this heart that “exposes the subject,” exposes it “to everything that is not its dialectic and its mastery as a subject” (89-90). In “Shattered Love,” Nancy redescribes love as what exposes me, time and again, to my radical exposedness.

     

    And Ronell takes off from there, situating love within a jaw-dropping string of non-synonymous substitutions, including finitude, irony, and a kind of transcendental stupidity, each of which, in and on its own terms, names the endless disruption of the appropriation of meaning and being. Ronell reminds us that irony, after Schlegel and de Man, is no mere trope but the permanent interruption of the meaning that tropes are charged with transporting; irony, then, she proposes, is “another way of saying finitude,” another way to mark “the experience of sheer exposition” (144). Inasmuch as both are non-stoppable interrupters, perpetual resisters to closure, to totality, to the work of appropriation, irony and finitude are semi-substitutable para-concepts that confound understanding; or, as Ronell also writes, both irony and nonunderstanding are ways of saying finitude (144). And love–so long as it is not conceived “on the basis of the politico-subjective model of communion in one,” (Nancy, Inoperative 38), inasmuch as it is instead based, as Ronell suggests, “on the unrepenting recognition of difference, separateness, and […] nonunderstanding”–takes its place within this disruptive (non)synonymy as precisely what “preempts the exchange of self-identical rings.” Tweaking Schlegel, Ronell suggests that love “is itself ironic,” or that “irony, truly, is love” (150), signaling the permanent interruption of (self-)appropriation and so the humbling predicament of finitude, which is also the predicament of nonunderstanding, of a transcendental stupidity.

     

    Indeed, Ronell tags love as stupidity’s secret agent, love being “one of the few sites where it is permitted publicly to be stupid,” where you are free to call one another by “stupid pet names” and to engage without apology in the various “imbecilic effusions of being-with” (89-90). When it comes to love, in fact, even the Law backs off, granting the lovers a pass: “Laws legislating social intelligence and sense-making operations are suspended for the duration of language-making scenes of love” (90). What this means, Ronell suggests, is either that “you have to get real down and prodigiously stupid to fall for love, or that stupidity is a repressed ground for human affectivity that only love has the power to license and unleash” (90). With a nod to Schlegel but against the grain of philosophical hermeneutics, Ronell situates a transcendental stupidity at and as the very ground of love and of friendship–in fact, of all experiences of community. After all, falling in love is not something that a self-enclosed, autarkic subject could experience. The subject’s very propensity to fall indicates its structural non-self-sufficiency, its irreparable exposure to an inappropriable alterity, which operates both as its condition of possibility (its abyssal ground) and as its inevitable impossibility, its inevitable (and perpetual) undoing. According to Ronell, then, love’s subject is always already the exposed subject, the subject (subject) of stupidity.

     

    Of course, philosophy cringes in the face of such formulations and has, for the most part, assimilated any thinking of stupidity “to error and derivative epistemological concerns” (20). Ronell suggests that this delimitation and reduction of the question of stupidity is a futile attempt by philosophy to protect “the domain of pure thought” from the stupidity that is both its guarantor and its original inhabitant. According to Deleuze–whom Ronell says in part inspired her project, posthumously putting her on assignment–what prevents philosophy from acknowledging stupidity as a “transcendental problem is the continued belief in the cogitatio” (20). If the motivation is no longer simply a belief in the thinking subject, then it may at least be the continued scramble to shield the subject from further contamination, to rescue it. A similar but more narcissistic scramble may be behind the link between stupidity and cruelty, the fact that the “really stupid” can inspire bloodlust (83). Given that you are an exposed being, ex-centric (an outside-inside), your desire to “make dead meat of the stupid” may indicate a panicked denial of the stupidity-in-you. That “the stupid make you want to kill them” (84), in other words, may be a symptom of stupephobia, a terrific struggle against the stirrings of attunement, against an extimacy that would out you, too, as stupid. Ronell exposes a “taste for straightforward cruelty” in Musil’s musings on stupidity, if not in his “lady”-smashing anecdotes (Ch. 2)–though her meticulous reading of his work is considerably more nuanced and psychoanalytically complex than I’m suggesting here. Still, throughout Stupidity, Ronell catalogues various atrocities committed against the feminized and minoritized other in the name of erecting stupidity-shields–in the name, that is, of maintaining the phantasmatic border/boundary between the cogitating self and the stupid other.

     

    However, as Ronell repeatedly demonstrates, these evasive and protective maneuvers are always already too late. “Stupidity, which cannot be examined apart from the subject accredited by the Enlightenment,” Ronell writes, “poses a challenge to my sovereignty and autonomy” (19); it therefore poses a challenge to any notion of ethics based on this sovereign and autonomous subject. And Stupidity offers nothing less than a post-humanist rethinking of ethics, a sustained interrogation of the potential for responsible responsiveness in an age that, despite everything, is still given to “brutal regressions.” It’s important to remember that when Ronell embraces the irony of understanding, the impossibility of understanding fully, she simultaneously affirms the never-ending struggle to understand. “There is a hermeneutic imperative,” she says, echoing Schlegel (161). “This imperative is bequeathed to us as gift and burden, it names a task” (161). But inasmuch as understanding endlessly eludes us, it must be affirmed as an infinite responsibility, an imperative to attend to the demand of a relentless uncertainty, a measureless inability to have understood. “Assuming understanding were to be resurrected without an imperative lording over its provenance,” Ronell observes alongside Werner Hamacher, “this could happen only by turning away from what is incomprehensible” (161).

     

    There is no ethical or logical past tense to understanding, in other words; it is a process (which does not necessarily imply progress) that is never finished. One abdicates the responsibility to alterity implied in this imperative at the instant one presumes to have accomplished it. The moment one presumes to have understood, one has already turned away from the incomprehensible, from what sparks the struggle to understand in the first place. And to turn away from the incomprehensible–that is, from the other–is to turn back toward the Same. Certitude is purchased by shooting a U in the face of a fundamental aporia: faced with the unassimilable other, understanding swerves back around, toward itself, toward what it already knows or what it is already programmed to assimilate. When Ronell, on the other hand, affirms the perpetual struggle to understand, the inability finally to know, she is embracing an ethical disposition dedicated to the other and to the responsibility for the other.

     

    Contra the exhausting argument that postfoundational thought ditches responsibility, Ronell demonstrates that responsibility grows unfathomably e-n-o-r-m-o-u-s when it exceeds the tiny bounds of the subject’s intentions. In a sense, what she’s suggesting is that to act with presumed certitude is to be irresponsible because to be certain is already to have turned away from the other for whom one is responsible. Both understanding and responsibility are infinite, endless, and this leads Ronell to suggest that the only possible ethical position would have to be: “I am stupid before the other” (60). Putting a kind of Levinasian ethic into play, Ronell makes noncomprehension the (non)ground of ethical attunement, of responsible responsiveness. It is in order to “explore the extreme limit of such responsibility” and to determine “what can be assumed by the limited subject,” that Ronell, in Stupidity, appeals to “the debilitated subject–the stupid, idiotic, puerile, slow-burn destruction of ethical being that, to [her] mind, can never be grounded in certitude or education or lucidity or prescriptive obeisance” (19).

     

    The debilitated subject of choice in this case is Dostoevsky’s epileptic Idiot, Prince Myshkin. There is no way to gloss this rich chapter, but I do want to note that it foregrounds the stupefying conditions of embodiment, continuing a devotion evident in much of Ronell’s work to a kind of corporeal hermeneutics. Elsewhere she has mapped out, for example, the mysteries of the addicted body, the wild circuitry of the technologized body, and the corporeal predicament thematized by the punk hairdo; she has offered meticulous symptomatological readings of the Wolfman’s constipation, Freud’s cancer of the jaw, and George Bush’s inability to age (to grow, to mourn). And in Stupidity, Ronell turns her attention, via Prince Myshkin, to the finite body abandoned to the “mute chronicity of illness.” Zooming in on the “sheer facticity of bodily existence” (179), she exposes the ways o the body operates as a “massive disruption of inherited meaning”: “The body is in the world and pins down the vague locality of world,” she writes, “but when brought into view, it threatens the solidity of the world. As with television, when things get very local, there is something uncanny and incomprehensible about materiality: it gets delocalized” (180). There is no way to know the body, not even your body: “there is no epistemological stronghold, no scientific comfort or medical absolute by which to grasp your body once and for all, as if it were ever merely itself, once and for all.” The body, Ronell observes, “never stays put long enough to form self-identity.” All we can really hope to learn about body is “maybe how to feed it, when to fast, how to soothe, moisturize, let go, heal.” Still, incomprehensible as it is, body has enormous “claims upon us” (180); there is no losing it. It is both your absolute limit and what makes “you” possible at all. You are stuck with it. And Ronell sticks with it, taking us into “the meeting grounds where psyche runs into soma” (26).

     

    Prince Myshkin’s body, she says, “points to the generality of the human predicament: idiocy has something to do with the nearly existential fact of being stuck with a body” (180-81). It hardly announces itself in times of health, when body is “on your side,” but illness, when it hits, “exhorts the body to reveal something of itself,” to produce “resistant signs of itself,” signs that remain “unremittingly opaque” (181, 186). Body does not hide, it presents itself, but it presents itself obscurely, offering us a sense of it that does not lead to knowledge–body is “elsewhere when it comes to cognitive scanners,” Ronell writes (187). Still, “somewhat surprisingly,” Ronell suggests with Nancy that “the site of nonknowledge that the body traverses, and of which it is a part,” is related to thought, to acts of thinking. Indeed, inasmuch as Heidegger’s distinction between knowing and thinking holds, it’s possible to say, as Nancy and Ronell do, that the body thinks and that thought itself is a body, a body, then, that “throws itself against the prevailing winds of philosophical tradition” (187). There is no writing the body–body is uninscribable; it’s that which “exscribes everything,” including itself. And yet, as it turns out, the thinking body writes: “the sweat, the nausea, sudden highs, certain crashes, headache, stomach weirdness” and other somaticizations are the writings of an “inappropriable text” that body leaves “in its tracks.” And this text, Ronell insists, “cannot simply be ignored” (26). The writing/thinking body demands a perpetual reading, even if it discloses nothing but “the exposition itself,” nothing but its own exposedness (188-89)–which, of course, is not nothing. It may be everything: a constant reminder of your non-self-sufficiency, of your irredeemable stupidity, and so of your inappropriable finitude.

     

    In his cover blurb for Stupidity, Christopher Fynsk writes:

     

    Avital Ronell has dared to approach a topic that effectively undoes any "knowing" or analytic posture, even any questioning stance. Advancing in full awareness of her vulnerability (and demonstrating constantly how this vulnerability exceeds awareness), she confronts the philosophical, psychosomatic, and ethico-political effects of her non-object through brilliant readings of a host of writers for whom stupidity (or idiocy) has become a haunting obsession or a kind of ambiguous promise.

     

    What I want to note here is that while Ronell’s latest work demonstrates stupidity’s all-pervasiveness, it simultaneously acquires and requires the descriptor “brilliant.” Not because Ronell, finally, is the subject who knows, but because this work evokes with such intensity the impossibility and nonknowledge–the stupidity–that grounds all knowing, including her own. It is brilliant inasmuch as it exposes the impossibility of detaching brilliance from a kind of transcendental stupidity. Granting the reader the chance (or the permission) to affirm his/her own “grounding” in stupidity without freaking and without violently projecting, Ronell offers the sujet ne supposé pas savoir (the subject not supposed to know and who doesn’t suppose it knows) as a figure of ethical attunement. Stupidity‘s most important contribution to thinking and to ethics may be that it embraces, and therefore makes it possible to embrace, a post-humanist ethics and activism that begins with the impossible utterance: “I am stupid before the other.”

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Hamacher, Werner. Premises: Essays on Philosophy and Literature from Kant to Celan. Trans. Peter Fenves. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1999.
    • Nancy, Jean-Luc. The Inoperative Community. Trans. Peter Connor. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1991.
    • —. “Shattered Love.” Trans. Lisa Garbus and Simona Sawhney. Nancy 82-109.

     

  • Materiality is the Message

    Del Doughty

    Department of English
    Huntington College
    ddoughty@huntington.edu

     

    Review of: N. Katherine Hayles, Writing Machines.Mediawork Pamphlet. Cambridge: MIT P, 2002.

     

    The first thing I noticed about N. Katherine Hayles’s Writing Machines was its design: its slimness (138 pages) and its texture. The pages are printed on the heavy, glossy paper typical of fashion magazines or catalogues, and the book’s cover is slightly corrugated, so that in running one’s fingers vertically down the front it feels smooth, but in moving horizontally one gets the sensation of tiny ridges. Inside, its slick black-and-white pages–with their variety of font styles, cut-and-pasted text samples, and handsome illustrations–contribute to the book’s visual appeal.

     

    That Writing Machines is a lovely book to hold, and to behold, is no accident, for it is a book about books: specifically, it is a book that inquires about the material aspect of books in a digital age. Peter Lunenfeld, editorial director of the MIT Mediaworks Pamphlet series, characterizes the volume as a “theoretical fetish object” with “visual and tactile” as well as intellectual appeal, and media designer Anne Burdick, who collaborated with Hayles on the project from the early stages of its development, has accomplished nothing less than a reinvention of the codex as a textual interface.

     

    Burdick also designed the text’s website–a virtual space where the interrogation of the concept “book” continues (< http://mitpress.mit.edu/e-books/mediawork>). Indices, notes, bibliographies–these we usually consider to be important parts of the academic monograph, but in Writing Machines these elements have been displaced to the website, along with navigable entries for errata, source material, and a very useful “lexicon linkmap,” which offers succinct definitions of key terms. The site has the appearance of an open book with sticky notes marking its various sections, and it thus embodies the theme of remediation, which is a recurring motif in the texts that Hayles discusses.

     

    Hayles is Professor of English and Design | Media Arts at UCLA, but she holds a graduate degree in chemistry from Caltech and has for two decades written persuasively on the intersections between chaos, computer science, informatics, and literature, which is to say, the emerging field of posthumanism. Indeed, her previous book, How We Became Posthuman (U of Chicago P, 1999), defines that very field. Here she once again proves herself an unapologetic champion of embodiment at a time when many people are enamored of the idea that the essence of life is an abstract code, or that the human body is a prosthesis that can be configured seamlessly into/with machines. As Hayles writes,

     

    a critical practice that ignores materiality, or that reduces it to a narrow range of engagements, cuts itself off from the exuberant possibilities of all the unpredictable things that happen when we as embodied creatures interact with the rich physicality of the world. Literature was never only words, never merely immaterial verbal constructions. Literary texts, like us, have bodies, an actuality necessitating that their materialities and meanings are deeply interwoven into each other. (107)

     

    Readers of How We Became Posthuman will recognize Writing Machines as a logical extension of issues addressed in the earlier book.

     

    The question that prompts Writing Machines is in fact a simple one: why don’t we hear more about materiality? Hayles complains that only in a few of the less glamorous, more specialized academic fields, such as bibliography or textual studies, does materiality merit much attention. Even cultural studies might do better. For Hayles the digital revolution is not so much about the triumph of computers over books, but a chance to rouse literary studies from the “somnolence” induced by “500 years of the dominance of print.” She therefore raises the call for more media-specific analyses. Two key terms involved in such a project would be “material metaphor” and “technotext.” The former term signifies the “traffic between words and physical artifacts,” while the latter denotes the literary work that “interrogates the inscription technology that produces it.” Computers, which process symbols according to programs that embody sets of instructions, are obviously material metaphors, but so are books, Hayles reminds us, and their interfaces can be every bit as sophisticated as literary machines with phosphor screens.

     

    So what does a media-specific analysis look like? Part of the value of Writing Machines derives from Hayles’s close readings of three recent technotexts: Talan Memmot’s web artwork Lexia to Perplexia (2000); Tom Phillips’s artists’ book A Humument (1987); and Mark Danielewski’s “postprint” novel House of Leaves (2000). The first of these pieces almost defies description, and Hayles’s patience in unfolding such a challenging work deserves praise. Lexia to Perplexia is a hybrid theoretical text that, for all of the difficulty it presents readers/users, actually “performs subjectivity” and thus turns out to be, in Hayles’s estimation, an important piece of evidence for the argument that humans co-evolve with their inscription technologies. Hayles contends that Lexia works by configuring its users as simulations through at least four strategies:

     

    • the user actions (choosing links, pointing-and-clicking, mousing over) required to navigate the site;
    • a sophisticated set of evolving images and hieroglyphics (eyes, funnels, curly brackets) that “invite the user to see herself as a permeable membrane through which information flows”;
    • a creolized, neologized language of English, computer code such as HTML and Java, and mathematical formulae; and
    • an allusive retelling of the familiar Echo and Narcissus myth in that very same–and very unfamiliar–creole.

     

    In defamiliarizing the conventions of reading and symbol-processing this way, Memmott’s text exposes the low-level assumptions that undergird our own human reading programs. Reading is seen here as an artificial behavior, not a natural one.

     

    One of the chief difficulties of reading Lexia stems from the fact that the writing on the screen is often illegible. Rather than supplant one screen or piece of text with another, as is the custom in hypertext writing, Memmott piles one swatch of text on top of another, so that the resulting occlusions make it laborious, if not impossible, to read. Hayles sees this very illegibility as another of Memmott’s ways of telling us that humans are becoming posthumans:

     

    the text announces its difference from the human body through this illegibility, reminding us that the computer is also a writer, and moreover a writer whose operations we cannot wholly grasp in all their semiotic complexity. Illegibility is not simply a lack of meaning, then, but a signifier of distributed cognitive processes that construct reading as an active production of a cybernetic circuit and not merely an internal activity of the human mind. (51)

     

    Tom Phillips’s A Humument is every bit as palimpsestic as Lexia and every bit as amazing. Phillips is an artist who, so the story goes, wanted to make the visual equivalent of a Burroughs-style cut-up. He browsed the London bookstores one afternoon and selected at random the first novel he could find that cost less than three pence: William Mallock’s A Human Document (1892), a conventional Victorian-era love story of two young people, Robert Grenville and Irma Schilizzi, whose sad account is pieced into a tactful and seamless whole from journals, diary entries, and letters by an unnamed editor. In cutting up or “treating” the novel, Phillips reverses the flow of the fictional editor’s narrative work by turning the whole back into fragments. Phillips accomplishes this feat by visually decorating every page of the novel in a different style. Sentences and even whole paragraphs are blocked out, cross-hatched, scribbled over, painted, or otherwise rendered into the elements of some new design. (Phillips’s inventiveness seems limitless–A Humument is a stunning book of portraits, landscapes, tableaus, and abstract designs.) The story, which is now told mostly in illustrations and a few scraps of surviving text on each page, concerns Irma and–in a twist–a character named “Toge,” whose name derives only from the words “together” or “altogether” in Mallock’s original text. Like his predecessor Grenville–and like virtually all Romantic lovers–Toge yearns for Irma, but unlike other heroes from nineteenth-century British fiction, Toge lacks even a hint of an autonomous, independent self. In Phillips’s world, Toge’s subjectivity is clearly a product of Mallock’s text as it is sliced and spliced by the designer’s set of inks and brushes–or, as Hayles puts it, “the processes that inscribe Toge’s form as a durable mark embody a multiplication of agency that, at the very least complicates, if it does not altogether subvert, his verbal construction as a solitary yearning individual” (89). She then notes how, on page 165, Phillips renders an “amoeba-like” portrait of Toge’s face with Mallock’s words bleeding through the shadowed portions of the image. Hayles is ever attentive to reading images this way, and, knowing that Phillips’s work is not a best-seller, she and Burdick give ample space to the pages of Phillips’s work in Writing Machines so that their readers can see first-hand the illustrations Hayles discusses.

     

    Hayles notes that in A Humument “the page is never allowed to disappear by serving only as the portal to an imagined world as it does with realistic fiction. In many ways and on many levels, A Humument insists on its materiality” (96). In her final piece of analysis, Hayles demonstrates how the same is true of Mark Danielewski’s House of Leaves. While the novel may have gained a cult following among horror fans, it is also very much about writing and mediation, and Hayles effectively shows how these subjects dominate the story (which concerns, briefly, the assembly of a book about a book about an unpublished analysis of a documentary film about a house that, by the laws of physics, cannot possibly exist). None of the major characters, for example, can be known apart from the material practices through which they are presented. To wit: Will Navidson, the owner of the house, appears only in his photographs and his documentary film; Zampano, the old man who researches the film, becomes known to us only as the subject of a book by Johnny Truant, tattoo artist; Pelafina, Johnny’s institutionalized mother, writes letters to her son that form, along with the text of Johnny’s edition of Zampano’s writings, the novel as we receive it. Even the very typography of the novel reveals to readers that House is a book that explores the material properties of the codex: flipping through the pages, one sees that the orientation of the print runs riot in all directions (forwards, up and down, around the page, in reverse), that footnotes occasionally take over the main text and, in the case of note 144, challenge the opacity of the page itself.

     

    At one point in her discussion, Hayles offers a provocative comparison to Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness. In that touchstone of modernism, Conrad layers his narrative voices through Marlow, but he does not account for “how these multiple orations are transcribed into writing.” Not so in House, says Hayles, where “consciousness is never seen apart from mediating inscription devices” (116). If Heart of Darkness provides us with the paradigmatic unreliable narrator, House of Leaves provides us, at the turn of the posthuman era, with the paradigm of the “remediated narrator”: “the speaker whose consciousness cannot be separated from the media used to represent him/her” (Lexicon Linkmap).

     

    Writing Machines marks more than just the passing of an old narrative strategy: it also marks the beginning of an indifference to old critical methodologies. Often in Writing Machines Hayles cites personal encounters with the writers she’s discussing–she cites emails she exchanged with Memmott and describes a conversation she had with Danielewski one afternoon at a Santa Monica bar. It is hard to imagine Cleanth Brooks or Robert Penn Warren taking the same approach to their readings of, say, Faulkner. Hayles is too committed to embodiment to suffer the foolishness of the affective fallacy. She shares a material infrastructure with these people, and while Hayles and Memmott and Danielewski would all likely acknowledge that their respective subjectivities are nodes embedded in a vast social, textual network, Hayles, at least, would not accept the idea of an enforced separation between the informational entity that is “N. Katherine Hayles” and the physical agent to which it is attached.

     

    And it is this refusal that accounts for a fair amount of the book’s richness. The odd-numbered chapters of Writing Machines recount the intellectual biography of an author-surrogate named Kaye and provide a sort of counterpoint to the even-numbered chapters, which discuss the three works already mentioned. Here we see Kaye as the product of a typical Midwestern small-town home, a bright young curious girl who reads voraciously and then goes off to study at the Rochester Institute of Technology and Caltech, where she is torn between science and literature. She gets graduate degrees in chemistry and literature, but it is not until she is a few years into her first job at an Ivy League job that she finds the object that allows her to bring both interests together: the desktop PC. Her English colleagues are slow to warm to this new tool, but Kaye, intuiting its possibilities and its promise, thrills at the little-known texts written in what she understands as a new medium: Michael Joyce’s afternoon, a story; Shelley Jackson’s Patchwork Girl; M.D. Coverly’s Califia; Dianne Slattery’s Glide; and Espen Aarseth’s prescient study Cybertext: Toward a Theory of Ergodic Literature–all of which are canonical texts in what she calls the “first generation” of hypertext.

     

    Chapter 5 relates, with particular vividness, the story of a serendipitous discovery for Kaye: the tradition of artists’ books. Throughout Writing Machines it is apparent that Hayles has a richer idea of what a book is than most people, and this is why: Hayles describes a research trip to New York City’s MOMA and offers her candid descriptions of Kaye’s pleasure at finding such treasures as Michael Snow’s Cover to Cover, Karen Chance’s Parallax, and Roberta Allen’s Pointless Arrows–books well off the beaten commercial path and that most literature professors are, sadly, unlikely ever to know. Indeed, Hayles does not go out of her way to hide the fact that she likes the books she reads–in cataloging her favorite things about Danielewski’s book, for instance, and trying to decide among them, she finally gushes: “for my part I like all of it, especially its encyclopedic impulse to make a world and encapsulate everything within its expanding perimeter, as if it were an exploding universe whose boundaries keep receding from the center with increasing velocity” (125).

     

    Chapter 7, the final autobiographical chapter, reflects on the meaning of theory in the sciences and the humanities and returns us to Hayles’s present-day concern–that is, the establishment of a field of media-specific analysis. Hayles hopes that this discourse will produce more texts like her Writing Machines, more “double-braided texts” where “the generalities of theory and the particularities of personal experience can both speak.” And in the spirit of her work, I would affirm that her hopes would soon come to pass.

     

  • Gullivers, Lilliputians, and the Root of Two Cultures

    Claudia Brodsky Lacour

    Department of Comparative Literature
    Princeton University
    cblacour@princeton.edu

     

    Review of: Arkady Plotnitsky, The Knowable and the Unknowable: Modern Science, Nonclassical Thought, and the “Two Cultures.”Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 2002.

     

    In The Knowable and the Unknowable, Arkady Plotnitsky takes on (at least) two unenviable double tasks. He endeavors to explain to nonexperts the rationally necessitated departure from traditional visual representation that, in part, characterizes “modern” or “nonclassical” physics and mathematics while–equally if not more arduous to achieve–distinguishing and defending groundbreaking philosophical reflection from the scattershot of slighter minds. In addition, rather than succumb to the ready pleasures of polemic in carrying out these aims, he carefully provides, in his own writing, an example of intellectual scrupulousness so striking as to inspire the improbable hope that The Knowable and the Unknowable might set a discursive benchmark to which less circumspect commentators may one day rise. Finally, Plotnitsky does all this while managing to avoid the fate to which his theoretical expertise and abilities could easily condemn him, that of being hamstrung by his own level of understanding, tied down, or compelled to talk down, like a Gulliver captive among the uncomprehending.

     

    Such discrepancy of stature is both the inspiration for and subject matter of Plotnitsky’s project. While describing and addressing cognitive issues of historic and (literally) immeasurable scope, The Knowable and the Unknowable also represents and responds to a tempest in a teapot, a battle in print of truly Swiftian disproportion: the recent controversy regarding the supposed use and abuse of science by contemporary theorists and philosophers. The so-called “Science Wars” in which Plotnitsky intervenes were inaugurated by Paul R. Gross and Norman Levitt’s Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels with Science, but were brought to popular attention under the spotlight of scandal with the publication of Alan Sokal’s “Transgressing the Boundaries–Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity” in Social Text. The uproar it caused stemmed not from the content of the “transgression” that Sokal’s article nominally proposed but from the fact that its proposal for publication received approbation at all. Following squarely in the tradition of discursive interaction that J. L. Austin named “speech acts,” whose uncircumscribable, working principle the author of the action entitled “Transgressing the Boundaries…” would perforce disavow, Sokal’s article was less about what it said than what it did. And what it did was speak double talk to great effect, perpetrating a hoax which the editors of Social Text “failed” to recognize as such (the general failure of quiddity in the face of effectivity, or at least their nonidentity, being what speech-act theory is all about). Sokal “successfully” presented what, in his view, would constitute a poststructuralist view of quantum physics, travestying both contemporary theory and quantum physics to achieve that pragmatic end. One year later, buoyed by his imposture, he joined forces with Jean Bricmont to publish Impostures intellectuelles, subsequently translated into English as Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science. In the interim, Nobel-prize-winning physicist Steven Weinberg reflected on “Sokal’s Hoax” in The New York Review of Books, followed by “Steven Weinberg Replies” and “Sokal’s Hoax: An Exchange,” and Plotnitsky and Richard Crew engaged in their own “exchange” on the “Wars” in the pages of this journal.

     

    For the active wagers of the “Science Wars,” however, the de facto inauguration of hostilities took place long before their own maneuvers, with a tentative answer by Jacques Derrida to a question posed to him at a conference at Johns Hopkins University in 1969. The proceedings of that watershed event, compiled into the now-classic volume The Structuralist Controversy by editors Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato, include contributions from and exchanges among many of the leading theorists of two generations working in Europe and America (then and now). As the title of the volume indicates, these historic discussions occurred previous to the coining of the catch-all chronological denomination “poststructuralism.” Heterogeneous, neither “structuralist” nor identifiably anything else, they in large part exposed for the first time, at least in the U.S., the prospect of modes of thinking as yet undesignated and unknown, work so different as to correspond to no available proper designation.

     

    Theoretical work that deliberately detaches itself from any governing concept may, by force of its own unsubordinated status, occasion its comparison with other concepts and conceptual work. In focusing on the uncertain epistemological status of discourse committed to pursuing adequate representations of truth without proffering new abstractions or representations of truth in their place, such theoretical writing seems both to pose and to beg the question of its own internal understanding. Like the cognitive problems and impasses in the writing it analyzes, theoretical discursive analyses may have the effect of suggesting that, by other means, their purposeful conceptual lacunae may be filled, that the persistent variable, or unknown, they indicate, may be defined by way of analogy or equation. Such suggestibility, if encountered in good faith, leads to questions of the most basic and probing nature: if one cannot name or say what x is, say, that x equals y, then can one say, at least for the time being, that x is something like y?

     

    Such a searching question was improvised at the Johns Hopkins University Conference by an important interpreter of Hegel, the late Jean Hyppolite, in response to the paper “Structure, Sign, and Play,” presented by Derrida. Hyppolite briefly asked that Derrida consider any similarities between his own destructuring work in the domain of philosophical systems and concepts and Einstein’s theory of relativity. Derrida’s equally brief response suggests that a similarity between the two indeed exists. Now, in the five-decade history of Derrida’s discursive work–exacting, often transformative excurses on philosophical and literary writings revealing both the indissoluble relationship of the stated and implicit purposes and problems of these writings to “writing” as such (that is, as nonconceptual, iterable, and recognizable material form) and the systematic vocabularies, figures, and conceptual frameworks or limits in which these problems and purposes are posed–this tentative answer to Hippolyte stands alone. Derrida has made no more extensive comparison between his own analyses of the cognitive and representational difficulties posed in and by writing aiming at knowledge (whether of the abstract, conceptual, or philosophical, or of the “real,” concrete, or referential kind), and the radical transformation by modern science and post-Euclidian mathematics of how we know and thereby what we know of the physical “world.” The lone existence, in an extraordinarily prolific career, of a single, halting statement of fewer than sixty words produced spontaneously in answer to the suggestion of another only underscores the obvious about the adversarial posture into whose aegis it has been inverted: that the “Science Wars,” whatever that appellation means and whatever is meant to be won by them, have not exactly been joined with any appreciable degree of reciprocity; in short, that these are “wars” waged by one side alone.

     

    A “war” waged by one side, one may argue, is an attack–in this instance an attack that, lacking even a substantive pretext, fabricates its own dummy text, a hoax–and Plotnitsky is unusually capable of defending those individual developments in philosophy, now dubbed “poststructuralist” by default, which are less antagonistic to than allied with those developments in physics and mathematics he helpfully calls “nonclassical” (xiii et passim). Trained as a mathematician first and a literary theorist second, Plotnitsky’s perceptions and intellectual development reverse the direction of untoward, misleading appropriation ascribed to discursive theorists by the wagers of the “Science Wars”–most prominently, to Derrida and Lacan, and synecdochically, or, perhaps, simply cynically, to all contemporary theoretical work. While scientist-warriors may view nontraditional philosophers and theorists as poachers upon the “hard” disciplines seeking to inflate and buttress their own insubstantial prestige, Plotnitsky instead finds in nontraditional philosophy a wrestling, from within the bounds of discourse, with the formal and empirical boundaries that gave rise to non-Euclidian mathematical theory and quantum mechanics. For Plotnitsky, the problems of the limits of cognition, whether discursively or mathematically conceived, are problems of rational or commensurate representation any and all disciplines fundamentally interested in the bases and emergence of knowledge must share.

     

    The overlap between empirical and theoretical knowledge is rarely, if ever, complete, and mathematical inquiry, since the invention of geometry, has often served as a self-sustaining bridge between them. The symbolic language of mathematics is a language of self-evidence, which is to say, a language unlike language, and its adoption in the study of physical data and relations frees science of some of the limits and errors that accompany experiment and perception. Still, scientists in even the most mathematically rich domains do engage in productive discord among themselves; the names Einstein and Bohr stand for one such signal development in twentieth-century atomic physics, as do the diverging yet, of course, interrelated paths taken by their early modern counterparts, Descartes and Leibniz. Indeed, if one wanted to locate a real passing referent for the unfortunate denomination “Science Wars,” perhaps one would do well to look first to its prima facie significance, the disputes within science itself. For what we understand and designate as “science” at any one time is the product of an ongoing history of differing interpretations, intellectual orientations, and directions, the often mutually contradictory or only partly shared views of physical reality whose full or partial, independent or contingent approbation may be immediate or delayed, refuted or maintained.

     

    The interpretive antagonisms and contradictions composing the progress of science were taken to another power–squared, or contradicted as contradictions themselves–when Bohr proposed that, at the atomic level, experimental results that appeared mutually exclusive should be considered “complementary.” In The Knowable and the Unknowable, as in his earlier Complementarity: Anti-Epistemology after Bohr and Derrida, Plotnitsky follows Bohr to the heart of the “logical contradiction” (66) that is the consequence and insight of quantum physics, namely, that our only empirical means for knowing “quantum objects” (67) destructure that knowledge even as they structure it, linking the known (for example, the “particle” or “wave” appearances of light) directly to the unknowable (how and why such dual appearances indeed take place and pertain to a single phenomenon). The conjunction of quantum objects and their science yields a kind of knowledge that is neither the antithesis of ignorance nor its cancellation and replacement, but its necessary while never observably continuous complement. Plotnitsky’s elucidating summary and discussion of the “double-slit experiment”–by which particles such as electrons or photons passing through screens with slits in them produce or do not produce a wave-like pattern depending on whether a detector of their movements, external to the movements themselves, is used in the experiment (61-66)–makes this paradox of empirical, experimental, or contingently objective knowledge clear:

     

    if [...] there are counters or other devices that would allow us to check through which slit particles pass (indeed even merely setting up the apparatus in a way that such a knowledge would in principle be possible would suffice), the interference pattern inevitably disappears. In other words, an appearance of this pattern irreducibly entails the lack of knowledge as to through which slit particles pass. Thus, ironically (such ironies are characteristic of or even define quantum mechanics), the irreducible lack of knowledge, the impossibility of knowing, is in fact associated with the appearance of a pattern and, hence, with a higher rather than a lower degree of order, as would be the case in, say, classical statistical physics. (64)

     

    Particles which seem to know more about our behavior (whether we’ve set up a detector or not) than we do about theirs (how do they “know that both slits are open, or conversely that counters are installed, and modify their behavior accordingly?” [66]) present, at very least, a “situation […] equivalent to uncertainty relations” (64), if not a necessary suspension of logical and causal assertions of any classical kind. Yet Bohr’s Copernican shift consisted in viewing differently not the fact of these antagonistic results, but rather the way in which we view their (mutually exclusive) factuality. It is not what we see but how we think of what we are seeing, the way in which we define and understand a quantum object–as a thing with certain attributes in itself or a “whole” constituted of experimentally conditioned, individual, phenomenal “effects”–that Bohr’s view changes. Quantum mechanics–on Bohr’s “interpretation” (68-69)–requires, in the first place, a different mode of interpretation, and Bohr’s name for that different view of what quantum evidence means is “complementary.” As Bohr describes it in the “Discussion with Einstein”:

     

    evidence obtained under different experimental conditions cannot be comprehended within a single picture, but must be regarded as complementary in the sense that only the totality of the [observable] phenomena [produces the data that] exhausts the possible information about the [quantum] objects [themselves]. (70)

     

    While originating in a predicament produced by physical experiments (set up as means of clarification), Bohr’s loosening of the logician’s double bind is conceptual in kind. As Plotnitsky observes, the introduction of the term “complementary” with regard to quantum mechanics enacts an epistemological shift from “objectivity” to “effectivity,” based upon, rather than stymied by, mutually exclusive, experimental results:

     

    thus, on the one hand, quantum objects are (or, again, are idealized as) irreducibly inaccessible to us, are beyond any reach (including again as objects); and in this sense there is irreducible rupture, discontinuity, arguably the only quantum-physical discontinuity in Bohr's epistemology. On the other hand, they are irreducibly indissociable, inseparable, indivisible from their interaction with measuring instruments and the effects this interaction produces. This situation may seem in turn paradoxical. It is not, however, once one accepts Bohr's nonclassical epistemology, according to which the ultimate nature of the efficacity of quantum effects, including their "peculiar individuality," is both reciprocal (that is, indissociable from its effects) and is outside any knowledge or conception, continuity and discontinuity among them [...] Thus Bohr's concept of the indivisibility or (the term is used interchangeably) the wholeness of phenomena allows him both to avoid the contradiction between indivisibility and discontinuity (along with other paradoxes of quantum physics) and to reestablish atomicity at the level of phenomena. (70-71)

     

    Like discourse, one could say, the effectivity of atomic objects is dependent but unlimited, contingent upon the interrelated experiments of which it is a result rather than derivative of the object in itself. Like rhetoric as such, rather than the specific rhetorical notion of the symbol or symbolon, according to which image and idea match, puzzle-like, to compose a single, concretely expressive meaning, Bohr’s interpretation and use of the term “complementary” do not signify an integral meshing of categorically distinct entities. The “aspects” or “characteristics” of atomic “phenomena” are what we “know”–in Bohr’s nontraditional phenomenological sense–but those aspects are derivative of the different experiments to and by which atomic objects are exposed (in rhetorical terms, these would be the different formulations or linguistic experiments that make evident different aspects of discourse, such as figure, noun, sign, or, following Saussure–surely, the Bohr of language study–signifier). A notion of the complementary that is not, or is only temporarily, contingently, closed, is, Plotnitsky points out, “peculiar” (74). Yet such peculiar language use may indeed be exactly appropriate to Bohr’s epistemology. For, like the nonsynthetic relations it describes, the name of Bohr’s interpretive breakthrough breaks the mold–the mold of the commensurate and thus traditionally “complementary” parts of a whole symbolized in rhetoric by the notion of the symbol, the equation and union of two as one. Bohr’s notion of “complementarity” instead fractures a delimited object of investigation, normally identified through a series of equations, into experimental “phenomena” whose perceptibility consists in a series of differing effects. Furthermore, this fracturing occurs without limits or deducible patterns–any pattern ceases in the presence of a “counter” designed to discern its objectivity. Nor does Bohr’s notion of complementarity suggest a shift in objective representation from the organic or living portrait, no part of which may be inconsequentially removed, to a more schematic outline or constellation, whose absent parts or interstices can be supplied by the mind. Bohr’s self-consciously rhetorical, or “novel,” formulation of complementarity instead spells out a thoroughly anti-representational logic by which “different experimental arrangements,” rather than cohering in any visualizable manner, bring about visibly mutually exclusive results:

     

    within the scope of classical physics, all characteristic properties of a given object can in principle be ascertained by a single experimental arrangement, although in practice various arrangements are often convenient for the study of different aspects of the phenomena. In fact, data obtained in such a way simply supplement each other and can be combined into a consistent picture of the behavior of the object under investigation. In quantum physics, however, evidence about atomic objects obtained by different experimental arrangements exhibits a novel kind of complementary relationship. Indeed, it must be recognized that such evidence, which appears contradictory when combination into a single picture is attempted, exhausts all conceivable knowledge about the object. Far from restricting our efforts to put questions to nature in the form of experiments, the notion of complementarity simply characterizes the answers we can receive by such inquiry, whenever the interaction between the measuring instruments and the objects forms an integral part of the phenomena. (qtd in Plotnitsky 74)

     

    Like a war which is not one, in that, one-sided, it opposes without measure, a “complementarity” which is not one, in that it represents (or in Bohr’s words, “characterizes”) the unrepresentable, that which cannot both be and be measured (or known) in “a single picture,” recalls, Plotnitsky argues, the irreducible incommensurability that arose along with the first mathematical means for knowing the world, geometry. Perhaps the unilateral assault conducted in the “Science Wars” on a grossly incommensurate object should simply be called, in squarely traditional fashion, “irrational,” the negative name given to the algebraic discovery of the immeasurable in geometry. Contradicting contradiction, we may view the true root of the evil signaled by a “war” waged against its own fictional pretext not as the neat opposition of one against one but rather as the original and unsettling complementary relationship that is the base of one with or plus one, an essential and irreducibly intricate twoness like that of mathematics itself under the aspects of algebra and geometry.

     

    For the irrational arose not in opposition to but from within the basic framework of rationality. Exposed to a certain “experimental arrangement,” it was discovered, the simplest act of calculation results in an imponderable relation. The most fundamental equation defining physical reality (a_ + b_ = c_), when solved for its simplest values (a=1, b=1) yields, as one of its characteristics, an immeasurable quantity (c= 2). The root or base number of one with or plus one should represent, in a single picture, an indivisible unity of two. Derivative of that unity as such, more fundamental than the external operation of addition, the common root of two does indeed present “a single picture:” a finite line–the diagonal–delimited by a regular geometric figure. An extension defined by other extensions that together describe a self-containing figure is an entity independent of traditionally symbolic, let alone “novel” complementary relations. Its reality is self-evident, but with an insurmountable hitch: the measure, or mathematical identity, of that reality cannot be figured. Moreover, the necessity of such unattainable knowledge is as pragmatic as it is epistemological. Plotnitsky states its centrality plainly–“one needs it if one wants to know the length of the diagonal of a square”–before explaining how such a novel, or immeasurable, “mathematical object,” the irrational ratio, came about:

     

    this is how the Greeks discovered it, or rather its geometrical equivalent. If the length of the side is 1, the length of the diagonal is 2. I would not be able to say--nobody would--what its exact numerical value is. It does not have an exact numerical value in the way rational numbers do: that is, it cannot be exactly represented (only approximated) by a finite, or an infinite periodical, decimal fraction and, accordingly, by a regular fraction--by a ratio of two whole numbers. It is what is called an "irrational number," and it was the first, or one of the first, of such numbers--or (they would not see it as a number) mathematical objects--discovered by the Greeks, specifically by the Pythagoreans. The discovery is sometimes attributed to Plato's friend and pupil Theaetetus, although earlier figures are also mentioned. It was an extraordinary and, at the time, shocking discovery--both a great glory and a great problem, almost a scandal, of Greek mathematics. The diagonal and the side of a square were mathematically proven to be mathematically incommensurable, their "ratio" irrational. The very term "irrational"--both alogon (outside logos) and arreton (incomprehensible) were used--was at the time of its discovery also used in its direct sense. (117-18)

     

    In a very real sense, independent of pretexts visited upon Social Text, it is the “scandal” of the irrational, mathematically and rationally derived, that the so-called Science Wars rehearse, worry, and travesty. Unlike a hoax-based polemic, mathematics publishes and is host to its own “transgression,” one “complementary” aspect of its operation excluding another. The discovery that the relationship between the diagonal and side of a square, while governed by the basic Pythagorean theorem regarding the magnitudes of lines composing a triangle, was not translatable into rational mathematical symbols, could not be represented as a ratio of whole numbers, and thus as a rational relationship or (rational) number tout court, was succeeded by the tale of the illustrative death of its progenitor. Legend has it that a storm and resulting shipwreck buried that revolutionary Pythagorean at sea (118-19). Truth may have it that the sound and fury of the “Science Wars,” to which The Knowable and the Unknowable tactfully, constructively responds, are an attempt to drown this illustrative figure once more. The storm in which the mythic discoverer of the irrational purportedly met his end may be what this recent tempest in a teapot is attempting, more or less unwittingly, to bring to life again.

     

    Yet, as Plotnitsky makes clear, since the link between the irrational and the rational, the core focus of his book, is borne out specifically by rational processes themselves, the desire to hurl overboard those who articulate the problem of the irrational is tantamount to curtailing rational inquiry itself. In a chapter treating Lacan’s “analogous, but not identical” (147) references to the rationally derived imaginary number, the square root of -1, to describe the “irreducibly nonvisualizable” “symbolic object” of his psychoanalytic epistemology–“the ‘erectile organ’” or symbolic phallus already operating, according to Lacan, as image or “signifier” in the psyche (141) (Plotnitsky helpfully calls this psychic object “the image of the image of the penis” [110])–Plotnitsky describes how the nonidentities of conceptual analogies function within an epistemological “system”:

     

    the erectile organ, or, again, a certain formalization of it, must be seen as [...] 'the square root of -1,' (L)-1 of the Lacanian system itself. It is an analogon of the mathematical concept of the mathematical -1 within this system, rather than anything identical, directly linked, or even metaphorized via the mathematical square root of -1. In a word, the erectile organ is the square root of -1, which I here designate as the (L)-1, of Lacan's system; the mathematical -1 is not the erectile organ. (147)

     

    (Plotnitsky explicitly uses the symbol for the mathematical concept -1, and the words “the square root of -1” or the amended “(L)-1″ to designate the analogous use of that mathematical concept within Lacan’s system [113]). In other words, just as -1 is the “simplest complex number,” which, “formally adjoined to the old domain of real numbers, enables one to introduce the new domain of complex numbers” (the field of numbers of which real and imaginary numbers are both factors), so the “erectile organ” is the simplest complex concept enabling a new domain or field of psychoanalysis, one in which real and imaginary objects are both irreducible factors (122). Whether or not one views this domain as thoroughly “novel” or as already latent in Freud’s epistemology, Lacan’s exposition of the complex notion of the phallus (as both imaginary and real) does indeed signal a redefinition of the operative field of psychoanalysis. In addition, Plotnitsky emphasizes, “analogous” means just that: “‘the square root of -1’ of Lacan’s statement is, I shall argue here, in fact not the mathematical -1 […]. There is no mathematics in the disciplinary sense in Lacan’s analysis” (147).

     

    It is in this context of restating the fundamental rational concept and operation of analogy itself, the proverbial wheel of reason here not reinvented but patiently redescribed, that Plotnitsky makes the central observation of his book, speaking not only to the inevitable recourse made to analogy in the course of analyzing essentially nonobjective, psychic phenomena, but to the necessary processes of symbolization and analogy involved in every new discovery of the irrational. Just as “the nonclassical epistemological component may be irreducible in all mathematics” (130), so

     

    irrationality--the inaccessibility to rational representation (in whatever sense)--can itself be discovered rationally, for example and in particular, by means of mathematical proof, a paradigmatic rational argument. This emergence of the irrational (the inaccessible, the unknowable, the unrepresentable, the incomprehensible, the inconceivable, and so forth) at the limit of the rational (the accessible, the knowable, the representable, the comprehensible, the conceivable, and so forth), defines the project of philosophy throughout its history, from Anaximander to Heidegger and beyond, or in mathematics from the Pythagoreans and the diagonal to Gödel and undecidability. In the wake of Heidegger, or indeed Nietzsche, who understood this epistemology more profoundly than anyone before him (and at least as profoundly as anyone since him), the extraordinary critical potential of this situation has been powerfully utilized by such nonclassical thinkers as Bataille, Blanchot, Levinas, Lacan, Derrida, and de Man, or of course Heisenberg and Bohr in the case of quantum mechanics. Indeed, the nonclassical epistemology of quantum mechanics, as considered here, gave especially remarkable shape to these relationships. (119-20)

     

    Plotnitsky’s none-too-delphic message is that the irrational indicated by numerical and notational as well as discursive epistemologies, by mathematicians and physicists as well as philosophers, is not going to sink with any single message-bearer to the ocean floor. And again, it is complex mathematics, rather than unilateral polemics, which may best “illustrate” his point. As Bohr rewrites the traditional notion of “complementarity” to indicate and encompass the notion of the noncomplementary, the mutually exclusive realities of a single physical phenomenon viewed under different aspects, so in mathematics the extraordinary notion of complex numbers encompasses both real and imaginary in a single mathematical “field.” “Complex” here even appears analogous to “complementary” when the problem of the visualization or spatial representation of such numbers is posed. For, like the mutually exclusive visual evidence provided by differing experimental set-ups in quantum mechanics, the field of complex numbers in mathematics is “symbolically” configurable on a two-dimensional real plane, one of whose axes, however, is being used to represent imaginary numbers. Yet this “schematic illustration,” “diagram,” or “representation” (on a real plane redefined as the Argand plane), even as it produces a kind of visualization of its objects, and even though its relationship to the field of alegebraic formulation is exhaustive, in no way corresponds to the measurable lengths of real lines or vectors, or the rationally derived points on a line, that real and rational numbers represent. The gap between algebra and geometry, or notation and spatial representation, is thus encompassed within the field of complex (real and imaginary) numbers, but not bridged. The algebra involved must be plotted on two visually analogous but mathematically different (“nonisomorphic”) structures: that of the “real plane” (or “vector-space”) and the strictly speaking non-spatial “field of complex numbers, which would no longer allow us to see [the real plane] […] as a real plane” (125-26).

     

    Complex numbers thus produce a “field” irreducible to a “space.” The attempt to so reduce the field would result, one might say, in a hoax, the representation of imaginary numbers as real. By analogy one may say that if the real aim of the wagers of the “Science Wars” is to clear the space of rational science of its false representation, that aim will continue to prove itself, in the philosophical sense, “imaginary”–first, because it lacks a real object (let alone enemy), and, second, because in the absence of such, it proves itself to belong foremost to the complementary relations of discourse, that other field in whose complex, nonvisualizable formulations the real and the imaginary, as in mathematics, interact.

     

    Riddled with their own characteristic patterns of misappropriation and misstatement, imaginary acts of salvation may finally not be evidence of ignorance, intellectual disingenuousness, or even analytic bad faith (cf.160-62 especially). The “failure” to “win” a war of one’s own invention may instead be analogous to the very force that war would mime: the roiling sea in which (again, as discourse, or legend, would have it) the rational voice of the irrational sinks. That is to say, the war waged upon philosophy may be a certain view of science at war with another view, a rejection of Bohr’s conception of complementarity, or the construction of the Gauss-Argand plane, or any articulation of complexity in which one of many “different aspects” is not and cannot be made present. For, in mathematics as in discourse, the irrational and the imaginary are based in the rational and the real they negate. This real scandal, recognized and interpreted in novel terms by traditionally classical proto-modernists (first among them Descartes) no less than nonclassical “post-modernists,” may necessarily attract discursive waves of submergence, interpretive storms stirred upon an open sea. Its details may be worth fighting over, but it itself is not open to debate. And the drawing of a bull’s eye on one contemporary French thinker or another may be a greater extravagance than any that such contrived aim-taking supposedly targets. Giving a face to the enemy is as old a discursive procedure as the first history of (irrational) war, told with unsparing rationality by Thucidydes. But the weight of tradition does not make this rhetorical maneuver any more substantial, any less imaginary, or, in its “defenses” of rationality, any less incommensurate or irrational.

     

    It is not that the target is moving and hard to hit; it is that it is not what one represents it to be, that objective absence being its very reason, its rationale, for being thought. Such a surmise indeed “characterizes” much “nonclassical” thinking, in which the failure of representation to meet its mark is directly or indirectly addressed. But it is also the irreducible basis for thinking proffered by the two central, significantly different founders of modern classical philosophy, Descartes and Kant, whose respective skeptical and critical limitations of rational cognition, accompanied by a redefinition of the real status of geometry, negatively re-established the novel project and possibility of thought.

     

    The irreducible evidence of the irrational, rationally recognized up to a limit, unites modern mathematics, science, and philosophy into a field whose different aspects may be analogous with complexity itself, complexity which is real and rationally conceived precisely because its elements and factors include the imaginary and the irrational. And it is here, in its recognition of a shared complexity, that Plotnitsky’s work takes its most important turn. For, instead of “wars” waged by ventriloquism, Plotnitsky suggests, a mutually reflexive acknowledgement of cognitive limits, the very limits that compose complexity, can include ethical action among its unknowable effects:

     

    perhaps the ultimate ethics or (since the ultimate ethics may not be possible, classically, in practice and, nonclassically, in principle) at least a good ethics of intellectual inquiry, or of cultural interaction, is the following: being strangers ourselves, to offer other strangers, strangers in our own or in other cultures, those ideas that bring our own culture--say, science, on one side, and the humanities, on the other--to the limits of both what is known and unknown, or unknowable, to them. To have an expertise is to reach the limits of both what is knowable and what is unknowable in one's field; and to be ethical in intellectual exchange is to offer others the sense of both of these limits, to tell the other culture or field both what we know and what we do not know ourselves, and what is knowable and what is unknowable, in our own field or culture. (240)

     

    Is this process of “exchange” of “expertise” more complex than attacking an adversary of one’s own devising? Doubtless–as the terms themselves suggest, the rational analysis of the irrational cannot, by definition, be unilateral; any such analysis must recognize both its own limits and its relation to what it is not. Yet, as the appearance of The Knowable and the Unknowable demonstrates, even the (irrational) negation of exchange issues in its own negation, or exchange. Thus it is, as Plotnitsky’s double expertise confirms, that a certain discrepancy of thinking remains, with the effect that, no more than do Titans, do Lilliputians need fear their final overthrow.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Gross, Paul R., and Norman Levitt. Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels with Science. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1994.
    • Macksey, Richard, and Eugenio Donato, eds. The Structuralist Controversy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1970.
    • Plotnitsky, Arkady. Complementarity: Anti-Epistemology after Bohr and Derrida. Durham, N.C.: Duke UP, 1994.
    • —, and Richard Crew. “Exchange.” Postmodern Culture 8.2: January 1998. <http://jefferson.village.virginia.edu/pmc/wip/issue.198/8.2exchange.html>
    • Sokal, Alan. “Transgressing the Boundaries–Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity.” Social Text (Spring/Summer) 1996: 217-52.
    • —, and Jean Bricmont. Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science. New York: Picador, 1998.
    • —, and Jean Bricmont. Impostures intellectuelles. Paris: Odile Jacob, 1997.
    • Weinberg, Steven. “Sokal’s Hoax.” The New York Review of Books 8 Aug. 1996: 11-15.
    • —. “Sokal’s Hoax: An Exchange” The New York Review of Books 3 Oct. 1996: 54.
    • —. “Steven Weinberg Replies.” The New York Review of Books 3 Oct. 1996: 54.

     

  • A Response to Leonard Wilcox’s “Baudrillard, September 11, and the Haunting Abyss of Reversal”

    Brad Butterfield

    Department of English
    University of Wisconsin, La Crosse
    butterfi.brad@uwlax.edu

     

    Leonard Wilcox is right that the conception of symbolic exchange has continued to inform Baudrillard’s work up to the present, but until 9/11 Baudrillard had stopped using the language of symbolic exchange, preferring instead to speak in terms of “seduction,” “fatal strategies,” and so on, which, as Rex Butler points out, nevertheless mirror his original model of symbolic exchange. And until 9/11 Baudrillard also seemed to have given up on the utopian prospect of a return to the symbolic order. I would still aver, paceWilcox, that the “key texts for understanding the way in which America responded to the events of September 11” are the earlier texts that I cite. The later texts, as Wilcox himself demonstrates, focus on terrorism and hostage taking as moments of simulation, media spectacles that remain “frozen in a state of disappearance.” But the incredible symbolic violence—the sacrificial demand, the singular challenge to the West and everyone in it–of this event, I would still suggest, made Baudrillard, and should make all of us, consider the basic tenets of symbolic exchange once again: challenge, singularity, obligation, reciprocity, honor.

     

    The question at issue here, as Wilcox makes clear, is whether the violence of 9/11 has since been absorbed in the “infinite multiplication” (Wilcox) of signs in the West’s culture of simulation, or whether, as Baudrillard writes in “L’Esprit,” it did indeed restore an “irreducible singularity to the heart of a generalized system of exchange.” For Baudrillard, the answer is of course both: the event begins by overwhelming our interpretive models, but then the latter end up overwhelming the event. And yet the damage has been done. We cannot avoid the singular challenge, the obligation to respond. If “we” (let us imagine for argument’s sake that “we” are the U.S.) ignore the symbolic point d’honneur, which people all over the world still recognize even if our corporations, governments, and media do not, then we create still more hostility and must expend increasingly more energy and money in our attempts to contain this hostility. The “system” grows stronger and weaker at the same time, and the “reversal” Wilcox speaks of is in fact the point at which the U.S. is obliged to become the opposite of what it presumed to stand for. The “democratic” West must become an infinite police state in the name of democracy. Thus the effectiveness of their symbolic violence: one cannot not respond, sacrifice begets sacrifice, one way or the other.

     

    “Our” other choice of response, rather than sacrificing every last resource in a ridiculous war against “evil,” is to make a different kind of sacrifice, placing the symbolic obligation back upon the terrorists. A gesture of “forgiveness,” as I wrote, entailing a sacrifice (a “gift of life” rather than of death) even greater than the terrorists’ self-immolation on 9/11, is the only way to restore honor on “our” side, forcing the terrorists either to lay down their swords or to lose face according to the symbolic code. But this of course cannot happen, even if “we” wanted it to. For the real “evil” today, as Baudrillard maintains in the works Wilcox points to, is the transparency of information, its omnipresence in a system where everything is revealed and yet nothing can be contested. Only a miraculous mass conversion of humanity’s collective will could change the “system” at this point, and the media monoliths will never let that happen, and the terrorists know it. And so their brilliance lies in the simple trick of enlisting the system against itself, by staging a single event that would be powerless if not for the media’s propagation of it. Their bet is that “we” will expend and ultimately ruin ourselves in our infinite war against an invisible, and at this point hyperreal, enemy. The system finally implodes by the weight of its own gravitational mass. This, of course, was Baudrillard’s prophesy too, something he tried to produce in his theorizing and encourage in other aesthetic modes. I remain ambivalent, as Wilcox says. I believe that there is still a sense of honor among individuals on this planet (symbolic obligation haunts our consciences just as “death” continues to haunt the “system), but the “system” has no honor, and neither its destruction nor its continuation seems desirable to me at this point.

     

     

  • Baudrillard, September 11, and the Haunting Abyss of Reversal

    Leonard Wilcox

    Department of American Studies
    University of Canterbury
    Leonard.Wilcox@canterbury.ac.nz

     

    . . . at the height of their coherence, the redoubled signs of the code are haunted by the abyss of reversal.

    –Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death

     
    In his article “The Baudrillardian Symbolic, 9/11, and the War of Good and Evil,” Bradley Butterfield examines Jean Baudrillard’s notion that terrorism functions according to the rule of symbolic exchange, a notion most fully articulated in Baudrillard’s The Spirit of Terrorism, written after the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001. Butterfield analyzes the concept of symbolic exchange as it emerged in Baudrillard’s early works, particularly in For A Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign and Symbolic Exchange and Death. Butterfield traces Baudrillard’s concept of symbolic exchange to Mauss’s studies of the Kula and Potlatch with their agonistic exchange of gifts.

     

    Butterfield notes that Baudrillard sees death as pivotal to the idea of symbolic exchange: in “primitive” societies, death has no equivalent return in exchange value, but must take its place ritualistically as part of the continual cycle of giving and receiving, part of a “gift” economy that forms a counterpoint to political economy, positive value, and the linear calculus of the code. As Baudrillard puts it, “giving and receiving constitute one symbolic act (the symbolic act par excellence), which rids death of all the indifferent negativity it holds for us in the ‘natural’ order of capital” (Symbolic 166). Yet, as Butterfield notes (following Baudrillard), in contemporary society the symbolic import of death is denied; it becomes a “natural phenomenon,” a sheer negation of life, a “bar” between the living and dead. Acts of terrorism, however, represent a “revolt” against this naturalization of death, and terrorist spectacle returns symbolic distinction to death (13).

     

    Butterfield isolates “a common motif” in Baudrillard’s speculations, and that is the potential for a moment “where simulation society is somehow reversed or revolutionized by the symbolic” (18). Nonetheless, Butterfield seems highly ambivalent about whether the events of 9/11 actually brought about such a reversal. He seems to concur with Baudrillard that 9/11 represented an “irreducible, singular, and irrevocable challenge to each and every imagination” (18). But ultimately he questions the efficacy of such a challenge: “What the system did in response to 9/11, or instead of responding to it, was to re-absorb its symbolic violence back into the never ending flow of anesthetized simulation […]” (25). “We live mostly,” he continues, “as Ernest Becker claimed, in denial of death, which our marketing specialists have yet to fully package […]. We see only TV spectacles. We do not see the real, or know the real, but we are a culture fascinated by its simulacrum” (26).

     

    Butterfield’s discussion suggests intriguing questions: can a symbolic challenge be mounted effectively against a hyperreal regime in which the multiplication of images serves to divert and neutralize that challenge? How can symbolic exchange function to “reverse” the logics of a system if death itself (so central to the idea of symbolic exchange) is absorbed into the code and rendered hyperreal? Butterfield leaves these questions unexamined, in spite of the fact that The Spirit of Terrorism is a text that explores the very issue of the relation between symbols and signs, images and symbolic events. Moreover, he leaves the questions unexplored in spite of the fact that a central theme common to Baudrillard’s works is the problematic relation between cultures of symbolism and cultures of simulation. As Mike Gane points out in Baudrillard: Critical and Fatal Theory, Baudrillard’s theorization of the symbolic posits “two irreconcilable orders”–cultures in which the symbolic mode is still intact, and cultures in which the more “archaic” symbolic mode has been displaced by a proliferation of signs (14). Baudrillard’s works are informed by a sense that these orders are in some sense incommensurable: symbolic cultures constitute the “other” of simulation cultures, and vice versa. The development of global media may have vitiated this situation to some extent; nonetheless, certain cultures retain the processes of symbolic exchange more or less intact. “Take Islam, for instance,” observes Baudrillard, “where there are still some strong symbolic processes, but which exact a high price” (qtd. in Gane, Baudrillard Live 185). On the other hand, in Western cultures, Baudrillard writes, symbolic exchange “is no longer an organizing principle; it no longer functions at the level of modern social institutions” (Jean Baudrillard 119).

     

    Yet the irreconcilability of symbolic and simulation cultures is only part of the picture. Baudrillard argues that the processes of symbolic exchange–challenge, seduction, that which is the radical other of economic exchange (Grace 18)–are in some sense basic to all cultures. On a fundamental level, says Baudrillard, “reciprocity never ends: every discrimination is only ever imaginary and is forever cut across by symbolic reciprocity, for better or worse” (Symbolic 168). While simulation may be an ascendant process in the West, the symbolic persists; indeed, its otherness continues to “haunt” the institutions of the West as a “prospect of their own demise” (Jean Baudrillard 119). The value of symbolic processes, Baudrillard argues, “consists in their being irreducible” (qtd. in Gane, Baudrillard Live 185). Thus it may follow that “irreducible” acts such as acts of sacrificial violence may momentarily reverse the logics of the system, disrupting its precarious balance. Indeed, symbolic events of a particular intensity (“the absolute event, the ‘mother’ of all events” [Spirit 4]) may transform the very relation between image and symbolic events.

     

    In his speculations on America’s response to the challenge of 9/11, Butterfield fails to take these matters into account. Moreover, Butterfield avers that the attack on the World Trade Center “inspired Baudrillard to dress up his old ideas about the symbolic and symbolic exchange” (5). Yet although Symbolic Exchange and Death is Baudrillard’s most sustained and comprehensive treatment of symbolic exchange, the notion has always informed Baudrillard’s works. As Victoria Grace explains, Baudrillard’s exploration of the mechanisms of symbolic exchange provides a “point of departure for the purpose of critique of the contemporary world he inhabits and the ideological processes that mark it” (18). Rather than dressing up “old ideas,” The Spirit of Terrorism draws upon notions either implicit or explicit in his earlier works on terrorism–challenge, reversibility, exchange in the sacrifice–and develops them in relation to what he sees as the definitive symbolic event of our times.

     

    In addressing the question of how America (and by extension the West) has responded to the symbolic challenge of 9/11, this essay will examine a number of Baudrillard’s works that Butterfield does not fully consider–the texts from Baudrillard’s “middle period” that deal, in varying degrees, with the phenomenon of terrorism. These texts include Simulacra and Simulation (originally published in 1981); “Figures of the Transpolitical” (from Les Stratégies fatales, 1983); In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities (1983); and The Gulf War Did Not Take Place (1991). In his continuing exploration of the “irreconcilable” relation between symbolic and simulation cultures, Baudrillard focuses in these works on the way the West constructs the phenomenon of terrorism and the mechanisms of simulation by which terrorism’s violence is absorbed into the logic of equivalence and the regime of commutable signs. These are key texts, I argue, for understanding the way America responded to the events of 9/11. They are pivotal for speculating on the degree to which America’s extensive apparatus of simulation functioned to assimilate the symbolic challenge of terrorism. On the other hand, these works also demonstrate Baudrillard’s sustained concern with the symbolic, for they grapple with how terrorists adopt the mechanisms of the postmodern sign to infiltrate a regime of simulation, how they use fatal strategies (for Baudrillard always the domain of reversion and exchange) to push the system to a crisis point of instability.

     

    An examination of these pivotal texts will ultimately lead to a consideration of Baudrillard’s The Spirit of Terrorism, for here Baudrillard’s speculations illuminate most fully the question of the West’s ability to “reabsorb” the dramatic events of 9/11 into the logic and processes of simulation. Baudrillard has always contended that symbolic exchange (like seduction) is an ineluctable force that persists, haunting an indifferent, hyperreal order. Baudrillard’s central question, which echoes in all his works, is whether the specter of symbolic exchange will “materialize,” whether it can become a potent force that subverts a hyperreal order: “Can reversibility seize control of systems? Is there going to be, at sometime in the future, such a destabilization of all of this undertaking by living elements, by cultures of illusions, by symbolic systems?” (qtd. in Gane, Baudrillard Live 185). In The Spirit of Terrorism, Baudrillard’s answer is yes.

     

    Part I

     

    Between 1976, when he wrote Symbolic Exchange and Death, and the early 1980s, when he began writing extensively on terrorism, the focus of Baudrillard’s thinking shifts from the realm of the symbol to the sign. In part, says Baudrillard himself, this shift is to be accounted for by confusions surrounding the category of the symbolic: “there are too many misunderstandings over the term” (qtd. in Gane, Baudrillard Live 57). But the shift is presaged in Symbolic Exchange and Death itself–much of the work is devoted to the logics of the sign in an emerging simulation culture. It would therefore seem that Baudrillard’s shift can be accounted for by his awareness of the accelerated development of an economy of the sign and media saturation in the West.

     

    This change in focus is suggested by Baudrillard’s treatment of terrorism in Symbolic Exchange and Death and “Figures of the Transpolitical.” In the former, the focus is still on the symbolic dimension of the terrorist act.

     

    The hostage has a symbolic yield a hundred times superior to that of the automobile death, which is itself a hundred times superior to natural death. This is because we rediscover here a time of the sacrifice, of the ritual of execution, in the immanence of the collectively expected death. This death, totally undeserved, therefore totally artificial, is therefore perfect from the sacrificial point of view, for which the officiating priest or "criminal" is expected to die in return, according to the rules of a symbolic exchange to which we adhere so much more profoundly than we do to the economic order. (Symbolic 165)

     

    Yet in “Figures of the Transpolitical,” Baudrillard focuses on the way terrorist scenarios are constructed in a spectacular order where sacrificial acts have all but lost symbolic resonance.

     

    In offering himself as a substitute for the hostages of Mogadiscio [in 1977], the Pope [Pious VI] also sought to substitute anonymous terror with elective death, with sacrifice, similar to the Christian model of universal atonement--but his offer was parodic without meaning to be so, since it designates a solution and a model which are totally unthinkable in our contemporary systems, whose incentive is precisely not sacrifice, but extermination, not elected victims, but spectacular anonymity. ("Figures" 172)

     

    In the “contemporary systems” of Western culture, terrorism and hostage-taking occur in the regime of sign value where the code of general equivalence triumphs. If terrorism represents anything, it is the dehumanized process of sign exchange, the interchange or exhibition of commutable and groundless signs. Rather than having any symbolic value, hostages “are suspended in an incalculable term of expiry” (“Figures” 170). Hostages

     

    are obscene because they no longer represent anything (this is the very definition of obscenity). They are in a state of exhibition pure and simple. Pure objects [...] made to disappear before their death. Frozen in a state of disappearance. In their own way, cryogenised. ("Figures" 176)

     

    As experienced in–and constructed by–the culture of the West, then, terrorism is no longer part of a symbolic “scene” but rather an aspect of the “obscene”: the immediate (real time), global, spectacular world of the media. Baudrillard’s middle works develop this analysis, situating terrorism within recent mutations of the sign brought on by a media-saturated culture in which informational events stand in for the real, in which the “real” is structured in accordance with the logic of sign value where all signifiers are liberated, open to infinite multiplication, and to simulated models of meaning:1

     

    [Terrorism's] only "ripples" are precisely not an historical flow but its story, its shock wave in the media. This story no more belongs to an objective and informative order than terrorism does to the political order. Both are elsewhere, in an order which is neither of meaning nor of representation--mythical perhaps, simulacrum undoubtedly. (In the Shadow 54)

     

    Terrorists have adapted to a simulation culture; their acts are staged for the media and become part of the world of self-referential signs, part of the hyperreal condition (“simulacrum undoubtedly”). An ecstatic form of violence, terrorism exceeds any critical or dialectical determination, and those observing are swept up in the mise en abyme of its staging, fascinated by the will to spectacle it represents.

     

    Part II

     

    How might we see 9/11 in terms of Baudrillard’s grim vision of terrorism in the Western regime of sign exchange and proliferation? How can such events with their devastating and catastrophic consequences– psychological, social, and economic–be seen as functioning according to the postmodern logic of sign value? Certainly the 9/11 attacks were “choreographed” for their maximum impact as spectacle: indeed, the twin towers attack had a precision, orchestration, and performative aspect that took on the abstract perfection of a simulation. In this sense the attacks were “already inscribed in the decoding and orchestration rituals of the media, anticipated in their presentation and their possible consequences” (Baudrillard, Simulacra 21). No doubt the terrorists behind the attack expected that images of the disaster would be caught on videotape and be disseminated globally. And certainly the international coverage with repeated replays of the disaster made all of us a fearful, captive audience.

     

    As Wheeler Dixon argues, “to satisfy us, the spectacle must engulf us, threaten us, sweep us up from the first ” (7), and the events of 9/11 did just that. A colleague commented that the television coverage seemed a series of simulations of “awesome special effects” (Baudrillard says that “terrorism itself is only one immense special effect” [“Figures” 175]). A gas station attendant told me that watching the planes dive into the World Trade Center was “like being at Universal Studios.” Indeed, part of the horror and fear was a haunting sense that what we saw on television was somehow unreal, a spectral show; yet as a colossal spectacle it was more-real-than-real, embodying, as it did, the images of countless apocalyptic disaster films.

     

    Western media coverage that followed 9/11 followed the logic of simulation, the severance of the sign from its referent, the explosion and proliferation of signs. It reinforced the sense of a world where signs are utterly commutable and sign exchange is promiscuous and self-replicating–“fractal.” In the days following, the “event strike” failed to reveal a hermeneutic core (let alone revealing who was “responsible” for the act), and its media-disseminated meanings mutated constantly, proliferating with compulsive virulence, metonymically merging and bleeding into one another. A plethora of signifieds emerged, from “human interest” stories on the heroism of firefighters or of victims calling loved ones on cell phones, to justification for the resurrection of a virulent nationalism and a call for “Operation Infinite Justice.”

     

    For Baudrillard, the “reality principle” of the Western “hegemony and the spectacle” is “all of reality absorbed by the hyperreality of the code and of simulation” (Jean Baudrillard 120). The explosion of sign value, the delirium of communication sparked by 9/11, functioned, on one level, to absorb the otherness of the event into the terms and processes of the system: the code, floating models that precede the real, the “indifference” of the simulacrum. Broadcasting reached unprecedented levels of simulation: when bombing began in Afghanistan, Western reporters were kept so far from the action they had to rely on their central news bureaus to provide information–which they then reported “live” (“Media Watch”). American media reported that Air Force One was in danger on 9/11: with an elaborate set of maps, diagrams, and arrows, reports detailed the position of the presidential aircraft, returning to Washington from Florida, when the President’s security team received word of “a threatening message received by the secret service” (“MediaWatch”). But although the President’s plane was controversially diverted, a subsequent investigation by The Washington Post revealed that Air Force One was never in danger.2 In short, one aspect of the pervasive media simulation involved the White House’s use of the media as a conduit for disinformation. Bush’s virtual challenges (Osama bin Laden, “wanted, dead or alive”), and the hackneyed presidential demands for “infinite justice” (combined with the call for a “crusade”) were so reminiscent of a bad Hollywood script that they prompted British journalist Robert Fisk to speculate:

     

    I am beginning to wonder whether we have not convinced ourselves that wars--our wars--are movies. The only Hollywood film ever made about Afghanistan was a Rambo epic in which Sylvester Stallone taught the Afghan mujaheddin how to fight the Russian occupation, helped to defeat Soviet troops and won the admiration of an Afghan boy. Are the Americans, I wonder, somehow trying to actualise the movie? (3)

     

    Terms were tossed around in the media like “freedom,” “defense of liberty,” and “terrorism”–not just vague in the old Orwellian sense, but palpably without referent, in a kind of ecstatic celebration of the death of referentiality itself. Indeed, the “war against terror” itself has been conducted in a hyperreal mode, the Bush administration’s “sustained, comprehensive and relentless” operations aimed at a chimera whose traces are evident on video or audiotape, the very logic of this “war” utterly sealed off from “the desert of the real”–the sordid material interests that might be driving it, such as the oil and defense industries.

     

    Another aspect of the system’s propensity to assimilate the “real” of the terrorist violence is suggested by the way the events of 9/11 were subject to dematerialization in a vertiginous and ecstatic flow of information. The “hostages” (if they could be called that) became part of an “obscene delirium of communication” (Baudrillard, “Ecstasy” 132) as they made cellphone calls to their loved ones, left messages on answer phones, and (on Flight 93, which plummeted to the ground) transmitted their intention to overcome the hijackers. CNN reporter Barbara Olson, who was on Flight 77, which crashed into the Pentagon, was herself going to Los Angeles to appear on a television show (Wolcott 68). In the media frenzy that followed, these “hostages” attained (posthumously) “a state of exhibition pure and simple,” an exhibition that fueled fascination and panic, as well as the discourse of cultural war and the brutality and barbarity of the “enemy.”3 The passengers on these doomed flights vanished into an implosive black hole without remainder–not even their bodies left behind to mark their death or provide the basis for what Derrida calls “the work of the remainder”: the process of symbolic exchange that enables mourning to occur (30). Like the Baudrillardian hostage, the passengers on the fated flights of 9/11 were “frozen in a state of disappearance […] in their own way cryogenized” (Baudrillard, “Figures” 176) at the zero degree of meaning. What was most uncanny and frightening was the “unrepresentability” of their deaths, the way in which they exemplified the quintessential condition of Baudrillard’s postmodern hostage, existing only as signs in potentially boundless transmissions.

     

    Yet, as Baudrillard points out, the modality of the hyperreal is always “fluctuating in indeterminacy” (Jean Baudrillard 120). Terrorism’s “messages” to the dominant system cannot be entirely consumed in a flurry of signs, or assimilated in awesome spectacle. What was so chilling about the events of 9/11 was that they mirrored, in some palpable way, the “blindness” of an anonymous society that is ours. If the hostages could be said to “represent” anything, it is the degree to which power in the contemporary period is decentered and anonymous, the degree to which power in postmodernity becomes a simulacrum constructed on the basis of signs. As Baudrillard puts it, “through the death of no matter whom, [terrorism] executes the sentence of anonymity which is already ours, that of the anonymous system, the anonymous power, the anonymous terror of our real lives” (“Figures” 171). Part of terrorism’s destabilizing potential lies in the fact that it provides a condensed image or distorting mirror of social and political processes.4 It draws upon and perpetuates a haunting “everyday fear” occasioned by anonymous power. In the space of the transpolitical, according to Baudrillard, “we are all hostages” (“Figures” 170). Novelist Don DeLillo, one of our foremost writers on terrorism, concurs; in his novel Mao II, a character puts the unspecifiable yet always-present potential of terrorism chillingly:

     

    Yes, I travel. Which means there is no moment on certain days when I'm not thinking terror. They have us in their power. In boarding areas I never sit near windows in case of flying glass. I carry a Swedish passport so that's okay unless you believe that terrorists killed the prime minister. Then maybe it's not so good. And I use codes in my address book for names and addresses of writers because how can you tell if the name of a certain writer is dangerous to carry, some dissident, some Jew or blasphemer. (41)

     

    Another factor which makes contemporary terrorism’s threat resistant to absorption by the system is an aspect of its adaptive character: the extent to which terrorism inhabits the very floating models and replicable scenarios that are characteristic of a hyperreal order. Baudrillard, as we have seen, contends that terrorist acts, disseminated in the global media and acting according to the logic of the sign, become fractal–rather than being governed by a code, they have no point of reference at all. With the autonomy of the signifier and the accelerated momentum of sign value, terrorism operates by “contiguity, fascination, and panic […] a chain reaction by contagion” (Baudrillard, In the Shadow 51). Terrorism is “virulent,” something that enters the global mediascapes and becomes self-replicating. The image takes the event as “hostage” in part by “multiplying the event into infinity” (Baudrillard, “L’Esprit” 17), producing an endless repetition of the same. How else to describe the events that occurred in New Zealand and Australia in the wake of 9/11 when the anthrax scare was sweeping the United States? Both these countries experienced uncontrollable replication of “scenes” of anthrax attacks: day after day, televised images appeared of workers dressed in protective garments and masks (exactly as in the U.S.), evacuating post offices, entering areas suspected of containing anthrax dust, although no “real” anthrax dust was discovered. By collapsing the distinction between the real and the copy, these contagious simulational scenarios (like something out of Don DeLillo’s White Noise) ironically conferred the status of authenticity on life in New Zealand –this little country, too, was on the receiving end of the global terrorist threat; we were significant enough to be targeted; we had our own scenes of anthrax terror–we were “real.”

     

    Part III

     

    Baudrillard’s texts from this middle period tell us that to view terrorism as a media event, “a group of signs dedicated exclusively to their recurrence as signs” (Simulacra 21), is not to say that media-disseminated “hyperreal” events do not have “real” effects. Nor does it suggest that the system can unproblematically absorb terrorism’s violence, with its symbolic message, back into mediatized indifference. Postmodern terrorism occurs in the context of what James Der Derian calls “a global information economy boosting sign power” (80). Such “sign power” includes strategic efforts on the part of corporations to simulate profitability (here the Enron debacle is instructive); it also entails an economy in which money itself is an object of circulation that has only a screen-and-networked existence rather than a “material” one. Such an economy is particularly vulnerable to forms of terrorism which insert themselves into the economy of the sign, and indeed there were enormous consequences in the wake of 9/11: the sudden decline of an already shaky international economy, the immediate, worldwide decline in the value of stocks (a trillion or so dollars vanished in this way), the domino-like collapse of airline industries, and the rush on the part of governments in the United States, Switzerland, New Zealand, and Australia to prop them up. New York lost close to 100,000 jobs in the aftermath of 9/11.

     

    In a postindustrial epoch when the “mode of information” is dominant, commandeering the mode of information–that is, creating a spectacular act which produces media spasms on a global scale–can be extraordinarily effective. As Slavoj Zizek notes, the shattering impact of the attacks can only be accounted for by the fact that “the two WTC towers stood for the center of virtual capitalism, of financial speculations disconnected from the sphere of material production” (3). Virtual capitalism–the world of global speculation and investment–is precisely the space in which a mediatized, spectacular, and hyperreal attack can be devastating, can constitute a “deconstruction” (or strategic reversal) of the system by pitting a hyperreal act against a hyperreal system. As Baudrillard observes,

     

    a hyperreal, imperceptible sociality, no longer operating by law and repression, but by the infiltration of models, no longer by violence, but by deterrence/persuasion--to that terrorism responds by an equally hyperreal act, caught up from the outset in concentric waves of media and of fascination [...] (In the Shadow 50)

     

    Terrorism engenders fascination, fear, and terror in a form that is utterly anonymous and contiguous, an “an arbitrary and hazardous abstraction” (Baudrillard, In the Shadow 51). A character in Mao II explains the dynamics of terrorism in exactly these terms:

     

    It's confusing when they [terrorists] kill the innocent. But this is precisely the language of being noticed, the only language the West understands. The way they determine how we see them. The way they dominate the rush of endless streaming images. (157-58)

     

    This is precisely Baudrillard’s point: in a society of ubiquitous hyperreality, the primary goal of the terrorist is media spectacle, “the only language the West understands.” Simultaneously brutal, repugnant, and fascinating, the terrorist’s repertoire–kidnappings, hijackings, and assassinations–convey their message by becoming part of the “obscene delirium” of televisual flows, informational anxiety, and technological catastrophe of media spectacle.

     

    Baudrillard’s texts in this middle period, then, help us understand postmodern terrorism (and 9/11) in the highly ambivalent regime of image and spectacle. While image and spectacle function to absorb the alterity of terrorism, terrorism has adapted adroitly to the logic of sign exchange and sign value. If a culture of simulation denies the symbolic import of death, it can never eradicate it. Indeed, in all these texts the idea of reversal and death is never far away. Contemporary terrorism usurps the mechanisms of simulation in order to inhabit the system from the inside; like a viral organism, it multiplies from within, pushing the very logic of the system to a point of extremity, inserting reversibility into the causal order, and bringing about a reversion of the system’s own power. Terrorism “aims at the white magic of the social encircling us, that of information, of simulation, of deterrence, of anonymous and random control, in order to precipitate its death by accentuating it” (Baudrillard, In the Shadow 51). Terrorism is a form of “fatal strategy,” and (as Baudrillard explains) “the order of the fatal is the site of symbolic exchange. There is no more liberty, everything is locked in a sequential chain” (qtd. in Gane, Baudrillard Live 108). Even the hostage, “frozen in a state of disappearance” (Baudrillard, “Figures” 176), becomes something of a nonnegotiable, inexchangeable object that casts a shadow over economic and semiotic exchange, insinuating the symbolic back into the flow of commutable signs.5 Ultimately, symbolic exchange is fundamentally irrevocable and singular; the “gift ” must be returned; symbolic obligation remains unbreachable by the dominant exchange and irreducible to the law of the code.

     

    Inspired by the events of 9/11, this is precisely the theme Baudrillard develops in The Spirit of Terrorism. In the parrying between symbolic and simulation cultures, here the symbolic clearly gains the upper hand.

     

    Part IV

     

    Rather than compelling Baudrillard to “dress up old ideas of symbolic exchange” (as Butterfield would have it), 9/11 provoked him to bring his ideas of symbolic exchange, always implicit in his writings on terrorism and its “fatal strategies,” to bear on what he considers to be the first global symbolic event. The momentous nature of the attack on the World Trade Center also compelled him to develop his views on the relation between simulation and symbolic exchange. In The Spirit of Terrorism, Baudrillard argues that in a world utterly saturated with images, our primary experience of the disaster was as “image-event.” The image takes the event “hostage”; it “consumes the event,” and in that sense “absorbs the event and offers it for consumption” (27). We cannot say that the World Trade Center attacks signaled a resurrection of the real, for our very reality principle has been lost, has become intermingled with the fictional, has all but been absorbed in the recursive processes of simulation. The image precedes the real, yet in the terrorist attacks the “frisson of the real” was superadded as an excess, an echo, “like an additional fiction, a fiction surpassing fiction” (29). Baudrillard seems to suggest that the “absolute event” of 9/11 produced a breach between the real (however entwined in the fantastic and surreal) and media event, between event and medium. Such a breach constitutes a dismantling of the formal correlation of signifier and signified, a radical dismembering of the mechanisms of the code.6 It transgresses the codification of signs and their semiotic/economic exchange (the definitive act is “not susceptible of exchange” [9]). The symbolic suddenly breaks through and subverts the indifference of simulation. The attack on the World Trade Center thus constituted a condensed site of symbolic power that “radicalized the relation of the image to reality” (27). The event breached the bar between life and death, between semiologic and the symbolic, constituting a singularity “at one and the same time the dazzling micro-model of a kernel of real violence with the maximum possible echo–hence the purist form of spectacle–and a sacrificial model mounting the purest symbolic form of defiance to the historical political order” (30).

     

    Such dramatic and sacrificial violence constituted a challenge to the West’s denial of death’s symbolic capacity for reversion. Yet Butterfield tells us, “Americans are not primitives–we do not value death symbolically, but rather only as a subtraction from life” (12). But the fact that Americans deny the symbolic dimension of death was ultimately of little importance on 9/11. For it was as if both individuals and systems, independent of intention or agency, at some profound level responded to the specter of death and reversibility. Indeed, the event was a challenge to the “real” of the Western world. The World Trade Center attacks made the vulnerability of an overly extended system suddenly palpable; its functional logic (which precludes reversion) was suddenly breached: “the whole system of the real and power [la puissance] gathers, transfixed; rallies briefly; then perishes by its own hyperefficiency” (Baudrillard, Spirit 18). The Twin Towers collapsed (a stunning image of violent and catastrophic implosion), the regime of signification (floating currency, floating signifiers) was thrown into chaos, the market plunged, jobs were lost, corporations become insolvent.

     

    But what possible “answer” could America give to the symbolic challenge? Butterfield argues that Baudrillard’s logic of gift and countergift would imply that the greatest possible symbolic honor would be the forgiveness of debt. The idea that the U.S. might forgive its debtors, says Butterfield, constitutes the “utopian moment” in Baudrillard’s thinking, but “Baudrillard will not speak his utopia” (25). On this point, however, it is again useful to think of the relation of the symbolic cultures to the orders of simulation found in the West that informs Baudrillard’s thinking. It may be that Baudrillard “will not speak” on the matter because he realizes that the very notion of forgiveness assumes values based in older notions of symbolic obligation. As Baudrillard commented in an interview, “today [in the West] forgiveness has turned into tolerance, the democratic virtue par excellence, a sort of ecology that shields all the differences, a sort of psychological demagogy” (qtd. in Gane, Baudrillard Live 195).

     

    Baudrillard seems to suggest that the West is unable to suffer the weight of symbolic obligation precisely because this would challenge the West’s very being–capitalism totalizing itself “as a code producing all the world as exchangeable within an identical order” (McMillan and Worth 127). And herein lies the conundrum the West confronts: any response which recognized symbolic obligation would be undertaken at the risk of the West’s becoming something other than it is, at the risk of bringing about its own “death”:

     

    At odds with itself, it can only plunge further into its own logic of relations of force, but it cannot operate on the terrain of the symbolic challenge and death--a thing of which it no longer has any idea, since it has erased it from its own culture. (Baudrillard, Spirit 15)

     

    The United States’s answer to symbolic challenge is precisely to “plunge further into its own logic of relations of force,” the logic of sign value and a global regime of monolithic indifference: “All that is singular and irreducible must be absorbed. This is the law of democracy and the new world order” (Gulf War 86). Among other things, the “war on terror” represents a frantic attempt to mend the breach in the code, to absorb the singular and irreducible symbolic challenge 9/11 into the order of simulation. The Bush administration targets Saddam Hussein, the fake terrorist enemy; it stages “Gulf War 2: The Sequel,” a repetition compulsion that exhibits all of the will to spectacle of the first Gulf War. Reporting of this war extended the logic of simulation with “embedded reporters”–a new breed of journalists largely indistinguishable in speech or dress from the troops with whom they travel, surrendering their independence to be ferried around in military vehicles, to be part of the larger “cast” of executive producer Donald Rumsfeld’s show of shows. Coverage of the war included scene after scene of “embeds,” wearing fatigues and goggles, sitting on tanks, talking by satellite to anchors in the U.S.–all scripted, all staged, the satellite technology that enabled this instant communication an integral part of its hyperreal production. Of the first Gulf War Baudrillard wrote, “it is a sign that the space of the event has become a hyperspace with multiple refractivity, and that the space of war has become definitely non-Euclidean” (Gulf War 50). “Gulf War 2” featured endless images of embeds inhabiting a non-Euclidean space devoid of all landmarks. When camera crews encountered recognizable landmarks of any potential strategic importance, stock footage or tight shots of helmeted talking heads in a tank’s interior were substituted; viewers were advised that live exterior tracking shots would resume when there was nothing distinctive about the terrain.7 Jokes circulated during the siege of Baghdad acknowledging the simulational character of the war: “Why didn’t American troops get to Baghdad quicker? Because CNN kept having to re-shoot the scenes” (Agence France Presse).

     

    Like the first Gulf War, the attack on Iraq functioned to rescue the idea of war, the status of war, its meaning, its future (the superiority of American might and its ability to identify and quash the terrorist enemy as opposed to negotiation with other countries within the U.N.). Like the first Gulf War, it does this in the hyperreal mode, proffering “the deontology of a pure electronic war without hitches” (Gulf War 34). Not only did the Iraqi regime collapse within a matter of days, but the U.S. won the nostalgia-evoking scenes of real war and real liberation it wanted. As one journalist put it, such scenes resembled “Paris after 1945 with an Arab cast. An old man beating a poster of Saddam Hussein with a shoe in deliberate insult. The statue of the Iraqi president with a noose around its neck and an American flag over its head like an executioner’s hood, the crowd below gathering to tug it from its pedestal” (Maddox). If this was not enough, Bush appeared in Top Gun-uniform aboard an aircraft carrier to declare victory. In its consistent and strategic embrace of the logic of simulation, Gulf War 2 was grounded in the “disappearance of alterity, of primitive hostility, and the enemy” (Gulf War 36).

     

    Indeed, the recent war on Iraq seems the final phase of pulling back the symbolic challenge of 9/11 into a non-Euclidian, hyperreal media space, and into simulational, replicable scenarios. Like the first Gulf War, the U.S.-led coalition’s attack on Iraq has proved to be a “celibate machine” (Gulf War 36), generating a series of models, codes, and scenarios. Iraq is a testing ground, a kind of blank slate or model by which to generate scenarios that might be deployed to effect regime change in “rogue” states such as Syria, Iran, and North Korea, countries which form Bush’s “axis of evil.” Finally, in hyperreal mode, this “deontology of war,” death itself–and, by extension, its potential for singularity and sacrificial violence–becomes subject to the code. In a press briefing, U.S. war commander General Tommy Franks asserted that American forces had genetic material that could be used to identify Saddam and check whether attempts to kill him had succeeded. “He’s either dead or he’s running a lot,” Franks said. “He’ll simply be alive until I can confirm he’s dead” (Reuters). In this semiotic regime of the code, people “die the only death the system authorizes” (Symbolic 177); the code (controlled by the Americans) bestows the power to differentiate between life and death, to confer death, and to produce death.

     

    Such examples suggest not only America’s (and the West’s) inability to grapple with symbolic obligation, but its concerted effort to absorb the threat of the Other by generating a seamless simulational and hyperreal world. Yet symbolic cultures such as Islam have a particularly potent weapon. As Victoria Grace notes, they have the power to “infect the west with that which it does not understand and cannot encompass: the symbolic power of culture that destabilizes any pretense to the universal and the coded instantiations of the real” (96). The West’s claim to a universal code is thus troubled and unsettled by the aftereffects of calamitous and seismic symbolic violence. Moreover, the destabilizing “infection” of symbolic power is integrally related to Baudrillard’s notion of the “transparency of evil” with its concept of the “accursed share” (Transparency 82)–the evil which Western society attempts to expel in order to maintain its operational positivity. There is a perverse paradox in America’s denial of the Other, including its denial of the evil and the alterity of death. If the West has barred the negative in the pursuit of the positive, the negative inevitably transpires, inexorably returns to haunt its comfortable positivity.8 As Baudrillard observes, “the price we pay for the ‘reality’ of this life, to live it as positive value, is the ever present phantasm of death” (Symbolic 133). In this dichotomous logic (death barred from life), death is constructed as irreversible, and therefore haunts life as an as ever-present and ever-threatening “ghostly presence.”9 In the death-denying contemporary West, it is precisely the ever-present specter of death that characterizes the “politics of everyday fear,” the general sense of disaster that is woven into the fabric of daily life, part of the haunting, nameless dread of terrorism, that which inevitably transpires as a result of a relentless devotion to positivity, “the triumph of Good all along the line” (Spirit 14).

     

    The United States’s War on Terror–including the attack on Iraq and the threats against other “rogue states”–is an aspect of what Gary Genosko refers to as “simulated reciprocity” (xxi-xxii), a bogus, simulacral response to a unique and binding symbolic challenge. Yet 9/11 was itself an aspect of the “transpolitical mirror of evil” (Baudrillard, Transparency 81) in which the barred and excluded “negative” reappeared in a symbolic form so overwhelming that it continues to haunt the positivist order of America and the West. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 were a redounding consequence of the global injunction to positive value and the denial of the symbolic potential of death–an injunction that precisely left the West vulnerable to the fatal strategies of sacrificial violence and sacrificial death, strategies it cannot meet or answer on their own terms.10

     

    Contrary to Bradley Butterfield’s argument, then, it is not a question of Americans being moderns or primitives, of Americans living in the denial of death, or even of Americans living in a never-ending flow of anesthetized simulation. For one of Baudrillard’s key points in The Spirit of Terrorism is that it is precisely the fundamental, constitutive antagonism of global capitalism that ultimately confounds America’s hegemony of the positive, as well as the mechanisms of simulation that produce and buttress it. For Baudrillard, this “fundamental antagonism […] points past the spectre of America […] and the spectre of Islam, to triumphant globalization battling against itself” (Spirit 11). What is excluded from this global system transpires in redoubled measure; that which the system finds intolerable, and that which is fatal to it–evil, death, reversibility–inexorably haunts the system in all its hyperextended perfection: “at the height of their coherence, the redoubled signs of the code are haunted by the abyss of reversal” (Jean Baudrillard 123). On 11 September 2001, this became dramatically apparent. In the “unforgettable incandescence of the images,” evil and death reasserted themselves, and the virtual consensus of globalism was suddenly engulfed by a void. Symbolic violence created a breakthrough, an effraction that shook the West’s self-certainty to the core, leaving it haunted with the specter of that which “dismantles the beautiful order of irreversibility, of the finality of things” (qtd. in Gane, Baudrillard Live 57).

     

    Notes

     

    1. For this formulation, I am indebted to Victoria Grace (25). I would like to thank her for providing me with galley proofs of Karen McMillan and Heather Worth’s article “In Dreams: Baudrillard, Derrida, and September 11.”

     

    2. See Bennetts 82 and White.

     

    3. See for example, Ann Coulter, “This is War” in which, responding to Barbara Olson’s death, she famously wrote about “those responsible” for the terrorist act: “We should invade their countries, kill their leaders, and convert them to Christianity.”

     

    4. See Genosko (98).

     

    5. Here I am indebted to Genosko’s discussion of the hostage (98). According to Genosko, Baudrillard’s reading of the hostage “has always been in the service of the symbolic […] ” (100).

     

    6. Here I am indebted to McMillan and Worth (125-26).

     

    7. I’d like to thank my colleague Kevin Glynn for pointing this out to me, and for lengthy discussions on the simulational aspects of the attack on Iraq.

     

    8. I’d like to thank Victoria Grace for conversations and emails in which she pointed out to me the importance of Baudrillard’s notion of the “transparency of evil” and its relation to the Baudrillardian symbolic.

     

    9. I am indebted to Victoria Grace’s discussion of the consequences of the West’s devotion to positive value (44).

     

    10. Here I am indebted to Karen McMillan and Heather Worth (126).

     

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Agence France Press (AFP). “War Rising Above the Pain.” The Press [Christchurch, New Zealand] 8 Apr. 2003: B1.
    • Baudrillard, Jean. “The Ecstasy of Communication.” The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture. Ed. Hal Foster. Port Townsend: Bay, 1983. 126-33.
    • —. “Figures of the Transpolitical.” Revenge of the Crystal: Selected Writings on the Modern Object and its Destiny, 1968-1983. Ed. and trans. Paul Foss and Julian Pefanis. London: Pluto, 1990. 161-98.
    • —. The Gulf War Did Not Take Place. Trans. Paul Patton. Sydney: Power, 1995.
    • —. In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities. Trans. Paul Foss, John Johnston, and Paul Patton. New York: Semiotext, 1983.
    • —. Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings. Ed. Mark Poster. Trans. Charles Levin. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1988.
    • —. “L’Esprit Du Terrorisme.” Trans. Donovan Hohn. Harper’s Magazine Feb. 2002: 13-18.
    • —. Simulacra and Simulation. Trans. Sheila Faria Glaser. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1994.
    • —. The Spirit of Terrorism and Requiem for the Twin Towers. Trans. Chris Turner. London: Verso, 2002.
    • —. Symbolic Exchange and Death. 1976. Trans. Iain Hamilton Grant. London: Sage, 1993.
    • —. The Transparency of Evil: Essays on Extreme Phenomenon. London: Verso, 1993.
    • Bennetts, Leslie. “One Nation, One Mind?” Vanity Fair Dec. 2001: 82-88.
    • Butterfield, Bradley. “The Baudrillardian Symbolic, 9/11, and the War of Good and Evil.” Postmodern Culture 13.1 (2002): 27 pars. Sept. 2002 <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/postmodern_culture/v013/13.1butterfield.html>.
    • Coulter, Ann. “This is War.” National Review Online 13 Sept. 2001 <www.nationalreview.com/coulter/coulter091301.shtml>.
    • DeLillo, Don. Mao II. New York: Viking, 1991.
    • Der Derian, James. Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.
    • Derrida, Jacques. “No Apocalypse, Not Now (full speed ahead, seven missiles, seven missives).” Diacritics 14 (Summer 1984): 20-31.
    • Dixon, Wheeler Winston. The Transparency of Spectacle: Meditations on the Moving Image. Albany, NY: State U of New York P, 1998.
    • Fisk, Robert. “Lost in the Rhetorical Fog of War.” The Independent. 9 Oct. 2000: 3.
    • Gane, Mike. Baudrillard: Critical and Fatal Theory. New York: Routledge, 1991.
    • —, ed. Baudrillard Live: Selected Interviews. New York: Routledge, 1993.
    • Genosko, Gary. Baudrillard and Signs: Signification Ablaze. New York: Routledge, 1994.
    • Grace, Victoria. Baudrillard’s Challenge: A Feminist Reading. New York: Routledge, 2000.
    • Maddox, Bronwen. “Will the U.S. Stop at Iraq? Victory in Baghdad Offers Vision of Easy Regime Change.” The Times [London] 11 Apr. 2003: B1.
    • “Media Watch.” Radio New Zealand. 25 Nov. 2001.
    • McMillan, Karen, and Heather Worth. “In Dreams: Baudrillard, Derrida and September 11.” Eds. Victoria Grace, Heather Worth, and Simmons, Laurence. Baudrillard West of the Dateline. Palmerston North: Dunmore, 2003. 116-37.
    • Reuters. “Where is Saddam”? The Press [Christchurch, New Zealand] 15 Apr. 2003: B1.
    • White, Jerry. “White House Lied about Threat to Air Force One.” World Socialist Web Site 28 Sept. 2001 <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/sep2001/bush-s28.shtml>
    • Wolcott, James. “Over, Under, Sideways, Down.” Vanity Fair December 2001: 64-74.
    • Zizek, Slavoj. “Welcome to the Desert of the Real.” Reconstructions: Reflections on Humanity and Media after Tragedy. 15 Sept. 2001. < web.mit.edu/cms/reconstructions/interpreations/desertreal/html/>.

     

  • Smart Bombs, Serial Killing, and the Rapture: The Vanishing Bodies of Imperial Apocalypticism

    Peter Yoonsuk Paik

    Department of French, Italian, and Comparative Literature
    University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee
    pypaik@uwm.edu

     

    One of the most well-publicized hypotheses regarding the terror of 9/11 is the notion that religious fantasies played a major role in inspiring the militants of al-Qaeda to launch their suicide attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Only irrational fanatics could have been capable of killing themselves for the sake of taking thousands of innocent lives and destroying three buildings that symbolize Western power and preeminence. Surely the hijackers must have been enticed and deluded by the rewards promised by Islam to martyrs–instant entry into paradise where they would be served by “seventy dark-eyed virgins.” The lurid and prurient nature of this fantasy has been invoked to account for the terrorist bombings committed by the Palestinians against the Israelis, as well. In the eyes of the liberal, capitalist West, such fantasies reveal the obscene underside of the puritanical worldview associated with radical Islam. The Muslim terrorist is capable of launching suicide attacks because he has embraced an immoderately concrete vision of the afterlife that has spawned in him a kind of psychosis. The belief that Islamist radicals are religious fanatics acting from a delusional hatred of the secular West or from contempt for the superseded religions of Judaism and Christianity has played no small role in stifling questions about the ideological factors behind these acts of terror, and about the legitimacy of Israeli policy towards the Palestinians in the occupied territories.

     

    That the mystifications underlying the mass media discourse on Islamist terror and the American military response to it might possess significant theological content of their own comes as little surprise. One may recall the jarring “slips,” such as “crusade” and “infinite justice,” terms deeply disturbing to most Muslims, used by the Bush administration in the immediate aftermath of the attacks of 9/11. Even as these terms were hastily jettisoned under the criticism of American Islamic clerics, the American invasion and occupation of Iraq has done much to confirm the view that the actual policy of the United States has become that of a latter-day crusade against the Arab world, whether in the name of preventing the future use of weapons of mass destruction or establishing a model liberal democracy in the region. Indeed, one might argue that it is theological, absolutist notions of freedom and security that are driving the war on terror. This article makes the case that the destruction inflicted by the United States against Afghanistan and Iraq is no less religious in nature than the terrorist acts of Islamist radicals by examining the political fantasies behind much of the popular support for the neo-imperialist policies of the second Bush administration. I first discuss the legitimation for neo-imperialism among intellectuals supportive of the administration and the popular millenarianism that sanctions militaristic policies seen as fulfilling a divine plan. In section two, I provide a brief analysis of the best-selling novel series of the 1990s, Left Behind, which is based on a literalist understanding of biblical prophecy concerning the millennium. In the third section, I discuss the mode of spirituality that informs the apocalypticism which has become pervasive in American culture–a form of religiosity that has little to do with historical Christianity but is in fact far closer to the ancient heresy of Gnosticism. In the fourth section I address how the overarching themes and ideological orientation of this explicitly programmatic series of novels emerge in mainstream Hollywood cinema. I conclude with a discussion of how Christian doctrines, particularly that of sacrifice, become derailed in the demonology that takes root from a system of belief far more dualistic than that of traditional Christianity.

     

    I. Suicide of the Last Men

     

    In his article on the “fantasy ideology” of the militants of al-Qaeda, published in the Heritage Foundation’s journal Policy Review, Lee Harris proposes that it is wrongheaded to view the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon as having been driven by political objectives (21-22). Instead, Harris argues, we must come to grips with the fact that al-Qaeda is interested chiefly in enacting a collective fantasy on the world stage, a fateful and titanic drama in which they, self-cast as the forces of righteousness, carry on a struggle against the decadent, apostate legions of the Great Satan of the West. Yet, in spite of the unprecedented destruction wrought by al-Qaeda on 9/11, Harris assures us that such ideological fantasies–which in effect derail politics from the rational pursuit of strategic interests into the enterprise of transforming human nature and reality itself–are nothing new. The examples he provides, of groups for whom politics served as a form of self-aggrandizing theatre, include Nazis, Communists, Jacobins, and even Vietnam War protesters.

     

    Fantasy ideologies, according to Harris, are a “plague” and should be dealt with accordingly, “in the same manner as you would deal with a fatal epidemic–you try to wipe it out” (35). I will leave aside for the moment the observation that the act of describing one’s political enemies in medical terms has served with disquieting regularity to legitimate massacres and genocide. Rather, the underlying assumption governing Harris’s distinction between politics as the rational and practical pursuit of concrete objectives and politics as the catastrophic enactment of a divine drama is that the secular West has outgrown the seductions of absolutist terror–so much so, in fact, that it is slow to recognize fully the true nature of the threat posed by radical Islam. Harris fears that the West has made itself more vulnerable to al-Qaeda in becoming bogged down in futile questioning over the ostensible political motives behind the attacks of 9/11, when, instead, it ought simply to devote its energies to annihilating a foe with whom it is senseless to reason. The conclusion that the liberal democratic West has effectively exorcised the demons of political totalitarianism and religious fanaticism also surfaces in the opposition between consumerism as a way of life in Western societies and the ethic of self-denial driving the Islamist militants, as pointed out by Slavoj Zizek in Welcome to the Desert of the Real, his recent book on 9/11 and the war on terror. In this particular ideological antagonism, the citizens of the West have become “Nietzschean Last Men,” whose primary concern is the satisfaction of fleshly and material appetites and who react with incomprehension at the suggestion that the only life worth living is one which is devoted to a transcendent cause. The Muslim radicals, by contrast, display the attributes ascribed to the Hegelian master–it is they “who are ready to risk everything, engaged in the struggle even up to their own self-destruction” (Welcome 40).

     

    Yet the opposition between fundamentalist Islam and the liberal West often works to overshadow a significant rift within the West itself. This is the divide between the “post-historical” social democracies of Europe, which, according to Robert Kagan, have entered the Kantian realm of “perpetual peace,” and the still all-too historical United States, which remains stranded in a Hobbesian world of unending struggle (3). Kagan’s distinction stems from the Nietzschean principle (which he leaves unstated) that weak nations, such as those of Western Europe, embrace international law as the primary means of exerting their influence, whereas “brute force” is both the province and prerogative of the powerful (6). Robert Kaplan, in Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos, goes even further to argue that the United States effectively constitutes a “new imperium” and urges that it should embrace the role of global hegemon (148). What emerges is thus the contradictory image of the United States as the lone remaining superpower that is at the same time excessively reluctant to expend the lives of its own citizens as the cost of maintaining its geopolitical dominance–hence its reliance upon proxies, such as the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, for the hand-to-hand combat, and its dependence upon the overwhelming destructive force afforded by its advanced technology, as seen in the invasion and conquest of Iraq. Do not Kagan’s reflections on the American practice of power politics–as well as Kaplan’s advocacy of “stealth imperialism” by the U.S. as a corrective to “the self-delusive, ceremonial trappings of the United Nations” (148-49)–provide the murderous supplement to the monotonous consumerism of the Last Men within the liberal capitalist order?

     

    It has been the province of thinkers who have achieved positions of governmental influence, from the liberal realist George Kennan to the Stalinist Eurocrat Alexandre Kojève, to explain in frank, “explicitly non-human” terms how the killing and impoverishment of millions is necessary for the prosperity of the West (Rosen 94). In the case of Kennan, the central matter is one of maintaining the imbalance of wealth and resources that grossly favors the United States; thus, the U.S. should abandon policies that champion “human rights, the raising of living standards and democratization” (Pilger 98). As Zizek notes, Kennan’s words have the salutary effect of tearing away the hypocritical mask of universal prosperity from late capitalism. But it is Kojève who articulates most forcefully the position that catastrophes always happen elsewhere and to other peoples. Kojève, a self-taught economist as well as a lecturer at the École des Hautes Études, where he taught an entire generation of French intellectuals, viewed his high-level position at the French ministry of foreign economic affairs as an unparalleled opportunity to unify theory and practice. For his idea of the “post-historical utopia,” which served as the philosophical underpinnings for his service to the French state and the emerging European Economic Community, is erected upon the “murders of millions of innocent persons in fulfillment of Hegel’s observation that history is a slaughter-bench […] upon which are prepared the feasts of the gods: the residents of the post-historical utopia” (Rosen 94).

     

    Thus avowedly antihumanist ideas have been increasingly breaking the surface of public discourse after 9/11–whether as the open advocacy of imperialism by Robert Kaplan or the “new racism” that justifies itself not on the basis of the “cultural” or “natural” superiority of the West but according to “unabashed economic egotism” (Welcome 149). Yet such appeals to brute, naked force and amoral national interest run counter to the value system of Christian morality (underscored by the title of Kaplan’s book) that informs mainstream American society. It is instructive here to refer to Zizek’s account of ideology, the function of which is to “combine a series of ‘inconsistent’ attitudes” inclusive of sentiments of both assent and critique, so that the “obscene unwritten rules” which sustain power may prevail over the public Law (Plague 75, 73). Ideology is thus a way to “have one’s cake and eat it,” providing unity for heterogeneous and contradictory positions, such as believing in the existence of a Christian God and a moral universe while approving of tyrannies and massacres in developing countries as the necessary conditions for one’s own peace, security, and economic well-being. Such antagonistic contents become unified through a “quilting point” (point de capiton), an “effectively […] immanent, purely textual operation” that becomes comprehended as an “unfathomable, transcendent, stable point of reference concealed behind the flow of appearances and acting as its hidden cause” (For They Know 18).

     

    The “quilting point” relieves the unbearable pressure wrought by irreducible ideological tensions by means of a reversal of perspective that magically changes turmoil and discord into harmony and resolve. Zizek’s examples of a “quilting point” include the function of the Jew as the bearer of contradiction in Nazi ideology as well as Saint Paul’s reversal of the view of Christ’s death on the Cross, which transformed it from a disastrous setback to the nascent Christian movement to its greatest triumph. It is my contention that the support of Christians–particularly the Christian Right–in the United States for decidedly un-Christian policies, such as a neo-imperialist foreign policy, a consumerist lifestyle, and the acceptance of a global system which condemns entire populations to destitution for the sake of U.S. prosperity, relies upon a “quilting point” that goes far beyond merely realistic concerns about the nation’s security. In fact, it is the very opposite of security; it is the mass destruction of the planet through the divine will of God that reconciles for these evangelicals the fact of having to live in the soulless, indolent world of the Last Men with a warlike imperialist foreign policy under the “third, properly symbolic moment” of an imminent apocalypse. Accordingly, wars are to be accepted not as the means for securing particular political ends, in terms of cold-hearted realpolitik, but rather to be read–and welcomed–as signs that the end-times have been set into motion. For the particular configuration of empire, Third World poverty, the dominance of sinful pleasures in the media, technological hubris, and the legal practice of abortion can only be tolerated by means of intense fantasies about their essentially temporary nature; such evils may reign at the present but will be swept away shortly by the punitive catastrophes of God’s judgment.

     

    II. Fateful Dispensations

     

    The view of the apocalypse that has become dominant at present among Christian evangelicals goes by the name of dispensational premillennialism. Promoted widely in the late nineteenth-century United States by John Nelson Darby, an Irish-born preacher who became the leader of a new sect, the Plymouth Brethren, after leaving the Protestant Church of Ireland, dispensational premillennialism emphasizes an account of the end-times based on a literalist reading of biblical prophecies (Boyer 87-88). Declaring that true Christians would be protected from the horrors predicted for the end-times, Darby popularized the doctrine of the Rapture, in which believers will vanish into thin air and be taken up into heaven. The Rapture has held a privileged position in the apocalyptic theology of Christian evangelicals, but evangelicals are divided about its timing vis-à-vis the Tribulation, the seven-year period when the earth will be overwhelmed by horrors and catastrophes of supernatural (and genocidal) magnitude. Post-tribulationism holds that the Rapture will occur at the Second Coming and that Christians will therefore have to suffer through the plagues, famines, and wars along with everybody else; this remains the viewpoint of a distinct minority that includes a number of survivalists. The view that looms largest in the public consciousness at present is the “pre-tribulationist” view, according to which believers will be evacuated into heaven before the onset of horrors. Of the two, the “pre-tribulationist” doctrine–the most widely held of the premillennialist viewpoints–offers the rosiest end-time scenario for believers and the ghastliest of sufferings for the faithless. Recent pre-tribulationists include Hal Lindsey, the best-selling author in the 1970s according to the New York Times, and Tim LaHaye and Jerry Jenkins, co-authors of the Left Behind series that features many of the best-selling novels of the last decade.

     

    Left Behind, published in 1995 as the first novel in the series by LaHaye and Jenkins, opens with a world thrown into disarray by the mysterious disappearances of millions of people. As is common in the representations of the apocalypse among evangelicals, the world is paralyzed by an epidemic of plane crashes and car accidents after their pilots and drivers instantaneously vanish. Not only have all true Christians disappeared, as well as have all children under the age of ten, but also all fetuses have vanished from wombs. The narrative focuses on the ordeals of those “left behind,” that is, former skeptics and nominal Christians who, because of the mass disappearances, become converts to the faith. One of the protagonists in the series is an airline pilot named Rayford Steele, who had been growing apart from his devoutly religious wife. After her disappearance, he becomes plunged into guilt, and visits the church she had attended, where the senior minister had frequently preached about the Rapture. A repentant junior pastor whose merely cosmetic faith had failed to make him dematerialize hands Steele a video made by the senior minister specifically in preparation for this eventuality. “As you watch this tape,” it begins, “I can only imagine the fear and despair you face, for this is being recorded for viewing only after the disappearance of God’s people from the earth” (209).

     

    The episode involving the video is intended as an injection of reality into the world of the novels, which have themselves been conceived as a kind of paratext to biblical prophecy (co-author Jenkins has said in a TV interview that he doesn’t think that these novels are fiction).1 Real-life churches enamored of apocalyptic prophecy have gone to the lengths of making their own videos to explain the Rapture to non-believers after their members have disappeared. Websites dealing with the apocalypse have special sections containing information for those still on earth in the wake of the divine evacuation. Yet the intensely programmatic aims of Left Behind–as a fictionalized treatment of the fulfillment of Biblical prophecies–interpellate the evangelical reader by satisfying the contradictory demands of a split consciousness. On the one hand, the reader is treated to the spectacle of divine wrath being visited upon hapless non-believers during the time of the Tribulation–major American cities are reduced to rubble by nuclear strikes, a meteor storm destroys much of Iraq, 200 million ghostly horsemen kill a third of the earth’s population. The evangelical reader is thus invited to marvel at and enjoy grandiose scenes of carnage inflicted by a punishing God (in Lacanian terms, the act of perversely identifying with the enjoyment of the big Other); as billions of unbelievers suffer gruesome deaths and tortures, he or she can remain secure in the knowledge that the faithful will all have ascended into heaven before these harrowing events take place. On the other hand, the struggles of Left Behind‘s heroes, who are new converts to Christianity, mirror (however hyperbolically) the widespread feelings of marginalization and embattlement among evangelicals living in a society that appears to them hopelessly corrupt, dangerous, and decadent.

     

    In the universe of Left Behind, the Antichrist is a charismatic Romanian politician with the unlikely name of Nicolae Carpathia. In the span of a few short months after the Rapture, he takes over the position of Secretary General of the UN, receives possession of Air Force One from an “emasculated” American president, purchases all the major media outlets around the globe, and wins the support of an overwhelming majority of the globe’s population in establishing a one-world government. Naming this universal regime the Global Community (GC), Nicolae takes on the title of “Global Potentate” and oversees the mass disarmament of the former nations’ arsenals from the GC’s capital, the newly rebuilt city of New Babylon, in Iraq. A scenario in which a pitifully small band of defiant Christians struggle against the might of a world empire may recall the “heroic period” of the early Church when it suffered persecution at the hands of the Roman emperors. Christian propaganda focusing on the courage and martyrdom of the saints greatly impressed Georges Sorel, whose myth of the general strike was influenced by the categorical refusal of the Church to accommodate the ostensibly reasonable demand of the Roman state to acknowledge the divinity of the emperor. As Sorel saw it, it was the Church’s uncompromising stance, which was judged by outsiders as irrational and foolish, that enabled it to take power once the empire had collapsed (211).2 The crude theology of Left Behind, however, depicts miracles taking place with plodding regularity and world events fitting mechanically into proper sequence in fulfillment of biblical prophecies. The notion that born-again Christians will be exempt from having to endure terrible suffering extends to the post-Rapture converts who are the principal characters of the series. The two prophets at the Wailing Wall, both converts from Judaism, routinely incinerate their Jewish and Muslim assailants with fire from their mouths. A full-scale surprise air assault by Russia against Israel results in the destruction of every single Russian jet without a single Israeli casualty. When a plague of demonic locusts is unleashed, the creatures sting only non-Christians, causing such agony that they “want to die but [are] unable to” do so (Apollyon 205). There is a moment of unintended sadistic humor, in which the authors’ avowed philo-semitism reveals its underlying prejudice, when Buck Williams, a member of the “Tribulation Force” of Christians mobilized to combat the Antichrist, chides his friend, the skeptical Nobel-Prize winning Jewish chemical engineer Chaim Rosenzweig, for not being more scientifically curious about these supernatural insects, knowing full well that the locusts’ stings will cause him terrible pain. When the older man doubles over with convulsions after being stung, he begs Buck to bring him some water, to which Buck perfunctorily replies, “It won’t help” (Apollyon 265).

     

    The supernatural turns of the narrative of Left Behind indulge the believer’s sense of Schadenfreude: evangelical Christians are depicted as the only people who understand why disaster is befalling the world; everyone else fruitlessly flails about for answers or, worse, is duped by the Antichrist’s explanations. Such smugness towards mass death and devastation is the result, I suggest, of the merger of American premillennialism and American consumer culture. For what is the Rapture but the “holiday from history” elevated to a cosmic principle? Moreover, this merger of millennialism and consumerism accounts for the increasingly wide appeal of apocalyptic scenarios and the recoding of apocalypse itself. The idea that the saved gain spiritual salvation but are spared physical suffering is a very different understanding of salvation than that of the early Church and its impassioned embrace of earthly ordeals and the risk of martyrdom. Indeed, the Rapture as a doctrine appears acutely symptomatic of a people for whom history is unreal and who have become convinced that disasters happen only to other people in foreign countries. The apocalyptic, as authors as different as Ernst Bloch and Norman Cohn remind us, has traditionally been linked to hopes for social transformation. The post-Augustinian revival of millenarianism by Joachim of Fiore was taken over by zealous Franciscans whose anger at the papacy and the wealthy would leave its mark upon the numerous anarchic sects and revolutionary uprisings that arose against the Church and nobility throughout medieval Europe. The apocalyptic of Left Behind, by contrast, is uncoupled from any concrete demand for social justice, and in fact advocates a political stance that opposes peace, especially in the Middle East, on principle, for the very reason that the Antichrist will dangle the vision of international harmony before a gullible globe as an irresistible lure for setting up his one-world government. Indeed, such humanistic ideas as religious tolerance, the rule of international law, and nuclear disarmament are all exposed in the novels as being ruses of the devil.

     

    The categorical rejection of working for peace as playing into the hands of the Antichrist results less in the active embrace of war as a means of achieving concrete foreign policy objectives than in a viewpoint which greets the outbreak of wars as confirmation that the Millennium is near. The readiness to approve of wars as fitting into the workings of a divine plan would make this brand of twenty-first-century American millenarianism an ideological partner, albeit a volatile one, to the neo-imperialism of the second Bush administration. There are, to be sure, less widely known groups of evangelicals whose millenarian expectations have led them to support nuclear disarmament, human rights, environmentalism, and other causes promoting for social justice. Indeed, the sharpest critics of premillennialist literalism are to be found among evangelicals themselves. The eclipse of political and ethical dilemmas by the question of individual salvation among most prophecy writers, who repeatedly exhort those not yet born-again to accept Christ so that they may escape the horrors of the Tribulation, nevertheless betrays a fatalistic inertia that causes their doctrines to drift into antinomianism. Take, for example, the words of doomsday popularizer Hal Lindsey regarding the inevitability of World War III: “It’s clearly not going to get better before Jesus comes; it’s going to get worse. Christ’s reentry to this planet is to save it from self-destruction, not to ascend a throne that we have provided for Him” (281). Lindsey is merely one among numerous prophecy writers who since the Progressive Era have dismissed social reform as utterly futile in combating social, political, and moral evils, which they believe will only increase as the end-times draw near. Questions of morality thus become effectively cast aside when politics is reduced to matter of choosing between actions that hasten the end and those that delay or “distract” from it.

     

    This rationale is explicitly at work in the activities of the so-called “Christian Zionists,” evangelicals who, believing in the decisive importance of Israel’s role in the apocalypse, have become fervent supporters for the hard-line, expansionist policies of the Israeli Right.3 Christian Zionists raised $14 million in 2001 alone to resettle diaspora Jews in Israel. They have also moved to cut off American financial support to Israel when it seemed that the Israelis and Palestinians were taking serious steps towards peace–when Ehud Barak, early in his ill-fated administration, attempted to move the peace process forward with the Wye River accord. In response, the conservative Christian Israel Public Affairs Committee, which was set up to garner Christian support for Israel, tried to block $1.6 billion in U.S. aid (Gorenberg 169). Ariel Sharon and Benjamin Netanyahu have recognized the Christian Right as the most steadfast backers of their aggressive policies against the Palestinians, and the Sharon government frequently provides expenses-paid trips to the Holy Land for leaders of the Christian Right and holds meetings to discuss strategy with the Christian Coalition and other groups (Goldberg; Engel). But according to the apocalyptic narrative of the Christian Zionists, of which Left Behind presents an elaborately detailed illustration, all Jews will have either been killed or become converts to Christianity by the time of Christ’s return.

     

    III. Onward Gnostic Soldiers

     

    It is thus in their fixation on Israel as the place where the decisive end-time prophecies will be fulfilled that premillennialist eschatology effectively crosses over into antinomianism–the doctrine that the redeemed no longer need uphold the moral law. Although the term was first coined by Martin Luther to condemn the views of Johannes Agricola, who took the notion of justification by faith to the extreme of maintaining that a Christian’s salvation cannot be altered even by the intentional commission of sins, antinomian beliefs can be traced to the Gnostic repudiation of the Decalogue as an instrument of oppression devised by the tyrannical creator deity, Yahweh, to keep human beings in a state of spiritual bondage. Saint Paul, like Luther, was acutely aware of the attraction that an amoral interpretation of Christ’s sacrifice as the extirpation of the Law might exert upon new converts to the faith, and so devoted considerable energy in his Letters to affirming the holiness of the commandments. Early Christianity, to be sure, was an apocalyptic sect; although Paul and the Apostles believed that the Second Coming was at hand, they discouraged speculation about when it would actually occur. Instead, they stressed the responsibility of the Christian to lead a moral life after he or she had become converted, that is, had undergone the symbolic death that leads the believer to a new life free from the dominion of sin. The believer must now live in the awareness of having died to sin, “but the life he lives, he lives to God” (Rom. 6.10). Contemporary premillennialism, on the other hand, is almost entirely consumed by the specifics of end-time speculation, and its central fantasy of the Rapture amounts to a blithe denial of physical death: a fantasy that–if I may be permitted to reverse one of Luther’s most memorable metaphors–squeezes this second life granted by salvation into the bowels leading out of earthly existence, in effect dispensing with the deeply Christian idea of conversion as a traumatic encounter which slays and recreates the believer as a subject–in this world.

     

    The question thus emerges as to whether premillennialism represents a deformation of Christian orthodoxy, or if it springs from an entirely different spiritual tradition. Let us recall here Harold Bloom’s thesis that Americans erroneously believe themselves to be Christian, but are in fact Gnostic without knowing it. In Bloom’s view, the exaltation of the self, the democratic–and anti-intellectual–mistrust of external authority, the vast spaces of the frontier, and the privileging of experience over doctrine in the churches have given rise to a kind of spirituality in the United States that has little in common with historical Christianity but is in fact a modern recurrence of ancient heresies. Such religiosity extends as well to the secular understanding of American nationhood, as the insistence upon the exceptionality of America’s destiny likewise commands the zeal of a religious devotion. For the ancient Gnostic as well as for the American Religion, the individual self is the irrevocable source of authenticity and truth, over and against any actual or imagined collectivity:

     

    urging the need for community upon American religionists is a vain enterprise; the experiential encounter with Jesus or God is too overwhelming for memories of community to abide, and the believer returns from the abyss of ecstasy with the self enhanced and the otherness devalued (Bloom 27).

     

    It is not repentance or brotherly love that is the defining attribute of Gnostic salvation but freedom–freedom from history, the cosmos, nature, as well as from morality itself. Gnosticism holds that the created world (and also the human body and soul) was designed by the Demiurge as a prison to hold the divine sparks, or pneuma, taken from the uncreated abyss of light. The politically explosive, even paranoiac character of Gnosticism in both its ancient and latter-day manifestations can be deduced from its account of the creation, which presents a cosmology in the form of a conspiracy theory. The minions of the tyrannical creator, the Archons, work to keep humanity in a state of ignorance regarding its own true, alien nature as well as the dark purpose of the created world. Gnostic salvation thus comes in the form of a liberating knowledge that awakens human beings to the presence of a divine spark hidden deep within the soul. The American Religion, Bloom argues, asserts this harsh dualism between spirit and matter in its “deepest knowledge,” which is the conviction of American Fundamentalists “that they were no part of the Creation, but existed as spirits before it, and so are as old as God himself” (57).

     

    The Gnostic valorization of freedom at the same time articulates an exceedingly vindictive denunciation of the physical world, a condemnation far harsher than any perspective found in Christian orthodoxy. The radical dualism of Gnosticism means that its adherents assume a drastically different spiritual posture from that of the Christian believer; whereas the latter experiences saving knowledge as the increasing awareness of his or her sinful condition in a divinely created cosmos, the Gnostic sets out to regain his or her innocence in a world that is the misshapen and unregenerate product of a malign deity. Thus, Gnosticism, in order to sustain its belief in the innocence of the uncreated spark, must project all that is baleful and malevolent onto the cosmos itself. The assertion of this insuperable divide between one’s inviolable self and the woeful prison of matter generates an equally intractable sense of indifference to one’s actions in the world, since such indifference, which is actively assumed out of disdain and horror and thus not to be mistaken for detached quietude, demonstrates the powerlessness of the Demiurge to corrupt the divine spark within. According to Bloom, the American Religion is likewise defined by the conviction that the world and one’s actions in it are irrelevant to the purity of the self: “If your knowing ultimately tells you that you are beyond nature, having long preceded it, then your natural acts cannot sully you. No wonder then, that salvation, once attained, cannot fall away from the American Religionist, no matter what he or she does” (265). Furthermore, if the creation is truly identical to the Fall, and the physical world reveals the designs of an antagonistic deity, then the sacrosanct self becomes defined according to its hostility against the order of being. For the American Religion’s worship of freedom is at the same time a war against otherness, which it understands as “whatever denies the self’s status and function as the true standard of being and of value” (Bloom 16).

     

    The premillennialist doctrine of the Rapture is thus distinctly Gnostic in character, as its image of mass ascent recalls not only the taking into heaven of Enoch and Elijah in the Hebrew Bible (both of whom are central figures in the Gnostic lore of the Kabbalah) but also the crucifixion of the Gnostic Christ, who, according to the heretical accounts, did not suffer a shameful and agonizing death but was instead transfigured by the bliss of illumination. The proximity of premillennialist eschatology to the heretical religiosity of the Gnostics and the enormous gulf separating it from Christian orthodoxy also becomes apparent in the fact that Left Behind emphatically breaks with the doctrine of original sin, as all children under the age of ten, as well as the unborn, are transported into heaven. What is astonishing is how this typically secular belief in the “natural innocence” of human beings, often derided by religious conservatives as a shallow, overly optimistic understanding of human nature, surfaces in a narrative in which the majority of the world’s population will be annihilated in horrifying catastrophes. There is, however, no contradiction that American Gnosticism, in its very creedlessness, has not yet been able to unify, least of all the perhaps altogether unprecedented phenomenon of an imperial eschatology–the convergence of millenarian fervor and imperialist domination that currently informs the foreign policy of the Gnostics of the American Right. The early, pre-Constantinian Church, Jürgen Moltmann notes, prayed “may thy kingdom come and this world pass away,” but once Christianity became the official religion of the empire, the imperial church came to pray instead “pro mora finis,” for the delay of the end (162). The know-nothing eschatologists of the Rapture, on the other hand, espouse an imperial politics while praying the prayers of the disinherited who yearned for divine intervention to destroy the empire!

     

    The contradiction of an imperialist apocalypse is thus a coherent manifestation of a heretical spiritual tradition that has survived systematic persecution by taking on forms which mask its origins. The God who works miracles in mechanistically fulfilling the predictions of his prophets exhibits aspects, on the one hand, of the God of the Pentateuch who rains frogs on Egypt and leaves manna on the desert floor every morning, and on the other, of the Demiurge derided by Captain Ahab for his automaton’s lack of creative intelligence in slapping together a jerrybuilt cosmos. According to Bloom, the American Religion is defined by a startling reversal of traditional Gnosticism and worships the Demiurge as God. In the contemporary instance, a God whose works are both visible and historical becomes not the subject of ridicule (as was the case for the ancient Gnostics), but rather idolized as a radically anthropomorphized divinity. Such a reversed Gnosticism belongs nonetheless to a rich and vital tradition of American thought and culture, as Emersonian self-reliance and the flourishing of antinomian dissent in the New World reflect unmistakably Gnostic preoccupations. In this new millennium, Gnostic forms of thought have become commonplace in popular culture, thanks in no small part to the ubiquity of New Age thinking that buttresses everything from conspiracy theories about UFOs to the psychobabble of our therapeutic culture. Gnostic concepts also dominate treatments of religious themes in films and literary works not distinguished by any explicit programmatic intent. Two recent Hollywood films, ostensibly about the nature of faith–M. Night Shyamalan’s Signs (2002) and Bill Paxton’s Frailty (2001)–attest to the insidious power of Gnostic doctrines to deflect ethico-religious dilemmas into fantasies of national idolatry.

     

    IV. Post-Ironic Affirmations

     

    In Signs, Mel Gibson plays a former Episcopalian minister named Graham Hess who has recently lost his faith after the death of his wife in a tragic road accident. The film opens with a shot of large, mysterious patterns set into the cornfield near his farmhouse, where he lives with his two small children and younger brother, a former baseball player named Merrill Hess, played by Joaquin Phoenix. Shrugging off the crop circles as a prank, Graham remains defiantly skeptical in the face of mounting evidence that an alien invasion is imminent. When the evening news shows UFOs hovering over many of the major cities of the world, Merrill suggests to Graham that there might be a divine purpose at work behind their arrival. Graham curtly dismisses any such notion of providence, saying that the last words of his wife, “swing away,” were spoken under the haze of pain-killers which caused her to fixate on a memory of watching Merrill playing in a baseball game, and that this incident proved to him that the cosmos is ruled purely by chance. Once the aliens attack, however, Graham realizes that his refusal to believe in the aliens’ existence has endangered the lives of his family, and so renounces his skepticism. At the film’s close, when Merrill confronts an alien that has taken his nephew hostage, Graham suddenly recognizes the true import of his wife’s final words–he directs Merrill to the baseball bat mounted in the wall behind him and instructs him to “swing away” at the extraterrestrial, thereby saving the life of his son. Even his son’s asthma proves providential, as an attack closes his lungs and thus saves him from the toxic gases emitted by the alien.

     

    Apart from the blatant consumerism of the film’s theology, in which the workings of God are made to fit the demands of a neat and tidy Hollywood resolution (God reduced tautologically to the mere function of deus ex machina), Signs is notable for its dimensionless literalism, its outright lack of metaphoric depth in its portrayal of the aliens. Science fiction, as a speculative genre, is rich in allegorical potential–one need only to call to mind the parable of Western imperialism in H. G. Wells’s The War of the Worlds, in which Great Britain gets to suffer the fate it inflicted upon the peoples it colonized. In Signs, by constrast, the aliens do not “stand for” anything at all; still less do they incarnate “something outside the rational chain of events, a lawless impossible real,” to which, according to Zizek, the birds in Hitchcock’s film attest (Looking Awry 105). The aliens’ sole purpose, rather, is to serve as the pretext for the dubious conversion of the film’s protagonist.

     

    In the “post-ironic” age we are now said to inhabit (especially after 9/11), in which one is called upon to renounce excessive skepticism and to embrace the responsibilities born of a new solemnity and earnestness, the very structure of the suspense narrative undergoes a dramatic shift. In earlier narratives about the supernatural, the genre of the “fantastic” as elucidated by Tzvetan Todorov in his classic study, the primary tension often emerges from and is defined by a protagonist’s–and the reader’s–activity of questioning whether or not ghosts or other paranormal beings really exist. The strategy of the post-ironic film about the supernatural hinges upon the surprise disclosure that the protagonist, with whom the audience has identified from the beginning of the narrative, is already dead. This narrative turn was made famous by Shyamalan’s earlier film, The Sixth Sense (1999), and also by Alejandro Aminabar’s The Others (2000), both of which interpellate the viewer as a ghost that has refused to acknowledge the fact of his or her own death. What these films seek to accomplish, whether by therapeutic ministrations or by the realization that death bridges two extensions of monotonous life, is the domestication of what Zizek, following Kierkegaard, calls the “ultimate horror,” which is not death but the inability to die (Ticklish Subject 292).

     

    To get a better sense of the ideological shifts at work in the post-ironic age, let us imagine a version of Signs made according to an alternate set of symbolic coordinates. In a perhaps more traditionally “ironic” version, Graham, instead of being convinced of God’s nonexistence after the death of his wife, actively inveighs against God as being cruel and malicious. Indeed, he would look upon the alien invasion as another instance of a bored and sadistic deity making a plaything out of human fate, that God’s gratuitous reaping of human life is no different from the aliens’ “harvesting” of human victims, and even raising the blasphemous suggestion that God himself is an alien. Such a film, regardless of whether it would go on to refute or validate these hypotheses, would not only achieve the narrative coherence missing from the existing Signs but would also directly confront the influence of Gnostic cosmology and its valuations. For what is at stake in Gnosticism is the human will that–often unwittingly–turns God into the devil. Indeed, in this re-imagining of Signs, the aliens would indeed come to represent something–the repressed alien God who was once identified with the blissful, uncreated abyss but now returns in the guise of the exterminating deity of a wished-for Armageddon.

     

    Signs, by contrast, presents the audience with a false wager, a dilemma about the existence of God that remains extrinsic to the strange events linked to an alien invasion, being instead programmatically foisted onto the eruption of the marvelous. As mentioned earlier, when Graham and Merrill first talk about the arrival of the alien ships, Gibson sternly rejects Merrill’s view that this fantastic event confirms the existence of a providential God governing the structure of the cosmos. The film therefore proceeds to muddle the distinction between faith and belief–that is, while faith is related to a binding symbolic pact, such as the covenant between God and Abraham or the Christian understanding of Christ’s death on the cross, one can “believe” in the existence of God (or in other deities or spirits for that matter) without necessarily having “faith” in Him, as in The Brothers Karamazov, where Ivan Karamazov condemns God for being unjust and unmerciful. Instead of developing Graham’s lack of faith as a refusal of the paradoxes of theodicy, Signs suppresses the question of faith by displacing it onto that of belief–Graham’s lack of faith in God translates seamlessly over the course of the film into his unwillingness to believe in the menace posed by the aliens, even as newscasts show armadas of flying saucers preparing to land and one of his neighbors is attacked by them. The narrative takes pains to emphasize the fact that his refusal to see the invasion as proof of God’s existence is what keeps from him taking reasonable steps to defend his family. In the film’s ideological universe, God can be counted on to demonstrate in astonishingly explicit terms that every tragedy or loss unequivocally serves higher and beneficial purposes, while skepticism is revealed as nothing less than a denial of reality itself. Signs thus shares with Left Behind a world in which the unbeliever commits the sin of stubbornly persisting in disbelief regarding the objective miracles of the alien invasion or of the Rapture that takes place before his or her eyes. The fact that belief is validated by miracles experienced on a collective and public scale turns any skepticism into a kind of psychosis in the face of cataclysms being meted out by divine power.

     

    It is impossible to overlook the ideological revision of Christianity at work here, in which the believers are protected by a God dealing in miraculous contrivances. The very crudeness of a consumerist theology in which belief draws the reward of earthly well-being undermines the traditional Christian idea that faith exposes the believer to suffering and hardships, often with tragic consequences. If Signs were about the properly Christian dilemma of faith, Graham’s belief in God might in fact lead him to place his children at terrible risk, not the other way around. He would do this not because he doesn’t love his children, but rather because faith, as the suspension of the ethical and the universal, demands that no other relationship come before the relationship of the faithful with God. I am taking Kierkegaard’s reading of the story of Abraham’s call to sacrifice Isaac as paradigmatic for the Christian conception of faith. The recent Gnostic rewriting of this tale in Bill Paxton’s Frailty (2001) proves quite instructive in its distance from Kierkegaard’s interpretation, with divergences that lay bare in compelling ways the spiritual dimensions of the new imperial politics.

     

    V. My So-Called Jihad

     

    Set in a small town in Texas in the late 1970s, Frailty stars Bill Paxton (who also directs) in the role of Meiks, a working-class father of two young boys named Adam and Fenton. His wife having died giving birth to the younger son, Meiks is presented as an exemplary single parent, devoted and caring, warm-hearted yet firm. He is shown preparing meals for his sons, making jokes with them, helping them with their math problems, and so on. But one night, the father comes rushing into the bedroom shared by his sons to tell them that he has received a vision from God. An angel had come bearing the message that God had chosen him and his family to fight the demons that have been unleashed on earth in preparation for the final clash between God and the devil. The younger son Adam readily accepts his father’s account as truth, whereas Fenton shrinks in horror, believing that his father has gone insane and is having homicidal delusions. Subsequent visitations by the angel reveal to Meiks the weapons he is to use–a length of metal pipe, an axe, and a pair of gardening gloves–and he receives the first list of names of the demons he is to “destroy” (Meiks makes much of this distinction between “killing people” and “destroying demons.”) Then, late one night he returns home carrying a bound and gagged middle-aged woman whom he has kidnapped. When Fenton implores him to spare her life, Meiks responds by admitting he too doesn’t want to go through with slaughtering the woman, but God’s commands must nevertheless be obeyed.

     

    The fundamentalist literalism behind the belief in the Rapture is echoed here in the father’s conviction that he can discern who, among those who look like ordinary persons, is actually a demon. When Meiks removes his white gloves and touches the flesh of his victims, he goes into convulsions while receiving visions of the evil acts they committed. Conversely, when Fenton brings the incredulous town sheriff to the house to show him the body of a recently executed victim, the father crumples over and begins to vomit after killing the officer, sickened at having been forced to take an innocent life to protect their sacred mission. Revealing that Fenton has been named by the angel as being one of the demons, thereby accounting for the boy’s reluctance to fight the forces of evil, Meiks declares that, in this one instance, he is determined to disprove the angel’s message. In a memorable scene portraying the manipulative, guilt-inducing power in a father’s admission of his own impotence, Meiks confides to his terrified elder son, just before locking him up in the dungeon built for their victims, “You’re my son, and I love you more than my own life. You know what’s funny about all this, Fenton? I’m afraid of you.”

     

    The father’s words prove prophetic when, after being released from the basement, Fenton is commanded by his father to prove his newfound faith by executing their latest victim. Handed the axe, the son turns the weapon against his father, killing him instead. The guilt assumed by the elder son goes beyond this act of parricide–it is later revealed, in a characteristically post-ironic narrative twist, that the skeptical Fenton is really the “God’s Hands” serial killer sought by the FBI, not the believing younger brother Adam, who had willingly participated in the “destruction” of the demons. At the end of the film, the audience learns that it is in fact Adam who is telling the story in flashback while impersonating Fenton, in order to trap the FBI agent who is the latest “demon” to appear on his list. Thus, as in Shyamalan’s better-known Sixth Sense, the thrill experienced by the audience at the conclusion of the film consists of the overturning of its spectatorial position (“the protagonist has been dead all along!”). In Frailty, the two characters with whom the viewer identifies–the FBI agent trying to solve the killings, the rational and compassionate “good” son who was traumatized by his father’s gruesome actions–are revealed in the end to have committed, respectively, matricide and serial murder. Such a dispossession of the spectator’s points of identification must not be understood simply as an effect of the film’s creators resorting to the only narrative trick still capable of taking today’s audiences by surprise. Rather, the “real story” that emerges once the skeptical point of view is feigned and then discarded validates the bloody undertakings of the father and younger son. The film establishes that, far from being a deluded madman, Meiks, as well as his son Adam, does possess the supernatural ability to perceive the demons hiding in human form. Indeed, Frailty essentially indicts the audience for its very presumption of critical distance; in the film’s moral universe, skepticism and doubt are attributes belonging to demons who murder their own parents, whereas ruthless, exterminating violence defines the actions of the righteous.

     

    Of course, religious (and political) faith does involve the overcoming of skepticism and doubt, and ruthless violence might even be the very action it enjoins. Indeed, Kierkegaard was drawn to Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac for precisely these reasons: to affirm the incommensurability between the moral law and the divine injunction. The Danish philosopher was well aware that virtue, common sense, and morality easily become obstacles to the unconditional commitment demanded by God. Frailty explicitly alludes to Abraham’s ordeal, when Adam, having thrown off the pretense of being Fenton, tells the FBI agent that his father had been commanded by God to kill his son: “You see, God asked Dad to destroy his son, much like he asked Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac. But Dad couldn’t do it, and God didn’t take pity on Dad like he did Abraham.” Doesn’t the category of the religious necessarily involve in some fundamental sense the repudiation of the ethical and of any notion of the good, defined in human terms? And if faith is ultimately to be opposed to ethics, reason, and common sense, doesn’t Frailty merely present an updated illustration of Kierkegaard’s idea of the teleological suspension of the ethical? The answer is no, and we may proceed by looking at how the film significantly deviates from Kierkegaard’s understanding of Abraham’s sacrifice.

     

    In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard defines the “paradox of faith” as the idea that the “single individual is higher than the universal” (70). Thus, insofar as the person of faith has “an absolute duty” to God, for Abraham the ethical/universal is the temptation which seeks to dissuade him from acting according to his faith. Kierkegaard contrasts the trial of the man of faith with that of the classical tragic heroes Agamemnon and Brutus. The mythical Achaean king and the defender of the Roman republic are forced to sacrifice their children for the sake of a greater social good–the necessity that compels them is thus the object of public approval and veneration and their actions are recognized as ethical. Abraham, on the other hand, is ready to commit an act of killing without any reference to the higher good of ethics. His sacrifice of Isaac is emphatically not for the sake of preventing a greater evil, and serves no purpose other than the fact that God has commanded it. One should stress here the wrong-headedness of attempts to critique the story of Abraham and Isaac as an oppressive myth that perpetuates the violence of patriarchal authority by referring to real-life instances where fathers have murdered their own children, such as the father who stabbed his daughter to death in California in 1990 or the 1996 case of Robert Blair in New Hampshire (in both instances, the father appealed to the biblical story of Abraham to justify and explain his act of killing), as detailed by anthropologist Carol Delaney in her book, Abraham on Trial: The Social Legacy of Biblical Myth (1998). According to Kierkegaard, God’s terrible commandment not only separates Abraham from the ethical, but also renders his dilemma incommunicable to others. The incommunicable nature of his ordeal thus makes Abraham either a man of faith or a murderer, but what his faith precisely excludes–the identity he is not ready to assume–is the “middle position” between the two, namely that of the murderer who makes the excuse that God commanded him to do it.

     

    In Frailty, by contrast, the divine command given to Meiks lacks the mystifying and futile character of the injunction imposed upon Abraham. He is ordered to kill Fenton not because his faith is being tested through an ordeal, but rather for the very pragmatic reason that his elder son is a demon and thus places in jeopardy the family’s mission of fighting the forces of evil. If the film were faithful to Kierkegaard and had evoked the Abrahamic sacrifice in all of its appalling gratuitousness, Meiks would have been called to slay his innocent, obedient younger son. Similarly, whereas according to Kierkegaard, Abraham’s faith brings him into contradiction with the moral law, the divine command in Frailty never conflicts with the demands of the ethical universal. Meiks’s failure to slaughter Fenton is presented both as a breach of moral necessity and as a lapse in practical judgment, as it results in his own death at the hands of his son. Thus, the divine injunction is not experienced as radically and inexplicably horrifying; rather, Meiks maintains to the end the illusion that he is acting on behalf of the good when God imposes upon him the command to do what is terrible. Frailty thus domesticates the terrible command by keeping it on the side of the moral law and collective good (as opposed to the Kierkegaardian constellation of the divine injunction/transgression of the law/separation from the universal). As such, the film fails to achieve the status of what Zizek calls the “properly modern post- or meta-tragic situation,” which comes about when “high necessity compels me to betray the very ethical substance of my being” (Did Somebody 14).

     

    VI. Collateral Sacrifices

     

    Frailty also avoids the problematic of secrecy that is decisive in Kierkegaard’s account of faith, invoking instead a theology of visible redemption through its supernatural motif whereby Meiks and his younger son Adam are able to distinguish, simply by laying their hands on others, which persons are beings of unregenerate evil. A similar plot device is to be found in Left Behind, in which the saved can be distinguished from non-believers by the mark of God on their foreheads–a mark, furthermore, that can be perceived only by other believers. Of course, one can object that Frailty‘s basis in the Bible is tenuous at best anyway, since Jesus Christ and his disciples went around casting out demons, not slaying those possessed by them. But one may counter that such deviations from the Gospel are far too common in religious contexts across the American cultural and political landscape to be regarded as mere exceptions to orthodoxy, as a theology of visible salvation is not of Christian provenance but profoundly Gnostic in inspiration. The mystical ability to fathom the hidden guilt of others or instantly recognize their status as unbelievers may give rise in these two instances to an infantile view of good and evil which easily lends itself to the demonizing of one’s political enemies, but the vision of sanctified violence that emerges at the end of Frailty bears particular relevance for the way in which wars have been conducted in the post-Cold War order. For the violence in the film is sanctified precisely insofar as it is surgical–its victims, with the one regrettable instance of collateral damage in the town sheriff (for which the film implicitly faults Fenton’s skepticism), are without exception murderers and pedophiles who would otherwise get away with their crimes.

     

    The idea of surgical killing, which is claimed to annihilate enemy combatants and matériel while minimizing civilian casualties, was of course a major legitimating factor for the recent war of conquest against Iraq as well as for the Persian Gulf War of 1991. Images of computer guidance systems directing bombs and missiles to Iraqi military targets dominated the television newscasts during the previous conflict, while the first Bush administration successfully kept pictures of dead and wounded bodies, the traditional imagery of war, off the air. The Air Force, however, announced on 15 March 1991 that 93.6% of the tonnage of the explosives that fell on Iraq were in fact conventional bombs, belying the surgical nature of the destruction inflicted upon Basra, the second largest city in Iraq before the war (Walker). Furthermore, even as the destroyed and damaged equipment of the Iraqi army was subjected to meticulous examination, the military suppressed any precise count of enemy casualties, giving a 50% margin of error to a total estimate of 100,000 Iraqi dead, a margin that, in the words of Margot Norris, “reduces the dead to phantoms of speculation” (242). Operation Desert Storm, celebrated as an overwhelming victory for the United States and its allies, concluded with the mass incineration of retreating Iraqi troops on what has become known as the Highway of Death. In a single month, a greater tonnage of bombs was dropped on Iraq than were used during all of World War II, while scarcely a photo of its human cost appeared in the U.S. media. The Western riposte to Islamist suicide attacks is to massacre from long range, using weaponry such as depleted uranium shells, which cause long-term environmental damage and physiological harm in the form of cancer, birth defects, and poisoned ground-water.

     

    Frailty makes explicit the inherent fantasy in the derealization of mass Arab casualties in its depiction of victims who, in spite of their normal, everyday appearance, fully deserve to be slaughtered. Because it lacks the essentially programmatic nature of Left Behind, which cannot but provoke in the nonfundamentalist reader the grotesque and suffocating sensation of being directly confronted by another’s obscene fantasy, Frailty renders with greater degrees of concreteness the ideological equivalent of a theology of visible salvation in the realm of politics. It baldly takes at his word the fatuous, Manichean utterances of the current President Bush (America’s enemies “hate” freedom; Americans value “innocent life”) in portraying a pair of serial killers who insist that they do value “innocent life.” Yet the film’s over-identification with post-9/11 militaristic moralizing is constrained by certain ideological limitations. Aside from its Gnostic revision of the Abraham story, Frailty fails to unsettle the belief of the “God’s Hands” that the victims of their jihad are anything but irredeemably depraved. The film in this sense falls in line with a president who self-righteously condemns the nations he considers hostile to his administration’s interests as “evil.” The skeptical viewer will no doubt be tempted to look with irony upon the final revelation that the calling received by the “God’s Hands” is true and divinely inspired. But an ironic interpretation remains wholly external to the narrative–nothing within the storyline authorizes such a stance. Instead, Frailty anticipates a “fundamentalist” reading by evoking the genre of the “superhero,” a comparison drawn by the young Adam (“we’re a family of superheroes that are going to help save the world”) when his father first shares the revelation of his own personal “war against evil.”

     

    One thing that has changed after 9/11, now recognized by the Left as a “missed opportunity” for the United States to confront and reevaluate its role in the world, is the acceptance of ideas formerly associated with the religious fringe by the mainstream media. Time magazine’s cover story of 23 June 2002 on the popularity of the Left Behind series commended the novels for exemplifying American optimism in the face of tragedy and took pains to mute the criticisms offered by various religious scholars and theologians. As mentioned earlier, Jerry Jenkins, the more avuncular of Left Behind‘s co-authors, declaimed in somber, almost melancholic tones on ABC’s UpClose that their work is not fiction, although he stated that he personally wishes that it were. As further evidence of how their exterminist eschatology is no longer regarded as a fringe phenomenon, his interviewer failed to pose any probing questions about a doctrine with a questionable basis in the Bible that bears more than passing resemblance to the cosmology of the Heaven’s Gate cult, which committed mass suicide near San Diego in March 1997. Yet, even as the Christian fundamentalist fantasy ideology of the apocalypse serves to endorse for many the blindly destructive policies of the United States in the Middle East, its suicidal nature reveals that it cannot entirely extinguish the critical force of the genre to which it belongs. For insofar as the apocalyptic evokes the sweeping and total transformation of things as they are, the millenarianism of the Christian Right comprises its own unconscious indictment. The prophecies of the Bible, with their rage against arrogant empires and unjust authorities, have served as a source of hope for the dispossessed and disenfranchised–that is, for those who are in a position to appreciate the metaphoric dimension of the imagery of the apocalyptic. In the hands of the fundamentalists for whom such symbols appear emptied of any metaphoric resonance, the prophecies, especially that of the Rapture, have become a kind of time bomb set against the providential history of the United States itself. “We live after the failure of peoples,” writes Giorgio Agamben, implying that the entry of a people or nation into post-history is marked by their taking up the task of reckoning with their crimes and complicity in terror (142). It might very well be that the apocalypticism of this new millennium is a kind of last obstacle–a final, almost but not quite nakedly nihilistic outburst seeking to give American manifest destiny a moral justification–before Americans, too, begin to realize their place alongside all the other peoples of the world. Until then, we are all subject to the risk that this apocalyptic will perpetrate further atrocities in the course of discrediting itself, so that we may have to live through yet more tragedies before we recognize how we were already bankrupt.

     

    Notes

     

    1. The interview took place on ABC News show UpClose on 5 August 2002.

     

    2. Accounting for the scarcity of attention accorded to the persecution of Christians in pagan literature, Sorel notes that “no ideology was ever more remote from the facts than that of the early Christians” (211).

     

    3. Nicholas Veliotes, former assistant secretary of state for the Near East and South Asia, relates that then-President Reagan himself explained to him the basis for conservative Christian support for Israel in biblical prophecy: “in order for Armageddon to occur, Israel had to exist so that it could be destroyed. Hence, any possible threat to the Jewish state has to be opposed. In this view, the peace process itself is a threat that must be opposed” (15). See Veliotes.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Agamben, Giorgio. Means without End: Notes on Politics. Trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2000.
    • Bloom, Harold. The American Religion: The Emergence of the Post-Christian Nation. New York: Simon, 1993.
    • Boyer, Paul. When Time Shall Be No More: Prophecy Belief in Modern American Culture. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1992.
    • Cloud, John. “Meet the Prophet: How an Evangelist and Conservative Activist Turned Prophecy into a Fiction Juggernaut.” Time 23 Jun. 2002: 50+.
    • Engel, Matthew. “Meet the New Zionists.” The Guardian 28 Oct. 2002 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,2763,820528,00.html>.
    • Frailty. Screenplay by Brent Hanley. Dir. Bill Paxton. Perf. Bill Paxton, Matthew McConaughey, and Powers Boothe. Lions Gate, 2001.
    • Goldberg, Michelle. “Antichrist Politics.” Salon 24 May 2002 <http://archive.salon.com/politics/feature/2002/05/24/dispensational/index.html>.
    • Gorenberg, Gershom. The End of Days: Fundamentalism and the Struggle for the Temple Mount. New York: Free, 2000.
    • Harris, Lee. “Al Qaeda’s Fantasy Ideology: War without Clausewitz.” Policy Review 114 (2002): 19-36.
    • “Interview with Jerry Jenkins,” ABC News UpClose. ABC, New York. 5 Aug. 2002.
    • Kagan, Robert. “Power and Weakness: Why the United States and Europe See the World Differently.” Policy Review 113 (2002): 3-28.
    • Kaplan, Robert. Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos. New York: Random, 2001.
    • Kierkegaard, Søren. Fear and Trembling/Repetition. Trans. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1983.
    • LaHaye, Tim, and Jerry Jenkins. Left Behind. Wheaton: Tyndale, 1995.
    • —. Apollyon. Wheaton: Tyndale, 1999.
    • Lindsey, Hal. The Final Battle. Palos Verdes: Western Front, 1995.
    • Moltmann, Jürgen. The Coming of God: Christian Eschatology. Trans. Margaret Kohl. London: SCM, 1996.
    • The New Oxford Annotated Bible. Ed. Herbert G. May and Bruce M. Metzger. Oxford, UK: Oxford UP, 1984.
    • Norris, Margot. Writing War in the Twentieth Century. Charlottesville: U of Virginia P, 2000.
    • Pilger, John. The New Rulers of the World. London: Verso, 2002.
    • Rosen, Stanley. Hermeneutics as Politics. Oxford, UK: Oxford UP, 1987.
    • Signs. Screenplay by M. Night Shyamalan. Dir. M. Night Shyamalan. Perf. Mel Gibson, Joaquin Phoenix, Rory Culkin, and Abigail Breslin. Buena Vista, 2002.
    • Sorel, Georges. Reflections on Violence. Trans. T. E. Hulme. New York: Peter Smith, 1941.
    • Walker, Paul. “U.S. Bombing: The Myth of Surgical Bombing in the Gulf War.” War Crimes: A Report on United States War Crimes Against Iraq to the Commission of Inquiry for the International War Crimes Tribunal. Ed. Ramsey Clark et al. 1992 <http://deoxy.org/wc/wc-index.htm>.
    • Zizek, Slavoj. Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism?: Five Interventions in the (Mis)use of a Notion. London: Verso, 2002.
    • —. For They Know Not What They Do. London: Verso, 1991.
    • —. Looking Awry. Cambridge: MIT P, 1991.
    • —. The Plague of Fantasies. London: Verso, 1997.
    • —. The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology. London: Verso, 1999.
    • —. Welcome to the Desert of the Real. London: Verso, 2002.

     

  • Constellation and Critique: Adorno’s Constellation, Benjamin’s Dialectical Image

    Steven Helmling

    Department of English
    University of Delaware
    helmling@udel.edu

     

    Fredric Jameson years ago characterized Adorno’s chief critical device or method as the “historical trope” (Marxism and Form 3-59), so it shouldn’t strike anyone as a novel claim that Adorno’s “constellation” displays affinities with other now-familiar devices of modernist art and literature–Eisensteinian montage, cubist collage, the Joycean “epiphany,” the Poundian “ideogram.” The young Adorno presumably first encountered the word’s relevant usages when he read Benjamin’s Trauerspiel in the late 1920s; however that may be, the word recurs in his work throughout his career, from “The Actuality of Philosophy” (1931) to the late pieces collected in Critical Models. Its connotations are diverse and often conflicting, and one could make an interesting study of such tellingly divergent uses, as well as an interesting speculation of the rarity of Adorno’s own second-level reflections on the word.1 The present study, however, attempts nothing so comprehensive.2 I want in this paper to unpack some of the implications of constellation as a critical practice and elicit their tension or contradiction (a word not necessarily a vitiation in Adorno’s usage, and in many contexts a term of high praise) with the overall program, derived from Hegel, that Adorno regularly calls “immanent critique.” To that end, I will consider constellation in relation to Walter Benjamin’s “dialectical image,” with which it has obvious but also qualified affinities, to the Gestalt psychology of Wolfgang Köhler, from which Adorno would have been anxious to distinguish it, and to the epic device of “parataxis” as Adorno commends Hölderlin’s use of it. I will end by bringing the issues that emerge to bear on the 1944 Dialectic of Enlightenment, co-authored with Max Horkheimer, and the curiously agitated stasis “motivating” its thematic of Western Civilization’s “progress” and “regress.”

     

    ADORNO AND BENJAMIN

     

    It is in his “Portrait of Walter Benjamin” that Adorno speaks most suggestively and, for his own practice, most revealingly, about the theory, the practice, and the effect, of Benjamin’s dialectical image:

     

    The [Benjaminian] essay as form consists in the ability to regard historical moments, manifestations of the objective spirit, "culture," as though they were natural. Benjamin could do this as no one else. The totality of this thought is characterized by what may be called "natural history." He was drawn to the petrified, frozen or obsolete elements of civilization, to everything in it devoid of domestic vitality [...]. The French word for still-life, nature morte, could be written above the portals of his philosophical dungeons. The Hegelian concept of "second nature," as the reification of estranged human relations, and also the Marxian category of "commodity fetishism" occupy key positions in Benjamin's work. He is driven not merely to awaken congealed life in petrified objects--as in allegory--but also to scrutinize living things so that they present themselves as ancient, "ur-historical" and abruptly release their significance. Philosophy appropriates the fetishism of commodities for itself: everything must metamorphose into a thing in order to break the catastrophic spell of things. Benjamin's thought is so saturated with culture as its natural object that it swears loyalty to reification instead of flatly rejecting it [...] the glance of his philosophy is Medusan. (Prisms 233)

     

    For us, there is peril in this assimilation of culture to nature, which we regard as the classic ruse of ideology. Our antidote, from Lévi-Strauss and Barthes, is to dissolve the category of nature entirely into culture–to “flatly reject,” in effect, to deny our critical practice any resort to, the category of nature at all. But for Adorno, the ruse itself is the first thing critique must grapple with–and it must do so “immanently,” that is, from the inside: critique must suffer the ruse of ideology, and even in a sense reproduce it from within, in the very course of the attempt to unmask it and undo its power. Hence the use, for Adorno and for Benjamin, of a critical device that permits just what our usual practice forbids, namely, a patience of, or tolerance for, transaction between categories (for example, nature/culture) that other styles of “external” critique would disjoin. An “external” critical practice insistently seeks to separate culture and nature, to fortify or sharpen or harden the putative antithesis between them, to (as it were) dis-ambiguate the mystifying conflation by recourse to which ideology sanctifies cultural/historical contingencies as natural necessities. By contrast, the practice of Benjamin and Adorno might here be thought of as a “motivated” re-ambiguation that again allows culture and nature access to each other in ways that can be critical of the binary from “inside,” ways impossible for any “external” construction of them as mutually exclusive. As Adorno elsewhere puts it:

     

    For [Benjamin] what is historically concrete becomes image--the archetypal image of nature as of what is beyond nature--and conversely nature becomes the figure of something historical. (Notes 2: 226)

     

    Hence it is a good thing, an opening to critical insight rather than an ideological lapse, that “in Benjamin the historical itself looks as though it were nature” (Notes 2: 226), or, even more provocatively, that Benjamin’s work “swears loyalty to reification instead of flatly rejecting it” (Prisms 233).3

     

    It is this subversive evocation of the ideology of nature from within, “immanently,” that makes Benjamin’s “Denkbild” or “thought image” (and, I am of course arguing, Adorno’s constellation as well) a dialectical image:

     

    [Benjamin] was right to call the images of his philosophy dialectical [...] the plan of his book on the Paris Arcades envisaged a panorama of dialectical images as well as their theory. The concept of dialectical image was intended objectively, not psychologically: the representation of the modern as the new, the past, and the eternally invariant in one would have become both the central philosophical theme and the central dialectical image. (Notes 2: 226-7)

     

    The language here leaves room for some unclarity. The “representation of the modern as the new, the past, and the eternally invariant in one” would, presumably, be ideological–the world’s own self-representation–and hence a fit “object” (“philosophical theme”) for ideological exposé by way of the dialectical image. But the unclarity allows also the suggestion that the representation is itself the theme and the (dialectical) image. Hold this ambiguity–cognate with our culture/nature problem–in mind; we will recur to it throughout. For now, the passage implicates in the “dialectic” that the dialectical image achieves or allows not only nature/culture, but also “theory” and “image”–another categorical binary often operative, and often less consciously, than culture/nature, in critical practice. In Hegel, “picture-thinking” is quite specifically a pre- or proto-philosophical kind of consciousness–although survivals of it persist into the age, the consciousness, the practices of philosophy itself. More conventionally, though–by something like a Hegelian methodological fiction–it belongs to earlier phases of the unfolding story of the World-Spirit, in which the advent of theory or philosophy is itself an important milestone. And this evocation of the World-story reminds us, too, that for Hegel, the dialectic was ineluctably a temporal process, which is to say conceptualizable only in or as narrative. Image, by contrast, is spatial and atemporal–and to that extent a dialectical image would seem to be a kind of paradox. Yet what makes the “representation of the modern as the new, the past, and the eternally invariant in one” ideological is that it has already collapsed the narrative implicit in the given terms (modern, new, the past) into the non-narrative stasis of an “eternally invariant” condition. Hence the interest, when Adorno insists,

     

    there are good reasons why [Benjamin's] is a dialectic of images rather than a dialectic of progress and continuity, a "dialectics at a standstill"--a name, incidentally, he found without knowing that Kierkegaard's melancholy had long since conjured it up. (Notes 2: 228)

     

    Thus can a Marxist critique recuperate, “immanently,” the arch-bourgeois Kierkegaard, as himself an immanent sufferer, exemplar, critic and diagnostician of all the superstitions and humors (“melancholy”) that compound the bourgeois ideology and Lebenswelt. But more to the present point is that the critical practice of Adorno generally presents what might seem the paradox or contradiction of an insistently historicizing program, realized in a critical practice that is virtually never motivated by historical argument in the form of historical narrative. Hence the relevance of the formula “dialectics at a standstill,” which has become almost a slogan for Western Marxists and others for whom the forward momentum of nineteenth-century progressive (liberal) and/or revolutionary (Marxist) narratives of eventual (of course, diversely) happy endings have stalled in the steady-state nightmare of the twentieth century, where, as Adorno and Horkheimer starkly put it, “mankind, instead of entering into a truly human condition, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism” (xi). For a world at such an impasse, “dialectics at a standstill”–a non-narrative dialectic–is the only kind of dialectic that answers to our condition.

     

    “Dialectics at a standstill” is, then, not only the ideological condition to be contested, but also the contestation’s method. Indeed, the passage from Benjamin’s Passagen-Werk from which the phrase comes makes just this point: “dialectics at a standstill–this is the quintessence of the method” (Arcades 865); elsewhere, quite simply, “image is dialectics at a standstill”; and, “only dialectical images are genuinely historical” (Arcades 463). Here again we observe the commutativity of the ideological ethos and the critical method. To link all this–not only ethos and method, but program as well–with dialectical image suggests another, related, contradiction latent in Adorno’s practice that can tell us much about his motives and his meanings. Since Hegel, the project, or desire, of broaching the “new” in the domain of Spirit has regularly generated figurations of loosening or liquifying formations inherited from the past that have “hardened” or “frozen” and thus become rigid and imprisoning. Hegel himself spoke of philosophy’s task in such terms, of “freeing determinate thoughts from their fixity” (Hegel 20); compare this with Hegel’s frequent formula that thought “sets in motion” thought-objects, former “certainties,” that had been stalled. Adorno likewise typically figures reification as a process of freezing, hardening, or congealing, and the critical process, by contrast, as one of softening, reliquifying, and so on, as we have already seen in the quotation above praising Benjamin’s attempt to “awaken congealed life in petrified objects” (Prisms 233). The task of immanent critique, as Adorno puts it elsewhere, is that “congealed” ideological thought “must be reliquified, its validity traced, in repetition” (Negative 97). Above we saw what I called a motivated ambiguation of culture and nature; here we have a cognate move, in that to “reliquify” so as to release or engender the new must entail a “repetition” of that which had been “congealed.” Also, regarding “its validity traced”: immanent critique seeks as much to recover what is valid in ideological congealments as to undo what is false.

     

    Thus conceived, immanent critique might seem, itself, an ambiguously narrative process putting the forward motion of renewal in tension with the cyclical or static entrapments of repetition. But the ambiguity above, whereby narrative devolves into standstill, into impasse, into image, has its analogous playing-out in the reversal whereby figurations of critical, anti-ideological reliquification are displaced by their very opposite: by imageries of petrification, hardening, freezing, rigidifying, even killing. In the following passage, for example, Adorno’s discussion of Benjamin’s dialectical image generates, not for the first time (we have already seen it above in the passage from Prisms) the balefully minatory image of Medusa.

     

    Benjamin's medusa-like gaze [...] turns its object to stone [...]. [It] froze [its object] to a kind of ontology [sc. hypostatization, reification, fetish] from the start [...]. This [...] was the spirit in which [Benjamin] restructured every element of culture that he encountered, as if the form of his intellectual organization and the melancholy with which his nature conceived the idea of something beyond nature, of reconciliation, necessarily endowed everything he took up with a deathly shimmer. (Notes 2: 228)

     

    Here, it would seem, the “gaze” of the critic does to its object just what immanent critique and other projects of “dereification” aim to un-do: hardens it, turns it to stone, turns it into a thing. (A resort to etymology here seems worthwhile: “thing” in Latin is res, the root of “re-ification; in Greek, “thing” is ontos, the root of “onto-logy,” another “thing,” so to speak, that Benjamin’s “medusa-gaze” turns its object into–both the thing, we might say, and its ideological theorization by Heidegger; hence “ontology” as figure here for what Adorno variously calls “reification,” “hypostatization,” “fetishization.”) Indeed, the critic’s gaze does something very suggestive of killing the object, depriving it of life–besides Medusa’s own lethal power of petrification, such is the suggestion of “endowing” it “with a deathly shimmer.” In context, it is following this passage that the “dialectics at a standstill” passage appears–so there is a pointed connection between, or constellation of, the theme above of non-narrative stasis and the point here about death. In Benjamin’s

     

    micrological method [...] the historical movement halts and becomes sedimented in the image. One understands Benjamin correctly if one senses behind each of his sentences the conversion of extreme animation into something static, in fact the static conception of movement itself. (Notes 2: 228)

     

    Here, again, the critic “immanently” repeats, even suffers, the stasis of our modern ideological condition in a way to perform (“repeat”) that very condition–the “moment” of the process captured in the Medusa-image being that in which the critic enacts the “repetition” of that congealed, petrified condition, not (yet) its reliquification.

     

    In his 1959 lectures on Kant, Adorno calls for a hermeneutic that, by entering the (objective) “force field” of a writer’s or a text’s problematic, allows the interpreter to “go beyond the immediate meaning on the page” (Kant’s 80). The Medusa image, fraught as it is with what Freud would call “antithetical” motifs, emboldens me to give this a try. In the myth, the Medusa’s power to petrify anyone who looks at her is defeated by Perseus, who contrives to approach her without looking, and at the crucial face-to-face moment, holds up to her a highly polished mirror. Medusa, seeing her own image, is herself turned to stone, and Perseus then decapitates her. He keeps her severed head, however, and in further adventures, he uses it as a weapon–a fright object with which to petrify new enemies. Adorno licenses us, I suggest, to read “Benjamin’s medusa-gaze” as having the power to do to ideology something like what Perseus’s mirror does to Medusa herself, as well as to do what Perseus uses Medusa’s severed head to do to further adversaries. This image, of Medusa’s petrifying power turned against itself and then appropriated for further use against other threats, suggests something of the reflexiveness, the “antithetical” character, that is, the capacity for “dialectical” reversals, as well as something of the ordeal, “the labour and the suffering of the negative,” incumbent on the (hero-) critic, encoded in Adorno’s project of immanent critique.

     

    I have been arguing, in effect, that the dialectical image de-narrativizes the implicitly temporal or narrative course, from “repeat” to “reliquify,” of immanent critique. We might say the Medusa gaze of the dialectical image freezes the temporality of immanent critique into a frozen, static, petrified image. But we can also play this construction the other way, reversing its direction, to reinsert the dialectical image back into the story by assigning it a particular “moment” in the narrative. If immanent critique is meant to reliquify an antecedent hardening, then the Medusa-gaze would seem to belong to the prequel of the story: the moment of its object’s petrification would seem to be the indispensable narrative precondition for the repetition and reliquification to follow. But Adorno evokes the Medusa myth in a context that suggests an even more surprising narrative for the Medusa moment to be assigned its place in. In the passage in question, Adorno resorts to the Medusa-image in the context of Benjamin’s treatment of some contemporary neo-Kantian efforts to make common cause with “ontology”; whether he is talking about Heidegger himself here I am uncertain, but the point would seem to be that Benjamin’s Medusa-gaze “froze” this nascent ideology in advance of its own hardening: that its action, in other words, projected or anticipated before the fact what still, at the time, lay in the future. The petrification it operates in such a case is prospective, not retrospective, which is to say it is petrification for the first time, not as repetition. To adapt Ernst Bloch, there is (of course) a “not yet” of ideology as well as of utopia–between which could be inserted, as a mediation, the “not yet” of (immanent) critique itself as Benjamin projects it in the very last sentence of his book on Baudelaire: “with the upheaval of the market economy, we begin to recognize the monuments of the bourgeoisie as ruins even before they have crumbled” (Charles Baudelaire 176).

     

    ADORNO VERSUS BENJAMIN

     

    I have so far expounded Adorno’s sense of constellation and critique by way of Adorno’s remarks on Benjamin’s dialectical image–a way of proceeding that has obscured their differences. Benjamin’s critical practice is strongly marked, as is Adorno’s, by the work of Freud, though a Freud mediated by the Surrealists rather than, as for Adorno, by Nietzsche. We may risk the generalization that the Surrealist program was to inhabit the madness of the culture, to re-enact it from within, less (directly) to critique it, than to exhibit it–to insert themselves into the Freudian drama, we might say, in the role not of ego, but of id, on the evident premise that the ego, whatever its for-or-against posture toward the world, cannot be as “naturally” or as “immediately” transgressive as the id. The practice of the Surrealists typically embraced what Adorno would have regarded as an irrationalist faith that the real madness was reason, and unreason its only antidote or purge, if not quite its salvation or its utopian alternative. Benjamin seems to regard such a resort to madness with some ambivalence–almost as something like a desire unhappily forbidden him by reason of that obdurately quotidian sanity from which all his brilliance and all his bile were powerless to deliver him. Some such longing, or nostalgia, seems to me symptomatized in Benjamin’s sense of the world as a pallid, petrified, undead, fundamentally irrational waking dream, and the resistless momentum by which this “phantasmagoria” passes into “allegory” in all the diffuse senses Benjamin lent that word. Benjamin plays with a morbid-seeming identification with the dead and with death itself; you might say that in his work critique is playing possum–one of his most famous quotations, indeed, avows that critique itself long since left the land of the living.

     

    Adorno was moved by the pathos of all this in the life and death of his friend, and I would bet that he had Benjamin in mind in section V of the Anti-Semitism chapter of Dialectic of Enlightenment, in which the modern subject’s protective “mimesis” of the reified surrounding world is imaged as a feigned death entailing all too literally the spiritual consequences of the real thing. Adorno’s animated, even febrile critical style could never be confused with Benjamin’s passive-aggressive, mock-compliant “melancholy.” As for Freud, Adorno took him very seriously indeed, as one who rationalized the irrational, but he never rose to what would seem to be the irresistible bait of assimilating the “repeat/reliquify” course of immanent critique altogether to the Freudian “compulsion to repeat” (best known from section III of Beyond the Pleasure Principle [1920]), and to Freud’s ingenious technique of appropriating that compulsion, in eliciting the patient’s own transferential resistances, to the healing labor of the analysis.4 Adorno was wary of any assimilation of his own project to psychoanalysis (the closest he comes, and it is not very close, is his late lecture “The Meaning of Working Through the Past” [Critical Models 89-103]); and his work holds itself much more aloof from Freud than that of such colleagues as Max Horkheimer, Erich Fromm, or Herbert Marcuse, let alone Benjamin, whose methexis in Freud brings him closer to the Joyce of the “Circe” episode than to the practice of any member of the Frankfurt School. Adorno has his own distinctively critical “unhappy consciousness,” an “after-Auschwitz” moral askesis that, to say it again, long pre-dated the news of Auschwitz itself–but this is a vibrant, highly cathected affect, quite different from that of the “saturnine” or “melancholy” Benjamin, which looks, indeed, rather like the resigned, “stoic” ataraxia that Adorno so frequently diagnoses as among the more desperate symptoms of the despair engendered by our supposedly empowered, post-Enlightenment, “administered world.”

     

    GESTALT

     

    These tensions between Adorno’s doubts concerning Benjamin’s practice of the dialectical image–and their implications for the sort of work Adorno wants performed, what problems he wants addressed, in his developing practice of constellation–may be illuminated here by a consideration of Adorno’s wariness of the Gestalt psychology of Wolfgang Köhler. As we will see, Adorno treats Gestalt theory as ideology–constellation, we might say, in reverse. Adorno sounds caveats about Gestalt theory in his 1931 inaugural lecture, “The Actuality of Philosophy” (Adorno Reader 31-32); a quarter century later, he makes almost a kind of satire of Husserlian “intentionality” fidgeting in the unwelcome embrace of Gestalt psychology (Against Epistemology 158-62). Pertinent here is Adorno’s discussion of Kant’s “unity of apperception,” the ground on which, Adorno forcefully argues, Kant’s “subjective” and “objective” sustain each other. For Adorno compares Kant’s conception–that is, he juxtaposes it heuristically, or one might even say, he “constellates” it–with Gestalt theory (Kant’s 100-01). Adorno is writing here in the late 1950s, at a time when artists and poets often seized on Gestalt theory as a validation of avant-garde practices of the quick cut, the elision of transitions, and so on; other kinds of inquirers, too–Marshall McLuhan comes to mind–made a sort of ideology, or shorthand, all-purpose explanation, of “pattern recognition” (as Gestalt was frequently anglicized) as a key to all manner of novel, putatively “modern,” styles of consciousness. In this passage, Adorno’s discussion projects Gestalt as the ideological problem rather than its critical solution: like Kant’s “unity of apperception,” the functioning of Gestalt is “unconsciously synthetic,” thus effecting (false, familiarized, familiarizing) reconciliations or integrations of experiential fragmentariness.5 By these lights, Gestalt is an instance or model, indeed an epitome, of ideology as such: reflex and reinforcer of the habitual familiarizations, the ideological conditionings, the false reconciliations or “imaginary solutions to real contradictions” of the historically and culturally given.

     

    But I am eliciting these implications of Adorno’s reservations about Gestalt because what they imply is what Adorno leaves unsaid here, namely the contrast with his ambitions for the constellation. I should caution here that Adorno sometimes uses the word “constellation” to designate historically given, that is, already familiarized, ideological arrays or Gestalts [for example, Critical Models 138, 260]; my usage henceforth will connote “constellation” in the sense Adorno valorizes, as a device with the potential to be turned, in somewhat the manner of the Brechtian V-effect, against such familiarizations (though just this dissident potential, of course, is what mid-century avant-gardists were seizing on in Gestalt). And as we’ll see, the word’s “antithetical” reversals of meaning are themselves indices of the “dialectical”-ness of Adorno’s immanent critique. We might say that these “antithetical” meanings–“constellation” as unconscious ideological synthesis versus “constellation” as consciousness-raising estrangement; “constellation” as object of critique, or as subject of it–are themselves a kind of constellation implying or encoding, concealing or de-familiarizing a narrative, that of the classic Enlightenment project summarized by Freud in the formula, “making the unconscious conscious.” Adorno may “repeat” an over-familiar constellation and then reliquify (or, Medusa-like, petrify) its “congelations”; or he may present an unfamiliar and even shocking juxtaposition, whose estrangement is to provoke a new and heightened consciousness of the ideological condition in which we are entrapped. The historical image that results, ideological and critical all at once, appropriates the critical force we saw Adorno ascribing to the Benjaminian dialectical image, turning it, immanently, to estranging or defamiliarizing, sc. critical or (Hegel) “negative” purposes.

     

    MEDIATION

     

    Most ideologically consequential in Adorno’s critique of Gestalt–consequential, I mean, for our thinking about constellation–is the issue of mediation. According to Kant’s “unity of apperception,” Husserl’s “intentionality,” and Gestalt theory alike, it is the mind that synthesizes or integrates disjunct bits of sense-data into a coherent whole or pattern; and as we have seen, this synthesis, under whatever name or construct, looks to Adorno like a virtual model of the operations of ideology. Adorno urges that such ideological Gestalt-components, the “fragmentariness” that Gestalt synthesizes, or, indeed, the fragments themselves, “stand in need of mediation” (Kant’s 100)–a complexly ideological indictment, but suffice it for now to say that in Adorno, “mediation” connotes dialectical self-consciousness, awareness of the negative, of contradiction, of non-identity, and of the “labor of conceptualization.” Enthusiasts of Gestalt theory counted it in the theory’s favor that it seemed to propose or promote a view of experience as “immediate,” a specifically positivist or “nominalist” naïveté or ideological mystification–one might even say, “Gestalt“–that Adorno consistently meant to combat. Yet versions of this (to Adorno, naïve) quest for “immediate experience” are pervasive throughout the early twentieth-century “modernist” arts, from the scruffiest anarchists of Dada and Surrealism to that most stiffly proper of reactionaries, T. S. Eliot. It would seem to be implicit in Adorno’s own frequent motif of “shock” as a way to awaken numbed perception, and it is clearly the program enacted in such modernist devices as montage, collage, and ideogram, devices mobilized by their authors expressly to suppress and subvert received habits of synthesizing, modulating, contriving transitions–in short, mediating–between the typically incongruous or dissonant elements they contrived to bring together. Like these modernist devices, in short, the constellation at the very least looks as if it is dispensing with mediation–which in the context of the left-to-Stalinist intellectual culture of the 1930s and 1940s was tantamount to dispensing with “dialectic” itself.

     

    Here we see just one among a complex of “overdetermining” factors that motivated Adorno’s modernism to stage itself as an affront to such “dialectical” political orthodoxy. His own practice was meant, in emulation of the great modernists he consistently advocated against the socialist realist alarums of Georg Lukács, to repudiate orthodox dialectical materialism (“diamat,” in the neologizing party-speak Adorno so loathed) as a reified dogmatic system. In the Lukácsean optic, Adorno’s practice of the constellation, assembling disjunct elements in (seemingly) unmediated array, would seem as decadent as cubist collage, Eisensteinian montage, Poundian ideogram, or Joycean stream-of-consciousness. It would seem “idealist,” “subjective,” “decadent”–“immediate” not only in the proscribed sense of un-mediated (philosophically impossible) but im- or de-mediating (politically and philosophically delusional, i.e., ideological). Most pertinently, and in terms deriving from the authority of Marx and Lenin both, it would have seemed “un-dialectical.” (See, for example, Lukács’s essays “Realism in the Balance” and “The Ideology of Modernism.”) Lukács’s prose retains the composure of the platform debater; Adorno more characteristically vents exasperation, rejoining that Lukács, “the certified dialectician,” himself argues “most undialectically” in, for example, dismissing Freud and Nietzsche as irrationalists and therefore “fascists pure and simple.”

     

    [Lukács] even managed to speak of Nietzsche's "more than ordinary ability" in the tone of a provincial Wilhelminian schoolmaster. Under the guise of an ostensibly radical critique of society he smuggled back the most pitiful clichés of the conformism to which that critique had once been directed. (Notes 1: 217).

     

    If Lukács denounced modernist “im-mediation” as “undialectical” and “sick,” Adorno here agitates (at age 55, and with Stalin five years in the grave) a vehemence that revives all the indignation of his avant-garde youth against the “provincial”moldy-fig-ismthat prefers a false unity, an “extorted reconciliation,” to an unflinching evocation of all the contradiction and falsehood of our condition.

     

    In Lukács, tellingly, the adjective “dialectical” often modifies the word “unity”: dialectic thus sustains a procedure for unifying or integrating disjunct and/or incommensurable things. In other words, for Lukács the point of dialectic should be to produce unity in phenomena and in settings where, presumably, it needs producing. Adorno’s sense is virtually the opposite, that the aim of dialectic should be to expose the contradictions that ideological appearance has falsely reconciled: to produce or expose disunity, contradiction, non-identity. Constellation serves this end by bringing diverse phenomena together and forcing their consideration together. The disjunction between the constellated items is very much the point. To Lukács, the gaps and disjunctions would be evidence of a failure to have done the dialectical work that is the sine qua non of critical activity–to put it another way, a failure of “mediation.” To Adorno, mediation that fills in the gaps between the disjuncta would be ideological, homogenizing, causing the disjuncta to “lose their difference” (as Roland Barthes used to say [for example, S/Z 3]). For Adorno, the point of mediation would be to render, even “exaggerate,” the disjunctions, the contradictions that, for Lukács, they should unify. To Lukács, Adorno’s constellation would exemplify the same spurious and “sick” immediacy on offer in Beckett, Kafka, Freud and the other “decadent” modernists Lukács deplored: a mere “symptom” rather than a critical “negation” of the degenerate bourgeois cultural surround.

     

    Adorno’s immanent critique, by contrast, stipulates that critique cannot hold itself above (or “outside”) the predicaments on which it aspires to offer critical comment. Since critique cannot help but participate in the culture’s “symptomatics,” it had best own this liability, and make of it, to the extent possible, a quickening instantiation of the challenge to be met, the problem to be addressed, thereby amplifying critique’s potential for dramatizing critical effort and ambition–“the labor and the suffering of the negative”–as such. Adorno agrees with Lukács in reprehending false or naïve “immediacy,” but his “constellational” view of mediation gives him a very different take on the evidence from Lukács’s. I don’t pretend always to understand why Adorno approves one work or artist–or indeed, theorist (for example, Freud, Nietzsche, Weber)–as dialectical and mediated, and damns another as deficient in these qualities; and to the objection that Adorno is “merely” making heavy philosophical weather of his personal tastes, I at least would not always be able to muster a very cogent reply. But worth mention here is the move that we might call, borrowing one of Adorno’s own most suggestive rubrics, “Dialectic In Spite of Itself” (Against Epistemology 49-50), by which Adorno often manages to recuperate (or “rescue”) his critical targets from his own critiques of them.6 But whereas Lukács casts these matters in terms of decadence and disease–his “Healthy or Sick Art?” only makes explicit a metaphorics pervasive in his work–Adorno stages the issue rather in terms of ideological appearance, “magic,” and “myth.” An especially pertinent instance for our purposes is Adorno’s exchange with Benjamin over an excerpt (on Baudelaire) of the Arcades Project that Benjamin submitted for publication in the Frankfurt School journal in 1938. Much to Benjamin’s surprise, Adorno reacted unfavorably: “motifs are assembled but they are not elaborated”; Benjamin’s materials, his trouvées, sit nakedly on the page, un-“mediated” by “theory”; the ideological result is that Benjamin’s “ascetic refusal of interpretation only serves to transport [the subject matter] into a realm quite opposed to asceticism: a realm where history and magic oscillate […].”

     

    Unless I am very much mistaken [writes Adorno to Benjamin], your dialectic is lacking in one thing: mediation. You show a prevailing tendency to relate the pragmatic contents of Baudelaire's work directly and immediately to adjacent features in the social history and [...] economic features of the time. [...] you substitute metaphorical expressions for categorical ones [...] [so that] one of the most powerful ideas in your study seems to be presented as a mere as-if [...]. I regard it as methodologically inappropriate to give conspicuous individual features from the realm of the superstructure a "materialist" turn by relating them immediately, and perhaps even causally, to certain corresponding features of the substructure. The materialist determination of cultural traits is only possible if it is mediated through the total social process [...] [such] immediate--and I would almost say again "anthropological"--materialism harbours a profoundly romantic element [...]. The mediation which I miss, and find obscured by materialistic-historical evocation, is simply the theory which your study has omitted [...] the theological motif of calling things by their names tends to switch into the wide-eyed presentation of mere facts. [...] one could say that your study is located at the crossroads of magic and positivism. The spot is bewitched. Only theory could break this spell--your own resolute and salutarily speculative theory. It is simply the claim of this theory that I bring against you here. (Complete Correspondence 281-3)

     

    Adorno’s objections here are not altogether dissimilar from the sorts of complaints Lukács vented about modernism, which at first may seem merely ironic, but it is more usefully taken as index of the fineness of the line Adorno means immanent critique to walk in its highwire ambition both to “repeat” the ideological “symptom” and to reliquify it in a critical negation. Hence the sting in the tail, the potential dialectical backfire, in Adorno’s homage, already quoted, to the effect that “Benjamin’s thought is so saturated with culture as its natural object that it swears loyalty to reification instead of flatly rejecting it. […] the glance of his philosophy is Medusan” (Prisms 233).

     

    So I have risked the lengthy quotation above because its diffuse suggestiveness implies the scope of the tension between Benjamin’s critical practice of the dialectical image, especially in the Passagen-Werk, and Adorno’s of the constellation. Benjamin cites or quotes particular faits divers, one at a time, each standing distinct in its surround of white space on the page–even typographically, a dialectical image, one might say, of that “separation” or “chorismos,” the ideological entailment of “analytic” (bourgeois) philosophical method from Plato to Kant and beyond, that the Hegelian Adorno protests throughout his career. Constellation is of course the vehicle of Adorno’s protest, but it could also serve as a figure for it as well; his famously boundless paragraphs constellate diverse materials so diffusely as to ground or “theorize” or mediate them together–albeit, again, that the ground is contradiction rather than unity. Adorno tends, also, to “constellate” higher-brow materials than Benjamin–Hegel and Beethoven rather than, say, century-old department store brochures: in his 1931 inaugural lecture, “The Actuality of Philosophy,” Adorno sounds the “materialist” motif of the philosophical worthiness of “the refuse of the physical world”;7 but Adorno nowhere incorporates such materials in his writing as Benjamin did, let alone to programmatize, even to yearn, so overtly as Benjamin for their utopian “redemption.”8 This difference resonates with Adorno’s “mandarin” fastidiousness, as well as with his greater circumspection–almost, as he says himself, a Bilderverbot–regarding the utopian (see Buck-Morss, 90-95); it’s arguable that the dissent from Benjamin above helped confirm Adorno in these penchants.

     

    But most consequential for our theme here (the contrast between Benjamin’s critical practice and Adorno’s) is the issue I characterized above in terms of kinesis versus stasis. Benjamin’s isolated atoms of social/historical fact, cited seriatim on the page, organized under generalizing rubrics into “Convolutes,” we may take as dialectical image of the pall under which the bourgeois world has, as if in the gaze of some Medusa more baleful than Benjamin, frozen into paralysis. By contrast, Adorno’s immanent critique, though it eschews narrative, can fairly be called kinetic: the sentences rush headlong, never faltering before difficulties more “responsible” critics would find daunting, and ready at every turn to embrace always heavier burdens of difficulty and challenge. Reading Adorno, you never cease to be surprised at, however you may grow accustomed to, the way a given sentence might lunge off in a new direction, extending (distending) itself to encompass further elements and all the problems they will bring in their train. And yet, as I have said, this kinesis of Adorno’s, however entoiled in the temporality of its own process of working through (Durcharbeit), the temporality of its own writing and being-read, is never itself narrative: whatever else he is, Adorno is never a storyteller.9 When Adorno advises Benjamin (above) that “the materialist determination of cultural traits is only possible if it is mediated through the total social process,” mediation itself sounds like an ineluctably kinetic activity or process, and the movement (my resort to the word is deliberate) between isolated particular and totality–as, at other moments in Adorno, between particular and universal, intuition and concept, matter and idea, content and form–suggests a universe in perpetual and turbulent flux, however stalled or arrested the dialectic that should be ceaselessly dislocating its apparently fixed and static ideological impasses. Adorno suggests something of this contradiction between kinesis and stasis in a much later formulation: “the concept of the mediated […] always presupposes something immediate running through these mediations and captured by them” (Introduction to Sociology 109). The immediate is both “running through” and “captured by” the mediations.

     

    PARATAXIS

     

    We are navigating, or “mediating,” between the stasis of image and the kinesis of narrative, and I want to adduce here a further motif in which these preoccupations find yet another way of overlapping: the “epic” device of parataxis, which lends its name to the title of Adorno’s late essay on Hölderlin. Parataxis is a rhetorical device in which narrative units–narratemes?–follow one another linked only by the conjunction “and,” thus evading or subverting more complex structures or grammars of narrative co- or subordination (cause and effect, antecedent and consequence, main event and subsidiary, and the like). Traditionally, parataxis was taken to be (and poets emulated it as) an artifice, a feature of the noble epic style; only in the twentieth century have classicists like Eric Havelock seen it as evidence of a kind of consciousness or mentalité preceding the advent of literacy. I am sure the latter view, as a way to link texts and consciousness in something like a “materialist” way, would have interested Adorno so much that his non-consideration of it in his essay is a sign that the suggestion hadn’t reached his ears.10 In any case, “Parataxis: On Hölderlin’s Late Poetry” (Notes 2: 109-49) praises parataxis, Hölderlin’s anyway, for evading the usual (sc. reified, familiarized, domesticated) ways of making sense. Hölderlin’s parataxes, Adorno writes, are “artificial disturbances that evade the logical hierarchy of a subordinating syntax,” and in particular, “the judgment” and “the propositional form” (Notes 2: 131-2). I don’t think it an impermissible stretch to suggest that Adorno values parataxis as doing with narrative monads something like what constellation is meant to do with the diverse fragments it constellates: presents them in an ensemble undomesticated by the familiar thought-syntax, the habituated grammars, the ideological presuppositions, that familiarize the new, converting it, in the very process of presenting it, into the same, the old, the already known–the, as it were, pre-reified. Hölderlin’s poetry “searches for a linguistic form that would escape the dictates of spirit’s own synthesizing principle” (Notes 2: 131)–that is, it strives to overcome the very liabilities of the mind’s own drive to grasp what it perceives.

     

    Parataxis thus might seem a solvent, a way of de-composingwhat “spirit’s own synthesizing principle” too unthinkingly composes or synthesizes.11 The evident motive is to mobilize the particular fragmentary contents against the larger synthesizing form(s). But Adorno insists that Hölderlin’s parataxis achieves not merely an abolition of form, an escape from it, but something like a kind of emancipation (not to say redemption) of form itself. And of course, to the extent that Hölderlin’s parataxis is itself a form, this is an emancipation not conferred on form from above or outside, but form’s own self-emancipation; hence what Adorno calls “the agency of form” (Notes 2: 114). Hölderlin’s parataxis “puts explication without deduction in the place of a so-called train of thought. This gives form its primacy over content, even the intellectual content” (Notes 2: 131-2). Set free from the “deductive” regimen of a “so-called train of thought,” the unfoldment (“explication”) of the matter can enact itself “immanently,” according to its own imperatives rather than to those of an external, syllogistic logic. So far from vanishing, form here rather achieves itself in allowing, being the vehicle for, new potentialities by which the particular contents find their expression. Thus does form become itself a content, content itself a kind of form, and all concretely, thus sublating the classic antinomies (form/content, idea/matter, abstract/concrete, universal/particular) that are the pitfalls common to philosophy and the aesthetic under the regime of “spirit’s own synthesizing principle.” Hence (and readers familiar with Adorno’s Beethoven-olatry will recognize the argument here):

     

    It is not only the micrological forms of serial transition in a narrow sense [...] that we must think of as parataxis. As in music, the tendency takes over larger structures. In Hölderlin there are forms that could as a whole be called paratactical in the broader sense [...]. In a manner reminiscent of Hegel, mediation of the vulgar kind, a middle element standing outside the moments it is to connect, is eliminated as being external and inessential, something that occurs frequently in Beethoven's late style; this not least of all gives Hölderlin's late poetry its anticlassicistic quality, its rebellion against harmony. What is lined up in sequence, unconnected, is as harsh as it is flowing. The mediation is set within what is mediated instead of bridging it. (Notes 2: 132-33)

     

    Note the recapitulation of our points above about mediation. But of larger consequence here is that Hölderlin, Beethoven, and Hegel are arrayed in constellation as practitioners of this immanent kind of composition (a “technique of seriation” Adorno calls it [Notes 2: 135]) in which the local, the particular “takes over larger structures,” producing forms that are “paratactical in the broader sense.”

     

    This issue of “larger structures,” of parataxis on the large-scale level of form, returns us to the issue of temporality–Hölderlin, Beethoven, and Hegel (and, of course, Adorno) are all practitioners of forms a hearer or reader must experience in time–and thus of possibilities of kinesis within or by way of the structures their form achieves. “The transformation of language [in Hölderlin’s parataxis] into a serial order whose elements are linked differently than in the judgment is musiclike” (Notes 2: 131)–so that parataxis pushes referential language in the direction of non-referential meaning; moreover, terms like “serial” and “musiclike” restore “temporality” to the stasis of constellation. (“Serial” here doubtless connotes Schoenberg-and-after, rather than Sartre’s “seriality,” although the latter conjuncture, not to say “constellation,” is suggestive as well.) Adorno frequently implies that the temporality of music, and of written texts, whether “creative” or “critical,” amounts to a sort of quasi- or crypto-narrative trajectory in which the hearer/reader is challenged to participate.12 In the “Parataxis” essay, although Adorno’s focus is on the lyric, narrative in Hölderlin appears (under the sign of the “epic”; see the discussion of Hölderlin’s relation to Pindar [Notes 2: 132-34]) as another impulse working against “the logical hierarchy of a subordinating syntax”:

     

    The narrative tendency in the poem strives downward into the prelogical medium and wants to drift along with the flow of time. The Logos had worked against the slippery quality of narrative [...] the self-reflection of Hölderlin's late poetry, in contrast, evokes it. Here too it converges in a most amazing way with the texture of Hegel's prose, which, in paradoxical contradiction to his systematic intent, in its form increasingly evades the constraints of construction the more it surrenders without reservation to the program of "simply looking on" outlined in the introduction to the Phenomenology and the more logic becomes history for it. (Notes 2: 134)

     

    Here the animus since Plato between poetry and philosophy is “sublated”; moreover, Adorno presents the sublation itself as event, that is to say, as narrative. The redemptive or utopian promise is made more explicit in a passage reprising all these themes:

     

    The logic of tightly bounded periods [i.e., the opposite of "parataxis"], each moving rigorously on to the next, is characterized by precisely that compulsive and violent quality for which poetry is to provide healing and which Hölderlin's poetry unambiguously negates. Linguistic synthesis contradicts what Hölderlin wants to express in language [...]. [Hölderlin] began by attacking syntax syntactically, in the spirit of the dialectic [...] In the same way, Hegel used the power of logic to protest against logic. (Notes 2: 135-36)

     

    THE “DIALECTIC” OF DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT

     

    I want to end by sketching the ways that the themes we have been agitating are evoked or enacted to peculiar effect in Dialectic of Enlightenment. With Lutz Niethammer’s acerbic mot in mind, that moderns of Adorno’s sort exemplify a “will to powerlessness” (138-42), I will risk adapting Adorno’s formula above. If “Hegel used the power of logic to protest against logic” (Notes 2: 135-36), the Dialectic of Enlightenment uses a “mimesis” of the powerlessness of Enlightenment positivism vis-à-vis the crises of the mid-twentieth century to protest the non- or indeed anti-dialectical cast of Enlightenment thought, that dehumanizing, instrumentalized empiricism whose mastery of nature is gained only at the cost of nature-ifying, reifying, reducing to thing-like reflex, human being, human existence itself. Kinesis/stasis, narrative/non-narrative, mediated/un-mediated, parataxis/synthesis, dialectical/mythical–“our” particular subcultural penchant is to see these pairs as binaries. But we won’t get the hang of Adorno’s “dialectical” practice unless we cultivate the power of seeing these pairs rather as terms demarking the coordinates of particular conflicted problem-points, or (Adorno’s own frequent figure) force-fields within which the energies of certain contradictions pulse and clash. In our critical practice, oppositional binaries, the two terms separated by the crisp marker of the slash, suggest black/white distinctions. The polemical energy of Adorno’s practice can seem to drive or be driven by such stark contrasts, but my own experience learning to read Adorno has been that his black and his white are best taken as exaggerations of grey–the point being that what he advocates and what he reprehends can overlap in unexpected ways. For one instance, we may cite the “antithetical” tangle imposed on immanent critique (repeat/reliquify) by the Medusa-effect (repeat/petrify). Likewise, Adorno’s often surprising generosity to, even recuperations of, figures one had assumed would be bêtes noirs–Kierkegaard, say, or Spengler, or even Richard Wagner.13 And hence, in the exposition above, the contrast with Lukács (which highlights the liability of Adorno’s constellational critical “negation” to appear as mere ideological “symptom”); and even closer to the quick, Adorno’s own discomfort with the extreme of Benjamin’s apparently “unmediated” practice of “motifs assembled but not elaborated.” The cut between “image” and “dialectical image,” between (to use a more Adorno-identified term) “mimesis” and what we might, by analogy with Benjamin’s coinage, call “dialectical mimesis”–and in like manner the cut, indeed, between all the other binaries just cited–is sufficiently fine as not merely to allow, but actually to “motivate,” some confusion between the opposed, and supposedly clearly distinguishable, terms.

     

    This, I take it, can appear, even to a mere amateur of philosophy like myself, as a major contradiction (of the bad sort) for Adorno as a philosopher. His assault on “identity”-thinking depends on practices of dialectic and mediation that can seem to undo the garden-variety kinds of non-identity or “difference” encoded in binaries like those above. If one of Adorno’s principle complaints with dialectic as usual–as practiced by historicizing heirs of the Hegelian legacy, whether left (Lukács) or right (Croce)–is that it can unwittingly accede to a logic of substitution that winds up affirming the “exchange/equivalence” habitus of Enlightenment, then it’s notable that Adorno’s negative dialectic can in certain lights appear to deliver itself to the same terminus. Perhaps the most troublesome instance is Adorno’s “deconstruction” (if the anachronism may be permitted) of nature/history in “The Idea of Natural History” (1931)–and I take it as some index of the trouble that Adorno never reprinted this essay in his lifetime. But however that may be philosophically, it is Adorno’s practice as writer that I want to illuminate here–and in that arena, the problem is one that Adorno’s immanent critique undertakes not to solve, or to make disappear, but precisely, to display, to expose, which must mean, to suffer, and in that special sense to “perform,” to make happen, to “repeat” and (to the extent possible) “reliquify,” in the writing itself. Critique must refuse the hubris of supposing it can escape, or has escaped, has risen above, its ideological condition. As knowingly as Milton’s Satan in hell (and compare Goethe’s Mephistopheles), critique must always avow, “Why this is ideology, nor am I out of it.” The point of Adorno’s immanent critique is not to exempt his own critical practice from the liabilities of the dominant ideology, but precisely to attest ideology’s ubiquity and power by enacting in the writing itself (his own) critique’s implication–even (his own) critique’s implication–in the very predicaments (his own) critique aims to address, protest, elucidate, redeem.

     

    To bring the foregoing themes together will, I hope, be to suggest their use for a better reading of Adorno. The demonstration-text is Dialectic of Enlightenment, on the premise that in our academic subculture this is the most read and, because most read by novices, least understood of Adorno’s texts. But: “Adorno‘s text”? What of Max Horkheimer, whose name appears first on the title page, and to whom Adorno always ceded priority? Well, in practice, all commentary I know of treats Dialectic of Enlightenment “as if” Adorno were its author, and the few attempts I’ve seen to parse Adorno’s contributions from Horkheimer’s seem perfunctory (see Noerr 219-24) or (perhaps appropriately) shy of specifics (Wiggershaus 177-91, 314-50). Here I’ll take as a methodological fiction or premise the authors’ own professions that their equal collaboration moots any attempt to untangle their respective contributions. The 1969 “Preface” insists that the “vital principle of the Dialectic is the tension between the two intellectual temperaments conjoined in writing it” (ix); and I will offer the speculation that what was crucial in Horkheimer’s input was his penchant for arguing by way of historical narrative, which gives Dialectic of Enlightenment its narrative shape and its quasi-narrative energy. By contrast, Adorno’s critical practice eschews narrative; hence the “vital principle,” the “intellectual tension” I’ve just insinuated between the book’s overtly narrative organization (a smaller-scale rescript of Hegel’s Phenomenology, orchestrating a variant of Hegel’s trajectory from Greco-Roman antiquity to “Enlightenment” and the present day), and its “motivatedly” static (or “regressive”) “image” of Western history (or “progress”). It is precisely this tension, precisely this problematic or contradiction, it seems to me, that has made Dialectic of Enlightenment, for the past generation, the preeminent text in “critical theory” by either Adorno or Horkheimer–a claim, I think, that should valorize Horkheimer’s large (and too-much discounted) importance in the composition of Dialectic of Enlightenment.

     

    But “authorship” issues aside, my point here is that the reflections above on constellation and mediation (and so on) shed light on what I recall, from my own “novice” first reading(s) of Dialectic of Enlightenment, as the most baffling of the problems and “difficulties” it presented for me. The book’s narrative organization was readily legible as an ironic reversal of the Hegelian narrative–the story of Geist not as triumphal progress to an Enlightened Absolute, but as ghastly “regression” to a nightmare of violence (“humanity, instead of entering into a truly human condition, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism” [xi]; “The curse of irresistible progress is irresistible regression” [36]). And the fate of narrative in modernist literature had prepared me for a story whose thematic burden of failure and waste was enacted formally in the failure of the narrative to achieve not only any putative thematic telos, but the telos of narrativity itself. The thornier problem for me was the book’s organization around binary pairs that defied my every presupposition concerning how an avowedly, and programmatically, historicizing and dialectical presentation would or should proceed. Odysseus/bourgeois, for example, or myth/Enlightenment: both of these oppositions seemed to collapse large and crucial historical differences, to homogenize them by, in effect, de-temporalizing or dehistoricizing them–as if “bourgeois,” or “myth,” or “Enlightenment” indeed, were names for “essentialized” or “essentializing,” trans-historical archetypes, permanent and immutable. And likewise for binaries whose aligned pairs were not from different historical periods, but contemporaneous, for example, Kant and de Sade, or Hitler and Hollywood. To expose as “bourgeois” classical philology’s idealization of Homer’s “universal” hero, as well as to root “modern” bourgeois values in the archaic (“heroic”) violences of self-preservation; to vandalize Enlightenment’s self-constituting difference from the (mythical, archaic) past; to elicit the unowned foundational commonalities between the categorical imperative and de Sade’s monstrous naturalism of the boudoir, or between anti-Semitism and the culture industry: I could read in all this a complex of protest and dissent and exposé–even, despite the extremity of the subject matter and the plangency of the affect, something at moments oddly like satire–but not, within the terms of what I took “critical theory” to be aiming at, a strategy of dialectical critique.

     

    To such dilemmas, Benjamin’s (and Adorno’s) formula of “dialectic at a standstill” offers something of a key, as does the ambiguous response or antidote–mimesis, or critique? repetition, or reliquification? symptom, or negation?–of the “dialectical image.” Let me cite here a passage on “Mythical Content” from Adorno’s book on Kierkegaard that anticipates much of the elaboration–or homogenization–in Dialectic of Enlightenment, of the binary of “myth” versus “history” (or “dialectic”), as well as implying the grounds of Adorno’s lifelong dissent from that “fundamental ontology” in which Kierkegaard’s “blocked ontology” (Kierkegaard 57) was so implicated. “Blocked ontology,” we might suppose, borrows some of the charge implicated in a, so to speak, “ontology at a standstill”–and it is part of Adorno’s dissent from Kierkegaard that he would elaborate such a blocked or arrested ontology not as Adorno or Benjamin would a “dialectic at a standstill”: that is, as a defeat, a catastrophe, a reification, a congealment, a steady-state repetition or cycle of the old and the same. On the contrary, in Kierkegaard’s idealization such “standstill” appears as “sublime object,” a desideratum or Tantalus-fruit at once spiritual, philosophical, and polemical. Consider the following passage, whose crucial term for us is “image,” associated here with “myth,” i.e., with eternalizing, reifying, essentializing (mis)uses of thought–which is why special interest attaches to the appearance here of the important modifier, the dialectical image (emphasis added):

     

    Dialectic comes to a stop in the image and cites the mythical; in the historically most recent as the distant past: nature as proto-history. For this reason the images, which [...] bring dialectic and myth to the point of indifferentiation, are truly "antediluvian fossils." They may be called dialectical images, to use Benjamin's expression, whose compelling definition of "allegory" also holds true for Kierkegaard's allegorical intention as a configuration [sc. "constellation"] of historical dialectic and mythical nature. According to this definition "in allegory the observer is confronted with the facies hippocratica of history, a petrified primordial landscape" (Kierkegaard 54; the Benjamin is quoted from Origin 166).

     

    “Dialectic comes to a stop”–as in “dialectic at a standstill” (compare the theme later in the book of “Intermittence” [Kierkegaard 100-02], a condition in which dialectic falters, becomes a stop-and-start affair)–“and cites the mythical,” the act of “citation” here apparently implying some self-consciously critical deployment of the given, ideological image, in quotation marks, as it were; or, on the analogy of the speech-act distinction, as (self-conscious) “mention” rather than (naïve) “use”–with the (Hegelian, and, many will complain, idealist) implication that the difference makes for some “critical” or “negative” consequence. Crucial here is that the “indifferentiation” of myth/dialectic seems, in the transit between the quoted passage’s second sentence and the third, to appear first as an ideological effect of the “image,” then as a critical effect of the “dialectical image.” And, as sign, vehicle, “motivation” of such “indifferentiation” is the implicit Medusa motif, here appearing in something like an inverted or (Freud) displaced form: the “facies hippocratica” is Benjamin’s image in the Trauerspiel of unhappy consciousness, an image drawn from Hippocrates’s physiognomics (see Hullot-Kentor’s note, Kierkegaard 151-2): a visage like the anguished mask of tragedy, or perhaps better, like the face of Medusa’s victim, struck by the horror of a “petrified primordial landscape.” Here the thing seen is stone, while the face of the viewer, seeing it, is animated to horror, whereas in the Medusa-motif, the vitality is all Medusa’s, upon seeing whom it is the viewer who turns to stone–but the tangle of “antithetical” motifs leaves in place the horror of petrifaction, and thus underscores the extremities of ambivalence in Adorno’s ascription of a “Medusa-gaze” to Benjamin as critic, or indeed to critique itself. Hence the analogously “antithetical” (or “dialectical”) wobble in Adorno’s own usage as regards “dialectics at a standstill,” which sometimes figures as an ideological condition critique and art protest, at other times as a “result” that critique and art are praised for achieving–the latter apparently as critical (or “dialectical”) “mimesis” of the former (see, for example, Beethoven 16; Philosophy of Modern Music 124).

     

    “Dialectics at a standstill,” in both these senses (as ideological condition to be protested, and as critical “effect” to be achieved) is a formula especially apposite to Dialectic of Enlightenment.14 The narrative (or anti-narrative) of Dialectic of Enlightenment enacts the failure of the Enlightenment’s own “grand narrative” to achieve its announced, programmatic (narrative) telos of change and progress; and it indicts not only bourgeois Enlightenment positivism’s refusal of dialectic, but also (and much more daringly) the Soviet world’s official Marxist-Leninist fetishization of dialectic as an orthodoxy, as equally deluded miscarriers or unwitting betrayers of dialectic (conceived as “the engine of history”) itself. To that end the “appearance” (in the aesthetic sense [German Schein]) of non- or anti-“dialectical” pairs like Odysseus/bourgeois, or myth/Enlightenment, presents something like a dialectical image aiming, with critical force, to “bring dialectic and myth to the point of indifferentiation”–or an “allegory” presenting a “configuration [sc. “constellation”] of historical dialectic and mythical nature.” This “appearance” of “indifferentiation” (sc. “identity”) of dialectic and myth enacts what Horkheimer and Adorno regard as Enlightenment’s fatal ideological false consciousness, its sacrifice of qualitative to quantitative (“identity” or “equivalence/exchange”) thinking–and enacts it, in “appearance,” from “inside,” i.e., “immanently,” taking upon itself the full ideological burden of what it protests and would redeem. The case I’m making here could be thought of as a version of Adorno’s “dialectical despite itself,” which underlies his enthusiasm for thinkers avowedly critical of or indifferent to “dialectic”; I mean that Adorno’s seemingly static and essentialized binaries display an affinity with (say) Nietzsche’s tragedy/Socrates and Übermensch/priest, or Freud’s Eros/Thanatos, or the antinomies of instinct and “vicissitude” that in the late work on Moses and elsewhere seem to force on Freud a quasi-Lamarckian view of the heritability of acquired characteristics. Equally exemplary would be the great works of modernist music and literature with all their techniques of seeming “im-mediation” or “de-mediation”: works that attempt to escape outworn habits of mediation, to conjure an atmospherics or nostalgia of immediacy, and achieve thereby a kind of re-mediation (new mediations) that it is no mere word-play to hope might also be remedy.

     

    The loosening of old mediations and the forging of new ones in modernism involved techniques of juxtaposition, of suppressing transitions (preeminently narrative ones), of foregoing explanatory motives for questioning ones–and it is among these modernist devices and motivations that Adorno’s constellation belongs. Michael Cahn, in what remains to my mind the richest and shrewdest essay on these matters, observes that Adorno’s aesthetic theory is not merely a theory of the aesthetic, but a theory that is aesthetic; he clinched the point by adducing the analogy of “critical theory” (42)–which is to suggest as well the senses in which Adorno’s aesthetic is critical, and (the premise of this essay) the extent to which Adorno’s critical practice involves issues usually referred to the aesthetic. It’s in something of that spirit that I have attempted here to explore Adorno’s constellation, not as a philosophic concept, nor even as an element or index of a critical method, but as part of a writing practice that I think Adorno’s readers should be readier than they have been to take as a kind of modernist poetics of critique–a poetics realizing itself as much in performance as in “theory.” In the critical practice of constellation, Adorno enacts a critique of the extant critical (dialectical, historicizing) practices of his own day, a critique analogous to that performed in modernist artistic practices. Adorno’s practice is as radical a departure from that of, say, Georg Lukács as Beckett (one of Adorno’s chief exemplars of the modern) is from Lukács’s standard-bearer for realism, Balzac. Indeed, Adorno’s defense of Beckett against Lukács may be thought especially suggestive, given Beckett’s gift for narratives whose point is the failure of anything to happen, whose meaning (as Adorno observes in “Trying to Understand Endgame“) is meaninglessness itself–a meaninglessness, Adorno would say, whose falsity Beckett enables us to reappropriate for truth. Some such result, event, or effect is the gesture of the dialectic of Dialectic of Enlightenment.

     

    Notes

     

    1. In perhaps the most suggestive of these, Adorno links it with Max Weber’s “ideal type,” a characterization stressing its heuristic potential (Negative Dialectics 164-66).

     

    2. There are many treatments more systematic than mine. Still indispensable on this, as on so much else about Adorno, is Buck-Morss; on constellation see especially 90-110. (Buck-Morss notes Adorno’s reservations about “constellation” as a term connoting astrology [254n54]). More recently, see Jameson, Late Marxism 54-60; Jameson also assimilates constellation to “model” (68); and if I opened by evoking Eisenstein and Pound, Jameson observes that the affinity of constellation with Althusser’s conjuncture makes Adorno “Althusserian avant la lettre” (244). Nicholson treats constellation under the broader rubric of “configurational form” (passim, but especially 103-36)–a useful reminder that the thematics of constellation can often attach to such cognate terms as “configuration,” “complex,” even “ensemble” or “juxtaposition.” Also useful on Adorno’s aesthetics, though without specific reference to constellation, are Wolin 62-79; Bernstein 188-224, esp. 206; and Paddison 21-64, especially 35-7.

     

    3. A full discussion of these issues would need to consider Adorno’s 1932 essay, “The Idea of Natural History”–and also, perhaps, his decision against republishing it.

     

    4. On this last, see Freud’s 1914 paper on technique, “Recollection, Repetition, and Working Through.”

     

    5. The motif of the fragment here touches on Adorno’s chronic theme of the false coherence of “system” and the necessity, in critique, of allowing the unintegrated, unintegratable loose ends of “the damaged life” to stand as reproach or “bad conscience” to all mystifying reconciliations.

     

    6. For example, from Kierkegaard in Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic passim, from Kant in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (125), and from Freud and Weber in Introduction to Sociology (113, 123).

     

    7. He is citing Freud’s Abhub der Erscheinungswelt (Adorno Reader 32).

     

    8. Adorno most movingly sounds this motif in his 1930 essay on “Mahler Today”: see especially Essays on Music 605, where Mahler’s project sounds strikingly like Benjamin’s; and cf. 608, where Adorno contrasts Mahler and Schoenberg in ways that suggest an analogy with his sense of the differences between Benjamin and himself.

     

    9. Here is another contention with Lukács–see the latter’s “Narrate or Describe?”–that resumes most of what is at stake in their conflicting positions on realism versus modernism.

     

    10. Both “Parataxis” and Havelock’s Preface to Plato date from 1963, so Havelock’s argument cannot have affected Adorno’s essay, but I find no evidence that Adorno came across it later, either: too bad–I am sure it would have interested him keenly.

     

    11. Compare the formula of “the logic of disintegration” by which Adorno at about this same time characterized what he acknowledged as a career-long concern (Negative 144-6; see also Buck-Morss 233n3).

     

    12. For his most extended workout on these problems, see “Vers Une Musique Informelle,” in Quasi Una Fantasia, especially 294-301.

     

    13. See the closing pages of In Search of Wagner (1952) or, an even more striking example, the 1963 essay on “Wagner’s Relevance for Today” (Essays on Music 584-602).

     

    14. Let me own here that Adorno reprehends all rhetoric of “effect”; for him it connotes composition with an eye on the audience rather than on “the matter in hand.” I apologize for my resort to it here, but the shifts by which I might have attempted to do without it were more trouble than they were worth–and I am, after all, discussing the book from the position of a reader. I can hope that Adorno would at least countenance my usage as, again, attestation of the ideological predicaments of critique itself as composition, i.e., as “a kind of writing”–and also, of course, as a kind of reading.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Adorno, Theodor W. The Adorno Reader. Ed. Brian O’Connor. Oxford: Blackwell, 2000.
    • —. Against Epistemology: A Metacritique. Trans. Willis Domingo. Oxford: Blackwell, 1982.
    • —. Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music. Ed. Rolf Tiedemann. Trans. Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998.
    • —. Critical Models. Trans. Henry W. Pickford. New York: Columbia UP, 1998.
    • —. Essays on Music. Ed. Richard Leppert. Berkeley: U of California P, 2002.
    • —. “The Idea of Natural History.” Trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor. Telos 60 (1984): 97-124.
    • —. In Search of Wagner. Trans. Rodney Livingstone. London: NLB, 1981.
    • —. Introduction to Sociology. Trans. Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2000.
    • —. Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic. Trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1989.
    • —. Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’. Trans. Rodney Livingstone. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2001.
    • —. Negative Dialectics. Trans. E. B. Ashton. New York: Continuum, 1973.
    • —. Notes on Literature. 2 vols. Trans. Shierry Weber Nicholson. New York: Columbia UP, 1992.
    • —. Philosophy of Modern Music. Trans. Anne G. Mitchell and Wesley V. Blomster. New York: Continuum, 1973.
    • —. Prisms. Trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber. Cambridge, MA: MIT P, 1981.
    • —. Quasi Una Fantasia. Trans. Rodney Livingstone. New York: Verso, 1998.
    • Adorno, Theodor, and Walter Benjamin. The Complete Correspondence, 1928-1940. Ed. Henri Lonitz. Trans. Nicholas Walker. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1999.
    • Barthes, Roland. S/Z. Trans. Richard Miller. Farrar: New York, 1974.
    • Benjamin, Walter. The Arcades Project. Ed. Rolf Tiedemann. Trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin. Cambridge: Belknap/Harvard UP, 1999.
    • —. Charles Baudelaire: The Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism. Trans. Harry Zohn. New York: Verso, 1983.
    • —. The Origin of German Tragic Drama. Trans. John Osborne. New York: Verso, 1998.
    • Bernstein, J. M. The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to Derrida and Adorno. Oxford: Polity, 1992.
    • Buck-Morss, Susan. The Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt Institute. Sussex: Harvester, 1977.
    • Cahn, Michael. “Subversive Mimesis: Theodor W. Adorno and the Modern Impasse of Critique.” Mimesis in Contemporary Theory: Volume I: The Literary and Philosophical Debate. Ed. Spariosu, Mihai. Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1984. 27-64.
    • Hegel, G. W. F. Phenomenology of Spirit. Trans. A. V. Miller. New York: Oxford UP, 1977.
    • Horkheimer, Max, and Theodor W. Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment. Trans. John Cumming. New York: Continuum, 1988.
    • Jameson, Fredric. Late Marxism: Adorno, or, The Persistence of the Dialectic. New York: Verso, 1990.
    • —. Marxism and Form. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1971.
    • Kahn, Arthur D. Writer and Critic And Other Essays. New York: Grosset, 1971. Lukács, Georg, “Healthy or Sick Art?” Kahn 103-09.
    • —. “The Ideology of Modernism.” Marxism and Human Liberation. Ed. E. San Juan, Jr. New York: Delta, 1973. 277-307.
    • —. “Narrate or Describe?” Kahn 110-48.
    • —–. “Realism in the Balance.” Aesthetics and Politics. Ed. Ronald Taylor. New York: Verso, 1980. 28-59.
    • Nicholson, Shierry Weber. Exact Imagination, Late Work: On Adorno’s Aesthetics. Cambridge, MA: MIT P, 1997.
    • Niethammer, Lutz. Posthistoire. Trans. Patrick Camiller. New York: Verso, 1992.
    • Noerr, Gunzelin Schmid. “Editorial Afterword.” Dialectic of Enlightenment. Horkheimer, Max, and Theodor W. Adorno. Trans. Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2002. 217-47.
    • Paddison, Max. Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993.
    • Wiggershaus, Rolf. The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories and Political Significance. Trans Michael Robertson. Cambridge, MA: MIT P, 1994.
    • Wolin, Richard. The Terms of Cultural Criticism: The Frankfurt School, Existentialism, Poststructuralism. New York: Columbia UP, 1992.

     

  • Postmodern Historiography: Politics and the Parallactic Method in Thomas Pynchon’s Mason & Dixon

    Christy L. Burns

    Department of English
    College of William and Mary
    clburn@wm.edu

     

    In 1997, Thomas Pynchon published Mason & Dixon, his much anticipated history of America written from the perspectives of the astronomer and surveyor sent over from England to draw the famous boundary line. Their work was necessitated by a long-standing dispute between overlapping land grants of the Penns, of Pennsylvania, and the Baltimores, of Maryland1; the job took nearly five years, from 1763 to 1768, and during that time the journals and letters of these two men record alternating shock and fascination with the functioning of society in the New World (see Mason). Pynchon draws on this historical material to create a fantastic, comedic, and at times seriously political novel. Pynchon’s work has always inclined toward the voices of cultural dissent–the counterculture of the 1960s being one of his more obvious inspirations, and the rebellion of the Luddites against mechanization a subtle revelation.2 In Vineland, however, Pynchon’s critique of governmental authority takes on a more central role, and in Mason & Dixon–which was some twenty-four years in the making–he develops an important new method for postmodern political insight.3 Pynchon introduces a parallactic method that allows him a full and yet contentiously dialectical representation of “America” as it was in the mid- to late eighteenth century and as it is now, by various implications. In his use of parallax, Pynchon interweaves a critical representation of imperialism’s oppressive practices alongside a history of science and exploration. While other writers, like James Joyce, have invoked parallax as a perspectival method in order to challenge univocal narrative form, Pynchon works the concept more radically into his fictional treatment of historiography.4 Avoiding any semblance of an apolitical sketch of the past–or simple didactic critique–he uses the same method that Mason and Dixon employed to chart the transits of Venus and to draw their boundary line, applying parallax to a series of triangulated views, starting with Mason’s and Dixon’s attempts to assess the New World and eventually delivering a temporal form of parallax, a synchronization of the past with the present.

     

    In her review of positions on postmodernism’s politics, Susan Rubin Suleiman identifies three general clusters among intellectuals and writers: those who pursue a “postmodernism of resistance” through experimental work that allows previously silenced groups to speak in contra-normative modes of representation; those who argue that postmodernism lacks a firmness of values and principles and so fails to have any political effect (that is, it disavows universals); and finally those whom Suleiman identifies as “cultural pessimists,” who believe neither in the efficacy of decentered experimentation nor in the claims of universals (the project of modernity, and so on), leaving to the postmodernist only the role of critic and never that of future visionary.5 Writers like Louise Erdrich and Ishmael Reed would qualify for the first category, Jürgen Habermas for the second, and Jean Baudrillard for the last. Pynchon’s work has straddled groups one and three; while his novels have implicitly supported a politics of resistance–and have employed experimental and decentering forms of representation–they have recently begun to engage not only in critique (the “pessimist” block) but also in future re-visioning.6 Vineland moved more directly into political critique, with its look back at the government’s means of breaking down the 1960s counterculture. But in Mason & Dixon Pynchon creates a parallactic intersection of perspectives and time frames, which allows him to engage in critique while also pointing toward a different possible future in which imperialist elements of American history are not comfortably edited out but are critically worked back in to national awareness.

     

    I am suggesting that in Mason & Dixon Pynchon’s temporal or historical coordinates are the mappable difference, measurable via his synchronization of the 1760s charted alongside the 1990s. His readers thus will interpret history as a dialogue between the differences and the uncanny similarities of that time’s “angle” and their own. Pynchon initially establishes this method in his politicized readings of the Cape, where Mason and Dixon chart the first Venus transit, and he then follows the two as they return to England and are shipped off on another venture, to draw their famous line in America. Employing a homology between spatial and temporal assessments, parallax and synchronism, Pynchon recasts Mason and Dixon as implied historians, developing through the novel’s language an oddly contemporary perspective from within the eighteenth-century context. The novel is, for example, marked by an uncanny tone, which is an eccentric combination of both eighteenth- and late-twentieth-century colloquialisms. In one of the initial reviews of Pynchon’s novel, Louis Menand praises Pynchon for drawing each of his characters, even the least, with “the same deft touch [. . .] recognizable types in eighteenth-century dress. They come onto the page with an attitude, and Pynchon’s success in getting them to sound contemporary and colonial at the same time is quite remarkable” (24). At times Pynchon seems bent upon anachronism, injecting contemporaneity into this portrait of the past. These differences are not so radical, however, as many of Pynchon’s readers might think. Take for example one of the more striking transpositions of contemporary life into Enlightenment culture: when Dixon, hearing a rumor of “a Coffee-House frequented by those with an interest in the Magnetic,” locates his destination, he passes into what is clearly an eighteenth-century tobacco den, and is asked “what’ll it be?” He glibly responds, “Half and Half please, Mount Kenya Double-A, with Java Highland,–perhaps a slug o’boil’d Milk as well[…]?” (298). However postmodern and Starbuck-esque this scene might be, coffee houses are not an exclusive artifact of the twentieth century. They proliferated in seventeenth-century Europe, and when in the next century Boston Tea Party activists insisted that it was an American duty to forego tea, coffee’s popularity peaked (see Pendergrast 15 and passim). Pynchon’s seemingly anachronistic introduction of the contemporary attitude in his narrative of America’s past allows him to deliver a comical portrait of the nation’s early history, joking that in its nascent history Americans were even then as we are now.

     

    Mason’s and Dixon’s potential agency as historical observers has long been overshadowed by their role as mapmakers, aligning them with science and relegating them to a “neutral” position in history. Yet Pynchon casts this neutrality in ironic relation to the position of knowledge assumed by Hegelian Enlightenment thought, drawing out the dialectics more than emphasizing the vantage point outside of history. Central to Pynchon’s consideration of what America is now (postmodernly) and what it was then (at the rise of modernity) are the combined traits of these two British astronomers, who constitute a pious Anglicanism (Mason) alongside Quaker sensibility (Dixon). While Mason paces around, haunted by the ghost of his wife Rebekah, who has been deceased already two years when the book begins, Dixon, a man of senses and desires, indulges merrily in drink and those fleshful desires that Mason’s mourning heart cannot allow. In terms of magic and social interpretation, Dixon is a pragmatist who sees abuse, while Mason is drawn most readily to the remarkable magic around them. Thus the forceful cohesion of future vision and social critique in the novel. Tending toward the metaphysical, Mason speculates upon their friend the talking dog, whom they first meet in London. He becomes agitated when Dixon wishes to shrug off the dog’s oddly magical skills: “mayn’t there be Oracles, for us, in our time?” he asks, “Gate-ways to Futurity? That can’t all have died with the ancient Peoples. Isn’t it worth looking ridiculous, at least to investigate this English Dog, for its obvious bearing upon Metempsychosis if nought else–” (19). Comically, the Learnèd Dog rebuffs Mason, “I may be praeternatural, but I am not supernatural. ‘Tis the Age of Reason, rrrf? There is ever an Explanation at hand” (22). Mason thus struggles to hold onto the magical, even as Enlightenment thought was calling for its extinction. Pynchon, in his inclusion of the Talking Dog and other miraculous forms, also mocks the drier form of reason with the pleasurable addition of high-flown imagination.

     

    On the cusp of reason’s advent and magic’s eclipse, America arises. Mason’s and Dixon’s differences echo a divided perspective that is the constitutive tension within America’s identity; through it the Puritan and Quaker ethics and often contrary drives meet, much as Mason and Dixon eventually meet up with one another as they chart the line from different ends. Their personalities seem at times to be tethered extremes for Pynchon. Even late in their acquaintance, we find still that “the most metaphysickal thing Mason will ever remember Dixon saying is, ‘I owe my Existence to a pair of Shoes,’” as he describes how his parents met (238). Towards the book’s end, “Mason is Gothickally depressive, as Dixon is Westeringly manic” (680). They finish drawing a line through America, but as Pynchon’s narrator surmises, they “could not cross the perilous Boundaries between themselves” (689). They part ways, unable to figure out their friendship. Their odd and interesting relations suggest two opposite forces still present in U.S. culture–Dixon’s pleasurable pragmatism and his Quaker values (equality, acceptance) in tension with Mason’s Puritan posing, his starkness and formality, and his metaphysical inclination. Stargazer and surveyor, they effectively take the measure of America, both cartographically and morally, while they simultaneously reflect its constitutive differences.

     

    If Mason and Dixon stand for the differences that make up America’s complex and at times contradictory consciousness, early in the novel they are alike in their dismay at the abuse that takes place in the colonies. In 1761, when Mason and Dixon travel to Cape Town to measure the first Venus transit, they find the Dutch in the early stages of exploiting African labor and resources, which they then export to the American colonies (Danson 7). Their host at the Cape of Good Hope is Cornellius Vroom, “an Admirer of the legendary Botha brothers, a pair of gin-drinking, pipe-smoking Nimrods of the generation previous whose great Joy and accomplishment lay in the hunting and slaughter of animals much larger than they” (60). The faux-Botha and his fellows see Mason and Dixon in distinct lights, admiring Mason’s potential contribution to the local gene pool and worrying about Dixon’s apparent sympathy for the oppressed in their society. They note “his unconceal’d attraction to the Malays and the Black slaves,–their Food, their Appearance, their Music, and so, it must be obvious, their desires to be deliver’d out of oppression” (61). While Dixon develops a great fondness for “ketjap” and things sensual in the novel (146), he also exhibits the Quakerly desire for equality, a politics that lends him a special sympathy for the slaves and a tendency to speak (and act) out of this sentiment, much as the Quaker community historically did in America (Danson 2, 8, 80-81). Mason, in the meantime, becomes the target of the Vroom family’s attempt to impregnate their slave, Austra, with valuable European sperm. Mason cannot let himself have sex with Austra, however, not because he sees clearly, as Dixon does, the machinations of the Vroom matron, Johanna, as she teases Mason’s desire and then propels him toward her slave. Rather, he finds himself repulsed by the thought of participating in any event that would add to the “Collective Ghost” that arises in his metaphysical eyes from the “Wrongs committed Daily against the Slaves” (68). Mason sees that

     

    Men of Reason will define a Ghost as nothing more otherworldly than a wrong unrighted, which like an uneasy spirit cannot move on [. . .]. But here is a Collective Ghost of more than household Scale,--the Wrongs committed Daily against the Slaves, petty and grave ones alike, going unrecorded, charm'd invisible to history, invisible yet possessing Mass, and Velocity, able not only to rattle Chains but to break them as well. (68)

     

    Mason observes the furious futility of religious and social codes, which still give rise not only to slaves committing suicide “at a frightening Rate,” but also to suicides among whites. If these wrongs remain “charm’d invisible to history,” he suspects that the future will bear the burden nonetheless.

     

    In America, Mason and Dixon join in their shock at the treatment of American Indians, but diverge in their means of assessment. Mason, for example, is compelled by reports of a massacre of Indians in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, and so visits the site. “‘What brought me here,’ Mason wrote in the Field-Record, ‘was my curiosity to see the place where was perpetrated last Winter the Horrid and inhuman murder of 26 Indians, Men, Women and Children, leaving none alive to tell’” (341). Dixon, it is gathered, tags along to keep Mason from venturing into such wilds alone, and they pick up a curious guide, who charms Mason but arouses suspicion in Dixon. As he talks on, “Mason soon enough on about how quaint, how American, Dixon rather suspecting him of being in the pay of the Paxton Boys, to keep an eye upon two Hirelings of their Landlord and Enemy, Mr. Penn” (341). Historically, Mason and Dixon had already witnessed bigotry in Philadelphia, where the worst fanatics pronounced Indians no better than animals and “Canaanites whom God had commanded Joshua to destroy” (Danson 83). While they were in Philadelphia, news arrived of the unprovoked massacre in Lancaster, some sixty miles west, where a band known later as “The Paxton Boys” attacked a small Conestoga village and killed and mangled the bodies of the inhabitants. Outraged, local officials gathered up the few survivors and promised them safe haven in a local jail in Lancaster, until they could be moved farther away. The Paxton Boys, however, broke in and murdered the refugees as well (Danson 88-89). Mason’s journal reflects his outrage, and Pynchon expands upon his fascinated horror and Dixon’s more cynical suspicions of their guide. What both discover, in his novel, is that excessive desire (whether for sex or for blood) motivates much of the nature of the New World.

     

    Desire to chart the sky is not neutral, any more than the mapping of the colonies is without political interest. Indeed a young character, DePugh, at one point identifies the Venus transit as “A Vector of Desire” (96). Pynchon’s own text repeatedly swerves into long tangents about a range of desires; eventually the role of reading itself becomes a way to desire. In one of the novel’s subplots, the Rev’d Cherrycoke’s young niece, Tenebrae, is seduced by (or seduces) her older cousin Ethelmer when she convinces him to read an erotic novel to her (526-27). Ethelmer has earlier been chided by Aunt Euphrenia and Uncle Ives on the absurdity of recognizing more than one version of any tale, as well as on the dangers of reading literature. Ives announces that “I cannot, damme I cannot I say, energetically enough insist upon the danger of reading these storybooks,–in particular those known as ‘Novel.’” (350-51). Pynchon’s own novel proliferates tales of sexual seduction and romantic pining, ranging from Mason’s devoted mourning of Rebekah to the comical insistence of an automated duck to have a female, Frankensteinian equivalent invented for him to love and take as a mate (377). In 1739, Jacques de Vaucanson famously invented a duck complete with an automatic digestive system. Pynchon portrays the famous duck as the emblem of suppressed desires and overweening ambition gone awry. Mason and Dixon initially hear of the duck when they encounter Armand, a first-tier French chef who has had to flee his country because of the unwanted hostile, and then affectionate, attentions of the mechanical duck. According to Pynchon’s reconfiguration of Vaucanson’s experiment, the inventor encounters disaster when he endeavors “to repeat for Sex and Reproduction, the Miracles he’d already achiev’d for Digestion and Excretion” (373). Desire, however, produces life, so that the duck becomes independent, with desires and demands of its own. Flying around with such speed as to make it invisible, the duck haunts Armand, having discovered his infamy of cooking such delectables as Canard au Pamplemousse Flambé, Canard avec Aubergines en Casserole, and Fantaisie des Canettes (374). Developing a strange affection, following the chef over to America, the duck makes various verbal demands, requesting finally and especially that he convince Vaucanson to make him a mate, much like a Frankenstein bride (377). Vaucanson refuses, wanting (according to the duck) total control of his pet’s affections. “His undoing,” the duck surmises, “was in modifying my Design, hoping to produce Venus from a Machine” (668). Here the “Venus” of love is teasingly linked to the “transit of Venus” measure yet again. Pynchon is also citing his earlier wariness of the combination of humans and machines, in V. In that, Pynchon’s first novel, he negotiates between two modes of history, using entropy as a touchstone definition. As Marcel Cornis-Pope observes, Pynchon attempts to find a middle ground between “the drifting disorder of ‘posthistory’ and the deadening burden of history’s grand narratives” (104). What Pynchon develops, between determinism and pragmatism, is a kind of “postmodern gothic paradox” in which the truth of history always finds us too late (102). In Mason & Dixon, the grand narratives seem to swirl around sexual and cartographical possession, in tension with a plurality of cultures and ethical systems. This tension lies within European imperialism’s fierce attempt to control local inhabitants and its excesses of desire that spill over into decadent forms of capitalism.

     

    Such desires circle around Mason and Dixon’s constitutive mapping of America; the country that emerges is marked by their contradictions, as it reaches for high ideals, energetically seeks investment of capital and power, and often seems to revel in its identity as a boundary-less place of unprohibited (secret) behaviors. Sexual desire is exploited and marketed, becoming a common by-product of the colonial drive. In Cape Town, their host, Vroom, attempts to “seduce” Dixon’s class-conscious politics by taking him to a place where a “menu of Erotic Scenarios” is offered, among them the “Black Hole.” In this scenario, a European may be taken and locked in a room, at very close quarters, with a mass of slaves dressed as Europeans. It is a “quarter-size replica of the cell at Fort Williams, Calcutta, in which 146 Europeans were oblig’d to spend the night of 20-21 June 1756” (152). In the replica of this “Night of the ‘Black Hole,’” all are naked and, pressed tightly together, and the sex tourist can find “that combination of Equatorial heat, sweat, and the flesh of strangers in enforc’d intimacy [which] might be Pleasurable […] with all squirming together in a serpent’s Nest of Limbs and Apertures and penises” (152-53). These “sex Entrepeneurs” thus use history as a means to an erotic imaginary, even as one might indignantly point out (just as Cherrycoke reflects) that “an hundred twenty lives were lost!” (153). Re-imagining, in Pynchon, may often be a way of progressive revisioning, but it can alternately be co-opted for exploitive forms of entrepreneurship.

     

    Indeed, capitalism seems here to work off of an extreme oppositional dichotomy: that of moralism (Puritan) bound resistantly to an urge to transgress all morals. The chant of self-denial that, through repression, elicits a yearning for extremes of indulgence emerges repeatedly in Pynchon’s novel.7 And lust is only one aspect of limitless desire in this tale of national “origins.” In this prescient history, capitalism is a compulsive American trait, and episodes of eager consumerism and entrepreneurial manipulations of desires proliferate. Humorously, Pynchon “predicts” America’s collapse into opportunism; as a band enlightens Dixon,

     

    this Age sees a corruption and disabling of the ancient Magick. Projectors, Brokers of Capital, Insurancers, Peddlers upon the global Scale, Enterprisers and Quacks,--these are the last poor fallen and feckless inheritors of a Knowledge they can never use, but in the service of Greed. The coming Rebellion is theirs,--Franklin, and that Lot,--and Heaven help the rest of us, if they prevail. (487-88)

     

    Benjamin Franklin’s writings have arguably shaped early American entrepreneurial consciousness, in its best and worst lights.8 And in this America, lawyers also abound, as Mason is warned by his family, who jokingly tell him that “ev’ryone needs Representation, from time to time. If you go to America, you’ll be hearing all about that, I expect” (202). Pynchon’s poke at litigiousness seems to be an extension of his mockery of many Americans’ commercial opportunism and their monetarily motivated sense of rights. Pynchon’s point may simply be that a particularly intense form of desire lies at the root of American identity itself, with its tensions between pragmatism and metaphysics, its cynical commercialism combined with youthful vision. Moreover, Pynchon constitutes the historical desire (and its narrative effects) not merely as subjectivized or psychologized; he understands it as this parallactic construct, which is measured and split between two roots or objects, defying will and clarification of any singular agency.9 This parallax draws on a series of oppositions, not only between Mason and Dixon, but also between the future’s backward glance (its historical gaze) and the point at which it intersects with a historical moment or event. Each present perspective (of past events and narrated histories) is always in a tense dialogue with some distant or distinct point. In this way, parallax also suggests a particular configuration, wherein historical agency, compelled by the desire to narrate history and formulate identity, must mediate its willful and subjective vantage point with that of some other, radically distant point-of-view in order to produce a true “measure” of the past.

     

    Pynchon’s parallactic method is appropriate to the eighteenth century not only because of Mason and Dixon’s use of it, but also because it was then “the rage”–a famous innovation being put to tremendously ambitious use. The method reached its most significant application in 1761, when scientists all over the world used it to measure Venus’s transit of the Sun. This transit was a major event for astronomers, and despite the Seven Years War in Europe, several scientists from a variety of European countries traveled to locations around the world to help compile data on Venus’s distance from the earth and, more importantly, the solar distance from Earth.10 Once astronomers had the solar distance, they could use it as an astronomical unit that would, according to Allan Chapman, operate as a “measuring rod to work out all the other dimensions of the solar system from proportions derived from Kepler’s Laws” (148). The parallactic method used to measure the Venus transits had been developed by Edmond Halley to observe Mercury’s transit of the sun in 1677. Mercury had moved too quickly to allow a measure, however, so Halley had to turn his attention to Venus’s transits of the sun, which, lasting eight hours, would enable more precise determinations. Although he published his findings through the Royal Society between 1691 and 1716, Halley did not live to measure a Venus transit. His parallactic method was therefore used for the first time by Mason and Dixon and their fellow astronomers in 1761.11

     

    To the Vroom girls, who teasingly inquire about their work at the Cape, Mason and Dixon explain their method:

     

    Parallax. To an Observer up at the North Cape, the Track of the Planet, across the Sun, will appear much to the south of the same Track as observ'd from down here, at the Cape of Good Hope. The further apart the Obs [observations] North and South, that is, the better. It is the Angular Distance between, that we wish to know. One day, someone sitting in a room will succeed in reducing all the Observations, from all 'round the World, to a simple number of Seconds, and tenths of a Second, of Arc, --and that will be the Parallax. (93)

     

    Drawing a triangle with its base on the earth and its apex in the sky, one can determine the distance of a heavenly body from the Earth. The first successful use of parallax was executed by the Greek astronomer Hipparchus, who observed the sun’s eclipse on March 14, 190 B.C. from what we now call Istanbul and also, with help, from Alexandria in northern Egypt. Measuring the angles to the moon from these points, Hipparchus could calculate that the moon’s distance from the Earth was approximately 71 times the Earth’s radius (Trefil 48). In 1761 and 1769, equipped with finer instruments of measurement, astronomers would set up a one-foot-radius quadrant, by which they could determine their local latitude. They also regulated a pendulum clock to establish local time. Precise coordinates enabled them to relate their various transit times to the home coordinates in Europe (Chapman 150).

     

    While the mapping of the sky (and earth) may, in some ways, be yet another imperialist effort, the parallactic method subjectively frames the supposed objectivity of science in Pynchon’s work.12 As Richard Powers, in his invocation of Joycean parallax, suggests, “the act of looking is powerful, if you can see the look. And for that you need some device that gives you parallax” (Birkerts 62). Powers explains it quite simply: if one holds a finger before one’s face, and then closes (and then opens) first the right eye and then the left, the finger appears to move slightly. One can thus “see the look” by virtue of the two different locations, different “points of view.” Pynchon is interested in more than the modernist emphasis on subjective narration and perspectival distortion, however. He examines the difference not merely between two “I”s but between two moments of national (self) perception: 1671 and 1997. Collective culture, at both points, seems to be spurred on by scientific curiosity and an intense capitalistic drive.

     

    If Mason & Dixon initially separates science and capitalism, by the novel’s close the two surveyors begin to suspect their work’s collusion with some hidden political agenda. They fear that they have been so used by the British Royal Society as to perhaps be “slaves” themselves (692). Having gradually become acquainted with the American politics surrounding the line for which they are responsible, they feel merely “We are Fools” for being used by the Society in a matter that may have been more political than either had realized (478). Here science fears being controlled by the government; previously, Pynchon focused more on the individual’s fear of being controlled by science.

     

    As readers of Gravity’s Rainbow will recall, that novel’s hero, Slothrop, is the hapless victim of a scientific conspiracy. Jamf, one of the inventors of Imipolex G, has paid off Slothrop’s impoverished father so that he might be allowed to experiment on the baby son’s tiny member. All this occurs under the umbrella of two commercial interests (a Swiss cartel and IG Farben) that have invested in Imipolex G. Himself unaware and unable to recall such early trauma, Slothrop now suffers the effects of having been conditioned to respond sexually (in the form of an erection) to the smell of the new plastic, which will eventually be used in rocket insulation (249-51). The result is that, during World War II whenever an A4 rocket approaches London, Slothrop as a full-grown man finds himself compelled toward a frantic search for sexual interludes. Sadly, he is the unwitting subject of the bawdy song “The Penis He Thought Was His Own” (216-17). Pynchon elaborates the ways in which postmodern society, through commercialism and science, has severed desire from its more intimate connections, taking away the supposed agency of sexual exchange. We become now merely the means of the drive, drawn on by false advertising and a world that conspiratorially manipulates our epistemologies (as in The Crying of Lot 49) and desires (as in Gravity’s Rainbow). We are, like Vaucanson’s mechanical duck, ever more machine-like in our impulses–yet always propelled by greater animating desire.

     

    If in Gravity’s Rainbow Pynchon suggests that science might be cruelly manipulating–and even inventing–our desires so that they are not our own, in the swirl of science and culture presented in Mason & Dixon, he asks if our very scientific certainties are not politically predetermined. Pynchon prods science’s hesitation to see its own desires and the imbalance its supposed objectivity creates in postmodern culture.13 In Mason & Dixon, he reveals the political compromise even science itself can make, regardless of whether its practitioners believe themselves to be beyond societal and ethical measure.

     

    In reviewing Mason & Dixon, Michael Wood poses one of the crucial questions raised by this novel; he asks, “why we should care about this amiably imagined old world, this motley and circumstantial eighteenth century smuggled into the twentieth?” Or, more broadly still, “what are we doing when we care about the (more or less remote) past?” (Wood 120). Differently put, one might ask: what is the historical impulse, that it should feed the desires of fiction? What is the historical desire, and is it linked to the scientific quest for knowledge? Pynchon’s novel would imply that it is, that the drive for an objective vantage point and insight–whether into the past behind us or the stars beyond–is an ambition far from alien to any of us. And yet those who serve as the conveyers of the drive–Mason and Dixon, for example–may neither be aware nor in control of its manifestation.

     

    Finally, one might ask if there is some impetus for history to fictionalize, even in its root-like resistance to anything beyond the empirical. Or, conversely, should one engage in projects like Pynchon’s, which so broadly fictionalize histories? It may be recognizably postmodern and so of our time to insert fiction into history, as Edmund Morris does in Dutch, his controversial memoir of Ronald Reagan. But that practice, as well as the art of fictionalizing history, still troubles U.S. culture.14 Pynchon has always had an uncanny penchant for disguising history as fiction. In The Crying of Lot 49, he invokes the sixteenth-century postal service operated by the noble house of Thurn and Taxis, and in both V. and Gravity’s Rainbow he portrays the struggle of the Herero, an oppressed group of blacks in a southwest African group, who are still defined today in part by the German culture of their colonizers.15 In Mason & Dixon, Pynchon transposes current awareness over previous erasures to produce an odd sense of both the differences and yet also the complicity between eighteenth-century racism and our own erasures (or de-racing) of the past.

     

    Rather than writing a counternarrative of history, Pynchon creates a form of history that stages an exchange between the past and present, so that the historian’s perspective, as Dominick LaCapra explains, “attempts to work out ‘dialogical’ connections between past and present through which historical understanding becomes linked to ethicopolitical concerns” (9-10). This makes no sense, of course, if one conceives of the past as static fact, rather than as a hybridized discourse composed of varying modes. However, in Jacques Lacan’s configuration of history, it is a form of rememoration that begins in material bits that have been left aside. Once these fragments are shaped by narrative, the nation may fold its history into identity with a sense that it is always what it now is (Lacan, Speech 17). When history is understood as destabilized and fragmentary from the start, Pynchon’s parallactic perspective is less a theft or distortion of some “honest” or “true” past. It is instead a conversation with its erasures, and a process of recovery. For psychoanalysis, the subject and the nation must be taught to grasp that this seemingly necessary history has been written around scars, “turning points,” and traumatic events (Lacan, Speech 22-23).16 Pynchon’s project offers a way of bringing lost fragments of history into a disruptive dialogue that could jolt his American audience out of assertive forgetting and the repeated aggressions that are propelled by the social-psychological work done as a whole culture endeavors to lock out memory of disturbing elements embedded within its national narrative.

     

    Mason & Dixon represents an impulse to write history through the imaginary field, to crosshatch its narrative with a realization of culture’s desire to find its identity in the realm of the imagination. It thus argues, implicitly, for the importance of artistic imagination alongside scientific and historical work. Pynchon rejects the harsh realism and more cynical parodies employed by many contemporary authors, using humor and even magic as modes of transformation.17 Talking dogs, sexually aroused mechanical ducks, and nighttime apparitions and ghosts haunt Mason and Dixon in America; perhaps the country that combines technical invention with capitalistic enterprise might be equally mythologic in Pynchon’s ambivalent history. My suggestion is that this magical aspect of his narrative necessarily–and politically–interferes with the drive to fix and control knowledge and “truth,” which, coming out of the Enlightenment project, has nonetheless produced streaks of “darkness” that Pynchon uncovers and sets in dialogue with the more celebrated aspects of America’s historical guise. Ultimately, Pynchon’s novel produces a duality, between comic acceptance of American commercialism, with all its lovable foibles, and careful scrutiny of its political roots and past. Mason and Dixon may not be revolutionary agents, in terms of toting guns and instigating liberatory wars, but their perspectives raise questions about slavery, genocide, commercialism, and gender oppression. In this manner, the novel both critiques the past (and present) while also recasting history, reinterpreting it in a way that might influence future trajectories. In so doing, Pynchon continues to interrogate pragmatic American optimism about agency (one’s ability to effect change singularly at a historical juncture), while he implicitly invokes the power (and hence “agency”) of a larger cultural imaginary that influences the country’s self-image and the more minute actions of a community and nation.

     

    Notes

     

    1. Edwin Danson’s recent history of the drawing of the line describes the details of this project as well as those of the two Venus transits. Mason and Dixon were brought in after several failed surveys (on which the Penns and Baltimores could not agree) in 1763 and departed in 1768, after four years and ten months in America. See Danson 3-4, 18-26, 77-78, 183, 191.

     

    2. Pynchon’s interest in politics is explicit in his essay “Is It O.K. to Be a Luddite?,” in which he recounts the vehement worker’s rebellion against the advance of machinery in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in England. His paranoia also points alternately to the pervasive powers of capitalist ventures, in The Crying of Lot 49, and to the government’s extensive surveillance (potentially) in Vineland and (through science) in Gravity’s Rainbow. David Cowart discusses Pynchon’s essay on the Luddites and its importance to Mason & Dixon, demonstrating the relevance of this rebellion for Pynchon’s own project of rethinking the influence of science on American culture and politics.

     

    3. According to Michael Dirda, in his review “Measure for Measure,” Pynchon signed contracts for two future books in 1973, the year Gravity’s Rainbow appeared. One book seems to have been Vineland and the second was provisionally titled “The Mason-Dixon Line.”

     

    4. If Pynchon’s use of parallax is unique in its form, his is not the first literary appropriation of the concept. In Ulysses Leopold Bloom thinks of parallax while wandering near the Liffey in “Lestrygonians” (U8.110), recalling a book by Sir Robert Ball that discusses the concept. References to parallax surface briefly in other episodes, but it is more forcefully acted out in Stephen Dedalus’s and Bloom’s relative apprehensions of Shakespeare in the mirror in “Circe,” whereby we measure their different senses of the Bard (and so perhaps ideals) (U15.3820-24). It also appears in “Ithaca,” where the two men famously urinate beneath Molly’s window after silently “contemplating the other in both mirrors of the reciprocal flesh of theirhisnothis fellow faces” (U17.1184). Joyce uses two perspectives–at times a proliferation of them–to undermine monocular views and to register the difference between two (or more) interpretive angles. Pynchon’s use is more pervasive, as I argue here, and more explicitly political. (Ulysses citations refer to episode and line numbers from the Hans Walter Gabler edition.)

     

    5. See Suleiman’s “Epilogue: The Politics of Postmodernism After the Wall; or, What do We do When the ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ Starts?”

     

    6. Two exceptional reconstructions of Pynchon’s political project have appeared to date. Jeffrey S. Baker argues that in Gravity’s Rainbow the author both critiques and holds up the struggle for true democracy. Pynchon exposes the Puritans’ divisive roots in American ideology, where to be a member of the chosen few (the preterite) of Christianity is a dream opposed to our call for radical equality. Turning to John Dewey’s works, Baker argues for their importance to 1960s radicalism and in Pynchon’s own writing. Baker must, however, launch this argument through a reading of Vineland. Prior to that text, I am suggesting, Pynchon’s radicalism was less easily recognized. Jerry Varsava, as well, reads backwards from Vineland, finding a plea for rationalism and consensus politics in The Crying of Lot 49.

     

    7. Lady Lepton’s party (which Mason and Dixon stumble upon in America when lost in the dark one night) has one servant who is startlingly familiar to the two, and Lord Lepton informs Dixon that he “purchas’d her my last time thro’ Quebec, of the Widows of Christ, a Convent quite well known in certain Circles, devoted altogether to the World,–helping its Novices descend, into ever more exact forms of carnal Mortality […] not ordinary Whores, though as Whores they must be quite gifted, but as eager practitioners of all Sins. Lust is but one of their Sacraments. So are Murder and Gluttony” (419).

     

    8. Max Weber uses Franklin as an example of the American capitalist imperative to accumulate wealth. See Weber 48-51 and passim.

     

    9. My understanding of agency here derives primarily from psychoanalysis and a deconstructive understanding of consciousness and action. That is, agency does not arise from an indivisible subject nor from one who (fantasmatically) claims full consciousness and wholly controlling intention. Instead, action arises from an ability to manage the tensions between unconscious pulls and conscious directives, an ability to encounter and embrace the ambivalence of fractured belief. Perhaps the most cogent defense of this notion of subjectivity comes in Jacques Lacan’s essay, “Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis,” and I have more extensively developed it in my book Gestural Politics: Stereotype and Parody in Joyce.

     

    10. See Chapman 149. Mason and Dixon were initially on their way to Sumatra to observe the 1761 transit of Venus. The Seven Years War in Europe was still underway, however, and so their ship, the Seahorse, was set upon by the French. The attack left eleven men dead, and Mason and Dixon turned back to port. They traveled eventually to Cape Town instead and set up their equipment to view Venus’s transit of the sun.

     

    11. Transits occur in pairs every 105 or 122 years. While Venus transits could never be seen without the help of a telescopic apparatus, Johannes Kepler predicted the transit of 1631, working from planetary observation data. Jeremiah Horrocks was the first to observe a Venus transit in 1639, having realized that a second transit would occur eight years after the first, despite Kepler’s prediction otherwise. Even before the parallactic method was developed, he was able to attain enough data on the transit to calculate the precise value for the node of the planet’s orbit, taken from the known position of the Sun’s center. He also calculated an accurate figure for the angular diameter of Venus, which proved to be smaller than previously believed. Most significantly, he extracted a solar parallax figure of 14 arc-seconds, which allowed him to calculate the mean distance of the Earth from the sun more accurately than any to date. Horrocks had informed other scientists, and his friend William Crabtree had also observed the transit. Both died before publishing their work, and the findings were eventually published by Johannet Hevelius in Poland in 1662 (Chapman 148).

     

    12. Graham Huggan points out that a map can function as a tool of persuasion, demonstrating, at its most extreme, the fantasy that the world can be turned into a simple object. He argues that, the “new ‘scientific’ cartography” of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while informed by more precise means of measurement and of attaining accuracy, still operated primarily as a tool of the colonialist imagination (5).

     

    13. Michel Serres presents a fairly powerful analysis of the drive to “win” or conquer and control imbedded within various discourses on science and reason (Baconian and Cartesian, particularly) in “The Algebra of Literature: The Wolf’s Game.”

     

    14. Morris apparently is inspired by Reagan’s own tendency to create fictions. What outraged some readers, however, was Morris’s decision to insert his own narrative persona into the biography as if he were a “real” historical presence in the past. The memoir stirred more than a little controversy. See Morris and Weisman.

     

    15. The New York Times ran an article on the Herero on 31 May 1998, documenting its attachment to German dress and history, despite Germany’s abusive treatment of the Africans in 1904 (see McNeil). As for Thurn and Taxis, they operated both as an imperial and later private postal system throughout Europe. They were only nationalized in the late nineteenth century.

     

    16. This analogy between the subject and nation is Lacan’s, and also seems to operate in some portion in Pynchon. If it is a simplistic and potentially ellisive move, belying the differences between intersubjective and national psychologies, my suggestion here is that it helps Pynchon describe, in his fictional form, a new postmodern mode that addresses politics explicitly.

     

    17. In this, Pynchon is balancing between the parodic or hyperrealist branch of postmodernism and that of magical realism, which appears in postmodern novels by writers like Maxine Hong Kingston, Ishmael Reed, and Gloria Naylor. While these writers may link magical moments to cultural specificity and the possibility of cultural or personal transformations, for Pynchon magic is the mythological prehistory of science. As such, it is the necessary focus of postmodernism, if it is to have some futurity.

    Works Cited

     

    • Baker, Jeffrey S. “A Democratic Pynchon: Counterculture, Counterforce and Participatory Democracy.” Pynchon Notes 32-33: 99-131.
    • Birkerts, Sven. “An Interview with Richard Powers.” Bomb (Summer 1998): 148-51.
    • Burns, Christy L. Gestural Politics: Stereotype and Parody in Joyce. New York: State U of New York P, 2000.
    • Chapman, Allan. “The Transit of Venus.” Endeavor 22.4: 148-51.
    • Cornis-Pope, Marcel. Narrative Innovation and Cultural Rewriting in the Cold War and After. New York: Palgrave, 2001.
    • Cowart, David. “The Luddite Vision: Mason & Dixon.American Literature 71:2 (June 1999): 341-63.
    • Danson, Edwin. Drawing the Line: How Mason and Dixon Surveyed the Most Famous Border in America. New York: Wiley, 2001.
    • Dirda, Michael. “Measure for Measure.” Rev. of Mason & Dixon, by Thomas Pynchon. Washington Post 27 Apr. 1997: X01.
    • Huggan, Graham. Territorial Disputes: Maps and Mapping Strategies in Contemporary Canadian and Australian Fiction. Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1994.
    • Joyce, James. Ulysses: The Corrected Text. New York: Vintage, 1986.
    • Lacan, Jacques. “Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis.” Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Norton, 1977. 8-29.
    • —. Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis. Trans. Anthony Wilden. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1968.
    • LaCapra, Dominick. History, Politics, and the Novel. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1987.
    • Mason, A. Hughlett. Journal of Charles Mason and Jeremiah Dixon. Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society. Vol. 76. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1969.
    • McNeil, Donald G. Jr. “Its Past on Its Sleeve.” New York Times 28 May 1998: 3.
    • Menand, Louis. “Entropology.” Rev. of Mason & Dixon, by Thomas Pynchon. New York Review of Books 12 Jun. 1997: 22-25.
    • Morris, Edmund. Dutch: A Memoir of Ronald Reagan. New York: Random, 1999.
    • Pendergrast, Mark. Uncommon Grounds: The History of Coffee and How It Transformed Our World. New York: Basic, 1999.
    • Pynchon, Thomas. The Crying of Lot 49. New York: Harper, 1965.
    • —. Gravity’s Rainbow. New York: Penguin, 1973.
    • —. “Is It O.K. to Be a Luddite?” New York Times Book Review 28 Oct. 1984: 1, 40, 42.
    • —. Mason & Dixon. New York: Holt, 1997.
    • —. V. New York: Harper, 1961.
    • —. Vineland. New York: Penguin, 1990.
    • Serres, Michel. “The Algebra of Literature: The Wolf’s Game.” Textual Strategies. Ed. Josué V. Harari. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1979. 260-76.
    • Suleiman, Susan Rubin. Risking Who One Is: Encounters with Contemporary Art and Literature. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1994.
    • Trefil, James. “Puzzling Out Parallax.” Astronomy 26:9 (September 1998): 46-50.
    • Varsava, Jerry. “Thomas Pynchon and Postmodern Liberalism.” Canadian Review of American Studies 25:3 (1995): 63-100.
    • Weber, Max. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. 1930. Trans. Talcott Parsons. London: Routledge, 1992.
    • Weisman, Steve R. “The Hollow Man.” Rev. of Dutch: A Memoir of Ronald Reagan, by Edmund Morris. New York Times Book Review 10 Oct. 1999: 7-8.
    • Wood, Michael. “Pynchon’s Mason & Dixon.” Rev. of Mason & Dixon, by Thomas Pynchon. Raritan 17:4 (Spring 1998): 120-30.

     

  • Exiles on Main Stream: Valuing the Popularity of Postcolonial Literature

    Chris Bongie

    Department of English
    Queen’s University
    bongiec@qsilver.queensu.ca

     

    Put me in a room with a great writer, I grovel. Put me in with Roseanne, I throw up.

    –Jamaica Kincaid1

     
    When Tina Brown asked Roseanne Barr to serve as guest consultant for a special women’s issue of The New Yorker in 1995, Antiguan-American novelist Jamaica Kincaid made her negative feelings crystal clear. She trashed Brown’s protégé in the most emphatic of terms–as my epigraph demonstrates–and eventually severed her decades-long ties with The New Yorker, accusing Brown of transforming that once venerable journal into “a version of People magazine.” In the following pages, I argue that Kincaid’s hostile reaction represents something more than an individual fit of pique on the part of a notoriously irascible and opinionated writer; rather, her nausea at the thought of being forced to occupy the same physical and textual space as Roseanne has much to tell us about the vexed, and very under-theorized, relations between postcolonial cultural producers (be they creative writers or academic theorists) and what is still often condescendingly referred to as mass culture. Kincaid’s testy comments direct us toward the surprisingly uncharted territory in which postcolonial and cultural studies (don’t yet) meet.

     

    The one-sided confrontation between Kincaid and Roseanne can be read as emblematic of a failed dialogue between postcolonial and cultural studies. In Kincaid, we have a respected author of such postcolonial (or Afro-diasporic) “classics” as Annie John and In a Small Place, someone frequently lionized by critics as a writer who “speaks to and from the position of the other” (Ferguson 238). In Roseanne, we have a U.S. TV icon, someone who has also accumulated her fair share of academic plaudits from critics in disciplines such as women’s and cultural studies who have lauded “her subversive potential as a source of resistance and inspiration for feminist change” (Lee 96) or the way her show “potentially helps restore class visibility to the overwhelmingly middle-class world of television” (Bettie 142). While Roseanne may never have read Kincaid, the postcolonial author obviously feels that she has ingested enough of this media icon to pass definitive judgment on the degraded form of culture she represents: only those with “coarse and vulgar” taste, like Tina Brown, could possibly be drawn to such a nauseating figure as Roseanne.2

     

    Revealingly, in voicing this negative evaluation of Roseanne, Kincaid seems compelled to preface it with the positive counterweight of groveling at the feet of a “great writer.” Kincaid has thus staked out a double position: one of power and contempt as regards the abject white woman she is condemning, but also one of deference to and emulation of an unnamed, unsexed, and unraced “great writer.” How are we to explain the hostility to an icon of mass culture on the postcolonial writer’s part, and the willingness to grovel before the idea of literary greatness? Both this hostility and this willingness must, at first blush, strike us as decidedly unexpected, given the strong tendency in postcolonial circles to question the legitimacy of the hierarchical thinking upon which Kincaid’s intertwined evaluations of Roseanne and great writers depends. As stated, a natural reaction to these comments would be to write them off as sports of Kincaid’s querulous nature that tell us nothing about postcolonial studies, its literatures, and its theories. I will, by contrast, be pursuing an “unnatural” counterargument based on the following intentionally provocative hypothesis: Kincaid’s double position, and the value judgments generating it, are in fact exemplary of the foundational bias of postcolonial literary studies, of its deep-rooted sense of distinction from the “coarse and vulgar” world of mass consumption.

     

    The tension between popular culture and great writing evident in Kincaid’s evaluation of Roseanne by no means exhausts the nuances that can be read into her one-sided attack. The binary opposition Kincaid draws is complicated by the fact that she is herself a writer whose books have gained no small success in the literary marketplace. If Kincaid is not “popular” in the same sense that Roseanne is “popular,” she nonetheless has a proven track record as a bestselling author: she is a writer who not only generates “serious” articles by postcolonial critics but also frothy interviews in such places (ironically enough) as People magazine, and who has been deemed “worthy” of inclusion in a series like Critical Companions to Popular Contemporary Writers, where she takes her place beside the likes of Stephen King, Anne Rice, but also, intriguingly enough, Toni Morrison (see Paravisini-Gebert). Postcolonial and Afro-diasporic Kincaid may well be, but that has not stopped her from finding a place in the literary mainstream: or, to put it another way, she is (or, more exactly, can be read as) a middlebrow writer, one who takes some stylistic and ideological chances in her work but who also writes in such as a way as to be capable of pleasing a relatively broad audience. Kincaid’s distinction between the “great” writer and the “vulgar” mass media star cannot stand alone: it must be understood in conjunction with this second opposition between two different types of popularity, the middlebrow and the lowbrow.

     

    Are these two types of popularity as easily separable from one another as one might wish (at least if one were a postcolonial defender of Kincaid), or is there a troubling complicity between them that needs to be thought through and perhaps even embraced? Might not the dramatic rejection of Roseanne on Kincaid’s part itself be nothing more than an anxious attempt–unconscious, calculated, or a mixture of both–to forestall any serious consideration of her own “popular” success, to fence off her own identity as a cultural producer from Roseanne’s, vaccinating herself against the latter by aggrandizing a sense of distinction that might ultimately be attributed to little more than the narcissism of small differences? Might not her middlebrow popularity be part of the very same media “buzz” as the lowbrow version she so disdainfully rejects?

     

    This possible complicity, or (dis)connection, between two forms of popularity–what René Girard would refer to as their “double mediation”3–generates a second set of questions that needs to be addressed in tandem with those surrounding our initial opposition between “vulgar” popularity and “great” writing. How and where do the lowbrow and middlebrow modes of popularity intersect? Does it make any sense to speak of a writer like Kincaid as exemplifying the “middlebrow postcolonial,” given the apparent tension between the assimilative connotations of the first term and the resistant ones of the second? If there is such a thing as the middlebrow postcolonial, how is its popularity (or its potential for popularity) processed by postcolonial literary studies? What about the “lowbrow postcolonial”: is there such a thing (or such a process of reading), and if so, what is its relation not only to its middlebrow double but to the mass popularity of media icons like Roseanne or Jackie Collins?

     

    Furthermore, to raise one last set of questions that has to be factored into the mix, what is the relation, or lack thereof, between all these forms of popularity (mass, lowbrow, middlebrow–or what I will be referring to collectively as the “inauthentically popular”) and that long-cherished ideological construct, a truly popular culture created and consumed by what Frantz Fanon was so fond of referring to as “the people”? Ideally neither degraded masses nor lowbrow or middlebrow consumers, the people–legitimate custodians of a traditional past or inspiriting lifeblood of a revolutionary future–might presumably be thought to have better and more “authentic” things to do with their time than watch Roseanne or read Annie John. In the failed dialogue between Roseanne and Kincaid, where are the people situated, presuming they even exist?

     

    The three sets of questions I have just asked lay out a clear set of overlapping oppositions–the postcolonial versus the popular; the middlebrow versus the lowbrow, with specific reference to the postcolonial; and the inauthentically popular versus the “authentically popular”–that I will be addressing in the following very preliminary account of the foundational bias of postcolonial literary studies and its anxious and under-theorized relation to the empirical question of popularity. In the next section, I expand on the first of these questions, attempting to smoke out the bias toward great, or at least not bad, writing in postcolonial studies by briefly examining the case of a neglected Martiniquan novelist, Tony Delsham; in the section after that, I discuss the far-from-neglected Guadeloupean novelist Maryse Condé by way of expanding upon the distinction between the low-, the middle-, and the highbrow, and its unacknowledged importance to academic readers of postcolonial texts. After these two case studies, I conclude–aided by Graham Huggan’s groundbreaking The Postcolonial Exotic: Marketing the Margins (2001)–with some general considerations regarding what, if anything, cultural studies, with its concerted focus on the popular (in all its many forms), can contribute to our understanding of postcolonial studies, and indeed, to postcolonialism’s self-understanding. Will it help us imagine a room in which Roseanne and Jamaica Kincaid can meet with a new-found respect for one another, or at least without throwing up? And, to anticipate my unlikely point of arrival in this article, can we (re)imagine a place for the “great writer” in that very same room–if not at its center, then at least still within hearing of the less strained, more productive dialogue between cultural and postcolonial studies that I advocate in the following pages?

     

    I. Pop Goes the Postcolonial: On (Not) Reading Tony Delsham

     

    The idea for this article came to me in the summer of 1999, while doing research in Martinique. I found myself passing an idle hour in Fort-de-France’s most upscale bookstore, perusing the impressive amount of Caribbean literature and history for sale there. Two items on the bookshelves especially caught my attention. The first of these was a prominent display devoted to Dérives–a recently published novel by Tony Delsham, editor of the Martiniquan weekly Antilla. I have provided a brief account of Delsham’s novel elsewhere (“Street” 246-51), but the issue that I want to raise here revolves around Delsham himself, and his place–or lack thereof–in accounts of French Caribbean literature in particular, and francophone literature in general (to say nothing of that even broader and more nebulous discipline, postcolonial literary studies4). For many years now, Delsham has been among the most popular and visible writers in the French Antilles, if one judges popularity by the criterion of number of books sold.5 Given the fact of Delsham’s popularity, the question I found myself asking (and it is a question Delsham himself has repeatedly posed) is why no one pays any attention to him in francophone–much less postcolonial–studies, when so much critical ink has been spilled during the past decade over other prominent writers from the area like Edouard Glissant, Patrick Chamoiseau, and Maryse Condé.6 Surely, I asked myself, the popularity of Delsham’s many novels, which consistently deal with local issues close to the heart of his Antillean readers, tells us as much or more about the culture as do those other, sometimes more experimental but often very accessible narratives that have acquired an ever-growing reputation in France and North America? Surely a novel like Dérives is in many respects as, or even more, relevant an example of Martiniquan literature than, say, Chamoiseau’s Prix Goncourt-winning Texaco? I then found myself asking a question that is the obligatory rhetorical starting point of so much postcolonial literary criticism: why is a particular author ignored by the critical orthodoxy, and what nefarious circumstances are promoting the marginalization of this author and others like him?

     

    One obvious factor in Delsham’s critical neglect doubtless involves the way his novels are marketed. A signal difference between Delsham and most of the luminous bodies in the firmament of Antillean literature is that the likes of Glissant and Condé benefit from their association with well-established Parisian publishing houses, whereas Delsham is self-published and the distribution of his books is largely a local affair, limited to the French Caribbean and certain parts of Paris; so, at a purely logistical level, it is hardly surprising he has been ignored.7 (To take this difference as a critical point of departure is, to be sure, to beg the question of how and why those other authors gained access to Parisian firms in the first place, and I will return to this question in my later discussion of the “certain quality” of Condé’s work.) The “indigenous” nature of the production and circulation of Delsham’s novels certainly helps explain his neglect, although one can easily imagine it becoming a major source of interest for some critics, who might want to take up Delsham’s cause and argue that this immersion in the local makes him more “authentic” than writers who have acquired an international audience. Complaints about the latter, cosmopolitan writers have, indeed, been repeatedly voiced in certain quarters in Martinique: the nationalist Guy Cabort-Masson has, for instance, lambasted Patrick Chamoiseau for complying with exoticizing Western notions about the Caribbean and “not writing for Martiniquans” (199). Such writers could well be regarded as appealing to “the ersatz nostalgia on which mass merchandising increasingly draws” (Appadurai 78). With his self-publishing and self-marketing approach, Delsham might conceivably be viewed as less subject to the collusions and compromises of this exoticizing nostalgia, and thus altogether more popular in the most positive (“authentic”) sense of the word since he has established a privileged relationship with a local readership–a readership that would not (at least according to this line of argument) be confused with the “assimilating” masses but that, rather, would be construed as forming part of the “oppositional” people, anchored in their “native” context and at a purifying distance from the global literary market and its ersatz commodities. For such critics, Delsham’s popularity in the French Caribbean might well be considered a vital source of distinction. The “writer as local hero” is, like the “writer as tragic exile,” the sort of script that postcolonial studies can live with–indeed, the sort of script it demands–and were a sociological consideration of production and consumption the only factor in deciding who is and is not worthy of being consecrated at the hands of postcolonial critics, it seems likely that Delsham would by now have been salvaged by a string of academics indignant at his marginalization.

     

    Sociological considerations of this sort are not, however, the only factor in such decisions (indeed, it is part of my argument that such considerations are nowhere near as important as they should be to postcolonial studies). There are certainly any number of other reasons that might help explain why Delsham, despite his wide popularity in the French Caribbean, has not attracted any critical attention. To cite just one of these reasons, Delsham might well be viewed as falling short of postcolonialism’s decided “preference for perfect political credentials” (Donnell 102): notwithstanding his repeated stress on the need for class justice and his championing of a trendy cause like Créolité, the conciliatory position he consistently preaches in his novels and in his countless editorials for Antilla–where he styles himself an “advocate of love,” one stridently opposed to angry nationalists who argue their case at “the tribunal of history, which is the refuge of the castrated” (1 January 1999, 6)–does not offer the incendiary agenda that would be immediately attractive to francophone and postcolonial critics programmed to sing the praises of a “denunciatory tradition.”8

     

    Delsham’s conciliatory “advocacy of love” may not be likely to win him a lot of fans amongst the advocates of denunciation, although one can certainly make the argument that his emphasis on cross-cultural understanding and “normalization” fits in with a recent turn toward “radically nonracial humanism” in postcolonial studies (Gilroy 15). However problematic his ideological positioning, though, it certainly cannot account in and of itself for the silence regarding his work: after all, a lot of ink has been spilled over V. S. Naipaul by critics who find his opinions on matters postcolonial utterly reprehensible. There must, in short, be a far stronger reason for Delsham’s exile from the mainstream of francophone criticism–a reason, I would argue, that extends well beyond the relatively narrow confines of French Caribbean literary studies and provides a conceptual base for the geographically wide-ranging but amorphous disciplines of francophone and, a fortiori, postcolonial studies. That reason, to put it bluntly, is this: Tony Delsham might be an energetic journalist, but he is a decidedly bad novelist.

     

    Although it is a critical commonplace in postcolonial studies to lament the way in which marginalized writers have been misidentified as “bad” by uncomprehending elitist (neo-)colonialcritics, one would, to put it mildly, have to exercise a great amount of ingenuity in order to salvage Delsham’s novels on the basis of their literary value and exercise upon them in good faith any of the multitude of interpretive strategies through which a book’s “literariness” (or even its angry or sly resistance to Eurocentric ideas of “literariness”) can supposedly be confirmed. Delsham’s novels are so manifestly sub-literary that it is hardly surprising critics have ignored the rapidly proliferating mass of historical novels and romans à thèse he has produced and that they have, instead, devoted their critical energies to self-evidently “good” writers like Glissant, Chamoiseau, and Condé.9

     

    Or, I should immediately add, these exclusionary practices are hardly surprising in a critical environment where any kind of premium is placed on literary value and where, indeed, the very fact of popularity (be it middlebrow or lowbrow) might be viewed with an Adorno-like suspicion. Hardly surprising, that is to say, if one has not abandoned oneself to the ostensibly “democratizing” insight–so prevalent in a lot of self-satisfied canon-bashing over the past several decades–that the very idea of literary value is nothing more than a cultural construction. Hardly surprising, if one has not fully absorbed what John Frow has isolated as “one of the fundamental themes of work in cultural studies”: namely, that to place the critical spotlight on popular culture is an excellent way of demonstrating the non-existence of its supposed antithesis, high culture, and of thereby showing us “that no object, no text, no cultural practice has an intrinsic or necessary meaning or value or function; and that meaning, value, and function are always the effect of specific social relations and mechanisms of signification” (61). Hardly surprising, in other words, if one remains committed to seemingly outmoded assumptions about the legitimacy of hierarchical distinctions between the good and the bad, the innovative and the conventional, masterworks and trash.

     

    What is surprising, though, is that most of what we know as postcolonial studies actually takes place precisely in this value-affirming critical context–a context that some would call dated, Eurocentric, and (thus) morally reprehensible, but that I will simply refer to in more neutral terms as modernist. Postcolonial studies as one of the last redoubts of modernism? Postcolonial studies as fundamentally opposed to, rather than in accord with, a cultural studies ever intent on voiding texts of “intrinsic or necessary meaning or value or function” by privileging the “coarse and vulgar” likes of Roseanne or her pop-literary equivalents? Postcolonial critics as latter-day Adornos, turning their noses up at mass culture and groveling, à la Kincaid, in the presence of the highly serious and the complex, the unpredigested and non-standardized? This scenario might seem to fly in the face of “common sense” (which may well be another way of saying that it radically contests the dominant–at least in academic circles–“postcolonial ideology”10), but it seems to provide the only plausible explanation for how a popular writer like Delsham could be so dramatically shunted to the margins of an ostensibly margin-hugging discipline like postcolonial studies.

     

    Two recent critiques of postcolonial theory can help us lay the foundation for an understanding of how this unlikely scenario might have come about: Emily Apter has disapprovingly commented on “postcolonial theory’s resistance to injecting itself with contemporaneity” (213), while Robert Young has pointed to the ways in which, largely due to Said’s textualist misappropriation in Orientalism of Foucault’s praxis-oriented idea of discourse, colonial discourse analysis has degenerated “into just a form of literary criticism that focuses on a certain category of texts” (394). Taken together, Apter’s critique of postcolonialism’s (and specifically Bhabha’s) insistence on the ways in which “‘time-lagged’ signification” continues to be “written out in postcolonial modernity” and Young’s critique of the bias toward texts (as opposed to everyday practices and material conditions) in colonial discourse analysis point the way toward an explanation for Delsham’s invisibility as an object of critical study. As a prerequisite for gaining institutional status in the 1980s, a geographically free-floating concept such as the “postcolonial”–even more open than its predecessor, Commonwealth studies, to the accusation of being little more than an empty abstraction–required something to unify it. While it might have seemed logical for this unifying force to have been supplied simply by “lived experience” and the geopolitical realities of colonial and postcolonial practice (as Young insists), the primary emphasis in fact came to be placed on the text, a text that could take any material form (postcolonial literature, painting, music, etc.) but that had to be read, and read in a certain “time-lagged” way, a modernist way. Lacking a “secure” grounding in any specific cultural territory,11 postcolonial studies anxiously, and anachronistically, attempted to find a home for its “unhomely” self in (a modernist idea of) the text–an idea inseparable from evaluative criteria that were elsewhere being seriously questioned by the relativizing outlook of both postmodernism and cultural studies.

     

    What does this modernist idea of the text entail? As I see it, when it comes to the identification and positive evaluation of cultural texts, the twin directives of modernism were as follows: aesthetic resistance (promoting stylistic difficulty) and political resistance (promoting social radical change). While the preference might well have been for an ideal fusion of the two (as in Brechtian theatre, for instance), style and politics could, needless to say, be seen as superficially at odds with one another, as the modernist extremes of art for art’s sake and agitprop demonstrate. Notwithstanding this potential for division, the two directives had in common an emphasis on the production, and productivity, of resistance which ensured they would be if not always open allies then at least secret sharers. Not surprisingly, given postcolonial theory’s explicit origins in the anti-colonial movements of the early- to mid-twentieth century, the two main strands of that theory replicate this double directive of modernist thinking: on the one hand (the “high seriousness” hand), we have “master thinkers” like Gayatri Spivak and Homi Bhabha, and on the other (the “resistance” hand), we have “engaged intellectuals” like Aijaz Ahmad and Benita Parry, with certain pioneering critics like Said occupying the vast middle ground between these two extremes.12 A similar broad distinction might be made by way of accounting for many of the seminal figures in postcolonial literature: a Wilson Harris or a J. M. Coetzee on the one hand, an Ngugi wa Thiong’o or a Michelle Cliff on the other, with a foundational figure like Chinua Achebe vacillating somewhere between these two poles.

     

    The question is not so much what separates these two sides, but what holds them together, presuming anything does, and it has been my contention that one of the primary factors enabling their coming together as part of the supposedly emancipatory field of postcolonial studies is an inability to come to terms with “compromised,” inauthentically popular texts, as well as the audiences who take pleasure in consuming them.13 Regardless of one’s gut-level reaction to this admittedly schematic claim regarding the modernist/textualist underpinnings of postcolonial studies, it is obvious that a general account of this sort overlooks a number of essential distinctions in its attempt at conveying a sense of the “whole” picture (to cite only a few: the distinction between postcolonial theory and postcolonial literary studies, between postcolonial literature and other forms of cultural production, between postcolonial cultural production and other material practices, etc.). There are obvious problems with any unified account of postcolonialism–even if the very idea of postcolonial studies necessitates a belief in some such unity. For that reason, at this point in the article, having made a general and pointedly polemical claim about the foundational bias of postcolonial studies, I should clarify that what I say in the following section about the “middlebrow postcolonial” is most specifically addressed to the biases of postcolonial literary studies. However, before turning to my discussion of Maryse Condé as a writer who in many respects exemplifies this under-theorized “problem,” I must add one last nuance to my account of how modernism and its biases continue to structure our reception of postcolonial literature: namely, an hypothesis regarding how these biases have adapted to the relativizing inroads of postmodernism.

     

    If there is something startling about my basic argument in this article, it is in large part because the modernist biases upon which I have insisted have been not only occluded but also attenuated in the reception of postcolonial texts. As modernism segued into postmodernism and its absolute meta-narratives became ever more relativized, modernist boundaries between the “authentic” and the “inauthentic” could not, given the openly hierarchical nature of such distinctions, be simply asserted as of old. If, for instance, the dual directives of modernism legitimized two very different but related types of ideal audience–on the one hand, the estranged intellectual still capable of appreciating highbrow texts in the wasteland of degraded “mass” culture (Adorno listening to atonal music) and, on the other, the “people” capable of resisting the threat of massification and answering the call either of the ancestral past (Senghor’s Africans) or the revolutionary future (Fanon’s Algerians)–it is now virtually impossible to envision such audiences without being accused of elitism, on the one hand, or idealism, on the other. What happened as the modernist meta-narratives gave way was that the boundaries demanded by these narratives shifted down (in the case of the first, elite audience) and across (in the case of the second, popular audience): in the most extreme, hyper-populist instances of this shift, the very idea of any distinction between “brows” gets erased, everything becoming part of the postmodern mix (the downward shift), and the idea of the popular ceases to be riven in two, the mere fact of popularity becoming the central point of critical interrogation and, often, cause for celebration (the crosswards shift).

     

    Up to a point, postcolonial literary studies has gone along with this relativizing tendency: first, by assimilating the middlebrow and the highbrow, while nonetheless continuing to exclude the lowbrow from its field of vision; second, by continuing to celebrate authentic popularity, while tacitly accepting, without interrogating, the inauthentic popularity that is defined by market forces rather than by the resistant desires of the “people.” Postcolonial literary studies ostensibly writes back against the hierarchical distinctions of the “Western” canon and renders audible the silenced voices of marginalized peoples; in fact, in its unstated reliance on a high/middlebrow vision of literature and its reluctance to take inauthentic popularity into serious account, it perpetuates a watered-down version of canonical thinking and only bothers to give a voice to the “people” when they say, do, and consume the “right” thing. In the following discussion of Maryse Condé, I attempt to flesh out this claim with specific reference to the “problem” that middlebrow popularity poses the postcolonial ideology.

     

    II. (Ab)errant Revisionism: Maryse Condé and the Middlebrow Postcolonial

     

    To introduce my account of Condé as a middlebrow popular writer, I must return to that same Fort-de-France bookstore where I first came across Delsham’s Dérives. The display for his novel was not the only item that got me thinking that day about the possible (dis)connections between popular writing and the ostensibly populist but surreptitiously elitist field of postcolonial studies and its unavowedly modernist vision of literature. On one of the shelves reserved for inexpensive paperbacks, I noticed Condé’s La migration des coeurs (1995), a Caribbean reworking of Wuthering Heights. Translated into English by her husband Richard Philcox as Windward Heights in 1998 (with an impressive array of blurbs on the back cover from a “wide” range of sources such as The New York Times Book Review, the Village Voice, Black Issues Book Review, and the Multicultural Review), this novel indulges in one of postcolonial literature’s most time-honored discursive moves: revising a European novel from the colonial era. As I flipped through its pages I thought to myself, with no doubt reprehensible cynicism: “Well, here’s a text that’s guaranteed to generate its fair share of essays by critics intent either on trumpeting the resistant virtues of postcolonial revisionism or on questioning the author’s decision to entangle herself in colonial narratives (a passionate but superficial difference of critical opinion that, as René Girard taught me, hides an underlying identity of outlook).”

     

    As I mused over the article-generating text in my hand, my attention was drawn to a nearby novel that was, like Condé’s, published by Robert Laffont in the Pocket format, and that thus bore–superficially at least–a rather close resemblance to Condé’s. What I was looking at, it turned out, was Marie-Reine de Jaham’s Le sang du volcan (1997), second in a trilogy entitled L’or des îles that chronicles the entirety of Martiniquan history. Although it is a well-known critical assumption that one should not judge a book by its cover,14 I could not help being struck by the fact that, at least up to a point, Condé and de Jaham were being marketed in a surprisingly similar fashion (see Figure 1).

     

    Figure 1
    (Click image for larger version)

     

    On the one hand, Condé: among the most respected francophone Caribbean writers, someone who long ago became a “consecrated” author, in Bourdieu’s sense of the word (75-78, 120-25). And on the other…de Jaham: a writer perhaps best described as the Jackie Collins of French Caribbean historical fiction, a decidedly second-rate but prolific Martiniquan writer of the béké (native white) caste who has lived most of her life in France, and whose first novel, La grande béké (1989), caused a good deal of scandal amongst her caste when it came out and proved popular enough that it was eventually made into a movie for French TV (1997; director, Alain Maline). What could these two writers possibly have in common aside from their French Antillean origins?

     

    “Not much of anything!” would be the obvious response. In terms of identity/politics, the differences seem self-evident: in Condé, we have a “black” woman who, despite her migrant life, has solid “roots” in her “native” land, is on the right side of the political fence when it comes to the issue of Guadeloupe’s independence, and yet uses her novels not as an excuse for making blunt political statements but rather as a forum for posing complex and irresoluble problems15; in de Jaham, we have a “white” woman who has lived most of her life in Paris and whose novels, notwithstanding the scandal they initially caused in béké circles, astoundingly repeat many of the ideological assumptions of nineteenth-century “creolist discourse,”16 redeploying any number of long-established clichés (both positive and negative) about Martinique and the central role of the békés in shaping the island’s history, and offering narrative closure in the form of straightforward appeals (in a novel like Le maître-savane, the sequel to La grande béké) to the healing virtues of political autonomy for the islands, albeit always within the framework of the French nation. Very different writers, in short. Indeed, even the marketing similarities that initially struck me are, if one takes a closer look, only “skin-deep”: for instance, the exoticizing cover images that accompany both texts are supplemented, in de Jaham’s case, by the word “roman,” which–as a perusal of the novel’s back pages shows–marks the fact that it belongs to a series featuring writers such as Collins and Danielle Steel; there is no equivalent list at the back of Condé’s Laffont novels, presumably signaling the distinctive as opposed to generic nature of her romans (which would also appear to legitimize using a smaller print font for her novels than for de Jaham’s). To acknowledge “differences” such as these does not, however, absolve us from thinking through the evident similarities in the paratextual material out of which, alone, our awareness of those differences emerges17; these similarities locate the two texts, and their authors, in an uncomfortable relation made possible by their relative marketability and draw our attention to the under-theorized affinities and antagonisms of lowbrow and middlebrow popularity in a postcolonial context.

     

    Given Condé’s preeminent status as a francophone writer, to think of her and de Jaham as occupying significantly overlapping spheres of production, circulation, and consumption seems almost heretical, and yet why should this appear such a strange coupling to us? One could certainly argue for specific points of intersection between these two prolific novelists–for instance, the way that de Jaham’s career trajectory seems almost parodically to mirror Condé’s, debuting with a scandalous first-person narrative and then moving on to recuperative historical sagas, just as Condé launched her career as a novelist with Hérémakhonon and went on to write the Segu cycle–but such arguments are of much less interest than the plain fact that both women are among the bestselling francophone writers with a Caribbean pedigree, each “worthy” of being marketed in Laffont’s Pocket collection, and each ubiquitous in Antillean bookstores.

     

    After all, Condé is not simply a writer venerated by (primarily) North American francophone and postcolonial critics. She is also, like Kincaid, the author of accessible novels that have frequently (especially in France, and especially in the 1980s) found a broad, and in the case of the multi-volume Segu diptych, an indisputably bestseller audience. A novel like I, Tituba, Black Witch of Salem (1986; trans. 1992), has made a significant impact on everyday readers in the States, finding its way into the substantial and growing market for informative fictional texts about the Afro-diasporic experience. Condé’s novels get reviewed in all the right places in France, and translations of her work are discussed in such places as USA Today and the Washington Post.18 The structural finesse and linguistic experimentation of many of her novels notwithstanding, they are, if not page-turners à la de Jaham, nonetheless, to cite the blurb from the Multicultural Review on the back of Windward Heights, “engaging and well-written book[s] that [are] difficult to put down.” In sum, Condé is in many respects the very model of a middlebrow writer, with all the stylistic restrictions, political ambivalence, and capacity for success in the literary and academic market that this adjective entails. Such is the cultural capital attached to the name of a consecrated writer like Maryse Condé in North America, however, and such are the a priori assumptions about the “value” of francophone and postcolonial literature in general, that no discussion of her as a popular writer, a writer of marketable middlebrow fiction, can take place: the consensus must be that she is producing valuable literary work, and this value must at all costs be abstracted both from the market forces that are so obviously at play in the promotion and dissemination of her novels amongst the greater public and from the elitist dynamics of the creation and promotion of aesthetic distinction at work in the academic culture industry, which has a clear stake in securing and legitimating her identity as “postcolonial subject,” especially now that she has become such a powerful figure in the U.S. academy, the very embodiment of la Francophonie. One could hardly wish for the doyenne of francophone studies to be anything less than a “great writer,” after all!

     

    And yet the (middlebrow) popularity of Condé’s novels (like that of any number of similar crossover writers such as Kincaid, Edwige Danticat, Arundhati Roy, etc.19) permits us to pose the unsettling question that has so often been asked by the practitioners of cultural studies: “What’s so great about great?” One answer to this question leads in a skeptical, relativizing direction that undermines the foundations upon which Condé’s distinction, and that of all writers, rests: “There’s nothing truly great about great, it’s all a conspiracy–or, more neutrally, the arbitrary product of institutional practices, contingent upon ideological imperatives and the like.” As someone who has never been wholly able to understand why my colleagues make such a fuss about Condé, I am sympathetic with this skeptical approach to answering the question. And yet, this question is a double-edged one: it allows not simply for the debunking response to which we have latterly become accustomed, but also for the same old response that people like F. R. Leavis used to haul out when talking about the “great tradition.” And this same old response, which undergirds Kincaid’s groveling comments about the “great writer,” is also–let me now strategically admit at the midway point of this article–of no small relevance to me! As someone who has read a lot of Condé and de Jaham, it seems self-evident to me that the former is a better writer than the latter, which makes it imperative to identify those features of her work that do make it, if not “great,” then at least greater than de Jaham’s. It is this double imperative, of skepticism and affirmation with regard to literary greatness, that I am ultimately arguing for in this article. This imperative becomes particularly visible when examining the interstitial terrain of the middlebrow, for to identify a text as middlebrow is, by virtue of its in-between condition, to acknowledge that its greatness is troubling; any stable conception of its actual worth is troubled by our sense that it is neither unequivocally “great” nor unequivocally the opposite of that, and for this reason we are forced to put into question and to (re)affirm its literary value.

     

    As this article progresses, I will return to this double-edged imperative, but for now more needs to be said about the way Condé’s place in the francophone and postcolonial literary canon has been achieved without any serious consideration of her popularity. Critics have, obviously, not gone so far as to deny the fact of Condé’s popularity; they have simply ignored it. If her husband and translator Richard Philcox is, understandably, not shy about pointing out “the duality of Maryse Condé’s books–the way they attract both the ‘greater public’ and those in universities” (229), critics have consistently proven unwilling to interrogate the double-dealing nature of her work: they will mention the popular reception of her novels only in passing (more frequently, though, they will insinuate a case for the admirable unpopularity of her work by stressing the indifferent or hostile reception of her first effort, Hérémakhonon), and then quickly move on to consider the supposedly more subtle ways in which these novels attract them. And yet it is precisely the entanglement of these two forms of attraction that most needs addressing if the true distinctiveness of Condé’s work, the “duality” of which Philcox speaks, is to be understood amidst the welter of elitist claims for its distinction–claims based on the assumption of its “high serious” and/or “resistant” nature as francophone and, a fortiori, postcolonial text.

     

    To flesh out this general scenario regarding Condé’s critical reception, it is worth pausing here to discuss in detail one random but highly influential example of a critic (mis)understanding Condé’s double identity by imposing modernist criteria of evaluation on her work: Françoise Lionnet’s exemplary 1993 account of La traversée de la mangrove (1989), the novel of Condé’s that–no doubt because of its quasi-Faulknerian array of relaying narrators and its “subversive” incorporation of Creole into a French text–has proven most popular with the critics, generating any number of articles praising its “polyphonic” or “mosaic” poetics, its “nomadic” and “relational” politics, its construction of an “authentically” creole or hybrid identity, and so on.

     

    Lionnet’s reading of this novel identifies it as an example of a “new Antillean humanism,” and stresses the way it embodies in textual form Condé’s “return” to Guadeloupe in the mid-1980s after decades of self-imposed exile in Africa and France. According to Lionnet, this return involved a recovery on Condé’s part of her connection to authentically popular culture: she had, as Lionnet puts it, finally recognized “the value of the Creole language, of the indigenous dances and tales which […] require acceptance ‘on their own terms’” (71-72). After her wanderings abroad, Condé was now, with Traversée, in a position to ask “how a writer might derive sustenance from the sources of popular culture in order eventually to represent this milieu better and touch the readers who belong to it”; her new and more “humble” attitude toward her native land was generated by a “desire to come to a better understanding of the lived experience of culture, to return to the oral traditions of a once disparaged–because poorly understood–popular tradition” (72). In statements like this, we find the sort of appeal to the authentically popular with which postcolonial studies is at ease: a return to such things as “indigenous dances and tales” and “oral traditions” would appear to be just the thing to purify Condé of whatever contamination she might have incurred only a few years before in France as a result of the bestselling popularity of the Segu novels, to say nothing of remedying her regrettable lack of humility when it came to “the readers who belong” to Caribbean popular culture.20

     

    Indeed, Lionnet draws an emphatic line in the sand between those bestsellers and Traversée when she makes the claim–based largely on Condé’s liberal sprinkling of Creole throughout the text–that the latter novel has only one “true” audience, an audience presumably immersed in the “lived experience” of “popular tradition”:

     

    Although published in Paris, like her previous books, Traversée is not written for a French public; for the first time, Condé seems to have a truly Caribbean audience in mind. Creole words and expressions are translated at the bottom of each page, but this was done after the fact, as a favor to the French reader and on the recommendation of Condé’s editor. (73-74)

     

    This astounding statement perfectly exemplifies the anxieties produced among (though seldom articulated by) academic critics at the mainstream success of Segu–especially among those of a hybridizing bent such as Lionnet who are not likely to be attracted to the Roots-y dimensions that critics of another, essentialist stripe might be tempted to valorize in their own (mis)readings of Condé’s bestselling historical romance about Africa. In the most manichean of fashions, Condé’s “true” readership is reduced here to the happy few, and any paratextual gestures toward an other readership–such as providing French translations of “Creole words and expressions” (of the sort commonly found, for instance, at the bottom of the pages of de Jaham’s novels)–is written off as being simply a “favor” to the wrong sort of reader and, moreover, the responsibility not of Condé herself but of a misguided editor evidently not attuned to the virtues of “defamiliarization and estrangement on the level of language” that Lionnet argues, in explicitly modernist terminology, are this novel’s central feature (180). The postcolonial novelist is here attractively (and stereotypically) presented as both a powerful, beneficent figure, one who magnanimously bestows “favors” on an alien public for whom she is not writing, and a distressingly victimized individual, one who is subject to the inane “recommendations” of a foreign editor.

     

    This clear distinction between a relevant and an irrelevant readership is supported in the rest of Lionnet’s account of the novel by a veritable battery of modernist assumptions and rhetorical moves. Her éloge of “oral traditions” is, for instance, doubled by an inflated emphasis on the (admittedly ambiguous) centrality of the writer in this novel.21 Her account of the ways in which Condé is inscribed within (good) traditions–not just “popular tradition” but also “the great tradition of European realism and humanism” as well as “that of nineteenth-century peasant literature” (76)–is supplemented by a repeated emphasis on the utter novelty of Condé’s enterprise, not only in terms of her own trajectory as a writer (the novel points us in an “entirely new narrative direction, the appropriation of a new locus of identity, the implementation of what might almost be called a new poetics” [75-76]) but also in terms of the history of literature itself (“she opens up the literary field to currently unexplored thematic and stylistic possibilities” [84]). Finally, her account of the novel’s undeniable emphasis on fragmentation is argumentatively linked to the idea that the text provides readers with a model for how to live: it demonstrates how Guadeloupeans’ “solutions to the problems of postcolonial life are sufficiently rich and nuanced to serve as a model for others” (77), and how fragmentation serves “as a basis for the construction of cultural models appropriate to the contexts of postcolonial creolization” (79).

     

    Lionnet’s reading of Condé is modernist almost to the point of parody, and so it is not surprising that many of its key elements have been put into question by other critics: Mireille Rosello has, for instance, ably critiqued the “insular” model of a return to the native land that generates Lionnet’s “line in the sand” rhetoric about Condé’s readership (186); Lydie Moudileno has shown how the ambiguously central role of the writer in Condé’s Traversée is actually part of an ironical trajectory in which, by the early 1990s, writers come to have less and less of a role to play, exemplary or otherwise, in her novels (141-71); and Maryse Condé has herself so often claimed that she is not interested in providing rules or models of any sort in her novels that appealing to her as a writer of exemplary “solutions to the problems of postcolonial life” seems wildly beside the point. One can argue against many of the specifics of Lionnet’s analysis (or praise her for being honest enough to situate Condé in what, from a postcolonial perspective, must be the disreputable “great tradition” of European humanism, even if she is at pains to clarify that Condé’s novel is humanism “with a difference”). From our perspective, though, we need only point out the extent to which the exclusionary logic of Lionnet’s account of Traversée, and its convenient distinction between the right and wrong sort of readers (those, as it were, who impose or read the footnotes and those who do not), is generated by the anxiety about the relation between inauthentic popularity and literary value that I have been arguing haunts postcolonial literary studies. A text’s existence in the literary marketplace and its possibly complicitous relation to the desires of the buying public (regardless of where that public is located) are precisely what postcolonial literary critics have an extremely hard time envisaging and what they exile to the unspoken margins of their own self-styled “minoritarian” readings.

     

    It is, to put it in more concrete terms, an easy thing for such critics to read the front cover blurb for Windward Heights (taken from a USA Today review) and feel overcome by a Kincaid-like nausea: “Exotic and eloquent […] Condé takes Emily Brontë’s cold-climate classic on obsessive love and makes it hot and lush.” The only “logical” reaction, from a postcolonial perspective, to such a fawningly effusive claim is to argue that it expresses an impoverished conception of the text, or even an act of deception promoted by insidious marketers and other such cultural mediators who have understood nothing about the work they are editing or reviewing. To speak of “co-optation,” “misappropriation,” “neo-exoticism” when faced with a blurb of this sort is postcolonial common sense, and for me to make the claim that this commonsense evaluation lacks any sense would simply be to replace one form of critical bad faith with another: nausea in the face of the USA Today review’s claims is, to a degree, a legitimate reaction, but there is also a degree of exactness to its “hot and lush” evaluation of Windward Heights, as there is to the Village Voice‘s by no means dismissive claim that the novel offers up a “monsoon of melodrama.”

     

    Now, although my discussion of Condé up to this point might make it seem as if I am simply mounting a cranky attack on her abilities as a writer and using the fact of her relative popularity as part of an argument against the consecrated status she has achieved in francophone and postcolonial circles, what I am actually doing here is teasing out the preconditions for such a status and the exclusionary strategies of reading through which it is constructed. If the drift of my argument seems critical of Condé’s work, that has less to do with my own ambivalence toward her work than with the fact that the only way to tease out the implicit modernist hierarchies at work in postcolonial literary studies is explicitly to adopt such a perspective, openly to entertain the possibility that distinctions between the “great writer” and lesser writers, and between the various levels of “brow,” might actually provide a (doubtful) ground for evaluating texts. Postcolonial literary studies requires “greatness” of its writers, but cannot openly formulate this requirement because that would put into question its non-elitist self-presentation, its insistence that the postcolonial (to quote Lionnet’s totalizing claims about the Antillean subject’s imaginaire) “can be successfully articulated only through nonlinear, egalitarian, and nonhierarchical cultural relations” (79). By contrast, I think we have to begin seriously to question what is great (and perhaps also not so great) about a writer like Condé, what distinguishes her from other writers and allows us to say with relative certainty that she is better than de Jaham or Delsham.

     

    What allows for this relative certainty? What is the “certain quality” that makes Condé more marketable (and teachable) than someone like Delsham, not quite as marketable (and very much more teachable) than de Jaham, and when all is said and done quite possibly more worthy of being taught and marketed than either of these writers? Viewed from a hostile perspective (of the sort that might, say, valorize Delsham for publishing his novels in the Caribbean rather than France), Condé’s marketability and teachability could simply be interpreted as the result of having fallen prey to the most dangerous of compromises, of having sacrificed her indigenous “opacity” to the nefariously cosmopolitan forces of Parisian publishing houses and the U.S. academic marketing circuit. Such a perspective would be a very limited one indeed, reducing not only Condé but virtually the entire roster of mainstream postcolonial writers to the status of literary Quislings. No, this “certain quality” of Condé’s does not (simply) have to do with betrayal and compromise; it has at least as much to do with how “good” her books are as with how “good” they are perceived as being by certain people (notably, publishers and academics). With my deliberately double-edged phrase “a certain quality,” I am referring both to something that is certain in the sense of indisputable (“established as a truth or fact to be absolutely received, depended, or relied upon; not to be doubted, disputed, or called in question; indubitable, sure” [OED]) and to something that is questionable in all sorts of ways (“of positive yet restricted (or of positive even if restricted) quantity, amount, or degree; of some extent at least” [OED]). The indisputable nature of this quality allows us to maintain that Condé is a better writer than de Jaham; its restricted nature renders her subject to an array of relative judgments that will be inflected by a complex set of cultural, ideological (etc.) assumptions. The two degrees of certainty–absolute and relative–cannot be disentangled from one another, which means that any critical discussion of a book’s worth will largely be a matter of expressing and analyzing (differing) perceptions of that worth (be those perceptions generated by individuals or what Frow refers to as “valuing communities”); however, this does not mean that to speak of a text’s real, as opposed to perceived, worth is simply nonsensical (as the relativizing insights of some extremist forms of cultural studies might suggest).

     

    I will return in the final paragraphs of this article to the need for retrieving a necessarily contingent sense of a text’s real literary worth, but what needs to be pointed out here is simply that postcolonial literary studies has been reluctant to acknowledge its own investment in the “certain quality” it demands of its authors: lumping the highest of the highbrow in with the most middling of the middlebrow in a common ground that only seems all-inclusively horizontal rather than exclusively vertical until one starts thinking about popular texts such as Delsham and de Jaham’s that are excluded from its field of vision, it fails to address the (need for) distinctions upon which it is founded. Pointing out this commitment to a “certain quality” forces us to think about the (dis)connections between popularity and the resistant value ascribed to particular texts by postcolonial critics. To what extent are they compatible and where do popularity and (a modernist conception of) value part ways? What is at stake in tacitly privileging the latter over the former when they do part ways? And what would happen if we were to reverse this bias, and start taking the former as, or even more, seriously than the latter?

     

    A crossover writer like Condé is all the more appropriate for thinking through questions about the (dis)connections between the popular and the postcolonial because she has herself, in both her critical pronouncements and novelistic practice, often made a (necessarily contradictory) case for both inauthentic popularity and literary value. On the one hand, unlike so many of her critical advocates, she has willingly acknowledged the ways in which her own work incorporates elements of the inauthentically popular,22 and somewhat less willingly interrogated her own status as a bestselling author.23 On the other, she has time and again proved willing to deploy an evaluative language that openly distinguishes between “good” and “bad” writers in an old-fashioned way that can only be an embarrassment in the ostensibly plural world of “nonlinear, egalitarian, and nonhierarchical cultural relations” for which, a critic like Lionnet would argue, she is laying the foundations in her novels: nowhere, for instance, is a Kincaid-like willingness to distinguish between the good and the not-so-good more evident than when she unfavorably compares a popular (middlebrow) writer like Isabel Allende to Gabriel García Márquez: “I cannot say that I consider Isabel Allende a major writer. It seems to me that as a writer, she is less comprehensive, less accomplished than García Márquez” (Pfaff 128). Examples of this double emphasis abound in her work.

     

    Condé thus occupies a double position with regard to the value of the popular, exhibiting a self-conscious acceptance and questioning of it. Indeed, such self-consciousness is one of the hallmark features of Condé’s novels and contributes in no small part, I would argue, to their “certain quality,” their ability to attract ostensibly very different readerships. Self-consciously occupying the middlebrow ground where different attitudes toward the value of literature troublingly meet, her work addresses, and takes its distance from, both inauthentically popular and academic audiences–a trend especially pronounced, I would suggest, since the late 1980s. Indeed, if I might venture a chronological thesis regarding the development of Condé’s oeuvre, it appears to me that her novels of the 1990s, following upon her bestseller successes of the previous decade and simultaneous with her belated immersion in and consecration by the U.S. academy, have increasingly become a meditation on what place, if any, the popular (in all its many forms, “authentic” and “inauthentic”) can have in what she herself once referred to as the “bourgeois and elitist” genre of the novel,24 and how that place might disrupt the ideological expectations such novels generate among her various audiences, especially those of academic readers singlemindedly intent on treating her as a postcolonial writer who “speaks to and from the position of the other.” In writing self-consciously middlebrow novels, Condé plays with and disarms the expectations of her academic audience, producing visibly hybrid texts in which the inauthentically popular and the “highly serious” intersect in unexpected ways in terms of both content and form (unexpected, at least, within the framework of the postcolonial ideology).

     

    Condé’s novels of the 1990s can be read as self-consciously invoking any number of time-honored ideological and narrative commonplaces of postcolonial literature, but in a page-turning format that troublingly evacuates them of their supposedly “resistant” value. From my perspective, this is where the real value of Condé’s novels resides–particularly those written over the past decade: in their ability to put into question, by packaging the postcolonial and the mainstream together in unmistakably middlebrow texts, the academic strategies of reading according to which they ostensibly demand to be read. To be sure, it is not just those strategies of reading that are troubled by these hybrid novels: a logical consequence of the double position Condé self-consciously occupies is that the postcolonial dimensions of her text will trouble other strategies of reading, “subverting” the expectations of her mainstream audiences by forcing them in a comprehensive and accomplished fashion to address normally marginalized cultural differences (race, class, gender, language, etc.). Such arguments can (and no doubt must) be made, although to be effective they require greater sensitivity than is usually found in postcolonial literary studies regarding the ways in which mainstream audiences–increasingly familiar with the basic ideological assumptions of postcolonial studies–may well expect a degree of subversion and estranging frissons of difference from the postcolonial novels they consume. However, familiar arguments about the postcolonial subverting the mainstream, valid as they might be, merely serve to confirm the foundational bias I have been critically examining here; more interestingly, the self-consciously middlebrow positioning of Condé’s novels forces us to think that familiar process of “subversion” in reverse, from the postcolonial to the mainstream, and in so doing, puts into question–without necessarily eliminating–that bias.

     

    Nowhere, to return to the point of departure for my reflections on Condé, is this playing with the expectations of academic audiences, this middlebrow hybridization, more evident than in Condé’s decision to revise a classic nineteenth-century British novel like Wuthering Heights. As the controversy surrounding Alice Randall’s recasting of Gone with the Wind as The Wind Done Gone shows, revisionism is now a commonplace move: be it the Tara plantation, or going back to Manderley and telling Rebecca’s side of the story, revisionism has become the intellectual property of even the most nondescript and inconsequential writers, to say nothing of an efficient way to acquire instant media “buzz.” The revisionist move, such an attractive option for postcolonial writers in the past, has become so familiar, so obvious, so calculated, it might be argued, that little or no case can be made for its “innovative” or “resistant” possibilities. In the specific case of Wuthering Heights, the move is a doubly familiar one inasmuch as over the past decade critics have, predictably enough, shown an increasing penchant for reading Brontë’s novel through a postcolonial lens, asserting boldly that “Heathcliff’s racial otherness cannot be a matter of dispute,”25 and scouring the text for references to faraway places. How are we to respond to such a familiar, and commercially canny, move on Condé’s part?

     

    The first of two obvious responses to this question is this: blithely disregard the unoriginality of the revisionist move and unself-consciously pursue the “let us compare Jane Eyre and Wide Sargasso Sea” type of approach that has generated so many scholarly articles over the past few decades and that, even more vitally, guarantees the presence of texts like Windward Heights on any number of course syllabi (mine included); fixate on similarities with and differences from the originary text; chart the ways in which Condé is rewriting the Victorians; and take sides on the eternal question as to whether or not stressing the entanglement of the colonial and the postcolonial is ultimately a politically useful move. The second obvious response to this unoriginality is this: recognize it and simply refuse to play such a well-rehearsed game. How much eventually gets published on this novel will in large part depend on which of these two options wins the day: my own guess is that Migration will find its fair share of exegetes, but that misgivings about the unoriginality of its revisionist move will ensure that it appears less frequently than Hérémakhon and Traversée in Condé bibliographies.

     

    A third response is possible, though. What if one were to acknowledge the unoriginality of this revisionist move and take it as one’s point of departure for an appraisal of the novel? What if one were to read, and valorize, it as strategically unoriginal? As will become clear in the concluding section of this article, such a recourse to the “strategic” is not without its problems (and its predictability), but it does seem to me a provisionally useful way of negotiating the impasse described in the previous paragraph. The blatant unoriginality of Condé’s move puts into question, without simply doing away with, the resistant and counterdiscursive energies conventionally associated with the revisionist subgenre of postcolonial literature. What work can this subgenre still perform if it has become so formulaic? That is the question, it seems to me, Condé is boldly forcing us to address with this novel, and the asking of that question is greatly facilitated by the sheer readability of Migration, which signals the text’s ready availability to middlebrow readers for whom its genealogical connection to Wuthering Heights will not necessarily form the primary point of interest or interrogation, but who might be drawn, rather, to such things as the presence of romance motifs (the pleasures of the “hot and lush”) or “universal” themes (the profundities that, to quote from the review of Windward Heights in the Chicago Tribune, make us “think about the kinds of emotions that have moved human beings throughout our existence”).

     

    Condé takes the master narrative of postcolonial revisionism, which has caused so many critics over the past several decades to go into spasms of high seriousness every time a name like Caliban, Ariel, or Bertha Mason gets mentioned, and strategically redirects it toward the commodified double ground of the (middlebrow) popular, where the pleasures of the text mingle (un)easily with its profundities, the “low” appeals of romance with “high” insights into the human condition. The novel’s culturally specific (Caribbean, womanist, etc.) aspects, upon which any attempt at reading the text as “purely” postcolonial must in large part rely, prove inseparable from pleasures and profundities that are far less culturally specific: this doubling and displacement of the overtly postcolonial contents of the novel, similar to the way its revisionist form cannot be detached from an awareness of its formulaic nature, serves to relocate Migration in a commodified (middlebrow) popular context that substantially voids, without erasing, whatever resistant values one might originally have wished to associate with its revisionist gesture. If one were to give a specific name to this process of doubling and displacement that Condé’s strategic unoriginality renders visible, it might well be pastiche, in Fredric Jameson’s unflattering sense of the word as the monstrous postmodern double of the parody he continues, in modernist fashion, to valorize.26 Following the lead of Condé herself, who once described Tituba as “a pastiche of the feminine heroic novel” (Pfaff 60), we might well read Migration as a pastiche of the postcolonial revisionist novel: a work that, by self-consciously exiling postcolonial revisionism to the mainstream, refuses to play along with the evaluative distinctions that undergird the postcolonial ideology, forcing us to confront the modernist limits of that ideology, while continuing to inscribe, weakly, the memories of resistance that it assumes.

     

    From the very first words of Migration, Condé signals the aberrant nature of her revisionist gesture, refusing to meet the understandable (from a postcolonial perspective) expectation that her work will contest its colonial antecedent–as can be seen from the novel’s amiable dedication “À Emily Brontë qui, je l’espère, agréera cette lecture de son chef-d’oeuvre. Honneur et respect!” (Migration 7; translated by Philcox as, “To Emily Brontë, who I hope will approve of this interpretation of her masterpiece. Honour and respect!” [Windward n.p.]). This is hardly the sort of antagonistic relationship that one would expect from a revisionist novel, and any reading of Condé’s lecture of Brontë must take this unexpectedly “respectful” dedication as its point of departure. In interviews, Condé herself has stressed her lifelong “passion” for the novel (Anagnostopoulou-Hielscher 75), and while this passion could easily be read as the sign of an affinity between two women marginalized both by their gender and their provincial/colonial origins (Yorkshire/Guadeloupe), a reading of the epigraph that stressed only solidarity between marginalized women, while valid up to a point, would fail to account for the ways in which this solidarity gets mediated by Condé’s appeal to the “chef d’oeuvre”–an appeal to the elitist idea of the “masterpiece” that would certainly have struck a sympathetic chord with the Leavises, who were themselves great fans of Wuthering Heights.27

     

    From the outset, then, we are forced to confront a number of elective affinities that divert us from a conventionally postcolonial reading of the revisionist text: it is not subversion but passion that is highlighted here. This passion is generated both by aesthetic and affective evaluations–evaluations that, on the one hand, rely upon the category of the “masterpiece” and that, on the other, arise out of the sort of readerly engagement that has made Wuthering Heights such a widely consumed and loved novel. (It is this same engagement, to draw a relevant point of comparison, that has made so many an academic reader of Jane Austen anxious about the ways in which Janeites appropriate her work.28) The amiable dedication to Migration, pointing us toward the literary value of Brontë’s “masterpiece” and signalling the author’s own affective ties to it as a reader, destabilizes the generic assumption that, as a postcolonial revisionist, Condé must have a bone to pick with Brontë’s colonial-era novel. As the inclusion of the Creole greeting “honneur et respect” in the epigraph suggests, the novel’s Caribbean content does not in any dramatic way contest the novel’s aberrant affiliation with its precursor but itself forms part of it. Condé has simply provided Wuthering Heights with new “migratory” contexts (Caribbean, womanist, etc.) that supplement but do not militate against her predecessor’s novel. Condé once remarked of Segu that it “is not a militant novel, and until people understand that I don’t write such novels, they will not comprehend my writings at all” (Pfaff 52); in pastiching the postcolonial revisionist novel, aberrantly channelling its militant energies in a mainstream direction, Condé forces this understanding upon her academic readers, while clearing a space for her other readers.

     

    The all-too-familiar revisionist strategy pastiched in Migration, to be sure, hardly exhausts its postcolonial resonance: indeed, the novel very evidently lends itself to being read as exemplifying another narrative strategy that is decidedly more au courant in postcolonial circles. If Migration is an aberrant work of revisionism, as argued above, it is also an errant one, blatantly confirming Condé’s investment in the virtues of “errance,” a dominant theme in her novels of the 1990s (speaking of Desirada [1997], for instance, she noted that when reading it “one comes to the conclusion that wandering [errance] is an essential ground for creativity” [Anagnostopoulou-Hielscher 73]). This privileging of errancy is clearly relevant to the diasporic, anti-essentialist turn of so much recent work, literary and critical, in postcolonial studies, which has seized upon metaphors like nomadism and migrancy by way of insisting upon the virtues of tracking routes rather than exploring roots.

     

    Indeed, it is precisely through a structural emphasis on errancy that Condé most visibly establishes the pastiche-like nature of her revisionist gesture in Migration: where the first third (Part I) of the novel sticks quite closely to a straightforward transposition of the Wuthering Heights story onto the Caribbean, with the requisite racial recoding (e.g., Condé’s light-skinned Catherine finds herself torn between a black Heathcliff, Razyé, and a béké Linton, Aymeric de Linsseuil29), the last two-thirds (Parts II-V) of the novel rapidly loses touch with its Victorian predecessor, scrambling the latter’s second-generation plot and wandering into “new” territory that seems of little or no relevance to (a rewriting of) Wuthering Heights. Brontë’s novel ceases, at some point, to matter: it proves neither a destiny to be lamented (as in Rhys’s Wide Sargasso Sea) nor contested (as in Césaire’s A Tempest); quite simply, it becomes something that goes forgotten, and the reader waits in vain for a “return” to the obvious pattern of similarities and differences between colonial text and postcolonial counter-text that obtained in Part I of the novel and that held out the promise of some contestatory significance to the revisionist gesture–a promise the novel declines to keep, as it wanders away from its premises and becomes, as it were, just another Maryse Condé novel.

     

    There will be no such “return” to the original, modernist assumptions of postcolonial revisionism, as Condé clarifies by her blandly obvious intertextual references to the idea of returning in various chapter headings, which are ironically undercut by what actually happens in these chapters. The closure sought by Heathcliff/Razyé in the final chapter of Part I, “Le temps retrouvé,” is not attained: Part II opens onto the second-generation story, initiating the novel’s errant drift away from its predecessor text. His son Razyé II’s “Retour au pays natal,” to cite the title of the novel’s penultimate chapter, proves equally unsatisfactory: his return to Guadeloupe fails to provide him with the catharsis and the anchor he was seeking. In Condé’s open-ended migratory world, there would thus appear to be none but the most highly ironized of places for standard modernist endings of the sort offered by Proust and Césaire, and her emphasis on errance and displacement is certainly in tune with the privileging of hybridity (Bhabha), relationality (Glissant), etc., in postcolonial theory of late. The way that Condé’s novel migrates away from its point of origin, away from both Wuthering Heights and the generic assumptions of postcolonial revisionism, might be read as an allegory for the process through which the colonial condition and the postcolonial response to it become slowly but surely erased, opening out onto a “new” world of errancy in which some of the old world’s key assumptions about the value of categories like “nation” and “race” have come to appear as errors. An errant world, then, but also a more human world–for it is assuredly the case that we only gain a sense of the humanity of Condé’s characters once we cease to read them as representative figures, as racialized embodiments of a text that has a revisionist point to make. The differences upon which colonial discourse and postcolonial counterdiscourse depend blind us to this common humanity, and as Condé’s novel errantly progresses, increasingly detaching itself from the revisionist script to which it initially seemed attached, it opens our eyes to what might be out there “beyond” the framework established by colonial discourse and perpetuated by postcolonial responses that, in directly contesting this discourse, cannot help remaining implicated in its inhuman vision of the world.

     

    This possible opening beyond the all-too-familiar concerns of that complicitous entanglement of colonial and postcolonial that I have elsewhere dubbed the post/colonial seems akin to what Paul Gilroy, in Against Race: Identifying Political Culture Beyond the Color Line, has identified as the opportunity made visible by the current crisis in raciological thinking. For Gilroy, that crisis has created the grounds for envisioning a “planetary humanism” in which “out-moded principles of differentiation” will have lost their value–a humanism in which we might exercise a renewed sensitivity to “the overwhelming sameness that overdetermines social relationships between people and continually betrays the tragic predicaments of their common species life,” and in which we might learn how to value “the undervalued power of this crushingly obvious, almost banal human sameness, so close and basically invariant that it regularly passes unremarked upon” (29). As Gilroy knows full well, his insistence on “the possibility of leaving ‘race’ behind, of setting aside its disabling use as we move out of the time in which it could have been expected to make sense” (29) will be branded by many as utopian at best and irresponsible at worst by those who, in his words, capitulate “to the lazy essentialisms that postmodern sages inform us we cannot escape” (53). Without taking sides on that issue, or raising the question of what, if any, relation there might be between the “overwhelming sameness” valorized here and the nightmarish scenario of homogenization that haunted modernist critiques of mass culture and that continues to feed into our understanding of the possible effects of globalization, I would simply like to conclude my discussion of Condé’s novel by noting that if its errant narrative movement seems to point in the direction argued for by Gilroy, it nonetheless cannot help pointing back toward the very thing that it is putting into question by pastiching: namely, the resistant tenets of postcolonial revisionism.

     

    The novel’s final chapter, after all, is entitled “Retour à L’Engoulvent,” and this final return takes us back, if only in translation and with the greatest ambivalence, to the revisionist return to Wuthering Heights that was Condé’s apparent point of departure in Migration and that the errancy of the last two-thirds of the novel seems to overturn. The two points–forward into the future and back into the past–meet here at novel’s end, cancelling each other out in the undecidability, the willed pointlessness, of the novel’s concluding sentence: it has finally become clear to Razyé II, who has moved back into L’Engoulvent (Wuthering Heights), that his dead wife Cathy, supposedly the daughter of Catherine and Aymeric, was almost certainly the daughter of Catherine and his own father Razyé. This unprovable if altogether likely scenario casts doubt on the future of his and Cathy’s daughter, Anthuria, fruit either of a legitimate cross-cultural interracial union or an unwitting act of incest.

     

    Il [Razyé II] s’absorbait dans la pensée d’Anthuria. Une si belle enfant ne pouvait pas être maudit. (Migration 337)

    [He was absorbed by the thought of Anthuria. Such a lovely child could not be cursed. (Windward 348)]

     

    It is with this fragment of free indirect discourse–the narrator’s statement translating the character’s anxious question, which is masquerading as a statement–that Condé’s novel ends. This is no ending at all. It is only the beginning–an errant beginning that may or may not be “cursed” by the past and its erroneous legacies. Whom are we to believe? The narrator who seemingly asserts? The character whose nervous question is masked by a defiant assertion? The author who both asserts and questions? How we answer this unanswerable question will, unquestionably, depend upon how much belief we can place in a truly postcolonial future, one liberated from the accursed, inhuman entanglements of the post/colonial. But, if we as readers can only answer, provisionally, one way or the other, the strength of Condé’s strategic unoriginality, her (ab)errant revisionism, is that it forces us to acknowledge the weakness of our every response to that question of belief. If such a questioning of belief is, as I believe it to be, what constitutes the “greatness” of literature, then Condé is, when all’s said and done, the “great” writer she is unquestionably assumed to be. To emphasize the middlebrow dimension of her work is not, appearances to the contrary, to deny her greatness as a writer: it is simply to suggest that we have been looking for it in all the wrong places, not in the mainstream where her work is so clearly, if uneasily, situated, but in an other, less compromised place inhabited by our modernist precursors that can now be nothing more or less than an exotic memory which has yet, for better and for worse, to go forgotten.

     

    III. A Spectre of Value: Living On the (Literary) Margins of Cultural and Postcolonial Studies

     

    My reading of Condé’s Migration as a self-consciously (ab)errant “pastiche” of postcolonial revisionism has allowed me to do what, as a literary critic, I am most comfortable doing: namely, arguing for the value of certain literary texts on the grounds that they are somehow “different” from other, less intellectually provocative works. I have tried to factor the (middlebrow) popularity of Condé’s work into my argument, to show that her novel needs to be read less as a manifesto for some postcolonial imaginaire than as a “hot and lush” text that, as so much old-fashioned literature was once said to do, “makes us think about the kinds of emotions that have moved human beings throughout our existence”; I have tried to highlight the ways in which the novel’s popular appeal needs to be factored in by academic readers who are all too likely to overlook or dismiss it as not integral to an understanding of what she’s really doing. But in arguing for the strategic unoriginality of her revisionist gesture in Migration I have, clearly, caved in to the same logic generating, say, Lionnet’s fervent desire to read Condé as someone who provides “model” texts for the postcolonial critic to valorize. I have wandered (indeed, erred) quite a distance from the questions posed at the outset of this article regarding the problematic place of the popular in postcolonial studies. My take on Migration may or may not capture the duplicitous way that it engages with multiple–academic and inauthentically popular–audiences, but it most certainly does not resolve the question of what to do with the likes of “lesser,” and seemingly less self-conscious, writers such as Delsham and de Jaham. The argument outlined in the preceding paragraphs is a way of salvaging Migration for an academic audience (and for me!), rescuing it in a paradoxical sort of way from its “nauseating” exile in the mainstream. It is a way of saying, “Hey look, Condé is producing work of literary value after all, even if that value cannot be disentangled from other values that help generate its inauthentically popular, middlebrow appeal; she’s being serious precisely by putting into question the ‘high seriousness’ of postcolonial studies and its by-now predictable commitment to tired ‘old’ strategies of textual resistance such as revisionism, or its equally predictable appeals to ‘new’ strategies such as errancy that are still very much in vogue. All of which helps explain why she’s a self-evidently better writer than Delsham and de Jaham.”

     

    But if my valorization of self-conscious textuality and the “certain quality” of Condé’s novels does not help us value Delsham and de Jaham, then does it really help us understand the (middlebrow) popularity of a writer like Condé? The fact that my account of Condé as pastiche artist par excellence would not work for these lowbrow writers puts into question, ultimately, the work I have just argued it might do for her; in the final analysis, I have continued to privilege Condé against cultural producers like Delsham and de Jaham, falling prey to the “creator orientation” that has informed so many critiques of mass culture (Gans 75), and placing a seemingly critical but ultimately narcissistic emphasis in my reading of her on the ways in which Condé plays (along) with the academic reader. In the preceding account of Migration, the text, the author, and a certain type of reader win out, and the concerted emphasis on issues of consumption, production, circulation, and regulation upon which cultural studies insists, and that my article initially seemed to promise, has gone by the wayside, as have many of the readers in Fort-de-France and Pointe-à-Pitre, to say nothing of those whose daily diet of prose includes USA Today.

     

    To explore the (dis)connections of the popular and the postcolonial must surely take postcolonial studies in other, less author-/critic-oriented directions of the sort toward which cultural studies has been pointing for several decades now. We need, for instance, to take the insights of reception theory more fully into account and to place a new emphasis on the consumption of (what we label as) postcolonial texts in both their “place of origin” and the transnational literary marketplace: what sorts of pleasure, for instance, do these various audiences take from their readings of Delsham, de Jaham, or Condé? Such questions can only be answered by the type of empirical inquiry exemplified, say, by Janice Radway’s ethnographic approach to popular romances, albeit nuanced by the powerful objections lodged against her by the likes of Ien Ang, who rightly criticized Radway’s Reading the Romance for its failure to take account of “the pleasurableness of the pleasure of romance reading,” bogged down as it is in elitist feminist (in the context of this article, read elitist postcolonial) meta-narratives which assume that “the pleasure of romance reading is somehow not real, as though there were other forms of pleasure that could be considered ‘more real’ because they are more ‘authentic,’ more enduring, more veritable, or whatever” (527). The pleasurableness of this pleasure, or the absence thereof, will certainly differ depending on the location(s) in which a text is read, which in turn will inevitably affect evaluations of its quality, but the important point to register is that neither this pleasurableness nor these judgments can be understood without sociological research of the sort that is so markedly absent from postcolonial literary studies and its implied but rarely theorized reader, who is more often than not nothing more than the critic’s idealized self-portrait, or his/her phantasmagoric portrait of the Other.

     

    This emphasis on consumption will need to be supplemented by an increased attention to the production and circulation of postcolonial texts (both literature and theory), which would begin to take into account such things as: the mutually implicated relations of aesthetic, philosophical, political (etc.) values and market values; the many ways in which postcolonial texts are commodified and distributed in an increasingly globalized market; which “marginal” books get adopted on course syllabi and what this has to tell us about the role of canon-formation in the ostensibly anti-canonical field of postcolonial studies; how the “postcolonial card” plays (or does not play) in current university hiring practices, and so on. In short, one would have to highlight the ways in which the postcolonial has become possible not simply as an object of textual interpretation, or of pleasurable (or not) consumption, but as an object of no small value to the literary and academic marketplace alike.

     

    To be sure, if the dominant postcolonial ideology renders the asking of such unpopular questions about various types of popularity difficult, it has certainly not rendered them impossible. Over the past decade, there have been sporadic attempts at inserting such questions into the mainstream of postcolonial studies. For example, it is somewhat, if not entirely, in this spirit that Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin, the oft-maligned Australian authors of The Empire Writes Back (1989), remark in the introduction to the final section of their Post-colonial Studies Reader (1995), entitled “Production and Consumption,” that they have included this section of mostly outdated articles “to stimulate the production of more current assessments of the material conditions of cultural production and consumption on post-colonial societies,” which is, they add, “one of the most important and so-far largely neglected areas of concern” in postcolonial studies (463-64). I suspect that the increasingly sullen reception of these pioneering Australian critics may well have something to do not only with their supposed privileging of “literary hybridity” at the expense of “histories of subjection,”30 but with their receptivity to the idea of opening postcolonialism up to these empirical studies–studies that would inevitably put into question not only the individualist cult of the author/critic and the fetishization of textuality that is at the heart of so much work being done in postcolonial studies (their own included) but also the mechanical emphasis on subversion and resistance that so easily flows from the pens of those critics who can neither honor nor respect the dubious complicities that inauthentic popularity necessarily involves. Moreover, the admittedly limited emphasis of Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin on “the material conditions of cultural production and consumption,” as well as the hostility directed toward them in certain postcolonial circles, may well be related to their status as settler colony critics (like myself) who have grown up in nation-states where it is difficult, if not impossible, to think (or imagine one is thinking) outside the boundaries of “mass” society and the forms of popularity it engenders, and where the fact of widespread literacy, leisure time, and purchasing power ensures that, in the case of the literary field, prestige-invested forms of cultural production such as novel-writing cannot be simply cordoned off from the dynamics of inauthentically popular consumption.31

     

    Be that as it may, it is out of this particular milieu that the most extended and energetic intervention dealing with the popularity of the postcolonial has recently emerged: Graham Huggan’s The Postcolonial Exotic, which comprehensively confronts many of the issues that crystallized for me around the figures of Delsham and Condé in that Fort-de-France bookstore. Huggan’s book constitutes a giant step toward breaking the relative silence surrounding the imbrication of postcolonial studies and the marketplace: taking as his starting point the question “How has the corporate publishing world co-opted postcolonial writing, and to what extent does the academy collaborate in similar processes of co-optation?” (viii), he offers “a speculative prolegomenon to the sociology of postcolonial cultural production” (xvi), very much along Bourdieuvian lines. The key move Huggan makes in order to raise the problem of the marketability of the postcolonial is to identify the postcolonial field of production as occupying “a site of struggle between contending ‘regimes of value’” which he denominates postcolonialism and postcoloniality (5). The latter, in Huggan’s usage, is a “value-regulating mechanism within the global late-capitalism system of commodity exchange,” an “implicitly assimilative and market-driven” regime, while the former is “an anti-colonial intellectualism that reads and valorizes the signs of social struggle in the faultlines of literary and cultural texts” and “implies a politics of value that stands in obvious opposition to global processes of commodification” (6). Rather than being simply at odds, these two regimes of value are “mutually entangled” and “bound up with” one another, which means that “in the overwhelmingly commercial context of late twentieth-century commodity culture, postcolonialism and its rhetoric of resistance have themselves become consumer products” (6). This does not mean that the one is simply reducible to the other, the “good” opposition to the “bad” assimilation, but that they cannot be told apart from one another, any more than the local can be kept separate from the global: as a result of this entanglement, “postcolonialism needs a greater understanding of the commodifying processes through which its critical discourses, like its literary products, are disseminated and consumed” (18).

     

    Huggan subsumes these processes under the category of the “postcolonial exotic,” the exotic being “the perfect term to describe the domesticating process through which commodities are taken from the margins and reabsorbed into mainstream culture” (22). In a wide array of case-studies, he mercilessly analyzes the workings of this postcolonial exotic, and the inseparability of postcolonialism and global commodity culture to which it bears witness: examining such things as the Heinemann African Writers Series, Indo-chic, the Booker Prize, multiculturalism, ethnic autobiography, tourist novels, and the Margaret Atwood Society, he maps out the innumerable ways in which “the language of resistance is entangled, like it or not, in the language of commerce” (264). Faced with this entanglement, in which it becomes virtually impossible to distinguish between co-optation and complicity, the choice facing writers and critics “may be not so much whether to ‘succumb’ to market forces as how to use them judiciously to suit one’s own, and other people’s, ends” (11). As Huggan suggests throughout, following Appadurai’s lead, this “succumbing” to the market will not necessarily produce the negative, homogenizing scenario one might expect since “global processes of commodification may engender new social relations that operate in anti-imperialist interests, empowering the previously dispossessed” (12), and “anti-imperialist resistance is not necessarily diminished when ‘resistance’ itself is inserted into global-capitalist networks of cultural consumption” (262). This is the positive message that, doubtfully (“may engender,” “is not necessarily diminished”), emerges from Huggan’s consideration of postcolonialism’s complicity with the market-driven regime of postcoloniality: “lay[ing] bare the workings of commodification” through which the postcolonial makes itself heard (and is made to be heard) will, perhaps, not simply result in identifying a symptomatic “mode of consumption” but make possible “an analysis of consumption” that, somehow, will challenge us to respond differently to it in the future (264).

     

    Huggan is understandably vague about what that future and its differences might look like, preferring to concentrate on the contemporary symptoms of the postcolonial exotic, that “pathology of cultural representation under late capitalism” (33). It is refreshingly clear that he is skeptical of those who, faced with “the spiralling commodification of cultural difference,” wish (like Aijaz Ahmad) “to disclaim or downplay their involvement in postcolonial theoretical production, or to posit alternative epistemologies and strategies of cultural representation,” or others who “might wish to ‘opt out’ of, or at least defy, the processes of commodification and institutionalisation that have arguably helped create a new canon of ‘representative’ postcolonial literary/cultural works” (32). If hero(in)es there are in his account of postcolonial writers responding to the dilemma posed by the postcolonial exotic, they are those who “have chosen to work within, while also seeking to challenge, institutional structures and dominant systems of representation […] [and] have recognised their own complicity with exoticist aesthetics while choosing to manipulate the conventions of the exotic to their own political ends” (32). These writers engage in what he calls “strategic exoticism,” “strategic marginalization,” and so on: for instance, someone like Vikram Seth–even if, or precisely because, his novels are not brooded over by the academic culture industry with the same intensity that Rushdie’s are, lacking as they do “the aura of self-conscious intellectual sophistication that might encourage, as it has certainly done for Rushdie’s work, the type of theoretically informed research that is a current requirement of the academic profession” (75)–is a novelist we can learn from because of the way that a work like A Suitable Boy “anticipates its own reception as a technically proficient blockbuster novel that seeks (and inevitably fails) to encapsulate a deliberately exoticised India,” and is aware of “the metropolitan formulae within which it is likely to be read and evaluated, and to some extent […] plays up to these, challenging its readers by pretending to humour them, to confirm their expectations” (76).

     

    Time and again Huggan has recourse to this idea of “strategic exoticism” as a way of reconciling popularity and aesthetic value, and it is a version of this double game that I myself could not help playing in my own analysis of Condé, even if my invocation of her “strategic unoriginality” was put forward not in order to point out the ways in which she might be challenging her “blockbuster” reader (as Huggan argues Seth is doing) but, rather, the ways in which she plays up to the formula of postcolonial revisionism and the expectations it generates amongst an academic readership only to challenge those elite readers by implicating that formula in the “troubling greatness” of a middlebrow text. Notwithstanding this difference in focus, it is clear that my account of Condé fits in well with Huggan’s general portrait of “postcolonial writers/thinkers […] [as] both aware of and resistant to their interpellation as marginal spokespersons, institutionalised cultural commentators and representative (iconic) figures” (26). As to what the political value of the awareness and resistance exemplified by strategic exoticism is, Huggan has no easy answers (and nor, as should be apparent from my analysis of Condé, do I): as he points out, if strategic exoticism is “an option,” it is “not necessarily a way out of the dilemma” posed by postcolonialism’s always-already insertedness into “global-capitalist networks of cultural consumption” (32). Aside from confirming a sense of Condé’s or Seth’s “worth” as writers (a “worth” that their popularity does not preclude, even if the two may be inseparable from one another), one might well ask what such arguments as his or mine ultimately achieve.

     

    This eternal question of the political value of literature, and its doubtful relation to the aesthetic value that both Huggan and I seem interested in preserving, is the familiar (no doubt, for some readers, all-too-familiar) territory to which my questions regarding the (dis)connections of the popular and the postcolonial have led me. Of what real help, or hindrance, is it to “know” that Condé is a better writer than Delsham? Can such “knowledge” benefit us in any way, or is it simply part of an obnoxiously hierarchical mode of thinking that prevents social justice from flowering on the face of this earth? What are the consequences of foregoing such “knowledge” and attempting to consider someone like Condé on “equal” terms with cultural producers like Delsham and de Jaham? It was precisely this leveling move–putting Roseanne and Jamaica Kincaid in (different parts of) the same room, as it were–that provided my point of departure in this article, and it is the sort of move without which cultural studies, with its concerted focus on the popular and the “ways of life” that give meaning to this popularity, would not exist. The cultural studies move, valorizing what might from an elitist perspective be regarded as inferior trash, is one–I started out by arguing–that postcolonial studies needs more effectively to incorporate into its repertoire if it is to go beyond the sort of sanctimonious vomiting and unseemly groveling to which Jamaica Kincaid seems prone. Identifying and breaking down the unspoken boundaries in postcolonial studies that separate the likes of Delsham and de Jaham from other more “accomplished” (but often glaringly middlebrow) writers would be a way of expanding the field in both a more democratic and a less homogenizing way, and thereby enhancing the field’s egalitarian and heterogenizing agenda. More democratic, because of its greater inclusivity. Less homogenizing, because issues of material production and consumption could now be foregrounded, supplementing the fetishization of certain authors/texts (who are inevitably found to have little more to say, politically speaking, than that “resistance to colonialism, capitalism, etc. is good, although not always easy”) with more of a sense of the diverse and overlapping cultural contexts (local, regional, global) in which these authors/texts operate. As Huggan’s study ably shows, the “postcolonial” as an institutionalized field of study has been constituted exotically, in complicitous relation to global markets and metropolitan audiences (a complicity that it has tried its best to ignore), and leveling the playing field of postcolonialism might enhance an awareness of other (e.g., regional) markets and other (non-metropolitan) audiences, offering if not a way out of the dilemma that his analysis of the postcolonial exotic and its conflicting regimes of value situates us in, then at least some refreshingly new perspectives on it.

     

    All well and good. But what are we to make of these new perspectives that a cultural studies approach might offer postcolonial studies? What, for instance, will ethnographical accounts of actual reading communities and consumption patterns in the French Caribbean produce? What will a sociologically precise account of marketing strategies in the French Caribbean as compared to France result in? What will be the effect of treating writers like Delsham and de Jaham to the sort of extended analyses afforded writers like Glissant and Condé? What, in short, do we gain by making a place for the inauthentically popular in postcolonial studies? This, of course, is a question that cultural studies itself has had to ask repeatedly, after its foundational act of deconstructing the idea of the inauthentically popular and learning to take any and all forms of popularity seriously. One dominant response has been to (over)value what had previously been devalued, as in the work of John Fiske who, as Jim McGuigan points out, “merely produces a simple inversion of the mass culture critique at its worst, […] never countenancing the possibility that a popular reading could be anything other than ‘progressive’” (588). For many, however, this celebratory blanding out of the popular (or, more exactly, of the social relationships that are constituted by and mediated through the popular), in which it is treated as being in and of itself valuable and resistant, appears as “a deterrent to Cultural Studies’ overall political and ethical project”–a radical, or at least progressive, project which requires that the popular be, in Stuart Hall’s terms, “rearticulated” as part of a “hegemonic struggle” (Le Hir 125-26).32

     

    In 1981, at the end of his “Notes on Deconstructing the Popular,” Hall vividly summed up this “overall political and ethical project” of cultural studies and its relation to the popular when he explained that the latter is “one of the places where socialism might be constituted. That is why ‘popular culture’ matters. Otherwise, to tell you the truth, I don’t give a damn about it” (453). Thus, from Hall’s perspective, the popular has value, but only after it has been evaluated according to the criteria of the larger political project in which (his) cultural studies situates it. Hall’s was, and still is, a fine and honest response to the disturbing question that the popular poses cultural (and by extension postcolonial) studies, and yet of course it also lends itself, over twenty years later, to no small degree of historical irony by virtue of its desire to constitute “socialism”: not just because a modernist, future-oriented meta-narrative such as the constitution of socialism has become increasingly difficult to credit, but because it was precisely around this time that the initial, primarily class-based project of British cultural studies had begun to be challenged by other related projects with a different/differing primary focus on issues such as gender, sexuality, and ethnicity. The irony goes further, though, because if these other projects put into question and “interrupted” the foundational biases of cultural studies, they also appeared to have the potential to rescue it: their “progressive,” if not necessarily socialist, agendas brought a fresh energy to cultural studies and promised a way out of the impasse it had reached by the 1980s, what with the failure of neo-Gramscianism to stay the ongoing tide of Thatcherism on the one (practical) hand and of rampant relativism on the other (theoretical) hand, the endless and seemingly irresoluble arguments between symbolic and economic approaches to culture, the growing dominance of an uncritically “celebratory” approach to popular culture, the institutionalization of cultural studies in America (analogous to what Huggan has referred to as the recent “Americanisation of the postcolonial” [271]), and so on. All of these were signs of an impasse that cultural studies had reached, the flagging of its “overall ethical and political project,” which led, and continues to lead, many of its practitioners to look beyond the original class parameters of the project and take a feminist turn, a queer turn, or a postcolonial turn as a way around that impasse.

     

    These signs are still with us, of course, and as my analysis of the postcolonial ideology has suggested, the postcolonial turn (which shaped a great deal of Hall’s own later work, be it added) in many respects leads not forward but back into the sorts of questions–notably, about the value of the popular–that cultural studies started out asking in the first place. Perhaps this circling (or more optimistically, spiraling) back is what has led Simon During–who, in his several accounts of the “global popular” over the past decade, has been one of the very few critics to have stressed the (dis)connectionsof the popular and the postcolonial–to state in the 1999 updated introduction to the second edition of his Cultural Studies Reader that “transnational cultural studies” is “eroding so-called ‘postcolonialism,’ first nurtured in literary studies, which was so important a feature of the late 1980s and early 1990s intellectual landscape,” but which (according to During) seems to be less able to deal, at least on its own terms, with the increasingly urgent issues surrounding globalization (“Introduction” 23). Will transnational cultural studies somehow synthesize the concerns of both cultural studies and postcolonialism, finally, and show us the way out of the failed dialogue that I have described in this article? One can, I suppose, always hope! But what needs to be kept in mind, as a new wave of transnational cultural studies hits the academic beaches, is that this hope for a “way out” is only thinkable, and hence only possible, within the terms of the original project that generated both cultural studies and postcolonial studies–a project committed to “hegemonic struggle” and, accordingly, committed to (that is, biased toward) certain values and not others. During exemplifies this commitment, for instance, when he argues at the end of his introduction that “engaged cultural studies” is a field “embracing clearly articulated, left-wing values” (27). It is only from a clearly articulated position such as this that the political value of the popular can be discerned and disengaged from other values that may or may not be compatible with it.

     

    To be sure, finding a stable ground upon which to make such evaluations has become an increasingly hard thing to do in a postmodern era increasingly sensitive to the contingency of all values. One might well ask, and it would be an entirely legitimate question, why those “left-wing values” During holds so dear should be of any value to those who might be interested in, say, popular culture but not in the “political and ethical project” that legitimizes the study of it. From a radically skeptical perspective, there is no way around this relativizing question, but there are certainly solid enough responses to it, as Stanley Fish argued recently in the pages of The New York Times when he responded to a reporter who had asked him if the events of 9/11 meant the end of postmodern relativism, since such a position leaves us “with no firm basis for either condemning the terrorist attacks or fighting back.” Fish noted that so-called postmodern relativism simply argues against “the hope of justifying our response to the attacks in universal terms that would be persuasive to everyone, including our enemies,” but that it in no way precludes taking action based upon our own convictions. “We can and should,” he stated, “invoke the particular lived values that unite us and inform the institutions we cherish and wish to defend”; these values provide us with “grounds enough for action and justified condemnation in the democratic ideals we embrace, without grasping for the empty rhetoric of universal absolutes to which all subscribe but which all define differently.” With this argument Fish “resolves” the superficially irresoluble question of postmodern relativism, clearing a space for actions based upon value-judgments and effecting that “arbitrary closure” without which, as Hall has repeatedly argued, “politics is impossible” (see, e.g., “Cultural Studies” 264). Yet, in resolving this question, Fish rather spectacularly begs the question of who “we” are, and offers what could easily be construed as a justification of the U.S. invading impoverished nations such as Afghanistan and Iraq to which neither Hall nor During, I suspect, would subscribe, notwithstanding the fact that both men are equally sensitive to the difficulties of pursuing the hard road to (socialist) renewal in a world, as Hall is fond of putting it, “without final guarantees.”

     

    It is precisely this lack of “final guarantees” to which, I argued at the end of my discussion of Condé, “great” literature so troublingly alerts us, displacing our certitudes and replacing us in other wor(l)ds, wor(l)ds where fictions become possibilities but never realities. That is, no doubt, a high-sounding albeit sincerely held belief about the value of literature; one can imagine any number of less ethereal counterarguments regarding what makes literature of value, but the important point to register is that valuations of some such sort are an inescapable feature of literary studies. To put oneself in the shoes of a practitioner of cultural studies, as I did at the beginning of this article, is to take one’s distance from such aesthetic and ethical evaluations, to relativize them and gain a sense of their limits (and also, of course, in the context of my own argument, to gain a sense of how those limits are, unavowedly, inscribed within a field such as postcolonialism, which shares an uneasy border with both literary and cultural studies). It is important to have a sense of the limits of what one values, no doubt, but as Fish suggests, it can also be worth defending those limits. When During states that postcolonialism was first nurtured in “literary studies” but is now being eroded by “transnational cultural studies,” he seems almost to imply that the tainted genealogy of postcolonialism might account for its supposed erosion. Literary studies, it would appear, cannot catch up to the incitements of globalization. Its seemingly residual status and elitist history (implicated, as it has been, not only in hierarchical assumptions about aesthetic value but in the material dynamics of colonization) explains very well why, as Huggan puts it, “some of the most recent work in the [postcolonial] field gives the impression of having bypassed literature altogether, offering a heady blend of philosophy, sociology, history and political science in which literary texts, when referred to at all, are read symptomatically within the context of larger social and cultural trends” (239). The foundational bias of literary studies toward “great” works could not be clearer, and it is not surprising that even the sub-field of postcolonial studies devoted to literature might wish to avoid any but the most condemnatory reckoning with this bias.

     

    I have argued throughout this article that such a bias does inf(l)ect postcolonial studies in a variety of ways, regardless of its flatteringly egalitarian self-image; however, I have purposefully developed a supplementary argument that this bias is not something which, once unmasked, can or should be simply jettisoned. Rather, this bias must be explored more openly and, from my own perspective as a literary critic, with a measure of belief in the value of literature, not just as a model or a symptom but as the troubling other of contemporary (and self-evidently “progressive”) disciplines such as postcolonial and cultural studies–in short, with a measure of belief that literature and the greatness it troublingly promises is indeed something we might “cherish and wish to defend,” notwithstanding or precisely because of the cautionary distance it allows us to take from those other, more pressing beliefs that, however provisionally, must ground the “political and ethical projects,” socialist or otherwise, about which we give a damn. As we learn to listen in on the as-yet failed (but, we must hope, ultimately successful) dialogue between Roseanne and Jamaica Kincaid, the “great writer,” I would suggest, not only is but must remain present in our minds, exiled from the mainstream of cultural and postcolonial studies that beckons us, a spectre of value haunting the margins of a new center to which neither that writer, nor we literary critics, can ever return but toward which we can yet, perhaps, migrate.

     

    Notes

     

    I would like to thank Rey Chow and Katie Trumpener for some useful feedback in the early stages of this project, as well as Carine Mardorossian, Grace Moore, Susan Weiner, and Robert J. C. Young for reading and commenting on drafts of the article.

     

    1. Quoted in Seabrook 33 (from Newsweek 18 Sept. 1995, 10). For the comment about People magazine, see Kincaid’s interview with Salon magazine (<http://www.salon.com/05/features/kincaid2.html>).

     

    2. In the Salon interview, discussing Brown’s enthusiasm for Roseanne, Kincaid laments “the coarseness of it, the vulgarity,” and expresses a desire to “rescue [Brown] from her coarseness. She’s actually got some nice qualities. But she can’t help but be attracted to the coarse and vulgar. I wish there was a vaccine–I would sneak it up on her.”

     

    3. Discussing how the “passionate divisions” of Restoration France (aristocracy versus bourgeoisie, political right versus political left, etc.) hide “the modern tendency to identity,” Girard notes that “double mediation is a melting-pot in which differences among classes and individuals gradually dissolve. It functions all the more efficiently because it does not even appear to affect diversity. In fact, the latter is even given a fresh though deceptive brilliance” (122).

     

    4. In this article I use “francophone” and “postcolonial” as relatively interchangeable terms. While not wishing to deny significant differences between these two catch-all labels and the worlds to which they (supposedly) refer, I do not believe that these differences greatly affect the argument I am developing here: the same foundational bias is at work in both fields of study (by virtue of their geographically free-floating nature, as explained later in this section).

     

    5. According to Gilles Alexandre, owner of the Librairie Alexandre in Fort-de-France and an important cultural mediator in the French Antillean literary scene, only Césaire sells more books than Delsham in Martinique (Césaire’s popularity being in large part attributable to school sales). Delsham’s status as Martinique’s bestselling novelist is common knowledge on the island, although any full account of his popularity would obviously need to be backed up by statistical research.

     

    6. As just two randomly chosen examples of Delsham’s neglect, it can be noted that there is not a single index entry on him in the recent An Introduction to Caribbean Francophone Writing: Guadeloupe and Martinique (Haigh), and that at the 4th International Conference on Caribbean Literatures, held in his native Martinique (November 2001), not a single paper addressed Delsham’s work.

     

    7. For Delsham’s own account of how he came to publish and distribute his own work, see the opening autobiographical chapters of his Gueule de journaliste (15-88).

     

    8. This phrase provides a “cri de guerre” for Keith Walker’s Countermodernism and Francophone Literary Culture (1999). According to Walker, “colonialism entailed not only the power to annex and exploit other races, but also to textualize the racial Other […] . It is this textualization against which francophone narratives must always work” (13, emphasis added). In its totalizing and exclusionary claims about what francophone narratives “must always” do, this categorical assertion exemplifies–to the point of parody–the postcolonial ideology that I am analyzing here.

     

    9. One could spend a lot of time analyzing the ways in which Delsham’s novels fail both to meet the standard criteria for positively evaluating literary texts or to contest those criteria in a knowingly postcolonial fashion. Necessary as such a discussion might be for “proving” my commonsense claims (widely echoed in Martiniquan literary circles) about Delsham’s dubious relation to what has come to be known as “literature,” such an account is beyond the purview of a general position paper like this.

     

    10. Here, I am echoing Jerome McGann’s influential account of “the Romantic ideology,” and his argument about how “the scholarship and interpretation of Romantic works is dominated by an uncritical absorption in Romanticism’s own self-representations” (137).

     

    11. The existence of identifiable nation-states and regions–the Caribbean, Latin America, West Africa, etc.–or longstanding cultural groupings within a nation-state or region–Afro-Americans, Aboriginals, etc.–greatly facilitates a coming-to-terms with the inauthentic popularity that forms such a sticking point for a “time-lagged” postcolonial studies, even if these readily identifiable territories or groupings are, under pressures of globalization, becoming ever more indissociable from geographically and culturally diffuse “ethnoscapes,” in Appadurai’s terms (that is, increasingly mobile landscapes of “persons who constitute the shifting world in which we live: tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles, guest workers, and other moving groups and individuals” [33]). If a text can be located within a particular territory, then–no matter how lowbrow or how market-driven–it can be read, positively, as forming an integral part of a culture’s “way of life”; indeed, this is how cultural studies came about in the first place, as a way of (re)defining the parameters of the British nation-state. To be sure, though, the “problem” of popularity that I am identifying with postcolonial studies does not simply disappear when one finds a home for the inauthentically popular within the limits of a particular national or cultural grouping: one need only think, for instance, about the ways in which, in Afro-American studies, Terry McMillan and Toni Morrison both are and are not thinkable in one and the same space to get a sense of how this “problem” persists even in ostensibly less abstract contexts than that of the “postcolonial” or “francophone.” For an exemplary reading of this dilemma in the context of Asian-American literature, see Wong.

     

    12. Graham Huggan, among others, confirms this account of the double directives generating postcolonial theory, which “might be seen as the provisional attempt to forge a working alliance between the–often Marxist-inspired–politics of anti-colonial resistance, exemplified in the liberationist tracts of Fanon, Césaire and Memmi, and the disparate, allegedly destabilising poststructuralisms of Derrida, Lacan, Althusser and Foucault” (260). In Huggan’s description, however, there is at work both an historical and geographical opposition (non-European writers from the 1940s and 1950s versus European writers from the 1960s and 1970s) that I would dissolve by referring both sides of the equation back to a modernism that took worldwide root amongst intellectuals and artists in the 1920s and 1930s.

     

    13. As Simon During has noted, “‘postcolonialism,’ with its emancipatory conceptual overtones, only obscures analysis of the rhythm of globalization”: the emergence of what he has dubbed “the global popular” is a phenomenon with which “postcolonial thought” must be uncomfortable since it is difficult for such thought “to concede the colonized’s partial consent to colonialism” (“Postcolonialism” 343, 347; see also his “Popular Culture”).

     

    14. The role of such paratextual material in (pre)determining a text’s meaning is, however, of vital importance; for a discussion of this role in a postcolonial context, see Huggan’s discussion of how cover design sets up “an initial horizon of readerly expectations that is subsequently confirmed or, more likely, modified in the narrative that follows” (168).

     

    15. As Condé frequently notes in her interviews, “I have never in my life written a political tract. But there are always errors in interpreting my writings because people think I have done so. They always look for militant or positive heroes, and I never portray any” (Pfaff 88).

     

    16. On “creolist discourse,” see my reading of the 1835 plantation novel Outre-mer by the béké Louis Maynard de Queilhe in Islands and Exiles (287-316). For a brief but effective comment on how de Jaham’s first two novels express the “ideological self-perception of the béké,” see Macey (45).

     

    17. For a pioneering consideration of paratextual material in earlier Condé novels, see Massardier-Kenney (250-52).

     

    18. As a glance at a bibliography of Condé shows (Pfaff 144-65), the review (along with the interview) is the preferred forum for discussion of her novels–another telling sign of the middlebrow nature (or at least reception) of her work.

     

    19. On the way in which “critiques of middlebrow culture have been persistently gendered,” see Radway 872. The particular relevance of middlebrow writing to women as a way of subverting gendered hierarchies is not an issue that I can explore here, but it is worth thinking about Condé in the context of Deidre Lynch’s remark that “many women writers, conscious of the gendering of these categories [‘classics’ and ‘trash’], have been more interested in collapsing the boundaries that separate the literary and the popular than in policing them” (23,n13).

     

    20. In a 1982 interview, for instance, Condé arrogantly commented, “In my opinion, no writer has ever spoken to the West Indian people, because our people do not read. Certain ideas may reach them through newspapers or television. But let’s not delude ourselves: West Indians have only vague idea of novels and poetry collections published in Paris by West Indian authors” (Pfaff 38). Condé voices a very limited understanding here of what it means to “read” in a highly literate location like the French Antilles, and I would certainly agree with Lionnet that she becomes more “humble” in this regard after the early 1980s.

     

    21. “Condé appropriates the technique of the novel within the novel to reflect upon the role of the writer as outsider, and of the outsider as catalyst or pharmakon, both poison and antidote, dangerous supplement, chronicler, and aide-mémoire of the community” (Lionnet 75).

     

    22. In one of her interviews with Françoise Pfaff, for instance, she happily described Segu as “a commissioned work” and noted the way in which it depends upon many of the formulas of lowbrow popular writing: “I followed the rules for that type of novel: coincidences, sensational developments, dramatic turns of events, and unexpected encounters. Like everyone else, I had read Alexander Dumas’s works, such as The Three Musketeers and Twenty Years After, as well as many other cloak-and-dagger novels. In French literature there is a whole tradition of adventure novels with surprise happenings” (49).

     

    23. Given her own understandable investment in presenting herself as a “good” writer, it is hardly surprising that Condé’s relation to her own popularity is not straightforwardly positive. This ambivalence is evident, for instance, in her comments about the differences between her reception in France and the United States:

     

    In France, writing a bestseller causes somewhat of a misfortune for the author. You have a hard time disengaging yourself from the image of an easy book that appealed to a large readership but was perhaps not very good as a literary work […]. [Whereas Americans don’t label one that way] because they think a best-seller is a good thing. It only means that the book appealed to a lot of people, and there is nothing wrong with that. Here, I don’t feel it is infamous to have written a bestseller like Segu. And besides I don’t know whether Segu is a bestseller in the United States. It is simply a book considered to be very important among certain African-American sectors. Segu hasn’t had the notoriety in the United States that it had in France. (Pfaff 106)

     

        Condé’s claim that Americans “think a best-seller is a good thing,” like so many of her sweeping cultural assertions, may or may not be true; more to the point, in the context of my argument, is that serious consideration of this “good thing” is beyond the scope of the postcolonial ideology: the critical

     

    scrutiny

     

        that Condé associates with her reception in France is one that, given the occlusion of inauthentic popularity in discussions of postcolonial literature, she is unlikely to face in the United States.

     

    24. Explaining her preference for novel writing in an interview, Condé once remarked, “the novel seemed simpler to me [than writing plays that could “reach illiterate people in Africa and the West Indies”] because it acknowledges that it is bourgeois and elitist. Literate people have access to novels. Books are sold in stores and you need money to acquire them. Authors have no illusion. They know that they will be read by a limited circle of people that they can almost anticipate” (Pfaff 37).

     

    25. Maja-Lisa Von Sneidern, quoted in Stoneman (152). For an overview of this postcolonial turn in Wuthering Heights criticism, see Stoneman (150-55).

     

    26.

     

    Pastiche is, like parody, the imitation of a peculiar or unique, idiosyncratic style, the wearing of a linguistic mask, speech in a dead language. But it is a neutral practice of such mimicry, without any of parody’s ulterior motives, amputated of the satiric impulse, devoid of laughter and of any conviction that alongside the abnormal tongue you have momentarily borrowed, some healthy linguistic normality still exists. Pastiche is thus blank parody, a statue with blind eyeballs […]. (Jameson 17)

     

    In my own critical work, I have repeatedly tried to rework this account of pastiche in more positive terms: see, for instance,

    Islands and Exiles (374-75).

     

    27. Q.D. Leavis’s comments about the Brontës, in her Fiction and the Reading Public (1932), are worth citing here as a prime example of the sort of modernist distinctions upon which postcolonial literary studies genealogically, if surreptitiously, depends: “The emotion exhibited in Wuthering Heights, unlike the emotion exhibited in Jane Eyre, has a frame round it […] [I]t is the Charlotte Brontës, not the Emilies, who have provided the popular fiction of the last hundred years” (quoted in Stoneman 131).

     

    28. As Deidre Lynch points out, in a discussion of the anxieties produced by Austen’s “popularity and marketability,” Janeite is “the term that Austen’s audiences have learned to press into service whenever they need to designate the Other Reader in his or her multiple guises, or rather, and more precisely, whenever they need to personify and distance themselves from particular ways of reading, ones they might well indulge in themselves” (12).

     

    29. Where Brontë’s Catherine asserts “it would degrade me to marry Heathcliff, now” (121), Condé’s elaborates: “Je ne pourrai jamais, jamais me marier avec Razyé. Ce serait trop dégradant. Ce serait recommencer à vivre comme nos ancêtres, les sauvages d’Afrique!” (Migration 20) [“I could never, never marry Razyé. It would be too degrading. It would be like starting to live all over again like our ancestors, the savages in Africa!” (Windward 13)].

     

    30. For a typical critique, see Gandhi 167-70.

     

    31. It is no coincidence that the case studies I have been considering in this article come from the French Antilles: relatively affluent islands with high literacy rates (over 90%). If the rare attempts to think postcolonialism and cultural studies together have generally originated from settler colonies such as Australia, it is also not by chance that recent efforts in this vein have been greatly facilitated by expanding “postcolonial” territory (traditionally identified with Africa, the Indian Subcontinent, the Caribbean) to include hitherto peripheral locations such as Hong Kong and China; see, for instance, the series of essays on Hong Kong “postcolonial cultural studies” collected in Cultural Studies 15.3-4 (2001).

     

    32. Le Hir, I should note, is simply paraphrasing those (like Meaghan Morris) who make this critique of Fiske-style populism. For the quotation from Hall, see Le Hir (128).

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Alexander, Gilles. Personal communication. 12 Nov. 2001.
    • Anagnostopoulou-Hielscher, Maria. “Parcours identitaires de la femme antillaise: Un entretien avec Maryse Condé.” Etudes francophones 14.2 (1999): 67-81.
    • Ang, Ien. “Feminist Desire and Feminist Pleasure.” Storey 522-31.
    • Appadurai, Arjun. Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1996.
    • Apter, Emily. Continental Drift: From National Characters to Virtual Subjects. Chicago: U of Chicago, 1999.
    • Ashcroft, Bill, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, eds. The Post-colonial Studies Reader. London: Routledge, 1995.
    • Bettie, Julie. “Class Dismissed? Roseanne and the Changing Face of Working-Class Iconography.” Social Text 14.4 (1995): 125-49.
    • Bongie, Chris. Islands and Exiles: The Creole Identities of Post/Colonial Literature. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998.
    • —. “A Street Named Bissette: Nostalgia, Memory, and the Cent-Cinquantenaire of the Abolition of Slavery in Martinique (1848-1998).” South Atlantic Quarterly 100.1 (2001): 215-57.
    • Bourdieu, Pierre. The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature. New York: Columbia UP, 1993.
    • Brontë, Emily. Wuthering Heights. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965.
    • Cabort-Masson, Guy. Martinique: Comportements & Mentalité. Voix du peuple: Fort-de-France, 1998.
    • Condé, Maryse. La Migration des coeurs. Paris: Robert Laffont, 1995.
    • —. Windward Heights. Trans. Richard Philcox. New York: Soho, 1998.
    • Delsham, Tony. Gueule de journaliste. Schoelcher: Ed. M.G.G., 1998.
    • Donnell, Alison. “She Ties Her Tongue: The Problems of Cultural Paralysis in Postcolonial Criticism.” Ariel 26.1 (1995): 101-16.
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