Year: 2013

  • Materiality is the Message

    Del Doughty

    Department of English
    Huntington College
    ddoughty@huntington.edu

     

    Review of: N. Katherine Hayles, Writing Machines.Mediawork Pamphlet. Cambridge: MIT P, 2002.

     

    The first thing I noticed about N. Katherine Hayles’s Writing Machines was its design: its slimness (138 pages) and its texture. The pages are printed on the heavy, glossy paper typical of fashion magazines or catalogues, and the book’s cover is slightly corrugated, so that in running one’s fingers vertically down the front it feels smooth, but in moving horizontally one gets the sensation of tiny ridges. Inside, its slick black-and-white pages–with their variety of font styles, cut-and-pasted text samples, and handsome illustrations–contribute to the book’s visual appeal.

     

    That Writing Machines is a lovely book to hold, and to behold, is no accident, for it is a book about books: specifically, it is a book that inquires about the material aspect of books in a digital age. Peter Lunenfeld, editorial director of the MIT Mediaworks Pamphlet series, characterizes the volume as a “theoretical fetish object” with “visual and tactile” as well as intellectual appeal, and media designer Anne Burdick, who collaborated with Hayles on the project from the early stages of its development, has accomplished nothing less than a reinvention of the codex as a textual interface.

     

    Burdick also designed the text’s website–a virtual space where the interrogation of the concept “book” continues (< http://mitpress.mit.edu/e-books/mediawork>). Indices, notes, bibliographies–these we usually consider to be important parts of the academic monograph, but in Writing Machines these elements have been displaced to the website, along with navigable entries for errata, source material, and a very useful “lexicon linkmap,” which offers succinct definitions of key terms. The site has the appearance of an open book with sticky notes marking its various sections, and it thus embodies the theme of remediation, which is a recurring motif in the texts that Hayles discusses.

     

    Hayles is Professor of English and Design | Media Arts at UCLA, but she holds a graduate degree in chemistry from Caltech and has for two decades written persuasively on the intersections between chaos, computer science, informatics, and literature, which is to say, the emerging field of posthumanism. Indeed, her previous book, How We Became Posthuman (U of Chicago P, 1999), defines that very field. Here she once again proves herself an unapologetic champion of embodiment at a time when many people are enamored of the idea that the essence of life is an abstract code, or that the human body is a prosthesis that can be configured seamlessly into/with machines. As Hayles writes,

     

    a critical practice that ignores materiality, or that reduces it to a narrow range of engagements, cuts itself off from the exuberant possibilities of all the unpredictable things that happen when we as embodied creatures interact with the rich physicality of the world. Literature was never only words, never merely immaterial verbal constructions. Literary texts, like us, have bodies, an actuality necessitating that their materialities and meanings are deeply interwoven into each other. (107)

     

    Readers of How We Became Posthuman will recognize Writing Machines as a logical extension of issues addressed in the earlier book.

     

    The question that prompts Writing Machines is in fact a simple one: why don’t we hear more about materiality? Hayles complains that only in a few of the less glamorous, more specialized academic fields, such as bibliography or textual studies, does materiality merit much attention. Even cultural studies might do better. For Hayles the digital revolution is not so much about the triumph of computers over books, but a chance to rouse literary studies from the “somnolence” induced by “500 years of the dominance of print.” She therefore raises the call for more media-specific analyses. Two key terms involved in such a project would be “material metaphor” and “technotext.” The former term signifies the “traffic between words and physical artifacts,” while the latter denotes the literary work that “interrogates the inscription technology that produces it.” Computers, which process symbols according to programs that embody sets of instructions, are obviously material metaphors, but so are books, Hayles reminds us, and their interfaces can be every bit as sophisticated as literary machines with phosphor screens.

     

    So what does a media-specific analysis look like? Part of the value of Writing Machines derives from Hayles’s close readings of three recent technotexts: Talan Memmot’s web artwork Lexia to Perplexia (2000); Tom Phillips’s artists’ book A Humument (1987); and Mark Danielewski’s “postprint” novel House of Leaves (2000). The first of these pieces almost defies description, and Hayles’s patience in unfolding such a challenging work deserves praise. Lexia to Perplexia is a hybrid theoretical text that, for all of the difficulty it presents readers/users, actually “performs subjectivity” and thus turns out to be, in Hayles’s estimation, an important piece of evidence for the argument that humans co-evolve with their inscription technologies. Hayles contends that Lexia works by configuring its users as simulations through at least four strategies:

     

    • the user actions (choosing links, pointing-and-clicking, mousing over) required to navigate the site;
    • a sophisticated set of evolving images and hieroglyphics (eyes, funnels, curly brackets) that “invite the user to see herself as a permeable membrane through which information flows”;
    • a creolized, neologized language of English, computer code such as HTML and Java, and mathematical formulae; and
    • an allusive retelling of the familiar Echo and Narcissus myth in that very same–and very unfamiliar–creole.

     

    In defamiliarizing the conventions of reading and symbol-processing this way, Memmott’s text exposes the low-level assumptions that undergird our own human reading programs. Reading is seen here as an artificial behavior, not a natural one.

     

    One of the chief difficulties of reading Lexia stems from the fact that the writing on the screen is often illegible. Rather than supplant one screen or piece of text with another, as is the custom in hypertext writing, Memmott piles one swatch of text on top of another, so that the resulting occlusions make it laborious, if not impossible, to read. Hayles sees this very illegibility as another of Memmott’s ways of telling us that humans are becoming posthumans:

     

    the text announces its difference from the human body through this illegibility, reminding us that the computer is also a writer, and moreover a writer whose operations we cannot wholly grasp in all their semiotic complexity. Illegibility is not simply a lack of meaning, then, but a signifier of distributed cognitive processes that construct reading as an active production of a cybernetic circuit and not merely an internal activity of the human mind. (51)

     

    Tom Phillips’s A Humument is every bit as palimpsestic as Lexia and every bit as amazing. Phillips is an artist who, so the story goes, wanted to make the visual equivalent of a Burroughs-style cut-up. He browsed the London bookstores one afternoon and selected at random the first novel he could find that cost less than three pence: William Mallock’s A Human Document (1892), a conventional Victorian-era love story of two young people, Robert Grenville and Irma Schilizzi, whose sad account is pieced into a tactful and seamless whole from journals, diary entries, and letters by an unnamed editor. In cutting up or “treating” the novel, Phillips reverses the flow of the fictional editor’s narrative work by turning the whole back into fragments. Phillips accomplishes this feat by visually decorating every page of the novel in a different style. Sentences and even whole paragraphs are blocked out, cross-hatched, scribbled over, painted, or otherwise rendered into the elements of some new design. (Phillips’s inventiveness seems limitless–A Humument is a stunning book of portraits, landscapes, tableaus, and abstract designs.) The story, which is now told mostly in illustrations and a few scraps of surviving text on each page, concerns Irma and–in a twist–a character named “Toge,” whose name derives only from the words “together” or “altogether” in Mallock’s original text. Like his predecessor Grenville–and like virtually all Romantic lovers–Toge yearns for Irma, but unlike other heroes from nineteenth-century British fiction, Toge lacks even a hint of an autonomous, independent self. In Phillips’s world, Toge’s subjectivity is clearly a product of Mallock’s text as it is sliced and spliced by the designer’s set of inks and brushes–or, as Hayles puts it, “the processes that inscribe Toge’s form as a durable mark embody a multiplication of agency that, at the very least complicates, if it does not altogether subvert, his verbal construction as a solitary yearning individual” (89). She then notes how, on page 165, Phillips renders an “amoeba-like” portrait of Toge’s face with Mallock’s words bleeding through the shadowed portions of the image. Hayles is ever attentive to reading images this way, and, knowing that Phillips’s work is not a best-seller, she and Burdick give ample space to the pages of Phillips’s work in Writing Machines so that their readers can see first-hand the illustrations Hayles discusses.

     

    Hayles notes that in A Humument “the page is never allowed to disappear by serving only as the portal to an imagined world as it does with realistic fiction. In many ways and on many levels, A Humument insists on its materiality” (96). In her final piece of analysis, Hayles demonstrates how the same is true of Mark Danielewski’s House of Leaves. While the novel may have gained a cult following among horror fans, it is also very much about writing and mediation, and Hayles effectively shows how these subjects dominate the story (which concerns, briefly, the assembly of a book about a book about an unpublished analysis of a documentary film about a house that, by the laws of physics, cannot possibly exist). None of the major characters, for example, can be known apart from the material practices through which they are presented. To wit: Will Navidson, the owner of the house, appears only in his photographs and his documentary film; Zampano, the old man who researches the film, becomes known to us only as the subject of a book by Johnny Truant, tattoo artist; Pelafina, Johnny’s institutionalized mother, writes letters to her son that form, along with the text of Johnny’s edition of Zampano’s writings, the novel as we receive it. Even the very typography of the novel reveals to readers that House is a book that explores the material properties of the codex: flipping through the pages, one sees that the orientation of the print runs riot in all directions (forwards, up and down, around the page, in reverse), that footnotes occasionally take over the main text and, in the case of note 144, challenge the opacity of the page itself.

     

    At one point in her discussion, Hayles offers a provocative comparison to Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness. In that touchstone of modernism, Conrad layers his narrative voices through Marlow, but he does not account for “how these multiple orations are transcribed into writing.” Not so in House, says Hayles, where “consciousness is never seen apart from mediating inscription devices” (116). If Heart of Darkness provides us with the paradigmatic unreliable narrator, House of Leaves provides us, at the turn of the posthuman era, with the paradigm of the “remediated narrator”: “the speaker whose consciousness cannot be separated from the media used to represent him/her” (Lexicon Linkmap).

     

    Writing Machines marks more than just the passing of an old narrative strategy: it also marks the beginning of an indifference to old critical methodologies. Often in Writing Machines Hayles cites personal encounters with the writers she’s discussing–she cites emails she exchanged with Memmott and describes a conversation she had with Danielewski one afternoon at a Santa Monica bar. It is hard to imagine Cleanth Brooks or Robert Penn Warren taking the same approach to their readings of, say, Faulkner. Hayles is too committed to embodiment to suffer the foolishness of the affective fallacy. She shares a material infrastructure with these people, and while Hayles and Memmott and Danielewski would all likely acknowledge that their respective subjectivities are nodes embedded in a vast social, textual network, Hayles, at least, would not accept the idea of an enforced separation between the informational entity that is “N. Katherine Hayles” and the physical agent to which it is attached.

     

    And it is this refusal that accounts for a fair amount of the book’s richness. The odd-numbered chapters of Writing Machines recount the intellectual biography of an author-surrogate named Kaye and provide a sort of counterpoint to the even-numbered chapters, which discuss the three works already mentioned. Here we see Kaye as the product of a typical Midwestern small-town home, a bright young curious girl who reads voraciously and then goes off to study at the Rochester Institute of Technology and Caltech, where she is torn between science and literature. She gets graduate degrees in chemistry and literature, but it is not until she is a few years into her first job at an Ivy League job that she finds the object that allows her to bring both interests together: the desktop PC. Her English colleagues are slow to warm to this new tool, but Kaye, intuiting its possibilities and its promise, thrills at the little-known texts written in what she understands as a new medium: Michael Joyce’s afternoon, a story; Shelley Jackson’s Patchwork Girl; M.D. Coverly’s Califia; Dianne Slattery’s Glide; and Espen Aarseth’s prescient study Cybertext: Toward a Theory of Ergodic Literature–all of which are canonical texts in what she calls the “first generation” of hypertext.

     

    Chapter 5 relates, with particular vividness, the story of a serendipitous discovery for Kaye: the tradition of artists’ books. Throughout Writing Machines it is apparent that Hayles has a richer idea of what a book is than most people, and this is why: Hayles describes a research trip to New York City’s MOMA and offers her candid descriptions of Kaye’s pleasure at finding such treasures as Michael Snow’s Cover to Cover, Karen Chance’s Parallax, and Roberta Allen’s Pointless Arrows–books well off the beaten commercial path and that most literature professors are, sadly, unlikely ever to know. Indeed, Hayles does not go out of her way to hide the fact that she likes the books she reads–in cataloging her favorite things about Danielewski’s book, for instance, and trying to decide among them, she finally gushes: “for my part I like all of it, especially its encyclopedic impulse to make a world and encapsulate everything within its expanding perimeter, as if it were an exploding universe whose boundaries keep receding from the center with increasing velocity” (125).

     

    Chapter 7, the final autobiographical chapter, reflects on the meaning of theory in the sciences and the humanities and returns us to Hayles’s present-day concern–that is, the establishment of a field of media-specific analysis. Hayles hopes that this discourse will produce more texts like her Writing Machines, more “double-braided texts” where “the generalities of theory and the particularities of personal experience can both speak.” And in the spirit of her work, I would affirm that her hopes would soon come to pass.

     

  • Gullivers, Lilliputians, and the Root of Two Cultures

    Claudia Brodsky Lacour

    Department of Comparative Literature
    Princeton University
    cblacour@princeton.edu

     

    Review of: Arkady Plotnitsky, The Knowable and the Unknowable: Modern Science, Nonclassical Thought, and the “Two Cultures.”Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 2002.

     

    In The Knowable and the Unknowable, Arkady Plotnitsky takes on (at least) two unenviable double tasks. He endeavors to explain to nonexperts the rationally necessitated departure from traditional visual representation that, in part, characterizes “modern” or “nonclassical” physics and mathematics while–equally if not more arduous to achieve–distinguishing and defending groundbreaking philosophical reflection from the scattershot of slighter minds. In addition, rather than succumb to the ready pleasures of polemic in carrying out these aims, he carefully provides, in his own writing, an example of intellectual scrupulousness so striking as to inspire the improbable hope that The Knowable and the Unknowable might set a discursive benchmark to which less circumspect commentators may one day rise. Finally, Plotnitsky does all this while managing to avoid the fate to which his theoretical expertise and abilities could easily condemn him, that of being hamstrung by his own level of understanding, tied down, or compelled to talk down, like a Gulliver captive among the uncomprehending.

     

    Such discrepancy of stature is both the inspiration for and subject matter of Plotnitsky’s project. While describing and addressing cognitive issues of historic and (literally) immeasurable scope, The Knowable and the Unknowable also represents and responds to a tempest in a teapot, a battle in print of truly Swiftian disproportion: the recent controversy regarding the supposed use and abuse of science by contemporary theorists and philosophers. The so-called “Science Wars” in which Plotnitsky intervenes were inaugurated by Paul R. Gross and Norman Levitt’s Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels with Science, but were brought to popular attention under the spotlight of scandal with the publication of Alan Sokal’s “Transgressing the Boundaries–Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity” in Social Text. The uproar it caused stemmed not from the content of the “transgression” that Sokal’s article nominally proposed but from the fact that its proposal for publication received approbation at all. Following squarely in the tradition of discursive interaction that J. L. Austin named “speech acts,” whose uncircumscribable, working principle the author of the action entitled “Transgressing the Boundaries…” would perforce disavow, Sokal’s article was less about what it said than what it did. And what it did was speak double talk to great effect, perpetrating a hoax which the editors of Social Text “failed” to recognize as such (the general failure of quiddity in the face of effectivity, or at least their nonidentity, being what speech-act theory is all about). Sokal “successfully” presented what, in his view, would constitute a poststructuralist view of quantum physics, travestying both contemporary theory and quantum physics to achieve that pragmatic end. One year later, buoyed by his imposture, he joined forces with Jean Bricmont to publish Impostures intellectuelles, subsequently translated into English as Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science. In the interim, Nobel-prize-winning physicist Steven Weinberg reflected on “Sokal’s Hoax” in The New York Review of Books, followed by “Steven Weinberg Replies” and “Sokal’s Hoax: An Exchange,” and Plotnitsky and Richard Crew engaged in their own “exchange” on the “Wars” in the pages of this journal.

     

    For the active wagers of the “Science Wars,” however, the de facto inauguration of hostilities took place long before their own maneuvers, with a tentative answer by Jacques Derrida to a question posed to him at a conference at Johns Hopkins University in 1969. The proceedings of that watershed event, compiled into the now-classic volume The Structuralist Controversy by editors Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato, include contributions from and exchanges among many of the leading theorists of two generations working in Europe and America (then and now). As the title of the volume indicates, these historic discussions occurred previous to the coining of the catch-all chronological denomination “poststructuralism.” Heterogeneous, neither “structuralist” nor identifiably anything else, they in large part exposed for the first time, at least in the U.S., the prospect of modes of thinking as yet undesignated and unknown, work so different as to correspond to no available proper designation.

     

    Theoretical work that deliberately detaches itself from any governing concept may, by force of its own unsubordinated status, occasion its comparison with other concepts and conceptual work. In focusing on the uncertain epistemological status of discourse committed to pursuing adequate representations of truth without proffering new abstractions or representations of truth in their place, such theoretical writing seems both to pose and to beg the question of its own internal understanding. Like the cognitive problems and impasses in the writing it analyzes, theoretical discursive analyses may have the effect of suggesting that, by other means, their purposeful conceptual lacunae may be filled, that the persistent variable, or unknown, they indicate, may be defined by way of analogy or equation. Such suggestibility, if encountered in good faith, leads to questions of the most basic and probing nature: if one cannot name or say what x is, say, that x equals y, then can one say, at least for the time being, that x is something like y?

     

    Such a searching question was improvised at the Johns Hopkins University Conference by an important interpreter of Hegel, the late Jean Hyppolite, in response to the paper “Structure, Sign, and Play,” presented by Derrida. Hyppolite briefly asked that Derrida consider any similarities between his own destructuring work in the domain of philosophical systems and concepts and Einstein’s theory of relativity. Derrida’s equally brief response suggests that a similarity between the two indeed exists. Now, in the five-decade history of Derrida’s discursive work–exacting, often transformative excurses on philosophical and literary writings revealing both the indissoluble relationship of the stated and implicit purposes and problems of these writings to “writing” as such (that is, as nonconceptual, iterable, and recognizable material form) and the systematic vocabularies, figures, and conceptual frameworks or limits in which these problems and purposes are posed–this tentative answer to Hippolyte stands alone. Derrida has made no more extensive comparison between his own analyses of the cognitive and representational difficulties posed in and by writing aiming at knowledge (whether of the abstract, conceptual, or philosophical, or of the “real,” concrete, or referential kind), and the radical transformation by modern science and post-Euclidian mathematics of how we know and thereby what we know of the physical “world.” The lone existence, in an extraordinarily prolific career, of a single, halting statement of fewer than sixty words produced spontaneously in answer to the suggestion of another only underscores the obvious about the adversarial posture into whose aegis it has been inverted: that the “Science Wars,” whatever that appellation means and whatever is meant to be won by them, have not exactly been joined with any appreciable degree of reciprocity; in short, that these are “wars” waged by one side alone.

     

    A “war” waged by one side, one may argue, is an attack–in this instance an attack that, lacking even a substantive pretext, fabricates its own dummy text, a hoax–and Plotnitsky is unusually capable of defending those individual developments in philosophy, now dubbed “poststructuralist” by default, which are less antagonistic to than allied with those developments in physics and mathematics he helpfully calls “nonclassical” (xiii et passim). Trained as a mathematician first and a literary theorist second, Plotnitsky’s perceptions and intellectual development reverse the direction of untoward, misleading appropriation ascribed to discursive theorists by the wagers of the “Science Wars”–most prominently, to Derrida and Lacan, and synecdochically, or, perhaps, simply cynically, to all contemporary theoretical work. While scientist-warriors may view nontraditional philosophers and theorists as poachers upon the “hard” disciplines seeking to inflate and buttress their own insubstantial prestige, Plotnitsky instead finds in nontraditional philosophy a wrestling, from within the bounds of discourse, with the formal and empirical boundaries that gave rise to non-Euclidian mathematical theory and quantum mechanics. For Plotnitsky, the problems of the limits of cognition, whether discursively or mathematically conceived, are problems of rational or commensurate representation any and all disciplines fundamentally interested in the bases and emergence of knowledge must share.

     

    The overlap between empirical and theoretical knowledge is rarely, if ever, complete, and mathematical inquiry, since the invention of geometry, has often served as a self-sustaining bridge between them. The symbolic language of mathematics is a language of self-evidence, which is to say, a language unlike language, and its adoption in the study of physical data and relations frees science of some of the limits and errors that accompany experiment and perception. Still, scientists in even the most mathematically rich domains do engage in productive discord among themselves; the names Einstein and Bohr stand for one such signal development in twentieth-century atomic physics, as do the diverging yet, of course, interrelated paths taken by their early modern counterparts, Descartes and Leibniz. Indeed, if one wanted to locate a real passing referent for the unfortunate denomination “Science Wars,” perhaps one would do well to look first to its prima facie significance, the disputes within science itself. For what we understand and designate as “science” at any one time is the product of an ongoing history of differing interpretations, intellectual orientations, and directions, the often mutually contradictory or only partly shared views of physical reality whose full or partial, independent or contingent approbation may be immediate or delayed, refuted or maintained.

     

    The interpretive antagonisms and contradictions composing the progress of science were taken to another power–squared, or contradicted as contradictions themselves–when Bohr proposed that, at the atomic level, experimental results that appeared mutually exclusive should be considered “complementary.” In The Knowable and the Unknowable, as in his earlier Complementarity: Anti-Epistemology after Bohr and Derrida, Plotnitsky follows Bohr to the heart of the “logical contradiction” (66) that is the consequence and insight of quantum physics, namely, that our only empirical means for knowing “quantum objects” (67) destructure that knowledge even as they structure it, linking the known (for example, the “particle” or “wave” appearances of light) directly to the unknowable (how and why such dual appearances indeed take place and pertain to a single phenomenon). The conjunction of quantum objects and their science yields a kind of knowledge that is neither the antithesis of ignorance nor its cancellation and replacement, but its necessary while never observably continuous complement. Plotnitsky’s elucidating summary and discussion of the “double-slit experiment”–by which particles such as electrons or photons passing through screens with slits in them produce or do not produce a wave-like pattern depending on whether a detector of their movements, external to the movements themselves, is used in the experiment (61-66)–makes this paradox of empirical, experimental, or contingently objective knowledge clear:

     

    if [...] there are counters or other devices that would allow us to check through which slit particles pass (indeed even merely setting up the apparatus in a way that such a knowledge would in principle be possible would suffice), the interference pattern inevitably disappears. In other words, an appearance of this pattern irreducibly entails the lack of knowledge as to through which slit particles pass. Thus, ironically (such ironies are characteristic of or even define quantum mechanics), the irreducible lack of knowledge, the impossibility of knowing, is in fact associated with the appearance of a pattern and, hence, with a higher rather than a lower degree of order, as would be the case in, say, classical statistical physics. (64)

     

    Particles which seem to know more about our behavior (whether we’ve set up a detector or not) than we do about theirs (how do they “know that both slits are open, or conversely that counters are installed, and modify their behavior accordingly?” [66]) present, at very least, a “situation […] equivalent to uncertainty relations” (64), if not a necessary suspension of logical and causal assertions of any classical kind. Yet Bohr’s Copernican shift consisted in viewing differently not the fact of these antagonistic results, but rather the way in which we view their (mutually exclusive) factuality. It is not what we see but how we think of what we are seeing, the way in which we define and understand a quantum object–as a thing with certain attributes in itself or a “whole” constituted of experimentally conditioned, individual, phenomenal “effects”–that Bohr’s view changes. Quantum mechanics–on Bohr’s “interpretation” (68-69)–requires, in the first place, a different mode of interpretation, and Bohr’s name for that different view of what quantum evidence means is “complementary.” As Bohr describes it in the “Discussion with Einstein”:

     

    evidence obtained under different experimental conditions cannot be comprehended within a single picture, but must be regarded as complementary in the sense that only the totality of the [observable] phenomena [produces the data that] exhausts the possible information about the [quantum] objects [themselves]. (70)

     

    While originating in a predicament produced by physical experiments (set up as means of clarification), Bohr’s loosening of the logician’s double bind is conceptual in kind. As Plotnitsky observes, the introduction of the term “complementary” with regard to quantum mechanics enacts an epistemological shift from “objectivity” to “effectivity,” based upon, rather than stymied by, mutually exclusive, experimental results:

     

    thus, on the one hand, quantum objects are (or, again, are idealized as) irreducibly inaccessible to us, are beyond any reach (including again as objects); and in this sense there is irreducible rupture, discontinuity, arguably the only quantum-physical discontinuity in Bohr's epistemology. On the other hand, they are irreducibly indissociable, inseparable, indivisible from their interaction with measuring instruments and the effects this interaction produces. This situation may seem in turn paradoxical. It is not, however, once one accepts Bohr's nonclassical epistemology, according to which the ultimate nature of the efficacity of quantum effects, including their "peculiar individuality," is both reciprocal (that is, indissociable from its effects) and is outside any knowledge or conception, continuity and discontinuity among them [...] Thus Bohr's concept of the indivisibility or (the term is used interchangeably) the wholeness of phenomena allows him both to avoid the contradiction between indivisibility and discontinuity (along with other paradoxes of quantum physics) and to reestablish atomicity at the level of phenomena. (70-71)

     

    Like discourse, one could say, the effectivity of atomic objects is dependent but unlimited, contingent upon the interrelated experiments of which it is a result rather than derivative of the object in itself. Like rhetoric as such, rather than the specific rhetorical notion of the symbol or symbolon, according to which image and idea match, puzzle-like, to compose a single, concretely expressive meaning, Bohr’s interpretation and use of the term “complementary” do not signify an integral meshing of categorically distinct entities. The “aspects” or “characteristics” of atomic “phenomena” are what we “know”–in Bohr’s nontraditional phenomenological sense–but those aspects are derivative of the different experiments to and by which atomic objects are exposed (in rhetorical terms, these would be the different formulations or linguistic experiments that make evident different aspects of discourse, such as figure, noun, sign, or, following Saussure–surely, the Bohr of language study–signifier). A notion of the complementary that is not, or is only temporarily, contingently, closed, is, Plotnitsky points out, “peculiar” (74). Yet such peculiar language use may indeed be exactly appropriate to Bohr’s epistemology. For, like the nonsynthetic relations it describes, the name of Bohr’s interpretive breakthrough breaks the mold–the mold of the commensurate and thus traditionally “complementary” parts of a whole symbolized in rhetoric by the notion of the symbol, the equation and union of two as one. Bohr’s notion of “complementarity” instead fractures a delimited object of investigation, normally identified through a series of equations, into experimental “phenomena” whose perceptibility consists in a series of differing effects. Furthermore, this fracturing occurs without limits or deducible patterns–any pattern ceases in the presence of a “counter” designed to discern its objectivity. Nor does Bohr’s notion of complementarity suggest a shift in objective representation from the organic or living portrait, no part of which may be inconsequentially removed, to a more schematic outline or constellation, whose absent parts or interstices can be supplied by the mind. Bohr’s self-consciously rhetorical, or “novel,” formulation of complementarity instead spells out a thoroughly anti-representational logic by which “different experimental arrangements,” rather than cohering in any visualizable manner, bring about visibly mutually exclusive results:

     

    within the scope of classical physics, all characteristic properties of a given object can in principle be ascertained by a single experimental arrangement, although in practice various arrangements are often convenient for the study of different aspects of the phenomena. In fact, data obtained in such a way simply supplement each other and can be combined into a consistent picture of the behavior of the object under investigation. In quantum physics, however, evidence about atomic objects obtained by different experimental arrangements exhibits a novel kind of complementary relationship. Indeed, it must be recognized that such evidence, which appears contradictory when combination into a single picture is attempted, exhausts all conceivable knowledge about the object. Far from restricting our efforts to put questions to nature in the form of experiments, the notion of complementarity simply characterizes the answers we can receive by such inquiry, whenever the interaction between the measuring instruments and the objects forms an integral part of the phenomena. (qtd in Plotnitsky 74)

     

    Like a war which is not one, in that, one-sided, it opposes without measure, a “complementarity” which is not one, in that it represents (or in Bohr’s words, “characterizes”) the unrepresentable, that which cannot both be and be measured (or known) in “a single picture,” recalls, Plotnitsky argues, the irreducible incommensurability that arose along with the first mathematical means for knowing the world, geometry. Perhaps the unilateral assault conducted in the “Science Wars” on a grossly incommensurate object should simply be called, in squarely traditional fashion, “irrational,” the negative name given to the algebraic discovery of the immeasurable in geometry. Contradicting contradiction, we may view the true root of the evil signaled by a “war” waged against its own fictional pretext not as the neat opposition of one against one but rather as the original and unsettling complementary relationship that is the base of one with or plus one, an essential and irreducibly intricate twoness like that of mathematics itself under the aspects of algebra and geometry.

     

    For the irrational arose not in opposition to but from within the basic framework of rationality. Exposed to a certain “experimental arrangement,” it was discovered, the simplest act of calculation results in an imponderable relation. The most fundamental equation defining physical reality (a_ + b_ = c_), when solved for its simplest values (a=1, b=1) yields, as one of its characteristics, an immeasurable quantity (c= 2). The root or base number of one with or plus one should represent, in a single picture, an indivisible unity of two. Derivative of that unity as such, more fundamental than the external operation of addition, the common root of two does indeed present “a single picture:” a finite line–the diagonal–delimited by a regular geometric figure. An extension defined by other extensions that together describe a self-containing figure is an entity independent of traditionally symbolic, let alone “novel” complementary relations. Its reality is self-evident, but with an insurmountable hitch: the measure, or mathematical identity, of that reality cannot be figured. Moreover, the necessity of such unattainable knowledge is as pragmatic as it is epistemological. Plotnitsky states its centrality plainly–“one needs it if one wants to know the length of the diagonal of a square”–before explaining how such a novel, or immeasurable, “mathematical object,” the irrational ratio, came about:

     

    this is how the Greeks discovered it, or rather its geometrical equivalent. If the length of the side is 1, the length of the diagonal is 2. I would not be able to say--nobody would--what its exact numerical value is. It does not have an exact numerical value in the way rational numbers do: that is, it cannot be exactly represented (only approximated) by a finite, or an infinite periodical, decimal fraction and, accordingly, by a regular fraction--by a ratio of two whole numbers. It is what is called an "irrational number," and it was the first, or one of the first, of such numbers--or (they would not see it as a number) mathematical objects--discovered by the Greeks, specifically by the Pythagoreans. The discovery is sometimes attributed to Plato's friend and pupil Theaetetus, although earlier figures are also mentioned. It was an extraordinary and, at the time, shocking discovery--both a great glory and a great problem, almost a scandal, of Greek mathematics. The diagonal and the side of a square were mathematically proven to be mathematically incommensurable, their "ratio" irrational. The very term "irrational"--both alogon (outside logos) and arreton (incomprehensible) were used--was at the time of its discovery also used in its direct sense. (117-18)

     

    In a very real sense, independent of pretexts visited upon Social Text, it is the “scandal” of the irrational, mathematically and rationally derived, that the so-called Science Wars rehearse, worry, and travesty. Unlike a hoax-based polemic, mathematics publishes and is host to its own “transgression,” one “complementary” aspect of its operation excluding another. The discovery that the relationship between the diagonal and side of a square, while governed by the basic Pythagorean theorem regarding the magnitudes of lines composing a triangle, was not translatable into rational mathematical symbols, could not be represented as a ratio of whole numbers, and thus as a rational relationship or (rational) number tout court, was succeeded by the tale of the illustrative death of its progenitor. Legend has it that a storm and resulting shipwreck buried that revolutionary Pythagorean at sea (118-19). Truth may have it that the sound and fury of the “Science Wars,” to which The Knowable and the Unknowable tactfully, constructively responds, are an attempt to drown this illustrative figure once more. The storm in which the mythic discoverer of the irrational purportedly met his end may be what this recent tempest in a teapot is attempting, more or less unwittingly, to bring to life again.

     

    Yet, as Plotnitsky makes clear, since the link between the irrational and the rational, the core focus of his book, is borne out specifically by rational processes themselves, the desire to hurl overboard those who articulate the problem of the irrational is tantamount to curtailing rational inquiry itself. In a chapter treating Lacan’s “analogous, but not identical” (147) references to the rationally derived imaginary number, the square root of -1, to describe the “irreducibly nonvisualizable” “symbolic object” of his psychoanalytic epistemology–“the ‘erectile organ’” or symbolic phallus already operating, according to Lacan, as image or “signifier” in the psyche (141) (Plotnitsky helpfully calls this psychic object “the image of the image of the penis” [110])–Plotnitsky describes how the nonidentities of conceptual analogies function within an epistemological “system”:

     

    the erectile organ, or, again, a certain formalization of it, must be seen as [...] 'the square root of -1,' (L)-1 of the Lacanian system itself. It is an analogon of the mathematical concept of the mathematical -1 within this system, rather than anything identical, directly linked, or even metaphorized via the mathematical square root of -1. In a word, the erectile organ is the square root of -1, which I here designate as the (L)-1, of Lacan's system; the mathematical -1 is not the erectile organ. (147)

     

    (Plotnitsky explicitly uses the symbol for the mathematical concept -1, and the words “the square root of -1” or the amended “(L)-1″ to designate the analogous use of that mathematical concept within Lacan’s system [113]). In other words, just as -1 is the “simplest complex number,” which, “formally adjoined to the old domain of real numbers, enables one to introduce the new domain of complex numbers” (the field of numbers of which real and imaginary numbers are both factors), so the “erectile organ” is the simplest complex concept enabling a new domain or field of psychoanalysis, one in which real and imaginary objects are both irreducible factors (122). Whether or not one views this domain as thoroughly “novel” or as already latent in Freud’s epistemology, Lacan’s exposition of the complex notion of the phallus (as both imaginary and real) does indeed signal a redefinition of the operative field of psychoanalysis. In addition, Plotnitsky emphasizes, “analogous” means just that: “‘the square root of -1’ of Lacan’s statement is, I shall argue here, in fact not the mathematical -1 […]. There is no mathematics in the disciplinary sense in Lacan’s analysis” (147).

     

    It is in this context of restating the fundamental rational concept and operation of analogy itself, the proverbial wheel of reason here not reinvented but patiently redescribed, that Plotnitsky makes the central observation of his book, speaking not only to the inevitable recourse made to analogy in the course of analyzing essentially nonobjective, psychic phenomena, but to the necessary processes of symbolization and analogy involved in every new discovery of the irrational. Just as “the nonclassical epistemological component may be irreducible in all mathematics” (130), so

     

    irrationality--the inaccessibility to rational representation (in whatever sense)--can itself be discovered rationally, for example and in particular, by means of mathematical proof, a paradigmatic rational argument. This emergence of the irrational (the inaccessible, the unknowable, the unrepresentable, the incomprehensible, the inconceivable, and so forth) at the limit of the rational (the accessible, the knowable, the representable, the comprehensible, the conceivable, and so forth), defines the project of philosophy throughout its history, from Anaximander to Heidegger and beyond, or in mathematics from the Pythagoreans and the diagonal to Gödel and undecidability. In the wake of Heidegger, or indeed Nietzsche, who understood this epistemology more profoundly than anyone before him (and at least as profoundly as anyone since him), the extraordinary critical potential of this situation has been powerfully utilized by such nonclassical thinkers as Bataille, Blanchot, Levinas, Lacan, Derrida, and de Man, or of course Heisenberg and Bohr in the case of quantum mechanics. Indeed, the nonclassical epistemology of quantum mechanics, as considered here, gave especially remarkable shape to these relationships. (119-20)

     

    Plotnitsky’s none-too-delphic message is that the irrational indicated by numerical and notational as well as discursive epistemologies, by mathematicians and physicists as well as philosophers, is not going to sink with any single message-bearer to the ocean floor. And again, it is complex mathematics, rather than unilateral polemics, which may best “illustrate” his point. As Bohr rewrites the traditional notion of “complementarity” to indicate and encompass the notion of the noncomplementary, the mutually exclusive realities of a single physical phenomenon viewed under different aspects, so in mathematics the extraordinary notion of complex numbers encompasses both real and imaginary in a single mathematical “field.” “Complex” here even appears analogous to “complementary” when the problem of the visualization or spatial representation of such numbers is posed. For, like the mutually exclusive visual evidence provided by differing experimental set-ups in quantum mechanics, the field of complex numbers in mathematics is “symbolically” configurable on a two-dimensional real plane, one of whose axes, however, is being used to represent imaginary numbers. Yet this “schematic illustration,” “diagram,” or “representation” (on a real plane redefined as the Argand plane), even as it produces a kind of visualization of its objects, and even though its relationship to the field of alegebraic formulation is exhaustive, in no way corresponds to the measurable lengths of real lines or vectors, or the rationally derived points on a line, that real and rational numbers represent. The gap between algebra and geometry, or notation and spatial representation, is thus encompassed within the field of complex (real and imaginary) numbers, but not bridged. The algebra involved must be plotted on two visually analogous but mathematically different (“nonisomorphic”) structures: that of the “real plane” (or “vector-space”) and the strictly speaking non-spatial “field of complex numbers, which would no longer allow us to see [the real plane] […] as a real plane” (125-26).

     

    Complex numbers thus produce a “field” irreducible to a “space.” The attempt to so reduce the field would result, one might say, in a hoax, the representation of imaginary numbers as real. By analogy one may say that if the real aim of the wagers of the “Science Wars” is to clear the space of rational science of its false representation, that aim will continue to prove itself, in the philosophical sense, “imaginary”–first, because it lacks a real object (let alone enemy), and, second, because in the absence of such, it proves itself to belong foremost to the complementary relations of discourse, that other field in whose complex, nonvisualizable formulations the real and the imaginary, as in mathematics, interact.

     

    Riddled with their own characteristic patterns of misappropriation and misstatement, imaginary acts of salvation may finally not be evidence of ignorance, intellectual disingenuousness, or even analytic bad faith (cf.160-62 especially). The “failure” to “win” a war of one’s own invention may instead be analogous to the very force that war would mime: the roiling sea in which (again, as discourse, or legend, would have it) the rational voice of the irrational sinks. That is to say, the war waged upon philosophy may be a certain view of science at war with another view, a rejection of Bohr’s conception of complementarity, or the construction of the Gauss-Argand plane, or any articulation of complexity in which one of many “different aspects” is not and cannot be made present. For, in mathematics as in discourse, the irrational and the imaginary are based in the rational and the real they negate. This real scandal, recognized and interpreted in novel terms by traditionally classical proto-modernists (first among them Descartes) no less than nonclassical “post-modernists,” may necessarily attract discursive waves of submergence, interpretive storms stirred upon an open sea. Its details may be worth fighting over, but it itself is not open to debate. And the drawing of a bull’s eye on one contemporary French thinker or another may be a greater extravagance than any that such contrived aim-taking supposedly targets. Giving a face to the enemy is as old a discursive procedure as the first history of (irrational) war, told with unsparing rationality by Thucidydes. But the weight of tradition does not make this rhetorical maneuver any more substantial, any less imaginary, or, in its “defenses” of rationality, any less incommensurate or irrational.

     

    It is not that the target is moving and hard to hit; it is that it is not what one represents it to be, that objective absence being its very reason, its rationale, for being thought. Such a surmise indeed “characterizes” much “nonclassical” thinking, in which the failure of representation to meet its mark is directly or indirectly addressed. But it is also the irreducible basis for thinking proffered by the two central, significantly different founders of modern classical philosophy, Descartes and Kant, whose respective skeptical and critical limitations of rational cognition, accompanied by a redefinition of the real status of geometry, negatively re-established the novel project and possibility of thought.

     

    The irreducible evidence of the irrational, rationally recognized up to a limit, unites modern mathematics, science, and philosophy into a field whose different aspects may be analogous with complexity itself, complexity which is real and rationally conceived precisely because its elements and factors include the imaginary and the irrational. And it is here, in its recognition of a shared complexity, that Plotnitsky’s work takes its most important turn. For, instead of “wars” waged by ventriloquism, Plotnitsky suggests, a mutually reflexive acknowledgement of cognitive limits, the very limits that compose complexity, can include ethical action among its unknowable effects:

     

    perhaps the ultimate ethics or (since the ultimate ethics may not be possible, classically, in practice and, nonclassically, in principle) at least a good ethics of intellectual inquiry, or of cultural interaction, is the following: being strangers ourselves, to offer other strangers, strangers in our own or in other cultures, those ideas that bring our own culture--say, science, on one side, and the humanities, on the other--to the limits of both what is known and unknown, or unknowable, to them. To have an expertise is to reach the limits of both what is knowable and what is unknowable in one's field; and to be ethical in intellectual exchange is to offer others the sense of both of these limits, to tell the other culture or field both what we know and what we do not know ourselves, and what is knowable and what is unknowable, in our own field or culture. (240)

     

    Is this process of “exchange” of “expertise” more complex than attacking an adversary of one’s own devising? Doubtless–as the terms themselves suggest, the rational analysis of the irrational cannot, by definition, be unilateral; any such analysis must recognize both its own limits and its relation to what it is not. Yet, as the appearance of The Knowable and the Unknowable demonstrates, even the (irrational) negation of exchange issues in its own negation, or exchange. Thus it is, as Plotnitsky’s double expertise confirms, that a certain discrepancy of thinking remains, with the effect that, no more than do Titans, do Lilliputians need fear their final overthrow.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Gross, Paul R., and Norman Levitt. Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels with Science. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1994.
    • Macksey, Richard, and Eugenio Donato, eds. The Structuralist Controversy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1970.
    • Plotnitsky, Arkady. Complementarity: Anti-Epistemology after Bohr and Derrida. Durham, N.C.: Duke UP, 1994.
    • —, and Richard Crew. “Exchange.” Postmodern Culture 8.2: January 1998. <http://jefferson.village.virginia.edu/pmc/wip/issue.198/8.2exchange.html>
    • Sokal, Alan. “Transgressing the Boundaries–Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity.” Social Text (Spring/Summer) 1996: 217-52.
    • —, and Jean Bricmont. Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science. New York: Picador, 1998.
    • —, and Jean Bricmont. Impostures intellectuelles. Paris: Odile Jacob, 1997.
    • Weinberg, Steven. “Sokal’s Hoax.” The New York Review of Books 8 Aug. 1996: 11-15.
    • —. “Sokal’s Hoax: An Exchange” The New York Review of Books 3 Oct. 1996: 54.
    • —. “Steven Weinberg Replies.” The New York Review of Books 3 Oct. 1996: 54.

     

  • A Response to Leonard Wilcox’s “Baudrillard, September 11, and the Haunting Abyss of Reversal”

    Brad Butterfield

    Department of English
    University of Wisconsin, La Crosse
    butterfi.brad@uwlax.edu

     

    Leonard Wilcox is right that the conception of symbolic exchange has continued to inform Baudrillard’s work up to the present, but until 9/11 Baudrillard had stopped using the language of symbolic exchange, preferring instead to speak in terms of “seduction,” “fatal strategies,” and so on, which, as Rex Butler points out, nevertheless mirror his original model of symbolic exchange. And until 9/11 Baudrillard also seemed to have given up on the utopian prospect of a return to the symbolic order. I would still aver, paceWilcox, that the “key texts for understanding the way in which America responded to the events of September 11” are the earlier texts that I cite. The later texts, as Wilcox himself demonstrates, focus on terrorism and hostage taking as moments of simulation, media spectacles that remain “frozen in a state of disappearance.” But the incredible symbolic violence—the sacrificial demand, the singular challenge to the West and everyone in it–of this event, I would still suggest, made Baudrillard, and should make all of us, consider the basic tenets of symbolic exchange once again: challenge, singularity, obligation, reciprocity, honor.

     

    The question at issue here, as Wilcox makes clear, is whether the violence of 9/11 has since been absorbed in the “infinite multiplication” (Wilcox) of signs in the West’s culture of simulation, or whether, as Baudrillard writes in “L’Esprit,” it did indeed restore an “irreducible singularity to the heart of a generalized system of exchange.” For Baudrillard, the answer is of course both: the event begins by overwhelming our interpretive models, but then the latter end up overwhelming the event. And yet the damage has been done. We cannot avoid the singular challenge, the obligation to respond. If “we” (let us imagine for argument’s sake that “we” are the U.S.) ignore the symbolic point d’honneur, which people all over the world still recognize even if our corporations, governments, and media do not, then we create still more hostility and must expend increasingly more energy and money in our attempts to contain this hostility. The “system” grows stronger and weaker at the same time, and the “reversal” Wilcox speaks of is in fact the point at which the U.S. is obliged to become the opposite of what it presumed to stand for. The “democratic” West must become an infinite police state in the name of democracy. Thus the effectiveness of their symbolic violence: one cannot not respond, sacrifice begets sacrifice, one way or the other.

     

    “Our” other choice of response, rather than sacrificing every last resource in a ridiculous war against “evil,” is to make a different kind of sacrifice, placing the symbolic obligation back upon the terrorists. A gesture of “forgiveness,” as I wrote, entailing a sacrifice (a “gift of life” rather than of death) even greater than the terrorists’ self-immolation on 9/11, is the only way to restore honor on “our” side, forcing the terrorists either to lay down their swords or to lose face according to the symbolic code. But this of course cannot happen, even if “we” wanted it to. For the real “evil” today, as Baudrillard maintains in the works Wilcox points to, is the transparency of information, its omnipresence in a system where everything is revealed and yet nothing can be contested. Only a miraculous mass conversion of humanity’s collective will could change the “system” at this point, and the media monoliths will never let that happen, and the terrorists know it. And so their brilliance lies in the simple trick of enlisting the system against itself, by staging a single event that would be powerless if not for the media’s propagation of it. Their bet is that “we” will expend and ultimately ruin ourselves in our infinite war against an invisible, and at this point hyperreal, enemy. The system finally implodes by the weight of its own gravitational mass. This, of course, was Baudrillard’s prophesy too, something he tried to produce in his theorizing and encourage in other aesthetic modes. I remain ambivalent, as Wilcox says. I believe that there is still a sense of honor among individuals on this planet (symbolic obligation haunts our consciences just as “death” continues to haunt the “system), but the “system” has no honor, and neither its destruction nor its continuation seems desirable to me at this point.

     

     

  • Baudrillard, September 11, and the Haunting Abyss of Reversal

    Leonard Wilcox

    Department of American Studies
    University of Canterbury
    Leonard.Wilcox@canterbury.ac.nz

     

    . . . at the height of their coherence, the redoubled signs of the code are haunted by the abyss of reversal.

    –Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death

     
    In his article “The Baudrillardian Symbolic, 9/11, and the War of Good and Evil,” Bradley Butterfield examines Jean Baudrillard’s notion that terrorism functions according to the rule of symbolic exchange, a notion most fully articulated in Baudrillard’s The Spirit of Terrorism, written after the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001. Butterfield analyzes the concept of symbolic exchange as it emerged in Baudrillard’s early works, particularly in For A Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign and Symbolic Exchange and Death. Butterfield traces Baudrillard’s concept of symbolic exchange to Mauss’s studies of the Kula and Potlatch with their agonistic exchange of gifts.

     

    Butterfield notes that Baudrillard sees death as pivotal to the idea of symbolic exchange: in “primitive” societies, death has no equivalent return in exchange value, but must take its place ritualistically as part of the continual cycle of giving and receiving, part of a “gift” economy that forms a counterpoint to political economy, positive value, and the linear calculus of the code. As Baudrillard puts it, “giving and receiving constitute one symbolic act (the symbolic act par excellence), which rids death of all the indifferent negativity it holds for us in the ‘natural’ order of capital” (Symbolic 166). Yet, as Butterfield notes (following Baudrillard), in contemporary society the symbolic import of death is denied; it becomes a “natural phenomenon,” a sheer negation of life, a “bar” between the living and dead. Acts of terrorism, however, represent a “revolt” against this naturalization of death, and terrorist spectacle returns symbolic distinction to death (13).

     

    Butterfield isolates “a common motif” in Baudrillard’s speculations, and that is the potential for a moment “where simulation society is somehow reversed or revolutionized by the symbolic” (18). Nonetheless, Butterfield seems highly ambivalent about whether the events of 9/11 actually brought about such a reversal. He seems to concur with Baudrillard that 9/11 represented an “irreducible, singular, and irrevocable challenge to each and every imagination” (18). But ultimately he questions the efficacy of such a challenge: “What the system did in response to 9/11, or instead of responding to it, was to re-absorb its symbolic violence back into the never ending flow of anesthetized simulation […]” (25). “We live mostly,” he continues, “as Ernest Becker claimed, in denial of death, which our marketing specialists have yet to fully package […]. We see only TV spectacles. We do not see the real, or know the real, but we are a culture fascinated by its simulacrum” (26).

     

    Butterfield’s discussion suggests intriguing questions: can a symbolic challenge be mounted effectively against a hyperreal regime in which the multiplication of images serves to divert and neutralize that challenge? How can symbolic exchange function to “reverse” the logics of a system if death itself (so central to the idea of symbolic exchange) is absorbed into the code and rendered hyperreal? Butterfield leaves these questions unexamined, in spite of the fact that The Spirit of Terrorism is a text that explores the very issue of the relation between symbols and signs, images and symbolic events. Moreover, he leaves the questions unexplored in spite of the fact that a central theme common to Baudrillard’s works is the problematic relation between cultures of symbolism and cultures of simulation. As Mike Gane points out in Baudrillard: Critical and Fatal Theory, Baudrillard’s theorization of the symbolic posits “two irreconcilable orders”–cultures in which the symbolic mode is still intact, and cultures in which the more “archaic” symbolic mode has been displaced by a proliferation of signs (14). Baudrillard’s works are informed by a sense that these orders are in some sense incommensurable: symbolic cultures constitute the “other” of simulation cultures, and vice versa. The development of global media may have vitiated this situation to some extent; nonetheless, certain cultures retain the processes of symbolic exchange more or less intact. “Take Islam, for instance,” observes Baudrillard, “where there are still some strong symbolic processes, but which exact a high price” (qtd. in Gane, Baudrillard Live 185). On the other hand, in Western cultures, Baudrillard writes, symbolic exchange “is no longer an organizing principle; it no longer functions at the level of modern social institutions” (Jean Baudrillard 119).

     

    Yet the irreconcilability of symbolic and simulation cultures is only part of the picture. Baudrillard argues that the processes of symbolic exchange–challenge, seduction, that which is the radical other of economic exchange (Grace 18)–are in some sense basic to all cultures. On a fundamental level, says Baudrillard, “reciprocity never ends: every discrimination is only ever imaginary and is forever cut across by symbolic reciprocity, for better or worse” (Symbolic 168). While simulation may be an ascendant process in the West, the symbolic persists; indeed, its otherness continues to “haunt” the institutions of the West as a “prospect of their own demise” (Jean Baudrillard 119). The value of symbolic processes, Baudrillard argues, “consists in their being irreducible” (qtd. in Gane, Baudrillard Live 185). Thus it may follow that “irreducible” acts such as acts of sacrificial violence may momentarily reverse the logics of the system, disrupting its precarious balance. Indeed, symbolic events of a particular intensity (“the absolute event, the ‘mother’ of all events” [Spirit 4]) may transform the very relation between image and symbolic events.

     

    In his speculations on America’s response to the challenge of 9/11, Butterfield fails to take these matters into account. Moreover, Butterfield avers that the attack on the World Trade Center “inspired Baudrillard to dress up his old ideas about the symbolic and symbolic exchange” (5). Yet although Symbolic Exchange and Death is Baudrillard’s most sustained and comprehensive treatment of symbolic exchange, the notion has always informed Baudrillard’s works. As Victoria Grace explains, Baudrillard’s exploration of the mechanisms of symbolic exchange provides a “point of departure for the purpose of critique of the contemporary world he inhabits and the ideological processes that mark it” (18). Rather than dressing up “old ideas,” The Spirit of Terrorism draws upon notions either implicit or explicit in his earlier works on terrorism–challenge, reversibility, exchange in the sacrifice–and develops them in relation to what he sees as the definitive symbolic event of our times.

     

    In addressing the question of how America (and by extension the West) has responded to the symbolic challenge of 9/11, this essay will examine a number of Baudrillard’s works that Butterfield does not fully consider–the texts from Baudrillard’s “middle period” that deal, in varying degrees, with the phenomenon of terrorism. These texts include Simulacra and Simulation (originally published in 1981); “Figures of the Transpolitical” (from Les Stratégies fatales, 1983); In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities (1983); and The Gulf War Did Not Take Place (1991). In his continuing exploration of the “irreconcilable” relation between symbolic and simulation cultures, Baudrillard focuses in these works on the way the West constructs the phenomenon of terrorism and the mechanisms of simulation by which terrorism’s violence is absorbed into the logic of equivalence and the regime of commutable signs. These are key texts, I argue, for understanding the way America responded to the events of 9/11. They are pivotal for speculating on the degree to which America’s extensive apparatus of simulation functioned to assimilate the symbolic challenge of terrorism. On the other hand, these works also demonstrate Baudrillard’s sustained concern with the symbolic, for they grapple with how terrorists adopt the mechanisms of the postmodern sign to infiltrate a regime of simulation, how they use fatal strategies (for Baudrillard always the domain of reversion and exchange) to push the system to a crisis point of instability.

     

    An examination of these pivotal texts will ultimately lead to a consideration of Baudrillard’s The Spirit of Terrorism, for here Baudrillard’s speculations illuminate most fully the question of the West’s ability to “reabsorb” the dramatic events of 9/11 into the logic and processes of simulation. Baudrillard has always contended that symbolic exchange (like seduction) is an ineluctable force that persists, haunting an indifferent, hyperreal order. Baudrillard’s central question, which echoes in all his works, is whether the specter of symbolic exchange will “materialize,” whether it can become a potent force that subverts a hyperreal order: “Can reversibility seize control of systems? Is there going to be, at sometime in the future, such a destabilization of all of this undertaking by living elements, by cultures of illusions, by symbolic systems?” (qtd. in Gane, Baudrillard Live 185). In The Spirit of Terrorism, Baudrillard’s answer is yes.

     

    Part I

     

    Between 1976, when he wrote Symbolic Exchange and Death, and the early 1980s, when he began writing extensively on terrorism, the focus of Baudrillard’s thinking shifts from the realm of the symbol to the sign. In part, says Baudrillard himself, this shift is to be accounted for by confusions surrounding the category of the symbolic: “there are too many misunderstandings over the term” (qtd. in Gane, Baudrillard Live 57). But the shift is presaged in Symbolic Exchange and Death itself–much of the work is devoted to the logics of the sign in an emerging simulation culture. It would therefore seem that Baudrillard’s shift can be accounted for by his awareness of the accelerated development of an economy of the sign and media saturation in the West.

     

    This change in focus is suggested by Baudrillard’s treatment of terrorism in Symbolic Exchange and Death and “Figures of the Transpolitical.” In the former, the focus is still on the symbolic dimension of the terrorist act.

     

    The hostage has a symbolic yield a hundred times superior to that of the automobile death, which is itself a hundred times superior to natural death. This is because we rediscover here a time of the sacrifice, of the ritual of execution, in the immanence of the collectively expected death. This death, totally undeserved, therefore totally artificial, is therefore perfect from the sacrificial point of view, for which the officiating priest or "criminal" is expected to die in return, according to the rules of a symbolic exchange to which we adhere so much more profoundly than we do to the economic order. (Symbolic 165)

     

    Yet in “Figures of the Transpolitical,” Baudrillard focuses on the way terrorist scenarios are constructed in a spectacular order where sacrificial acts have all but lost symbolic resonance.

     

    In offering himself as a substitute for the hostages of Mogadiscio [in 1977], the Pope [Pious VI] also sought to substitute anonymous terror with elective death, with sacrifice, similar to the Christian model of universal atonement--but his offer was parodic without meaning to be so, since it designates a solution and a model which are totally unthinkable in our contemporary systems, whose incentive is precisely not sacrifice, but extermination, not elected victims, but spectacular anonymity. ("Figures" 172)

     

    In the “contemporary systems” of Western culture, terrorism and hostage-taking occur in the regime of sign value where the code of general equivalence triumphs. If terrorism represents anything, it is the dehumanized process of sign exchange, the interchange or exhibition of commutable and groundless signs. Rather than having any symbolic value, hostages “are suspended in an incalculable term of expiry” (“Figures” 170). Hostages

     

    are obscene because they no longer represent anything (this is the very definition of obscenity). They are in a state of exhibition pure and simple. Pure objects [...] made to disappear before their death. Frozen in a state of disappearance. In their own way, cryogenised. ("Figures" 176)

     

    As experienced in–and constructed by–the culture of the West, then, terrorism is no longer part of a symbolic “scene” but rather an aspect of the “obscene”: the immediate (real time), global, spectacular world of the media. Baudrillard’s middle works develop this analysis, situating terrorism within recent mutations of the sign brought on by a media-saturated culture in which informational events stand in for the real, in which the “real” is structured in accordance with the logic of sign value where all signifiers are liberated, open to infinite multiplication, and to simulated models of meaning:1

     

    [Terrorism's] only "ripples" are precisely not an historical flow but its story, its shock wave in the media. This story no more belongs to an objective and informative order than terrorism does to the political order. Both are elsewhere, in an order which is neither of meaning nor of representation--mythical perhaps, simulacrum undoubtedly. (In the Shadow 54)

     

    Terrorists have adapted to a simulation culture; their acts are staged for the media and become part of the world of self-referential signs, part of the hyperreal condition (“simulacrum undoubtedly”). An ecstatic form of violence, terrorism exceeds any critical or dialectical determination, and those observing are swept up in the mise en abyme of its staging, fascinated by the will to spectacle it represents.

     

    Part II

     

    How might we see 9/11 in terms of Baudrillard’s grim vision of terrorism in the Western regime of sign exchange and proliferation? How can such events with their devastating and catastrophic consequences– psychological, social, and economic–be seen as functioning according to the postmodern logic of sign value? Certainly the 9/11 attacks were “choreographed” for their maximum impact as spectacle: indeed, the twin towers attack had a precision, orchestration, and performative aspect that took on the abstract perfection of a simulation. In this sense the attacks were “already inscribed in the decoding and orchestration rituals of the media, anticipated in their presentation and their possible consequences” (Baudrillard, Simulacra 21). No doubt the terrorists behind the attack expected that images of the disaster would be caught on videotape and be disseminated globally. And certainly the international coverage with repeated replays of the disaster made all of us a fearful, captive audience.

     

    As Wheeler Dixon argues, “to satisfy us, the spectacle must engulf us, threaten us, sweep us up from the first ” (7), and the events of 9/11 did just that. A colleague commented that the television coverage seemed a series of simulations of “awesome special effects” (Baudrillard says that “terrorism itself is only one immense special effect” [“Figures” 175]). A gas station attendant told me that watching the planes dive into the World Trade Center was “like being at Universal Studios.” Indeed, part of the horror and fear was a haunting sense that what we saw on television was somehow unreal, a spectral show; yet as a colossal spectacle it was more-real-than-real, embodying, as it did, the images of countless apocalyptic disaster films.

     

    Western media coverage that followed 9/11 followed the logic of simulation, the severance of the sign from its referent, the explosion and proliferation of signs. It reinforced the sense of a world where signs are utterly commutable and sign exchange is promiscuous and self-replicating–“fractal.” In the days following, the “event strike” failed to reveal a hermeneutic core (let alone revealing who was “responsible” for the act), and its media-disseminated meanings mutated constantly, proliferating with compulsive virulence, metonymically merging and bleeding into one another. A plethora of signifieds emerged, from “human interest” stories on the heroism of firefighters or of victims calling loved ones on cell phones, to justification for the resurrection of a virulent nationalism and a call for “Operation Infinite Justice.”

     

    For Baudrillard, the “reality principle” of the Western “hegemony and the spectacle” is “all of reality absorbed by the hyperreality of the code and of simulation” (Jean Baudrillard 120). The explosion of sign value, the delirium of communication sparked by 9/11, functioned, on one level, to absorb the otherness of the event into the terms and processes of the system: the code, floating models that precede the real, the “indifference” of the simulacrum. Broadcasting reached unprecedented levels of simulation: when bombing began in Afghanistan, Western reporters were kept so far from the action they had to rely on their central news bureaus to provide information–which they then reported “live” (“Media Watch”). American media reported that Air Force One was in danger on 9/11: with an elaborate set of maps, diagrams, and arrows, reports detailed the position of the presidential aircraft, returning to Washington from Florida, when the President’s security team received word of “a threatening message received by the secret service” (“MediaWatch”). But although the President’s plane was controversially diverted, a subsequent investigation by The Washington Post revealed that Air Force One was never in danger.2 In short, one aspect of the pervasive media simulation involved the White House’s use of the media as a conduit for disinformation. Bush’s virtual challenges (Osama bin Laden, “wanted, dead or alive”), and the hackneyed presidential demands for “infinite justice” (combined with the call for a “crusade”) were so reminiscent of a bad Hollywood script that they prompted British journalist Robert Fisk to speculate:

     

    I am beginning to wonder whether we have not convinced ourselves that wars--our wars--are movies. The only Hollywood film ever made about Afghanistan was a Rambo epic in which Sylvester Stallone taught the Afghan mujaheddin how to fight the Russian occupation, helped to defeat Soviet troops and won the admiration of an Afghan boy. Are the Americans, I wonder, somehow trying to actualise the movie? (3)

     

    Terms were tossed around in the media like “freedom,” “defense of liberty,” and “terrorism”–not just vague in the old Orwellian sense, but palpably without referent, in a kind of ecstatic celebration of the death of referentiality itself. Indeed, the “war against terror” itself has been conducted in a hyperreal mode, the Bush administration’s “sustained, comprehensive and relentless” operations aimed at a chimera whose traces are evident on video or audiotape, the very logic of this “war” utterly sealed off from “the desert of the real”–the sordid material interests that might be driving it, such as the oil and defense industries.

     

    Another aspect of the system’s propensity to assimilate the “real” of the terrorist violence is suggested by the way the events of 9/11 were subject to dematerialization in a vertiginous and ecstatic flow of information. The “hostages” (if they could be called that) became part of an “obscene delirium of communication” (Baudrillard, “Ecstasy” 132) as they made cellphone calls to their loved ones, left messages on answer phones, and (on Flight 93, which plummeted to the ground) transmitted their intention to overcome the hijackers. CNN reporter Barbara Olson, who was on Flight 77, which crashed into the Pentagon, was herself going to Los Angeles to appear on a television show (Wolcott 68). In the media frenzy that followed, these “hostages” attained (posthumously) “a state of exhibition pure and simple,” an exhibition that fueled fascination and panic, as well as the discourse of cultural war and the brutality and barbarity of the “enemy.”3 The passengers on these doomed flights vanished into an implosive black hole without remainder–not even their bodies left behind to mark their death or provide the basis for what Derrida calls “the work of the remainder”: the process of symbolic exchange that enables mourning to occur (30). Like the Baudrillardian hostage, the passengers on the fated flights of 9/11 were “frozen in a state of disappearance […] in their own way cryogenized” (Baudrillard, “Figures” 176) at the zero degree of meaning. What was most uncanny and frightening was the “unrepresentability” of their deaths, the way in which they exemplified the quintessential condition of Baudrillard’s postmodern hostage, existing only as signs in potentially boundless transmissions.

     

    Yet, as Baudrillard points out, the modality of the hyperreal is always “fluctuating in indeterminacy” (Jean Baudrillard 120). Terrorism’s “messages” to the dominant system cannot be entirely consumed in a flurry of signs, or assimilated in awesome spectacle. What was so chilling about the events of 9/11 was that they mirrored, in some palpable way, the “blindness” of an anonymous society that is ours. If the hostages could be said to “represent” anything, it is the degree to which power in the contemporary period is decentered and anonymous, the degree to which power in postmodernity becomes a simulacrum constructed on the basis of signs. As Baudrillard puts it, “through the death of no matter whom, [terrorism] executes the sentence of anonymity which is already ours, that of the anonymous system, the anonymous power, the anonymous terror of our real lives” (“Figures” 171). Part of terrorism’s destabilizing potential lies in the fact that it provides a condensed image or distorting mirror of social and political processes.4 It draws upon and perpetuates a haunting “everyday fear” occasioned by anonymous power. In the space of the transpolitical, according to Baudrillard, “we are all hostages” (“Figures” 170). Novelist Don DeLillo, one of our foremost writers on terrorism, concurs; in his novel Mao II, a character puts the unspecifiable yet always-present potential of terrorism chillingly:

     

    Yes, I travel. Which means there is no moment on certain days when I'm not thinking terror. They have us in their power. In boarding areas I never sit near windows in case of flying glass. I carry a Swedish passport so that's okay unless you believe that terrorists killed the prime minister. Then maybe it's not so good. And I use codes in my address book for names and addresses of writers because how can you tell if the name of a certain writer is dangerous to carry, some dissident, some Jew or blasphemer. (41)

     

    Another factor which makes contemporary terrorism’s threat resistant to absorption by the system is an aspect of its adaptive character: the extent to which terrorism inhabits the very floating models and replicable scenarios that are characteristic of a hyperreal order. Baudrillard, as we have seen, contends that terrorist acts, disseminated in the global media and acting according to the logic of the sign, become fractal–rather than being governed by a code, they have no point of reference at all. With the autonomy of the signifier and the accelerated momentum of sign value, terrorism operates by “contiguity, fascination, and panic […] a chain reaction by contagion” (Baudrillard, In the Shadow 51). Terrorism is “virulent,” something that enters the global mediascapes and becomes self-replicating. The image takes the event as “hostage” in part by “multiplying the event into infinity” (Baudrillard, “L’Esprit” 17), producing an endless repetition of the same. How else to describe the events that occurred in New Zealand and Australia in the wake of 9/11 when the anthrax scare was sweeping the United States? Both these countries experienced uncontrollable replication of “scenes” of anthrax attacks: day after day, televised images appeared of workers dressed in protective garments and masks (exactly as in the U.S.), evacuating post offices, entering areas suspected of containing anthrax dust, although no “real” anthrax dust was discovered. By collapsing the distinction between the real and the copy, these contagious simulational scenarios (like something out of Don DeLillo’s White Noise) ironically conferred the status of authenticity on life in New Zealand –this little country, too, was on the receiving end of the global terrorist threat; we were significant enough to be targeted; we had our own scenes of anthrax terror–we were “real.”

     

    Part III

     

    Baudrillard’s texts from this middle period tell us that to view terrorism as a media event, “a group of signs dedicated exclusively to their recurrence as signs” (Simulacra 21), is not to say that media-disseminated “hyperreal” events do not have “real” effects. Nor does it suggest that the system can unproblematically absorb terrorism’s violence, with its symbolic message, back into mediatized indifference. Postmodern terrorism occurs in the context of what James Der Derian calls “a global information economy boosting sign power” (80). Such “sign power” includes strategic efforts on the part of corporations to simulate profitability (here the Enron debacle is instructive); it also entails an economy in which money itself is an object of circulation that has only a screen-and-networked existence rather than a “material” one. Such an economy is particularly vulnerable to forms of terrorism which insert themselves into the economy of the sign, and indeed there were enormous consequences in the wake of 9/11: the sudden decline of an already shaky international economy, the immediate, worldwide decline in the value of stocks (a trillion or so dollars vanished in this way), the domino-like collapse of airline industries, and the rush on the part of governments in the United States, Switzerland, New Zealand, and Australia to prop them up. New York lost close to 100,000 jobs in the aftermath of 9/11.

     

    In a postindustrial epoch when the “mode of information” is dominant, commandeering the mode of information–that is, creating a spectacular act which produces media spasms on a global scale–can be extraordinarily effective. As Slavoj Zizek notes, the shattering impact of the attacks can only be accounted for by the fact that “the two WTC towers stood for the center of virtual capitalism, of financial speculations disconnected from the sphere of material production” (3). Virtual capitalism–the world of global speculation and investment–is precisely the space in which a mediatized, spectacular, and hyperreal attack can be devastating, can constitute a “deconstruction” (or strategic reversal) of the system by pitting a hyperreal act against a hyperreal system. As Baudrillard observes,

     

    a hyperreal, imperceptible sociality, no longer operating by law and repression, but by the infiltration of models, no longer by violence, but by deterrence/persuasion--to that terrorism responds by an equally hyperreal act, caught up from the outset in concentric waves of media and of fascination [...] (In the Shadow 50)

     

    Terrorism engenders fascination, fear, and terror in a form that is utterly anonymous and contiguous, an “an arbitrary and hazardous abstraction” (Baudrillard, In the Shadow 51). A character in Mao II explains the dynamics of terrorism in exactly these terms:

     

    It's confusing when they [terrorists] kill the innocent. But this is precisely the language of being noticed, the only language the West understands. The way they determine how we see them. The way they dominate the rush of endless streaming images. (157-58)

     

    This is precisely Baudrillard’s point: in a society of ubiquitous hyperreality, the primary goal of the terrorist is media spectacle, “the only language the West understands.” Simultaneously brutal, repugnant, and fascinating, the terrorist’s repertoire–kidnappings, hijackings, and assassinations–convey their message by becoming part of the “obscene delirium” of televisual flows, informational anxiety, and technological catastrophe of media spectacle.

     

    Baudrillard’s texts in this middle period, then, help us understand postmodern terrorism (and 9/11) in the highly ambivalent regime of image and spectacle. While image and spectacle function to absorb the alterity of terrorism, terrorism has adapted adroitly to the logic of sign exchange and sign value. If a culture of simulation denies the symbolic import of death, it can never eradicate it. Indeed, in all these texts the idea of reversal and death is never far away. Contemporary terrorism usurps the mechanisms of simulation in order to inhabit the system from the inside; like a viral organism, it multiplies from within, pushing the very logic of the system to a point of extremity, inserting reversibility into the causal order, and bringing about a reversion of the system’s own power. Terrorism “aims at the white magic of the social encircling us, that of information, of simulation, of deterrence, of anonymous and random control, in order to precipitate its death by accentuating it” (Baudrillard, In the Shadow 51). Terrorism is a form of “fatal strategy,” and (as Baudrillard explains) “the order of the fatal is the site of symbolic exchange. There is no more liberty, everything is locked in a sequential chain” (qtd. in Gane, Baudrillard Live 108). Even the hostage, “frozen in a state of disappearance” (Baudrillard, “Figures” 176), becomes something of a nonnegotiable, inexchangeable object that casts a shadow over economic and semiotic exchange, insinuating the symbolic back into the flow of commutable signs.5 Ultimately, symbolic exchange is fundamentally irrevocable and singular; the “gift ” must be returned; symbolic obligation remains unbreachable by the dominant exchange and irreducible to the law of the code.

     

    Inspired by the events of 9/11, this is precisely the theme Baudrillard develops in The Spirit of Terrorism. In the parrying between symbolic and simulation cultures, here the symbolic clearly gains the upper hand.

     

    Part IV

     

    Rather than compelling Baudrillard to “dress up old ideas of symbolic exchange” (as Butterfield would have it), 9/11 provoked him to bring his ideas of symbolic exchange, always implicit in his writings on terrorism and its “fatal strategies,” to bear on what he considers to be the first global symbolic event. The momentous nature of the attack on the World Trade Center also compelled him to develop his views on the relation between simulation and symbolic exchange. In The Spirit of Terrorism, Baudrillard argues that in a world utterly saturated with images, our primary experience of the disaster was as “image-event.” The image takes the event “hostage”; it “consumes the event,” and in that sense “absorbs the event and offers it for consumption” (27). We cannot say that the World Trade Center attacks signaled a resurrection of the real, for our very reality principle has been lost, has become intermingled with the fictional, has all but been absorbed in the recursive processes of simulation. The image precedes the real, yet in the terrorist attacks the “frisson of the real” was superadded as an excess, an echo, “like an additional fiction, a fiction surpassing fiction” (29). Baudrillard seems to suggest that the “absolute event” of 9/11 produced a breach between the real (however entwined in the fantastic and surreal) and media event, between event and medium. Such a breach constitutes a dismantling of the formal correlation of signifier and signified, a radical dismembering of the mechanisms of the code.6 It transgresses the codification of signs and their semiotic/economic exchange (the definitive act is “not susceptible of exchange” [9]). The symbolic suddenly breaks through and subverts the indifference of simulation. The attack on the World Trade Center thus constituted a condensed site of symbolic power that “radicalized the relation of the image to reality” (27). The event breached the bar between life and death, between semiologic and the symbolic, constituting a singularity “at one and the same time the dazzling micro-model of a kernel of real violence with the maximum possible echo–hence the purist form of spectacle–and a sacrificial model mounting the purest symbolic form of defiance to the historical political order” (30).

     

    Such dramatic and sacrificial violence constituted a challenge to the West’s denial of death’s symbolic capacity for reversion. Yet Butterfield tells us, “Americans are not primitives–we do not value death symbolically, but rather only as a subtraction from life” (12). But the fact that Americans deny the symbolic dimension of death was ultimately of little importance on 9/11. For it was as if both individuals and systems, independent of intention or agency, at some profound level responded to the specter of death and reversibility. Indeed, the event was a challenge to the “real” of the Western world. The World Trade Center attacks made the vulnerability of an overly extended system suddenly palpable; its functional logic (which precludes reversion) was suddenly breached: “the whole system of the real and power [la puissance] gathers, transfixed; rallies briefly; then perishes by its own hyperefficiency” (Baudrillard, Spirit 18). The Twin Towers collapsed (a stunning image of violent and catastrophic implosion), the regime of signification (floating currency, floating signifiers) was thrown into chaos, the market plunged, jobs were lost, corporations become insolvent.

     

    But what possible “answer” could America give to the symbolic challenge? Butterfield argues that Baudrillard’s logic of gift and countergift would imply that the greatest possible symbolic honor would be the forgiveness of debt. The idea that the U.S. might forgive its debtors, says Butterfield, constitutes the “utopian moment” in Baudrillard’s thinking, but “Baudrillard will not speak his utopia” (25). On this point, however, it is again useful to think of the relation of the symbolic cultures to the orders of simulation found in the West that informs Baudrillard’s thinking. It may be that Baudrillard “will not speak” on the matter because he realizes that the very notion of forgiveness assumes values based in older notions of symbolic obligation. As Baudrillard commented in an interview, “today [in the West] forgiveness has turned into tolerance, the democratic virtue par excellence, a sort of ecology that shields all the differences, a sort of psychological demagogy” (qtd. in Gane, Baudrillard Live 195).

     

    Baudrillard seems to suggest that the West is unable to suffer the weight of symbolic obligation precisely because this would challenge the West’s very being–capitalism totalizing itself “as a code producing all the world as exchangeable within an identical order” (McMillan and Worth 127). And herein lies the conundrum the West confronts: any response which recognized symbolic obligation would be undertaken at the risk of the West’s becoming something other than it is, at the risk of bringing about its own “death”:

     

    At odds with itself, it can only plunge further into its own logic of relations of force, but it cannot operate on the terrain of the symbolic challenge and death--a thing of which it no longer has any idea, since it has erased it from its own culture. (Baudrillard, Spirit 15)

     

    The United States’s answer to symbolic challenge is precisely to “plunge further into its own logic of relations of force,” the logic of sign value and a global regime of monolithic indifference: “All that is singular and irreducible must be absorbed. This is the law of democracy and the new world order” (Gulf War 86). Among other things, the “war on terror” represents a frantic attempt to mend the breach in the code, to absorb the singular and irreducible symbolic challenge 9/11 into the order of simulation. The Bush administration targets Saddam Hussein, the fake terrorist enemy; it stages “Gulf War 2: The Sequel,” a repetition compulsion that exhibits all of the will to spectacle of the first Gulf War. Reporting of this war extended the logic of simulation with “embedded reporters”–a new breed of journalists largely indistinguishable in speech or dress from the troops with whom they travel, surrendering their independence to be ferried around in military vehicles, to be part of the larger “cast” of executive producer Donald Rumsfeld’s show of shows. Coverage of the war included scene after scene of “embeds,” wearing fatigues and goggles, sitting on tanks, talking by satellite to anchors in the U.S.–all scripted, all staged, the satellite technology that enabled this instant communication an integral part of its hyperreal production. Of the first Gulf War Baudrillard wrote, “it is a sign that the space of the event has become a hyperspace with multiple refractivity, and that the space of war has become definitely non-Euclidean” (Gulf War 50). “Gulf War 2” featured endless images of embeds inhabiting a non-Euclidean space devoid of all landmarks. When camera crews encountered recognizable landmarks of any potential strategic importance, stock footage or tight shots of helmeted talking heads in a tank’s interior were substituted; viewers were advised that live exterior tracking shots would resume when there was nothing distinctive about the terrain.7 Jokes circulated during the siege of Baghdad acknowledging the simulational character of the war: “Why didn’t American troops get to Baghdad quicker? Because CNN kept having to re-shoot the scenes” (Agence France Presse).

     

    Like the first Gulf War, the attack on Iraq functioned to rescue the idea of war, the status of war, its meaning, its future (the superiority of American might and its ability to identify and quash the terrorist enemy as opposed to negotiation with other countries within the U.N.). Like the first Gulf War, it does this in the hyperreal mode, proffering “the deontology of a pure electronic war without hitches” (Gulf War 34). Not only did the Iraqi regime collapse within a matter of days, but the U.S. won the nostalgia-evoking scenes of real war and real liberation it wanted. As one journalist put it, such scenes resembled “Paris after 1945 with an Arab cast. An old man beating a poster of Saddam Hussein with a shoe in deliberate insult. The statue of the Iraqi president with a noose around its neck and an American flag over its head like an executioner’s hood, the crowd below gathering to tug it from its pedestal” (Maddox). If this was not enough, Bush appeared in Top Gun-uniform aboard an aircraft carrier to declare victory. In its consistent and strategic embrace of the logic of simulation, Gulf War 2 was grounded in the “disappearance of alterity, of primitive hostility, and the enemy” (Gulf War 36).

     

    Indeed, the recent war on Iraq seems the final phase of pulling back the symbolic challenge of 9/11 into a non-Euclidian, hyperreal media space, and into simulational, replicable scenarios. Like the first Gulf War, the U.S.-led coalition’s attack on Iraq has proved to be a “celibate machine” (Gulf War 36), generating a series of models, codes, and scenarios. Iraq is a testing ground, a kind of blank slate or model by which to generate scenarios that might be deployed to effect regime change in “rogue” states such as Syria, Iran, and North Korea, countries which form Bush’s “axis of evil.” Finally, in hyperreal mode, this “deontology of war,” death itself–and, by extension, its potential for singularity and sacrificial violence–becomes subject to the code. In a press briefing, U.S. war commander General Tommy Franks asserted that American forces had genetic material that could be used to identify Saddam and check whether attempts to kill him had succeeded. “He’s either dead or he’s running a lot,” Franks said. “He’ll simply be alive until I can confirm he’s dead” (Reuters). In this semiotic regime of the code, people “die the only death the system authorizes” (Symbolic 177); the code (controlled by the Americans) bestows the power to differentiate between life and death, to confer death, and to produce death.

     

    Such examples suggest not only America’s (and the West’s) inability to grapple with symbolic obligation, but its concerted effort to absorb the threat of the Other by generating a seamless simulational and hyperreal world. Yet symbolic cultures such as Islam have a particularly potent weapon. As Victoria Grace notes, they have the power to “infect the west with that which it does not understand and cannot encompass: the symbolic power of culture that destabilizes any pretense to the universal and the coded instantiations of the real” (96). The West’s claim to a universal code is thus troubled and unsettled by the aftereffects of calamitous and seismic symbolic violence. Moreover, the destabilizing “infection” of symbolic power is integrally related to Baudrillard’s notion of the “transparency of evil” with its concept of the “accursed share” (Transparency 82)–the evil which Western society attempts to expel in order to maintain its operational positivity. There is a perverse paradox in America’s denial of the Other, including its denial of the evil and the alterity of death. If the West has barred the negative in the pursuit of the positive, the negative inevitably transpires, inexorably returns to haunt its comfortable positivity.8 As Baudrillard observes, “the price we pay for the ‘reality’ of this life, to live it as positive value, is the ever present phantasm of death” (Symbolic 133). In this dichotomous logic (death barred from life), death is constructed as irreversible, and therefore haunts life as an as ever-present and ever-threatening “ghostly presence.”9 In the death-denying contemporary West, it is precisely the ever-present specter of death that characterizes the “politics of everyday fear,” the general sense of disaster that is woven into the fabric of daily life, part of the haunting, nameless dread of terrorism, that which inevitably transpires as a result of a relentless devotion to positivity, “the triumph of Good all along the line” (Spirit 14).

     

    The United States’s War on Terror–including the attack on Iraq and the threats against other “rogue states”–is an aspect of what Gary Genosko refers to as “simulated reciprocity” (xxi-xxii), a bogus, simulacral response to a unique and binding symbolic challenge. Yet 9/11 was itself an aspect of the “transpolitical mirror of evil” (Baudrillard, Transparency 81) in which the barred and excluded “negative” reappeared in a symbolic form so overwhelming that it continues to haunt the positivist order of America and the West. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 were a redounding consequence of the global injunction to positive value and the denial of the symbolic potential of death–an injunction that precisely left the West vulnerable to the fatal strategies of sacrificial violence and sacrificial death, strategies it cannot meet or answer on their own terms.10

     

    Contrary to Bradley Butterfield’s argument, then, it is not a question of Americans being moderns or primitives, of Americans living in the denial of death, or even of Americans living in a never-ending flow of anesthetized simulation. For one of Baudrillard’s key points in The Spirit of Terrorism is that it is precisely the fundamental, constitutive antagonism of global capitalism that ultimately confounds America’s hegemony of the positive, as well as the mechanisms of simulation that produce and buttress it. For Baudrillard, this “fundamental antagonism […] points past the spectre of America […] and the spectre of Islam, to triumphant globalization battling against itself” (Spirit 11). What is excluded from this global system transpires in redoubled measure; that which the system finds intolerable, and that which is fatal to it–evil, death, reversibility–inexorably haunts the system in all its hyperextended perfection: “at the height of their coherence, the redoubled signs of the code are haunted by the abyss of reversal” (Jean Baudrillard 123). On 11 September 2001, this became dramatically apparent. In the “unforgettable incandescence of the images,” evil and death reasserted themselves, and the virtual consensus of globalism was suddenly engulfed by a void. Symbolic violence created a breakthrough, an effraction that shook the West’s self-certainty to the core, leaving it haunted with the specter of that which “dismantles the beautiful order of irreversibility, of the finality of things” (qtd. in Gane, Baudrillard Live 57).

     

    Notes

     

    1. For this formulation, I am indebted to Victoria Grace (25). I would like to thank her for providing me with galley proofs of Karen McMillan and Heather Worth’s article “In Dreams: Baudrillard, Derrida, and September 11.”

     

    2. See Bennetts 82 and White.

     

    3. See for example, Ann Coulter, “This is War” in which, responding to Barbara Olson’s death, she famously wrote about “those responsible” for the terrorist act: “We should invade their countries, kill their leaders, and convert them to Christianity.”

     

    4. See Genosko (98).

     

    5. Here I am indebted to Genosko’s discussion of the hostage (98). According to Genosko, Baudrillard’s reading of the hostage “has always been in the service of the symbolic […] ” (100).

     

    6. Here I am indebted to McMillan and Worth (125-26).

     

    7. I’d like to thank my colleague Kevin Glynn for pointing this out to me, and for lengthy discussions on the simulational aspects of the attack on Iraq.

     

    8. I’d like to thank Victoria Grace for conversations and emails in which she pointed out to me the importance of Baudrillard’s notion of the “transparency of evil” and its relation to the Baudrillardian symbolic.

     

    9. I am indebted to Victoria Grace’s discussion of the consequences of the West’s devotion to positive value (44).

     

    10. Here I am indebted to Karen McMillan and Heather Worth (126).

     

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Agence France Press (AFP). “War Rising Above the Pain.” The Press [Christchurch, New Zealand] 8 Apr. 2003: B1.
    • Baudrillard, Jean. “The Ecstasy of Communication.” The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture. Ed. Hal Foster. Port Townsend: Bay, 1983. 126-33.
    • —. “Figures of the Transpolitical.” Revenge of the Crystal: Selected Writings on the Modern Object and its Destiny, 1968-1983. Ed. and trans. Paul Foss and Julian Pefanis. London: Pluto, 1990. 161-98.
    • —. The Gulf War Did Not Take Place. Trans. Paul Patton. Sydney: Power, 1995.
    • —. In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities. Trans. Paul Foss, John Johnston, and Paul Patton. New York: Semiotext, 1983.
    • —. Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings. Ed. Mark Poster. Trans. Charles Levin. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1988.
    • —. “L’Esprit Du Terrorisme.” Trans. Donovan Hohn. Harper’s Magazine Feb. 2002: 13-18.
    • —. Simulacra and Simulation. Trans. Sheila Faria Glaser. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1994.
    • —. The Spirit of Terrorism and Requiem for the Twin Towers. Trans. Chris Turner. London: Verso, 2002.
    • —. Symbolic Exchange and Death. 1976. Trans. Iain Hamilton Grant. London: Sage, 1993.
    • —. The Transparency of Evil: Essays on Extreme Phenomenon. London: Verso, 1993.
    • Bennetts, Leslie. “One Nation, One Mind?” Vanity Fair Dec. 2001: 82-88.
    • Butterfield, Bradley. “The Baudrillardian Symbolic, 9/11, and the War of Good and Evil.” Postmodern Culture 13.1 (2002): 27 pars. Sept. 2002 <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/postmodern_culture/v013/13.1butterfield.html>.
    • Coulter, Ann. “This is War.” National Review Online 13 Sept. 2001 <www.nationalreview.com/coulter/coulter091301.shtml>.
    • DeLillo, Don. Mao II. New York: Viking, 1991.
    • Der Derian, James. Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.
    • Derrida, Jacques. “No Apocalypse, Not Now (full speed ahead, seven missiles, seven missives).” Diacritics 14 (Summer 1984): 20-31.
    • Dixon, Wheeler Winston. The Transparency of Spectacle: Meditations on the Moving Image. Albany, NY: State U of New York P, 1998.
    • Fisk, Robert. “Lost in the Rhetorical Fog of War.” The Independent. 9 Oct. 2000: 3.
    • Gane, Mike. Baudrillard: Critical and Fatal Theory. New York: Routledge, 1991.
    • —, ed. Baudrillard Live: Selected Interviews. New York: Routledge, 1993.
    • Genosko, Gary. Baudrillard and Signs: Signification Ablaze. New York: Routledge, 1994.
    • Grace, Victoria. Baudrillard’s Challenge: A Feminist Reading. New York: Routledge, 2000.
    • Maddox, Bronwen. “Will the U.S. Stop at Iraq? Victory in Baghdad Offers Vision of Easy Regime Change.” The Times [London] 11 Apr. 2003: B1.
    • “Media Watch.” Radio New Zealand. 25 Nov. 2001.
    • McMillan, Karen, and Heather Worth. “In Dreams: Baudrillard, Derrida and September 11.” Eds. Victoria Grace, Heather Worth, and Simmons, Laurence. Baudrillard West of the Dateline. Palmerston North: Dunmore, 2003. 116-37.
    • Reuters. “Where is Saddam”? The Press [Christchurch, New Zealand] 15 Apr. 2003: B1.
    • White, Jerry. “White House Lied about Threat to Air Force One.” World Socialist Web Site 28 Sept. 2001 <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/sep2001/bush-s28.shtml>
    • Wolcott, James. “Over, Under, Sideways, Down.” Vanity Fair December 2001: 64-74.
    • Zizek, Slavoj. “Welcome to the Desert of the Real.” Reconstructions: Reflections on Humanity and Media after Tragedy. 15 Sept. 2001. < web.mit.edu/cms/reconstructions/interpreations/desertreal/html/>.

     

  • Smart Bombs, Serial Killing, and the Rapture: The Vanishing Bodies of Imperial Apocalypticism

    Peter Yoonsuk Paik

    Department of French, Italian, and Comparative Literature
    University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee
    pypaik@uwm.edu

     

    One of the most well-publicized hypotheses regarding the terror of 9/11 is the notion that religious fantasies played a major role in inspiring the militants of al-Qaeda to launch their suicide attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Only irrational fanatics could have been capable of killing themselves for the sake of taking thousands of innocent lives and destroying three buildings that symbolize Western power and preeminence. Surely the hijackers must have been enticed and deluded by the rewards promised by Islam to martyrs–instant entry into paradise where they would be served by “seventy dark-eyed virgins.” The lurid and prurient nature of this fantasy has been invoked to account for the terrorist bombings committed by the Palestinians against the Israelis, as well. In the eyes of the liberal, capitalist West, such fantasies reveal the obscene underside of the puritanical worldview associated with radical Islam. The Muslim terrorist is capable of launching suicide attacks because he has embraced an immoderately concrete vision of the afterlife that has spawned in him a kind of psychosis. The belief that Islamist radicals are religious fanatics acting from a delusional hatred of the secular West or from contempt for the superseded religions of Judaism and Christianity has played no small role in stifling questions about the ideological factors behind these acts of terror, and about the legitimacy of Israeli policy towards the Palestinians in the occupied territories.

     

    That the mystifications underlying the mass media discourse on Islamist terror and the American military response to it might possess significant theological content of their own comes as little surprise. One may recall the jarring “slips,” such as “crusade” and “infinite justice,” terms deeply disturbing to most Muslims, used by the Bush administration in the immediate aftermath of the attacks of 9/11. Even as these terms were hastily jettisoned under the criticism of American Islamic clerics, the American invasion and occupation of Iraq has done much to confirm the view that the actual policy of the United States has become that of a latter-day crusade against the Arab world, whether in the name of preventing the future use of weapons of mass destruction or establishing a model liberal democracy in the region. Indeed, one might argue that it is theological, absolutist notions of freedom and security that are driving the war on terror. This article makes the case that the destruction inflicted by the United States against Afghanistan and Iraq is no less religious in nature than the terrorist acts of Islamist radicals by examining the political fantasies behind much of the popular support for the neo-imperialist policies of the second Bush administration. I first discuss the legitimation for neo-imperialism among intellectuals supportive of the administration and the popular millenarianism that sanctions militaristic policies seen as fulfilling a divine plan. In section two, I provide a brief analysis of the best-selling novel series of the 1990s, Left Behind, which is based on a literalist understanding of biblical prophecy concerning the millennium. In the third section, I discuss the mode of spirituality that informs the apocalypticism which has become pervasive in American culture–a form of religiosity that has little to do with historical Christianity but is in fact far closer to the ancient heresy of Gnosticism. In the fourth section I address how the overarching themes and ideological orientation of this explicitly programmatic series of novels emerge in mainstream Hollywood cinema. I conclude with a discussion of how Christian doctrines, particularly that of sacrifice, become derailed in the demonology that takes root from a system of belief far more dualistic than that of traditional Christianity.

     

    I. Suicide of the Last Men

     

    In his article on the “fantasy ideology” of the militants of al-Qaeda, published in the Heritage Foundation’s journal Policy Review, Lee Harris proposes that it is wrongheaded to view the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon as having been driven by political objectives (21-22). Instead, Harris argues, we must come to grips with the fact that al-Qaeda is interested chiefly in enacting a collective fantasy on the world stage, a fateful and titanic drama in which they, self-cast as the forces of righteousness, carry on a struggle against the decadent, apostate legions of the Great Satan of the West. Yet, in spite of the unprecedented destruction wrought by al-Qaeda on 9/11, Harris assures us that such ideological fantasies–which in effect derail politics from the rational pursuit of strategic interests into the enterprise of transforming human nature and reality itself–are nothing new. The examples he provides, of groups for whom politics served as a form of self-aggrandizing theatre, include Nazis, Communists, Jacobins, and even Vietnam War protesters.

     

    Fantasy ideologies, according to Harris, are a “plague” and should be dealt with accordingly, “in the same manner as you would deal with a fatal epidemic–you try to wipe it out” (35). I will leave aside for the moment the observation that the act of describing one’s political enemies in medical terms has served with disquieting regularity to legitimate massacres and genocide. Rather, the underlying assumption governing Harris’s distinction between politics as the rational and practical pursuit of concrete objectives and politics as the catastrophic enactment of a divine drama is that the secular West has outgrown the seductions of absolutist terror–so much so, in fact, that it is slow to recognize fully the true nature of the threat posed by radical Islam. Harris fears that the West has made itself more vulnerable to al-Qaeda in becoming bogged down in futile questioning over the ostensible political motives behind the attacks of 9/11, when, instead, it ought simply to devote its energies to annihilating a foe with whom it is senseless to reason. The conclusion that the liberal democratic West has effectively exorcised the demons of political totalitarianism and religious fanaticism also surfaces in the opposition between consumerism as a way of life in Western societies and the ethic of self-denial driving the Islamist militants, as pointed out by Slavoj Zizek in Welcome to the Desert of the Real, his recent book on 9/11 and the war on terror. In this particular ideological antagonism, the citizens of the West have become “Nietzschean Last Men,” whose primary concern is the satisfaction of fleshly and material appetites and who react with incomprehension at the suggestion that the only life worth living is one which is devoted to a transcendent cause. The Muslim radicals, by contrast, display the attributes ascribed to the Hegelian master–it is they “who are ready to risk everything, engaged in the struggle even up to their own self-destruction” (Welcome 40).

     

    Yet the opposition between fundamentalist Islam and the liberal West often works to overshadow a significant rift within the West itself. This is the divide between the “post-historical” social democracies of Europe, which, according to Robert Kagan, have entered the Kantian realm of “perpetual peace,” and the still all-too historical United States, which remains stranded in a Hobbesian world of unending struggle (3). Kagan’s distinction stems from the Nietzschean principle (which he leaves unstated) that weak nations, such as those of Western Europe, embrace international law as the primary means of exerting their influence, whereas “brute force” is both the province and prerogative of the powerful (6). Robert Kaplan, in Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos, goes even further to argue that the United States effectively constitutes a “new imperium” and urges that it should embrace the role of global hegemon (148). What emerges is thus the contradictory image of the United States as the lone remaining superpower that is at the same time excessively reluctant to expend the lives of its own citizens as the cost of maintaining its geopolitical dominance–hence its reliance upon proxies, such as the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, for the hand-to-hand combat, and its dependence upon the overwhelming destructive force afforded by its advanced technology, as seen in the invasion and conquest of Iraq. Do not Kagan’s reflections on the American practice of power politics–as well as Kaplan’s advocacy of “stealth imperialism” by the U.S. as a corrective to “the self-delusive, ceremonial trappings of the United Nations” (148-49)–provide the murderous supplement to the monotonous consumerism of the Last Men within the liberal capitalist order?

     

    It has been the province of thinkers who have achieved positions of governmental influence, from the liberal realist George Kennan to the Stalinist Eurocrat Alexandre Kojève, to explain in frank, “explicitly non-human” terms how the killing and impoverishment of millions is necessary for the prosperity of the West (Rosen 94). In the case of Kennan, the central matter is one of maintaining the imbalance of wealth and resources that grossly favors the United States; thus, the U.S. should abandon policies that champion “human rights, the raising of living standards and democratization” (Pilger 98). As Zizek notes, Kennan’s words have the salutary effect of tearing away the hypocritical mask of universal prosperity from late capitalism. But it is Kojève who articulates most forcefully the position that catastrophes always happen elsewhere and to other peoples. Kojève, a self-taught economist as well as a lecturer at the École des Hautes Études, where he taught an entire generation of French intellectuals, viewed his high-level position at the French ministry of foreign economic affairs as an unparalleled opportunity to unify theory and practice. For his idea of the “post-historical utopia,” which served as the philosophical underpinnings for his service to the French state and the emerging European Economic Community, is erected upon the “murders of millions of innocent persons in fulfillment of Hegel’s observation that history is a slaughter-bench […] upon which are prepared the feasts of the gods: the residents of the post-historical utopia” (Rosen 94).

     

    Thus avowedly antihumanist ideas have been increasingly breaking the surface of public discourse after 9/11–whether as the open advocacy of imperialism by Robert Kaplan or the “new racism” that justifies itself not on the basis of the “cultural” or “natural” superiority of the West but according to “unabashed economic egotism” (Welcome 149). Yet such appeals to brute, naked force and amoral national interest run counter to the value system of Christian morality (underscored by the title of Kaplan’s book) that informs mainstream American society. It is instructive here to refer to Zizek’s account of ideology, the function of which is to “combine a series of ‘inconsistent’ attitudes” inclusive of sentiments of both assent and critique, so that the “obscene unwritten rules” which sustain power may prevail over the public Law (Plague 75, 73). Ideology is thus a way to “have one’s cake and eat it,” providing unity for heterogeneous and contradictory positions, such as believing in the existence of a Christian God and a moral universe while approving of tyrannies and massacres in developing countries as the necessary conditions for one’s own peace, security, and economic well-being. Such antagonistic contents become unified through a “quilting point” (point de capiton), an “effectively […] immanent, purely textual operation” that becomes comprehended as an “unfathomable, transcendent, stable point of reference concealed behind the flow of appearances and acting as its hidden cause” (For They Know 18).

     

    The “quilting point” relieves the unbearable pressure wrought by irreducible ideological tensions by means of a reversal of perspective that magically changes turmoil and discord into harmony and resolve. Zizek’s examples of a “quilting point” include the function of the Jew as the bearer of contradiction in Nazi ideology as well as Saint Paul’s reversal of the view of Christ’s death on the Cross, which transformed it from a disastrous setback to the nascent Christian movement to its greatest triumph. It is my contention that the support of Christians–particularly the Christian Right–in the United States for decidedly un-Christian policies, such as a neo-imperialist foreign policy, a consumerist lifestyle, and the acceptance of a global system which condemns entire populations to destitution for the sake of U.S. prosperity, relies upon a “quilting point” that goes far beyond merely realistic concerns about the nation’s security. In fact, it is the very opposite of security; it is the mass destruction of the planet through the divine will of God that reconciles for these evangelicals the fact of having to live in the soulless, indolent world of the Last Men with a warlike imperialist foreign policy under the “third, properly symbolic moment” of an imminent apocalypse. Accordingly, wars are to be accepted not as the means for securing particular political ends, in terms of cold-hearted realpolitik, but rather to be read–and welcomed–as signs that the end-times have been set into motion. For the particular configuration of empire, Third World poverty, the dominance of sinful pleasures in the media, technological hubris, and the legal practice of abortion can only be tolerated by means of intense fantasies about their essentially temporary nature; such evils may reign at the present but will be swept away shortly by the punitive catastrophes of God’s judgment.

     

    II. Fateful Dispensations

     

    The view of the apocalypse that has become dominant at present among Christian evangelicals goes by the name of dispensational premillennialism. Promoted widely in the late nineteenth-century United States by John Nelson Darby, an Irish-born preacher who became the leader of a new sect, the Plymouth Brethren, after leaving the Protestant Church of Ireland, dispensational premillennialism emphasizes an account of the end-times based on a literalist reading of biblical prophecies (Boyer 87-88). Declaring that true Christians would be protected from the horrors predicted for the end-times, Darby popularized the doctrine of the Rapture, in which believers will vanish into thin air and be taken up into heaven. The Rapture has held a privileged position in the apocalyptic theology of Christian evangelicals, but evangelicals are divided about its timing vis-à-vis the Tribulation, the seven-year period when the earth will be overwhelmed by horrors and catastrophes of supernatural (and genocidal) magnitude. Post-tribulationism holds that the Rapture will occur at the Second Coming and that Christians will therefore have to suffer through the plagues, famines, and wars along with everybody else; this remains the viewpoint of a distinct minority that includes a number of survivalists. The view that looms largest in the public consciousness at present is the “pre-tribulationist” view, according to which believers will be evacuated into heaven before the onset of horrors. Of the two, the “pre-tribulationist” doctrine–the most widely held of the premillennialist viewpoints–offers the rosiest end-time scenario for believers and the ghastliest of sufferings for the faithless. Recent pre-tribulationists include Hal Lindsey, the best-selling author in the 1970s according to the New York Times, and Tim LaHaye and Jerry Jenkins, co-authors of the Left Behind series that features many of the best-selling novels of the last decade.

     

    Left Behind, published in 1995 as the first novel in the series by LaHaye and Jenkins, opens with a world thrown into disarray by the mysterious disappearances of millions of people. As is common in the representations of the apocalypse among evangelicals, the world is paralyzed by an epidemic of plane crashes and car accidents after their pilots and drivers instantaneously vanish. Not only have all true Christians disappeared, as well as have all children under the age of ten, but also all fetuses have vanished from wombs. The narrative focuses on the ordeals of those “left behind,” that is, former skeptics and nominal Christians who, because of the mass disappearances, become converts to the faith. One of the protagonists in the series is an airline pilot named Rayford Steele, who had been growing apart from his devoutly religious wife. After her disappearance, he becomes plunged into guilt, and visits the church she had attended, where the senior minister had frequently preached about the Rapture. A repentant junior pastor whose merely cosmetic faith had failed to make him dematerialize hands Steele a video made by the senior minister specifically in preparation for this eventuality. “As you watch this tape,” it begins, “I can only imagine the fear and despair you face, for this is being recorded for viewing only after the disappearance of God’s people from the earth” (209).

     

    The episode involving the video is intended as an injection of reality into the world of the novels, which have themselves been conceived as a kind of paratext to biblical prophecy (co-author Jenkins has said in a TV interview that he doesn’t think that these novels are fiction).1 Real-life churches enamored of apocalyptic prophecy have gone to the lengths of making their own videos to explain the Rapture to non-believers after their members have disappeared. Websites dealing with the apocalypse have special sections containing information for those still on earth in the wake of the divine evacuation. Yet the intensely programmatic aims of Left Behind–as a fictionalized treatment of the fulfillment of Biblical prophecies–interpellate the evangelical reader by satisfying the contradictory demands of a split consciousness. On the one hand, the reader is treated to the spectacle of divine wrath being visited upon hapless non-believers during the time of the Tribulation–major American cities are reduced to rubble by nuclear strikes, a meteor storm destroys much of Iraq, 200 million ghostly horsemen kill a third of the earth’s population. The evangelical reader is thus invited to marvel at and enjoy grandiose scenes of carnage inflicted by a punishing God (in Lacanian terms, the act of perversely identifying with the enjoyment of the big Other); as billions of unbelievers suffer gruesome deaths and tortures, he or she can remain secure in the knowledge that the faithful will all have ascended into heaven before these harrowing events take place. On the other hand, the struggles of Left Behind‘s heroes, who are new converts to Christianity, mirror (however hyperbolically) the widespread feelings of marginalization and embattlement among evangelicals living in a society that appears to them hopelessly corrupt, dangerous, and decadent.

     

    In the universe of Left Behind, the Antichrist is a charismatic Romanian politician with the unlikely name of Nicolae Carpathia. In the span of a few short months after the Rapture, he takes over the position of Secretary General of the UN, receives possession of Air Force One from an “emasculated” American president, purchases all the major media outlets around the globe, and wins the support of an overwhelming majority of the globe’s population in establishing a one-world government. Naming this universal regime the Global Community (GC), Nicolae takes on the title of “Global Potentate” and oversees the mass disarmament of the former nations’ arsenals from the GC’s capital, the newly rebuilt city of New Babylon, in Iraq. A scenario in which a pitifully small band of defiant Christians struggle against the might of a world empire may recall the “heroic period” of the early Church when it suffered persecution at the hands of the Roman emperors. Christian propaganda focusing on the courage and martyrdom of the saints greatly impressed Georges Sorel, whose myth of the general strike was influenced by the categorical refusal of the Church to accommodate the ostensibly reasonable demand of the Roman state to acknowledge the divinity of the emperor. As Sorel saw it, it was the Church’s uncompromising stance, which was judged by outsiders as irrational and foolish, that enabled it to take power once the empire had collapsed (211).2 The crude theology of Left Behind, however, depicts miracles taking place with plodding regularity and world events fitting mechanically into proper sequence in fulfillment of biblical prophecies. The notion that born-again Christians will be exempt from having to endure terrible suffering extends to the post-Rapture converts who are the principal characters of the series. The two prophets at the Wailing Wall, both converts from Judaism, routinely incinerate their Jewish and Muslim assailants with fire from their mouths. A full-scale surprise air assault by Russia against Israel results in the destruction of every single Russian jet without a single Israeli casualty. When a plague of demonic locusts is unleashed, the creatures sting only non-Christians, causing such agony that they “want to die but [are] unable to” do so (Apollyon 205). There is a moment of unintended sadistic humor, in which the authors’ avowed philo-semitism reveals its underlying prejudice, when Buck Williams, a member of the “Tribulation Force” of Christians mobilized to combat the Antichrist, chides his friend, the skeptical Nobel-Prize winning Jewish chemical engineer Chaim Rosenzweig, for not being more scientifically curious about these supernatural insects, knowing full well that the locusts’ stings will cause him terrible pain. When the older man doubles over with convulsions after being stung, he begs Buck to bring him some water, to which Buck perfunctorily replies, “It won’t help” (Apollyon 265).

     

    The supernatural turns of the narrative of Left Behind indulge the believer’s sense of Schadenfreude: evangelical Christians are depicted as the only people who understand why disaster is befalling the world; everyone else fruitlessly flails about for answers or, worse, is duped by the Antichrist’s explanations. Such smugness towards mass death and devastation is the result, I suggest, of the merger of American premillennialism and American consumer culture. For what is the Rapture but the “holiday from history” elevated to a cosmic principle? Moreover, this merger of millennialism and consumerism accounts for the increasingly wide appeal of apocalyptic scenarios and the recoding of apocalypse itself. The idea that the saved gain spiritual salvation but are spared physical suffering is a very different understanding of salvation than that of the early Church and its impassioned embrace of earthly ordeals and the risk of martyrdom. Indeed, the Rapture as a doctrine appears acutely symptomatic of a people for whom history is unreal and who have become convinced that disasters happen only to other people in foreign countries. The apocalyptic, as authors as different as Ernst Bloch and Norman Cohn remind us, has traditionally been linked to hopes for social transformation. The post-Augustinian revival of millenarianism by Joachim of Fiore was taken over by zealous Franciscans whose anger at the papacy and the wealthy would leave its mark upon the numerous anarchic sects and revolutionary uprisings that arose against the Church and nobility throughout medieval Europe. The apocalyptic of Left Behind, by contrast, is uncoupled from any concrete demand for social justice, and in fact advocates a political stance that opposes peace, especially in the Middle East, on principle, for the very reason that the Antichrist will dangle the vision of international harmony before a gullible globe as an irresistible lure for setting up his one-world government. Indeed, such humanistic ideas as religious tolerance, the rule of international law, and nuclear disarmament are all exposed in the novels as being ruses of the devil.

     

    The categorical rejection of working for peace as playing into the hands of the Antichrist results less in the active embrace of war as a means of achieving concrete foreign policy objectives than in a viewpoint which greets the outbreak of wars as confirmation that the Millennium is near. The readiness to approve of wars as fitting into the workings of a divine plan would make this brand of twenty-first-century American millenarianism an ideological partner, albeit a volatile one, to the neo-imperialism of the second Bush administration. There are, to be sure, less widely known groups of evangelicals whose millenarian expectations have led them to support nuclear disarmament, human rights, environmentalism, and other causes promoting for social justice. Indeed, the sharpest critics of premillennialist literalism are to be found among evangelicals themselves. The eclipse of political and ethical dilemmas by the question of individual salvation among most prophecy writers, who repeatedly exhort those not yet born-again to accept Christ so that they may escape the horrors of the Tribulation, nevertheless betrays a fatalistic inertia that causes their doctrines to drift into antinomianism. Take, for example, the words of doomsday popularizer Hal Lindsey regarding the inevitability of World War III: “It’s clearly not going to get better before Jesus comes; it’s going to get worse. Christ’s reentry to this planet is to save it from self-destruction, not to ascend a throne that we have provided for Him” (281). Lindsey is merely one among numerous prophecy writers who since the Progressive Era have dismissed social reform as utterly futile in combating social, political, and moral evils, which they believe will only increase as the end-times draw near. Questions of morality thus become effectively cast aside when politics is reduced to matter of choosing between actions that hasten the end and those that delay or “distract” from it.

     

    This rationale is explicitly at work in the activities of the so-called “Christian Zionists,” evangelicals who, believing in the decisive importance of Israel’s role in the apocalypse, have become fervent supporters for the hard-line, expansionist policies of the Israeli Right.3 Christian Zionists raised $14 million in 2001 alone to resettle diaspora Jews in Israel. They have also moved to cut off American financial support to Israel when it seemed that the Israelis and Palestinians were taking serious steps towards peace–when Ehud Barak, early in his ill-fated administration, attempted to move the peace process forward with the Wye River accord. In response, the conservative Christian Israel Public Affairs Committee, which was set up to garner Christian support for Israel, tried to block $1.6 billion in U.S. aid (Gorenberg 169). Ariel Sharon and Benjamin Netanyahu have recognized the Christian Right as the most steadfast backers of their aggressive policies against the Palestinians, and the Sharon government frequently provides expenses-paid trips to the Holy Land for leaders of the Christian Right and holds meetings to discuss strategy with the Christian Coalition and other groups (Goldberg; Engel). But according to the apocalyptic narrative of the Christian Zionists, of which Left Behind presents an elaborately detailed illustration, all Jews will have either been killed or become converts to Christianity by the time of Christ’s return.

     

    III. Onward Gnostic Soldiers

     

    It is thus in their fixation on Israel as the place where the decisive end-time prophecies will be fulfilled that premillennialist eschatology effectively crosses over into antinomianism–the doctrine that the redeemed no longer need uphold the moral law. Although the term was first coined by Martin Luther to condemn the views of Johannes Agricola, who took the notion of justification by faith to the extreme of maintaining that a Christian’s salvation cannot be altered even by the intentional commission of sins, antinomian beliefs can be traced to the Gnostic repudiation of the Decalogue as an instrument of oppression devised by the tyrannical creator deity, Yahweh, to keep human beings in a state of spiritual bondage. Saint Paul, like Luther, was acutely aware of the attraction that an amoral interpretation of Christ’s sacrifice as the extirpation of the Law might exert upon new converts to the faith, and so devoted considerable energy in his Letters to affirming the holiness of the commandments. Early Christianity, to be sure, was an apocalyptic sect; although Paul and the Apostles believed that the Second Coming was at hand, they discouraged speculation about when it would actually occur. Instead, they stressed the responsibility of the Christian to lead a moral life after he or she had become converted, that is, had undergone the symbolic death that leads the believer to a new life free from the dominion of sin. The believer must now live in the awareness of having died to sin, “but the life he lives, he lives to God” (Rom. 6.10). Contemporary premillennialism, on the other hand, is almost entirely consumed by the specifics of end-time speculation, and its central fantasy of the Rapture amounts to a blithe denial of physical death: a fantasy that–if I may be permitted to reverse one of Luther’s most memorable metaphors–squeezes this second life granted by salvation into the bowels leading out of earthly existence, in effect dispensing with the deeply Christian idea of conversion as a traumatic encounter which slays and recreates the believer as a subject–in this world.

     

    The question thus emerges as to whether premillennialism represents a deformation of Christian orthodoxy, or if it springs from an entirely different spiritual tradition. Let us recall here Harold Bloom’s thesis that Americans erroneously believe themselves to be Christian, but are in fact Gnostic without knowing it. In Bloom’s view, the exaltation of the self, the democratic–and anti-intellectual–mistrust of external authority, the vast spaces of the frontier, and the privileging of experience over doctrine in the churches have given rise to a kind of spirituality in the United States that has little in common with historical Christianity but is in fact a modern recurrence of ancient heresies. Such religiosity extends as well to the secular understanding of American nationhood, as the insistence upon the exceptionality of America’s destiny likewise commands the zeal of a religious devotion. For the ancient Gnostic as well as for the American Religion, the individual self is the irrevocable source of authenticity and truth, over and against any actual or imagined collectivity:

     

    urging the need for community upon American religionists is a vain enterprise; the experiential encounter with Jesus or God is too overwhelming for memories of community to abide, and the believer returns from the abyss of ecstasy with the self enhanced and the otherness devalued (Bloom 27).

     

    It is not repentance or brotherly love that is the defining attribute of Gnostic salvation but freedom–freedom from history, the cosmos, nature, as well as from morality itself. Gnosticism holds that the created world (and also the human body and soul) was designed by the Demiurge as a prison to hold the divine sparks, or pneuma, taken from the uncreated abyss of light. The politically explosive, even paranoiac character of Gnosticism in both its ancient and latter-day manifestations can be deduced from its account of the creation, which presents a cosmology in the form of a conspiracy theory. The minions of the tyrannical creator, the Archons, work to keep humanity in a state of ignorance regarding its own true, alien nature as well as the dark purpose of the created world. Gnostic salvation thus comes in the form of a liberating knowledge that awakens human beings to the presence of a divine spark hidden deep within the soul. The American Religion, Bloom argues, asserts this harsh dualism between spirit and matter in its “deepest knowledge,” which is the conviction of American Fundamentalists “that they were no part of the Creation, but existed as spirits before it, and so are as old as God himself” (57).

     

    The Gnostic valorization of freedom at the same time articulates an exceedingly vindictive denunciation of the physical world, a condemnation far harsher than any perspective found in Christian orthodoxy. The radical dualism of Gnosticism means that its adherents assume a drastically different spiritual posture from that of the Christian believer; whereas the latter experiences saving knowledge as the increasing awareness of his or her sinful condition in a divinely created cosmos, the Gnostic sets out to regain his or her innocence in a world that is the misshapen and unregenerate product of a malign deity. Thus, Gnosticism, in order to sustain its belief in the innocence of the uncreated spark, must project all that is baleful and malevolent onto the cosmos itself. The assertion of this insuperable divide between one’s inviolable self and the woeful prison of matter generates an equally intractable sense of indifference to one’s actions in the world, since such indifference, which is actively assumed out of disdain and horror and thus not to be mistaken for detached quietude, demonstrates the powerlessness of the Demiurge to corrupt the divine spark within. According to Bloom, the American Religion is likewise defined by the conviction that the world and one’s actions in it are irrelevant to the purity of the self: “If your knowing ultimately tells you that you are beyond nature, having long preceded it, then your natural acts cannot sully you. No wonder then, that salvation, once attained, cannot fall away from the American Religionist, no matter what he or she does” (265). Furthermore, if the creation is truly identical to the Fall, and the physical world reveals the designs of an antagonistic deity, then the sacrosanct self becomes defined according to its hostility against the order of being. For the American Religion’s worship of freedom is at the same time a war against otherness, which it understands as “whatever denies the self’s status and function as the true standard of being and of value” (Bloom 16).

     

    The premillennialist doctrine of the Rapture is thus distinctly Gnostic in character, as its image of mass ascent recalls not only the taking into heaven of Enoch and Elijah in the Hebrew Bible (both of whom are central figures in the Gnostic lore of the Kabbalah) but also the crucifixion of the Gnostic Christ, who, according to the heretical accounts, did not suffer a shameful and agonizing death but was instead transfigured by the bliss of illumination. The proximity of premillennialist eschatology to the heretical religiosity of the Gnostics and the enormous gulf separating it from Christian orthodoxy also becomes apparent in the fact that Left Behind emphatically breaks with the doctrine of original sin, as all children under the age of ten, as well as the unborn, are transported into heaven. What is astonishing is how this typically secular belief in the “natural innocence” of human beings, often derided by religious conservatives as a shallow, overly optimistic understanding of human nature, surfaces in a narrative in which the majority of the world’s population will be annihilated in horrifying catastrophes. There is, however, no contradiction that American Gnosticism, in its very creedlessness, has not yet been able to unify, least of all the perhaps altogether unprecedented phenomenon of an imperial eschatology–the convergence of millenarian fervor and imperialist domination that currently informs the foreign policy of the Gnostics of the American Right. The early, pre-Constantinian Church, Jürgen Moltmann notes, prayed “may thy kingdom come and this world pass away,” but once Christianity became the official religion of the empire, the imperial church came to pray instead “pro mora finis,” for the delay of the end (162). The know-nothing eschatologists of the Rapture, on the other hand, espouse an imperial politics while praying the prayers of the disinherited who yearned for divine intervention to destroy the empire!

     

    The contradiction of an imperialist apocalypse is thus a coherent manifestation of a heretical spiritual tradition that has survived systematic persecution by taking on forms which mask its origins. The God who works miracles in mechanistically fulfilling the predictions of his prophets exhibits aspects, on the one hand, of the God of the Pentateuch who rains frogs on Egypt and leaves manna on the desert floor every morning, and on the other, of the Demiurge derided by Captain Ahab for his automaton’s lack of creative intelligence in slapping together a jerrybuilt cosmos. According to Bloom, the American Religion is defined by a startling reversal of traditional Gnosticism and worships the Demiurge as God. In the contemporary instance, a God whose works are both visible and historical becomes not the subject of ridicule (as was the case for the ancient Gnostics), but rather idolized as a radically anthropomorphized divinity. Such a reversed Gnosticism belongs nonetheless to a rich and vital tradition of American thought and culture, as Emersonian self-reliance and the flourishing of antinomian dissent in the New World reflect unmistakably Gnostic preoccupations. In this new millennium, Gnostic forms of thought have become commonplace in popular culture, thanks in no small part to the ubiquity of New Age thinking that buttresses everything from conspiracy theories about UFOs to the psychobabble of our therapeutic culture. Gnostic concepts also dominate treatments of religious themes in films and literary works not distinguished by any explicit programmatic intent. Two recent Hollywood films, ostensibly about the nature of faith–M. Night Shyamalan’s Signs (2002) and Bill Paxton’s Frailty (2001)–attest to the insidious power of Gnostic doctrines to deflect ethico-religious dilemmas into fantasies of national idolatry.

     

    IV. Post-Ironic Affirmations

     

    In Signs, Mel Gibson plays a former Episcopalian minister named Graham Hess who has recently lost his faith after the death of his wife in a tragic road accident. The film opens with a shot of large, mysterious patterns set into the cornfield near his farmhouse, where he lives with his two small children and younger brother, a former baseball player named Merrill Hess, played by Joaquin Phoenix. Shrugging off the crop circles as a prank, Graham remains defiantly skeptical in the face of mounting evidence that an alien invasion is imminent. When the evening news shows UFOs hovering over many of the major cities of the world, Merrill suggests to Graham that there might be a divine purpose at work behind their arrival. Graham curtly dismisses any such notion of providence, saying that the last words of his wife, “swing away,” were spoken under the haze of pain-killers which caused her to fixate on a memory of watching Merrill playing in a baseball game, and that this incident proved to him that the cosmos is ruled purely by chance. Once the aliens attack, however, Graham realizes that his refusal to believe in the aliens’ existence has endangered the lives of his family, and so renounces his skepticism. At the film’s close, when Merrill confronts an alien that has taken his nephew hostage, Graham suddenly recognizes the true import of his wife’s final words–he directs Merrill to the baseball bat mounted in the wall behind him and instructs him to “swing away” at the extraterrestrial, thereby saving the life of his son. Even his son’s asthma proves providential, as an attack closes his lungs and thus saves him from the toxic gases emitted by the alien.

     

    Apart from the blatant consumerism of the film’s theology, in which the workings of God are made to fit the demands of a neat and tidy Hollywood resolution (God reduced tautologically to the mere function of deus ex machina), Signs is notable for its dimensionless literalism, its outright lack of metaphoric depth in its portrayal of the aliens. Science fiction, as a speculative genre, is rich in allegorical potential–one need only to call to mind the parable of Western imperialism in H. G. Wells’s The War of the Worlds, in which Great Britain gets to suffer the fate it inflicted upon the peoples it colonized. In Signs, by constrast, the aliens do not “stand for” anything at all; still less do they incarnate “something outside the rational chain of events, a lawless impossible real,” to which, according to Zizek, the birds in Hitchcock’s film attest (Looking Awry 105). The aliens’ sole purpose, rather, is to serve as the pretext for the dubious conversion of the film’s protagonist.

     

    In the “post-ironic” age we are now said to inhabit (especially after 9/11), in which one is called upon to renounce excessive skepticism and to embrace the responsibilities born of a new solemnity and earnestness, the very structure of the suspense narrative undergoes a dramatic shift. In earlier narratives about the supernatural, the genre of the “fantastic” as elucidated by Tzvetan Todorov in his classic study, the primary tension often emerges from and is defined by a protagonist’s–and the reader’s–activity of questioning whether or not ghosts or other paranormal beings really exist. The strategy of the post-ironic film about the supernatural hinges upon the surprise disclosure that the protagonist, with whom the audience has identified from the beginning of the narrative, is already dead. This narrative turn was made famous by Shyamalan’s earlier film, The Sixth Sense (1999), and also by Alejandro Aminabar’s The Others (2000), both of which interpellate the viewer as a ghost that has refused to acknowledge the fact of his or her own death. What these films seek to accomplish, whether by therapeutic ministrations or by the realization that death bridges two extensions of monotonous life, is the domestication of what Zizek, following Kierkegaard, calls the “ultimate horror,” which is not death but the inability to die (Ticklish Subject 292).

     

    To get a better sense of the ideological shifts at work in the post-ironic age, let us imagine a version of Signs made according to an alternate set of symbolic coordinates. In a perhaps more traditionally “ironic” version, Graham, instead of being convinced of God’s nonexistence after the death of his wife, actively inveighs against God as being cruel and malicious. Indeed, he would look upon the alien invasion as another instance of a bored and sadistic deity making a plaything out of human fate, that God’s gratuitous reaping of human life is no different from the aliens’ “harvesting” of human victims, and even raising the blasphemous suggestion that God himself is an alien. Such a film, regardless of whether it would go on to refute or validate these hypotheses, would not only achieve the narrative coherence missing from the existing Signs but would also directly confront the influence of Gnostic cosmology and its valuations. For what is at stake in Gnosticism is the human will that–often unwittingly–turns God into the devil. Indeed, in this re-imagining of Signs, the aliens would indeed come to represent something–the repressed alien God who was once identified with the blissful, uncreated abyss but now returns in the guise of the exterminating deity of a wished-for Armageddon.

     

    Signs, by contrast, presents the audience with a false wager, a dilemma about the existence of God that remains extrinsic to the strange events linked to an alien invasion, being instead programmatically foisted onto the eruption of the marvelous. As mentioned earlier, when Graham and Merrill first talk about the arrival of the alien ships, Gibson sternly rejects Merrill’s view that this fantastic event confirms the existence of a providential God governing the structure of the cosmos. The film therefore proceeds to muddle the distinction between faith and belief–that is, while faith is related to a binding symbolic pact, such as the covenant between God and Abraham or the Christian understanding of Christ’s death on the cross, one can “believe” in the existence of God (or in other deities or spirits for that matter) without necessarily having “faith” in Him, as in The Brothers Karamazov, where Ivan Karamazov condemns God for being unjust and unmerciful. Instead of developing Graham’s lack of faith as a refusal of the paradoxes of theodicy, Signs suppresses the question of faith by displacing it onto that of belief–Graham’s lack of faith in God translates seamlessly over the course of the film into his unwillingness to believe in the menace posed by the aliens, even as newscasts show armadas of flying saucers preparing to land and one of his neighbors is attacked by them. The narrative takes pains to emphasize the fact that his refusal to see the invasion as proof of God’s existence is what keeps from him taking reasonable steps to defend his family. In the film’s ideological universe, God can be counted on to demonstrate in astonishingly explicit terms that every tragedy or loss unequivocally serves higher and beneficial purposes, while skepticism is revealed as nothing less than a denial of reality itself. Signs thus shares with Left Behind a world in which the unbeliever commits the sin of stubbornly persisting in disbelief regarding the objective miracles of the alien invasion or of the Rapture that takes place before his or her eyes. The fact that belief is validated by miracles experienced on a collective and public scale turns any skepticism into a kind of psychosis in the face of cataclysms being meted out by divine power.

     

    It is impossible to overlook the ideological revision of Christianity at work here, in which the believers are protected by a God dealing in miraculous contrivances. The very crudeness of a consumerist theology in which belief draws the reward of earthly well-being undermines the traditional Christian idea that faith exposes the believer to suffering and hardships, often with tragic consequences. If Signs were about the properly Christian dilemma of faith, Graham’s belief in God might in fact lead him to place his children at terrible risk, not the other way around. He would do this not because he doesn’t love his children, but rather because faith, as the suspension of the ethical and the universal, demands that no other relationship come before the relationship of the faithful with God. I am taking Kierkegaard’s reading of the story of Abraham’s call to sacrifice Isaac as paradigmatic for the Christian conception of faith. The recent Gnostic rewriting of this tale in Bill Paxton’s Frailty (2001) proves quite instructive in its distance from Kierkegaard’s interpretation, with divergences that lay bare in compelling ways the spiritual dimensions of the new imperial politics.

     

    V. My So-Called Jihad

     

    Set in a small town in Texas in the late 1970s, Frailty stars Bill Paxton (who also directs) in the role of Meiks, a working-class father of two young boys named Adam and Fenton. His wife having died giving birth to the younger son, Meiks is presented as an exemplary single parent, devoted and caring, warm-hearted yet firm. He is shown preparing meals for his sons, making jokes with them, helping them with their math problems, and so on. But one night, the father comes rushing into the bedroom shared by his sons to tell them that he has received a vision from God. An angel had come bearing the message that God had chosen him and his family to fight the demons that have been unleashed on earth in preparation for the final clash between God and the devil. The younger son Adam readily accepts his father’s account as truth, whereas Fenton shrinks in horror, believing that his father has gone insane and is having homicidal delusions. Subsequent visitations by the angel reveal to Meiks the weapons he is to use–a length of metal pipe, an axe, and a pair of gardening gloves–and he receives the first list of names of the demons he is to “destroy” (Meiks makes much of this distinction between “killing people” and “destroying demons.”) Then, late one night he returns home carrying a bound and gagged middle-aged woman whom he has kidnapped. When Fenton implores him to spare her life, Meiks responds by admitting he too doesn’t want to go through with slaughtering the woman, but God’s commands must nevertheless be obeyed.

     

    The fundamentalist literalism behind the belief in the Rapture is echoed here in the father’s conviction that he can discern who, among those who look like ordinary persons, is actually a demon. When Meiks removes his white gloves and touches the flesh of his victims, he goes into convulsions while receiving visions of the evil acts they committed. Conversely, when Fenton brings the incredulous town sheriff to the house to show him the body of a recently executed victim, the father crumples over and begins to vomit after killing the officer, sickened at having been forced to take an innocent life to protect their sacred mission. Revealing that Fenton has been named by the angel as being one of the demons, thereby accounting for the boy’s reluctance to fight the forces of evil, Meiks declares that, in this one instance, he is determined to disprove the angel’s message. In a memorable scene portraying the manipulative, guilt-inducing power in a father’s admission of his own impotence, Meiks confides to his terrified elder son, just before locking him up in the dungeon built for their victims, “You’re my son, and I love you more than my own life. You know what’s funny about all this, Fenton? I’m afraid of you.”

     

    The father’s words prove prophetic when, after being released from the basement, Fenton is commanded by his father to prove his newfound faith by executing their latest victim. Handed the axe, the son turns the weapon against his father, killing him instead. The guilt assumed by the elder son goes beyond this act of parricide–it is later revealed, in a characteristically post-ironic narrative twist, that the skeptical Fenton is really the “God’s Hands” serial killer sought by the FBI, not the believing younger brother Adam, who had willingly participated in the “destruction” of the demons. At the end of the film, the audience learns that it is in fact Adam who is telling the story in flashback while impersonating Fenton, in order to trap the FBI agent who is the latest “demon” to appear on his list. Thus, as in Shyamalan’s better-known Sixth Sense, the thrill experienced by the audience at the conclusion of the film consists of the overturning of its spectatorial position (“the protagonist has been dead all along!”). In Frailty, the two characters with whom the viewer identifies–the FBI agent trying to solve the killings, the rational and compassionate “good” son who was traumatized by his father’s gruesome actions–are revealed in the end to have committed, respectively, matricide and serial murder. Such a dispossession of the spectator’s points of identification must not be understood simply as an effect of the film’s creators resorting to the only narrative trick still capable of taking today’s audiences by surprise. Rather, the “real story” that emerges once the skeptical point of view is feigned and then discarded validates the bloody undertakings of the father and younger son. The film establishes that, far from being a deluded madman, Meiks, as well as his son Adam, does possess the supernatural ability to perceive the demons hiding in human form. Indeed, Frailty essentially indicts the audience for its very presumption of critical distance; in the film’s moral universe, skepticism and doubt are attributes belonging to demons who murder their own parents, whereas ruthless, exterminating violence defines the actions of the righteous.

     

    Of course, religious (and political) faith does involve the overcoming of skepticism and doubt, and ruthless violence might even be the very action it enjoins. Indeed, Kierkegaard was drawn to Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac for precisely these reasons: to affirm the incommensurability between the moral law and the divine injunction. The Danish philosopher was well aware that virtue, common sense, and morality easily become obstacles to the unconditional commitment demanded by God. Frailty explicitly alludes to Abraham’s ordeal, when Adam, having thrown off the pretense of being Fenton, tells the FBI agent that his father had been commanded by God to kill his son: “You see, God asked Dad to destroy his son, much like he asked Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac. But Dad couldn’t do it, and God didn’t take pity on Dad like he did Abraham.” Doesn’t the category of the religious necessarily involve in some fundamental sense the repudiation of the ethical and of any notion of the good, defined in human terms? And if faith is ultimately to be opposed to ethics, reason, and common sense, doesn’t Frailty merely present an updated illustration of Kierkegaard’s idea of the teleological suspension of the ethical? The answer is no, and we may proceed by looking at how the film significantly deviates from Kierkegaard’s understanding of Abraham’s sacrifice.

     

    In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard defines the “paradox of faith” as the idea that the “single individual is higher than the universal” (70). Thus, insofar as the person of faith has “an absolute duty” to God, for Abraham the ethical/universal is the temptation which seeks to dissuade him from acting according to his faith. Kierkegaard contrasts the trial of the man of faith with that of the classical tragic heroes Agamemnon and Brutus. The mythical Achaean king and the defender of the Roman republic are forced to sacrifice their children for the sake of a greater social good–the necessity that compels them is thus the object of public approval and veneration and their actions are recognized as ethical. Abraham, on the other hand, is ready to commit an act of killing without any reference to the higher good of ethics. His sacrifice of Isaac is emphatically not for the sake of preventing a greater evil, and serves no purpose other than the fact that God has commanded it. One should stress here the wrong-headedness of attempts to critique the story of Abraham and Isaac as an oppressive myth that perpetuates the violence of patriarchal authority by referring to real-life instances where fathers have murdered their own children, such as the father who stabbed his daughter to death in California in 1990 or the 1996 case of Robert Blair in New Hampshire (in both instances, the father appealed to the biblical story of Abraham to justify and explain his act of killing), as detailed by anthropologist Carol Delaney in her book, Abraham on Trial: The Social Legacy of Biblical Myth (1998). According to Kierkegaard, God’s terrible commandment not only separates Abraham from the ethical, but also renders his dilemma incommunicable to others. The incommunicable nature of his ordeal thus makes Abraham either a man of faith or a murderer, but what his faith precisely excludes–the identity he is not ready to assume–is the “middle position” between the two, namely that of the murderer who makes the excuse that God commanded him to do it.

     

    In Frailty, by contrast, the divine command given to Meiks lacks the mystifying and futile character of the injunction imposed upon Abraham. He is ordered to kill Fenton not because his faith is being tested through an ordeal, but rather for the very pragmatic reason that his elder son is a demon and thus places in jeopardy the family’s mission of fighting the forces of evil. If the film were faithful to Kierkegaard and had evoked the Abrahamic sacrifice in all of its appalling gratuitousness, Meiks would have been called to slay his innocent, obedient younger son. Similarly, whereas according to Kierkegaard, Abraham’s faith brings him into contradiction with the moral law, the divine command in Frailty never conflicts with the demands of the ethical universal. Meiks’s failure to slaughter Fenton is presented both as a breach of moral necessity and as a lapse in practical judgment, as it results in his own death at the hands of his son. Thus, the divine injunction is not experienced as radically and inexplicably horrifying; rather, Meiks maintains to the end the illusion that he is acting on behalf of the good when God imposes upon him the command to do what is terrible. Frailty thus domesticates the terrible command by keeping it on the side of the moral law and collective good (as opposed to the Kierkegaardian constellation of the divine injunction/transgression of the law/separation from the universal). As such, the film fails to achieve the status of what Zizek calls the “properly modern post- or meta-tragic situation,” which comes about when “high necessity compels me to betray the very ethical substance of my being” (Did Somebody 14).

     

    VI. Collateral Sacrifices

     

    Frailty also avoids the problematic of secrecy that is decisive in Kierkegaard’s account of faith, invoking instead a theology of visible redemption through its supernatural motif whereby Meiks and his younger son Adam are able to distinguish, simply by laying their hands on others, which persons are beings of unregenerate evil. A similar plot device is to be found in Left Behind, in which the saved can be distinguished from non-believers by the mark of God on their foreheads–a mark, furthermore, that can be perceived only by other believers. Of course, one can object that Frailty‘s basis in the Bible is tenuous at best anyway, since Jesus Christ and his disciples went around casting out demons, not slaying those possessed by them. But one may counter that such deviations from the Gospel are far too common in religious contexts across the American cultural and political landscape to be regarded as mere exceptions to orthodoxy, as a theology of visible salvation is not of Christian provenance but profoundly Gnostic in inspiration. The mystical ability to fathom the hidden guilt of others or instantly recognize their status as unbelievers may give rise in these two instances to an infantile view of good and evil which easily lends itself to the demonizing of one’s political enemies, but the vision of sanctified violence that emerges at the end of Frailty bears particular relevance for the way in which wars have been conducted in the post-Cold War order. For the violence in the film is sanctified precisely insofar as it is surgical–its victims, with the one regrettable instance of collateral damage in the town sheriff (for which the film implicitly faults Fenton’s skepticism), are without exception murderers and pedophiles who would otherwise get away with their crimes.

     

    The idea of surgical killing, which is claimed to annihilate enemy combatants and matériel while minimizing civilian casualties, was of course a major legitimating factor for the recent war of conquest against Iraq as well as for the Persian Gulf War of 1991. Images of computer guidance systems directing bombs and missiles to Iraqi military targets dominated the television newscasts during the previous conflict, while the first Bush administration successfully kept pictures of dead and wounded bodies, the traditional imagery of war, off the air. The Air Force, however, announced on 15 March 1991 that 93.6% of the tonnage of the explosives that fell on Iraq were in fact conventional bombs, belying the surgical nature of the destruction inflicted upon Basra, the second largest city in Iraq before the war (Walker). Furthermore, even as the destroyed and damaged equipment of the Iraqi army was subjected to meticulous examination, the military suppressed any precise count of enemy casualties, giving a 50% margin of error to a total estimate of 100,000 Iraqi dead, a margin that, in the words of Margot Norris, “reduces the dead to phantoms of speculation” (242). Operation Desert Storm, celebrated as an overwhelming victory for the United States and its allies, concluded with the mass incineration of retreating Iraqi troops on what has become known as the Highway of Death. In a single month, a greater tonnage of bombs was dropped on Iraq than were used during all of World War II, while scarcely a photo of its human cost appeared in the U.S. media. The Western riposte to Islamist suicide attacks is to massacre from long range, using weaponry such as depleted uranium shells, which cause long-term environmental damage and physiological harm in the form of cancer, birth defects, and poisoned ground-water.

     

    Frailty makes explicit the inherent fantasy in the derealization of mass Arab casualties in its depiction of victims who, in spite of their normal, everyday appearance, fully deserve to be slaughtered. Because it lacks the essentially programmatic nature of Left Behind, which cannot but provoke in the nonfundamentalist reader the grotesque and suffocating sensation of being directly confronted by another’s obscene fantasy, Frailty renders with greater degrees of concreteness the ideological equivalent of a theology of visible salvation in the realm of politics. It baldly takes at his word the fatuous, Manichean utterances of the current President Bush (America’s enemies “hate” freedom; Americans value “innocent life”) in portraying a pair of serial killers who insist that they do value “innocent life.” Yet the film’s over-identification with post-9/11 militaristic moralizing is constrained by certain ideological limitations. Aside from its Gnostic revision of the Abraham story, Frailty fails to unsettle the belief of the “God’s Hands” that the victims of their jihad are anything but irredeemably depraved. The film in this sense falls in line with a president who self-righteously condemns the nations he considers hostile to his administration’s interests as “evil.” The skeptical viewer will no doubt be tempted to look with irony upon the final revelation that the calling received by the “God’s Hands” is true and divinely inspired. But an ironic interpretation remains wholly external to the narrative–nothing within the storyline authorizes such a stance. Instead, Frailty anticipates a “fundamentalist” reading by evoking the genre of the “superhero,” a comparison drawn by the young Adam (“we’re a family of superheroes that are going to help save the world”) when his father first shares the revelation of his own personal “war against evil.”

     

    One thing that has changed after 9/11, now recognized by the Left as a “missed opportunity” for the United States to confront and reevaluate its role in the world, is the acceptance of ideas formerly associated with the religious fringe by the mainstream media. Time magazine’s cover story of 23 June 2002 on the popularity of the Left Behind series commended the novels for exemplifying American optimism in the face of tragedy and took pains to mute the criticisms offered by various religious scholars and theologians. As mentioned earlier, Jerry Jenkins, the more avuncular of Left Behind‘s co-authors, declaimed in somber, almost melancholic tones on ABC’s UpClose that their work is not fiction, although he stated that he personally wishes that it were. As further evidence of how their exterminist eschatology is no longer regarded as a fringe phenomenon, his interviewer failed to pose any probing questions about a doctrine with a questionable basis in the Bible that bears more than passing resemblance to the cosmology of the Heaven’s Gate cult, which committed mass suicide near San Diego in March 1997. Yet, even as the Christian fundamentalist fantasy ideology of the apocalypse serves to endorse for many the blindly destructive policies of the United States in the Middle East, its suicidal nature reveals that it cannot entirely extinguish the critical force of the genre to which it belongs. For insofar as the apocalyptic evokes the sweeping and total transformation of things as they are, the millenarianism of the Christian Right comprises its own unconscious indictment. The prophecies of the Bible, with their rage against arrogant empires and unjust authorities, have served as a source of hope for the dispossessed and disenfranchised–that is, for those who are in a position to appreciate the metaphoric dimension of the imagery of the apocalyptic. In the hands of the fundamentalists for whom such symbols appear emptied of any metaphoric resonance, the prophecies, especially that of the Rapture, have become a kind of time bomb set against the providential history of the United States itself. “We live after the failure of peoples,” writes Giorgio Agamben, implying that the entry of a people or nation into post-history is marked by their taking up the task of reckoning with their crimes and complicity in terror (142). It might very well be that the apocalypticism of this new millennium is a kind of last obstacle–a final, almost but not quite nakedly nihilistic outburst seeking to give American manifest destiny a moral justification–before Americans, too, begin to realize their place alongside all the other peoples of the world. Until then, we are all subject to the risk that this apocalyptic will perpetrate further atrocities in the course of discrediting itself, so that we may have to live through yet more tragedies before we recognize how we were already bankrupt.

     

    Notes

     

    1. The interview took place on ABC News show UpClose on 5 August 2002.

     

    2. Accounting for the scarcity of attention accorded to the persecution of Christians in pagan literature, Sorel notes that “no ideology was ever more remote from the facts than that of the early Christians” (211).

     

    3. Nicholas Veliotes, former assistant secretary of state for the Near East and South Asia, relates that then-President Reagan himself explained to him the basis for conservative Christian support for Israel in biblical prophecy: “in order for Armageddon to occur, Israel had to exist so that it could be destroyed. Hence, any possible threat to the Jewish state has to be opposed. In this view, the peace process itself is a threat that must be opposed” (15). See Veliotes.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Agamben, Giorgio. Means without End: Notes on Politics. Trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2000.
    • Bloom, Harold. The American Religion: The Emergence of the Post-Christian Nation. New York: Simon, 1993.
    • Boyer, Paul. When Time Shall Be No More: Prophecy Belief in Modern American Culture. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1992.
    • Cloud, John. “Meet the Prophet: How an Evangelist and Conservative Activist Turned Prophecy into a Fiction Juggernaut.” Time 23 Jun. 2002: 50+.
    • Engel, Matthew. “Meet the New Zionists.” The Guardian 28 Oct. 2002 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,2763,820528,00.html>.
    • Frailty. Screenplay by Brent Hanley. Dir. Bill Paxton. Perf. Bill Paxton, Matthew McConaughey, and Powers Boothe. Lions Gate, 2001.
    • Goldberg, Michelle. “Antichrist Politics.” Salon 24 May 2002 <http://archive.salon.com/politics/feature/2002/05/24/dispensational/index.html>.
    • Gorenberg, Gershom. The End of Days: Fundamentalism and the Struggle for the Temple Mount. New York: Free, 2000.
    • Harris, Lee. “Al Qaeda’s Fantasy Ideology: War without Clausewitz.” Policy Review 114 (2002): 19-36.
    • “Interview with Jerry Jenkins,” ABC News UpClose. ABC, New York. 5 Aug. 2002.
    • Kagan, Robert. “Power and Weakness: Why the United States and Europe See the World Differently.” Policy Review 113 (2002): 3-28.
    • Kaplan, Robert. Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos. New York: Random, 2001.
    • Kierkegaard, Søren. Fear and Trembling/Repetition. Trans. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1983.
    • LaHaye, Tim, and Jerry Jenkins. Left Behind. Wheaton: Tyndale, 1995.
    • —. Apollyon. Wheaton: Tyndale, 1999.
    • Lindsey, Hal. The Final Battle. Palos Verdes: Western Front, 1995.
    • Moltmann, Jürgen. The Coming of God: Christian Eschatology. Trans. Margaret Kohl. London: SCM, 1996.
    • The New Oxford Annotated Bible. Ed. Herbert G. May and Bruce M. Metzger. Oxford, UK: Oxford UP, 1984.
    • Norris, Margot. Writing War in the Twentieth Century. Charlottesville: U of Virginia P, 2000.
    • Pilger, John. The New Rulers of the World. London: Verso, 2002.
    • Rosen, Stanley. Hermeneutics as Politics. Oxford, UK: Oxford UP, 1987.
    • Signs. Screenplay by M. Night Shyamalan. Dir. M. Night Shyamalan. Perf. Mel Gibson, Joaquin Phoenix, Rory Culkin, and Abigail Breslin. Buena Vista, 2002.
    • Sorel, Georges. Reflections on Violence. Trans. T. E. Hulme. New York: Peter Smith, 1941.
    • Walker, Paul. “U.S. Bombing: The Myth of Surgical Bombing in the Gulf War.” War Crimes: A Report on United States War Crimes Against Iraq to the Commission of Inquiry for the International War Crimes Tribunal. Ed. Ramsey Clark et al. 1992 <http://deoxy.org/wc/wc-index.htm>.
    • Zizek, Slavoj. Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism?: Five Interventions in the (Mis)use of a Notion. London: Verso, 2002.
    • —. For They Know Not What They Do. London: Verso, 1991.
    • —. Looking Awry. Cambridge: MIT P, 1991.
    • —. The Plague of Fantasies. London: Verso, 1997.
    • —. The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology. London: Verso, 1999.
    • —. Welcome to the Desert of the Real. London: Verso, 2002.

     

  • Constellation and Critique: Adorno’s Constellation, Benjamin’s Dialectical Image

    Steven Helmling

    Department of English
    University of Delaware
    helmling@udel.edu

     

    Fredric Jameson years ago characterized Adorno’s chief critical device or method as the “historical trope” (Marxism and Form 3-59), so it shouldn’t strike anyone as a novel claim that Adorno’s “constellation” displays affinities with other now-familiar devices of modernist art and literature–Eisensteinian montage, cubist collage, the Joycean “epiphany,” the Poundian “ideogram.” The young Adorno presumably first encountered the word’s relevant usages when he read Benjamin’s Trauerspiel in the late 1920s; however that may be, the word recurs in his work throughout his career, from “The Actuality of Philosophy” (1931) to the late pieces collected in Critical Models. Its connotations are diverse and often conflicting, and one could make an interesting study of such tellingly divergent uses, as well as an interesting speculation of the rarity of Adorno’s own second-level reflections on the word.1 The present study, however, attempts nothing so comprehensive.2 I want in this paper to unpack some of the implications of constellation as a critical practice and elicit their tension or contradiction (a word not necessarily a vitiation in Adorno’s usage, and in many contexts a term of high praise) with the overall program, derived from Hegel, that Adorno regularly calls “immanent critique.” To that end, I will consider constellation in relation to Walter Benjamin’s “dialectical image,” with which it has obvious but also qualified affinities, to the Gestalt psychology of Wolfgang Köhler, from which Adorno would have been anxious to distinguish it, and to the epic device of “parataxis” as Adorno commends Hölderlin’s use of it. I will end by bringing the issues that emerge to bear on the 1944 Dialectic of Enlightenment, co-authored with Max Horkheimer, and the curiously agitated stasis “motivating” its thematic of Western Civilization’s “progress” and “regress.”

     

    ADORNO AND BENJAMIN

     

    It is in his “Portrait of Walter Benjamin” that Adorno speaks most suggestively and, for his own practice, most revealingly, about the theory, the practice, and the effect, of Benjamin’s dialectical image:

     

    The [Benjaminian] essay as form consists in the ability to regard historical moments, manifestations of the objective spirit, "culture," as though they were natural. Benjamin could do this as no one else. The totality of this thought is characterized by what may be called "natural history." He was drawn to the petrified, frozen or obsolete elements of civilization, to everything in it devoid of domestic vitality [...]. The French word for still-life, nature morte, could be written above the portals of his philosophical dungeons. The Hegelian concept of "second nature," as the reification of estranged human relations, and also the Marxian category of "commodity fetishism" occupy key positions in Benjamin's work. He is driven not merely to awaken congealed life in petrified objects--as in allegory--but also to scrutinize living things so that they present themselves as ancient, "ur-historical" and abruptly release their significance. Philosophy appropriates the fetishism of commodities for itself: everything must metamorphose into a thing in order to break the catastrophic spell of things. Benjamin's thought is so saturated with culture as its natural object that it swears loyalty to reification instead of flatly rejecting it [...] the glance of his philosophy is Medusan. (Prisms 233)

     

    For us, there is peril in this assimilation of culture to nature, which we regard as the classic ruse of ideology. Our antidote, from Lévi-Strauss and Barthes, is to dissolve the category of nature entirely into culture–to “flatly reject,” in effect, to deny our critical practice any resort to, the category of nature at all. But for Adorno, the ruse itself is the first thing critique must grapple with–and it must do so “immanently,” that is, from the inside: critique must suffer the ruse of ideology, and even in a sense reproduce it from within, in the very course of the attempt to unmask it and undo its power. Hence the use, for Adorno and for Benjamin, of a critical device that permits just what our usual practice forbids, namely, a patience of, or tolerance for, transaction between categories (for example, nature/culture) that other styles of “external” critique would disjoin. An “external” critical practice insistently seeks to separate culture and nature, to fortify or sharpen or harden the putative antithesis between them, to (as it were) dis-ambiguate the mystifying conflation by recourse to which ideology sanctifies cultural/historical contingencies as natural necessities. By contrast, the practice of Benjamin and Adorno might here be thought of as a “motivated” re-ambiguation that again allows culture and nature access to each other in ways that can be critical of the binary from “inside,” ways impossible for any “external” construction of them as mutually exclusive. As Adorno elsewhere puts it:

     

    For [Benjamin] what is historically concrete becomes image--the archetypal image of nature as of what is beyond nature--and conversely nature becomes the figure of something historical. (Notes 2: 226)

     

    Hence it is a good thing, an opening to critical insight rather than an ideological lapse, that “in Benjamin the historical itself looks as though it were nature” (Notes 2: 226), or, even more provocatively, that Benjamin’s work “swears loyalty to reification instead of flatly rejecting it” (Prisms 233).3

     

    It is this subversive evocation of the ideology of nature from within, “immanently,” that makes Benjamin’s “Denkbild” or “thought image” (and, I am of course arguing, Adorno’s constellation as well) a dialectical image:

     

    [Benjamin] was right to call the images of his philosophy dialectical [...] the plan of his book on the Paris Arcades envisaged a panorama of dialectical images as well as their theory. The concept of dialectical image was intended objectively, not psychologically: the representation of the modern as the new, the past, and the eternally invariant in one would have become both the central philosophical theme and the central dialectical image. (Notes 2: 226-7)

     

    The language here leaves room for some unclarity. The “representation of the modern as the new, the past, and the eternally invariant in one” would, presumably, be ideological–the world’s own self-representation–and hence a fit “object” (“philosophical theme”) for ideological exposé by way of the dialectical image. But the unclarity allows also the suggestion that the representation is itself the theme and the (dialectical) image. Hold this ambiguity–cognate with our culture/nature problem–in mind; we will recur to it throughout. For now, the passage implicates in the “dialectic” that the dialectical image achieves or allows not only nature/culture, but also “theory” and “image”–another categorical binary often operative, and often less consciously, than culture/nature, in critical practice. In Hegel, “picture-thinking” is quite specifically a pre- or proto-philosophical kind of consciousness–although survivals of it persist into the age, the consciousness, the practices of philosophy itself. More conventionally, though–by something like a Hegelian methodological fiction–it belongs to earlier phases of the unfolding story of the World-Spirit, in which the advent of theory or philosophy is itself an important milestone. And this evocation of the World-story reminds us, too, that for Hegel, the dialectic was ineluctably a temporal process, which is to say conceptualizable only in or as narrative. Image, by contrast, is spatial and atemporal–and to that extent a dialectical image would seem to be a kind of paradox. Yet what makes the “representation of the modern as the new, the past, and the eternally invariant in one” ideological is that it has already collapsed the narrative implicit in the given terms (modern, new, the past) into the non-narrative stasis of an “eternally invariant” condition. Hence the interest, when Adorno insists,

     

    there are good reasons why [Benjamin's] is a dialectic of images rather than a dialectic of progress and continuity, a "dialectics at a standstill"--a name, incidentally, he found without knowing that Kierkegaard's melancholy had long since conjured it up. (Notes 2: 228)

     

    Thus can a Marxist critique recuperate, “immanently,” the arch-bourgeois Kierkegaard, as himself an immanent sufferer, exemplar, critic and diagnostician of all the superstitions and humors (“melancholy”) that compound the bourgeois ideology and Lebenswelt. But more to the present point is that the critical practice of Adorno generally presents what might seem the paradox or contradiction of an insistently historicizing program, realized in a critical practice that is virtually never motivated by historical argument in the form of historical narrative. Hence the relevance of the formula “dialectics at a standstill,” which has become almost a slogan for Western Marxists and others for whom the forward momentum of nineteenth-century progressive (liberal) and/or revolutionary (Marxist) narratives of eventual (of course, diversely) happy endings have stalled in the steady-state nightmare of the twentieth century, where, as Adorno and Horkheimer starkly put it, “mankind, instead of entering into a truly human condition, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism” (xi). For a world at such an impasse, “dialectics at a standstill”–a non-narrative dialectic–is the only kind of dialectic that answers to our condition.

     

    “Dialectics at a standstill” is, then, not only the ideological condition to be contested, but also the contestation’s method. Indeed, the passage from Benjamin’s Passagen-Werk from which the phrase comes makes just this point: “dialectics at a standstill–this is the quintessence of the method” (Arcades 865); elsewhere, quite simply, “image is dialectics at a standstill”; and, “only dialectical images are genuinely historical” (Arcades 463). Here again we observe the commutativity of the ideological ethos and the critical method. To link all this–not only ethos and method, but program as well–with dialectical image suggests another, related, contradiction latent in Adorno’s practice that can tell us much about his motives and his meanings. Since Hegel, the project, or desire, of broaching the “new” in the domain of Spirit has regularly generated figurations of loosening or liquifying formations inherited from the past that have “hardened” or “frozen” and thus become rigid and imprisoning. Hegel himself spoke of philosophy’s task in such terms, of “freeing determinate thoughts from their fixity” (Hegel 20); compare this with Hegel’s frequent formula that thought “sets in motion” thought-objects, former “certainties,” that had been stalled. Adorno likewise typically figures reification as a process of freezing, hardening, or congealing, and the critical process, by contrast, as one of softening, reliquifying, and so on, as we have already seen in the quotation above praising Benjamin’s attempt to “awaken congealed life in petrified objects” (Prisms 233). The task of immanent critique, as Adorno puts it elsewhere, is that “congealed” ideological thought “must be reliquified, its validity traced, in repetition” (Negative 97). Above we saw what I called a motivated ambiguation of culture and nature; here we have a cognate move, in that to “reliquify” so as to release or engender the new must entail a “repetition” of that which had been “congealed.” Also, regarding “its validity traced”: immanent critique seeks as much to recover what is valid in ideological congealments as to undo what is false.

     

    Thus conceived, immanent critique might seem, itself, an ambiguously narrative process putting the forward motion of renewal in tension with the cyclical or static entrapments of repetition. But the ambiguity above, whereby narrative devolves into standstill, into impasse, into image, has its analogous playing-out in the reversal whereby figurations of critical, anti-ideological reliquification are displaced by their very opposite: by imageries of petrification, hardening, freezing, rigidifying, even killing. In the following passage, for example, Adorno’s discussion of Benjamin’s dialectical image generates, not for the first time (we have already seen it above in the passage from Prisms) the balefully minatory image of Medusa.

     

    Benjamin's medusa-like gaze [...] turns its object to stone [...]. [It] froze [its object] to a kind of ontology [sc. hypostatization, reification, fetish] from the start [...]. This [...] was the spirit in which [Benjamin] restructured every element of culture that he encountered, as if the form of his intellectual organization and the melancholy with which his nature conceived the idea of something beyond nature, of reconciliation, necessarily endowed everything he took up with a deathly shimmer. (Notes 2: 228)

     

    Here, it would seem, the “gaze” of the critic does to its object just what immanent critique and other projects of “dereification” aim to un-do: hardens it, turns it to stone, turns it into a thing. (A resort to etymology here seems worthwhile: “thing” in Latin is res, the root of “re-ification; in Greek, “thing” is ontos, the root of “onto-logy,” another “thing,” so to speak, that Benjamin’s “medusa-gaze” turns its object into–both the thing, we might say, and its ideological theorization by Heidegger; hence “ontology” as figure here for what Adorno variously calls “reification,” “hypostatization,” “fetishization.”) Indeed, the critic’s gaze does something very suggestive of killing the object, depriving it of life–besides Medusa’s own lethal power of petrification, such is the suggestion of “endowing” it “with a deathly shimmer.” In context, it is following this passage that the “dialectics at a standstill” passage appears–so there is a pointed connection between, or constellation of, the theme above of non-narrative stasis and the point here about death. In Benjamin’s

     

    micrological method [...] the historical movement halts and becomes sedimented in the image. One understands Benjamin correctly if one senses behind each of his sentences the conversion of extreme animation into something static, in fact the static conception of movement itself. (Notes 2: 228)

     

    Here, again, the critic “immanently” repeats, even suffers, the stasis of our modern ideological condition in a way to perform (“repeat”) that very condition–the “moment” of the process captured in the Medusa-image being that in which the critic enacts the “repetition” of that congealed, petrified condition, not (yet) its reliquification.

     

    In his 1959 lectures on Kant, Adorno calls for a hermeneutic that, by entering the (objective) “force field” of a writer’s or a text’s problematic, allows the interpreter to “go beyond the immediate meaning on the page” (Kant’s 80). The Medusa image, fraught as it is with what Freud would call “antithetical” motifs, emboldens me to give this a try. In the myth, the Medusa’s power to petrify anyone who looks at her is defeated by Perseus, who contrives to approach her without looking, and at the crucial face-to-face moment, holds up to her a highly polished mirror. Medusa, seeing her own image, is herself turned to stone, and Perseus then decapitates her. He keeps her severed head, however, and in further adventures, he uses it as a weapon–a fright object with which to petrify new enemies. Adorno licenses us, I suggest, to read “Benjamin’s medusa-gaze” as having the power to do to ideology something like what Perseus’s mirror does to Medusa herself, as well as to do what Perseus uses Medusa’s severed head to do to further adversaries. This image, of Medusa’s petrifying power turned against itself and then appropriated for further use against other threats, suggests something of the reflexiveness, the “antithetical” character, that is, the capacity for “dialectical” reversals, as well as something of the ordeal, “the labour and the suffering of the negative,” incumbent on the (hero-) critic, encoded in Adorno’s project of immanent critique.

     

    I have been arguing, in effect, that the dialectical image de-narrativizes the implicitly temporal or narrative course, from “repeat” to “reliquify,” of immanent critique. We might say the Medusa gaze of the dialectical image freezes the temporality of immanent critique into a frozen, static, petrified image. But we can also play this construction the other way, reversing its direction, to reinsert the dialectical image back into the story by assigning it a particular “moment” in the narrative. If immanent critique is meant to reliquify an antecedent hardening, then the Medusa-gaze would seem to belong to the prequel of the story: the moment of its object’s petrification would seem to be the indispensable narrative precondition for the repetition and reliquification to follow. But Adorno evokes the Medusa myth in a context that suggests an even more surprising narrative for the Medusa moment to be assigned its place in. In the passage in question, Adorno resorts to the Medusa-image in the context of Benjamin’s treatment of some contemporary neo-Kantian efforts to make common cause with “ontology”; whether he is talking about Heidegger himself here I am uncertain, but the point would seem to be that Benjamin’s Medusa-gaze “froze” this nascent ideology in advance of its own hardening: that its action, in other words, projected or anticipated before the fact what still, at the time, lay in the future. The petrification it operates in such a case is prospective, not retrospective, which is to say it is petrification for the first time, not as repetition. To adapt Ernst Bloch, there is (of course) a “not yet” of ideology as well as of utopia–between which could be inserted, as a mediation, the “not yet” of (immanent) critique itself as Benjamin projects it in the very last sentence of his book on Baudelaire: “with the upheaval of the market economy, we begin to recognize the monuments of the bourgeoisie as ruins even before they have crumbled” (Charles Baudelaire 176).

     

    ADORNO VERSUS BENJAMIN

     

    I have so far expounded Adorno’s sense of constellation and critique by way of Adorno’s remarks on Benjamin’s dialectical image–a way of proceeding that has obscured their differences. Benjamin’s critical practice is strongly marked, as is Adorno’s, by the work of Freud, though a Freud mediated by the Surrealists rather than, as for Adorno, by Nietzsche. We may risk the generalization that the Surrealist program was to inhabit the madness of the culture, to re-enact it from within, less (directly) to critique it, than to exhibit it–to insert themselves into the Freudian drama, we might say, in the role not of ego, but of id, on the evident premise that the ego, whatever its for-or-against posture toward the world, cannot be as “naturally” or as “immediately” transgressive as the id. The practice of the Surrealists typically embraced what Adorno would have regarded as an irrationalist faith that the real madness was reason, and unreason its only antidote or purge, if not quite its salvation or its utopian alternative. Benjamin seems to regard such a resort to madness with some ambivalence–almost as something like a desire unhappily forbidden him by reason of that obdurately quotidian sanity from which all his brilliance and all his bile were powerless to deliver him. Some such longing, or nostalgia, seems to me symptomatized in Benjamin’s sense of the world as a pallid, petrified, undead, fundamentally irrational waking dream, and the resistless momentum by which this “phantasmagoria” passes into “allegory” in all the diffuse senses Benjamin lent that word. Benjamin plays with a morbid-seeming identification with the dead and with death itself; you might say that in his work critique is playing possum–one of his most famous quotations, indeed, avows that critique itself long since left the land of the living.

     

    Adorno was moved by the pathos of all this in the life and death of his friend, and I would bet that he had Benjamin in mind in section V of the Anti-Semitism chapter of Dialectic of Enlightenment, in which the modern subject’s protective “mimesis” of the reified surrounding world is imaged as a feigned death entailing all too literally the spiritual consequences of the real thing. Adorno’s animated, even febrile critical style could never be confused with Benjamin’s passive-aggressive, mock-compliant “melancholy.” As for Freud, Adorno took him very seriously indeed, as one who rationalized the irrational, but he never rose to what would seem to be the irresistible bait of assimilating the “repeat/reliquify” course of immanent critique altogether to the Freudian “compulsion to repeat” (best known from section III of Beyond the Pleasure Principle [1920]), and to Freud’s ingenious technique of appropriating that compulsion, in eliciting the patient’s own transferential resistances, to the healing labor of the analysis.4 Adorno was wary of any assimilation of his own project to psychoanalysis (the closest he comes, and it is not very close, is his late lecture “The Meaning of Working Through the Past” [Critical Models 89-103]); and his work holds itself much more aloof from Freud than that of such colleagues as Max Horkheimer, Erich Fromm, or Herbert Marcuse, let alone Benjamin, whose methexis in Freud brings him closer to the Joyce of the “Circe” episode than to the practice of any member of the Frankfurt School. Adorno has his own distinctively critical “unhappy consciousness,” an “after-Auschwitz” moral askesis that, to say it again, long pre-dated the news of Auschwitz itself–but this is a vibrant, highly cathected affect, quite different from that of the “saturnine” or “melancholy” Benjamin, which looks, indeed, rather like the resigned, “stoic” ataraxia that Adorno so frequently diagnoses as among the more desperate symptoms of the despair engendered by our supposedly empowered, post-Enlightenment, “administered world.”

     

    GESTALT

     

    These tensions between Adorno’s doubts concerning Benjamin’s practice of the dialectical image–and their implications for the sort of work Adorno wants performed, what problems he wants addressed, in his developing practice of constellation–may be illuminated here by a consideration of Adorno’s wariness of the Gestalt psychology of Wolfgang Köhler. As we will see, Adorno treats Gestalt theory as ideology–constellation, we might say, in reverse. Adorno sounds caveats about Gestalt theory in his 1931 inaugural lecture, “The Actuality of Philosophy” (Adorno Reader 31-32); a quarter century later, he makes almost a kind of satire of Husserlian “intentionality” fidgeting in the unwelcome embrace of Gestalt psychology (Against Epistemology 158-62). Pertinent here is Adorno’s discussion of Kant’s “unity of apperception,” the ground on which, Adorno forcefully argues, Kant’s “subjective” and “objective” sustain each other. For Adorno compares Kant’s conception–that is, he juxtaposes it heuristically, or one might even say, he “constellates” it–with Gestalt theory (Kant’s 100-01). Adorno is writing here in the late 1950s, at a time when artists and poets often seized on Gestalt theory as a validation of avant-garde practices of the quick cut, the elision of transitions, and so on; other kinds of inquirers, too–Marshall McLuhan comes to mind–made a sort of ideology, or shorthand, all-purpose explanation, of “pattern recognition” (as Gestalt was frequently anglicized) as a key to all manner of novel, putatively “modern,” styles of consciousness. In this passage, Adorno’s discussion projects Gestalt as the ideological problem rather than its critical solution: like Kant’s “unity of apperception,” the functioning of Gestalt is “unconsciously synthetic,” thus effecting (false, familiarized, familiarizing) reconciliations or integrations of experiential fragmentariness.5 By these lights, Gestalt is an instance or model, indeed an epitome, of ideology as such: reflex and reinforcer of the habitual familiarizations, the ideological conditionings, the false reconciliations or “imaginary solutions to real contradictions” of the historically and culturally given.

     

    But I am eliciting these implications of Adorno’s reservations about Gestalt because what they imply is what Adorno leaves unsaid here, namely the contrast with his ambitions for the constellation. I should caution here that Adorno sometimes uses the word “constellation” to designate historically given, that is, already familiarized, ideological arrays or Gestalts [for example, Critical Models 138, 260]; my usage henceforth will connote “constellation” in the sense Adorno valorizes, as a device with the potential to be turned, in somewhat the manner of the Brechtian V-effect, against such familiarizations (though just this dissident potential, of course, is what mid-century avant-gardists were seizing on in Gestalt). And as we’ll see, the word’s “antithetical” reversals of meaning are themselves indices of the “dialectical”-ness of Adorno’s immanent critique. We might say that these “antithetical” meanings–“constellation” as unconscious ideological synthesis versus “constellation” as consciousness-raising estrangement; “constellation” as object of critique, or as subject of it–are themselves a kind of constellation implying or encoding, concealing or de-familiarizing a narrative, that of the classic Enlightenment project summarized by Freud in the formula, “making the unconscious conscious.” Adorno may “repeat” an over-familiar constellation and then reliquify (or, Medusa-like, petrify) its “congelations”; or he may present an unfamiliar and even shocking juxtaposition, whose estrangement is to provoke a new and heightened consciousness of the ideological condition in which we are entrapped. The historical image that results, ideological and critical all at once, appropriates the critical force we saw Adorno ascribing to the Benjaminian dialectical image, turning it, immanently, to estranging or defamiliarizing, sc. critical or (Hegel) “negative” purposes.

     

    MEDIATION

     

    Most ideologically consequential in Adorno’s critique of Gestalt–consequential, I mean, for our thinking about constellation–is the issue of mediation. According to Kant’s “unity of apperception,” Husserl’s “intentionality,” and Gestalt theory alike, it is the mind that synthesizes or integrates disjunct bits of sense-data into a coherent whole or pattern; and as we have seen, this synthesis, under whatever name or construct, looks to Adorno like a virtual model of the operations of ideology. Adorno urges that such ideological Gestalt-components, the “fragmentariness” that Gestalt synthesizes, or, indeed, the fragments themselves, “stand in need of mediation” (Kant’s 100)–a complexly ideological indictment, but suffice it for now to say that in Adorno, “mediation” connotes dialectical self-consciousness, awareness of the negative, of contradiction, of non-identity, and of the “labor of conceptualization.” Enthusiasts of Gestalt theory counted it in the theory’s favor that it seemed to propose or promote a view of experience as “immediate,” a specifically positivist or “nominalist” naïveté or ideological mystification–one might even say, “Gestalt“–that Adorno consistently meant to combat. Yet versions of this (to Adorno, naïve) quest for “immediate experience” are pervasive throughout the early twentieth-century “modernist” arts, from the scruffiest anarchists of Dada and Surrealism to that most stiffly proper of reactionaries, T. S. Eliot. It would seem to be implicit in Adorno’s own frequent motif of “shock” as a way to awaken numbed perception, and it is clearly the program enacted in such modernist devices as montage, collage, and ideogram, devices mobilized by their authors expressly to suppress and subvert received habits of synthesizing, modulating, contriving transitions–in short, mediating–between the typically incongruous or dissonant elements they contrived to bring together. Like these modernist devices, in short, the constellation at the very least looks as if it is dispensing with mediation–which in the context of the left-to-Stalinist intellectual culture of the 1930s and 1940s was tantamount to dispensing with “dialectic” itself.

     

    Here we see just one among a complex of “overdetermining” factors that motivated Adorno’s modernism to stage itself as an affront to such “dialectical” political orthodoxy. His own practice was meant, in emulation of the great modernists he consistently advocated against the socialist realist alarums of Georg Lukács, to repudiate orthodox dialectical materialism (“diamat,” in the neologizing party-speak Adorno so loathed) as a reified dogmatic system. In the Lukácsean optic, Adorno’s practice of the constellation, assembling disjunct elements in (seemingly) unmediated array, would seem as decadent as cubist collage, Eisensteinian montage, Poundian ideogram, or Joycean stream-of-consciousness. It would seem “idealist,” “subjective,” “decadent”–“immediate” not only in the proscribed sense of un-mediated (philosophically impossible) but im- or de-mediating (politically and philosophically delusional, i.e., ideological). Most pertinently, and in terms deriving from the authority of Marx and Lenin both, it would have seemed “un-dialectical.” (See, for example, Lukács’s essays “Realism in the Balance” and “The Ideology of Modernism.”) Lukács’s prose retains the composure of the platform debater; Adorno more characteristically vents exasperation, rejoining that Lukács, “the certified dialectician,” himself argues “most undialectically” in, for example, dismissing Freud and Nietzsche as irrationalists and therefore “fascists pure and simple.”

     

    [Lukács] even managed to speak of Nietzsche's "more than ordinary ability" in the tone of a provincial Wilhelminian schoolmaster. Under the guise of an ostensibly radical critique of society he smuggled back the most pitiful clichés of the conformism to which that critique had once been directed. (Notes 1: 217).

     

    If Lukács denounced modernist “im-mediation” as “undialectical” and “sick,” Adorno here agitates (at age 55, and with Stalin five years in the grave) a vehemence that revives all the indignation of his avant-garde youth against the “provincial”moldy-fig-ismthat prefers a false unity, an “extorted reconciliation,” to an unflinching evocation of all the contradiction and falsehood of our condition.

     

    In Lukács, tellingly, the adjective “dialectical” often modifies the word “unity”: dialectic thus sustains a procedure for unifying or integrating disjunct and/or incommensurable things. In other words, for Lukács the point of dialectic should be to produce unity in phenomena and in settings where, presumably, it needs producing. Adorno’s sense is virtually the opposite, that the aim of dialectic should be to expose the contradictions that ideological appearance has falsely reconciled: to produce or expose disunity, contradiction, non-identity. Constellation serves this end by bringing diverse phenomena together and forcing their consideration together. The disjunction between the constellated items is very much the point. To Lukács, the gaps and disjunctions would be evidence of a failure to have done the dialectical work that is the sine qua non of critical activity–to put it another way, a failure of “mediation.” To Adorno, mediation that fills in the gaps between the disjuncta would be ideological, homogenizing, causing the disjuncta to “lose their difference” (as Roland Barthes used to say [for example, S/Z 3]). For Adorno, the point of mediation would be to render, even “exaggerate,” the disjunctions, the contradictions that, for Lukács, they should unify. To Lukács, Adorno’s constellation would exemplify the same spurious and “sick” immediacy on offer in Beckett, Kafka, Freud and the other “decadent” modernists Lukács deplored: a mere “symptom” rather than a critical “negation” of the degenerate bourgeois cultural surround.

     

    Adorno’s immanent critique, by contrast, stipulates that critique cannot hold itself above (or “outside”) the predicaments on which it aspires to offer critical comment. Since critique cannot help but participate in the culture’s “symptomatics,” it had best own this liability, and make of it, to the extent possible, a quickening instantiation of the challenge to be met, the problem to be addressed, thereby amplifying critique’s potential for dramatizing critical effort and ambition–“the labor and the suffering of the negative”–as such. Adorno agrees with Lukács in reprehending false or naïve “immediacy,” but his “constellational” view of mediation gives him a very different take on the evidence from Lukács’s. I don’t pretend always to understand why Adorno approves one work or artist–or indeed, theorist (for example, Freud, Nietzsche, Weber)–as dialectical and mediated, and damns another as deficient in these qualities; and to the objection that Adorno is “merely” making heavy philosophical weather of his personal tastes, I at least would not always be able to muster a very cogent reply. But worth mention here is the move that we might call, borrowing one of Adorno’s own most suggestive rubrics, “Dialectic In Spite of Itself” (Against Epistemology 49-50), by which Adorno often manages to recuperate (or “rescue”) his critical targets from his own critiques of them.6 But whereas Lukács casts these matters in terms of decadence and disease–his “Healthy or Sick Art?” only makes explicit a metaphorics pervasive in his work–Adorno stages the issue rather in terms of ideological appearance, “magic,” and “myth.” An especially pertinent instance for our purposes is Adorno’s exchange with Benjamin over an excerpt (on Baudelaire) of the Arcades Project that Benjamin submitted for publication in the Frankfurt School journal in 1938. Much to Benjamin’s surprise, Adorno reacted unfavorably: “motifs are assembled but they are not elaborated”; Benjamin’s materials, his trouvées, sit nakedly on the page, un-“mediated” by “theory”; the ideological result is that Benjamin’s “ascetic refusal of interpretation only serves to transport [the subject matter] into a realm quite opposed to asceticism: a realm where history and magic oscillate […].”

     

    Unless I am very much mistaken [writes Adorno to Benjamin], your dialectic is lacking in one thing: mediation. You show a prevailing tendency to relate the pragmatic contents of Baudelaire's work directly and immediately to adjacent features in the social history and [...] economic features of the time. [...] you substitute metaphorical expressions for categorical ones [...] [so that] one of the most powerful ideas in your study seems to be presented as a mere as-if [...]. I regard it as methodologically inappropriate to give conspicuous individual features from the realm of the superstructure a "materialist" turn by relating them immediately, and perhaps even causally, to certain corresponding features of the substructure. The materialist determination of cultural traits is only possible if it is mediated through the total social process [...] [such] immediate--and I would almost say again "anthropological"--materialism harbours a profoundly romantic element [...]. The mediation which I miss, and find obscured by materialistic-historical evocation, is simply the theory which your study has omitted [...] the theological motif of calling things by their names tends to switch into the wide-eyed presentation of mere facts. [...] one could say that your study is located at the crossroads of magic and positivism. The spot is bewitched. Only theory could break this spell--your own resolute and salutarily speculative theory. It is simply the claim of this theory that I bring against you here. (Complete Correspondence 281-3)

     

    Adorno’s objections here are not altogether dissimilar from the sorts of complaints Lukács vented about modernism, which at first may seem merely ironic, but it is more usefully taken as index of the fineness of the line Adorno means immanent critique to walk in its highwire ambition both to “repeat” the ideological “symptom” and to reliquify it in a critical negation. Hence the sting in the tail, the potential dialectical backfire, in Adorno’s homage, already quoted, to the effect that “Benjamin’s thought is so saturated with culture as its natural object that it swears loyalty to reification instead of flatly rejecting it. […] the glance of his philosophy is Medusan” (Prisms 233).

     

    So I have risked the lengthy quotation above because its diffuse suggestiveness implies the scope of the tension between Benjamin’s critical practice of the dialectical image, especially in the Passagen-Werk, and Adorno’s of the constellation. Benjamin cites or quotes particular faits divers, one at a time, each standing distinct in its surround of white space on the page–even typographically, a dialectical image, one might say, of that “separation” or “chorismos,” the ideological entailment of “analytic” (bourgeois) philosophical method from Plato to Kant and beyond, that the Hegelian Adorno protests throughout his career. Constellation is of course the vehicle of Adorno’s protest, but it could also serve as a figure for it as well; his famously boundless paragraphs constellate diverse materials so diffusely as to ground or “theorize” or mediate them together–albeit, again, that the ground is contradiction rather than unity. Adorno tends, also, to “constellate” higher-brow materials than Benjamin–Hegel and Beethoven rather than, say, century-old department store brochures: in his 1931 inaugural lecture, “The Actuality of Philosophy,” Adorno sounds the “materialist” motif of the philosophical worthiness of “the refuse of the physical world”;7 but Adorno nowhere incorporates such materials in his writing as Benjamin did, let alone to programmatize, even to yearn, so overtly as Benjamin for their utopian “redemption.”8 This difference resonates with Adorno’s “mandarin” fastidiousness, as well as with his greater circumspection–almost, as he says himself, a Bilderverbot–regarding the utopian (see Buck-Morss, 90-95); it’s arguable that the dissent from Benjamin above helped confirm Adorno in these penchants.

     

    But most consequential for our theme here (the contrast between Benjamin’s critical practice and Adorno’s) is the issue I characterized above in terms of kinesis versus stasis. Benjamin’s isolated atoms of social/historical fact, cited seriatim on the page, organized under generalizing rubrics into “Convolutes,” we may take as dialectical image of the pall under which the bourgeois world has, as if in the gaze of some Medusa more baleful than Benjamin, frozen into paralysis. By contrast, Adorno’s immanent critique, though it eschews narrative, can fairly be called kinetic: the sentences rush headlong, never faltering before difficulties more “responsible” critics would find daunting, and ready at every turn to embrace always heavier burdens of difficulty and challenge. Reading Adorno, you never cease to be surprised at, however you may grow accustomed to, the way a given sentence might lunge off in a new direction, extending (distending) itself to encompass further elements and all the problems they will bring in their train. And yet, as I have said, this kinesis of Adorno’s, however entoiled in the temporality of its own process of working through (Durcharbeit), the temporality of its own writing and being-read, is never itself narrative: whatever else he is, Adorno is never a storyteller.9 When Adorno advises Benjamin (above) that “the materialist determination of cultural traits is only possible if it is mediated through the total social process,” mediation itself sounds like an ineluctably kinetic activity or process, and the movement (my resort to the word is deliberate) between isolated particular and totality–as, at other moments in Adorno, between particular and universal, intuition and concept, matter and idea, content and form–suggests a universe in perpetual and turbulent flux, however stalled or arrested the dialectic that should be ceaselessly dislocating its apparently fixed and static ideological impasses. Adorno suggests something of this contradiction between kinesis and stasis in a much later formulation: “the concept of the mediated […] always presupposes something immediate running through these mediations and captured by them” (Introduction to Sociology 109). The immediate is both “running through” and “captured by” the mediations.

     

    PARATAXIS

     

    We are navigating, or “mediating,” between the stasis of image and the kinesis of narrative, and I want to adduce here a further motif in which these preoccupations find yet another way of overlapping: the “epic” device of parataxis, which lends its name to the title of Adorno’s late essay on Hölderlin. Parataxis is a rhetorical device in which narrative units–narratemes?–follow one another linked only by the conjunction “and,” thus evading or subverting more complex structures or grammars of narrative co- or subordination (cause and effect, antecedent and consequence, main event and subsidiary, and the like). Traditionally, parataxis was taken to be (and poets emulated it as) an artifice, a feature of the noble epic style; only in the twentieth century have classicists like Eric Havelock seen it as evidence of a kind of consciousness or mentalité preceding the advent of literacy. I am sure the latter view, as a way to link texts and consciousness in something like a “materialist” way, would have interested Adorno so much that his non-consideration of it in his essay is a sign that the suggestion hadn’t reached his ears.10 In any case, “Parataxis: On Hölderlin’s Late Poetry” (Notes 2: 109-49) praises parataxis, Hölderlin’s anyway, for evading the usual (sc. reified, familiarized, domesticated) ways of making sense. Hölderlin’s parataxes, Adorno writes, are “artificial disturbances that evade the logical hierarchy of a subordinating syntax,” and in particular, “the judgment” and “the propositional form” (Notes 2: 131-2). I don’t think it an impermissible stretch to suggest that Adorno values parataxis as doing with narrative monads something like what constellation is meant to do with the diverse fragments it constellates: presents them in an ensemble undomesticated by the familiar thought-syntax, the habituated grammars, the ideological presuppositions, that familiarize the new, converting it, in the very process of presenting it, into the same, the old, the already known–the, as it were, pre-reified. Hölderlin’s poetry “searches for a linguistic form that would escape the dictates of spirit’s own synthesizing principle” (Notes 2: 131)–that is, it strives to overcome the very liabilities of the mind’s own drive to grasp what it perceives.

     

    Parataxis thus might seem a solvent, a way of de-composingwhat “spirit’s own synthesizing principle” too unthinkingly composes or synthesizes.11 The evident motive is to mobilize the particular fragmentary contents against the larger synthesizing form(s). But Adorno insists that Hölderlin’s parataxis achieves not merely an abolition of form, an escape from it, but something like a kind of emancipation (not to say redemption) of form itself. And of course, to the extent that Hölderlin’s parataxis is itself a form, this is an emancipation not conferred on form from above or outside, but form’s own self-emancipation; hence what Adorno calls “the agency of form” (Notes 2: 114). Hölderlin’s parataxis “puts explication without deduction in the place of a so-called train of thought. This gives form its primacy over content, even the intellectual content” (Notes 2: 131-2). Set free from the “deductive” regimen of a “so-called train of thought,” the unfoldment (“explication”) of the matter can enact itself “immanently,” according to its own imperatives rather than to those of an external, syllogistic logic. So far from vanishing, form here rather achieves itself in allowing, being the vehicle for, new potentialities by which the particular contents find their expression. Thus does form become itself a content, content itself a kind of form, and all concretely, thus sublating the classic antinomies (form/content, idea/matter, abstract/concrete, universal/particular) that are the pitfalls common to philosophy and the aesthetic under the regime of “spirit’s own synthesizing principle.” Hence (and readers familiar with Adorno’s Beethoven-olatry will recognize the argument here):

     

    It is not only the micrological forms of serial transition in a narrow sense [...] that we must think of as parataxis. As in music, the tendency takes over larger structures. In Hölderlin there are forms that could as a whole be called paratactical in the broader sense [...]. In a manner reminiscent of Hegel, mediation of the vulgar kind, a middle element standing outside the moments it is to connect, is eliminated as being external and inessential, something that occurs frequently in Beethoven's late style; this not least of all gives Hölderlin's late poetry its anticlassicistic quality, its rebellion against harmony. What is lined up in sequence, unconnected, is as harsh as it is flowing. The mediation is set within what is mediated instead of bridging it. (Notes 2: 132-33)

     

    Note the recapitulation of our points above about mediation. But of larger consequence here is that Hölderlin, Beethoven, and Hegel are arrayed in constellation as practitioners of this immanent kind of composition (a “technique of seriation” Adorno calls it [Notes 2: 135]) in which the local, the particular “takes over larger structures,” producing forms that are “paratactical in the broader sense.”

     

    This issue of “larger structures,” of parataxis on the large-scale level of form, returns us to the issue of temporality–Hölderlin, Beethoven, and Hegel (and, of course, Adorno) are all practitioners of forms a hearer or reader must experience in time–and thus of possibilities of kinesis within or by way of the structures their form achieves. “The transformation of language [in Hölderlin’s parataxis] into a serial order whose elements are linked differently than in the judgment is musiclike” (Notes 2: 131)–so that parataxis pushes referential language in the direction of non-referential meaning; moreover, terms like “serial” and “musiclike” restore “temporality” to the stasis of constellation. (“Serial” here doubtless connotes Schoenberg-and-after, rather than Sartre’s “seriality,” although the latter conjuncture, not to say “constellation,” is suggestive as well.) Adorno frequently implies that the temporality of music, and of written texts, whether “creative” or “critical,” amounts to a sort of quasi- or crypto-narrative trajectory in which the hearer/reader is challenged to participate.12 In the “Parataxis” essay, although Adorno’s focus is on the lyric, narrative in Hölderlin appears (under the sign of the “epic”; see the discussion of Hölderlin’s relation to Pindar [Notes 2: 132-34]) as another impulse working against “the logical hierarchy of a subordinating syntax”:

     

    The narrative tendency in the poem strives downward into the prelogical medium and wants to drift along with the flow of time. The Logos had worked against the slippery quality of narrative [...] the self-reflection of Hölderlin's late poetry, in contrast, evokes it. Here too it converges in a most amazing way with the texture of Hegel's prose, which, in paradoxical contradiction to his systematic intent, in its form increasingly evades the constraints of construction the more it surrenders without reservation to the program of "simply looking on" outlined in the introduction to the Phenomenology and the more logic becomes history for it. (Notes 2: 134)

     

    Here the animus since Plato between poetry and philosophy is “sublated”; moreover, Adorno presents the sublation itself as event, that is to say, as narrative. The redemptive or utopian promise is made more explicit in a passage reprising all these themes:

     

    The logic of tightly bounded periods [i.e., the opposite of "parataxis"], each moving rigorously on to the next, is characterized by precisely that compulsive and violent quality for which poetry is to provide healing and which Hölderlin's poetry unambiguously negates. Linguistic synthesis contradicts what Hölderlin wants to express in language [...]. [Hölderlin] began by attacking syntax syntactically, in the spirit of the dialectic [...] In the same way, Hegel used the power of logic to protest against logic. (Notes 2: 135-36)

     

    THE “DIALECTIC” OF DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT

     

    I want to end by sketching the ways that the themes we have been agitating are evoked or enacted to peculiar effect in Dialectic of Enlightenment. With Lutz Niethammer’s acerbic mot in mind, that moderns of Adorno’s sort exemplify a “will to powerlessness” (138-42), I will risk adapting Adorno’s formula above. If “Hegel used the power of logic to protest against logic” (Notes 2: 135-36), the Dialectic of Enlightenment uses a “mimesis” of the powerlessness of Enlightenment positivism vis-à-vis the crises of the mid-twentieth century to protest the non- or indeed anti-dialectical cast of Enlightenment thought, that dehumanizing, instrumentalized empiricism whose mastery of nature is gained only at the cost of nature-ifying, reifying, reducing to thing-like reflex, human being, human existence itself. Kinesis/stasis, narrative/non-narrative, mediated/un-mediated, parataxis/synthesis, dialectical/mythical–“our” particular subcultural penchant is to see these pairs as binaries. But we won’t get the hang of Adorno’s “dialectical” practice unless we cultivate the power of seeing these pairs rather as terms demarking the coordinates of particular conflicted problem-points, or (Adorno’s own frequent figure) force-fields within which the energies of certain contradictions pulse and clash. In our critical practice, oppositional binaries, the two terms separated by the crisp marker of the slash, suggest black/white distinctions. The polemical energy of Adorno’s practice can seem to drive or be driven by such stark contrasts, but my own experience learning to read Adorno has been that his black and his white are best taken as exaggerations of grey–the point being that what he advocates and what he reprehends can overlap in unexpected ways. For one instance, we may cite the “antithetical” tangle imposed on immanent critique (repeat/reliquify) by the Medusa-effect (repeat/petrify). Likewise, Adorno’s often surprising generosity to, even recuperations of, figures one had assumed would be bêtes noirs–Kierkegaard, say, or Spengler, or even Richard Wagner.13 And hence, in the exposition above, the contrast with Lukács (which highlights the liability of Adorno’s constellational critical “negation” to appear as mere ideological “symptom”); and even closer to the quick, Adorno’s own discomfort with the extreme of Benjamin’s apparently “unmediated” practice of “motifs assembled but not elaborated.” The cut between “image” and “dialectical image,” between (to use a more Adorno-identified term) “mimesis” and what we might, by analogy with Benjamin’s coinage, call “dialectical mimesis”–and in like manner the cut, indeed, between all the other binaries just cited–is sufficiently fine as not merely to allow, but actually to “motivate,” some confusion between the opposed, and supposedly clearly distinguishable, terms.

     

    This, I take it, can appear, even to a mere amateur of philosophy like myself, as a major contradiction (of the bad sort) for Adorno as a philosopher. His assault on “identity”-thinking depends on practices of dialectic and mediation that can seem to undo the garden-variety kinds of non-identity or “difference” encoded in binaries like those above. If one of Adorno’s principle complaints with dialectic as usual–as practiced by historicizing heirs of the Hegelian legacy, whether left (Lukács) or right (Croce)–is that it can unwittingly accede to a logic of substitution that winds up affirming the “exchange/equivalence” habitus of Enlightenment, then it’s notable that Adorno’s negative dialectic can in certain lights appear to deliver itself to the same terminus. Perhaps the most troublesome instance is Adorno’s “deconstruction” (if the anachronism may be permitted) of nature/history in “The Idea of Natural History” (1931)–and I take it as some index of the trouble that Adorno never reprinted this essay in his lifetime. But however that may be philosophically, it is Adorno’s practice as writer that I want to illuminate here–and in that arena, the problem is one that Adorno’s immanent critique undertakes not to solve, or to make disappear, but precisely, to display, to expose, which must mean, to suffer, and in that special sense to “perform,” to make happen, to “repeat” and (to the extent possible) “reliquify,” in the writing itself. Critique must refuse the hubris of supposing it can escape, or has escaped, has risen above, its ideological condition. As knowingly as Milton’s Satan in hell (and compare Goethe’s Mephistopheles), critique must always avow, “Why this is ideology, nor am I out of it.” The point of Adorno’s immanent critique is not to exempt his own critical practice from the liabilities of the dominant ideology, but precisely to attest ideology’s ubiquity and power by enacting in the writing itself (his own) critique’s implication–even (his own) critique’s implication–in the very predicaments (his own) critique aims to address, protest, elucidate, redeem.

     

    To bring the foregoing themes together will, I hope, be to suggest their use for a better reading of Adorno. The demonstration-text is Dialectic of Enlightenment, on the premise that in our academic subculture this is the most read and, because most read by novices, least understood of Adorno’s texts. But: “Adorno‘s text”? What of Max Horkheimer, whose name appears first on the title page, and to whom Adorno always ceded priority? Well, in practice, all commentary I know of treats Dialectic of Enlightenment “as if” Adorno were its author, and the few attempts I’ve seen to parse Adorno’s contributions from Horkheimer’s seem perfunctory (see Noerr 219-24) or (perhaps appropriately) shy of specifics (Wiggershaus 177-91, 314-50). Here I’ll take as a methodological fiction or premise the authors’ own professions that their equal collaboration moots any attempt to untangle their respective contributions. The 1969 “Preface” insists that the “vital principle of the Dialectic is the tension between the two intellectual temperaments conjoined in writing it” (ix); and I will offer the speculation that what was crucial in Horkheimer’s input was his penchant for arguing by way of historical narrative, which gives Dialectic of Enlightenment its narrative shape and its quasi-narrative energy. By contrast, Adorno’s critical practice eschews narrative; hence the “vital principle,” the “intellectual tension” I’ve just insinuated between the book’s overtly narrative organization (a smaller-scale rescript of Hegel’s Phenomenology, orchestrating a variant of Hegel’s trajectory from Greco-Roman antiquity to “Enlightenment” and the present day), and its “motivatedly” static (or “regressive”) “image” of Western history (or “progress”). It is precisely this tension, precisely this problematic or contradiction, it seems to me, that has made Dialectic of Enlightenment, for the past generation, the preeminent text in “critical theory” by either Adorno or Horkheimer–a claim, I think, that should valorize Horkheimer’s large (and too-much discounted) importance in the composition of Dialectic of Enlightenment.

     

    But “authorship” issues aside, my point here is that the reflections above on constellation and mediation (and so on) shed light on what I recall, from my own “novice” first reading(s) of Dialectic of Enlightenment, as the most baffling of the problems and “difficulties” it presented for me. The book’s narrative organization was readily legible as an ironic reversal of the Hegelian narrative–the story of Geist not as triumphal progress to an Enlightened Absolute, but as ghastly “regression” to a nightmare of violence (“humanity, instead of entering into a truly human condition, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism” [xi]; “The curse of irresistible progress is irresistible regression” [36]). And the fate of narrative in modernist literature had prepared me for a story whose thematic burden of failure and waste was enacted formally in the failure of the narrative to achieve not only any putative thematic telos, but the telos of narrativity itself. The thornier problem for me was the book’s organization around binary pairs that defied my every presupposition concerning how an avowedly, and programmatically, historicizing and dialectical presentation would or should proceed. Odysseus/bourgeois, for example, or myth/Enlightenment: both of these oppositions seemed to collapse large and crucial historical differences, to homogenize them by, in effect, de-temporalizing or dehistoricizing them–as if “bourgeois,” or “myth,” or “Enlightenment” indeed, were names for “essentialized” or “essentializing,” trans-historical archetypes, permanent and immutable. And likewise for binaries whose aligned pairs were not from different historical periods, but contemporaneous, for example, Kant and de Sade, or Hitler and Hollywood. To expose as “bourgeois” classical philology’s idealization of Homer’s “universal” hero, as well as to root “modern” bourgeois values in the archaic (“heroic”) violences of self-preservation; to vandalize Enlightenment’s self-constituting difference from the (mythical, archaic) past; to elicit the unowned foundational commonalities between the categorical imperative and de Sade’s monstrous naturalism of the boudoir, or between anti-Semitism and the culture industry: I could read in all this a complex of protest and dissent and exposé–even, despite the extremity of the subject matter and the plangency of the affect, something at moments oddly like satire–but not, within the terms of what I took “critical theory” to be aiming at, a strategy of dialectical critique.

     

    To such dilemmas, Benjamin’s (and Adorno’s) formula of “dialectic at a standstill” offers something of a key, as does the ambiguous response or antidote–mimesis, or critique? repetition, or reliquification? symptom, or negation?–of the “dialectical image.” Let me cite here a passage on “Mythical Content” from Adorno’s book on Kierkegaard that anticipates much of the elaboration–or homogenization–in Dialectic of Enlightenment, of the binary of “myth” versus “history” (or “dialectic”), as well as implying the grounds of Adorno’s lifelong dissent from that “fundamental ontology” in which Kierkegaard’s “blocked ontology” (Kierkegaard 57) was so implicated. “Blocked ontology,” we might suppose, borrows some of the charge implicated in a, so to speak, “ontology at a standstill”–and it is part of Adorno’s dissent from Kierkegaard that he would elaborate such a blocked or arrested ontology not as Adorno or Benjamin would a “dialectic at a standstill”: that is, as a defeat, a catastrophe, a reification, a congealment, a steady-state repetition or cycle of the old and the same. On the contrary, in Kierkegaard’s idealization such “standstill” appears as “sublime object,” a desideratum or Tantalus-fruit at once spiritual, philosophical, and polemical. Consider the following passage, whose crucial term for us is “image,” associated here with “myth,” i.e., with eternalizing, reifying, essentializing (mis)uses of thought–which is why special interest attaches to the appearance here of the important modifier, the dialectical image (emphasis added):

     

    Dialectic comes to a stop in the image and cites the mythical; in the historically most recent as the distant past: nature as proto-history. For this reason the images, which [...] bring dialectic and myth to the point of indifferentiation, are truly "antediluvian fossils." They may be called dialectical images, to use Benjamin's expression, whose compelling definition of "allegory" also holds true for Kierkegaard's allegorical intention as a configuration [sc. "constellation"] of historical dialectic and mythical nature. According to this definition "in allegory the observer is confronted with the facies hippocratica of history, a petrified primordial landscape" (Kierkegaard 54; the Benjamin is quoted from Origin 166).

     

    “Dialectic comes to a stop”–as in “dialectic at a standstill” (compare the theme later in the book of “Intermittence” [Kierkegaard 100-02], a condition in which dialectic falters, becomes a stop-and-start affair)–“and cites the mythical,” the act of “citation” here apparently implying some self-consciously critical deployment of the given, ideological image, in quotation marks, as it were; or, on the analogy of the speech-act distinction, as (self-conscious) “mention” rather than (naïve) “use”–with the (Hegelian, and, many will complain, idealist) implication that the difference makes for some “critical” or “negative” consequence. Crucial here is that the “indifferentiation” of myth/dialectic seems, in the transit between the quoted passage’s second sentence and the third, to appear first as an ideological effect of the “image,” then as a critical effect of the “dialectical image.” And, as sign, vehicle, “motivation” of such “indifferentiation” is the implicit Medusa motif, here appearing in something like an inverted or (Freud) displaced form: the “facies hippocratica” is Benjamin’s image in the Trauerspiel of unhappy consciousness, an image drawn from Hippocrates’s physiognomics (see Hullot-Kentor’s note, Kierkegaard 151-2): a visage like the anguished mask of tragedy, or perhaps better, like the face of Medusa’s victim, struck by the horror of a “petrified primordial landscape.” Here the thing seen is stone, while the face of the viewer, seeing it, is animated to horror, whereas in the Medusa-motif, the vitality is all Medusa’s, upon seeing whom it is the viewer who turns to stone–but the tangle of “antithetical” motifs leaves in place the horror of petrifaction, and thus underscores the extremities of ambivalence in Adorno’s ascription of a “Medusa-gaze” to Benjamin as critic, or indeed to critique itself. Hence the analogously “antithetical” (or “dialectical”) wobble in Adorno’s own usage as regards “dialectics at a standstill,” which sometimes figures as an ideological condition critique and art protest, at other times as a “result” that critique and art are praised for achieving–the latter apparently as critical (or “dialectical”) “mimesis” of the former (see, for example, Beethoven 16; Philosophy of Modern Music 124).

     

    “Dialectics at a standstill,” in both these senses (as ideological condition to be protested, and as critical “effect” to be achieved) is a formula especially apposite to Dialectic of Enlightenment.14 The narrative (or anti-narrative) of Dialectic of Enlightenment enacts the failure of the Enlightenment’s own “grand narrative” to achieve its announced, programmatic (narrative) telos of change and progress; and it indicts not only bourgeois Enlightenment positivism’s refusal of dialectic, but also (and much more daringly) the Soviet world’s official Marxist-Leninist fetishization of dialectic as an orthodoxy, as equally deluded miscarriers or unwitting betrayers of dialectic (conceived as “the engine of history”) itself. To that end the “appearance” (in the aesthetic sense [German Schein]) of non- or anti-“dialectical” pairs like Odysseus/bourgeois, or myth/Enlightenment, presents something like a dialectical image aiming, with critical force, to “bring dialectic and myth to the point of indifferentiation”–or an “allegory” presenting a “configuration [sc. “constellation”] of historical dialectic and mythical nature.” This “appearance” of “indifferentiation” (sc. “identity”) of dialectic and myth enacts what Horkheimer and Adorno regard as Enlightenment’s fatal ideological false consciousness, its sacrifice of qualitative to quantitative (“identity” or “equivalence/exchange”) thinking–and enacts it, in “appearance,” from “inside,” i.e., “immanently,” taking upon itself the full ideological burden of what it protests and would redeem. The case I’m making here could be thought of as a version of Adorno’s “dialectical despite itself,” which underlies his enthusiasm for thinkers avowedly critical of or indifferent to “dialectic”; I mean that Adorno’s seemingly static and essentialized binaries display an affinity with (say) Nietzsche’s tragedy/Socrates and Übermensch/priest, or Freud’s Eros/Thanatos, or the antinomies of instinct and “vicissitude” that in the late work on Moses and elsewhere seem to force on Freud a quasi-Lamarckian view of the heritability of acquired characteristics. Equally exemplary would be the great works of modernist music and literature with all their techniques of seeming “im-mediation” or “de-mediation”: works that attempt to escape outworn habits of mediation, to conjure an atmospherics or nostalgia of immediacy, and achieve thereby a kind of re-mediation (new mediations) that it is no mere word-play to hope might also be remedy.

     

    The loosening of old mediations and the forging of new ones in modernism involved techniques of juxtaposition, of suppressing transitions (preeminently narrative ones), of foregoing explanatory motives for questioning ones–and it is among these modernist devices and motivations that Adorno’s constellation belongs. Michael Cahn, in what remains to my mind the richest and shrewdest essay on these matters, observes that Adorno’s aesthetic theory is not merely a theory of the aesthetic, but a theory that is aesthetic; he clinched the point by adducing the analogy of “critical theory” (42)–which is to suggest as well the senses in which Adorno’s aesthetic is critical, and (the premise of this essay) the extent to which Adorno’s critical practice involves issues usually referred to the aesthetic. It’s in something of that spirit that I have attempted here to explore Adorno’s constellation, not as a philosophic concept, nor even as an element or index of a critical method, but as part of a writing practice that I think Adorno’s readers should be readier than they have been to take as a kind of modernist poetics of critique–a poetics realizing itself as much in performance as in “theory.” In the critical practice of constellation, Adorno enacts a critique of the extant critical (dialectical, historicizing) practices of his own day, a critique analogous to that performed in modernist artistic practices. Adorno’s practice is as radical a departure from that of, say, Georg Lukács as Beckett (one of Adorno’s chief exemplars of the modern) is from Lukács’s standard-bearer for realism, Balzac. Indeed, Adorno’s defense of Beckett against Lukács may be thought especially suggestive, given Beckett’s gift for narratives whose point is the failure of anything to happen, whose meaning (as Adorno observes in “Trying to Understand Endgame“) is meaninglessness itself–a meaninglessness, Adorno would say, whose falsity Beckett enables us to reappropriate for truth. Some such result, event, or effect is the gesture of the dialectic of Dialectic of Enlightenment.

     

    Notes

     

    1. In perhaps the most suggestive of these, Adorno links it with Max Weber’s “ideal type,” a characterization stressing its heuristic potential (Negative Dialectics 164-66).

     

    2. There are many treatments more systematic than mine. Still indispensable on this, as on so much else about Adorno, is Buck-Morss; on constellation see especially 90-110. (Buck-Morss notes Adorno’s reservations about “constellation” as a term connoting astrology [254n54]). More recently, see Jameson, Late Marxism 54-60; Jameson also assimilates constellation to “model” (68); and if I opened by evoking Eisenstein and Pound, Jameson observes that the affinity of constellation with Althusser’s conjuncture makes Adorno “Althusserian avant la lettre” (244). Nicholson treats constellation under the broader rubric of “configurational form” (passim, but especially 103-36)–a useful reminder that the thematics of constellation can often attach to such cognate terms as “configuration,” “complex,” even “ensemble” or “juxtaposition.” Also useful on Adorno’s aesthetics, though without specific reference to constellation, are Wolin 62-79; Bernstein 188-224, esp. 206; and Paddison 21-64, especially 35-7.

     

    3. A full discussion of these issues would need to consider Adorno’s 1932 essay, “The Idea of Natural History”–and also, perhaps, his decision against republishing it.

     

    4. On this last, see Freud’s 1914 paper on technique, “Recollection, Repetition, and Working Through.”

     

    5. The motif of the fragment here touches on Adorno’s chronic theme of the false coherence of “system” and the necessity, in critique, of allowing the unintegrated, unintegratable loose ends of “the damaged life” to stand as reproach or “bad conscience” to all mystifying reconciliations.

     

    6. For example, from Kierkegaard in Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic passim, from Kant in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (125), and from Freud and Weber in Introduction to Sociology (113, 123).

     

    7. He is citing Freud’s Abhub der Erscheinungswelt (Adorno Reader 32).

     

    8. Adorno most movingly sounds this motif in his 1930 essay on “Mahler Today”: see especially Essays on Music 605, where Mahler’s project sounds strikingly like Benjamin’s; and cf. 608, where Adorno contrasts Mahler and Schoenberg in ways that suggest an analogy with his sense of the differences between Benjamin and himself.

     

    9. Here is another contention with Lukács–see the latter’s “Narrate or Describe?”–that resumes most of what is at stake in their conflicting positions on realism versus modernism.

     

    10. Both “Parataxis” and Havelock’s Preface to Plato date from 1963, so Havelock’s argument cannot have affected Adorno’s essay, but I find no evidence that Adorno came across it later, either: too bad–I am sure it would have interested him keenly.

     

    11. Compare the formula of “the logic of disintegration” by which Adorno at about this same time characterized what he acknowledged as a career-long concern (Negative 144-6; see also Buck-Morss 233n3).

     

    12. For his most extended workout on these problems, see “Vers Une Musique Informelle,” in Quasi Una Fantasia, especially 294-301.

     

    13. See the closing pages of In Search of Wagner (1952) or, an even more striking example, the 1963 essay on “Wagner’s Relevance for Today” (Essays on Music 584-602).

     

    14. Let me own here that Adorno reprehends all rhetoric of “effect”; for him it connotes composition with an eye on the audience rather than on “the matter in hand.” I apologize for my resort to it here, but the shifts by which I might have attempted to do without it were more trouble than they were worth–and I am, after all, discussing the book from the position of a reader. I can hope that Adorno would at least countenance my usage as, again, attestation of the ideological predicaments of critique itself as composition, i.e., as “a kind of writing”–and also, of course, as a kind of reading.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Adorno, Theodor W. The Adorno Reader. Ed. Brian O’Connor. Oxford: Blackwell, 2000.
    • —. Against Epistemology: A Metacritique. Trans. Willis Domingo. Oxford: Blackwell, 1982.
    • —. Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music. Ed. Rolf Tiedemann. Trans. Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998.
    • —. Critical Models. Trans. Henry W. Pickford. New York: Columbia UP, 1998.
    • —. Essays on Music. Ed. Richard Leppert. Berkeley: U of California P, 2002.
    • —. “The Idea of Natural History.” Trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor. Telos 60 (1984): 97-124.
    • —. In Search of Wagner. Trans. Rodney Livingstone. London: NLB, 1981.
    • —. Introduction to Sociology. Trans. Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2000.
    • —. Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic. Trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1989.
    • —. Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’. Trans. Rodney Livingstone. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2001.
    • —. Negative Dialectics. Trans. E. B. Ashton. New York: Continuum, 1973.
    • —. Notes on Literature. 2 vols. Trans. Shierry Weber Nicholson. New York: Columbia UP, 1992.
    • —. Philosophy of Modern Music. Trans. Anne G. Mitchell and Wesley V. Blomster. New York: Continuum, 1973.
    • —. Prisms. Trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber. Cambridge, MA: MIT P, 1981.
    • —. Quasi Una Fantasia. Trans. Rodney Livingstone. New York: Verso, 1998.
    • Adorno, Theodor, and Walter Benjamin. The Complete Correspondence, 1928-1940. Ed. Henri Lonitz. Trans. Nicholas Walker. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1999.
    • Barthes, Roland. S/Z. Trans. Richard Miller. Farrar: New York, 1974.
    • Benjamin, Walter. The Arcades Project. Ed. Rolf Tiedemann. Trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin. Cambridge: Belknap/Harvard UP, 1999.
    • —. Charles Baudelaire: The Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism. Trans. Harry Zohn. New York: Verso, 1983.
    • —. The Origin of German Tragic Drama. Trans. John Osborne. New York: Verso, 1998.
    • Bernstein, J. M. The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to Derrida and Adorno. Oxford: Polity, 1992.
    • Buck-Morss, Susan. The Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt Institute. Sussex: Harvester, 1977.
    • Cahn, Michael. “Subversive Mimesis: Theodor W. Adorno and the Modern Impasse of Critique.” Mimesis in Contemporary Theory: Volume I: The Literary and Philosophical Debate. Ed. Spariosu, Mihai. Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1984. 27-64.
    • Hegel, G. W. F. Phenomenology of Spirit. Trans. A. V. Miller. New York: Oxford UP, 1977.
    • Horkheimer, Max, and Theodor W. Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment. Trans. John Cumming. New York: Continuum, 1988.
    • Jameson, Fredric. Late Marxism: Adorno, or, The Persistence of the Dialectic. New York: Verso, 1990.
    • —. Marxism and Form. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1971.
    • Kahn, Arthur D. Writer and Critic And Other Essays. New York: Grosset, 1971. Lukács, Georg, “Healthy or Sick Art?” Kahn 103-09.
    • —. “The Ideology of Modernism.” Marxism and Human Liberation. Ed. E. San Juan, Jr. New York: Delta, 1973. 277-307.
    • —. “Narrate or Describe?” Kahn 110-48.
    • —–. “Realism in the Balance.” Aesthetics and Politics. Ed. Ronald Taylor. New York: Verso, 1980. 28-59.
    • Nicholson, Shierry Weber. Exact Imagination, Late Work: On Adorno’s Aesthetics. Cambridge, MA: MIT P, 1997.
    • Niethammer, Lutz. Posthistoire. Trans. Patrick Camiller. New York: Verso, 1992.
    • Noerr, Gunzelin Schmid. “Editorial Afterword.” Dialectic of Enlightenment. Horkheimer, Max, and Theodor W. Adorno. Trans. Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2002. 217-47.
    • Paddison, Max. Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993.
    • Wiggershaus, Rolf. The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories and Political Significance. Trans Michael Robertson. Cambridge, MA: MIT P, 1994.
    • Wolin, Richard. The Terms of Cultural Criticism: The Frankfurt School, Existentialism, Poststructuralism. New York: Columbia UP, 1992.

     

  • Postmodern Historiography: Politics and the Parallactic Method in Thomas Pynchon’s Mason & Dixon

    Christy L. Burns

    Department of English
    College of William and Mary
    clburn@wm.edu

     

    In 1997, Thomas Pynchon published Mason & Dixon, his much anticipated history of America written from the perspectives of the astronomer and surveyor sent over from England to draw the famous boundary line. Their work was necessitated by a long-standing dispute between overlapping land grants of the Penns, of Pennsylvania, and the Baltimores, of Maryland1; the job took nearly five years, from 1763 to 1768, and during that time the journals and letters of these two men record alternating shock and fascination with the functioning of society in the New World (see Mason). Pynchon draws on this historical material to create a fantastic, comedic, and at times seriously political novel. Pynchon’s work has always inclined toward the voices of cultural dissent–the counterculture of the 1960s being one of his more obvious inspirations, and the rebellion of the Luddites against mechanization a subtle revelation.2 In Vineland, however, Pynchon’s critique of governmental authority takes on a more central role, and in Mason & Dixon–which was some twenty-four years in the making–he develops an important new method for postmodern political insight.3 Pynchon introduces a parallactic method that allows him a full and yet contentiously dialectical representation of “America” as it was in the mid- to late eighteenth century and as it is now, by various implications. In his use of parallax, Pynchon interweaves a critical representation of imperialism’s oppressive practices alongside a history of science and exploration. While other writers, like James Joyce, have invoked parallax as a perspectival method in order to challenge univocal narrative form, Pynchon works the concept more radically into his fictional treatment of historiography.4 Avoiding any semblance of an apolitical sketch of the past–or simple didactic critique–he uses the same method that Mason and Dixon employed to chart the transits of Venus and to draw their boundary line, applying parallax to a series of triangulated views, starting with Mason’s and Dixon’s attempts to assess the New World and eventually delivering a temporal form of parallax, a synchronization of the past with the present.

     

    In her review of positions on postmodernism’s politics, Susan Rubin Suleiman identifies three general clusters among intellectuals and writers: those who pursue a “postmodernism of resistance” through experimental work that allows previously silenced groups to speak in contra-normative modes of representation; those who argue that postmodernism lacks a firmness of values and principles and so fails to have any political effect (that is, it disavows universals); and finally those whom Suleiman identifies as “cultural pessimists,” who believe neither in the efficacy of decentered experimentation nor in the claims of universals (the project of modernity, and so on), leaving to the postmodernist only the role of critic and never that of future visionary.5 Writers like Louise Erdrich and Ishmael Reed would qualify for the first category, Jürgen Habermas for the second, and Jean Baudrillard for the last. Pynchon’s work has straddled groups one and three; while his novels have implicitly supported a politics of resistance–and have employed experimental and decentering forms of representation–they have recently begun to engage not only in critique (the “pessimist” block) but also in future re-visioning.6 Vineland moved more directly into political critique, with its look back at the government’s means of breaking down the 1960s counterculture. But in Mason & Dixon Pynchon creates a parallactic intersection of perspectives and time frames, which allows him to engage in critique while also pointing toward a different possible future in which imperialist elements of American history are not comfortably edited out but are critically worked back in to national awareness.

     

    I am suggesting that in Mason & Dixon Pynchon’s temporal or historical coordinates are the mappable difference, measurable via his synchronization of the 1760s charted alongside the 1990s. His readers thus will interpret history as a dialogue between the differences and the uncanny similarities of that time’s “angle” and their own. Pynchon initially establishes this method in his politicized readings of the Cape, where Mason and Dixon chart the first Venus transit, and he then follows the two as they return to England and are shipped off on another venture, to draw their famous line in America. Employing a homology between spatial and temporal assessments, parallax and synchronism, Pynchon recasts Mason and Dixon as implied historians, developing through the novel’s language an oddly contemporary perspective from within the eighteenth-century context. The novel is, for example, marked by an uncanny tone, which is an eccentric combination of both eighteenth- and late-twentieth-century colloquialisms. In one of the initial reviews of Pynchon’s novel, Louis Menand praises Pynchon for drawing each of his characters, even the least, with “the same deft touch [. . .] recognizable types in eighteenth-century dress. They come onto the page with an attitude, and Pynchon’s success in getting them to sound contemporary and colonial at the same time is quite remarkable” (24). At times Pynchon seems bent upon anachronism, injecting contemporaneity into this portrait of the past. These differences are not so radical, however, as many of Pynchon’s readers might think. Take for example one of the more striking transpositions of contemporary life into Enlightenment culture: when Dixon, hearing a rumor of “a Coffee-House frequented by those with an interest in the Magnetic,” locates his destination, he passes into what is clearly an eighteenth-century tobacco den, and is asked “what’ll it be?” He glibly responds, “Half and Half please, Mount Kenya Double-A, with Java Highland,–perhaps a slug o’boil’d Milk as well[…]?” (298). However postmodern and Starbuck-esque this scene might be, coffee houses are not an exclusive artifact of the twentieth century. They proliferated in seventeenth-century Europe, and when in the next century Boston Tea Party activists insisted that it was an American duty to forego tea, coffee’s popularity peaked (see Pendergrast 15 and passim). Pynchon’s seemingly anachronistic introduction of the contemporary attitude in his narrative of America’s past allows him to deliver a comical portrait of the nation’s early history, joking that in its nascent history Americans were even then as we are now.

     

    Mason’s and Dixon’s potential agency as historical observers has long been overshadowed by their role as mapmakers, aligning them with science and relegating them to a “neutral” position in history. Yet Pynchon casts this neutrality in ironic relation to the position of knowledge assumed by Hegelian Enlightenment thought, drawing out the dialectics more than emphasizing the vantage point outside of history. Central to Pynchon’s consideration of what America is now (postmodernly) and what it was then (at the rise of modernity) are the combined traits of these two British astronomers, who constitute a pious Anglicanism (Mason) alongside Quaker sensibility (Dixon). While Mason paces around, haunted by the ghost of his wife Rebekah, who has been deceased already two years when the book begins, Dixon, a man of senses and desires, indulges merrily in drink and those fleshful desires that Mason’s mourning heart cannot allow. In terms of magic and social interpretation, Dixon is a pragmatist who sees abuse, while Mason is drawn most readily to the remarkable magic around them. Thus the forceful cohesion of future vision and social critique in the novel. Tending toward the metaphysical, Mason speculates upon their friend the talking dog, whom they first meet in London. He becomes agitated when Dixon wishes to shrug off the dog’s oddly magical skills: “mayn’t there be Oracles, for us, in our time?” he asks, “Gate-ways to Futurity? That can’t all have died with the ancient Peoples. Isn’t it worth looking ridiculous, at least to investigate this English Dog, for its obvious bearing upon Metempsychosis if nought else–” (19). Comically, the Learnèd Dog rebuffs Mason, “I may be praeternatural, but I am not supernatural. ‘Tis the Age of Reason, rrrf? There is ever an Explanation at hand” (22). Mason thus struggles to hold onto the magical, even as Enlightenment thought was calling for its extinction. Pynchon, in his inclusion of the Talking Dog and other miraculous forms, also mocks the drier form of reason with the pleasurable addition of high-flown imagination.

     

    On the cusp of reason’s advent and magic’s eclipse, America arises. Mason’s and Dixon’s differences echo a divided perspective that is the constitutive tension within America’s identity; through it the Puritan and Quaker ethics and often contrary drives meet, much as Mason and Dixon eventually meet up with one another as they chart the line from different ends. Their personalities seem at times to be tethered extremes for Pynchon. Even late in their acquaintance, we find still that “the most metaphysickal thing Mason will ever remember Dixon saying is, ‘I owe my Existence to a pair of Shoes,’” as he describes how his parents met (238). Towards the book’s end, “Mason is Gothickally depressive, as Dixon is Westeringly manic” (680). They finish drawing a line through America, but as Pynchon’s narrator surmises, they “could not cross the perilous Boundaries between themselves” (689). They part ways, unable to figure out their friendship. Their odd and interesting relations suggest two opposite forces still present in U.S. culture–Dixon’s pleasurable pragmatism and his Quaker values (equality, acceptance) in tension with Mason’s Puritan posing, his starkness and formality, and his metaphysical inclination. Stargazer and surveyor, they effectively take the measure of America, both cartographically and morally, while they simultaneously reflect its constitutive differences.

     

    If Mason and Dixon stand for the differences that make up America’s complex and at times contradictory consciousness, early in the novel they are alike in their dismay at the abuse that takes place in the colonies. In 1761, when Mason and Dixon travel to Cape Town to measure the first Venus transit, they find the Dutch in the early stages of exploiting African labor and resources, which they then export to the American colonies (Danson 7). Their host at the Cape of Good Hope is Cornellius Vroom, “an Admirer of the legendary Botha brothers, a pair of gin-drinking, pipe-smoking Nimrods of the generation previous whose great Joy and accomplishment lay in the hunting and slaughter of animals much larger than they” (60). The faux-Botha and his fellows see Mason and Dixon in distinct lights, admiring Mason’s potential contribution to the local gene pool and worrying about Dixon’s apparent sympathy for the oppressed in their society. They note “his unconceal’d attraction to the Malays and the Black slaves,–their Food, their Appearance, their Music, and so, it must be obvious, their desires to be deliver’d out of oppression” (61). While Dixon develops a great fondness for “ketjap” and things sensual in the novel (146), he also exhibits the Quakerly desire for equality, a politics that lends him a special sympathy for the slaves and a tendency to speak (and act) out of this sentiment, much as the Quaker community historically did in America (Danson 2, 8, 80-81). Mason, in the meantime, becomes the target of the Vroom family’s attempt to impregnate their slave, Austra, with valuable European sperm. Mason cannot let himself have sex with Austra, however, not because he sees clearly, as Dixon does, the machinations of the Vroom matron, Johanna, as she teases Mason’s desire and then propels him toward her slave. Rather, he finds himself repulsed by the thought of participating in any event that would add to the “Collective Ghost” that arises in his metaphysical eyes from the “Wrongs committed Daily against the Slaves” (68). Mason sees that

     

    Men of Reason will define a Ghost as nothing more otherworldly than a wrong unrighted, which like an uneasy spirit cannot move on [. . .]. But here is a Collective Ghost of more than household Scale,--the Wrongs committed Daily against the Slaves, petty and grave ones alike, going unrecorded, charm'd invisible to history, invisible yet possessing Mass, and Velocity, able not only to rattle Chains but to break them as well. (68)

     

    Mason observes the furious futility of religious and social codes, which still give rise not only to slaves committing suicide “at a frightening Rate,” but also to suicides among whites. If these wrongs remain “charm’d invisible to history,” he suspects that the future will bear the burden nonetheless.

     

    In America, Mason and Dixon join in their shock at the treatment of American Indians, but diverge in their means of assessment. Mason, for example, is compelled by reports of a massacre of Indians in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, and so visits the site. “‘What brought me here,’ Mason wrote in the Field-Record, ‘was my curiosity to see the place where was perpetrated last Winter the Horrid and inhuman murder of 26 Indians, Men, Women and Children, leaving none alive to tell’” (341). Dixon, it is gathered, tags along to keep Mason from venturing into such wilds alone, and they pick up a curious guide, who charms Mason but arouses suspicion in Dixon. As he talks on, “Mason soon enough on about how quaint, how American, Dixon rather suspecting him of being in the pay of the Paxton Boys, to keep an eye upon two Hirelings of their Landlord and Enemy, Mr. Penn” (341). Historically, Mason and Dixon had already witnessed bigotry in Philadelphia, where the worst fanatics pronounced Indians no better than animals and “Canaanites whom God had commanded Joshua to destroy” (Danson 83). While they were in Philadelphia, news arrived of the unprovoked massacre in Lancaster, some sixty miles west, where a band known later as “The Paxton Boys” attacked a small Conestoga village and killed and mangled the bodies of the inhabitants. Outraged, local officials gathered up the few survivors and promised them safe haven in a local jail in Lancaster, until they could be moved farther away. The Paxton Boys, however, broke in and murdered the refugees as well (Danson 88-89). Mason’s journal reflects his outrage, and Pynchon expands upon his fascinated horror and Dixon’s more cynical suspicions of their guide. What both discover, in his novel, is that excessive desire (whether for sex or for blood) motivates much of the nature of the New World.

     

    Desire to chart the sky is not neutral, any more than the mapping of the colonies is without political interest. Indeed a young character, DePugh, at one point identifies the Venus transit as “A Vector of Desire” (96). Pynchon’s own text repeatedly swerves into long tangents about a range of desires; eventually the role of reading itself becomes a way to desire. In one of the novel’s subplots, the Rev’d Cherrycoke’s young niece, Tenebrae, is seduced by (or seduces) her older cousin Ethelmer when she convinces him to read an erotic novel to her (526-27). Ethelmer has earlier been chided by Aunt Euphrenia and Uncle Ives on the absurdity of recognizing more than one version of any tale, as well as on the dangers of reading literature. Ives announces that “I cannot, damme I cannot I say, energetically enough insist upon the danger of reading these storybooks,–in particular those known as ‘Novel.’” (350-51). Pynchon’s own novel proliferates tales of sexual seduction and romantic pining, ranging from Mason’s devoted mourning of Rebekah to the comical insistence of an automated duck to have a female, Frankensteinian equivalent invented for him to love and take as a mate (377). In 1739, Jacques de Vaucanson famously invented a duck complete with an automatic digestive system. Pynchon portrays the famous duck as the emblem of suppressed desires and overweening ambition gone awry. Mason and Dixon initially hear of the duck when they encounter Armand, a first-tier French chef who has had to flee his country because of the unwanted hostile, and then affectionate, attentions of the mechanical duck. According to Pynchon’s reconfiguration of Vaucanson’s experiment, the inventor encounters disaster when he endeavors “to repeat for Sex and Reproduction, the Miracles he’d already achiev’d for Digestion and Excretion” (373). Desire, however, produces life, so that the duck becomes independent, with desires and demands of its own. Flying around with such speed as to make it invisible, the duck haunts Armand, having discovered his infamy of cooking such delectables as Canard au Pamplemousse Flambé, Canard avec Aubergines en Casserole, and Fantaisie des Canettes (374). Developing a strange affection, following the chef over to America, the duck makes various verbal demands, requesting finally and especially that he convince Vaucanson to make him a mate, much like a Frankenstein bride (377). Vaucanson refuses, wanting (according to the duck) total control of his pet’s affections. “His undoing,” the duck surmises, “was in modifying my Design, hoping to produce Venus from a Machine” (668). Here the “Venus” of love is teasingly linked to the “transit of Venus” measure yet again. Pynchon is also citing his earlier wariness of the combination of humans and machines, in V. In that, Pynchon’s first novel, he negotiates between two modes of history, using entropy as a touchstone definition. As Marcel Cornis-Pope observes, Pynchon attempts to find a middle ground between “the drifting disorder of ‘posthistory’ and the deadening burden of history’s grand narratives” (104). What Pynchon develops, between determinism and pragmatism, is a kind of “postmodern gothic paradox” in which the truth of history always finds us too late (102). In Mason & Dixon, the grand narratives seem to swirl around sexual and cartographical possession, in tension with a plurality of cultures and ethical systems. This tension lies within European imperialism’s fierce attempt to control local inhabitants and its excesses of desire that spill over into decadent forms of capitalism.

     

    Such desires circle around Mason and Dixon’s constitutive mapping of America; the country that emerges is marked by their contradictions, as it reaches for high ideals, energetically seeks investment of capital and power, and often seems to revel in its identity as a boundary-less place of unprohibited (secret) behaviors. Sexual desire is exploited and marketed, becoming a common by-product of the colonial drive. In Cape Town, their host, Vroom, attempts to “seduce” Dixon’s class-conscious politics by taking him to a place where a “menu of Erotic Scenarios” is offered, among them the “Black Hole.” In this scenario, a European may be taken and locked in a room, at very close quarters, with a mass of slaves dressed as Europeans. It is a “quarter-size replica of the cell at Fort Williams, Calcutta, in which 146 Europeans were oblig’d to spend the night of 20-21 June 1756” (152). In the replica of this “Night of the ‘Black Hole,’” all are naked and, pressed tightly together, and the sex tourist can find “that combination of Equatorial heat, sweat, and the flesh of strangers in enforc’d intimacy [which] might be Pleasurable […] with all squirming together in a serpent’s Nest of Limbs and Apertures and penises” (152-53). These “sex Entrepeneurs” thus use history as a means to an erotic imaginary, even as one might indignantly point out (just as Cherrycoke reflects) that “an hundred twenty lives were lost!” (153). Re-imagining, in Pynchon, may often be a way of progressive revisioning, but it can alternately be co-opted for exploitive forms of entrepreneurship.

     

    Indeed, capitalism seems here to work off of an extreme oppositional dichotomy: that of moralism (Puritan) bound resistantly to an urge to transgress all morals. The chant of self-denial that, through repression, elicits a yearning for extremes of indulgence emerges repeatedly in Pynchon’s novel.7 And lust is only one aspect of limitless desire in this tale of national “origins.” In this prescient history, capitalism is a compulsive American trait, and episodes of eager consumerism and entrepreneurial manipulations of desires proliferate. Humorously, Pynchon “predicts” America’s collapse into opportunism; as a band enlightens Dixon,

     

    this Age sees a corruption and disabling of the ancient Magick. Projectors, Brokers of Capital, Insurancers, Peddlers upon the global Scale, Enterprisers and Quacks,--these are the last poor fallen and feckless inheritors of a Knowledge they can never use, but in the service of Greed. The coming Rebellion is theirs,--Franklin, and that Lot,--and Heaven help the rest of us, if they prevail. (487-88)

     

    Benjamin Franklin’s writings have arguably shaped early American entrepreneurial consciousness, in its best and worst lights.8 And in this America, lawyers also abound, as Mason is warned by his family, who jokingly tell him that “ev’ryone needs Representation, from time to time. If you go to America, you’ll be hearing all about that, I expect” (202). Pynchon’s poke at litigiousness seems to be an extension of his mockery of many Americans’ commercial opportunism and their monetarily motivated sense of rights. Pynchon’s point may simply be that a particularly intense form of desire lies at the root of American identity itself, with its tensions between pragmatism and metaphysics, its cynical commercialism combined with youthful vision. Moreover, Pynchon constitutes the historical desire (and its narrative effects) not merely as subjectivized or psychologized; he understands it as this parallactic construct, which is measured and split between two roots or objects, defying will and clarification of any singular agency.9 This parallax draws on a series of oppositions, not only between Mason and Dixon, but also between the future’s backward glance (its historical gaze) and the point at which it intersects with a historical moment or event. Each present perspective (of past events and narrated histories) is always in a tense dialogue with some distant or distinct point. In this way, parallax also suggests a particular configuration, wherein historical agency, compelled by the desire to narrate history and formulate identity, must mediate its willful and subjective vantage point with that of some other, radically distant point-of-view in order to produce a true “measure” of the past.

     

    Pynchon’s parallactic method is appropriate to the eighteenth century not only because of Mason and Dixon’s use of it, but also because it was then “the rage”–a famous innovation being put to tremendously ambitious use. The method reached its most significant application in 1761, when scientists all over the world used it to measure Venus’s transit of the Sun. This transit was a major event for astronomers, and despite the Seven Years War in Europe, several scientists from a variety of European countries traveled to locations around the world to help compile data on Venus’s distance from the earth and, more importantly, the solar distance from Earth.10 Once astronomers had the solar distance, they could use it as an astronomical unit that would, according to Allan Chapman, operate as a “measuring rod to work out all the other dimensions of the solar system from proportions derived from Kepler’s Laws” (148). The parallactic method used to measure the Venus transits had been developed by Edmond Halley to observe Mercury’s transit of the sun in 1677. Mercury had moved too quickly to allow a measure, however, so Halley had to turn his attention to Venus’s transits of the sun, which, lasting eight hours, would enable more precise determinations. Although he published his findings through the Royal Society between 1691 and 1716, Halley did not live to measure a Venus transit. His parallactic method was therefore used for the first time by Mason and Dixon and their fellow astronomers in 1761.11

     

    To the Vroom girls, who teasingly inquire about their work at the Cape, Mason and Dixon explain their method:

     

    Parallax. To an Observer up at the North Cape, the Track of the Planet, across the Sun, will appear much to the south of the same Track as observ'd from down here, at the Cape of Good Hope. The further apart the Obs [observations] North and South, that is, the better. It is the Angular Distance between, that we wish to know. One day, someone sitting in a room will succeed in reducing all the Observations, from all 'round the World, to a simple number of Seconds, and tenths of a Second, of Arc, --and that will be the Parallax. (93)

     

    Drawing a triangle with its base on the earth and its apex in the sky, one can determine the distance of a heavenly body from the Earth. The first successful use of parallax was executed by the Greek astronomer Hipparchus, who observed the sun’s eclipse on March 14, 190 B.C. from what we now call Istanbul and also, with help, from Alexandria in northern Egypt. Measuring the angles to the moon from these points, Hipparchus could calculate that the moon’s distance from the Earth was approximately 71 times the Earth’s radius (Trefil 48). In 1761 and 1769, equipped with finer instruments of measurement, astronomers would set up a one-foot-radius quadrant, by which they could determine their local latitude. They also regulated a pendulum clock to establish local time. Precise coordinates enabled them to relate their various transit times to the home coordinates in Europe (Chapman 150).

     

    While the mapping of the sky (and earth) may, in some ways, be yet another imperialist effort, the parallactic method subjectively frames the supposed objectivity of science in Pynchon’s work.12 As Richard Powers, in his invocation of Joycean parallax, suggests, “the act of looking is powerful, if you can see the look. And for that you need some device that gives you parallax” (Birkerts 62). Powers explains it quite simply: if one holds a finger before one’s face, and then closes (and then opens) first the right eye and then the left, the finger appears to move slightly. One can thus “see the look” by virtue of the two different locations, different “points of view.” Pynchon is interested in more than the modernist emphasis on subjective narration and perspectival distortion, however. He examines the difference not merely between two “I”s but between two moments of national (self) perception: 1671 and 1997. Collective culture, at both points, seems to be spurred on by scientific curiosity and an intense capitalistic drive.

     

    If Mason & Dixon initially separates science and capitalism, by the novel’s close the two surveyors begin to suspect their work’s collusion with some hidden political agenda. They fear that they have been so used by the British Royal Society as to perhaps be “slaves” themselves (692). Having gradually become acquainted with the American politics surrounding the line for which they are responsible, they feel merely “We are Fools” for being used by the Society in a matter that may have been more political than either had realized (478). Here science fears being controlled by the government; previously, Pynchon focused more on the individual’s fear of being controlled by science.

     

    As readers of Gravity’s Rainbow will recall, that novel’s hero, Slothrop, is the hapless victim of a scientific conspiracy. Jamf, one of the inventors of Imipolex G, has paid off Slothrop’s impoverished father so that he might be allowed to experiment on the baby son’s tiny member. All this occurs under the umbrella of two commercial interests (a Swiss cartel and IG Farben) that have invested in Imipolex G. Himself unaware and unable to recall such early trauma, Slothrop now suffers the effects of having been conditioned to respond sexually (in the form of an erection) to the smell of the new plastic, which will eventually be used in rocket insulation (249-51). The result is that, during World War II whenever an A4 rocket approaches London, Slothrop as a full-grown man finds himself compelled toward a frantic search for sexual interludes. Sadly, he is the unwitting subject of the bawdy song “The Penis He Thought Was His Own” (216-17). Pynchon elaborates the ways in which postmodern society, through commercialism and science, has severed desire from its more intimate connections, taking away the supposed agency of sexual exchange. We become now merely the means of the drive, drawn on by false advertising and a world that conspiratorially manipulates our epistemologies (as in The Crying of Lot 49) and desires (as in Gravity’s Rainbow). We are, like Vaucanson’s mechanical duck, ever more machine-like in our impulses–yet always propelled by greater animating desire.

     

    If in Gravity’s Rainbow Pynchon suggests that science might be cruelly manipulating–and even inventing–our desires so that they are not our own, in the swirl of science and culture presented in Mason & Dixon, he asks if our very scientific certainties are not politically predetermined. Pynchon prods science’s hesitation to see its own desires and the imbalance its supposed objectivity creates in postmodern culture.13 In Mason & Dixon, he reveals the political compromise even science itself can make, regardless of whether its practitioners believe themselves to be beyond societal and ethical measure.

     

    In reviewing Mason & Dixon, Michael Wood poses one of the crucial questions raised by this novel; he asks, “why we should care about this amiably imagined old world, this motley and circumstantial eighteenth century smuggled into the twentieth?” Or, more broadly still, “what are we doing when we care about the (more or less remote) past?” (Wood 120). Differently put, one might ask: what is the historical impulse, that it should feed the desires of fiction? What is the historical desire, and is it linked to the scientific quest for knowledge? Pynchon’s novel would imply that it is, that the drive for an objective vantage point and insight–whether into the past behind us or the stars beyond–is an ambition far from alien to any of us. And yet those who serve as the conveyers of the drive–Mason and Dixon, for example–may neither be aware nor in control of its manifestation.

     

    Finally, one might ask if there is some impetus for history to fictionalize, even in its root-like resistance to anything beyond the empirical. Or, conversely, should one engage in projects like Pynchon’s, which so broadly fictionalize histories? It may be recognizably postmodern and so of our time to insert fiction into history, as Edmund Morris does in Dutch, his controversial memoir of Ronald Reagan. But that practice, as well as the art of fictionalizing history, still troubles U.S. culture.14 Pynchon has always had an uncanny penchant for disguising history as fiction. In The Crying of Lot 49, he invokes the sixteenth-century postal service operated by the noble house of Thurn and Taxis, and in both V. and Gravity’s Rainbow he portrays the struggle of the Herero, an oppressed group of blacks in a southwest African group, who are still defined today in part by the German culture of their colonizers.15 In Mason & Dixon, Pynchon transposes current awareness over previous erasures to produce an odd sense of both the differences and yet also the complicity between eighteenth-century racism and our own erasures (or de-racing) of the past.

     

    Rather than writing a counternarrative of history, Pynchon creates a form of history that stages an exchange between the past and present, so that the historian’s perspective, as Dominick LaCapra explains, “attempts to work out ‘dialogical’ connections between past and present through which historical understanding becomes linked to ethicopolitical concerns” (9-10). This makes no sense, of course, if one conceives of the past as static fact, rather than as a hybridized discourse composed of varying modes. However, in Jacques Lacan’s configuration of history, it is a form of rememoration that begins in material bits that have been left aside. Once these fragments are shaped by narrative, the nation may fold its history into identity with a sense that it is always what it now is (Lacan, Speech 17). When history is understood as destabilized and fragmentary from the start, Pynchon’s parallactic perspective is less a theft or distortion of some “honest” or “true” past. It is instead a conversation with its erasures, and a process of recovery. For psychoanalysis, the subject and the nation must be taught to grasp that this seemingly necessary history has been written around scars, “turning points,” and traumatic events (Lacan, Speech 22-23).16 Pynchon’s project offers a way of bringing lost fragments of history into a disruptive dialogue that could jolt his American audience out of assertive forgetting and the repeated aggressions that are propelled by the social-psychological work done as a whole culture endeavors to lock out memory of disturbing elements embedded within its national narrative.

     

    Mason & Dixon represents an impulse to write history through the imaginary field, to crosshatch its narrative with a realization of culture’s desire to find its identity in the realm of the imagination. It thus argues, implicitly, for the importance of artistic imagination alongside scientific and historical work. Pynchon rejects the harsh realism and more cynical parodies employed by many contemporary authors, using humor and even magic as modes of transformation.17 Talking dogs, sexually aroused mechanical ducks, and nighttime apparitions and ghosts haunt Mason and Dixon in America; perhaps the country that combines technical invention with capitalistic enterprise might be equally mythologic in Pynchon’s ambivalent history. My suggestion is that this magical aspect of his narrative necessarily–and politically–interferes with the drive to fix and control knowledge and “truth,” which, coming out of the Enlightenment project, has nonetheless produced streaks of “darkness” that Pynchon uncovers and sets in dialogue with the more celebrated aspects of America’s historical guise. Ultimately, Pynchon’s novel produces a duality, between comic acceptance of American commercialism, with all its lovable foibles, and careful scrutiny of its political roots and past. Mason and Dixon may not be revolutionary agents, in terms of toting guns and instigating liberatory wars, but their perspectives raise questions about slavery, genocide, commercialism, and gender oppression. In this manner, the novel both critiques the past (and present) while also recasting history, reinterpreting it in a way that might influence future trajectories. In so doing, Pynchon continues to interrogate pragmatic American optimism about agency (one’s ability to effect change singularly at a historical juncture), while he implicitly invokes the power (and hence “agency”) of a larger cultural imaginary that influences the country’s self-image and the more minute actions of a community and nation.

     

    Notes

     

    1. Edwin Danson’s recent history of the drawing of the line describes the details of this project as well as those of the two Venus transits. Mason and Dixon were brought in after several failed surveys (on which the Penns and Baltimores could not agree) in 1763 and departed in 1768, after four years and ten months in America. See Danson 3-4, 18-26, 77-78, 183, 191.

     

    2. Pynchon’s interest in politics is explicit in his essay “Is It O.K. to Be a Luddite?,” in which he recounts the vehement worker’s rebellion against the advance of machinery in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in England. His paranoia also points alternately to the pervasive powers of capitalist ventures, in The Crying of Lot 49, and to the government’s extensive surveillance (potentially) in Vineland and (through science) in Gravity’s Rainbow. David Cowart discusses Pynchon’s essay on the Luddites and its importance to Mason & Dixon, demonstrating the relevance of this rebellion for Pynchon’s own project of rethinking the influence of science on American culture and politics.

     

    3. According to Michael Dirda, in his review “Measure for Measure,” Pynchon signed contracts for two future books in 1973, the year Gravity’s Rainbow appeared. One book seems to have been Vineland and the second was provisionally titled “The Mason-Dixon Line.”

     

    4. If Pynchon’s use of parallax is unique in its form, his is not the first literary appropriation of the concept. In Ulysses Leopold Bloom thinks of parallax while wandering near the Liffey in “Lestrygonians” (U8.110), recalling a book by Sir Robert Ball that discusses the concept. References to parallax surface briefly in other episodes, but it is more forcefully acted out in Stephen Dedalus’s and Bloom’s relative apprehensions of Shakespeare in the mirror in “Circe,” whereby we measure their different senses of the Bard (and so perhaps ideals) (U15.3820-24). It also appears in “Ithaca,” where the two men famously urinate beneath Molly’s window after silently “contemplating the other in both mirrors of the reciprocal flesh of theirhisnothis fellow faces” (U17.1184). Joyce uses two perspectives–at times a proliferation of them–to undermine monocular views and to register the difference between two (or more) interpretive angles. Pynchon’s use is more pervasive, as I argue here, and more explicitly political. (Ulysses citations refer to episode and line numbers from the Hans Walter Gabler edition.)

     

    5. See Suleiman’s “Epilogue: The Politics of Postmodernism After the Wall; or, What do We do When the ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ Starts?”

     

    6. Two exceptional reconstructions of Pynchon’s political project have appeared to date. Jeffrey S. Baker argues that in Gravity’s Rainbow the author both critiques and holds up the struggle for true democracy. Pynchon exposes the Puritans’ divisive roots in American ideology, where to be a member of the chosen few (the preterite) of Christianity is a dream opposed to our call for radical equality. Turning to John Dewey’s works, Baker argues for their importance to 1960s radicalism and in Pynchon’s own writing. Baker must, however, launch this argument through a reading of Vineland. Prior to that text, I am suggesting, Pynchon’s radicalism was less easily recognized. Jerry Varsava, as well, reads backwards from Vineland, finding a plea for rationalism and consensus politics in The Crying of Lot 49.

     

    7. Lady Lepton’s party (which Mason and Dixon stumble upon in America when lost in the dark one night) has one servant who is startlingly familiar to the two, and Lord Lepton informs Dixon that he “purchas’d her my last time thro’ Quebec, of the Widows of Christ, a Convent quite well known in certain Circles, devoted altogether to the World,–helping its Novices descend, into ever more exact forms of carnal Mortality […] not ordinary Whores, though as Whores they must be quite gifted, but as eager practitioners of all Sins. Lust is but one of their Sacraments. So are Murder and Gluttony” (419).

     

    8. Max Weber uses Franklin as an example of the American capitalist imperative to accumulate wealth. See Weber 48-51 and passim.

     

    9. My understanding of agency here derives primarily from psychoanalysis and a deconstructive understanding of consciousness and action. That is, agency does not arise from an indivisible subject nor from one who (fantasmatically) claims full consciousness and wholly controlling intention. Instead, action arises from an ability to manage the tensions between unconscious pulls and conscious directives, an ability to encounter and embrace the ambivalence of fractured belief. Perhaps the most cogent defense of this notion of subjectivity comes in Jacques Lacan’s essay, “Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis,” and I have more extensively developed it in my book Gestural Politics: Stereotype and Parody in Joyce.

     

    10. See Chapman 149. Mason and Dixon were initially on their way to Sumatra to observe the 1761 transit of Venus. The Seven Years War in Europe was still underway, however, and so their ship, the Seahorse, was set upon by the French. The attack left eleven men dead, and Mason and Dixon turned back to port. They traveled eventually to Cape Town instead and set up their equipment to view Venus’s transit of the sun.

     

    11. Transits occur in pairs every 105 or 122 years. While Venus transits could never be seen without the help of a telescopic apparatus, Johannes Kepler predicted the transit of 1631, working from planetary observation data. Jeremiah Horrocks was the first to observe a Venus transit in 1639, having realized that a second transit would occur eight years after the first, despite Kepler’s prediction otherwise. Even before the parallactic method was developed, he was able to attain enough data on the transit to calculate the precise value for the node of the planet’s orbit, taken from the known position of the Sun’s center. He also calculated an accurate figure for the angular diameter of Venus, which proved to be smaller than previously believed. Most significantly, he extracted a solar parallax figure of 14 arc-seconds, which allowed him to calculate the mean distance of the Earth from the sun more accurately than any to date. Horrocks had informed other scientists, and his friend William Crabtree had also observed the transit. Both died before publishing their work, and the findings were eventually published by Johannet Hevelius in Poland in 1662 (Chapman 148).

     

    12. Graham Huggan points out that a map can function as a tool of persuasion, demonstrating, at its most extreme, the fantasy that the world can be turned into a simple object. He argues that, the “new ‘scientific’ cartography” of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while informed by more precise means of measurement and of attaining accuracy, still operated primarily as a tool of the colonialist imagination (5).

     

    13. Michel Serres presents a fairly powerful analysis of the drive to “win” or conquer and control imbedded within various discourses on science and reason (Baconian and Cartesian, particularly) in “The Algebra of Literature: The Wolf’s Game.”

     

    14. Morris apparently is inspired by Reagan’s own tendency to create fictions. What outraged some readers, however, was Morris’s decision to insert his own narrative persona into the biography as if he were a “real” historical presence in the past. The memoir stirred more than a little controversy. See Morris and Weisman.

     

    15. The New York Times ran an article on the Herero on 31 May 1998, documenting its attachment to German dress and history, despite Germany’s abusive treatment of the Africans in 1904 (see McNeil). As for Thurn and Taxis, they operated both as an imperial and later private postal system throughout Europe. They were only nationalized in the late nineteenth century.

     

    16. This analogy between the subject and nation is Lacan’s, and also seems to operate in some portion in Pynchon. If it is a simplistic and potentially ellisive move, belying the differences between intersubjective and national psychologies, my suggestion here is that it helps Pynchon describe, in his fictional form, a new postmodern mode that addresses politics explicitly.

     

    17. In this, Pynchon is balancing between the parodic or hyperrealist branch of postmodernism and that of magical realism, which appears in postmodern novels by writers like Maxine Hong Kingston, Ishmael Reed, and Gloria Naylor. While these writers may link magical moments to cultural specificity and the possibility of cultural or personal transformations, for Pynchon magic is the mythological prehistory of science. As such, it is the necessary focus of postmodernism, if it is to have some futurity.

    Works Cited

     

    • Baker, Jeffrey S. “A Democratic Pynchon: Counterculture, Counterforce and Participatory Democracy.” Pynchon Notes 32-33: 99-131.
    • Birkerts, Sven. “An Interview with Richard Powers.” Bomb (Summer 1998): 148-51.
    • Burns, Christy L. Gestural Politics: Stereotype and Parody in Joyce. New York: State U of New York P, 2000.
    • Chapman, Allan. “The Transit of Venus.” Endeavor 22.4: 148-51.
    • Cornis-Pope, Marcel. Narrative Innovation and Cultural Rewriting in the Cold War and After. New York: Palgrave, 2001.
    • Cowart, David. “The Luddite Vision: Mason & Dixon.American Literature 71:2 (June 1999): 341-63.
    • Danson, Edwin. Drawing the Line: How Mason and Dixon Surveyed the Most Famous Border in America. New York: Wiley, 2001.
    • Dirda, Michael. “Measure for Measure.” Rev. of Mason & Dixon, by Thomas Pynchon. Washington Post 27 Apr. 1997: X01.
    • Huggan, Graham. Territorial Disputes: Maps and Mapping Strategies in Contemporary Canadian and Australian Fiction. Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1994.
    • Joyce, James. Ulysses: The Corrected Text. New York: Vintage, 1986.
    • Lacan, Jacques. “Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis.” Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Norton, 1977. 8-29.
    • —. Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis. Trans. Anthony Wilden. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1968.
    • LaCapra, Dominick. History, Politics, and the Novel. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1987.
    • Mason, A. Hughlett. Journal of Charles Mason and Jeremiah Dixon. Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society. Vol. 76. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1969.
    • McNeil, Donald G. Jr. “Its Past on Its Sleeve.” New York Times 28 May 1998: 3.
    • Menand, Louis. “Entropology.” Rev. of Mason & Dixon, by Thomas Pynchon. New York Review of Books 12 Jun. 1997: 22-25.
    • Morris, Edmund. Dutch: A Memoir of Ronald Reagan. New York: Random, 1999.
    • Pendergrast, Mark. Uncommon Grounds: The History of Coffee and How It Transformed Our World. New York: Basic, 1999.
    • Pynchon, Thomas. The Crying of Lot 49. New York: Harper, 1965.
    • —. Gravity’s Rainbow. New York: Penguin, 1973.
    • —. “Is It O.K. to Be a Luddite?” New York Times Book Review 28 Oct. 1984: 1, 40, 42.
    • —. Mason & Dixon. New York: Holt, 1997.
    • —. V. New York: Harper, 1961.
    • —. Vineland. New York: Penguin, 1990.
    • Serres, Michel. “The Algebra of Literature: The Wolf’s Game.” Textual Strategies. Ed. Josué V. Harari. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1979. 260-76.
    • Suleiman, Susan Rubin. Risking Who One Is: Encounters with Contemporary Art and Literature. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1994.
    • Trefil, James. “Puzzling Out Parallax.” Astronomy 26:9 (September 1998): 46-50.
    • Varsava, Jerry. “Thomas Pynchon and Postmodern Liberalism.” Canadian Review of American Studies 25:3 (1995): 63-100.
    • Weber, Max. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. 1930. Trans. Talcott Parsons. London: Routledge, 1992.
    • Weisman, Steve R. “The Hollow Man.” Rev. of Dutch: A Memoir of Ronald Reagan, by Edmund Morris. New York Times Book Review 10 Oct. 1999: 7-8.
    • Wood, Michael. “Pynchon’s Mason & Dixon.” Rev. of Mason & Dixon, by Thomas Pynchon. Raritan 17:4 (Spring 1998): 120-30.

     

  • Exiles on Main Stream: Valuing the Popularity of Postcolonial Literature

    Chris Bongie

    Department of English
    Queen’s University
    bongiec@qsilver.queensu.ca

     

    Put me in a room with a great writer, I grovel. Put me in with Roseanne, I throw up.

    –Jamaica Kincaid1

     
    When Tina Brown asked Roseanne Barr to serve as guest consultant for a special women’s issue of The New Yorker in 1995, Antiguan-American novelist Jamaica Kincaid made her negative feelings crystal clear. She trashed Brown’s protégé in the most emphatic of terms–as my epigraph demonstrates–and eventually severed her decades-long ties with The New Yorker, accusing Brown of transforming that once venerable journal into “a version of People magazine.” In the following pages, I argue that Kincaid’s hostile reaction represents something more than an individual fit of pique on the part of a notoriously irascible and opinionated writer; rather, her nausea at the thought of being forced to occupy the same physical and textual space as Roseanne has much to tell us about the vexed, and very under-theorized, relations between postcolonial cultural producers (be they creative writers or academic theorists) and what is still often condescendingly referred to as mass culture. Kincaid’s testy comments direct us toward the surprisingly uncharted territory in which postcolonial and cultural studies (don’t yet) meet.

     

    The one-sided confrontation between Kincaid and Roseanne can be read as emblematic of a failed dialogue between postcolonial and cultural studies. In Kincaid, we have a respected author of such postcolonial (or Afro-diasporic) “classics” as Annie John and In a Small Place, someone frequently lionized by critics as a writer who “speaks to and from the position of the other” (Ferguson 238). In Roseanne, we have a U.S. TV icon, someone who has also accumulated her fair share of academic plaudits from critics in disciplines such as women’s and cultural studies who have lauded “her subversive potential as a source of resistance and inspiration for feminist change” (Lee 96) or the way her show “potentially helps restore class visibility to the overwhelmingly middle-class world of television” (Bettie 142). While Roseanne may never have read Kincaid, the postcolonial author obviously feels that she has ingested enough of this media icon to pass definitive judgment on the degraded form of culture she represents: only those with “coarse and vulgar” taste, like Tina Brown, could possibly be drawn to such a nauseating figure as Roseanne.2

     

    Revealingly, in voicing this negative evaluation of Roseanne, Kincaid seems compelled to preface it with the positive counterweight of groveling at the feet of a “great writer.” Kincaid has thus staked out a double position: one of power and contempt as regards the abject white woman she is condemning, but also one of deference to and emulation of an unnamed, unsexed, and unraced “great writer.” How are we to explain the hostility to an icon of mass culture on the postcolonial writer’s part, and the willingness to grovel before the idea of literary greatness? Both this hostility and this willingness must, at first blush, strike us as decidedly unexpected, given the strong tendency in postcolonial circles to question the legitimacy of the hierarchical thinking upon which Kincaid’s intertwined evaluations of Roseanne and great writers depends. As stated, a natural reaction to these comments would be to write them off as sports of Kincaid’s querulous nature that tell us nothing about postcolonial studies, its literatures, and its theories. I will, by contrast, be pursuing an “unnatural” counterargument based on the following intentionally provocative hypothesis: Kincaid’s double position, and the value judgments generating it, are in fact exemplary of the foundational bias of postcolonial literary studies, of its deep-rooted sense of distinction from the “coarse and vulgar” world of mass consumption.

     

    The tension between popular culture and great writing evident in Kincaid’s evaluation of Roseanne by no means exhausts the nuances that can be read into her one-sided attack. The binary opposition Kincaid draws is complicated by the fact that she is herself a writer whose books have gained no small success in the literary marketplace. If Kincaid is not “popular” in the same sense that Roseanne is “popular,” she nonetheless has a proven track record as a bestselling author: she is a writer who not only generates “serious” articles by postcolonial critics but also frothy interviews in such places (ironically enough) as People magazine, and who has been deemed “worthy” of inclusion in a series like Critical Companions to Popular Contemporary Writers, where she takes her place beside the likes of Stephen King, Anne Rice, but also, intriguingly enough, Toni Morrison (see Paravisini-Gebert). Postcolonial and Afro-diasporic Kincaid may well be, but that has not stopped her from finding a place in the literary mainstream: or, to put it another way, she is (or, more exactly, can be read as) a middlebrow writer, one who takes some stylistic and ideological chances in her work but who also writes in such as a way as to be capable of pleasing a relatively broad audience. Kincaid’s distinction between the “great” writer and the “vulgar” mass media star cannot stand alone: it must be understood in conjunction with this second opposition between two different types of popularity, the middlebrow and the lowbrow.

     

    Are these two types of popularity as easily separable from one another as one might wish (at least if one were a postcolonial defender of Kincaid), or is there a troubling complicity between them that needs to be thought through and perhaps even embraced? Might not the dramatic rejection of Roseanne on Kincaid’s part itself be nothing more than an anxious attempt–unconscious, calculated, or a mixture of both–to forestall any serious consideration of her own “popular” success, to fence off her own identity as a cultural producer from Roseanne’s, vaccinating herself against the latter by aggrandizing a sense of distinction that might ultimately be attributed to little more than the narcissism of small differences? Might not her middlebrow popularity be part of the very same media “buzz” as the lowbrow version she so disdainfully rejects?

     

    This possible complicity, or (dis)connection, between two forms of popularity–what René Girard would refer to as their “double mediation”3–generates a second set of questions that needs to be addressed in tandem with those surrounding our initial opposition between “vulgar” popularity and “great” writing. How and where do the lowbrow and middlebrow modes of popularity intersect? Does it make any sense to speak of a writer like Kincaid as exemplifying the “middlebrow postcolonial,” given the apparent tension between the assimilative connotations of the first term and the resistant ones of the second? If there is such a thing as the middlebrow postcolonial, how is its popularity (or its potential for popularity) processed by postcolonial literary studies? What about the “lowbrow postcolonial”: is there such a thing (or such a process of reading), and if so, what is its relation not only to its middlebrow double but to the mass popularity of media icons like Roseanne or Jackie Collins?

     

    Furthermore, to raise one last set of questions that has to be factored into the mix, what is the relation, or lack thereof, between all these forms of popularity (mass, lowbrow, middlebrow–or what I will be referring to collectively as the “inauthentically popular”) and that long-cherished ideological construct, a truly popular culture created and consumed by what Frantz Fanon was so fond of referring to as “the people”? Ideally neither degraded masses nor lowbrow or middlebrow consumers, the people–legitimate custodians of a traditional past or inspiriting lifeblood of a revolutionary future–might presumably be thought to have better and more “authentic” things to do with their time than watch Roseanne or read Annie John. In the failed dialogue between Roseanne and Kincaid, where are the people situated, presuming they even exist?

     

    The three sets of questions I have just asked lay out a clear set of overlapping oppositions–the postcolonial versus the popular; the middlebrow versus the lowbrow, with specific reference to the postcolonial; and the inauthentically popular versus the “authentically popular”–that I will be addressing in the following very preliminary account of the foundational bias of postcolonial literary studies and its anxious and under-theorized relation to the empirical question of popularity. In the next section, I expand on the first of these questions, attempting to smoke out the bias toward great, or at least not bad, writing in postcolonial studies by briefly examining the case of a neglected Martiniquan novelist, Tony Delsham; in the section after that, I discuss the far-from-neglected Guadeloupean novelist Maryse Condé by way of expanding upon the distinction between the low-, the middle-, and the highbrow, and its unacknowledged importance to academic readers of postcolonial texts. After these two case studies, I conclude–aided by Graham Huggan’s groundbreaking The Postcolonial Exotic: Marketing the Margins (2001)–with some general considerations regarding what, if anything, cultural studies, with its concerted focus on the popular (in all its many forms), can contribute to our understanding of postcolonial studies, and indeed, to postcolonialism’s self-understanding. Will it help us imagine a room in which Roseanne and Jamaica Kincaid can meet with a new-found respect for one another, or at least without throwing up? And, to anticipate my unlikely point of arrival in this article, can we (re)imagine a place for the “great writer” in that very same room–if not at its center, then at least still within hearing of the less strained, more productive dialogue between cultural and postcolonial studies that I advocate in the following pages?

     

    I. Pop Goes the Postcolonial: On (Not) Reading Tony Delsham

     

    The idea for this article came to me in the summer of 1999, while doing research in Martinique. I found myself passing an idle hour in Fort-de-France’s most upscale bookstore, perusing the impressive amount of Caribbean literature and history for sale there. Two items on the bookshelves especially caught my attention. The first of these was a prominent display devoted to Dérives–a recently published novel by Tony Delsham, editor of the Martiniquan weekly Antilla. I have provided a brief account of Delsham’s novel elsewhere (“Street” 246-51), but the issue that I want to raise here revolves around Delsham himself, and his place–or lack thereof–in accounts of French Caribbean literature in particular, and francophone literature in general (to say nothing of that even broader and more nebulous discipline, postcolonial literary studies4). For many years now, Delsham has been among the most popular and visible writers in the French Antilles, if one judges popularity by the criterion of number of books sold.5 Given the fact of Delsham’s popularity, the question I found myself asking (and it is a question Delsham himself has repeatedly posed) is why no one pays any attention to him in francophone–much less postcolonial–studies, when so much critical ink has been spilled during the past decade over other prominent writers from the area like Edouard Glissant, Patrick Chamoiseau, and Maryse Condé.6 Surely, I asked myself, the popularity of Delsham’s many novels, which consistently deal with local issues close to the heart of his Antillean readers, tells us as much or more about the culture as do those other, sometimes more experimental but often very accessible narratives that have acquired an ever-growing reputation in France and North America? Surely a novel like Dérives is in many respects as, or even more, relevant an example of Martiniquan literature than, say, Chamoiseau’s Prix Goncourt-winning Texaco? I then found myself asking a question that is the obligatory rhetorical starting point of so much postcolonial literary criticism: why is a particular author ignored by the critical orthodoxy, and what nefarious circumstances are promoting the marginalization of this author and others like him?

     

    One obvious factor in Delsham’s critical neglect doubtless involves the way his novels are marketed. A signal difference between Delsham and most of the luminous bodies in the firmament of Antillean literature is that the likes of Glissant and Condé benefit from their association with well-established Parisian publishing houses, whereas Delsham is self-published and the distribution of his books is largely a local affair, limited to the French Caribbean and certain parts of Paris; so, at a purely logistical level, it is hardly surprising he has been ignored.7 (To take this difference as a critical point of departure is, to be sure, to beg the question of how and why those other authors gained access to Parisian firms in the first place, and I will return to this question in my later discussion of the “certain quality” of Condé’s work.) The “indigenous” nature of the production and circulation of Delsham’s novels certainly helps explain his neglect, although one can easily imagine it becoming a major source of interest for some critics, who might want to take up Delsham’s cause and argue that this immersion in the local makes him more “authentic” than writers who have acquired an international audience. Complaints about the latter, cosmopolitan writers have, indeed, been repeatedly voiced in certain quarters in Martinique: the nationalist Guy Cabort-Masson has, for instance, lambasted Patrick Chamoiseau for complying with exoticizing Western notions about the Caribbean and “not writing for Martiniquans” (199). Such writers could well be regarded as appealing to “the ersatz nostalgia on which mass merchandising increasingly draws” (Appadurai 78). With his self-publishing and self-marketing approach, Delsham might conceivably be viewed as less subject to the collusions and compromises of this exoticizing nostalgia, and thus altogether more popular in the most positive (“authentic”) sense of the word since he has established a privileged relationship with a local readership–a readership that would not (at least according to this line of argument) be confused with the “assimilating” masses but that, rather, would be construed as forming part of the “oppositional” people, anchored in their “native” context and at a purifying distance from the global literary market and its ersatz commodities. For such critics, Delsham’s popularity in the French Caribbean might well be considered a vital source of distinction. The “writer as local hero” is, like the “writer as tragic exile,” the sort of script that postcolonial studies can live with–indeed, the sort of script it demands–and were a sociological consideration of production and consumption the only factor in deciding who is and is not worthy of being consecrated at the hands of postcolonial critics, it seems likely that Delsham would by now have been salvaged by a string of academics indignant at his marginalization.

     

    Sociological considerations of this sort are not, however, the only factor in such decisions (indeed, it is part of my argument that such considerations are nowhere near as important as they should be to postcolonial studies). There are certainly any number of other reasons that might help explain why Delsham, despite his wide popularity in the French Caribbean, has not attracted any critical attention. To cite just one of these reasons, Delsham might well be viewed as falling short of postcolonialism’s decided “preference for perfect political credentials” (Donnell 102): notwithstanding his repeated stress on the need for class justice and his championing of a trendy cause like Créolité, the conciliatory position he consistently preaches in his novels and in his countless editorials for Antilla–where he styles himself an “advocate of love,” one stridently opposed to angry nationalists who argue their case at “the tribunal of history, which is the refuge of the castrated” (1 January 1999, 6)–does not offer the incendiary agenda that would be immediately attractive to francophone and postcolonial critics programmed to sing the praises of a “denunciatory tradition.”8

     

    Delsham’s conciliatory “advocacy of love” may not be likely to win him a lot of fans amongst the advocates of denunciation, although one can certainly make the argument that his emphasis on cross-cultural understanding and “normalization” fits in with a recent turn toward “radically nonracial humanism” in postcolonial studies (Gilroy 15). However problematic his ideological positioning, though, it certainly cannot account in and of itself for the silence regarding his work: after all, a lot of ink has been spilled over V. S. Naipaul by critics who find his opinions on matters postcolonial utterly reprehensible. There must, in short, be a far stronger reason for Delsham’s exile from the mainstream of francophone criticism–a reason, I would argue, that extends well beyond the relatively narrow confines of French Caribbean literary studies and provides a conceptual base for the geographically wide-ranging but amorphous disciplines of francophone and, a fortiori, postcolonial studies. That reason, to put it bluntly, is this: Tony Delsham might be an energetic journalist, but he is a decidedly bad novelist.

     

    Although it is a critical commonplace in postcolonial studies to lament the way in which marginalized writers have been misidentified as “bad” by uncomprehending elitist (neo-)colonialcritics, one would, to put it mildly, have to exercise a great amount of ingenuity in order to salvage Delsham’s novels on the basis of their literary value and exercise upon them in good faith any of the multitude of interpretive strategies through which a book’s “literariness” (or even its angry or sly resistance to Eurocentric ideas of “literariness”) can supposedly be confirmed. Delsham’s novels are so manifestly sub-literary that it is hardly surprising critics have ignored the rapidly proliferating mass of historical novels and romans à thèse he has produced and that they have, instead, devoted their critical energies to self-evidently “good” writers like Glissant, Chamoiseau, and Condé.9

     

    Or, I should immediately add, these exclusionary practices are hardly surprising in a critical environment where any kind of premium is placed on literary value and where, indeed, the very fact of popularity (be it middlebrow or lowbrow) might be viewed with an Adorno-like suspicion. Hardly surprising, that is to say, if one has not abandoned oneself to the ostensibly “democratizing” insight–so prevalent in a lot of self-satisfied canon-bashing over the past several decades–that the very idea of literary value is nothing more than a cultural construction. Hardly surprising, if one has not fully absorbed what John Frow has isolated as “one of the fundamental themes of work in cultural studies”: namely, that to place the critical spotlight on popular culture is an excellent way of demonstrating the non-existence of its supposed antithesis, high culture, and of thereby showing us “that no object, no text, no cultural practice has an intrinsic or necessary meaning or value or function; and that meaning, value, and function are always the effect of specific social relations and mechanisms of signification” (61). Hardly surprising, in other words, if one remains committed to seemingly outmoded assumptions about the legitimacy of hierarchical distinctions between the good and the bad, the innovative and the conventional, masterworks and trash.

     

    What is surprising, though, is that most of what we know as postcolonial studies actually takes place precisely in this value-affirming critical context–a context that some would call dated, Eurocentric, and (thus) morally reprehensible, but that I will simply refer to in more neutral terms as modernist. Postcolonial studies as one of the last redoubts of modernism? Postcolonial studies as fundamentally opposed to, rather than in accord with, a cultural studies ever intent on voiding texts of “intrinsic or necessary meaning or value or function” by privileging the “coarse and vulgar” likes of Roseanne or her pop-literary equivalents? Postcolonial critics as latter-day Adornos, turning their noses up at mass culture and groveling, à la Kincaid, in the presence of the highly serious and the complex, the unpredigested and non-standardized? This scenario might seem to fly in the face of “common sense” (which may well be another way of saying that it radically contests the dominant–at least in academic circles–“postcolonial ideology”10), but it seems to provide the only plausible explanation for how a popular writer like Delsham could be so dramatically shunted to the margins of an ostensibly margin-hugging discipline like postcolonial studies.

     

    Two recent critiques of postcolonial theory can help us lay the foundation for an understanding of how this unlikely scenario might have come about: Emily Apter has disapprovingly commented on “postcolonial theory’s resistance to injecting itself with contemporaneity” (213), while Robert Young has pointed to the ways in which, largely due to Said’s textualist misappropriation in Orientalism of Foucault’s praxis-oriented idea of discourse, colonial discourse analysis has degenerated “into just a form of literary criticism that focuses on a certain category of texts” (394). Taken together, Apter’s critique of postcolonialism’s (and specifically Bhabha’s) insistence on the ways in which “‘time-lagged’ signification” continues to be “written out in postcolonial modernity” and Young’s critique of the bias toward texts (as opposed to everyday practices and material conditions) in colonial discourse analysis point the way toward an explanation for Delsham’s invisibility as an object of critical study. As a prerequisite for gaining institutional status in the 1980s, a geographically free-floating concept such as the “postcolonial”–even more open than its predecessor, Commonwealth studies, to the accusation of being little more than an empty abstraction–required something to unify it. While it might have seemed logical for this unifying force to have been supplied simply by “lived experience” and the geopolitical realities of colonial and postcolonial practice (as Young insists), the primary emphasis in fact came to be placed on the text, a text that could take any material form (postcolonial literature, painting, music, etc.) but that had to be read, and read in a certain “time-lagged” way, a modernist way. Lacking a “secure” grounding in any specific cultural territory,11 postcolonial studies anxiously, and anachronistically, attempted to find a home for its “unhomely” self in (a modernist idea of) the text–an idea inseparable from evaluative criteria that were elsewhere being seriously questioned by the relativizing outlook of both postmodernism and cultural studies.

     

    What does this modernist idea of the text entail? As I see it, when it comes to the identification and positive evaluation of cultural texts, the twin directives of modernism were as follows: aesthetic resistance (promoting stylistic difficulty) and political resistance (promoting social radical change). While the preference might well have been for an ideal fusion of the two (as in Brechtian theatre, for instance), style and politics could, needless to say, be seen as superficially at odds with one another, as the modernist extremes of art for art’s sake and agitprop demonstrate. Notwithstanding this potential for division, the two directives had in common an emphasis on the production, and productivity, of resistance which ensured they would be if not always open allies then at least secret sharers. Not surprisingly, given postcolonial theory’s explicit origins in the anti-colonial movements of the early- to mid-twentieth century, the two main strands of that theory replicate this double directive of modernist thinking: on the one hand (the “high seriousness” hand), we have “master thinkers” like Gayatri Spivak and Homi Bhabha, and on the other (the “resistance” hand), we have “engaged intellectuals” like Aijaz Ahmad and Benita Parry, with certain pioneering critics like Said occupying the vast middle ground between these two extremes.12 A similar broad distinction might be made by way of accounting for many of the seminal figures in postcolonial literature: a Wilson Harris or a J. M. Coetzee on the one hand, an Ngugi wa Thiong’o or a Michelle Cliff on the other, with a foundational figure like Chinua Achebe vacillating somewhere between these two poles.

     

    The question is not so much what separates these two sides, but what holds them together, presuming anything does, and it has been my contention that one of the primary factors enabling their coming together as part of the supposedly emancipatory field of postcolonial studies is an inability to come to terms with “compromised,” inauthentically popular texts, as well as the audiences who take pleasure in consuming them.13 Regardless of one’s gut-level reaction to this admittedly schematic claim regarding the modernist/textualist underpinnings of postcolonial studies, it is obvious that a general account of this sort overlooks a number of essential distinctions in its attempt at conveying a sense of the “whole” picture (to cite only a few: the distinction between postcolonial theory and postcolonial literary studies, between postcolonial literature and other forms of cultural production, between postcolonial cultural production and other material practices, etc.). There are obvious problems with any unified account of postcolonialism–even if the very idea of postcolonial studies necessitates a belief in some such unity. For that reason, at this point in the article, having made a general and pointedly polemical claim about the foundational bias of postcolonial studies, I should clarify that what I say in the following section about the “middlebrow postcolonial” is most specifically addressed to the biases of postcolonial literary studies. However, before turning to my discussion of Maryse Condé as a writer who in many respects exemplifies this under-theorized “problem,” I must add one last nuance to my account of how modernism and its biases continue to structure our reception of postcolonial literature: namely, an hypothesis regarding how these biases have adapted to the relativizing inroads of postmodernism.

     

    If there is something startling about my basic argument in this article, it is in large part because the modernist biases upon which I have insisted have been not only occluded but also attenuated in the reception of postcolonial texts. As modernism segued into postmodernism and its absolute meta-narratives became ever more relativized, modernist boundaries between the “authentic” and the “inauthentic” could not, given the openly hierarchical nature of such distinctions, be simply asserted as of old. If, for instance, the dual directives of modernism legitimized two very different but related types of ideal audience–on the one hand, the estranged intellectual still capable of appreciating highbrow texts in the wasteland of degraded “mass” culture (Adorno listening to atonal music) and, on the other, the “people” capable of resisting the threat of massification and answering the call either of the ancestral past (Senghor’s Africans) or the revolutionary future (Fanon’s Algerians)–it is now virtually impossible to envision such audiences without being accused of elitism, on the one hand, or idealism, on the other. What happened as the modernist meta-narratives gave way was that the boundaries demanded by these narratives shifted down (in the case of the first, elite audience) and across (in the case of the second, popular audience): in the most extreme, hyper-populist instances of this shift, the very idea of any distinction between “brows” gets erased, everything becoming part of the postmodern mix (the downward shift), and the idea of the popular ceases to be riven in two, the mere fact of popularity becoming the central point of critical interrogation and, often, cause for celebration (the crosswards shift).

     

    Up to a point, postcolonial literary studies has gone along with this relativizing tendency: first, by assimilating the middlebrow and the highbrow, while nonetheless continuing to exclude the lowbrow from its field of vision; second, by continuing to celebrate authentic popularity, while tacitly accepting, without interrogating, the inauthentic popularity that is defined by market forces rather than by the resistant desires of the “people.” Postcolonial literary studies ostensibly writes back against the hierarchical distinctions of the “Western” canon and renders audible the silenced voices of marginalized peoples; in fact, in its unstated reliance on a high/middlebrow vision of literature and its reluctance to take inauthentic popularity into serious account, it perpetuates a watered-down version of canonical thinking and only bothers to give a voice to the “people” when they say, do, and consume the “right” thing. In the following discussion of Maryse Condé, I attempt to flesh out this claim with specific reference to the “problem” that middlebrow popularity poses the postcolonial ideology.

     

    II. (Ab)errant Revisionism: Maryse Condé and the Middlebrow Postcolonial

     

    To introduce my account of Condé as a middlebrow popular writer, I must return to that same Fort-de-France bookstore where I first came across Delsham’s Dérives. The display for his novel was not the only item that got me thinking that day about the possible (dis)connections between popular writing and the ostensibly populist but surreptitiously elitist field of postcolonial studies and its unavowedly modernist vision of literature. On one of the shelves reserved for inexpensive paperbacks, I noticed Condé’s La migration des coeurs (1995), a Caribbean reworking of Wuthering Heights. Translated into English by her husband Richard Philcox as Windward Heights in 1998 (with an impressive array of blurbs on the back cover from a “wide” range of sources such as The New York Times Book Review, the Village Voice, Black Issues Book Review, and the Multicultural Review), this novel indulges in one of postcolonial literature’s most time-honored discursive moves: revising a European novel from the colonial era. As I flipped through its pages I thought to myself, with no doubt reprehensible cynicism: “Well, here’s a text that’s guaranteed to generate its fair share of essays by critics intent either on trumpeting the resistant virtues of postcolonial revisionism or on questioning the author’s decision to entangle herself in colonial narratives (a passionate but superficial difference of critical opinion that, as René Girard taught me, hides an underlying identity of outlook).”

     

    As I mused over the article-generating text in my hand, my attention was drawn to a nearby novel that was, like Condé’s, published by Robert Laffont in the Pocket format, and that thus bore–superficially at least–a rather close resemblance to Condé’s. What I was looking at, it turned out, was Marie-Reine de Jaham’s Le sang du volcan (1997), second in a trilogy entitled L’or des îles that chronicles the entirety of Martiniquan history. Although it is a well-known critical assumption that one should not judge a book by its cover,14 I could not help being struck by the fact that, at least up to a point, Condé and de Jaham were being marketed in a surprisingly similar fashion (see Figure 1).

     

    Figure 1
    (Click image for larger version)

     

    On the one hand, Condé: among the most respected francophone Caribbean writers, someone who long ago became a “consecrated” author, in Bourdieu’s sense of the word (75-78, 120-25). And on the other…de Jaham: a writer perhaps best described as the Jackie Collins of French Caribbean historical fiction, a decidedly second-rate but prolific Martiniquan writer of the béké (native white) caste who has lived most of her life in France, and whose first novel, La grande béké (1989), caused a good deal of scandal amongst her caste when it came out and proved popular enough that it was eventually made into a movie for French TV (1997; director, Alain Maline). What could these two writers possibly have in common aside from their French Antillean origins?

     

    “Not much of anything!” would be the obvious response. In terms of identity/politics, the differences seem self-evident: in Condé, we have a “black” woman who, despite her migrant life, has solid “roots” in her “native” land, is on the right side of the political fence when it comes to the issue of Guadeloupe’s independence, and yet uses her novels not as an excuse for making blunt political statements but rather as a forum for posing complex and irresoluble problems15; in de Jaham, we have a “white” woman who has lived most of her life in Paris and whose novels, notwithstanding the scandal they initially caused in béké circles, astoundingly repeat many of the ideological assumptions of nineteenth-century “creolist discourse,”16 redeploying any number of long-established clichés (both positive and negative) about Martinique and the central role of the békés in shaping the island’s history, and offering narrative closure in the form of straightforward appeals (in a novel like Le maître-savane, the sequel to La grande béké) to the healing virtues of political autonomy for the islands, albeit always within the framework of the French nation. Very different writers, in short. Indeed, even the marketing similarities that initially struck me are, if one takes a closer look, only “skin-deep”: for instance, the exoticizing cover images that accompany both texts are supplemented, in de Jaham’s case, by the word “roman,” which–as a perusal of the novel’s back pages shows–marks the fact that it belongs to a series featuring writers such as Collins and Danielle Steel; there is no equivalent list at the back of Condé’s Laffont novels, presumably signaling the distinctive as opposed to generic nature of her romans (which would also appear to legitimize using a smaller print font for her novels than for de Jaham’s). To acknowledge “differences” such as these does not, however, absolve us from thinking through the evident similarities in the paratextual material out of which, alone, our awareness of those differences emerges17; these similarities locate the two texts, and their authors, in an uncomfortable relation made possible by their relative marketability and draw our attention to the under-theorized affinities and antagonisms of lowbrow and middlebrow popularity in a postcolonial context.

     

    Given Condé’s preeminent status as a francophone writer, to think of her and de Jaham as occupying significantly overlapping spheres of production, circulation, and consumption seems almost heretical, and yet why should this appear such a strange coupling to us? One could certainly argue for specific points of intersection between these two prolific novelists–for instance, the way that de Jaham’s career trajectory seems almost parodically to mirror Condé’s, debuting with a scandalous first-person narrative and then moving on to recuperative historical sagas, just as Condé launched her career as a novelist with Hérémakhonon and went on to write the Segu cycle–but such arguments are of much less interest than the plain fact that both women are among the bestselling francophone writers with a Caribbean pedigree, each “worthy” of being marketed in Laffont’s Pocket collection, and each ubiquitous in Antillean bookstores.

     

    After all, Condé is not simply a writer venerated by (primarily) North American francophone and postcolonial critics. She is also, like Kincaid, the author of accessible novels that have frequently (especially in France, and especially in the 1980s) found a broad, and in the case of the multi-volume Segu diptych, an indisputably bestseller audience. A novel like I, Tituba, Black Witch of Salem (1986; trans. 1992), has made a significant impact on everyday readers in the States, finding its way into the substantial and growing market for informative fictional texts about the Afro-diasporic experience. Condé’s novels get reviewed in all the right places in France, and translations of her work are discussed in such places as USA Today and the Washington Post.18 The structural finesse and linguistic experimentation of many of her novels notwithstanding, they are, if not page-turners à la de Jaham, nonetheless, to cite the blurb from the Multicultural Review on the back of Windward Heights, “engaging and well-written book[s] that [are] difficult to put down.” In sum, Condé is in many respects the very model of a middlebrow writer, with all the stylistic restrictions, political ambivalence, and capacity for success in the literary and academic market that this adjective entails. Such is the cultural capital attached to the name of a consecrated writer like Maryse Condé in North America, however, and such are the a priori assumptions about the “value” of francophone and postcolonial literature in general, that no discussion of her as a popular writer, a writer of marketable middlebrow fiction, can take place: the consensus must be that she is producing valuable literary work, and this value must at all costs be abstracted both from the market forces that are so obviously at play in the promotion and dissemination of her novels amongst the greater public and from the elitist dynamics of the creation and promotion of aesthetic distinction at work in the academic culture industry, which has a clear stake in securing and legitimating her identity as “postcolonial subject,” especially now that she has become such a powerful figure in the U.S. academy, the very embodiment of la Francophonie. One could hardly wish for the doyenne of francophone studies to be anything less than a “great writer,” after all!

     

    And yet the (middlebrow) popularity of Condé’s novels (like that of any number of similar crossover writers such as Kincaid, Edwige Danticat, Arundhati Roy, etc.19) permits us to pose the unsettling question that has so often been asked by the practitioners of cultural studies: “What’s so great about great?” One answer to this question leads in a skeptical, relativizing direction that undermines the foundations upon which Condé’s distinction, and that of all writers, rests: “There’s nothing truly great about great, it’s all a conspiracy–or, more neutrally, the arbitrary product of institutional practices, contingent upon ideological imperatives and the like.” As someone who has never been wholly able to understand why my colleagues make such a fuss about Condé, I am sympathetic with this skeptical approach to answering the question. And yet, this question is a double-edged one: it allows not simply for the debunking response to which we have latterly become accustomed, but also for the same old response that people like F. R. Leavis used to haul out when talking about the “great tradition.” And this same old response, which undergirds Kincaid’s groveling comments about the “great writer,” is also–let me now strategically admit at the midway point of this article–of no small relevance to me! As someone who has read a lot of Condé and de Jaham, it seems self-evident to me that the former is a better writer than the latter, which makes it imperative to identify those features of her work that do make it, if not “great,” then at least greater than de Jaham’s. It is this double imperative, of skepticism and affirmation with regard to literary greatness, that I am ultimately arguing for in this article. This imperative becomes particularly visible when examining the interstitial terrain of the middlebrow, for to identify a text as middlebrow is, by virtue of its in-between condition, to acknowledge that its greatness is troubling; any stable conception of its actual worth is troubled by our sense that it is neither unequivocally “great” nor unequivocally the opposite of that, and for this reason we are forced to put into question and to (re)affirm its literary value.

     

    As this article progresses, I will return to this double-edged imperative, but for now more needs to be said about the way Condé’s place in the francophone and postcolonial literary canon has been achieved without any serious consideration of her popularity. Critics have, obviously, not gone so far as to deny the fact of Condé’s popularity; they have simply ignored it. If her husband and translator Richard Philcox is, understandably, not shy about pointing out “the duality of Maryse Condé’s books–the way they attract both the ‘greater public’ and those in universities” (229), critics have consistently proven unwilling to interrogate the double-dealing nature of her work: they will mention the popular reception of her novels only in passing (more frequently, though, they will insinuate a case for the admirable unpopularity of her work by stressing the indifferent or hostile reception of her first effort, Hérémakhonon), and then quickly move on to consider the supposedly more subtle ways in which these novels attract them. And yet it is precisely the entanglement of these two forms of attraction that most needs addressing if the true distinctiveness of Condé’s work, the “duality” of which Philcox speaks, is to be understood amidst the welter of elitist claims for its distinction–claims based on the assumption of its “high serious” and/or “resistant” nature as francophone and, a fortiori, postcolonial text.

     

    To flesh out this general scenario regarding Condé’s critical reception, it is worth pausing here to discuss in detail one random but highly influential example of a critic (mis)understanding Condé’s double identity by imposing modernist criteria of evaluation on her work: Françoise Lionnet’s exemplary 1993 account of La traversée de la mangrove (1989), the novel of Condé’s that–no doubt because of its quasi-Faulknerian array of relaying narrators and its “subversive” incorporation of Creole into a French text–has proven most popular with the critics, generating any number of articles praising its “polyphonic” or “mosaic” poetics, its “nomadic” and “relational” politics, its construction of an “authentically” creole or hybrid identity, and so on.

     

    Lionnet’s reading of this novel identifies it as an example of a “new Antillean humanism,” and stresses the way it embodies in textual form Condé’s “return” to Guadeloupe in the mid-1980s after decades of self-imposed exile in Africa and France. According to Lionnet, this return involved a recovery on Condé’s part of her connection to authentically popular culture: she had, as Lionnet puts it, finally recognized “the value of the Creole language, of the indigenous dances and tales which […] require acceptance ‘on their own terms’” (71-72). After her wanderings abroad, Condé was now, with Traversée, in a position to ask “how a writer might derive sustenance from the sources of popular culture in order eventually to represent this milieu better and touch the readers who belong to it”; her new and more “humble” attitude toward her native land was generated by a “desire to come to a better understanding of the lived experience of culture, to return to the oral traditions of a once disparaged–because poorly understood–popular tradition” (72). In statements like this, we find the sort of appeal to the authentically popular with which postcolonial studies is at ease: a return to such things as “indigenous dances and tales” and “oral traditions” would appear to be just the thing to purify Condé of whatever contamination she might have incurred only a few years before in France as a result of the bestselling popularity of the Segu novels, to say nothing of remedying her regrettable lack of humility when it came to “the readers who belong” to Caribbean popular culture.20

     

    Indeed, Lionnet draws an emphatic line in the sand between those bestsellers and Traversée when she makes the claim–based largely on Condé’s liberal sprinkling of Creole throughout the text–that the latter novel has only one “true” audience, an audience presumably immersed in the “lived experience” of “popular tradition”:

     

    Although published in Paris, like her previous books, Traversée is not written for a French public; for the first time, Condé seems to have a truly Caribbean audience in mind. Creole words and expressions are translated at the bottom of each page, but this was done after the fact, as a favor to the French reader and on the recommendation of Condé’s editor. (73-74)

     

    This astounding statement perfectly exemplifies the anxieties produced among (though seldom articulated by) academic critics at the mainstream success of Segu–especially among those of a hybridizing bent such as Lionnet who are not likely to be attracted to the Roots-y dimensions that critics of another, essentialist stripe might be tempted to valorize in their own (mis)readings of Condé’s bestselling historical romance about Africa. In the most manichean of fashions, Condé’s “true” readership is reduced here to the happy few, and any paratextual gestures toward an other readership–such as providing French translations of “Creole words and expressions” (of the sort commonly found, for instance, at the bottom of the pages of de Jaham’s novels)–is written off as being simply a “favor” to the wrong sort of reader and, moreover, the responsibility not of Condé herself but of a misguided editor evidently not attuned to the virtues of “defamiliarization and estrangement on the level of language” that Lionnet argues, in explicitly modernist terminology, are this novel’s central feature (180). The postcolonial novelist is here attractively (and stereotypically) presented as both a powerful, beneficent figure, one who magnanimously bestows “favors” on an alien public for whom she is not writing, and a distressingly victimized individual, one who is subject to the inane “recommendations” of a foreign editor.

     

    This clear distinction between a relevant and an irrelevant readership is supported in the rest of Lionnet’s account of the novel by a veritable battery of modernist assumptions and rhetorical moves. Her éloge of “oral traditions” is, for instance, doubled by an inflated emphasis on the (admittedly ambiguous) centrality of the writer in this novel.21 Her account of the ways in which Condé is inscribed within (good) traditions–not just “popular tradition” but also “the great tradition of European realism and humanism” as well as “that of nineteenth-century peasant literature” (76)–is supplemented by a repeated emphasis on the utter novelty of Condé’s enterprise, not only in terms of her own trajectory as a writer (the novel points us in an “entirely new narrative direction, the appropriation of a new locus of identity, the implementation of what might almost be called a new poetics” [75-76]) but also in terms of the history of literature itself (“she opens up the literary field to currently unexplored thematic and stylistic possibilities” [84]). Finally, her account of the novel’s undeniable emphasis on fragmentation is argumentatively linked to the idea that the text provides readers with a model for how to live: it demonstrates how Guadeloupeans’ “solutions to the problems of postcolonial life are sufficiently rich and nuanced to serve as a model for others” (77), and how fragmentation serves “as a basis for the construction of cultural models appropriate to the contexts of postcolonial creolization” (79).

     

    Lionnet’s reading of Condé is modernist almost to the point of parody, and so it is not surprising that many of its key elements have been put into question by other critics: Mireille Rosello has, for instance, ably critiqued the “insular” model of a return to the native land that generates Lionnet’s “line in the sand” rhetoric about Condé’s readership (186); Lydie Moudileno has shown how the ambiguously central role of the writer in Condé’s Traversée is actually part of an ironical trajectory in which, by the early 1990s, writers come to have less and less of a role to play, exemplary or otherwise, in her novels (141-71); and Maryse Condé has herself so often claimed that she is not interested in providing rules or models of any sort in her novels that appealing to her as a writer of exemplary “solutions to the problems of postcolonial life” seems wildly beside the point. One can argue against many of the specifics of Lionnet’s analysis (or praise her for being honest enough to situate Condé in what, from a postcolonial perspective, must be the disreputable “great tradition” of European humanism, even if she is at pains to clarify that Condé’s novel is humanism “with a difference”). From our perspective, though, we need only point out the extent to which the exclusionary logic of Lionnet’s account of Traversée, and its convenient distinction between the right and wrong sort of readers (those, as it were, who impose or read the footnotes and those who do not), is generated by the anxiety about the relation between inauthentic popularity and literary value that I have been arguing haunts postcolonial literary studies. A text’s existence in the literary marketplace and its possibly complicitous relation to the desires of the buying public (regardless of where that public is located) are precisely what postcolonial literary critics have an extremely hard time envisaging and what they exile to the unspoken margins of their own self-styled “minoritarian” readings.

     

    It is, to put it in more concrete terms, an easy thing for such critics to read the front cover blurb for Windward Heights (taken from a USA Today review) and feel overcome by a Kincaid-like nausea: “Exotic and eloquent […] Condé takes Emily Brontë’s cold-climate classic on obsessive love and makes it hot and lush.” The only “logical” reaction, from a postcolonial perspective, to such a fawningly effusive claim is to argue that it expresses an impoverished conception of the text, or even an act of deception promoted by insidious marketers and other such cultural mediators who have understood nothing about the work they are editing or reviewing. To speak of “co-optation,” “misappropriation,” “neo-exoticism” when faced with a blurb of this sort is postcolonial common sense, and for me to make the claim that this commonsense evaluation lacks any sense would simply be to replace one form of critical bad faith with another: nausea in the face of the USA Today review’s claims is, to a degree, a legitimate reaction, but there is also a degree of exactness to its “hot and lush” evaluation of Windward Heights, as there is to the Village Voice‘s by no means dismissive claim that the novel offers up a “monsoon of melodrama.”

     

    Now, although my discussion of Condé up to this point might make it seem as if I am simply mounting a cranky attack on her abilities as a writer and using the fact of her relative popularity as part of an argument against the consecrated status she has achieved in francophone and postcolonial circles, what I am actually doing here is teasing out the preconditions for such a status and the exclusionary strategies of reading through which it is constructed. If the drift of my argument seems critical of Condé’s work, that has less to do with my own ambivalence toward her work than with the fact that the only way to tease out the implicit modernist hierarchies at work in postcolonial literary studies is explicitly to adopt such a perspective, openly to entertain the possibility that distinctions between the “great writer” and lesser writers, and between the various levels of “brow,” might actually provide a (doubtful) ground for evaluating texts. Postcolonial literary studies requires “greatness” of its writers, but cannot openly formulate this requirement because that would put into question its non-elitist self-presentation, its insistence that the postcolonial (to quote Lionnet’s totalizing claims about the Antillean subject’s imaginaire) “can be successfully articulated only through nonlinear, egalitarian, and nonhierarchical cultural relations” (79). By contrast, I think we have to begin seriously to question what is great (and perhaps also not so great) about a writer like Condé, what distinguishes her from other writers and allows us to say with relative certainty that she is better than de Jaham or Delsham.

     

    What allows for this relative certainty? What is the “certain quality” that makes Condé more marketable (and teachable) than someone like Delsham, not quite as marketable (and very much more teachable) than de Jaham, and when all is said and done quite possibly more worthy of being taught and marketed than either of these writers? Viewed from a hostile perspective (of the sort that might, say, valorize Delsham for publishing his novels in the Caribbean rather than France), Condé’s marketability and teachability could simply be interpreted as the result of having fallen prey to the most dangerous of compromises, of having sacrificed her indigenous “opacity” to the nefariously cosmopolitan forces of Parisian publishing houses and the U.S. academic marketing circuit. Such a perspective would be a very limited one indeed, reducing not only Condé but virtually the entire roster of mainstream postcolonial writers to the status of literary Quislings. No, this “certain quality” of Condé’s does not (simply) have to do with betrayal and compromise; it has at least as much to do with how “good” her books are as with how “good” they are perceived as being by certain people (notably, publishers and academics). With my deliberately double-edged phrase “a certain quality,” I am referring both to something that is certain in the sense of indisputable (“established as a truth or fact to be absolutely received, depended, or relied upon; not to be doubted, disputed, or called in question; indubitable, sure” [OED]) and to something that is questionable in all sorts of ways (“of positive yet restricted (or of positive even if restricted) quantity, amount, or degree; of some extent at least” [OED]). The indisputable nature of this quality allows us to maintain that Condé is a better writer than de Jaham; its restricted nature renders her subject to an array of relative judgments that will be inflected by a complex set of cultural, ideological (etc.) assumptions. The two degrees of certainty–absolute and relative–cannot be disentangled from one another, which means that any critical discussion of a book’s worth will largely be a matter of expressing and analyzing (differing) perceptions of that worth (be those perceptions generated by individuals or what Frow refers to as “valuing communities”); however, this does not mean that to speak of a text’s real, as opposed to perceived, worth is simply nonsensical (as the relativizing insights of some extremist forms of cultural studies might suggest).

     

    I will return in the final paragraphs of this article to the need for retrieving a necessarily contingent sense of a text’s real literary worth, but what needs to be pointed out here is simply that postcolonial literary studies has been reluctant to acknowledge its own investment in the “certain quality” it demands of its authors: lumping the highest of the highbrow in with the most middling of the middlebrow in a common ground that only seems all-inclusively horizontal rather than exclusively vertical until one starts thinking about popular texts such as Delsham and de Jaham’s that are excluded from its field of vision, it fails to address the (need for) distinctions upon which it is founded. Pointing out this commitment to a “certain quality” forces us to think about the (dis)connections between popularity and the resistant value ascribed to particular texts by postcolonial critics. To what extent are they compatible and where do popularity and (a modernist conception of) value part ways? What is at stake in tacitly privileging the latter over the former when they do part ways? And what would happen if we were to reverse this bias, and start taking the former as, or even more, seriously than the latter?

     

    A crossover writer like Condé is all the more appropriate for thinking through questions about the (dis)connections between the popular and the postcolonial because she has herself, in both her critical pronouncements and novelistic practice, often made a (necessarily contradictory) case for both inauthentic popularity and literary value. On the one hand, unlike so many of her critical advocates, she has willingly acknowledged the ways in which her own work incorporates elements of the inauthentically popular,22 and somewhat less willingly interrogated her own status as a bestselling author.23 On the other, she has time and again proved willing to deploy an evaluative language that openly distinguishes between “good” and “bad” writers in an old-fashioned way that can only be an embarrassment in the ostensibly plural world of “nonlinear, egalitarian, and nonhierarchical cultural relations” for which, a critic like Lionnet would argue, she is laying the foundations in her novels: nowhere, for instance, is a Kincaid-like willingness to distinguish between the good and the not-so-good more evident than when she unfavorably compares a popular (middlebrow) writer like Isabel Allende to Gabriel García Márquez: “I cannot say that I consider Isabel Allende a major writer. It seems to me that as a writer, she is less comprehensive, less accomplished than García Márquez” (Pfaff 128). Examples of this double emphasis abound in her work.

     

    Condé thus occupies a double position with regard to the value of the popular, exhibiting a self-conscious acceptance and questioning of it. Indeed, such self-consciousness is one of the hallmark features of Condé’s novels and contributes in no small part, I would argue, to their “certain quality,” their ability to attract ostensibly very different readerships. Self-consciously occupying the middlebrow ground where different attitudes toward the value of literature troublingly meet, her work addresses, and takes its distance from, both inauthentically popular and academic audiences–a trend especially pronounced, I would suggest, since the late 1980s. Indeed, if I might venture a chronological thesis regarding the development of Condé’s oeuvre, it appears to me that her novels of the 1990s, following upon her bestseller successes of the previous decade and simultaneous with her belated immersion in and consecration by the U.S. academy, have increasingly become a meditation on what place, if any, the popular (in all its many forms, “authentic” and “inauthentic”) can have in what she herself once referred to as the “bourgeois and elitist” genre of the novel,24 and how that place might disrupt the ideological expectations such novels generate among her various audiences, especially those of academic readers singlemindedly intent on treating her as a postcolonial writer who “speaks to and from the position of the other.” In writing self-consciously middlebrow novels, Condé plays with and disarms the expectations of her academic audience, producing visibly hybrid texts in which the inauthentically popular and the “highly serious” intersect in unexpected ways in terms of both content and form (unexpected, at least, within the framework of the postcolonial ideology).

     

    Condé’s novels of the 1990s can be read as self-consciously invoking any number of time-honored ideological and narrative commonplaces of postcolonial literature, but in a page-turning format that troublingly evacuates them of their supposedly “resistant” value. From my perspective, this is where the real value of Condé’s novels resides–particularly those written over the past decade: in their ability to put into question, by packaging the postcolonial and the mainstream together in unmistakably middlebrow texts, the academic strategies of reading according to which they ostensibly demand to be read. To be sure, it is not just those strategies of reading that are troubled by these hybrid novels: a logical consequence of the double position Condé self-consciously occupies is that the postcolonial dimensions of her text will trouble other strategies of reading, “subverting” the expectations of her mainstream audiences by forcing them in a comprehensive and accomplished fashion to address normally marginalized cultural differences (race, class, gender, language, etc.). Such arguments can (and no doubt must) be made, although to be effective they require greater sensitivity than is usually found in postcolonial literary studies regarding the ways in which mainstream audiences–increasingly familiar with the basic ideological assumptions of postcolonial studies–may well expect a degree of subversion and estranging frissons of difference from the postcolonial novels they consume. However, familiar arguments about the postcolonial subverting the mainstream, valid as they might be, merely serve to confirm the foundational bias I have been critically examining here; more interestingly, the self-consciously middlebrow positioning of Condé’s novels forces us to think that familiar process of “subversion” in reverse, from the postcolonial to the mainstream, and in so doing, puts into question–without necessarily eliminating–that bias.

     

    Nowhere, to return to the point of departure for my reflections on Condé, is this playing with the expectations of academic audiences, this middlebrow hybridization, more evident than in Condé’s decision to revise a classic nineteenth-century British novel like Wuthering Heights. As the controversy surrounding Alice Randall’s recasting of Gone with the Wind as The Wind Done Gone shows, revisionism is now a commonplace move: be it the Tara plantation, or going back to Manderley and telling Rebecca’s side of the story, revisionism has become the intellectual property of even the most nondescript and inconsequential writers, to say nothing of an efficient way to acquire instant media “buzz.” The revisionist move, such an attractive option for postcolonial writers in the past, has become so familiar, so obvious, so calculated, it might be argued, that little or no case can be made for its “innovative” or “resistant” possibilities. In the specific case of Wuthering Heights, the move is a doubly familiar one inasmuch as over the past decade critics have, predictably enough, shown an increasing penchant for reading Brontë’s novel through a postcolonial lens, asserting boldly that “Heathcliff’s racial otherness cannot be a matter of dispute,”25 and scouring the text for references to faraway places. How are we to respond to such a familiar, and commercially canny, move on Condé’s part?

     

    The first of two obvious responses to this question is this: blithely disregard the unoriginality of the revisionist move and unself-consciously pursue the “let us compare Jane Eyre and Wide Sargasso Sea” type of approach that has generated so many scholarly articles over the past few decades and that, even more vitally, guarantees the presence of texts like Windward Heights on any number of course syllabi (mine included); fixate on similarities with and differences from the originary text; chart the ways in which Condé is rewriting the Victorians; and take sides on the eternal question as to whether or not stressing the entanglement of the colonial and the postcolonial is ultimately a politically useful move. The second obvious response to this unoriginality is this: recognize it and simply refuse to play such a well-rehearsed game. How much eventually gets published on this novel will in large part depend on which of these two options wins the day: my own guess is that Migration will find its fair share of exegetes, but that misgivings about the unoriginality of its revisionist move will ensure that it appears less frequently than Hérémakhon and Traversée in Condé bibliographies.

     

    A third response is possible, though. What if one were to acknowledge the unoriginality of this revisionist move and take it as one’s point of departure for an appraisal of the novel? What if one were to read, and valorize, it as strategically unoriginal? As will become clear in the concluding section of this article, such a recourse to the “strategic” is not without its problems (and its predictability), but it does seem to me a provisionally useful way of negotiating the impasse described in the previous paragraph. The blatant unoriginality of Condé’s move puts into question, without simply doing away with, the resistant and counterdiscursive energies conventionally associated with the revisionist subgenre of postcolonial literature. What work can this subgenre still perform if it has become so formulaic? That is the question, it seems to me, Condé is boldly forcing us to address with this novel, and the asking of that question is greatly facilitated by the sheer readability of Migration, which signals the text’s ready availability to middlebrow readers for whom its genealogical connection to Wuthering Heights will not necessarily form the primary point of interest or interrogation, but who might be drawn, rather, to such things as the presence of romance motifs (the pleasures of the “hot and lush”) or “universal” themes (the profundities that, to quote from the review of Windward Heights in the Chicago Tribune, make us “think about the kinds of emotions that have moved human beings throughout our existence”).

     

    Condé takes the master narrative of postcolonial revisionism, which has caused so many critics over the past several decades to go into spasms of high seriousness every time a name like Caliban, Ariel, or Bertha Mason gets mentioned, and strategically redirects it toward the commodified double ground of the (middlebrow) popular, where the pleasures of the text mingle (un)easily with its profundities, the “low” appeals of romance with “high” insights into the human condition. The novel’s culturally specific (Caribbean, womanist, etc.) aspects, upon which any attempt at reading the text as “purely” postcolonial must in large part rely, prove inseparable from pleasures and profundities that are far less culturally specific: this doubling and displacement of the overtly postcolonial contents of the novel, similar to the way its revisionist form cannot be detached from an awareness of its formulaic nature, serves to relocate Migration in a commodified (middlebrow) popular context that substantially voids, without erasing, whatever resistant values one might originally have wished to associate with its revisionist gesture. If one were to give a specific name to this process of doubling and displacement that Condé’s strategic unoriginality renders visible, it might well be pastiche, in Fredric Jameson’s unflattering sense of the word as the monstrous postmodern double of the parody he continues, in modernist fashion, to valorize.26 Following the lead of Condé herself, who once described Tituba as “a pastiche of the feminine heroic novel” (Pfaff 60), we might well read Migration as a pastiche of the postcolonial revisionist novel: a work that, by self-consciously exiling postcolonial revisionism to the mainstream, refuses to play along with the evaluative distinctions that undergird the postcolonial ideology, forcing us to confront the modernist limits of that ideology, while continuing to inscribe, weakly, the memories of resistance that it assumes.

     

    From the very first words of Migration, Condé signals the aberrant nature of her revisionist gesture, refusing to meet the understandable (from a postcolonial perspective) expectation that her work will contest its colonial antecedent–as can be seen from the novel’s amiable dedication “À Emily Brontë qui, je l’espère, agréera cette lecture de son chef-d’oeuvre. Honneur et respect!” (Migration 7; translated by Philcox as, “To Emily Brontë, who I hope will approve of this interpretation of her masterpiece. Honour and respect!” [Windward n.p.]). This is hardly the sort of antagonistic relationship that one would expect from a revisionist novel, and any reading of Condé’s lecture of Brontë must take this unexpectedly “respectful” dedication as its point of departure. In interviews, Condé herself has stressed her lifelong “passion” for the novel (Anagnostopoulou-Hielscher 75), and while this passion could easily be read as the sign of an affinity between two women marginalized both by their gender and their provincial/colonial origins (Yorkshire/Guadeloupe), a reading of the epigraph that stressed only solidarity between marginalized women, while valid up to a point, would fail to account for the ways in which this solidarity gets mediated by Condé’s appeal to the “chef d’oeuvre”–an appeal to the elitist idea of the “masterpiece” that would certainly have struck a sympathetic chord with the Leavises, who were themselves great fans of Wuthering Heights.27

     

    From the outset, then, we are forced to confront a number of elective affinities that divert us from a conventionally postcolonial reading of the revisionist text: it is not subversion but passion that is highlighted here. This passion is generated both by aesthetic and affective evaluations–evaluations that, on the one hand, rely upon the category of the “masterpiece” and that, on the other, arise out of the sort of readerly engagement that has made Wuthering Heights such a widely consumed and loved novel. (It is this same engagement, to draw a relevant point of comparison, that has made so many an academic reader of Jane Austen anxious about the ways in which Janeites appropriate her work.28) The amiable dedication to Migration, pointing us toward the literary value of Brontë’s “masterpiece” and signalling the author’s own affective ties to it as a reader, destabilizes the generic assumption that, as a postcolonial revisionist, Condé must have a bone to pick with Brontë’s colonial-era novel. As the inclusion of the Creole greeting “honneur et respect” in the epigraph suggests, the novel’s Caribbean content does not in any dramatic way contest the novel’s aberrant affiliation with its precursor but itself forms part of it. Condé has simply provided Wuthering Heights with new “migratory” contexts (Caribbean, womanist, etc.) that supplement but do not militate against her predecessor’s novel. Condé once remarked of Segu that it “is not a militant novel, and until people understand that I don’t write such novels, they will not comprehend my writings at all” (Pfaff 52); in pastiching the postcolonial revisionist novel, aberrantly channelling its militant energies in a mainstream direction, Condé forces this understanding upon her academic readers, while clearing a space for her other readers.

     

    The all-too-familiar revisionist strategy pastiched in Migration, to be sure, hardly exhausts its postcolonial resonance: indeed, the novel very evidently lends itself to being read as exemplifying another narrative strategy that is decidedly more au courant in postcolonial circles. If Migration is an aberrant work of revisionism, as argued above, it is also an errant one, blatantly confirming Condé’s investment in the virtues of “errance,” a dominant theme in her novels of the 1990s (speaking of Desirada [1997], for instance, she noted that when reading it “one comes to the conclusion that wandering [errance] is an essential ground for creativity” [Anagnostopoulou-Hielscher 73]). This privileging of errancy is clearly relevant to the diasporic, anti-essentialist turn of so much recent work, literary and critical, in postcolonial studies, which has seized upon metaphors like nomadism and migrancy by way of insisting upon the virtues of tracking routes rather than exploring roots.

     

    Indeed, it is precisely through a structural emphasis on errancy that Condé most visibly establishes the pastiche-like nature of her revisionist gesture in Migration: where the first third (Part I) of the novel sticks quite closely to a straightforward transposition of the Wuthering Heights story onto the Caribbean, with the requisite racial recoding (e.g., Condé’s light-skinned Catherine finds herself torn between a black Heathcliff, Razyé, and a béké Linton, Aymeric de Linsseuil29), the last two-thirds (Parts II-V) of the novel rapidly loses touch with its Victorian predecessor, scrambling the latter’s second-generation plot and wandering into “new” territory that seems of little or no relevance to (a rewriting of) Wuthering Heights. Brontë’s novel ceases, at some point, to matter: it proves neither a destiny to be lamented (as in Rhys’s Wide Sargasso Sea) nor contested (as in Césaire’s A Tempest); quite simply, it becomes something that goes forgotten, and the reader waits in vain for a “return” to the obvious pattern of similarities and differences between colonial text and postcolonial counter-text that obtained in Part I of the novel and that held out the promise of some contestatory significance to the revisionist gesture–a promise the novel declines to keep, as it wanders away from its premises and becomes, as it were, just another Maryse Condé novel.

     

    There will be no such “return” to the original, modernist assumptions of postcolonial revisionism, as Condé clarifies by her blandly obvious intertextual references to the idea of returning in various chapter headings, which are ironically undercut by what actually happens in these chapters. The closure sought by Heathcliff/Razyé in the final chapter of Part I, “Le temps retrouvé,” is not attained: Part II opens onto the second-generation story, initiating the novel’s errant drift away from its predecessor text. His son Razyé II’s “Retour au pays natal,” to cite the title of the novel’s penultimate chapter, proves equally unsatisfactory: his return to Guadeloupe fails to provide him with the catharsis and the anchor he was seeking. In Condé’s open-ended migratory world, there would thus appear to be none but the most highly ironized of places for standard modernist endings of the sort offered by Proust and Césaire, and her emphasis on errance and displacement is certainly in tune with the privileging of hybridity (Bhabha), relationality (Glissant), etc., in postcolonial theory of late. The way that Condé’s novel migrates away from its point of origin, away from both Wuthering Heights and the generic assumptions of postcolonial revisionism, might be read as an allegory for the process through which the colonial condition and the postcolonial response to it become slowly but surely erased, opening out onto a “new” world of errancy in which some of the old world’s key assumptions about the value of categories like “nation” and “race” have come to appear as errors. An errant world, then, but also a more human world–for it is assuredly the case that we only gain a sense of the humanity of Condé’s characters once we cease to read them as representative figures, as racialized embodiments of a text that has a revisionist point to make. The differences upon which colonial discourse and postcolonial counterdiscourse depend blind us to this common humanity, and as Condé’s novel errantly progresses, increasingly detaching itself from the revisionist script to which it initially seemed attached, it opens our eyes to what might be out there “beyond” the framework established by colonial discourse and perpetuated by postcolonial responses that, in directly contesting this discourse, cannot help remaining implicated in its inhuman vision of the world.

     

    This possible opening beyond the all-too-familiar concerns of that complicitous entanglement of colonial and postcolonial that I have elsewhere dubbed the post/colonial seems akin to what Paul Gilroy, in Against Race: Identifying Political Culture Beyond the Color Line, has identified as the opportunity made visible by the current crisis in raciological thinking. For Gilroy, that crisis has created the grounds for envisioning a “planetary humanism” in which “out-moded principles of differentiation” will have lost their value–a humanism in which we might exercise a renewed sensitivity to “the overwhelming sameness that overdetermines social relationships between people and continually betrays the tragic predicaments of their common species life,” and in which we might learn how to value “the undervalued power of this crushingly obvious, almost banal human sameness, so close and basically invariant that it regularly passes unremarked upon” (29). As Gilroy knows full well, his insistence on “the possibility of leaving ‘race’ behind, of setting aside its disabling use as we move out of the time in which it could have been expected to make sense” (29) will be branded by many as utopian at best and irresponsible at worst by those who, in his words, capitulate “to the lazy essentialisms that postmodern sages inform us we cannot escape” (53). Without taking sides on that issue, or raising the question of what, if any, relation there might be between the “overwhelming sameness” valorized here and the nightmarish scenario of homogenization that haunted modernist critiques of mass culture and that continues to feed into our understanding of the possible effects of globalization, I would simply like to conclude my discussion of Condé’s novel by noting that if its errant narrative movement seems to point in the direction argued for by Gilroy, it nonetheless cannot help pointing back toward the very thing that it is putting into question by pastiching: namely, the resistant tenets of postcolonial revisionism.

     

    The novel’s final chapter, after all, is entitled “Retour à L’Engoulvent,” and this final return takes us back, if only in translation and with the greatest ambivalence, to the revisionist return to Wuthering Heights that was Condé’s apparent point of departure in Migration and that the errancy of the last two-thirds of the novel seems to overturn. The two points–forward into the future and back into the past–meet here at novel’s end, cancelling each other out in the undecidability, the willed pointlessness, of the novel’s concluding sentence: it has finally become clear to Razyé II, who has moved back into L’Engoulvent (Wuthering Heights), that his dead wife Cathy, supposedly the daughter of Catherine and Aymeric, was almost certainly the daughter of Catherine and his own father Razyé. This unprovable if altogether likely scenario casts doubt on the future of his and Cathy’s daughter, Anthuria, fruit either of a legitimate cross-cultural interracial union or an unwitting act of incest.

     

    Il [Razyé II] s’absorbait dans la pensée d’Anthuria. Une si belle enfant ne pouvait pas être maudit. (Migration 337)

    [He was absorbed by the thought of Anthuria. Such a lovely child could not be cursed. (Windward 348)]

     

    It is with this fragment of free indirect discourse–the narrator’s statement translating the character’s anxious question, which is masquerading as a statement–that Condé’s novel ends. This is no ending at all. It is only the beginning–an errant beginning that may or may not be “cursed” by the past and its erroneous legacies. Whom are we to believe? The narrator who seemingly asserts? The character whose nervous question is masked by a defiant assertion? The author who both asserts and questions? How we answer this unanswerable question will, unquestionably, depend upon how much belief we can place in a truly postcolonial future, one liberated from the accursed, inhuman entanglements of the post/colonial. But, if we as readers can only answer, provisionally, one way or the other, the strength of Condé’s strategic unoriginality, her (ab)errant revisionism, is that it forces us to acknowledge the weakness of our every response to that question of belief. If such a questioning of belief is, as I believe it to be, what constitutes the “greatness” of literature, then Condé is, when all’s said and done, the “great” writer she is unquestionably assumed to be. To emphasize the middlebrow dimension of her work is not, appearances to the contrary, to deny her greatness as a writer: it is simply to suggest that we have been looking for it in all the wrong places, not in the mainstream where her work is so clearly, if uneasily, situated, but in an other, less compromised place inhabited by our modernist precursors that can now be nothing more or less than an exotic memory which has yet, for better and for worse, to go forgotten.

     

    III. A Spectre of Value: Living On the (Literary) Margins of Cultural and Postcolonial Studies

     

    My reading of Condé’s Migration as a self-consciously (ab)errant “pastiche” of postcolonial revisionism has allowed me to do what, as a literary critic, I am most comfortable doing: namely, arguing for the value of certain literary texts on the grounds that they are somehow “different” from other, less intellectually provocative works. I have tried to factor the (middlebrow) popularity of Condé’s work into my argument, to show that her novel needs to be read less as a manifesto for some postcolonial imaginaire than as a “hot and lush” text that, as so much old-fashioned literature was once said to do, “makes us think about the kinds of emotions that have moved human beings throughout our existence”; I have tried to highlight the ways in which the novel’s popular appeal needs to be factored in by academic readers who are all too likely to overlook or dismiss it as not integral to an understanding of what she’s really doing. But in arguing for the strategic unoriginality of her revisionist gesture in Migration I have, clearly, caved in to the same logic generating, say, Lionnet’s fervent desire to read Condé as someone who provides “model” texts for the postcolonial critic to valorize. I have wandered (indeed, erred) quite a distance from the questions posed at the outset of this article regarding the problematic place of the popular in postcolonial studies. My take on Migration may or may not capture the duplicitous way that it engages with multiple–academic and inauthentically popular–audiences, but it most certainly does not resolve the question of what to do with the likes of “lesser,” and seemingly less self-conscious, writers such as Delsham and de Jaham. The argument outlined in the preceding paragraphs is a way of salvaging Migration for an academic audience (and for me!), rescuing it in a paradoxical sort of way from its “nauseating” exile in the mainstream. It is a way of saying, “Hey look, Condé is producing work of literary value after all, even if that value cannot be disentangled from other values that help generate its inauthentically popular, middlebrow appeal; she’s being serious precisely by putting into question the ‘high seriousness’ of postcolonial studies and its by-now predictable commitment to tired ‘old’ strategies of textual resistance such as revisionism, or its equally predictable appeals to ‘new’ strategies such as errancy that are still very much in vogue. All of which helps explain why she’s a self-evidently better writer than Delsham and de Jaham.”

     

    But if my valorization of self-conscious textuality and the “certain quality” of Condé’s novels does not help us value Delsham and de Jaham, then does it really help us understand the (middlebrow) popularity of a writer like Condé? The fact that my account of Condé as pastiche artist par excellence would not work for these lowbrow writers puts into question, ultimately, the work I have just argued it might do for her; in the final analysis, I have continued to privilege Condé against cultural producers like Delsham and de Jaham, falling prey to the “creator orientation” that has informed so many critiques of mass culture (Gans 75), and placing a seemingly critical but ultimately narcissistic emphasis in my reading of her on the ways in which Condé plays (along) with the academic reader. In the preceding account of Migration, the text, the author, and a certain type of reader win out, and the concerted emphasis on issues of consumption, production, circulation, and regulation upon which cultural studies insists, and that my article initially seemed to promise, has gone by the wayside, as have many of the readers in Fort-de-France and Pointe-à-Pitre, to say nothing of those whose daily diet of prose includes USA Today.

     

    To explore the (dis)connections of the popular and the postcolonial must surely take postcolonial studies in other, less author-/critic-oriented directions of the sort toward which cultural studies has been pointing for several decades now. We need, for instance, to take the insights of reception theory more fully into account and to place a new emphasis on the consumption of (what we label as) postcolonial texts in both their “place of origin” and the transnational literary marketplace: what sorts of pleasure, for instance, do these various audiences take from their readings of Delsham, de Jaham, or Condé? Such questions can only be answered by the type of empirical inquiry exemplified, say, by Janice Radway’s ethnographic approach to popular romances, albeit nuanced by the powerful objections lodged against her by the likes of Ien Ang, who rightly criticized Radway’s Reading the Romance for its failure to take account of “the pleasurableness of the pleasure of romance reading,” bogged down as it is in elitist feminist (in the context of this article, read elitist postcolonial) meta-narratives which assume that “the pleasure of romance reading is somehow not real, as though there were other forms of pleasure that could be considered ‘more real’ because they are more ‘authentic,’ more enduring, more veritable, or whatever” (527). The pleasurableness of this pleasure, or the absence thereof, will certainly differ depending on the location(s) in which a text is read, which in turn will inevitably affect evaluations of its quality, but the important point to register is that neither this pleasurableness nor these judgments can be understood without sociological research of the sort that is so markedly absent from postcolonial literary studies and its implied but rarely theorized reader, who is more often than not nothing more than the critic’s idealized self-portrait, or his/her phantasmagoric portrait of the Other.

     

    This emphasis on consumption will need to be supplemented by an increased attention to the production and circulation of postcolonial texts (both literature and theory), which would begin to take into account such things as: the mutually implicated relations of aesthetic, philosophical, political (etc.) values and market values; the many ways in which postcolonial texts are commodified and distributed in an increasingly globalized market; which “marginal” books get adopted on course syllabi and what this has to tell us about the role of canon-formation in the ostensibly anti-canonical field of postcolonial studies; how the “postcolonial card” plays (or does not play) in current university hiring practices, and so on. In short, one would have to highlight the ways in which the postcolonial has become possible not simply as an object of textual interpretation, or of pleasurable (or not) consumption, but as an object of no small value to the literary and academic marketplace alike.

     

    To be sure, if the dominant postcolonial ideology renders the asking of such unpopular questions about various types of popularity difficult, it has certainly not rendered them impossible. Over the past decade, there have been sporadic attempts at inserting such questions into the mainstream of postcolonial studies. For example, it is somewhat, if not entirely, in this spirit that Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin, the oft-maligned Australian authors of The Empire Writes Back (1989), remark in the introduction to the final section of their Post-colonial Studies Reader (1995), entitled “Production and Consumption,” that they have included this section of mostly outdated articles “to stimulate the production of more current assessments of the material conditions of cultural production and consumption on post-colonial societies,” which is, they add, “one of the most important and so-far largely neglected areas of concern” in postcolonial studies (463-64). I suspect that the increasingly sullen reception of these pioneering Australian critics may well have something to do not only with their supposed privileging of “literary hybridity” at the expense of “histories of subjection,”30 but with their receptivity to the idea of opening postcolonialism up to these empirical studies–studies that would inevitably put into question not only the individualist cult of the author/critic and the fetishization of textuality that is at the heart of so much work being done in postcolonial studies (their own included) but also the mechanical emphasis on subversion and resistance that so easily flows from the pens of those critics who can neither honor nor respect the dubious complicities that inauthentic popularity necessarily involves. Moreover, the admittedly limited emphasis of Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin on “the material conditions of cultural production and consumption,” as well as the hostility directed toward them in certain postcolonial circles, may well be related to their status as settler colony critics (like myself) who have grown up in nation-states where it is difficult, if not impossible, to think (or imagine one is thinking) outside the boundaries of “mass” society and the forms of popularity it engenders, and where the fact of widespread literacy, leisure time, and purchasing power ensures that, in the case of the literary field, prestige-invested forms of cultural production such as novel-writing cannot be simply cordoned off from the dynamics of inauthentically popular consumption.31

     

    Be that as it may, it is out of this particular milieu that the most extended and energetic intervention dealing with the popularity of the postcolonial has recently emerged: Graham Huggan’s The Postcolonial Exotic, which comprehensively confronts many of the issues that crystallized for me around the figures of Delsham and Condé in that Fort-de-France bookstore. Huggan’s book constitutes a giant step toward breaking the relative silence surrounding the imbrication of postcolonial studies and the marketplace: taking as his starting point the question “How has the corporate publishing world co-opted postcolonial writing, and to what extent does the academy collaborate in similar processes of co-optation?” (viii), he offers “a speculative prolegomenon to the sociology of postcolonial cultural production” (xvi), very much along Bourdieuvian lines. The key move Huggan makes in order to raise the problem of the marketability of the postcolonial is to identify the postcolonial field of production as occupying “a site of struggle between contending ‘regimes of value’” which he denominates postcolonialism and postcoloniality (5). The latter, in Huggan’s usage, is a “value-regulating mechanism within the global late-capitalism system of commodity exchange,” an “implicitly assimilative and market-driven” regime, while the former is “an anti-colonial intellectualism that reads and valorizes the signs of social struggle in the faultlines of literary and cultural texts” and “implies a politics of value that stands in obvious opposition to global processes of commodification” (6). Rather than being simply at odds, these two regimes of value are “mutually entangled” and “bound up with” one another, which means that “in the overwhelmingly commercial context of late twentieth-century commodity culture, postcolonialism and its rhetoric of resistance have themselves become consumer products” (6). This does not mean that the one is simply reducible to the other, the “good” opposition to the “bad” assimilation, but that they cannot be told apart from one another, any more than the local can be kept separate from the global: as a result of this entanglement, “postcolonialism needs a greater understanding of the commodifying processes through which its critical discourses, like its literary products, are disseminated and consumed” (18).

     

    Huggan subsumes these processes under the category of the “postcolonial exotic,” the exotic being “the perfect term to describe the domesticating process through which commodities are taken from the margins and reabsorbed into mainstream culture” (22). In a wide array of case-studies, he mercilessly analyzes the workings of this postcolonial exotic, and the inseparability of postcolonialism and global commodity culture to which it bears witness: examining such things as the Heinemann African Writers Series, Indo-chic, the Booker Prize, multiculturalism, ethnic autobiography, tourist novels, and the Margaret Atwood Society, he maps out the innumerable ways in which “the language of resistance is entangled, like it or not, in the language of commerce” (264). Faced with this entanglement, in which it becomes virtually impossible to distinguish between co-optation and complicity, the choice facing writers and critics “may be not so much whether to ‘succumb’ to market forces as how to use them judiciously to suit one’s own, and other people’s, ends” (11). As Huggan suggests throughout, following Appadurai’s lead, this “succumbing” to the market will not necessarily produce the negative, homogenizing scenario one might expect since “global processes of commodification may engender new social relations that operate in anti-imperialist interests, empowering the previously dispossessed” (12), and “anti-imperialist resistance is not necessarily diminished when ‘resistance’ itself is inserted into global-capitalist networks of cultural consumption” (262). This is the positive message that, doubtfully (“may engender,” “is not necessarily diminished”), emerges from Huggan’s consideration of postcolonialism’s complicity with the market-driven regime of postcoloniality: “lay[ing] bare the workings of commodification” through which the postcolonial makes itself heard (and is made to be heard) will, perhaps, not simply result in identifying a symptomatic “mode of consumption” but make possible “an analysis of consumption” that, somehow, will challenge us to respond differently to it in the future (264).

     

    Huggan is understandably vague about what that future and its differences might look like, preferring to concentrate on the contemporary symptoms of the postcolonial exotic, that “pathology of cultural representation under late capitalism” (33). It is refreshingly clear that he is skeptical of those who, faced with “the spiralling commodification of cultural difference,” wish (like Aijaz Ahmad) “to disclaim or downplay their involvement in postcolonial theoretical production, or to posit alternative epistemologies and strategies of cultural representation,” or others who “might wish to ‘opt out’ of, or at least defy, the processes of commodification and institutionalisation that have arguably helped create a new canon of ‘representative’ postcolonial literary/cultural works” (32). If hero(in)es there are in his account of postcolonial writers responding to the dilemma posed by the postcolonial exotic, they are those who “have chosen to work within, while also seeking to challenge, institutional structures and dominant systems of representation […] [and] have recognised their own complicity with exoticist aesthetics while choosing to manipulate the conventions of the exotic to their own political ends” (32). These writers engage in what he calls “strategic exoticism,” “strategic marginalization,” and so on: for instance, someone like Vikram Seth–even if, or precisely because, his novels are not brooded over by the academic culture industry with the same intensity that Rushdie’s are, lacking as they do “the aura of self-conscious intellectual sophistication that might encourage, as it has certainly done for Rushdie’s work, the type of theoretically informed research that is a current requirement of the academic profession” (75)–is a novelist we can learn from because of the way that a work like A Suitable Boy “anticipates its own reception as a technically proficient blockbuster novel that seeks (and inevitably fails) to encapsulate a deliberately exoticised India,” and is aware of “the metropolitan formulae within which it is likely to be read and evaluated, and to some extent […] plays up to these, challenging its readers by pretending to humour them, to confirm their expectations” (76).

     

    Time and again Huggan has recourse to this idea of “strategic exoticism” as a way of reconciling popularity and aesthetic value, and it is a version of this double game that I myself could not help playing in my own analysis of Condé, even if my invocation of her “strategic unoriginality” was put forward not in order to point out the ways in which she might be challenging her “blockbuster” reader (as Huggan argues Seth is doing) but, rather, the ways in which she plays up to the formula of postcolonial revisionism and the expectations it generates amongst an academic readership only to challenge those elite readers by implicating that formula in the “troubling greatness” of a middlebrow text. Notwithstanding this difference in focus, it is clear that my account of Condé fits in well with Huggan’s general portrait of “postcolonial writers/thinkers […] [as] both aware of and resistant to their interpellation as marginal spokespersons, institutionalised cultural commentators and representative (iconic) figures” (26). As to what the political value of the awareness and resistance exemplified by strategic exoticism is, Huggan has no easy answers (and nor, as should be apparent from my analysis of Condé, do I): as he points out, if strategic exoticism is “an option,” it is “not necessarily a way out of the dilemma” posed by postcolonialism’s always-already insertedness into “global-capitalist networks of cultural consumption” (32). Aside from confirming a sense of Condé’s or Seth’s “worth” as writers (a “worth” that their popularity does not preclude, even if the two may be inseparable from one another), one might well ask what such arguments as his or mine ultimately achieve.

     

    This eternal question of the political value of literature, and its doubtful relation to the aesthetic value that both Huggan and I seem interested in preserving, is the familiar (no doubt, for some readers, all-too-familiar) territory to which my questions regarding the (dis)connections of the popular and the postcolonial have led me. Of what real help, or hindrance, is it to “know” that Condé is a better writer than Delsham? Can such “knowledge” benefit us in any way, or is it simply part of an obnoxiously hierarchical mode of thinking that prevents social justice from flowering on the face of this earth? What are the consequences of foregoing such “knowledge” and attempting to consider someone like Condé on “equal” terms with cultural producers like Delsham and de Jaham? It was precisely this leveling move–putting Roseanne and Jamaica Kincaid in (different parts of) the same room, as it were–that provided my point of departure in this article, and it is the sort of move without which cultural studies, with its concerted focus on the popular and the “ways of life” that give meaning to this popularity, would not exist. The cultural studies move, valorizing what might from an elitist perspective be regarded as inferior trash, is one–I started out by arguing–that postcolonial studies needs more effectively to incorporate into its repertoire if it is to go beyond the sort of sanctimonious vomiting and unseemly groveling to which Jamaica Kincaid seems prone. Identifying and breaking down the unspoken boundaries in postcolonial studies that separate the likes of Delsham and de Jaham from other more “accomplished” (but often glaringly middlebrow) writers would be a way of expanding the field in both a more democratic and a less homogenizing way, and thereby enhancing the field’s egalitarian and heterogenizing agenda. More democratic, because of its greater inclusivity. Less homogenizing, because issues of material production and consumption could now be foregrounded, supplementing the fetishization of certain authors/texts (who are inevitably found to have little more to say, politically speaking, than that “resistance to colonialism, capitalism, etc. is good, although not always easy”) with more of a sense of the diverse and overlapping cultural contexts (local, regional, global) in which these authors/texts operate. As Huggan’s study ably shows, the “postcolonial” as an institutionalized field of study has been constituted exotically, in complicitous relation to global markets and metropolitan audiences (a complicity that it has tried its best to ignore), and leveling the playing field of postcolonialism might enhance an awareness of other (e.g., regional) markets and other (non-metropolitan) audiences, offering if not a way out of the dilemma that his analysis of the postcolonial exotic and its conflicting regimes of value situates us in, then at least some refreshingly new perspectives on it.

     

    All well and good. But what are we to make of these new perspectives that a cultural studies approach might offer postcolonial studies? What, for instance, will ethnographical accounts of actual reading communities and consumption patterns in the French Caribbean produce? What will a sociologically precise account of marketing strategies in the French Caribbean as compared to France result in? What will be the effect of treating writers like Delsham and de Jaham to the sort of extended analyses afforded writers like Glissant and Condé? What, in short, do we gain by making a place for the inauthentically popular in postcolonial studies? This, of course, is a question that cultural studies itself has had to ask repeatedly, after its foundational act of deconstructing the idea of the inauthentically popular and learning to take any and all forms of popularity seriously. One dominant response has been to (over)value what had previously been devalued, as in the work of John Fiske who, as Jim McGuigan points out, “merely produces a simple inversion of the mass culture critique at its worst, […] never countenancing the possibility that a popular reading could be anything other than ‘progressive’” (588). For many, however, this celebratory blanding out of the popular (or, more exactly, of the social relationships that are constituted by and mediated through the popular), in which it is treated as being in and of itself valuable and resistant, appears as “a deterrent to Cultural Studies’ overall political and ethical project”–a radical, or at least progressive, project which requires that the popular be, in Stuart Hall’s terms, “rearticulated” as part of a “hegemonic struggle” (Le Hir 125-26).32

     

    In 1981, at the end of his “Notes on Deconstructing the Popular,” Hall vividly summed up this “overall political and ethical project” of cultural studies and its relation to the popular when he explained that the latter is “one of the places where socialism might be constituted. That is why ‘popular culture’ matters. Otherwise, to tell you the truth, I don’t give a damn about it” (453). Thus, from Hall’s perspective, the popular has value, but only after it has been evaluated according to the criteria of the larger political project in which (his) cultural studies situates it. Hall’s was, and still is, a fine and honest response to the disturbing question that the popular poses cultural (and by extension postcolonial) studies, and yet of course it also lends itself, over twenty years later, to no small degree of historical irony by virtue of its desire to constitute “socialism”: not just because a modernist, future-oriented meta-narrative such as the constitution of socialism has become increasingly difficult to credit, but because it was precisely around this time that the initial, primarily class-based project of British cultural studies had begun to be challenged by other related projects with a different/differing primary focus on issues such as gender, sexuality, and ethnicity. The irony goes further, though, because if these other projects put into question and “interrupted” the foundational biases of cultural studies, they also appeared to have the potential to rescue it: their “progressive,” if not necessarily socialist, agendas brought a fresh energy to cultural studies and promised a way out of the impasse it had reached by the 1980s, what with the failure of neo-Gramscianism to stay the ongoing tide of Thatcherism on the one (practical) hand and of rampant relativism on the other (theoretical) hand, the endless and seemingly irresoluble arguments between symbolic and economic approaches to culture, the growing dominance of an uncritically “celebratory” approach to popular culture, the institutionalization of cultural studies in America (analogous to what Huggan has referred to as the recent “Americanisation of the postcolonial” [271]), and so on. All of these were signs of an impasse that cultural studies had reached, the flagging of its “overall ethical and political project,” which led, and continues to lead, many of its practitioners to look beyond the original class parameters of the project and take a feminist turn, a queer turn, or a postcolonial turn as a way around that impasse.

     

    These signs are still with us, of course, and as my analysis of the postcolonial ideology has suggested, the postcolonial turn (which shaped a great deal of Hall’s own later work, be it added) in many respects leads not forward but back into the sorts of questions–notably, about the value of the popular–that cultural studies started out asking in the first place. Perhaps this circling (or more optimistically, spiraling) back is what has led Simon During–who, in his several accounts of the “global popular” over the past decade, has been one of the very few critics to have stressed the (dis)connectionsof the popular and the postcolonial–to state in the 1999 updated introduction to the second edition of his Cultural Studies Reader that “transnational cultural studies” is “eroding so-called ‘postcolonialism,’ first nurtured in literary studies, which was so important a feature of the late 1980s and early 1990s intellectual landscape,” but which (according to During) seems to be less able to deal, at least on its own terms, with the increasingly urgent issues surrounding globalization (“Introduction” 23). Will transnational cultural studies somehow synthesize the concerns of both cultural studies and postcolonialism, finally, and show us the way out of the failed dialogue that I have described in this article? One can, I suppose, always hope! But what needs to be kept in mind, as a new wave of transnational cultural studies hits the academic beaches, is that this hope for a “way out” is only thinkable, and hence only possible, within the terms of the original project that generated both cultural studies and postcolonial studies–a project committed to “hegemonic struggle” and, accordingly, committed to (that is, biased toward) certain values and not others. During exemplifies this commitment, for instance, when he argues at the end of his introduction that “engaged cultural studies” is a field “embracing clearly articulated, left-wing values” (27). It is only from a clearly articulated position such as this that the political value of the popular can be discerned and disengaged from other values that may or may not be compatible with it.

     

    To be sure, finding a stable ground upon which to make such evaluations has become an increasingly hard thing to do in a postmodern era increasingly sensitive to the contingency of all values. One might well ask, and it would be an entirely legitimate question, why those “left-wing values” During holds so dear should be of any value to those who might be interested in, say, popular culture but not in the “political and ethical project” that legitimizes the study of it. From a radically skeptical perspective, there is no way around this relativizing question, but there are certainly solid enough responses to it, as Stanley Fish argued recently in the pages of The New York Times when he responded to a reporter who had asked him if the events of 9/11 meant the end of postmodern relativism, since such a position leaves us “with no firm basis for either condemning the terrorist attacks or fighting back.” Fish noted that so-called postmodern relativism simply argues against “the hope of justifying our response to the attacks in universal terms that would be persuasive to everyone, including our enemies,” but that it in no way precludes taking action based upon our own convictions. “We can and should,” he stated, “invoke the particular lived values that unite us and inform the institutions we cherish and wish to defend”; these values provide us with “grounds enough for action and justified condemnation in the democratic ideals we embrace, without grasping for the empty rhetoric of universal absolutes to which all subscribe but which all define differently.” With this argument Fish “resolves” the superficially irresoluble question of postmodern relativism, clearing a space for actions based upon value-judgments and effecting that “arbitrary closure” without which, as Hall has repeatedly argued, “politics is impossible” (see, e.g., “Cultural Studies” 264). Yet, in resolving this question, Fish rather spectacularly begs the question of who “we” are, and offers what could easily be construed as a justification of the U.S. invading impoverished nations such as Afghanistan and Iraq to which neither Hall nor During, I suspect, would subscribe, notwithstanding the fact that both men are equally sensitive to the difficulties of pursuing the hard road to (socialist) renewal in a world, as Hall is fond of putting it, “without final guarantees.”

     

    It is precisely this lack of “final guarantees” to which, I argued at the end of my discussion of Condé, “great” literature so troublingly alerts us, displacing our certitudes and replacing us in other wor(l)ds, wor(l)ds where fictions become possibilities but never realities. That is, no doubt, a high-sounding albeit sincerely held belief about the value of literature; one can imagine any number of less ethereal counterarguments regarding what makes literature of value, but the important point to register is that valuations of some such sort are an inescapable feature of literary studies. To put oneself in the shoes of a practitioner of cultural studies, as I did at the beginning of this article, is to take one’s distance from such aesthetic and ethical evaluations, to relativize them and gain a sense of their limits (and also, of course, in the context of my own argument, to gain a sense of how those limits are, unavowedly, inscribed within a field such as postcolonialism, which shares an uneasy border with both literary and cultural studies). It is important to have a sense of the limits of what one values, no doubt, but as Fish suggests, it can also be worth defending those limits. When During states that postcolonialism was first nurtured in “literary studies” but is now being eroded by “transnational cultural studies,” he seems almost to imply that the tainted genealogy of postcolonialism might account for its supposed erosion. Literary studies, it would appear, cannot catch up to the incitements of globalization. Its seemingly residual status and elitist history (implicated, as it has been, not only in hierarchical assumptions about aesthetic value but in the material dynamics of colonization) explains very well why, as Huggan puts it, “some of the most recent work in the [postcolonial] field gives the impression of having bypassed literature altogether, offering a heady blend of philosophy, sociology, history and political science in which literary texts, when referred to at all, are read symptomatically within the context of larger social and cultural trends” (239). The foundational bias of literary studies toward “great” works could not be clearer, and it is not surprising that even the sub-field of postcolonial studies devoted to literature might wish to avoid any but the most condemnatory reckoning with this bias.

     

    I have argued throughout this article that such a bias does inf(l)ect postcolonial studies in a variety of ways, regardless of its flatteringly egalitarian self-image; however, I have purposefully developed a supplementary argument that this bias is not something which, once unmasked, can or should be simply jettisoned. Rather, this bias must be explored more openly and, from my own perspective as a literary critic, with a measure of belief in the value of literature, not just as a model or a symptom but as the troubling other of contemporary (and self-evidently “progressive”) disciplines such as postcolonial and cultural studies–in short, with a measure of belief that literature and the greatness it troublingly promises is indeed something we might “cherish and wish to defend,” notwithstanding or precisely because of the cautionary distance it allows us to take from those other, more pressing beliefs that, however provisionally, must ground the “political and ethical projects,” socialist or otherwise, about which we give a damn. As we learn to listen in on the as-yet failed (but, we must hope, ultimately successful) dialogue between Roseanne and Jamaica Kincaid, the “great writer,” I would suggest, not only is but must remain present in our minds, exiled from the mainstream of cultural and postcolonial studies that beckons us, a spectre of value haunting the margins of a new center to which neither that writer, nor we literary critics, can ever return but toward which we can yet, perhaps, migrate.

     

    Notes

     

    I would like to thank Rey Chow and Katie Trumpener for some useful feedback in the early stages of this project, as well as Carine Mardorossian, Grace Moore, Susan Weiner, and Robert J. C. Young for reading and commenting on drafts of the article.

     

    1. Quoted in Seabrook 33 (from Newsweek 18 Sept. 1995, 10). For the comment about People magazine, see Kincaid’s interview with Salon magazine (<http://www.salon.com/05/features/kincaid2.html>).

     

    2. In the Salon interview, discussing Brown’s enthusiasm for Roseanne, Kincaid laments “the coarseness of it, the vulgarity,” and expresses a desire to “rescue [Brown] from her coarseness. She’s actually got some nice qualities. But she can’t help but be attracted to the coarse and vulgar. I wish there was a vaccine–I would sneak it up on her.”

     

    3. Discussing how the “passionate divisions” of Restoration France (aristocracy versus bourgeoisie, political right versus political left, etc.) hide “the modern tendency to identity,” Girard notes that “double mediation is a melting-pot in which differences among classes and individuals gradually dissolve. It functions all the more efficiently because it does not even appear to affect diversity. In fact, the latter is even given a fresh though deceptive brilliance” (122).

     

    4. In this article I use “francophone” and “postcolonial” as relatively interchangeable terms. While not wishing to deny significant differences between these two catch-all labels and the worlds to which they (supposedly) refer, I do not believe that these differences greatly affect the argument I am developing here: the same foundational bias is at work in both fields of study (by virtue of their geographically free-floating nature, as explained later in this section).

     

    5. According to Gilles Alexandre, owner of the Librairie Alexandre in Fort-de-France and an important cultural mediator in the French Antillean literary scene, only Césaire sells more books than Delsham in Martinique (Césaire’s popularity being in large part attributable to school sales). Delsham’s status as Martinique’s bestselling novelist is common knowledge on the island, although any full account of his popularity would obviously need to be backed up by statistical research.

     

    6. As just two randomly chosen examples of Delsham’s neglect, it can be noted that there is not a single index entry on him in the recent An Introduction to Caribbean Francophone Writing: Guadeloupe and Martinique (Haigh), and that at the 4th International Conference on Caribbean Literatures, held in his native Martinique (November 2001), not a single paper addressed Delsham’s work.

     

    7. For Delsham’s own account of how he came to publish and distribute his own work, see the opening autobiographical chapters of his Gueule de journaliste (15-88).

     

    8. This phrase provides a “cri de guerre” for Keith Walker’s Countermodernism and Francophone Literary Culture (1999). According to Walker, “colonialism entailed not only the power to annex and exploit other races, but also to textualize the racial Other […] . It is this textualization against which francophone narratives must always work” (13, emphasis added). In its totalizing and exclusionary claims about what francophone narratives “must always” do, this categorical assertion exemplifies–to the point of parody–the postcolonial ideology that I am analyzing here.

     

    9. One could spend a lot of time analyzing the ways in which Delsham’s novels fail both to meet the standard criteria for positively evaluating literary texts or to contest those criteria in a knowingly postcolonial fashion. Necessary as such a discussion might be for “proving” my commonsense claims (widely echoed in Martiniquan literary circles) about Delsham’s dubious relation to what has come to be known as “literature,” such an account is beyond the purview of a general position paper like this.

     

    10. Here, I am echoing Jerome McGann’s influential account of “the Romantic ideology,” and his argument about how “the scholarship and interpretation of Romantic works is dominated by an uncritical absorption in Romanticism’s own self-representations” (137).

     

    11. The existence of identifiable nation-states and regions–the Caribbean, Latin America, West Africa, etc.–or longstanding cultural groupings within a nation-state or region–Afro-Americans, Aboriginals, etc.–greatly facilitates a coming-to-terms with the inauthentic popularity that forms such a sticking point for a “time-lagged” postcolonial studies, even if these readily identifiable territories or groupings are, under pressures of globalization, becoming ever more indissociable from geographically and culturally diffuse “ethnoscapes,” in Appadurai’s terms (that is, increasingly mobile landscapes of “persons who constitute the shifting world in which we live: tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles, guest workers, and other moving groups and individuals” [33]). If a text can be located within a particular territory, then–no matter how lowbrow or how market-driven–it can be read, positively, as forming an integral part of a culture’s “way of life”; indeed, this is how cultural studies came about in the first place, as a way of (re)defining the parameters of the British nation-state. To be sure, though, the “problem” of popularity that I am identifying with postcolonial studies does not simply disappear when one finds a home for the inauthentically popular within the limits of a particular national or cultural grouping: one need only think, for instance, about the ways in which, in Afro-American studies, Terry McMillan and Toni Morrison both are and are not thinkable in one and the same space to get a sense of how this “problem” persists even in ostensibly less abstract contexts than that of the “postcolonial” or “francophone.” For an exemplary reading of this dilemma in the context of Asian-American literature, see Wong.

     

    12. Graham Huggan, among others, confirms this account of the double directives generating postcolonial theory, which “might be seen as the provisional attempt to forge a working alliance between the–often Marxist-inspired–politics of anti-colonial resistance, exemplified in the liberationist tracts of Fanon, Césaire and Memmi, and the disparate, allegedly destabilising poststructuralisms of Derrida, Lacan, Althusser and Foucault” (260). In Huggan’s description, however, there is at work both an historical and geographical opposition (non-European writers from the 1940s and 1950s versus European writers from the 1960s and 1970s) that I would dissolve by referring both sides of the equation back to a modernism that took worldwide root amongst intellectuals and artists in the 1920s and 1930s.

     

    13. As Simon During has noted, “‘postcolonialism,’ with its emancipatory conceptual overtones, only obscures analysis of the rhythm of globalization”: the emergence of what he has dubbed “the global popular” is a phenomenon with which “postcolonial thought” must be uncomfortable since it is difficult for such thought “to concede the colonized’s partial consent to colonialism” (“Postcolonialism” 343, 347; see also his “Popular Culture”).

     

    14. The role of such paratextual material in (pre)determining a text’s meaning is, however, of vital importance; for a discussion of this role in a postcolonial context, see Huggan’s discussion of how cover design sets up “an initial horizon of readerly expectations that is subsequently confirmed or, more likely, modified in the narrative that follows” (168).

     

    15. As Condé frequently notes in her interviews, “I have never in my life written a political tract. But there are always errors in interpreting my writings because people think I have done so. They always look for militant or positive heroes, and I never portray any” (Pfaff 88).

     

    16. On “creolist discourse,” see my reading of the 1835 plantation novel Outre-mer by the béké Louis Maynard de Queilhe in Islands and Exiles (287-316). For a brief but effective comment on how de Jaham’s first two novels express the “ideological self-perception of the béké,” see Macey (45).

     

    17. For a pioneering consideration of paratextual material in earlier Condé novels, see Massardier-Kenney (250-52).

     

    18. As a glance at a bibliography of Condé shows (Pfaff 144-65), the review (along with the interview) is the preferred forum for discussion of her novels–another telling sign of the middlebrow nature (or at least reception) of her work.

     

    19. On the way in which “critiques of middlebrow culture have been persistently gendered,” see Radway 872. The particular relevance of middlebrow writing to women as a way of subverting gendered hierarchies is not an issue that I can explore here, but it is worth thinking about Condé in the context of Deidre Lynch’s remark that “many women writers, conscious of the gendering of these categories [‘classics’ and ‘trash’], have been more interested in collapsing the boundaries that separate the literary and the popular than in policing them” (23,n13).

     

    20. In a 1982 interview, for instance, Condé arrogantly commented, “In my opinion, no writer has ever spoken to the West Indian people, because our people do not read. Certain ideas may reach them through newspapers or television. But let’s not delude ourselves: West Indians have only vague idea of novels and poetry collections published in Paris by West Indian authors” (Pfaff 38). Condé voices a very limited understanding here of what it means to “read” in a highly literate location like the French Antilles, and I would certainly agree with Lionnet that she becomes more “humble” in this regard after the early 1980s.

     

    21. “Condé appropriates the technique of the novel within the novel to reflect upon the role of the writer as outsider, and of the outsider as catalyst or pharmakon, both poison and antidote, dangerous supplement, chronicler, and aide-mémoire of the community” (Lionnet 75).

     

    22. In one of her interviews with Françoise Pfaff, for instance, she happily described Segu as “a commissioned work” and noted the way in which it depends upon many of the formulas of lowbrow popular writing: “I followed the rules for that type of novel: coincidences, sensational developments, dramatic turns of events, and unexpected encounters. Like everyone else, I had read Alexander Dumas’s works, such as The Three Musketeers and Twenty Years After, as well as many other cloak-and-dagger novels. In French literature there is a whole tradition of adventure novels with surprise happenings” (49).

     

    23. Given her own understandable investment in presenting herself as a “good” writer, it is hardly surprising that Condé’s relation to her own popularity is not straightforwardly positive. This ambivalence is evident, for instance, in her comments about the differences between her reception in France and the United States:

     

    In France, writing a bestseller causes somewhat of a misfortune for the author. You have a hard time disengaging yourself from the image of an easy book that appealed to a large readership but was perhaps not very good as a literary work […]. [Whereas Americans don’t label one that way] because they think a best-seller is a good thing. It only means that the book appealed to a lot of people, and there is nothing wrong with that. Here, I don’t feel it is infamous to have written a bestseller like Segu. And besides I don’t know whether Segu is a bestseller in the United States. It is simply a book considered to be very important among certain African-American sectors. Segu hasn’t had the notoriety in the United States that it had in France. (Pfaff 106)

     

        Condé’s claim that Americans “think a best-seller is a good thing,” like so many of her sweeping cultural assertions, may or may not be true; more to the point, in the context of my argument, is that serious consideration of this “good thing” is beyond the scope of the postcolonial ideology: the critical

     

    scrutiny

     

        that Condé associates with her reception in France is one that, given the occlusion of inauthentic popularity in discussions of postcolonial literature, she is unlikely to face in the United States.

     

    24. Explaining her preference for novel writing in an interview, Condé once remarked, “the novel seemed simpler to me [than writing plays that could “reach illiterate people in Africa and the West Indies”] because it acknowledges that it is bourgeois and elitist. Literate people have access to novels. Books are sold in stores and you need money to acquire them. Authors have no illusion. They know that they will be read by a limited circle of people that they can almost anticipate” (Pfaff 37).

     

    25. Maja-Lisa Von Sneidern, quoted in Stoneman (152). For an overview of this postcolonial turn in Wuthering Heights criticism, see Stoneman (150-55).

     

    26.

     

    Pastiche is, like parody, the imitation of a peculiar or unique, idiosyncratic style, the wearing of a linguistic mask, speech in a dead language. But it is a neutral practice of such mimicry, without any of parody’s ulterior motives, amputated of the satiric impulse, devoid of laughter and of any conviction that alongside the abnormal tongue you have momentarily borrowed, some healthy linguistic normality still exists. Pastiche is thus blank parody, a statue with blind eyeballs […]. (Jameson 17)

     

    In my own critical work, I have repeatedly tried to rework this account of pastiche in more positive terms: see, for instance,

    Islands and Exiles (374-75).

     

    27. Q.D. Leavis’s comments about the Brontës, in her Fiction and the Reading Public (1932), are worth citing here as a prime example of the sort of modernist distinctions upon which postcolonial literary studies genealogically, if surreptitiously, depends: “The emotion exhibited in Wuthering Heights, unlike the emotion exhibited in Jane Eyre, has a frame round it […] [I]t is the Charlotte Brontës, not the Emilies, who have provided the popular fiction of the last hundred years” (quoted in Stoneman 131).

     

    28. As Deidre Lynch points out, in a discussion of the anxieties produced by Austen’s “popularity and marketability,” Janeite is “the term that Austen’s audiences have learned to press into service whenever they need to designate the Other Reader in his or her multiple guises, or rather, and more precisely, whenever they need to personify and distance themselves from particular ways of reading, ones they might well indulge in themselves” (12).

     

    29. Where Brontë’s Catherine asserts “it would degrade me to marry Heathcliff, now” (121), Condé’s elaborates: “Je ne pourrai jamais, jamais me marier avec Razyé. Ce serait trop dégradant. Ce serait recommencer à vivre comme nos ancêtres, les sauvages d’Afrique!” (Migration 20) [“I could never, never marry Razyé. It would be too degrading. It would be like starting to live all over again like our ancestors, the savages in Africa!” (Windward 13)].

     

    30. For a typical critique, see Gandhi 167-70.

     

    31. It is no coincidence that the case studies I have been considering in this article come from the French Antilles: relatively affluent islands with high literacy rates (over 90%). If the rare attempts to think postcolonialism and cultural studies together have generally originated from settler colonies such as Australia, it is also not by chance that recent efforts in this vein have been greatly facilitated by expanding “postcolonial” territory (traditionally identified with Africa, the Indian Subcontinent, the Caribbean) to include hitherto peripheral locations such as Hong Kong and China; see, for instance, the series of essays on Hong Kong “postcolonial cultural studies” collected in Cultural Studies 15.3-4 (2001).

     

    32. Le Hir, I should note, is simply paraphrasing those (like Meaghan Morris) who make this critique of Fiske-style populism. For the quotation from Hall, see Le Hir (128).

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Alexander, Gilles. Personal communication. 12 Nov. 2001.
    • Anagnostopoulou-Hielscher, Maria. “Parcours identitaires de la femme antillaise: Un entretien avec Maryse Condé.” Etudes francophones 14.2 (1999): 67-81.
    • Ang, Ien. “Feminist Desire and Feminist Pleasure.” Storey 522-31.
    • Appadurai, Arjun. Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1996.
    • Apter, Emily. Continental Drift: From National Characters to Virtual Subjects. Chicago: U of Chicago, 1999.
    • Ashcroft, Bill, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, eds. The Post-colonial Studies Reader. London: Routledge, 1995.
    • Bettie, Julie. “Class Dismissed? Roseanne and the Changing Face of Working-Class Iconography.” Social Text 14.4 (1995): 125-49.
    • Bongie, Chris. Islands and Exiles: The Creole Identities of Post/Colonial Literature. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998.
    • —. “A Street Named Bissette: Nostalgia, Memory, and the Cent-Cinquantenaire of the Abolition of Slavery in Martinique (1848-1998).” South Atlantic Quarterly 100.1 (2001): 215-57.
    • Bourdieu, Pierre. The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature. New York: Columbia UP, 1993.
    • Brontë, Emily. Wuthering Heights. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965.
    • Cabort-Masson, Guy. Martinique: Comportements & Mentalité. Voix du peuple: Fort-de-France, 1998.
    • Condé, Maryse. La Migration des coeurs. Paris: Robert Laffont, 1995.
    • —. Windward Heights. Trans. Richard Philcox. New York: Soho, 1998.
    • Delsham, Tony. Gueule de journaliste. Schoelcher: Ed. M.G.G., 1998.
    • Donnell, Alison. “She Ties Her Tongue: The Problems of Cultural Paralysis in Postcolonial Criticism.” Ariel 26.1 (1995): 101-16.
    • During, Simon. Introduction. The Cultural Studies Reader. 2nd. ed. Ed. Simon During. London: Routledge, 1999.
    • —. “Popular Culture on a Global Scale: A Challenge for Cultural Studies?” Critical Inquiry 23.4 (1997): 808-33.
    • —. “Postcolonialism and Globalization.” Meanjin 51.2 (1992): 339-53.
    • Ferguson, Moira. “Lucy and the Mark of the Colonizer.” Modern Fiction Studies 39.2 (1993): 237-59.
    • Fish, Stanley. “Condemnation Without Absolutes.” New York Times 15 Oct. 2001: (A23).
    • Frow, John. “Economies of Value.” Multicultural States: Rethinking Difference and Identity. Ed. David Bennett. London: Routledge, 1998. 53-68.
    • Gandhi, Leela. Postcolonial Theory: A Critical Introduction. New York: Columbia UP, 1998.
    • Gans, Herbert J. Popular Culture and High Culture: An Analysis and Evaluation of Taste. Rev. ed. New York: Basic, 1999.
    • Gilroy, Paul. Against Race: Imagining Political Culture Beyond the Color Line. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard UP, 2000.
    • Girard, René. Deceit, Desire and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure. Trans. Yvonne Freccero. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1965.
    • Haigh, Sam, ed. An Introduction to Caribbean Francophone Writing: Guadeloupe and Martinique. Oxford: Berg, 1999.
    • Hall, Stuart. “Cultural Studies and Its Theoretical Legacies.” Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies. Eds. David Morley and Juan-Hsing Chen. London: Routledge, 1996. 262-75.
    • —. “Notes on Deconstructing ‘the Popular’.” Storey 442-53.
    • Huggan, Graham. The Post-Colonial Exotic: Marketing the Margins. London: Routledge, 2001.
    • Jameson, Fredric. Postmodernism: Or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Durham, N.C.: Duke UP, 1991.
    • Le Hir, Marie-Pierre. “The ‘Popular’ in Cultural Studies.” French Cultural Studies: Criticism at the Crossroads. Eds. Le Hir and Dana Strand. Albany: SUNY P, 2000. 123-42.
    • Lee, Janet. “Subversive Sitcoms: Roseanne as Inspiration for Feminist Resistance.” Women’s Studies 21.1 (1992): 87-101.
    • Lionnet, Françoise. Postcolonial Representations: Women, Literature, Identity. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1995.
    • Lynch, Deirdre. “Introduction: Sharing with Our Neighbors.” Janeites: Austen’s Disciples and Devotees. Ed. Lynch. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2000. 3-24.
    • Macey, David. Frantz Fanon: A Life. London: Verso, 2000.
    • Massardier-Kenney, Françoise. “La question de la traduction plurielle, ou les traducteurs de Maryse Condé.” L’oeuvre 249-58.
    • McGann, Jerome. The Romantic Ideology: A Critical Investigation. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1983.
    • McGuigan, Jim. “Trajectories of Cultural Populism.” Storey 587-99.
    • Moudileno, Lydie. L’écrivain antillais au miroir de sa littérature. Paris: Karthala, 1997.
    • L’oeuvre de Maryse Condé: A propos d’une écrivaine politiquement incorrecte. Paris: L’Harmattan, 1996.
    • Paravisini-Gebert, Lizabeth. Jamaica Kincaid: A Critical Companion. Greenwood: Westport, CT: 1999.
    • Pfaff, Françoise. Conversations with Maryse Condé. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1996.
    • Philcox, Richard. “Traduire ‘Traversée de la Mangrove.’” L’oeuvre 221-30.
    • Radway, Janice. “On the Gender of the Middlebrow Consumer and the Threat of the Culturally Fraudulent Female.” South Atlantic Quarterly 93.4 (1994): 871-93.
    • Rosello, Mireille. “Les derniers rois mages et La Traversée de la mangrove: Insularité ou insularisation?” Elles Ecrivent des Antilles (Haïti, Guadeloupe, Martinique). Eds. Suzanne Rinne and Joëlle Vitiello. Paris: L’Harmattan, 1997. 175-92.
    • Seabrook, John. Nobrow: The Culture of Marketing/The Marketing of Culture. New York: Vintage Books, 2000.
    • Stoneman, Patsy. Emily Brontë: Wuthering Heights. New York: Columbia UP, 1998.
    • Storey, John, ed. Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: A Reader. 2nd ed. London: Prentice Hall, 1998.
    • Walker, Keith. Countermodernism and Francophone Literary Culture: The Game of Slipknot. Durham, N.C.: Duke UP, 1999.
    • Wong, Sau-Ling Cynthia. “‘Sugar Sisterhood’: Situating the Amy Tan Phenomenon.” The Ethnic Canon: Histories, Institutions, and Interventions. Ed. David Palumbo-Liu. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1995. 174-210.
    • Young, Robert J. C. Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell, 2001.

     

  • Notices

     

     

     

    Volume 14, Number 2
    January, 2004
    Every issue of Postmodern Culturecarries notices of events, calls for papers, and other announcements, free of charge. Advertisements will also be published on an exchange basis. If you respond to one of the ads or announcements below, please mention that you saw the notice in PMC.

     


    Publication Announcements

    • We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship
      Etienne Balibar
    • Variant 19 (Spring 2004)

    Conferences, Calls for Papers, Invitations to Submit

    • Outside the Frame: A Journal for Texts and Technology
    • Reconstruction: Studies in Contemporary Culture
    • Digital Resources for the Humanities 2004

    General Announcements

    • Crossroads 2004
      5th International Conference of the Association for Cultural Studies
      25 Jun-28 Jun 2004
    • Cultural Studies Association
      2nd Annual Conference

     

  • Exposition in Ruins

    Charles Sheaffer

    Department of Cultural Studies and Comparative Literature
    University of Minnesota
    Shea0016@umn.edu

     

    Review of: Gregory Ulmer, Internet Invention. New York: Pearson, 2003.

     

    Gregory Ulmer’s Internet Invention can be accurately described as a composition handbook for students working in an increasingly visual culture–provided that one follows Ulmer in understanding the newfound prevalence of the image not as a shift in the relative status of specific media, but rather as the ascendance of a particular set of signifying rules. These rules readily accommodate the printed word while nonetheless exploding the premises of expository discourse that the academy continues to equate with the act of written composition. Indeed, the crux of Ulmer’s important and illuminating project could be said to reside in his distinction between pedagogical instantiation and technological potentiality: since the appearance of Applied Grammatology in 1985, Ulmer has sought to delineate the growing epistemological deficiencies of our print-based educational apparatus in the face of its own digital-age contexts. Yet in doing so, he has strived to avoid the easy conflation of discursive structure with technological means–an effort that manifests itself, for instance, in Ulmer’s persistent characterization of the academic essay not as the inevitable legacy of alphabet technology, but rather as a particular form of “interface,” a specific code developed by Renaissance scholars as one means of harnessing the cognitive properties facilitated by the written sign.

     

    In Ulmer’s view, then, it is incumbent upon researchers working within the contemporary humanities disciplines to craft the digital-age counterpart to the essay itself–a project entailing not only the development of specific technological prostheses (for example, the extension of the print-based educational apparatus into such settings as the video production studio or the networked learning environment), but also the conceptualization of altogether new forms of epistemological code, the conceptualization, that is, of a specifically digital rhetoric that would accommodate any technological medium, including paper and pen. On this matter, it is worth noting the case of the “mystory,” the calculatedly post-literate genre that Ulmer first fully adumbrated in his 1989 book, Teletheory, and that he and his students at the University of Florida initially performed in traditional (that is, un-wired) classrooms: the point of the mystory has always been to think electronically regardless of the medium in use–that is, to augment the modes of inductive and deductive reasoning with the use of conductive methodologies, the formulation of knowledge through the associative channels afforded by the function of the signifier.

     

    For Roland Barthes, it was of course the photographic “punctum” that best displayed the infusion of putatively expository representations with individuated meaning and that demonstrated, in turn, the linking of discrete chains of knowledge through the short-circuitry inherent to the signifying field. And in developing his own trope of “conductivity,” Ulmer’s intent is to raise (or lower, as the case may be) this associative mode of knowledge-production to the level of academic method. As such, the purpose of Internet Invention is not simply to facilitate the incorporation of sound and image within the context of the expository text, but rather to cultivate a post-expository method reflective of the polyvalent conduction of meaning explored by Freud, Barthes, and Derrida and evident throughout the practices that comprise the university’s contemporary contexts. As Gerald Graff began to argue in the mid-eighties, advertising has now usurped the university as the arbiter of cultural logic; Ulmer’s contention, in turn, would be that academic writing lags behind precisely because it has yet to allow for the metonymic sliding–the repetition of sounds, images, and letters across otherwise disjointed contexts–that comprises the fundamental code of the advertising discourse as such.

     

    In assessing Ulmer’s commitment to the issue of pedagogy, it is already enough to observe the quotidian circumstances surrounding the appearance of the book in question: handled by the educational division of Longman Publishers and featuring the kind of companion website now more or less mandatory for college writing guides, Internet Invention is indeed meant to serve as a student textbook. Even more indicative of Ulmer’s investment, though, is the site of his departure from received pedagogical practices: while Internet comprises a different kind of textbook, this difference has little to do with its substitution of the webpage for the writing pad. Much more to the point, Internet comprises a first-person composition manual (to paraphrase Ulmer himself), a revelation of methodologies through the enactment of the institutional, conceptual, and personal problems that have spawned them. Hence, while Ulmer joins a sizeable group of scholars in emphasizing the growing gap between academic discourse and the practices that surround the contemporary academy, he stands out for his enactment of a distinctly post-expository method.

     

    Here, though, we must proceed by way of caveat: the revelatory act in question has less to do with the kind of personal agency espoused by Peter Elbow than with the retroactive effect denoted by Lacan as the mechanism of capitonnage; what’s to be revealed to the student of Ulmer’s digital pedagogy is the instantaneous linking of public and private modes of experience through the repetition of signifiers across conceptual contexts. In Internet Invention, this form of revelation, as it were, is demonstrated through the same mix of popular and personal discourses that has marked Ulmer’s previous books (with topics ranging from Derrida to Elvis to Ulmer’s boyhood in Eastern Montana). In this case, however, these fragments serve to guide the student’s movement through a four-step cycle of “career,” “family,” “entertainment,” and “community.” Through various exercises interspersed amongst the aforementioned mosaic (the complexion of which is unabashedly mediated by Ulmer’s ample formulations of both the principle of conductivity itself and the forms and methods by which it might be exploited), the student is directed toward the production of four correlative websites.

     

    Significantly, this progression is to be driven not by the employment of subtending concepts but rather through the recognition of isolated, trans-contextual details (through the circulation, that is, of the gram, the signifier removed from the presumption of fixed subtending meaning). The hoped-for result is the production of a “widesite,” a constellation of text and image derived through the aforementioned succession and used, in turn, as a themata in the formulation of public or professional problems. In one of Ulmer’s many personal examples, the sound of the steel guitar links the country-western music of his boyhood Montana to the hybrid pop music of the contemporary African continent (the sound in question having traveled to both locales from its origins in the Hawaiian method of slack-string guitar tuning). The resulting connection affords Ulmer an idiosyncratic structuring of the various problems connoted by the disciplinary concept of postcolonialism. In this manner, Internet Invention mounts an epistemological formalization of the generative use of extra-disciplinary patterns that researchers of intellectual creativity have ascribed to the work of innovative thinkers in every field. Here, then, resides the site of Ulmer’s intended break: despite its delivery through the familiar interface of the expository text, Internet Invention asks the student/reader to perform a distinctly extra-expository blending of word, sound, and image, a gesture that does not usurp the writing of literate discourse so much as enlist it in a process otherwise obfuscated through the academic espousal of expository knowledge production.

     

    As already suggested, Ulmer’s project rests not so much upon the putative obsolescence of literate epistemology as on the mobilization of methods previously excluded by the pedagogical extolling of expository ends. And as such, the difference between the subtending presumptions of the academic essay and the generative code inherent to the “widesite” cannot be plotted temporally. Media theorist Rita Raley makes a similar point in a productively different manner: in her analysis of the widespread endeavors to discern between (analog) text and (digital) hypertext, Raley notes that any attempt at the binary classification of the two (in terms of their material or ontological differences, for instance) already signals the default invocation of a decidedly analogical method. Alternately, then, Raley formulates the distinction in question through a conceptual inversion of sorts: beginning with the notion of the textual object as that which bespeaks its disciplinary and/or methodological foundations, Raley characterizes hypertextual production as that for which the condition of textuality has simply become prerequisite. As Raley puts it, the analog/digital divide can be said to exist strictly as the precipitate of the movement from the one to the other–with the caveat that it is precisely this anchoring of meaning upon its own anamorphotic trace that defines the hypertextual experience as such.

     

    Where this inversion becomes illuminating with respect to Ulmer’s project is in its implicit formulation of analog representation as a foreclosure of sorts, as a deviation from the “baseline” condition of the hypertext. Within Ulmer’s oeuvre, this same conceptual reversal becomes evident in his frequent references (particularly in his earlier works, such as Teletheory and Heuretics) to the modern suppression of metonymic methods of knowledge production. It is not simply that Ulmer advocates a digital-age return to the pre-literate use of poetics; rather, the point not to be missed (a point that Raley can be said to illuminate by way of analogy) concerns Ulmer’s differentiation between method and potential–his realization, in other words, of the delimited status of the expository code relative to a range of potentialities that was already inherent in the era of literate discourse.

     

    What this analogy underscores in turn, however, is the internal horizon of the mystory itself, the lacuna of Ulmer’s own pedagogical narrative. For once we differentiate between rhetorical interface and technological potentiality, then why wouldn’t we want to locate this split within the literate apparatus itself? In other words, having learned from Ulmer the importance of distinguishing between epistemological method and material specificity, why should we necessarily look to generic alternatives to the essay? Shouldn’t conductive knowledge-formation be expected to function within the form of the modern essay despite this form’s pedagogical subordination to the fantasy of exposition?

     

    We can pursue this point further by way of a quick return to Ulmer’s core impetus. As Ulmer suggests, one of the best rationales for the widesite is the growing need for a means of knowledge production that would effectively mime the postapocalyptic condition of ruin in which we now operate. In delineating his method, then, Ulmer takes as one of his models Freud’s schematization of the dream mechanism–that is, the psychoanalytic theorization of the linking of latent and manifest fragments (or ruins) through the purely associative interactions of visual and textual signs. In the aforementioned case of the disciplinary problem of postcolonialism, for instance, Ulmer’s point is that his investment in the issue derives not from an objective survey of the global cultural-historical landscape but from the conductive linking of discrete contexts through their confluence within polysemic signifiers (“I hated the piles of rocks at the Sand and Gravel plant, but I loved the new rock music on KOMA that we could hear in Montana at night” [116]). In Ulmer’s words, it is the metonymic pursuit of the signifying thread that leads to conceptual epiphany.

     

    Here, then, lies the essence of Ulmer’s crucial contribution. In conclusion, however, the trajectory of his most recent offering can be both corroborated and qualified through a consideration of our academic responses to the public crisis of the 9/11 attacks. As we now know, attempts to place the attacks within pertinent historical contexts merely tended to feed the hegemonic fantasies that our various historiographical expositions sought to dispel (as evidenced, for instance, by the backlash against Susan Sontag’s New Yorker commentary). But consider, in turn, Seattle journalist Charles Mudede’s chronicling of African-American reactions to 9/11. Throughout the wide range of views represented within Mudede’s September 2001 article, one begins to recognize a recurrent expression of anger toward the attackers’ disregard for the domestic victims of American policy. In other words, the position that emerges in Mudede’s piece effectively circumvents the false choice between patriotic solidarity and global sympathy–and it does so through the generative “revelation” of a new chain of knowledge.

     

    Mudede’s article is entitled “Black Flag,” a nice example of conductivity in and of itself. But one could argue that the epistemological significance of the position described in Mudede’s narrative becomes clear only once it is read alongside, say, Martin Luther King Jr.’s proclamations of a violated American dream. King’s strategy was to invoke the American way itself as the context for a new articulation of its own antagonistic failure, its own intrinsic incompleteness. As such, King’s rhetoric further exemplifies the tenet of generative epistemology, the associative linking of fragmentary “ruins” toward the intervening reformulation of public issues.

     

    The point, though, is that in doing so King merely mobilizes the very form of logic that afforded the emergence of the national community in the first place: the predication of new discursive fields upon their own lacuna, upon a condition of purely intrinsic antagonism. Here then, it perhaps becomes necessary to augment the mechanisms of condensation and displacement with the function of the impossible “navel” that Freud posits as the anchor of the dream structure itself: in the seminal case of the emergence of the French republic, for instance, the experience of nationalism erupts precisely as a generative expression of its own incompleteness.1 Likewise, in Raley’s analysis of the comparative status of digital representation, it is precisely this retroactive emergence of the trace that becomes recognized as the zero-degree of the hypertextual field itself–with the important caveat that it is this “field,” as it were, that comprises the logical foundation of the modern episteme as such. With respect to the implementation of Ulmer’s project, the above juxtapositions underscore the possibility of recognizing conductivity as a function that already subtends the modern act of writing. In light of Ulmer’s own demonstration of the distinction between electronic thinking and electronic media, then, the continuation of the project enacted in Internet Invention appears too important to remain displaced onto the anticipatory form of the mystory. In the immediate future, the range of the widesite might well be gainfully extended to the domain of the freshman research paper.

     

    Notes

     

    1. This formulation of the generative basis of nationalist discourse is derived from chapter three of Laclau and Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist Strategy.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. London: Verso, 1985.
    • Mudede, Charles. “Black Flag: The Black Response to America’s Tragedy.” The Stranger. 25 Oct. 2001. 14 Dec. 2002 <http://www.thestranger.com/2001-10-25/feature2.html>.
    • Raley, Rita. “Reveal Codes: Hypertext and Performance.” Postmodern Culture 12 (2001). 26 Nov. 2002 <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/pmc/v012/12.1raley.html>.
    • Sontag, Susan. “Talk of the Town.” The New Yorker. 24 Sept. 2001: 24.
    • Ulmer, Gregory. Applied Grammatology. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1985.
    • —. Heuretics: the Logic of Invention. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1994.
    • —. Internet Invention: from Literacy to Electracy. New York: Pearson, 2003.
    • —. Teletheory: Grammatology in the Age of Video. New York: Routledge, 1989.

     

  • Killing the Big Other

    Daniel Worden

    Department of English & American Literature
    Brandeis University
    dworden@brandeis.edu

     

    Review of: Slavoj Zizek, The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity.Cambridge: MIT P, 2003.

     

    The first book in his “Short Circuits” series from MIT Press, Slavoj Zizek’s The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity strives to radicalize belief and action by revaluing the solid, divine foundation usually thought to underpin religious faith. The book’s title might be misleading for those interested in the study of puppetry or dwarves, for this work does not share a common focus with Susan Stewart’s On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection or Victoria Nelson’s The Secret Life of Puppets.

     

    Instead, The Puppet and the Dwarf alludes to the first of Walter Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History.” Benjamin describes “an automaton constructed in such a way that it could play a winning game of chess.” Inside the chess-playing puppet is “a little hunchback who was an expert chess player” who controls the puppet’s moves. This absurd Turing Machine illustrates the trick involved in theoretical discourse: “the puppet called ‘historical materialism’ is to win all the time. It can easily be a match for anyone, if it enlists the service of theology, which today, as we know, is wizened and has to keep out of sight” (253). Benjamin’s formulation implicates theology as the hidden motor of historical materialism, and the thesis aphoristically argues that “materialist” accounts of history are ultimately guided by theological narratives of salvation, of a progressively inclined “invisible hand,” or of the divine coming of class consciousness. Zizek reverses this formulation to mount an attack not against theology in general or Christianity in particular, but against deconstruction.

     

    At the outset of the book, Zizek claims that in our historical moment “the theological dimension is given a new lease on life in the guise of the postsecular ‘Messianic’ turn of deconstruction” (3). Deconstruction assumes the position of Benjamin’s chess-playing puppet, while historical materialism retreats to the dwarf’s position. Never sparing of deconstruction, Zizek’s formulation here and throughout unapologetically links deconstruction to the pasty liberalism he is so fond of deriding. However, lurking behind Zizek’s usual critique of liberal political positions (multiculturalism, identity politics, human rights), there lies a more intriguing relation to deconstruction. Zizek devotes a great number of pages in this book to Saint Paul, one of his heroes, and Jesus, a man whom he values not as the son of God but as he who kills himself in order to save himself from becoming doxa. Jesus seems to figure here as none other than Jacques Derrida, the messianic voice of deconstruction, around whom disciples gather, and Paul as none other than Zizek himself, the outsider who rigorously theorizes and institutionalizes the excess out of the dominant tradition. Christianity serves as the allegory through which Zizek critiques and proposes a solution to the apolitical “messianism” of deconstruction.

     

    The messianic promise has recently taken the shape of “elsewhere” in Derrida’s writings. As he claims in Monolingualism of the Other; or, The Prosthesis of Origin, this elsewhere exists “on the shores” of language, just barely unreachable and unspeakable, but nevertheless it is that which constitutes language’s promise. In Monolingualism of the Other, Derrida constructs a dialogue on the limits of language, and language’s limits give way to the promise of an “elsewhere”:

     

    you at once appreciate the source of my sufferings, the place of my passions, my desires, my prayers, the vocation of my hopes, since this language runs right across them all. But I am wrong, wrong to speak of a crossing and a place. For it is on the shores of the French language, uniquely, and neither inside nor outside it, on the unplaceable line of its coast that, since forever, and lastingly [à demeure], I wonder if one can love, enjoy oneself [jouir], pray, die from pain, or just die, plain and simple, in another language or without telling one about it, without even speaking at all. (2)

     

    Occurring “on the shores” of language, this “wonder” reaches for the promise of unmediated transparency. Derrida here seriously entertains the possibility of an “unspeakable” that promises the very profundity of belief that remains “lastingly” inaccessible. Zizek traces this concept of the unspeakable to Hegel’s “absolute panlogicism” and Lacan’s formulation of the Real as not external to the Symbolic, in effect arguing that language overlays the real and in so doing punctures its surface:

     

    it is not that we need words to designate objects, to symbolize reality, and that then, in surplus, there is some excess of reality, a traumatic core that resists symbolization--this obscurantist theme of the unnameable Core of Higher Reality that eludes the grasp of language is to be thoroughly rejected; not because of a naïve belief that everything can be nominated, grasped by our reason, but because of the fact that the Unnameable is an effect of language. We have reality before our eyes well before language, and what language does, in its most fundamental gesture, is--as Lacan put it--the very opposite of designating reality: it digs a hole in it, it opens up a visible/present reality toward the dimension of the immaterial/unseen. When I simply see you, I simply see you--but it is only by naming you that I can indicate the abyss in you beyond what I see. (70)

     

    This dialectical relation between reality and language, that reality is explained by language, while the latter, through its articulation, exposes reality as propped up by nothing in its fundamental rootlessness, though, never reaches even a tentative synthesis. The praxis that emerges from this insight seems to be simply that one is responsible for one’s own decisions, a solution more descriptive than prescriptive. Zizek lacks a positive program of action, causing his work here to resonate with the moral ambiguousness that emerges out of Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, an embrace of radical freedom that fails to develop a normative component to guide one’s radically free choices.

     

    To give his Christian allegory of deconstruction and ideology critique a positive component, a model of intellectual praxis, Zizek theorizes what, exactly, Paul did to the Jewish tradition to force a radical break between Judaism and Christianity. This radical break occurs because of the “perverse core” of which the book’s title speaks; the promised core, simply put, is no core at all. The messianic promise of Christianity is a hollow promise, for God, the core, can do nothing but fail to act. God is a “petit objet a,” an object that is desired but can never satisfy. Zizek performs a convincing reading of Jesus’s question during the crucifixion–“God, why hast thou forsaken me?”–to support this point. Instead of marking the necessity of Jesus becoming fully human so that he could then rise from the dead and ascend to heaven, Jesus’s question exposes God’s essential impotence. God forsakes Jesus because God is powerless to do anything. The messianic promise is exposed in Christianity to be a promise with no possibility of fulfillment. Like the commodity, Christ is figured as that which gives value to humanity by promising to be more than human. As Zizek claims in a previous work, On Belief, “Christ directly embodies/assumes the excess that makes the human animal a proper human being” (99). But this excess is always already fictional, an excess that ideologically inflects desire.

     

    The argument of The Puppet and the Dwarf has much less to do with actual theology than with present-day critical theory. Concerned not with the “historical” Jesus or the “historical” Paul (although he does cite historical studies and even an “alternative” history that asks, “what if Jesus had not been betrayed by Judas and crucified but had lived to a ripe old age?”), Zizek’s argument is aimed at contemporary ideology, particularly leftist ideology. Since theology is the puppet against whom we all play chess (theology not only in the sense of a messianic promise but also in the sense of the valuation of things as sacred, including, but not limited to, our bodies, our health, commodities, and the cultures of ourselves and others), then theology itself must be modified. Zizek’s book, in this sense, is an attempt to embrace the dwarf (historical materialism) and forego the puppet (theology). If Christ is ultimately human with no excess content that makes him transcendent, then the Big Other turns out to not be a Big Other after all. Accordingly, one should view the world not as constituted by radical difference but instead as always reaching toward a totality. Christianity, then, demystifies Otherness and allows for collective formations:

     

    insofar as the Other is God Himself, I should risk the claim that it is the epochal achievement of Christianity to reduce its Otherness to Sameness: God Himself is Man, "one of us" [...]. The ultimate horizon of Christianity is thus not respect for the neighbor, for the abyss of its impenetrable otherness; it is possible to go beyond--not, of course, to penetrate the Other directly, to experience the Other as it is "in itself," but to become aware that there is no mystery, no hidden true content, behind the mask (deceptive surface) of the Other. (138)

     

    Opposed to the Levinasian insistence of absolute Otherness, Zizek affirms radical collectivity as the basis for an ethics, an ethics that figures “believers” as the idolatrous and those who fail to believe in the content behind the “face of God” as the radically pious. Through recognizing that ideology is everywhere and denying the “messianic promise” of a pure language or a divine politics, one embraces radical freedom and responsibility.

     

    The alternative to the absolute alterity of Levinas, Zizek argues, is ideology critique. Discontented with the reification of cultural difference as an alibi for ideologically informed exploitation, the book calls for a renewed investment in the demystification of perceived differences that are not evidence of “the Big Other” but instead are cultural productions. The clearest sense of this ideology occurs in Zizek’s endorsement of a “return to the earlier Derrida of différance,” wherein the subject perceives that something rendered “outside” by ideology is in fact “inside”:

     

    in this precise sense, the "primordial" difference is not between things themselves, nor between things and their signs, but between the thing and the void of an invisible screen which distorts our perception of the thing so that we do not take the thing for itself. (143)

     

    This plea might sound pathetic, even humanistic. But, within the schema of the book, similarities emerge through communal recognition and action, not through one-to-one reified individual interaction. Zizek’s recent book endorses ideology critique as a means of rendering texts–film, fiction, philosophy, psychoanalysis, theory–as moments of ideological work, both mystifying and liberating. Zizek reads theology as a philosophy, as productive of a metaphysics that burrows within liberal ideology in the form of a reverence for Otherness and a refusal to think Otherness as Sameness. In this register, The Puppet and the Dwarf complicates the common methodology underlying postcolonial studies, gender studies, queer theory, race studies, and deconstruction.

     

    Paul emerges as the hero of this book, for he exposes the lack at the center of the messianic promise and then builds a scaffolding around that lack. As Zizek argues in the Appendix on “Ideology Today,” the structure of the commodity matches up nicely with the belief that “the face of God” marks an alien consciousness. Using the example of the Kinder Egg, the chocolate candy that contains a toy, Zizek remarks that “a child who buys this chocolate egg often unwraps it nervously and just breaks the chocolate, not bothering to eat it, worrying only about the toy in the center” (145); the child who cares only for the promised interior to the egg matches up with the consumer, caring only for the promised commodity’s value never to be given, or messianic deconstruction, with its promise of “elsewhere,” desiring the Unnameable which can only remain so as an effect of language.

     

    Interestingly, the example of the Kinder Egg also mirrors the opening image of Benjamin’s dwarf-piloted puppet. Like the child, the consumer, and the deconstructionist, Zizek too seizes on the interior, historical materialism, while discarding the puppet, theology. Zizek’s system here, if it is even systematic enough to be called such, is structured around a lack, like the other systems that he both criticizes and admires. While the scaffolding constructed around any lack eventually becomes rigid doxa, much like Lenin’s politics eventually informing the rigid totalitarianism of Stalin, there remains a fleeting moment when one is radically responsible for one’s choices, when ideology no longer determines actions but gives way to freedom.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Benjamin, Walter. “Theses on the Philosophy of History.” Illuminations. Ed. Hannah Arendt. Trans. Harry Zohn. New York: Schocken, 1969. 253-64.
    • Derrida, Jacques. Monolingualism of the Other; or, the Prosthesis of Origin. Trans. Patrick Mensah. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998.
    • Zizek, Slavoj. On Belief. New York: Routledge, 2001.

     

  • Irigaray’s Erotic Ontology

    Hillary L. Chute

    Department of English
    Rutgers University
    Kinny8@hotmail.com

     

    Review of: Luce Irigaray, Between East and West: From Singularity to Community.New York: Columbia UP, 2002.

     

    Many contemporary feminist thinkers reject the accusation, most forcefully leveled by Monique Plaza in 1978, that Luce Irigaray’s theories of the feminine are naturalist. Irigaray’s conception of “the feminine” is hardly biological, but rather an “interrogative mood,” writes Meaghan Morris, coming to her defense in 1978; Morris imagined the iconoclastic philosopher lingering in a doorway, an ironic “recalcitrant outsider at the festival of feminine specificity” (64). Irigaray’s lasting radical concepts, including the “two lips,” which posits a feminist economy of knowledge production–chains of speaking in which no one ever speaks the final word–have invigorated feminist philosophy in both esoteric and popular milieus, as the resurgence of Irigaray’s reputation in academia in the 1990s and her influence on the grassroots theorizing of the recent Riot Girl movement confirm. A special issue of Diacritics in 1998, with titles like “Toward a Radical Female Imaginary: Temporality and Embodiment in Irigaray’s Ethics” and “Women on the Global Market: Irigaray and the Democratic State,” attests to the fact that Irigaray, once unfortunately unfashionable among U.S. feminists, still provokes and compels some thirty years after she transformed the feminist critical landscape with her second doctoral thesis, which became one of her most important books, The Speculum of the Other Woman.

     

    In one of the most inspiring grapplings with Irigaray’s work, Beyond Accommodation: Ethical Feminism, Deconstruction, and the Law (1991; 1999), Drucilla Cornell rejects any notion that Irigaray’s “feminine” can be mapped onto femaleness, or even that it describes something that exists in reality. Rather, Cornell explains, the feminine is “a kind of radical otherness to any conception of the real.”1 Cornell persuasively describes Irigaray’s category of the “feminine” as a space of the prospective, a conditional tense that inaugurates a certain future within language and within intelligibility. The fears in U.S. feminist academic circles (much less acute abroad) of what was seen as Irigaray’s essentialism now tell us more about the exigencies of backlash provoked by poststructuralism than about the real nature of Irigaray’s work. For, again to quote Morris, in fact “Luce Irigaray is very far from confusing the anatomical and the social, but works with a deadly deliberation on the point (the site and the purpose) of the confusion of anatomical and cultural” (64).

     

    Now that the polemic of essentialism versus constructionism no longer dominates feminist scholarship, contemporary critics like Cornell and others have begun to engage Irigaray on her own terms. In her new work, Between East and West, Irigaray continues to do what she’s always done: interrogate the binaries of Western metaphysics, question what passes as normative rationality, insist on sexual difference as the impetus for the ethical apprehension of the Other. But here she also moves beyond the “feminine” as a critical space of possibility, to talk about actual breathing, stretching, orgasmic female bodies.

     

    In this addition to Columbia University Press’s “European Perspectives” series, Irigaray’s tone is open, appraising–lacking the charged, tricky edge of “loyalty and aggression,” to use Judith Butler’s phrase, that characterizes her early, furious outfoxings of Plato and Freud (19). Here she dispatches the Pope with two words–“naïve paganism”–and takes a mere snip at deconstruction, identifying its practitioner’s virtuosity with a too “secular manner of know-how” and hence with Western man’s domination of nature: “does not the technical cleverness of the deconstructor risk accelerating, without possible check or alternative, a process that appears henceforth almost inevitable?” (5). In Between East and West, Irigaray has herself abandoned some of this “technical cleverness” and with it too the anger that fueled her first dizzying displays of critical prowess. Here, Irigaray is once more focused intently on what Morris admiringly identified as writing the “elsewhere.” Like Cornell, her American colleague in philosophy, Irigaray is “dreaming of the new”–what she calls “human becoming”–but her dominant mood is one of sadness for an entire civilization gone astray: “we are to have become at best objects of study. Like the whole living world, destroyed little by little by the exploration-exploitation of what it is instead of cultivating what it could become” (85, vii).

     

    Searching for a different way to “constitute the mental,” Irigaray diagnoses our current condition as breathing badly: we are “bathing in a sort of socio-cultural placenta” of exhaled, already-used air (74). Yet when it comes down to it, Irigaray is not simply employing a pretty metaphor. Literal breathing is, she believes, a way out of the potential pitfalls of the “linguistic turn”:

     

    We Westerners believe that the essential part of culture resides in words, in texts, or perhaps in works of art, and that physical exercise should help us to dedicate ourselves to this essential. For the masters of the East, the body itself can become spirit through the cultivation of breathing. Without doubt, at the origin of our tradition--for Aristotle, for example, and still more for Empedocles--the soul still seems related to the breath, to air. But the link between the two was then forgotten, particularly in philosophy. The soul, or what takes its place, has become the effect of conceptualizations and of representations and not the result of a practice of breathing. (7)

     

    To cultivate the kind of consciousness needed to be aware of breathing–and different, gendered modes of breathing–would constitute a re-education of the body, a spiritualization of the body in the present tense that Western metaphysical tradition, with its emphasis on divine, inaccessible transcendence, has occluded. In the Western framework, the possibility of the very “divine” character of sexual difference itself falls by the wayside. This metaphysics, Irigaray argues, has sacrificed the pleasures of the spiritualized, individuated body by focusing on the fruits of reproductive intelligence, both literal and figurative: “man essentially wants to reproduce […] [He] gives birth to imaginary children. Philosophy and religion are two of them,” she quips (26).

     

    Irigaray turns to the traditions of India to present a model of a different kind of plenitude, one radically different from Schopenhauer’s schema of the “genius of the species,” in which “love between lovers represents nothing but an irresistible reproductive attraction. […] as individuals, the lovers do not exist. […]. They are differentiated only by the hierarchy of natural functions” (25). India, Irigaray muses, has a philosophy of sexual difference with no separation of theory and practice, where the continuity between microcosm (the body) and macrocosm (the universe) ensures an ethic of caring about “the maintenance of the life of the universe and […] body as cosmic nature” (31).

     

    Where is Irigaray going with all this? One of her primary targets is the too-abstract nature of Western culture. Attention to the body demands a practice and a framework of intention, the goal being an “accomplished” and “connected” interiority (the Hindus, she writes, worship individuation as body, as self, but not as ego–unlike the egological Schopenhauer). Our reigning ethos is too speculative, sociological, she wagers; it has run away from–but needs desperately to return to–consideration and cultivation of sensory perceptions.

     

    Irigaray takes this moment, before bemoaning the fact that “the majority of animals have erotic displays that we no longer even have,” to interject an intriguing, if brief, narrative of her own (ontological and psychoanalytic) education:

     

    It has often been said to me that I should have conquered my body, that I should have subjected it to spirit. The development of spirit was presented to me in the form of philosophical or religious texts, of abstract imperatives, of (an) absent God(s), at best of politeness and love. But why could love not come about in the respect and cultivation of my/our bodies? It seems to me this dimension of human development is indispensable. (61)

     

    This brings us to the aspect of the book that stands out the most: its powerful obsession with Eros. This direction in Irigaray’s work has always distinguished her enterprise and is perhaps responsible for the renewed respectful attention to even her earliest theorizations of the body. Irigaray’s most fervent argument here is for the creative–but not necessarily procreative–integrity of what she memorably names “carnal sharing.” Irigaray goes further here in specifying the parameters and contours of “the carnal” than do other feminist theorists. Cornell, for instance, advocates but never actually details a “carnal ethics” in Beyond Accommodation (in which the concept is her shorthand for taking the body, and the Other, seriously).

     

    Irigaray’s focus on the carnal emphasizes that carnal union can be a privileged place of individuation, an engaged practice even more rigorous than the renunciation of the flesh. The body, then, is the “very site” where the spiritual gets built. To put it baldly, “men and women have something besides children to engender” (64). This is not merely what Fredric Jameson terms Molly Bloom’s sensual, affirmative “vitalist ideology,” but rather “an evolved, transmuted, transfigured corporeal” (63). Here sexual difference, manifest in the physical union of bodies, provides a fabric for a type of transcendence that Irigaray theorizes as productively “horizontal,” in contradistinction to the genealogical transcendence outlined by Schopenhauer.

     

    Sexual energy is often sinfully paralyzed in regimes of knowledge–even leftist or feminist ones–and it is equally stagnant under postmodernity’s “technical chains” and multiplicity of information that theorists like Jameson and David Harvey analyze. Irigaray exhorts the postmodern subject to revolt against all that produces obeisance (“abandon the clarity of judgement!” she demands), even obeisant patterns of breathing (116). “The flesh,” then, can become both spirit and “soul” (conceived as a force animating the body), thanks to the conscious physical machinations of the body. Irigaray sees the body registering shades of non-compliance to metaphysical strictures and thought patterns. A new sexuality invested with mystery works against the idea that sex is a base “corporeal particularity,” yet Irigaray desires an erotic ontology of sexual difference whose foundations are not solely in the abstract. Here Irigaray’s focus is on the bridge that real bodies create–not on the theoretical “elsewhere” in language that the “feminine” once seemed to powerfully indicate (escaping the tyranny of logos, in fact, is a recurring theme).

     

    Unfortunately, however, unlike in her earlier work, here Irigaray’s rhetoric–while grand and even gorgeous–often slips into the “vive la difference” or even the “opposites attract” approach that for years feminists have understandably been writing past: “what attracts men and women to each other, beyond the simple corporeal difference, is a difference of subjectivity” (84). It is further disconcerting, then, when she also declares, “love, including carnal love, becomes the construction of a new human identity through that basic unit of community: the relation between man and woman” (117, emphasis mine). She also proposes legislation to “protect […] the difference between subjects, particularly the difference of gender” (102).2 Irigaray’s stubborn insistence on restricting her purview to the male-female dyad is unwarranted, even willfully ignorant. That she bypasses consideration of same-sex “unions,” spiritual or physical or legal, even in her chapter devoted to mixité, the “mixing” up of the normative family as a principle for refounding community, is a central weakness of this text. While she speaks of multiracial and, more broadly, of “multicultural” and mixed-religion couples, and of family “mutations” as a factor of progress, never does she so much as mention a gay family or how, on a basic theoretical level, carnal sharing between people of the same sex might challenge or transvalue her ethic of sexual difference, the dialectic between two gendered consciousnesses that she views as a bedrock of culture. Her conceptualization of a solution to the dilemma of subjectivity and community–that “being I” and “being we” become instead simply “beings-in-relation” (yet with “I” and “you” still individuated, singular)–is seductive, but her strong emphasis on the relation between the genders as “the privileged place for the creation of horizontal relations” leaves much unanswered. Carnal love, Irigaray strongly suggests (and her prose, dotted with metaphors of openings, elevations, and ladders, affirms) is vaginal sex.

     

    Generalizations about men and women abound; Irigaray flies in the face of poststructuralist doxa. Sometimes this is refreshing, an invocation of political common sense, as when she snaps, “the corporeal and spiritual experience of woman is singular, and what she can teach of it to her daughter and to her son is not the same. To efface this contribution of the transmission of culture is to falsify its truth and value” (59). But when Irigaray issues such proclamations as, “woman also remains in greater harmony with the cosmos” and ascribes–much like Carol Gilligan did in her seminal, roundly criticized A Different Voice (1982)–a relational ontology to woman, one begins to suspect that she is idealizing: “woman has, from her birth, an almost spontaneous taste for relational life” (85, 87). The list of woman’s attributes goes on along these lines, though Irigaray is careful, in drawing in part on Eastern feminine traditions for inspiration, to make clear that she is not invoking the maternal; in fact, as she states rather frankly, “the role of woman as lover is in some ways superior and more inclusive compared with that of the mother” (89).

     

    Yet in Irigaray’s most recent schema, what is finally most frustrating about her fascinating and provocative vision of mental, spiritual, and physical erotic production is that women bear the burden of educating men. Ethics, Irigaray points out, differ for men and women; but while Gilligan, and Seyla Benhabib most notably after her, aimed to revise the dichotomies structuring this perceived enculturated difference, Irigaray seems only to substitute the physical for the numinous with the idea of the “spiritual virginity of woman,” a quality that helps man discover relational life. Hence, women must teach men to breathe not only for the sake of male survival, but also to cultivate men’s interior vitality (88). The thought that woman must spiritually give birth to already-adult men is unappealing, to say the least; yet woman must also “initiate” and “safeguard” the process of education (130). To put it simply, compared to men, women have a markedly spiritual role in furthering humanity. Irigaray’s rallying call is as follows:

     

    The task is great, yet passionate and beautiful. It is indispensable for the liberation of women themselves and, more generally, for a culture of life and love. It requires patience, perseverance, faithfulness to self and to the other. Women are often lacking these virtues today. But why not acquire them? (91)

     

    To use Irigaray’s own language (from her description of Brahma, the Indian god), women’s genius is not to know everything, but to be capable of one more question.

     

    Resolutely diagnosing Western civilization and seeing that we are, at best, as Irigaray puts it, sometimes good patriarchs or good matriarchs, Irigaray posits the goal of establishing a global civil community–and especially an as-yet-unrealized civil identity in the feminine. It is not enough to criticize patriarchy, she correctly observes. Women need to be aware of themselves as women, letting go of fundamentally conservative models of substantive equality and pursuing an ethics of carnality that surpasses instinct, the urge to procreate, in favor of a disciplined and rewarding “becoming without an end” (99). Irigaray calmly offers options for this “new epoch of History,” affirming her hopeful belief in “tranquil world revolution” (145).

     

    Irigaray’s argument and the strategy for civil identity that she describes are both deeply compelling and deeply flawed. What is viable here is Irigaray’s evaluation of the erotic as a political foundation for subjectivity and the social. Serious and vital, Irigaray’s critical attention to the erotic–not just as “philosophy,” but as the sensible–skillfully connects Eros with ethical community-building and carries much power. Her ongoing and adamant focus on the erotic–ongoing since she unforgettably announced that women’s desire “upsets the linearity of a project, undermines the goal-object of desire, diffuses the polarization toward a single pleasure, [and] disconcerts fidelity to a single discourse” in “This Sex Which is Not One”–remains Irigaray’s outstanding achievement (27). The major–and riveting–contribution of Between East and West is that her relational ontology is specifically premised on an expansive erotic ontology, and this locus allows Irigaray to make her most provocative statements. Her privileging of individuated sexual “becoming” between lovers over motherhood in the chapter “The Family Begins With Two,” for instance, is still indubitably radical. For many in the academy and in spaces of activism alike (and this is especially the case for the new generation of young feminists), Irigaray remains the most moving and articulate theorist of the body’s relation to the horizon of the political.

     

    Ultimately, however, much of what Irigaray outlines in this new work is problematic. She is, as she has always been, frustrating. This is part of her continuing appeal, her bid for us to engage. “The path of such accomplishment of the flesh does not correspond to a solipsistic dream of Luce Irigaray, nor to a fin-de-siècle utopia, but to a new stage to be realized by humanity,” she reminds us (115). It is not the commanding, exalted language, threaded with hope, that is objectionable. It is rather that Irigaray, in focusing solely on the generative force of sexual alliances between men and women, boldly ignores myriad portions of this resurgent “humanity” and the question of how they fit into her plan for the future. Irigaray consistently writes of “the union of two lovers, man and woman, free with respect to genealogy”; of how “between these two subjects, man and woman, there takes place […] a spiritual generation, a culture foreign to a unique objective and a unique absolute” (63, 100). She notes–and casually dismisses–other possibilities, as when she writes of her hope for a refigured concept of the familial: “a family is born when two persons, most generally a man and a woman, decide to live together” (105, emphasis mine).

     

    Hence this brilliant and difficult philosopher ends an essentially fascinating text with what feels like voluntary obliquity. The stubbornness of this narrow vision is all the more confounding because Irigaray’s proposals–her championing of the nonreproductive family, for instance, and her order for women to “pass from […] imposed natural identity”–would seem to lend themselves to a more inclusive theory of sexuality (112). In this disappointing adoption, late in her career, of what strikes me as an inadequate (and yet surely self-aware) romance of gender, Irigaray is not alone: fellow French feminist Julia Kristeva’s Revolt, She Said (also published in 2002) smacks of the same. As interviewer Phillipe Petit remarks to Kristeva in this book, “what is difficult to understand with you is the type of place you reserve for men and women in heterosexual couples” (93).3 The force of Irigaray’s argument would only be strengthened by a discussion of carnal sharing outside of the male-female dyad. If she further addressed the modes of love and union that her gender-charged “sexual difference in the feminine” does not furnish, her model would be even more relevant.

     

    Notes

     

    1. See Cheah and Grosz for Cornell’s retrospective elaboration of her views of “the feminine” in Beyond Accommodation. The “imaginary domain” is the concept Cornell now prefers in place of the Irigarayan feminine.

     

    2. The content of this proposed legislation isn’t surprising, given the fact that Irigaray has addressed certain questions of “sexuate rights” to the UN, for example, as Elizabeth Grosz points out, and has touched on this in recent work. See Pheng and Grosz.

     

    3. Kristeva’s response to Petit is vague, describing the “endemic and deep” feminine melancholia that is the result of woman’s relationship to the social order and indicating that “[balancing] out this strangeness” requires economic independence, as well as psychic and existential reassurance in which “husbands and lovers try to offset the Bovary blues that affect most of us.” Unlike Irigaray, Kristeva here posits the primary role of the child: for woman, “it’s the child who is the real presence and becomes her permanent analyst.” Like Irigaray, Kristeva believes that “women hold the key to the species on the condition that they share it with men” (94).

    Works Cited

     

    • Cheah, Pheng, and Elizabeth Grosz. “The Future of Sexual Difference: An Interview with Judith Butler and Drucilla Cornell.” Diacritics 28.1 (1998): 19-42.
    • Irigaray, Luce. “This Sex Which Is Not One.” This Sex Which Is Not One. Trans. Catherine Porter with Carolyn Burke. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1985.
    • Kristeva, Julia. Revolt, She Said. Trans. Brian O’Keeffe. New York:Semiotext(e), 2002.
    • Morris, Meaghan. “The Pirate’s Fiancée: Feminists and Philosophers, or maybe tonight it’ll happen.” The Pirate’s Fiancée: Feminism, Reading, Postmodernism. London: Verso, 1988.
    • Plaza, Monique. “‘Phallomorphic Power’ and the Psychology of ‘Woman.’” Ideology and Consciousness 4 (1978): 4-36.

     

  • Not Just a Matter of the Internet

    Stuart J. Murray

    Department of Rhetoric
    University of California, Berkeley
    sjmurray@socrates.berkeley.edu

     

    Review of: Mark Poster, What’s the Matter with the Internet?.Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2001.

     

    There is surely a double entendre at work in the title of Mark Poster’s book, What’s the Matter with the Internet?. In this matter, it is not just a question of what might have gone wrong, what danger lurks behind the Internet’s promise. We’re also asked to consider the ways in which the Internet and related technologies bear upon matter itself, upon the very real and material conditions of human culture.

     

    If a picture is worth a thousand words, the photograph reproduced in the front matter of the book makes a strong statement. The caption adequately conveys the immediate sense of the picture:

     

    in a new configuration of the virtual, an orthodox Jew at the sacred site of the Wailing Wall holds a cell phone so that a distant friend can pray.

     

    Here we are offered a jarring image of what for some is an unholy alliance between the old and the new. If the sacred can still be said to exist in our modern world, it does not merely exist alongside new technologies, but has, as this photograph attests, become inseparable from them.

     

    This is an extreme example, but it captures a common theme shared by the essays collected in this volume. If the early context of critical theory was capitalism, Poster argues, today it is surely the mode of information. Information has assumed the form of a commodity, silently and invisibly working to reconfigure what we call “culture,” upsetting the bounds of tradition, redefining who we are, and troubling political terminologies and identities. Poster suggests that such a politics is outmoded: “culture has lost its boundary” (2). And this most certainly ushers in a crisis of identity and meaning no less than it opens up hitherto unavailable possibilities for subjects, citizens, races, classes, and genders to be configured anew. What are the possibilities for loosening rigid notions of ontogeny, epistemology, and identity in a recombinant world of 0/1/0/1…? And how desirable would this be? While Poster’s critics have often been quick to seize on the more utopian aspects of his analyses, they usually overlook the material import of his work, inadequately acknowledging the subtleties at play and the risks at stake.

     

    Several of the essays collected in What’s the Matter with the Internet? have appeared elsewhere, but at the heart of these and especially in his new work, Poster is at his best. In the last two decades, Poster has earned a well-deserved reputation not least for translating and interpreting Baudrillard, but also for rendering the difficult theory of members of the Frankfurt School and of more recent thinkers such as Foucault, Habermas, Derrida, and Lyotard accessible to North American academic audiences. This book continues the tradition of lucid exegesis while at the same time firmly establishing Poster as an original thinker in his own right; in these pages he has really come into his own, and his voice is one worth listening to. Even more than in The Second Media Age (1995), these essays are theoretically rich and risk original analyses by adapting a political economy critique to the new media.

     

    For instance, in chapter two, “The Being of Technologies,” Poster resituates the insights of Heidegger’s famous essay on technology for our current digital context.1 He argues: “The terms of the debate over technology must be reconceived in relation to the emergence of qualitatively new kinds of machines” (23). These new machines pose significant challenges. The traditional view of technology went only so far as conceiving machinery materially, as that which is of and which affects matter. Today, however, “the matter” with the Internet and related techno-machines is that their effects are profoundly symbolic, and therefore bear on society, culture, and politics in new and complex ways. Today’s techno-machines must be conceived as engaging in technical and rational activities; consequently, technology enjoys a kind of “agency”–a power traditionally preserved for human subjects. Poster continues to challenge us to think the ways in which the boundaries between human subjects and machines have become blurred, from both sides. He has recently dramatized this alliance by the awkward locution “network digital information humachines.”2

     

    Not so long ago, the human alone was celebrated as the unique alloy, as a symbolizing and material entity, both spiritual and corporeal. Aquinas tells us how even the angels envy man for this! And since the humanism of the Enlightenment, man3 has been the measure of all things, the source of truth and justice, the locus of value, and the bearer of rights. But intelligent machines, made in our image, effectively challenge human supremacy, bringing to light the conceits of liberal humanism. As Poster points out, “the failure to distinguish between machines that act upon matter and those that act upon symbols mars the humanist critique” (23). Of course, these machines do not aspire to be gods, but they do seriously rattle the foundations of Enlightenment reason, truth, and justice–including their material effects in social, cultural, and political contexts.

     

    Thus the “challenge” that comes from techno-machines is much more radical than the kind of “challenging forth” [Herausfordern] that Heidegger envisaged. Heidegger’s view of technology is instrumentalist; for him, machines “challenge forth” the environment in a particular way, “enframing” [gestellen] nature as an object at the behest of a machinic will to power. Ultimately, not only nature but humanity itself gets configured as an available resource or “standing reserve” [Bestand]. Despite himself, however, Heidegger remains ensconced in a humanist frame insofar as he believes that we can be saved from technological dangers without altogether destroying technology and returning to some bucolic past. According to Heidegger, our “saving power” lies in our very human capacity to philosophize. Poster points out the limitations of Heidegger’s instrumentalist view of technology, offering an approach more in keeping with the information age. Poster remarks: “there is a being of technology and […] it varies depending upon the material constraints of the technology” (35). In Poster’s view, technology generates its own autonomous constraints, free from the constraints we would place on a subject who acts, and free from humanist conceits: “the machine itself inscribes meaning, enunciates, but it does so within its own register, not as a human subject would” (36). This is perhaps more sinister than Heidegger could have imagined, for it not only acknowledges that techno-machines signify in hitherto unimaginable ways, but that a shoring up of humanism’s liberal subject is both anachronistic and futile if our project is to reassert supremacy.

     

    Because the human subject appears to be irreversibly situated within a worldwide technological web, the traditional Cartesian notion of subjectivity is no longer relevant. As we saw with the photograph mentioned above, even human sacred practices are now imbricated within ever-expanding technologies. Poster writes:

     

    the network has become more and more complex as dimension has been overlaid upon dimension, progressing to the point that Cartesian configurations of space/time, body/mind, subject/object--patterns that are essential components of [Heideggerian] enframing--are each reconstituted in new, even unrepresentable forms. (37)

     

    And the matter at hand is not merely that complexity has rendered these patterns epistemologically “unrepresentable,” somehow unknowable or outside of logic; rather, they have also undergone an ontological shift. The metaphysics of presence must now be rewritten. It is no longer sensible to theorize a subject who would possess or otherwise represent and know an object. If there is a “subject” (and the term itself must be debated), this “subject,” along with its “consciousness” and “agency,” must be theorized as part of the diffuse and decentralized network in which it is taken up.

     

    Thus, even the subjectivity of the author must be reconceived in light of digital networks. Drawing on Foucault’s discussion of authorship and what he calls the “author function,” Poster spends two chapters reframing this discussion in light of current technologies and the subjectivities they foster. We must first overthrow the cultural assumptions based on the paradigm of print media. He distinguishes between what he calls an “analogue author” and a “digital author.” The central difference between these two is the relation each has to his or her work; for the analogue author, written work is seen as participating in a kind of material contiguity reminiscent of analogue technologies, whereas for the digital author, written work is further displaced from any “source” in symbolic ways akin to digitized products. In Poster’s words, analogue authors assume and “configure a strong bond between the text and the self of the writer, a narcissistic, mirroring relation” (69), whereas digital authorship is a relation of “greater alterity” (69), “a rearticulation of the author from the center of the text to its margins, from the source of meaning to an offering” (91).

     

    The being of the network not only bears upon the authorial subject, but it impacts those domains in which subjects locate themselves, claim identities and affiliations, and demand political recognition, often as a form of representation. In addition to the radical challenge to a metaphysics of representation, Poster develops a critique of the subject and its sociocultural contexts through a sustained reflection on nationhood and identity in the age of global technology. What, for instance, is the fate of the nation-state in the digital age? From a digital perspective, information can in theory be perfectly, infinitely, and extremely inexpensively reproduced. Thus, the presence and authority of any so-called original is displaced along with its “author.” In Benjamin’s terms, it has lost its “aura.” “Once digitized,” Poster remarks, “the original cultural object loses its privilege, its ability to control copies of itself, escaping the laws that would manage it” (104). As far as national(ist) institutions are concerned, this might well result in a declining ability to control or govern ways in which particular cultural products or discourses are consumed and circulated as the norm. Although we may register this change in form as a loss of and even as a threat to traditional subject-positions, with a shift in perspective we shall see that the field has opened up for various and multiple discourses: less centralized, less normative, and allowing for individual empowerment through more local and grass-roots activism. Of course, this is an ideal, and a distant one; Poster cites compelling examples and he is hopeful, but cautiously so.

     

    Today more than ever we live in a state of what Poster calls “postnational anxiety.” Although this book was published in 2001, before the events of 9/11, it eerily anticipates our culture of terror and the extreme governmental response designed to resignify “America” as part of its effort to safeguard her “homeland” and its interests from would-be enemies, both domestic and foreign. Poster cites Timothy McVeigh as a patriot whose acts were motivated by “postnational anxiety”–in McVeigh’s case, specifically the fear of a multiracial society. Interestingly, Poster states that the efforts of the U.S. government, “while apparently in opposition, are in fact responding to the same conditions of postnationalism” (106). His critical point is that neither McVeigh nor the U.S. government knows how to respond to the ongoing process of globalization:

     

    The U.S. government's very effort to secure its borders from "terrorism" (one might see terrorism as an aspect of globalization) is similar to the fantasy on the part of the bomber in Oklahoma of an America secure from the "contamination" of foreign bodies. (106)

     

    Thus, a shoring up of national borders, a “return” to American “family values,” and the like, is a reaction that seeks to bolster traditional forms of subjectivity with a corresponding nationalism and political identity; however, in all likelihood this incommensurate response will prove ineffective against the diffuse, global, and decentralized terrorist networks that constitute a numinous “enemy.” It is therefore not surprising that official state rhetoric would assign evil a name and a face: without Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein as subjective counterparts to the just and piously crusading subject/nation-state, there would be no enemy and no war. As this troubling example illustrates, while the Internet and related technologies might suggest new possibilities for postnational forms of political authority and authorship–for “CyberDemocracy,” as Poster says–these possibilities are as yet without a navigable roadmap. Poster does, however, provide a thoughtful analysis of some of the paradigm shifts that must occur if we are to meet the political challenges raised by global(izing) technologies.

     

    The network operates behind the scenes, as it were. This is a Marxian insight regarding capitalism, brought to bear here on the mode of information. We hear everywhere that we have entered a “digital” or “new” economy where intellectual property and information itself are commodified. In a chapter titled “Capitalism’s Linguistic Turn,” Poster discusses new ways in which commodities are produced, distributed, and consumed. He is critical of the received wisdom. For instance, he is wary of those who claim that in industrialized countries, machines replace physical labor while human beings “manipulate data in computers and monitor computers, which in turn monitor and control machines” (42). Such a model would in theory allow for a more lateral and less hierarchical–rather than top-down–management style, although this is rarely met in practice, and even more rarely outside of first-world industrial centers. Instead, capitalism’s market principles represent a faith and a hope, rewriting geopolitics by replacing the state in the allocation of scarce resources–capitalism over communism, three cheers.

     

    While the market was quick to seize the opportunities of the Internet to turn a quick buck, this is not a unilateral victory because with digital technologies greater power has also been placed in the hands of the consumer, namely, for each individual, “the capacity to become a producer of cultural objects” (47). The division between production and consumption has become blurred, argues Poster, but we shall have to wait to see the long-term implications of these changes. While we remain wedded to the markets, there are signs that age-old structures are under threat, if the reactions of the music industry to online music trading are any indication. Legal claims aside, these corporations have had a great deal of control wrested from them by ordinary citizens and even children. The culture industry itself is under threat, and the promise of placing culture in the hands of a greater number of people has geopolitical implications:

     

    with its decentralized structure, the Internet enables non-Western culture to have presence on an equal footing with the West. It establishes for the first time the possibility of a meeting and exchange of cultures that is global in scope, albeit favoring the wealthy and educated everywhere. (49)

     

    This “equal footing” is still a dream, but it seems slightly more possible than ever before, at least in some venues. And while the wealthy and educated are “favored,” it is still uncertain whether in the long term the Internet will help realize a postcapitalist economy or, on the contrary, a kind of hypercapitalism. (It will probably be both.) In any case, the new experience of being a producer-consumer is bound to have a vast and continuing effect on what it means to be a subject and a global citizen.

     

    If we understand that both subjects and nations are historical formations, discursively produced, we may feel less anxiety about their disappearance and even embrace our postnationalism. This insight–again, owed to Foucault–is also extended to various discussions on ethnicity, gender, and capitalism vis-à-vis digital networks. Poster is respectfully critical of both Foucault and what he calls “the postmodern position” because, he claims, they are “limited to an insistence on the constructedness of identity” (174). As for postmodernists, he has Lyotard and Jameson in mind:

     

    In both instances postmodernity registered not an institutional transformation or alteration of practices so much as a new figure of the self [...]. For Lyotard the self was disengaged from historicity and for Jameson in addition it was fragmented, dispersed, low in affect, and one-dimensional. (9)

     

    Poster’s critique of this position–at least insofar as he’s characterized it here–is that while it works well to deconstruct entrenched notions of identity, it remains limited in its ability “to define a new political direction” (174). He therefore sees his work as going beyond these theorists in important practical–and material–ways. For this purpose, the reader need not agree wholeheartedly with Poster’s characterization of the nature or scope of Foucault’s, Lyotard’s, or Jameson’s interventions. Suffice it to say that Poster makes an intervention of his own, independent of these theorists. Poster is, after all, an intellectual historian who works to identify historical structures in present modes of being and to read in these structures new possibilities for the future. In this regard, I see his recent work as remarkably faithful to Foucault’s later ethical project, from the last years of his life in the 1980s. Poster takes up the spirit of Foucault’s ethics to ask how, at the advent of the digital age, we might reconceive those possibilities available to us to understand the self as a social, cultural, and political being, and from these, how we might begin to be otherwise.

     

    What’s the Matter with the Internet? poses a rhetorical question that is deceptive in its simplicity. At stake is the yet-unanswered question of what will matter, why, and to whom; worse, what matters is a historical reality, and as such, it is always in flux. What, after all, is the Internet? Before retorting that the Internet represents a victory of the virtual over the real, or even of mind over matter, Poster reminds us that the Internet affects the very real and material conditions of human lives, on a planetary scale. “The Internet” thus stands in a synecdochic relation to an unfolding, vast and complex technical and technological network; this network is a reality imbricated with the gamut of human existence, from our most sacred acts to our most mundane functions. This includes Orthodox Jews praying through cell phones at the Wailing Wall and teenaged Indonesian girls working in factories of multinational corporations. In brief, “the Internet” is a synecdoche that matters here because it stands in for a reality that has taken on “new, even unrepresentable forms” (37). It is true that some reactionary critics claim that the significance of work such as Poster’s is overblown; they are fond of stating as evidence that the vast majority of human beings haven’t even made a phone call, let alone used the Internet. But this would be to miss Poster’s point: the implications are vast and not overblown because, given the very material effects of this unrepresentable global-technological mode of being that “the Internet” here signifies, few human lives are materially free from its web.

     

    Notes

     

    1. See Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977).

     

    2. See my interview with Mark Poster, “Network Digital Information Humachines: A Conversation with Mark Poster,” Qui Parle 14.1 (forthcoming, Fall/Winter 2003).

     

    3. I say “man” here in the generic sense as anthropos, but also catachrestically, to underscore the sexist historical fact that the male, and not the female, was–and arguably continues to be–the paradigm for the species.

     

  • Pain-in-the-ass Democracy

    Jeffrey T. Nealon

    Department of English
    Pennsylvania State University
    jxn8@psu.edu

     

    Review of: John McGowan, Democracy’s Children: Intellectuals and the Rise of Cultural Politics.Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2002.

     

    Are we so confident in our current formulations that we would not value the person who comes along to challenge them? More likely than not, that person is a pain in the ass.(McGowan 224)

     

     

    In Democracy’s Children, John McGowan goes out of his way to be a pain in the ass–as long as we understand that term in the very circumscribed manner he outlines in our epigraph: a person who ceaselessly examines, challenges, and unsettles many of our longstanding beliefs and assumptions. McGowan’s project, he admits, is “to provoke as much as convince” (95), and there is much both convincing and provocative to recommend Democracy’s Children.

     

    Like McGowan’s earlier books, Postmodernism and Its Critics and Hannah Arendt: An Introduction, Democracy’s Children is an exceedingly smart and deft surgical strike to the heart of contemporary debates about intellectuals and politics. Among the dozens of books published on this topic, I know of none that will so quickly and persuasively orient the reader within these crucial debates. McGowan cuts decisively to the crux of critical arguments, and more importantly, he offers a series of paths away from the stale platitudes that too often adhere to cultural criticism. “I am an intellectual,” McGowan insists, “not a scholar” (1)–and in a personal style that quickly gains the reader’s attention and trust, he takes us on a guided critical tour of the fraught relations among contemporary intellectual production, academic work, and politics.

     

    McGowan’s most sustained engagement here is with critical in-fighting among academic intellectuals themselves, the tendency of many intellectual debates to become intramural wars of position, rather than useful critical interventions. “What I am trying to combat,” he writes in the book’s introduction, “is the narcissism of intellectuals, their tendency to find their own ambiguous position in modern societies endlessly fascinating. ‘This is not about us,’ I want to scream” (5). Later he expands on this claim, in another of the book’s many spot-on, “pain in the ass” critical moments: “manifestos with footnotes capture the laughable plight of today’s would-be intellectual, a careerist in the university who believes himself to be a threat to the status quo. Luckily, he has Roger Kimball to bolster his self-esteem” (79). Not the sort of thing academic intellectuals like to hear, but increasingly the sort of problem that intellectuals need to confront. What might “resistance” or “critique” mean in a climate where the dominant mode of power shares intellectuals’ suspicion of something called “the status quo”? And how might intellectual work be rethought or reoriented to give it some traction in public debates? These are the questions that fuel McGowan’s inquiry into intellectual work.

     

    Democracy’s Children also constitutes a thoroughgoing interrogation of the roots of contemporary cultural studies in North America: “the very enterprise of cultural studies,” McGowan argues, “marks our Victorianism” (141). As he expands on this claim, McGowan insists that “loyalty to culture is almost always reactionary in every sense of that term. Such loyalty tends to be negative, to exist as a defensive resistance to change, without any positive plan of action” (182). Culture, then, is the abstract, oddly contentless Victorian moniker for all those things that might have saved Victorians from complete adherence to instrumental rationality, the market, and the commonplace.

     

    But culture is our code word for such hopes, as well–the hopes of a critical practice that would subvert or overturn the economic leveling effects of late capitalism. On McGowan’s view, such faith in culture is either hopelessly abstract, or much too particularist. “With dreams of revolution lost,” he writes, “local resistance to capitalism often seems the best hope available” (182). At the vanguard of the contemporary fight against capitalism, McGowan argues, the enemy to be overcome is both “their” vision of the future and “our” nostalgia for the subversive past, when the realm of culture challenged the repressive forces of capitalism. We, the other Arnoldians: contemporary radicals fighting from tenured pulpits, just as the conservative Victorians did from their drawing rooms, both trying to keep some privileged and supposedly resistant forms of “culture” from disappearing into the maw of uncultured, lunkheaded businessmen.

     

    And McGowan takes head-on left intellectuals’ near-universal denunciation of corporate or market economics, and their concomitant celebration of cultural alternatives: “as a pluralist, I am not in favor of letting the market determine all human relations or all human desires. But I want to encourage suspicion about the culturalist alternative, which looks equally anti-pluralist to me” (121). Indeed, McGowan provocatively suggests that “cultural studies needs an ethnography of business to match its sophisticated ethnographies of consumers. Then we would stand a chance of getting past the fatuous opinions of commerce that now pass unchallenged” (125). In short, McGowan insistently shows that “culture” continues to mark our fear of massification and our fear of the other, 100 years after the Victorians.

     

    Against any emphasis on studying something narrowly called “culture,” the central concept that McGowan both builds and performs throughout the book is “pragmatic pluralism,” a thoroughgoing pluralism that maintains a healthy skepticism about its own claims, abilities, and limitations. Subtly, McGowan’s “pragmatic pluralism” continues his critique of the cultural intellectual as the subject presumed to know. His notion of pragmatism, in other words, is not territorialized on subjects and their supposedly plural abilities to subvert dominant norms and expectations. “Significance,” he insists, “is not solely the provenance of selves but the product of a multitude of signifying acts” (194). In other words, pluralism is pragmatic precisely because it’s not primarily subjective, but is rather beholden to process, “the non-subjective creation of meaning” (194).

     

    McGowan’s principled stand of pragmatic pluralism commits him to ceaselessly interrogating notions of politics and the intellectual, rather than settling for platitudinous solutions to complex problems. So when McGowan writes, for example, that “the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ have lost their usefulness” (157), he argues this provocation and its consequences not according to some neo-liberal consensus model–we’re beyond such ideological conflicts here at the end of history or the rebirth of Empire, etc.–but through a principled commitment to pragmatic pluralism. The terminology of left and right has to be abandoned not because of its anachronistic or polemical nature, but precisely because it smoothes out a whole complex world of differences, non-subjective differences of performative labeling that we precisely do not get to choose or remake. Pragmatically, we have to negotiate among plural stances of naming, and we are as subject to the chain of plural meanings as we are in control of it.

     

    McGowan builds his notion of pragmatic pluralism on the scaffolding afforded by an odd but finally effective linking of performative theory and narratology, an approach that allows him to treat “pragmatist themes [he] want[s] to take up against prevailing Derridean models of the performative” (187). Rather than seeing performatives as essentially semantic entities, tied up with meaning and its ostensible subversion, McGowan wants to emphasize the forceful, open-ended, and future-oriented qualities of performativity. And he sees a robust, narrative, non-truth-oriented pragmatism as the key factor in helping him do so:

     

    pragmatism sees the emphasis on process as a way of freeing us from the dead hand of the past. Because meaning is always in process, our primary concern should not be in delineating the meaning of this situation or the causes that bring us to this moment, but instead on the possible ways to go from here. Process means that acts of naming are always transformative, always supplements to the already-named. (195)

     

     

    Rather than emphasize the originary absences so crucial to Derridean notions of the performative (where the conditions of meaning’s possibility are always and simultaneously the conditions of its impossibility), McGowan highlights the positive upshot of meaning’s plurality: the constant (and necessarily non-subjective, non-originary) experimental deployment of response that makes up the public sphere of “culture.”

     

    Rather than understanding culture primarily as a negative site of subjective subversion (the culturalist undermining of a totalized caricature of capitalism, meaning, identity, or whatever), McGowan asks us to reconceptualize cultural politics as a positive performative process, “a succession of namings in a perpetual call and response that establishes the ongoing relations among self, world, and others, relations that individual performatives strive to shape, to change for the better, but which no action can permanently arrest” (198). So for McGowan the “performative” political is precisely not the site of meaning’s constant failure, from which we learn over and over again negative lessons concerning our inabilities to communicate or effect change. Rather, “the political refers to the processes that produce a public sphere and the activities that are enabled by the existence of that public sphere” (178). This is a subtle but important change of focus from the performative political theories of, say, Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, or Jean-Luc Nancy (all of whom, in different ways, emphasize the negative moment of meaning’s failure in cultural politics). Without relying on some notion of privatized subjective creativity, McGowan wants to emphasize the positive, productive, enabling powers of performativity, what he calls performativity’s social “creativity and its plural effects” (214).

     

    In short, McGowan tries to build a notion of the performative public sphere, where debates are treated less as wars of position among ossified cultural commonplaces (left/right, liberal/conservative, intellectuals/mass culture) than they are as open-ended situations, always “stressing the rhetorical component of democracy,” its “dialogic give-and-take” (8). Importantly, though, McGowan’s notion of “rhetoric” is less concerned with any kind of correctness or speaking of “the truth” than it is with transformation and intervention: “we don’t begin from nowhere,” he writes, “since just as situations come to us already label-laden, so each agent begins from a set of commitments, loyalties, other agents to whom he or she feels answerable, and habitual strategies of relation to various realities. But selves and situations are transformed through their interaction in the on-going process of meaning-creation” (195).

     

    As an alternative to the public discourses of right and wrong or true and false, McGowan offers us an Arendt-inflected notion of “story-telling and judgment,” a kind of rhetorical public work that is less dedicated to ideology critique (unmasking the illusions we live by) than it is interested in creating performative narratives that allow us to go somewhere else, to escape dead-end debates. This, I think, is the most important provocation performed in this most important book: McGowan challenges intellectuals to take up a critical, pragmatic pluralism that gives up the pretense of unmasking the sinister truth hiding behind the cultural glitz and noise. As he asks, “does critical reflection, lucidity about the social and intellectual processes by which habits are formed, gain us anything? The watchword of critique has always been that the truth will set you free […]. The arrogance of this position is among the least reasons it has come under increasing attack” (77).

     

    McGowan’s Democracy’s Children, at some level, finishes off the attack on the intellectual and his or her position as the subject presumed to know. But, more importantly, he gives intellectual work another place to go, another more crucial series of interventions to perform. In the end, McGowan suggests that intellectuals–as “democracy’s children”–have affinities with children everywhere, a kind of ingrained commitment to dialogic, pain-in-the-ass questions: “where are we going? Why? How do we get there?” And in the end, maybe intellectuals can learn their most important lessons about democracy from children, who know intuitively that getting somewhere beats knowing something any day of the week.

     

  • Evolution and Contingency

    Arkady Plotnitsky

    Theory and Cultural Studies Program
    Purdue University
    aplotnit@sla.purdue.edu

     

    Review of: Gould, Stephen J. The Structure of Evolutionary Theory.Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2002.

     

    We often complain about long books, and, at nearly 1500 pages, Stephen Jay Gould’s magnum opus is about as long as one could find in the sciences. But then, the actual genre of the book, which is a mixture of science, history of science, and biography, sets it apart from most science books as well, although the approach has its companions and precursors from Galileo’s dialogues (which add literature to the mix) on. We do not, however, always do long books justice either; and I’d urge the readers of this review to give Gould the benefit of the doubt and read the whole book, which, it may be added, is not forbidding in its technical aspects. One could of course benefit considerably even from readings parts of it. Gould must have known that some would, and he offers a summary of the chapters’ content at the outset, which can be used to plot various itineraries through the book. Chapter 1, “Defining and Revising the Structure of Evolutionary Theory,” is almost a book in itself, especially by current publishing standards (The Structure of Evolutionary Theory [hereafter SET] 1-89). Chapter 2, “The Essence of Darwinism and the Basis of Modern Orthodoxy,” offers an introduction to Darwin in general and in a twentieth-century context, and is reasonably self-contained, as well. Gould, however, pleads with his readers to “read the book,” the whole book (SET 89). No doubt the book could be trimmed, but, in this reader’s assessment, not by much (maybe by 150 pages or so), and, in some respects, it may not be long enough. But then perhaps no book, no matter how long, could be in a case like this.

     

    The Tolstoyan, War-and-Peace scale and ambition of the project are not out of place. The book may even be seen as the “War and Peace” of evolution itself (the relative “peace” or more gradual processes of adaptational natural selection punctuated by war-like catastrophes wiping out entire species) and of the history of evolutionary theory, or even of Gould’s own life as a scientist. Evolutionary peace is of course relative at best, a fact reflected in Darwin’s extraordinary (full) title, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life. But then so is Tolstoy’s peace, as familial and societal “wars” are waged in the continuous struggle for social survival and success. Possibly influenced by Darwin’s work, Tolstoy’s concept of history in War and Peace (which contains, as one its two epilogues, a philosophical essay on the nature of history) is itself relevant to Gould’s argument and is invoked by him (SET 1340).

     

    Gould, rightly, sees Darwin’s historicizing of evolution and his conception of history as among his most important contributions, perhaps, combined, the most important one. He also, again, rightly, sees Darwin as a philosophical (rather than only scientific) revolutionary, an aspect of Darwin’s work he addresses at some length (99-103, 117-63). (That Gould himself shares this ambition is evident in the book as well.) That history and, hence, at least some philosophy of history are significant is inevitable, given evolution as the subject of their scientific pursuits, inevitable, that is, once Darwin gives life evolution and thus history. In this case, however, at stake is also the introduction of a new philosophical concept of history, as part of a scientific theory, which is not inevitable, since one can also borrow such a concept from elsewhere. Revolutionary as Darwin is, along with so many others, on this score, he is not without his debts. In particular, Darwin’s concepts of history may be seen as extending Hegel’s. Hegel is, to be sure, only one among Darwin’s precursors, but a more significant one than we might surmise from Gould’s discussion of Darwin’s historical thinking, where Hegel is strangely absent. (Gould does invoke Hegel’s notion of dialectical synthesis [591].) Nietzsche, in singling out Hegel’s unique contribution as a philosopher of history, made the point in strong terms by stating that “without Hegel there could have been no Darwin” (Gay Science 305). This may or may not be true, but, to use Nietzsche’s term, the “genealogy” itself is hardly in question. The general appeal to history is more natural (in either sense) in evolutionary theory than in philosophy. As, however, a structural element of theorizing a given phenomenon (which is also how history works in Darwin, and in Gould), it was largely introduced by Hegel and is arguably his greatest philosophical discovery. It is also worth noting the equally crucial influence of Adam Smith on both Hegel and (in part via Thomas Malthus and against William Paley) Darwin, which Gould stresses in Darwin’s case (59-60, 121-125, 231-32). Both Hegel’s philosophy and Darwin’s theory are, conceptually, forms of economics, theories of gains and losses in the struggle of concepts or living beings for life.

     

    Gould’s own concept of history also follows that of Nietzsche (52, 1214-18). As Gould notes:

     

    Although I am chagrined that I discovered Nietzsche's account [in On the Genealogy of Morals] of the distinction between current utility and historical origin so late in my work, I know no better introduction--from one of history's greatest philosophers to boot, and in his analysis of morality, not of any scientific subject--to the theoretical importance of spandrels and exaptation in the rebalancing of constraint and adaptation within evolutionary theory (Chapter 11, pp. 1214-1218). (52)1

     

    Gould also stresses that Darwin’s theory, especially his nearly unconditional insistence on the organismal character of selection, was deeply indebted to the analogy with theories of morality, specifically, again, Adam Smith’s work (127-36; 596-97). On the other hand, Darwinism is one of Nietzsche’s points of departure for his analysis in On the Genealogy of Morals, a point missed or not addressed by Gould (21). Gould does note similarities with Darwin in Nietzsche’s argument, which he sees as “almost eerie,” but which are, I would argue, inevitable (1217). It would be surprising otherwise, even though Nietzsche famously preferred Lamarck to Darwin, or a certain “Lamarck” to a certain “Darwin.” Gould’s Darwin would be much closer to Nietzsche, and Gould, it is worth noting, gives a well-deserved credit to Lamarck as well (170-92). Had Gould dug into Nietzsche a bit deeper, he could have discovered the conceptual problematic of evolutionary theory there. In any event, Nietzsche takes our understanding of the history of morality in radically new directions, including those that Gould found converging on his concept of evolutionary history.

     

    This concept also serves Gould’s critique of Darwin’s grounding of evolution in organismal selection, a critique in part extracted from Darwin’s argument against its grain, from Darwin’s “battle with himself,” or, one might say, by means of a deconstruction from within Darwin’s argument (135-36, 596-97). A central part of Gould’s program is “the expansion of Darwin’s reliance upon organismal selection into a hierarchical model of simultaneous selection at several levels of Darwinian individuality (gene, cell lineage, organism, deme, species and clade)” (1340). Darwin’s version of Nietzsche’s principle of the distinction between current utility and historical origin is “overly restrictive” and “remains fully adaptational,” as against Gould’s, which extends this principle to the role of different structural elements, such as spandrel and exaptation, in shaping evolution (1229). Applications and implications of this principle extend far beyond this particular case, however, and lead to a radical view of evolution–one of the book’s most important philosophical, as well as scientific, contributions.

     

    There are many other contributions, some equally important, and reflecting equally radical and controversial views. The book is a scientific, philosophical, and cultural document of major significance; the parallels with Galileo, Tolstoy, and Hegel are not fortuitous, and the one with Darwin is unavoidable, given that Gould clearly aims at Darwin’s reach and scale. It is not accidental, either, that one can invoke scientific, philosophical, and literary works here, even apart from the role literature and art play in Gould’s argument and exposition. At the same time, the links to the ideas of such authors as Nietzsche, whom Gould, again, follows expressly, or (Gould might have been surprised to hear this) Derrida and Deleuze, and Gould’s inescapable presence in the current cultural debates also make the book a significant document of postmodern thought and culture. This significance is further amplified by the shift from physics to life sciences and information sciences, and their relationships (for example, in the genome project) as primarily defining the relationships between science and culture during the same postmodernist period. Physics retains its scientific and cultural role, in part in conjunction with information sciences, as in quantum information theory, and new biology, specifically via chaos and complexity theory (an icon, sometimes abused, of many recent discussions in the humanities as well). Even though not given a major treatment, complexity theory and its application in evolutionary theory, especially in Stuart Kauffman’s work, play an important role in Gould’s argument for extending and radicalizing Darwin (SET 1208-14).

     

    This argument is for the extension of evolutionary theory beyond what Gould calls the modern synthesis of (the more traditional) Darwinism, presented in Part I, “The History of Darwinian Logic Debate,” toward a different type of evolutionary theory presented in Gould’s argument in Part II, “Toward a Revised and Expanded Evolutionary Theory.” The key aspects of both logics are explained from the outset, where Gould uses the memorable image of Agostino Scilla’s corals as a symbol of Darwin’s theory, to be reshaped by Gould’s revisions, even against Darwin’s favorite “tree of life,” although, as will be seen, both share their essential tree-like structure (16-19, 97). Darwin’s first book was on corals, and it is honored by Gould with “the coral reef principle” of sequencing of Darwin’s historical way of thinking (103-4). This joint structure–of Darwin’s theory and Gould’s revision–is reiterated throughout the book. It is even restated, with a considerable mastery of composition, in the final and the longest footnote in the book on page 1313 and then yet again in (almost) closing the book. To cite this final summary:

     

    In most general terms, and in order to form a more perfect union among evolution's hierarchy of structural levels and tiers of time, this revised theory rests upon an expansion and substantial reformation of all three central principles that build the tripod of support for Darwinian logic: (1) the expansion of Darwin's reliance upon organismal selection into a hierarchical model of simultaneous selection at several levels of Darwinian individuality (gene, cell lineage, organism, deme, species and clade); (2) the construction of an interactive model to explain the sources of creative evolutionary change by fusing the positive constraints of structural and historical pathways internal to the anatomy and development of organisms (the functionalist approach); and (3) the generation of theories appropriate to the characteristic rates and modalities of time's higher tiers to explain the extensive range of macroevolutionary phenomena (particularly the restructuring of global biotas in episodes of mass extinction) that cannot be rendered as simple extrapolated consequences of microevolutionary principles. (1340)

     

    This is an immense program, and one can, obviously, offer no more than a sketch of some among its lineaments here. I shall assess Gould’s argument from a particular angle, indicated by my title, “evolution and contingency,” which will, however, allow me to address some among the most fundamental aspects of the argument. Many other aspects of it, some of them important, will have to be sacrificed. Most of these, however, are among the better known and the more extensively commented-upon aspects of Darwin’s work or post-Darwinian evolutionary theory and of Gould’s work. Given this history, Gould’s theoretical and historical arguments in the book are bound to be challenged by evolutionary theorists and historians of science. Here, however, in a more “positive spirit,” such as Nietzsche invokes in On the Genealogy of Morals, I will look beyond these specific points of agreement or disagreement to consider some of the more radical questions and challenges posed by the book itself (18).

     

    My angle is defined by the joint role of chance and discontinuity (as in Gould’s “punctuation”) in evolution and in the structure (or history) of evolutionary theory and, indeed inevitably, beyond them. The scientific and epistemological significance of this problematic in evolutionary theory and elsewhere in modern science is unquestionable.2 It is, I would argue, culturally significant as well. At least from the mid-nineteenth century on, our culture may be seen as the culture of chance, or of the confrontation with chance, a confrontation which, in the absence of any counterbalancing causality, it may not yet be ready to accept (SET 1332-33). I speak of the role of chance (rather than simply chance), since the argument of the book is not primarily about chance but is (more) about causality and organization (46-47, 1339). And yet, from Darwin on, chance is seen as an essential force in evolution, which gives the concept of chance a central role in the structure of evolutionary theory, especially as it is developed in Gould’s work, including in this book. I shall link causality and chance in the concept of contingency (which is also Gould’s preferred concept) as the (inter)play of both. The idea originates with Democritus and extends through a long chain of thinkers to Derrida in particular, and is here invoked by Gould via the complexity theorists Jacques Monod and Stuart Kauffman (144, 1336).3 My appeal to contingency stresses the significance of theorizing chance in evolution, as opposed to causal explanation, while keeping the latter as part of the overall theory. This emphasis is consistent with both Darwin’s and Gould’s views, different as these are in their overall theoretical structure. Gould’s own use of contingency is defined at the outset, in his biographical “Apologia Pro Vita Sua,” complementing his historicist philosophy and attitude, his “love of history in the broadest sense.” He writes:

     

    Finally, my general love of history in the broadest sense spilled over into my empirical work as I began to explore the role of history's great theoretical theme in my empirical work as well--contingency, or the tendency of complex systems with substantial stochastic components, and intricate nonlinear interactions among components, to be unpredictable in principle from full knowledge of antecedent conditions, but fully explainable after time's actual unfoldings. (46; emphasis added)

     

    This concept of contingency is close, but not identical, to that of chaos and complexity theories (specifically as developed in Kauffman’s work), as the invocation of the terms “complex systems” and “nonlinearity” suggests. While granting the significance of the Gouldian dynamics of contingency in evolution, I shall introduce a broader and in some respects more radical view of chance (conceived in part on the model of quantum theory) and, hence, of contingency, and suggest that this type of chance plays a role in evolutionary theory. Overall, I shall argue that it is the structure of evolutionary contingency–of what types of chance, of causality, and of the relationships between them–that is, ultimately, at stake in Gould’s argument. Gould’s book directs us toward a different, higher-level, synthesis between the modern (Darwinist) synthesis presented in Part I and Gould’s argument presented in Part II, “Toward a Revised and Expanded Evolutionary Theory.” This new synthesis, for which, as Gould says, the Hegelian triad of thesis-antithesis-synthesis may be inadequate, is not offered in the book, which only directs us “toward” it (591). The book does not have and did not aim to have a Part III, but it did aim to argue for such a new synthesis and to prepare for it–a Herculean labor and an immense achievement already (SET 591-92; also pp. 46-47, 1332-43). It is clear, however, that, as announced by Gould at the outset, following his definition of contingency, and as sketched in the epilogue, that new synthesis is fundamentally defined by the role of contingency in the structure of evolutionary theory. As Gould writes:

     

    This work [his previous work on contingency] led to two books on the pageant of life's history [Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History [1989] and Full House: The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin [1996]). Although this book, by contrast, treats general theory and its broad results (patterns vs. pageant in terms of this text), rather than contingency and the explanation of life's particulars, the science of contingency must ultimately be integrated with the more conventional science of general theory as explored in this book--for we shall thus attain our best possible understanding of both pattern and pageant, and their different attributes and predictabilities. The closing sections of the book (pp. 1332-1343 of Chapter 12) offer some suggestions for these future efforts. (46-47)

     

    I shall have a chance to return to the image of pageant, a special favorite with Gould, used three times here. The problematic itself developed in these closing sections may, as I said, take us toward notions of chance and contingency more radical than Gould’s, but not more than what may be demanded from our theories by evolution–or by life, to which both Darwin and Gould appeal at crucial junctures. The concept of evolution may be insufficient in turn, even as it emerges in all its architectural complexity in Darwin’s or Gould’s cathedral, a persistent image in the book, almost closing it as well–almost: ultimately Darwin’s “the tree of life” does. Gould’s argument is, however, framed by Milan’s Duomo and San Marco in Venice, with the architecture of New York taking over in the Epilog (SET 1-6, 1249-55, 1339). Would life, however we image it, be sufficient? Do we, in truth, have such a concept qua concept, life, which doubt compelled Shelley to ask in his great unfinished poem The Triumph of Life, the poem that his death interrupted, punctuated, on this very question: “What is Life?”? Would even a double question mark be enough?

     

    Gould’s book was published posthumously in 2002 (Gould died earlier the same year). Forty years earlier, in closing his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn addressed Darwin’s evolutionary theory, a primary inspiration for Kuhn’s own work. Kuhn noted that Darwin’s most innovative and radical idea, which “bothered many professionals most was neither the notion of species change nor the possible descent of man from apes,” but instead that of the abolition of evolutionary teleology (171-72). These, especially, as Gould stresses, the first one, remain important conceptually, historically, and culturally (SET 99-103). Nevertheless, Kuhn is right. As he elaborates:

     

    The evidence pointing to evolution, including the evolution of man, had been accumulating for decades, and the idea of evolution had been suggested and widely disseminated before. Though evolution, as such, did encounter resistance, particularly from some religious groups, it was by no means the greatest of the difficulties the Darwinians faced. That difficulty stemmed from the idea [of non-teleological, undirected evolution] that was more nearly Darwin's own. All the well-known pre-Darwinian evolutionary theories--those of Lamarck, Chambers, Spencer, and the German Naturephilosophen--had taken evolution to be a goal-directed process. The "idea" of man and of the contemporary flora and fauna was thought to have been present from the first creation of life, perhaps in the mind of God. That idea or plan had provided the direction and the guiding force to the entire evolutionary process. Each new stage of evolutionary development was a more perfect realization of a plan that has been present from the start. (171-72)

     

    Gould’s book shows the enormous richness and complexity of this history and its transition to Darwinism, well beyond what Kuhn could convey here and, he argues, beyond what Kuhn’s conception of history of science could offer (SET 967-70). Darwin enters the stage set by this history with “his most significant and least palatable suggestion”:

     

    For many men the abolition of that teleological kind of evolution was the most significant and least palatable of Darwin's suggestions. The Origin of Species recognized no goal set either by God or nature. Instead, natural selection, operating in the given environment and with the actual organisms presently at hand, was responsible for the gradual but steady emergence of more elaborate, further articulated, and vastly more specialized organisms. Even such marvelously adapted organs as the eye and hand of man--organs whose design had previously provided powerful arguments for the existence of a supreme artificer and an advance plan--were products of a process that moved steadily from primitive beginnings but towards no goal. The belief that natural selection, resulting from mere competition between organisms for survival, could have produced man together with the higher animals and plants was the most difficult and disturbing aspect of Darwin's theory. What could "evolution," "development," and "progress" mean in the absence of specified goal? To many people, such terms suddenly seemed self-contradictory. (Kuhn 172)

     

    Several key Darwinian concepts are indicated here, even beyond the abolition of evolutionary teleology, most especially “gradualism” or a more general principle of “gaining the knowledge of the world” or natural history from the behavior of its small or even infinitesimal parts or changes and their continuity.4 This principle may be seen as defining the scientific paradigm and paradigm change, established not only by Darwin’s work but by such contemporary theories as James Clerk Maxwell’s field theory of electromagnetism and Bernhard Riemann’s mathematics (or earlier differential calculus, since, like all paradigm changes, this one has a long pre-history as well), and extending to Einstein’s work in relativity. Leibniz, a co-inventor of differential calculus and a major influence on Riemann, was arguably the most significant precursor, as Gould notes, rightly coupling him with Linnaeus–although, as Gould explains, Charles Lyell may be an equally important influence upon Darwin in this respect (150, 149, 479-86). In science, one needed quantum theory to announce a new paradigm, although there are earlier intimations, especially as concerns the idea of chance, as in thermodynamics, and philosophically one can trace this history still earlier. The principle cannot be sustained in Gould’s version of evolutionary theory either, which shift has its history in turn, at least from Georges Cuvier on (484-92).

     

    Along with most Darwinian concepts, those just mentioned are given a powerful critical treatment by Gould throughout the book, using the term “critical” in Kant’s sense of critique as an exploration of fundamental concepts in a given field and of the conditions for their effective deployment there. Decisive to this critique are the questions of chance and discontinuity, and the relationships between them, in evolution and specifically in the non-teleological view of evolution advanced by Darwin. Both Kuhn and Gould fundamentally link the structures of biological and scientific evolutions, or revolutions, to chance and discontinuity (“revolution” in Kuhn and “punctuation” in Gould), in Kuhn’s case under the impact of quantum theory. Gould could hardly have been unaware of the parallel between Kuhn’s and his own title, even if he did not intend a direct allusion. Nor could he have been unaware of Kuhn’s elaborations just cited, and it is of some interest that he does not comment on them or Darwin’s influence on Kuhn’s work. Gould does discuss Kuhn’s ideas concerning scientific revolution and acknowledges Kuhn’s significance and influence in this respect, as well as noting certain Darwinian elements in Kuhn’s later (1969) “Postscript” to his book in the context of the concept and the very term “punctuation” (SET 967-70).

     

    Now, all teleology is, by definition, causal, even if, as I shall explain, this causality is hidden behind (the appearance of) chance, and, by virtue of its causal nature, essentially continuous. Accordingly, the questions of chance and discontinuity, or of the relationships between causality and chance and continuity and discontinuity (or among all of these), may be seen as less interesting in this case. On the other hand, the role of chance and discontinuity in non-teleological views of evolution is a subtle issue, which caused a complex and sometimes ambivalent attitude on the part of Darwin himself, specifically in the relations between more local (such as adaptation) and more global evolutionary dynamics (SET 1333-36). Can we dispense with chance and discontinuity, given the abolition of teleology? What are the dynamics of chance or discontinuity? How are the latter linked to causalities and continuities? What are the relationships between chance and discontinuity, or causality and continuity? These are decisive questions. For, at least in evolution, chance without causality, or discontinuity without continuity, would be almost as problematic and scientifically uninteresting as causality, natural or divine, absolutely without chance (100-2). In question is an interplay of chance and causality or necessity, of which Democritus was perhaps first to speak, coupled, if one wants to trace it to the pre-Socratics, to the Heraclitean becoming, the never-the-same flow of evolution, but, on this view, the flow interrupted and reshaped by discontinuity. With Darwin and, then, with Nietzsche, this double interplay acquires an extraordinary and ultimately irreducible complexity and, as Derrida argues, becomes ultimately incalculable, preventing us from ascertaining whether, at least, some events are products of chance or causal dynamics (7).5

     

    Gould’s own contribution to evolutionary theory belongs primarily to this problematic of causality and chance, within contingency, or (sometimes correlatively) between punctuation and continuity. It is, again, important that all these elements and various relationships between and among them are engaged with by Gould and made parts of the structure of evolutionary theory, as he sees it. Thus, for example, the continuity and persistence of form (morphological continuity) or that of other constraints is just as important as punctuation, as both equally work against orthodox Darwinism. This type of complexity is found, however, throughout Gould’s arguments, for and against Darwin’s theory, and translates into the relationships, conceptual or historical, between various strains of evolutionary theory. Granting this complexity, one might, nevertheless, argue that the most radical implication, if not the idea, of Darwin’s theory is that of the role of chance, also in its discontinuous, interruptive effect, as the primary force of evolutionary change. As Gould says:

     

    If, however, as the central thesis of this book maintains and the [postmodern?] Zeitgeist of our dawning millennium no longer rejects [in contrast to evolutionists and paleontologists of the preceding generations], we cannot validate the actuality of mammalian success by general principles, but only as a happy (albeit entirely sensible) contingency of a historical process with innumerable alternatives that didn't happen to attain expression (despite their equal plausibility before the fact), then we must face the philosophical question of whether we have surrendered too much [of contingency] in developing a more complex and nuanced view of causality in the history of life. (SET 1332; emphasis added)

     

    On this view, the rise of humans, as conscious animals, is, too, a product of contingency, of a series of contingent, if sensible accidents, perhaps glorious, as Gould once called them, but accidents nonetheless. The question becomes what is the particular character of this chance and, hence, of the interplay of chance and causality defining the contingency/ies of evolution. The emphasis on contingency, as the interplay of chance and causality, rather than on chance alone, is crucial, but the character of contingency is defined by the character of chance within it. This is not to say that the nature of causalities and necessities involved in evolution is not important; quite the contrary, and we need as rich and complex conceptions and theories of causal processes as we can develop. The same argument applies to continuity and discontinuity, and the relationships between them, or between them and causality and chance. Gould’s elaboration opening the section “Undirected,” dealing with Darwin’s abolition of teleology, indicates this complexity as well, in part by way of warning (143-46). Gould stresses the contingent and yet also notes the crucial significance of chance in shaping this complexity, including as concerns “the direction of evolutionary change.” He writes:

     

    Textbooks of evolution still often refer to variations as "random." We all recognize this designation as a misnomer, but continue to use the phrase by force of habit. Darwinians have never argued for "random" mutation in the restricted and technical sense of "equally likely in all directions," as in tossing a die. But our sloppy use of "random" [...] does capture, at least in a vernacular sense, the essence of the important claim that we do wish to convey--namely, that variation must be unrelated to the direction of evolutionary change; or, more strongly, that nothing about the process of creating raw material biases the pathway of subsequent change in adaptive directions. This fundamental postulate gives Darwinism its "two step" character, the "chance" and "necessity" of Monod's famous formulation--the separation of a source of raw material (mutation, recombination, etc.) from a force of change (natural selection). (144)

     

    Monod’s formulation captures well the Darwinian contingency, to which Gould adds the chance of punctuation, or, conversely, additional morphological causalities and/as continuities, thus reshaping the overall structure of evolutionary contingency. As will be seen, there may be more of tossing of the dice in mutation. The problem, however, may indeed be that the complexity of the process prevents us from properly assessing how much, if at all, loaded these dice are. In any event, the mutations in question are random enough, at least as “unrelated to the direction of evolutionary change,” as Gould rightly stresses. That is, they are random enough to change our view of evolution. The evolutionary survival of such mutations is of course a still different bet, more Darwinian (gradualist and adaptational) or more Gouldian, which supplements the Darwinian bet with other elements, such as the contingency of punctuation. Even well-adapted species, such as dinosaurs, or potentially well-adaptable species in the proper evolutionary contexts of their emergence and developments, could be “punctuated” out of existence due to external (geological or cosmic events) or other changes in the context.

     

    It is true that, as I have indicated, this particular book is, at least overtly, not about contingency. Gould stresses this point in the Epilog:

     

    But this book--entitled The Structure of Evolutionary Theory--does not address the realm of contingency as a central subject, and fires my very best shot in the service of my lifelong fascination for the fierce beauty and sheer intellectual satisfaction of timeless and general theory. I am a child of the streets of New York; and although I reveled in a million details of molding on the spandrel panels of Manhattan skyscrapers, and while I marveled at the inch of difference between a forgotten foul ball and an immortal home run, I guess I always thrilled more to the power of coordination than to the delight of a strange moment--or I would not have devoted 20 years and the longest project of my life to macroevolutionary theory rather than paleontological pageant. (1339)

     

    And yet, even as the book only looks toward and prepares the ground for the synthesis of the science of general theory and the science of contingency in evolutionary theory, while primarily doing general theory, contingency is everywhere in this book. This is hardly surprising. Indeed, there is a “because” behind my “and yet.” Contingency is irreducibly complicit with the general theory engaged with by the book, or in Darwin’s work and most versions of Darwinism, which, accordingly, defines the character of the future theory that Gould has in mind. To give one example, which is, however, central to Gould’s argument, Nietzsche’s principle, mentioned earlier, of “the distinction between current utility and historical origin” shapes (albeit differently) both Darwin’s and Gould’s arguments. “Nietzsche recognizes (as Darwin did),” that this principle also

     

    establishes grounds for contingency and unpredictability in history--for if any organ [such as the eye or hand], during its history, undergoes a series of quirky shifts in function, then we can neither predict the next use from a current value, nor can we easily work backwards to elucidate the reason behind the origin of the trait. (1217)

     

     

    Hence, the irreducible role of contingency and indeed chance (“unpredictability”) in the general theory, Darwin’s and even more so Gould’s. There could be no Darwin without contingency anymore than without history, as Darwin’s concept of history is itself crucially shaped by the concept of contingency as the interplay of chance and causality (without ultimate causes) in evolution.

     

    Gould “embraces this apparent paradox with delight”: “I have championed contingency, and will continue to do so, because its large realm and legitimate claims have been so poorly attended by evolutionary scientists who cannot discern the beat of this different drummer while their brains and ears remain tuned to the sounds of general theory” (1339; emphasis added). The paradox itself is of course only apparent, or reveals a more subtle theoretical logic. One might also say that the paradox interrupts and destabilizes the accepted logic of evolutionary theory, and leads to a new logic and, with it, new evolutionary theory, which thus “refute” the paradox, along with (some) of the Darwinisms and even (some) Darwin. As Gould adds, rightly assessing his book (it is difficult to do better): “So yes, guilty as charged, and immensely proud of it! The most adequate one-sentence description of my intent in writing this volume flows best as a refutation to the claim of paradox just above […]” (1339). It is a long sentence, but a good one, both in content and in form, structure, in its continuous flow, which I punctuate a bit here:

     

    This book attempts to expand and alter the premises of Darwinism, in order to build an enlarged and distinctive evolutionary theory that, while remaining within the tradition, and under the logic, of Darwinian argument, can also explain a wide range of macroevolutionary phenomena lying outside the explanatory power of extrapolated modes and mechanisms of microevolution, and that would therefore be assigned to contingent explanation if these microevolutionary principles necessarily build the complete corpus of general theory in principle. To restate just the two most obvious examples of the higher tiers of time exemplified in this chapter: (1) punctuated equilibrium establishes, at the second tier, a general speciational theory of cladal trending, capable of explaining a cardinal macroevolutionary phenomena that has remained stubbornly resistant to conventional resolution in terms of adaptive advantages to organisms, generated by natural selection and extrapolated through geological time; (2) catastrophic mass extinction at the third tier suggests a general theory of faunal coordination far in excess [...] of what Darwinian microevolutionary assumptions about the independent history of lineages under competitive models of natural selection could possibly generate. (1339-1340)

     

    On the other hand, as I have indicated, while contingency and, within contingency, randomness and chance, are fundamental to Gould’s theory of evolution, this theory itself, even when dealing with contingency, is, as is Darwin’s, ultimately more interested in causality, without the ultimate cause, than in chance as such. The qualification is, again, crucial, for “following Hutton, Lyell, and many other great thinkers,” Darwin “foreswore (as beyond the realm of science) all inquiry into the ultimate origins of things” (SET 101). In particular and most significantly, this attitude is correlative to the view that the key causalities, either more Darwinian or more Gouldian, in question in the theory are initiated by random events. These events must thus also be treated structurally as discontinuous in relation to these new causal chains as in relation to previous causal chains. In other words, the dynamics of these chains is initiated by but does not depend on and is dissociated from what triggers them. The absence of the single overall teleology, or a single overall archeology (the ultimate origin), of evolution follows automatically. While incorporating Darwinian mutations (as of secondary significance, without the ultimate creative evolutionary force), Gould’s theory also deals with causal sequences resulting from or shaped by random events, such as punctuations, and in itself qua theory concerns only these causal sequences, and not random events initiating or affecting them. As in Darwin’s case, the specific character of the causalities in question, however, gives this theory its explanatory and descriptive power, and Gould’s book offers ample evidence of this power along both lines, Darwinian and Gouldian, or in joining them.

     

    Gould’s concept of contingency is subordinated and indeed defined by the agenda just explained. To restate his definition, contingency is “the tendency of complex systems with substantial stochastic components, and intricate nonlinear interactions among components, to be unpredictable in principle from full knowledge of antecedent conditions, but fully explainable after time’s actual unfoldings” (46; emphasis added). Analogously (although not identically) to chaos or complexity theory, the dynamics in question are highly nonlinear but ultimately causal, although, in contrast to most situations considered by chaos or complexity theory, these dynamics are, again, initiated by random events. More accurately, these events are seen as random in the context of evolution and may be causal in other contexts, geological, cosmic, or others, but, if they are causal in these latter contexts, these causalities (say, those responsible for the collisions between the Earth and asteroids that destroyed so many well-adapted species) are bracketed. They are not part of the structure of evolutionary theory. Accordingly, Gould’s concept of contingency is well suited to the workings of punctuation or other nonadaptational events and forces at work in evolution that he considers. As will be seen, however, some chance events in evolution, such as, possibly, mutations, may not be bracketed in this way, although they are of course in Darwin’s theory. And yet they may still need to be left to chance, without any hope of theorizing any causality behind them. Would theorizing such events, with or without causality behind them, be part of Gould’s new synthesis, or does he merely mean expanding causal macroevolutionary patterns initiated by random events and their relationships, positive or negative, to microevolutionary dynamics? Could it be, once causality is suspended? Could they be theorized? What would the theory of chance events without causality behind them or of particulars without relations to the whole be, and what kind of explanatory specificity could it offer? I shall return to these questions below. A broader overarching point can be made now, however, to convey one of the most important lessons of this book.

     

    Evolutionary theory may demand from us as complex a combination of chance and causality (or necessity) as we can develop, indeed many a complex combination of both, to a degree of complexity arguably unique in the natural sciences. It is true that, if we consider physics as a conglomerate of its various theories, one can make a similar case there as well. Indeed, as will be seen, one of the key questions here is what a general or unified theory joining such theories, say, as branches of a single tree, would be, if it were possible. For the moment, Gould’s argument is that, along with the Darwinian contingency (as part of a more gradual dynamics of evolutionary change), random discontinuous punctuation is an equally and even more significant force of change, thus leading him to a more radical and more complex concept of evolutionary contingency. The contingency part of this argument (whereby causal chains are initiated or reshaped by chance events that themselves are not included in these chains and are, thus, also discontinuous from them) is, again, decisive. We may need still more complex structure(s) of contingency, however, extending the spectrum of contingency, and thus of both chance and causality, even further. In the case of the history of life, of its, to cite, with Gould, Shakespeare’s most famous lines from The Tempest, continuous, incessant “sea change into something rich and strange,” we might need to do so as much as we possibly can (The Tempest I, ii, 403; SET 24).

     

    With this argument for a necessarily broad spectrum of causality, chance, and contingency in mind, the question becomes that of the character of chance as such. In particular, the question is whether chance is a manifestation of causality or necessity, however hidden or remote, or not. These two alternatives define the two concepts of chance that I shall discuss–classical, which entails a hidden causality or necessity behind chance, and nonclassical, in which case we do not or even cannot assume any causality behind it. Nonclassical contingency is defined, accordingly, as contingency involving nonclassical chance in one way or another, which is the case in Darwin’s or Gould’s view of evolutionary contingency. It is worth qualifying that for the moment I am concerned with what is responsible for chance, with the effects of chance, with random effects, as opposed to the effects of chance events upon a given causal dynamics or engendering new causalities, the main concern of Darwin and Gould. Their argument for giving chance a shaping role in evolution, however, remains important in this context as well. For, as explained above, in relation to the dynamics these interruptive events (such as mutational variations or exterior punctuations) trigger or enter, they are nonclassical, even if the dynamics responsible for the emergence of such events is classical (causal), since this dynamics itself is not included in evolutionary theory. The unpunctuated evolutionary dynamics occurring between such events is considered by the theory as causal or classical, which may not be the case elsewhere, for example, in quantum theory, and, as I indicated above, mutations may need to be considered in a more radically nonclassical way.

     

    By “chance” itself, it is worth reiterating, I mean a manifestation of the unpredictable (possibly within some dynamics of contingency, as the interplay of causality and chance). A chance event is an unpredictable, random event, whether it ultimately hides some underlying causal dynamics, as in the case of classical chance, or not, as in the case in nonclassical chance. For example, when they occur in classical physics, randomness and probability result from insufficient information concerning systems that are at bottom causal. It is their complexity (due, say, to the large numbers of their individual constituents, as in the kinetic theory of gases) that prevents us from accessing their causal behavior and making deterministic predictions concerning this behavior. I here distinguish causality and determinism. I use “causality” as an ontological category relating to the behavior of the systems whose evolution is defined by the fact that the state of a given system is determined at all points in time by its state at a given point. (In the present context, causal and classical are the same.) I use “determinism” as an epistemological category having to do with our ability to predict exactly the state of a system at any and all points once we know its state at a given point.

     

    In physics, classical mechanics deals deterministically with causal systems; classical statistical physics deals with causal systems, but only statistically, rather than deterministically; and chaos theory or complexity theory deals with systems that are, in principle, causal, but whose behavior cannot be predicted even in statistical terms in view of the highly nonlinear character of this behavior. Gould’s evolutionary contingency involves an analogous causal stratum, although the specific dynamics operative there differs from that of complexity theory, for example, as developed in the evolutionary context in Kauffman’s work. All these theories are causal and hence classical insofar as they deal, deterministically or not, with systems that are assumed to behave causally, in contrast to quantum theory and possibly evolutionary theory. Quantum theory offers predictions, of a statistical nature, concerning the systems that may not be and, in most versions of the theory, indeed cannot be considered as causal or, more generally, subject to any realist description, and thus the events such systems trigger cannot be “fully [or even partially] explainable after time’s actual unfoldings,” along the lines of Gould’s contingency. Quantum theory only predicts, statistically, certain events (in the manner of outcomes of tossing dice) but does not explain the physical processes through which these events come about. Even though the probabilistic predictions of quantum mechanics are subject to rigorous mathematical laws, in this case, in contrast to that of classical statistical physics, randomness and probability do not arise in view of our inability to access the underlying causal dynamics determining the behavior of quantum systems.6 It does not appear possible to assume such a behavior to be causal. Accordingly, in quantum mechanics we confront nonclassical chance in the case of all events considered by the theory, without assigning or assuming any causality between these events, rather than only in the case of certain events punctuating causal chains, as in the case of evolutionary theory and its dynamics of contingency. Although not without parallels or predecessors elsewhere, the physical theories just described are our primary scientific and mathematical-scientific models of chance, including in biology and evolutionary theory, which cannot as yet escape “physics envy,” even when they exercise proper ambivalence in this attitude (SET 1209).

     

    Classically, then, chance or, it follows, the appearance of chance is seen as arising from our insufficient (and perhaps, in practice, unavailable) knowledge of a total configuration of the forces involved and, hence, of a lawful causality that is always postulated behind an apparently lawless chance event. If this configuration becomes available, or if it could be made available in principle, the chance character of the event would disappear. Chance would reveal itself to be a product of the play of forces that, however complex, is, at least in principle if not in practice, calculable by man, or at least by God, who, in this view, indeed does not play dice, as Einstein famously said, or at least always knows how they will fall. In other words, in practice, we only have partially available, incomplete information about chance events, which are, nonetheless, determined by, in principle, a complete architecture of causality or necessity behind them. This architecture itself may or may not be accessible in full or even partial measure. The presupposition of its existence is, however, essential for and defines the classical view as causal and, correlatively, realist. Subtle and complex as they may be, all scientific theories of chance and probability prior to Darwin’s evolutionary theory (and then, still more radically, quantum theory), and many beyond them, as well as most philosophical theories of chance, are of the type just described. They are classical. Combined, two of Alexander Pope’s famous utterances, the closing of Epistle 1 of An Essay on Man and his “Proposed Epitaph for Isaac Newton,” encapsulate the classical view of chance or, conversely, causality and law:

     

    All Nature is but art, unknown to thee;
    All chance, direction, which thou canst not see;
    All discord, harmony not understood;
    All partial evil, universal good:
    And, spite of pride, in erring reason's spite,
    One truth is clear: Whatever IS, is RIGHT.

     

    (An Essay on Man, Epistle 1, 289-94)

     

    Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night;
    God said, let Newton be! and all was light.

     

    (“Proposed Epitaph for Isaac Newton, who died in 1727”)

     

    Gould cites the immediately following passage from An Essay of Man, opening Epistle 2, which considers the nature of man, while Epistle 1 considers the nature of nature itself, as best seen by man, or by best men. Women are yet another subject in Pope. On the other hand, some women writers, such as Emily Brontë, invoked by Gould alongside Tolstoy, give us a more subtle perspective on the world, as defined by chance and contingency (SET 1340). In the passage cited by Gould, Pope writes:

     

    Know then thyself, presume not God to scan;
    The proper study of Mankind is Man.
    Placed on this isthmus of a middle state,
    A being darkly wise, and rudely great [...]
    He hangs between; in doubt to act, or rest;
    In doubt to deem himself a God, or Beast;
    In doubt his Mind or Body to prefer.
    Born but to die, and reas'ning but err;
    Alike in ignorance, his reason such,
    Whether he thinks too little, or too much:
    Chaos of Thought and Passion, all confus'd;
    Still by himself abus'd, or disabus'd;
    Created half to rise, and half to fall;
    Great lord of all things, yet a prey to all;
    Sole judge of Truth, in endless Error hurl'd:
    The glory, jest, and riddle of the world!

     

    (An Essay on Man, Epistle 2, 1-18)

     

    I give a slightly fuller quotation, including the first two lines, which tell us that, as far as science is concerned, we no longer need to appeal to any theological considerations, as (the genius of) Newton is sufficient, but also necessary–a necessary and sufficient condition, as mathematicians say. This passage appears at an important juncture of Gould’s book, in the opening chapter of Part II, “Toward a Revised and Expanded Evolutionary Theory,” as he begins his build-up of his revisionist theory, from the argument concerning, to cite the title of the chapter, “Species as Individuals in the Hierarchical Theory of Selection” (SET 680). It is hardly surprising that Gould sees Pope’s passage “as composed for a quite different, but interestingly related purpose” (680; emphasis added). Pope’s biological, geological, and cosmological examples and hierarchies are of much interest here. To be sure, Pope’s pre-Darwinian and even pre-Linnaen “chain of beings” is well short of evolution. It can, however, be given a teleological, directed historical and thus evolutionary dynamics. Undirected and contingent history is a far more radical and difficult move, which requires the genius of Darwin. With Darwin and then with new non-Newtonian physics, at God’s command or not, a different light appears and different night must be assumed. Man’s view, even at its best, may be even more “parochial” (Gould’s word) than Pope thought, its parochialism lying, ironically, in the assumption of a plan in this maze of Nature–“a mighty maze! but not without a plan” (Epistle 1, 6)–or of “God-does-not-play-dice” necessity and order in this “one stupendous whole” (Epistle 1, 267), or, for that matter, in an assumption of wholeness or oneness, even while renouncing any possible understanding of this plan in its working specificity. Einstein would not be quite so modest and would aim to know how it all works. Bohr, in response, argued that, in order to do quantum theory, we might have to be even more modest than Pope urges us to be. As Gould says:

     

    The problem can be summarized with another, much older, classical quotation. "Man is," as Protagoras wrote in his wonderfully ambiguous epigram, "the measure of all things"--ambiguous, that is, in embodying both positive and negative meanings: positive for humanistic reasons of ubiquitous self-valuing that might lead to some form of universal brotherhood and compassion; but negative because our own "measure" can be so parochially limiting, and therefore so conducive to misunderstanding other scales if we must assess these various domains by the allometric properties of our limited estate. (680-81)

     

    Ultimately, this parochialism may be irreducible. Gould, in the epilogue, offers a powerful critique of the classical view in science. Thus, he says:

     

    I confess that, after 30 years of teaching at a major university, I remain surprised by the unquestioned acceptance of this view of science--which, by the way, I strongly reject for the reasons exemplified just below--both among students headed for a life in this profession, and among intellectually inclined people in general. If, as a teacher, I suggest to students that they might wish to construe probability and contingency as ontological properties of nature, they often become confused, and even angry, and almost invariably respond with some version of the old Laplacean claim [of the underlying ultimate causality of nature]. In the short, they insist that our use of probabilistic inference can only, and in principle, be an epistemological consequence of our mental limitations, and simply cannot represent an irreducible property of nature, which must, if science works at all, be truly deterministic. (1333)

     

    At least it must be truly causal, on the present definition. On the other hand, one should not perhaps be surprised, given that the classical view has the backing of a great many major figures in modern science and beyond it, beginning with Einstein, for whom quantum mechanics was almost not science on these very grounds.

     

    Inspired by, among others, Lucretius (whose well-known passages could also be cited here), Milton’s description of chaos in Paradise Lost gives us a subtler picture of chance:

     

    Before thir [Satan's, Sin's and Death's] eyes in sudden view appear
    The secrets of the hoary deep, a dark
    Illimitable Ocean without bound,
    Without dimension, where lengths, breadth, and highth,
    And time and place are lost; where eldest Night
    And Chaos, ancestors of Nature, hold
    Eternal Anarchy, amidst the noise
    Of endless worth, and by confusion stand.
    [...] Chaos Umpire sits,
    And by decision more imbroils the fray
    By which he Reigns: next his high Arbiter
    Chance governs all. Into this wild Abyss,
    The Womb of Nature, and perhaps her Grave,
    Of neither Sea, nor Shore, not Air, nor Fire,
    But all of these in thir pregnant causes mixed
    Confus'dly, and which this must ever fight,
    Unless th's Almighty Maker them ordain
    His dark materials to create more Worlds,

     

    (Book II, 890-916)

     

    This extraordinary vision is closer to the nonclassical view of chance, if not quite as radical by giving God at least a chance to govern chance and shape it into order. It should be noted, though, that the view of chaos given here is how Satan and his family entourage see it, and it may be that, as in Pope, in Milton, too, there would be no randomness and chaos at the ultimate level, unavailable to anyone “except to God alone” (Book III, 684).

     

    In any event, to reach the conceptual-epistemological structure of evolutionary theory, as advocated by Gould, one needs to remove God from the structure here proposed, or again, with Darwin, “foresw[ear] (as beyond the realm of science) all inquiry into the ultimate origins of things” (SET 101). From this perspective, evolutionary processes are seen as giving rise to causal sequences and ordered structures without presupposing the overall underlying or primordial causality or order, either exterior or integrated into the evolutionary process. Random impacts upon evolution may, again, come either from within, through mutations or constraints, for example, or from exterior punctuations. In question is, accordingly, first, the interplay of chance and causality (or necessity), and, then, the order (life is a highly ordered phenomenon) emerging from it, and, second, the specific character of chance and causality involved, or of their interplay. There may be many variations on how new formations, such as new species, in the biological evolution may arise or are destroyed. As I have stressed throughout, “expanded evolutionary theory” conceived by Gould, is defined by the great complexity of these relations, and we might need a greater complexity still.

     

    The Romantics, such as Hölderlin, Kleist, Keats, and Shelley would, in Shelley’s words, “take the darker side” (Julian and Maddalo 49), and bring us at least to the threshold of nonclassical chance. Gould places Darwin between the Enlightenment and Romanticism, with the help of his grandfather Erasmus (much revered by Darwin), who, I would add, was an important and often equally revered figure for both traditions, and especially for Shelley (SET 595). Shelley’s The Triumph of Life, which presents a tragic-triumphant procession of life or/as death (it is true, of human life) that is hardly a pageant (which Gould favors) stops, remarkably, on an as-yet unanswered question: “What is Life?” (The Triumph of Life 544). The poem intimates that all life, biological or other, may be shaped and even ultimately governed by nonclassical chance. While remarkable, it is not by chance, given Shelley’s biography, and specifically his interest in contemporary science. Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, for which Shelley wrote a preface, is shaped by the spectrum of scientific themes shared with Shelley’s work, and by this question “What is Life?”. Gould mentions the novel, via Shakespeare’s famous lines–“Nothing in him that doth fade/But does suffer a sea-change/Into something rich and strange”–from The Tempest (I.ii.401-03), the work multiply connected with Shelley’s work, including The Triumph of Life. Gould, at least at this juncture, takes a more positive view, as does Mary Shelley. Shakespeare’s lines, Gould reminds us, “appear on the tombstone of the great poet Percy Bysshe Shelley (also the author of the preface to his wife’s novella, Frankenstein, which cites Erasmus Darwin in its first line of text). I believe that these words would suit, and honor, Charles Darwin just as well and just as rightly” (SET 24). These words, it may be added, also offer as good a description as any of evolutionary change. There is, however, a darker side, along with “grandeur” to Darwin’s “view of life,” to cite the conclusion of The Origin of Species, the side that brings his view of life as life-death and of chance closer to Shelley’s in The Triumph of Life. In Paul de Man’s words, “The Triumph of Life warns us that, nothing, whether deed, word, thought or text, ever happens in relation, positive or negative, to anything that preceded, follows, or exists elsewhere, but only as a random event whose power, like the power of death, is due to the randomness of its occurrence” (122; emphasis added). De Man also stresses, however, that, while it retains the underlying overall economy of chance, thus reversing the classical view (where causality underlies chance), Shelley’s poem also teaches us that causal sequences do shape certain events. It also tells us how we may integrate irreducibly random events into classical-like causal sequences, which we often continue to prefer, as Gould noted above, but which may not be rigorously possible.

     

    Nonclassical chance, then, is irreducible to any causality or necessity, not only in practice but, at the limit, also, and most fundamentally, in principle. There is no argumentation offered and there may be none in principle available to us that would allow us to eliminate chance and replace it with the picture of causality or necessity behind it. Nor, however, does one or, again, at the limit, can one postulate a causal dynamics as unknown or even unknowable but existing behind random events. This qualification is crucial. For, as I explained, some forms of the classical understanding of chance allow for and are defined by this type of assumption. The nonclassical chance is irreducibly random.

     

    At the very least, it is irreducibly random within the field demarcated by a given theory, as in the evolutionary theory of Darwin and Gould, where random events in question may result from some exterior causality, as against quantum mechanics where all events in question in the theory are nonclassically random and are, thus, within the domain of the theory. Unlike in Milton and Pope, in Gould’s theory one is not concerned with the ultimate theological determination of the world (classical, by definition), but only with the specific scientific explanations of evolutionary dynamics. For example, one is not concerned with who or what arranged for the asteroid to hit the earth 65 or so millions years ago (seconds on the cosmological scale, and we, as a species, have been or will be around much less) or other catastrophes that punctuated and changed evolution. One is only concerned with how such events shape the workings of evolution. As I said, more generally, if a given punctuation or mutation has a causality behind it, this causality would not be linked to the evolutionarycausality/iesinitiated or affected by this punctuation or mutation. One might say that mutation, too, functions as a form of punctuation in this sense, although within a more gradual rather than catastrophically ruptured dynamics. One could be concerned with the causalities of such events in studying the motion of asteroids, subject to classical mechanics or else chaos theory. Understanding the specific nature of their motion is essential, for example, if we want to prevent, if we can, yet another chance event that would catastrophically change the course of evolution and would eliminate us from the face of the earth, would do us in, as it did the dinosaurs. That, however, would entail shifting the theoretical context outside the domain of evolutionary theory. In sum, in Darwin’s or Gould’s theories, one theoretically deals with causalities triggered by certain random events, such as mutations or punctuations, rather than with these events themselves in their own history, whether the latter is classical or nonclassical. In other words, evolutionary contingency in Darwin’s and Gould’s sense depends on the nonclassicality of interrupting or punctuating events shaping causal sequences the theory considered in a classical, and specifically descriptive way, just as classical physics does in considering its objects.
    By contrast, in quantum theory, at least in certain (nonclassical) interpretations of it, we deal only with nonclassically shaped events, as opposed to causal (classical) chains that such events would trigger, as they may, for example, by virtue of their impact in the macroworld, to which chains we can, then, apply classical physics. Quantum theory is, accordingly, a theory of predicting such events on the basis of other events of the same type, without explaining (which may not be possible) the process leading from one event to another. If one wants a contrast to Gould’s or Darwin’s theory, quantum theory qua in principle7

     

    Now, the question is whether the structure of evolutionary theory involves this type of nonclassical stratum as well–an unanswered or perhaps, in this form, unasked question of Gould’s book. Before I sketch my reasons for asking this question, or rather by way of transition, I would like to respond to the question that one might ask concerning my general argument here on classical vs. nonclassical chance, whether the latter is of a Gouldian (or Darwinian) type or of a more radical quantum-mechanical type. This question goes as follows. If the underlying causal dynamics of chance, while presupposed, could not be known even in the classical case, what difference would the introduction of nonclassical chance, that is, a suspension of even an assumption of causality behind chance, make? Can assuming something that we cannot possibly know make a difference? Indeed, as explained above, on Gould’s or Darwin’s view it would not make that significant a difference, since evolutionary theory does not deal with chance events themselves but only with their effects, which are causal sequences, treated classically. (The introduction itself of such events is, again, crucial for the structure of evolutionary theory.) Strange as it may seem, however, it can make a difference. We know that, in view of the so-called Bell’s theorem, it does make a difference in quantum theory. For the correctness of our theoretical prediction of the outcomes of the experiments depends on making or not making this assumption. In the words of quantum physicist David Mermin,

     

    Bell [...] demonstrated that there were circumstances under which one could [in fact] settle a question of whether "something [a causal reality behind quantum randomness] one cannot know anything about exists all the same" [or not], and if quantum mechanics was quantitatively correct in its predictions, the answer was, contrary to Einstein's conviction, that it does not. (124)

     

    By contrast, for classical statistical physics or, differently, chaos theory and complexity theory to be correct in their predictions, we must presuppose an underlying causal reality within the scope of the theory, even though we cannot, even in principle, access it.

     

    Accordingly, one might argue that, whenever we deal with a theory where chance plays an essential role, the classical or conversely nonclassical nature of this chance may prove to be significant. Evolutionary theory is such a theory. A certain nonclassicality is already introduced into it by Darwin and extended by Gould (although the extension is subject of much debate among evolutionary theorists). This may be as much nonclassicality as Gould wants, and Gould’s macroevoluationary theory, defined by hierarchy, punctuation, spandrels, and so forth may not need more, although his general appeal of integrating contingency and (causal) general theory may leave space for more. Gould does not, however, here or, as far as I know, anywhere, discuss chance and contingency of the type we encounter in quantum theory or offer theoretical arguments of this (nonclassical) type. On the other hand, microevolutionary dynamics may require a kind of through-and-through quantum-mechanical nonclassicality. Such may be the case, for example, if one wants to address theoretically the nature of random mutations as part of evolutionary theory, rather than see them as microtransformations or micropunctuations, whose biology is bracketed by the evolutionary theory, either Darwinian or Gouldian (which incorporates Darwin on this score). At most, it appears to be left to other theoretical fields such as genetics, say, at the level of the molecular biology and chemistry and physics it involves, apart from evolutionary theory. If, however, as Gould argues in the passage cited earlier, “random” mutations are not necessarily “equally likely in all directions,” and if we want to understand how mutational dice are loaded (quantum dice, we recall, are) and make this understanding part of evolutionary theory, then the nature of such processes may be in question, possibly involving nonclassical features of the kind one finds in quantum theory. In the latter case, we would confront epistemological complexities, as concerns the possibility or impossibility of describing or explaining this type of process, of the type we encounter in quantum theory. There is a crucial difference. In quantum mechanics we deal primarily with predictions concerning future events on the basis of certain events that have previously occurred. By contrast, in evolutionary theory, at least so far, we deal with past events, whose “history” to some previous events we might want to trace, in however limited a fashion, which situation may lead to yet further theoretical complexities. The considerations of the kind just outlined may also arise in other interactions forming Gould’s “expansion of Darwin’s reliance upon organismal selection into a hierarchical model of simultaneous selection at several levels of Darwinian individuality (gene, cell lineage, organism, deme, species and clade)” (1340).

     

    What would such a theory be? Would it be a theory of the quantum-mechanical type, for example, or would it still proceed along the lines of Darwin’s or Gould’s view of contingency on a smaller scale?8 Whether such a “unified” theory is possible is yet another question, to which I shall return presently. It is not unlike the question of a possible or impossible ultimate unified theory in physics, which would unify quantum theory, as a microlevel theory, and general relativity, as currently a macrolevel theory, within a single theory, a string theory, for example. Gould does not address these questions, although it may be seen as shadowing his argument, for example, in some of his discussions of genetic aspects of evolution and debates surrounding them.

     

    Gould, unavoidably, invokes classical physics, via the works of d’Arcy Thomson, whose work, especially his famous On Growth and Form, pioneered a rigorous application of classical physics and related mathematics to biological morphology, as Gould discusses in some detail (SET 1182-1214). Gould might have mentioned the related morphological work of a great mathematician and d’Arcy Thomson’s fellow Aristotelian, René Thom (the two last names also share a signifier, a “form”), whom Gould only invokes in a related context of catastrophe theories, one of Thom’s great contribution to mathematics (922). Gould also discusses the more recent work of Stuart Kauffman in complexity theory, of which Kauffman was one of the pioneers, and which continues d’Arcy Thomson’s tradition of relating physics and biology and extends to new but classical theories, on the present definition, although not in Kaufmann’s terminology. As explained above, there are differences between classical physics, including classical statistical physics, and chaos and complexity theories, which compel Kaufmann to juxtapose them.9 Interestingly enough, however, especially given the place of contingency in Gould’s thinking, quantum theory, a paradigmatic and paradigmatically modern or indeed postmodern theory of chance, does not find its place in the book. The work in molecular biology, essential to modern genetics, stemming in part from quantum theory and in part initiated by quantum theorists, beginning with Erwin Schrödinger’s book What is Life?, which thus repeats Shelley’s question, is not part of the book either. But then, as I said, no book, however long, is ever long enough.

     

    As I argue here, however, Gould’s contingency has crucial nonclassical affinities with quantum theory, and he could not avoid quantum theory altogether, at least by implication. One of the more remarkable junctures of personal, historical, philosophical, and scientific trajectories defining the book occurs around the case of the so-called “quantum evolution” theory (introduced in the 1940s). The name is an inevitably evocative title or, one might say, signifier. I do not want to overstress the significance of this signifier, especially given that the signified behind it is far from the (micro)considerationsof the quantum-theoretical type here discussed. It is in fact closer to Gould’s macroevolutionary theory, and this is why Gould discusses it. Moreover, as Gould shows (which is one of his points), quantum evolution theory progressed from its more radical to its more conventional form, maintaining the same terms or signifiers but subtly shifting its concepts (SET 521-531). Nevertheless, it is not out of place to speak of a shadow of the quantum over Gould’s argument and evolutionary theory, or conversely the shadow of Darwin, arguably the first step toward the nonclassical view of chance in science, over quantum theory. (There are also actual historical lineages and influences.)

     

    One can, then, sum up the preceding argument as follows. First, the structure of evolutionary theory is fundamentally determined by whether we assume that the character of chance that shapes the contingencies of evolution is classical or nonclassical, or combines both, which, I would argue with Gould, is in fact the case, even given the more limited, Gouldian or Darwinian, form of nonclassicality. Second, the nature and the structure of evolutionary theory, arguably more so than that of any other single scientific theory, requires a maximal and multilevel deployment of both views and of their many combinations. In paradigmatic terms of physical theories, it needs the structures of causality and chance, and of their interplay, contingency, on the model of classical physics at some junctures; on the model of classical statistical physics at others; on the model of chaos and complexity theory at still others; and possibly (as we have only seen intimations of it so far) on still other models, such as those of quantum theory (which has different levels and versions in turn). The deployment of such models in evolutionary theory may be qualitative or quantitative, mathematical or nonmathematical, and so forth. But evolutionary theory may also need its own models, such as Darwin’s or Gould’s. Accordingly, it may demand from us the ultimate complexity in the domain of natural science and already engages this type of complexity. This is, I would argue, what Gould’s book teaches us, or this is how it answers or rather asks Shelley’s question “What is Life?”

     

    But would it be, could it be one evolutionary theory, then, even with multiple structures, and in what sense of oneness? Gould appears to suggest or wants to see it as possibly a single theory. His commentary in his epilogue on Darwin’s famous passage ending The Origin of Species is of some interest in this respect. To cite Darwin’s great final sentence first:

     

    There is grandeur to this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being evolved. (490)

     

    Gould turns this sentence around and turns around it, in a kind of mutual dance, a few times in his epilogue, beginning with this elegant turn:

     

    Note how Darwin contrasts the dull repetitiveness of planetary cycling (despite the elegance and simplicity of its quantitative expression) with the gutsy glory of rich diversity of life's ever rising and expanding tree. Darwin even gives his metaphor a geometric flavor, as he contrasts the horizontal solar system, its planets cycling around a central sun to nowhere, with the vertical tree of life, starting in utmost simplicity at the bottom, and rising right through the horizontality of this repetitive physical setting towards the heavenly heights of magnificent and ever expanding diversity, in a contingent and unpredictable future of still greater possibility. (SET 1334)

     

    Perhaps! The “utmost simplicity” at bottom only appears at the expense of the contingent event of enormous complexity, that is the origin of life, which, it is true, is properly bracketed in Darwin’s and Gould’s theories alike, but need not be, and no longer is, seen in terms of absolute origins. The future is far less certain, too. We also know (it is true, better than Darwin did) how complex the structure (more likely chaos) of the solar system is, let alone the nature, so far unfathomable, of gravitation, thanks to Einstein’s theory. I am of course not aiming these arguments against Darwin, who could not know them, or indeed against Gould, who is well aware of them. Besides, Gould’s main point here is a historical particularity, contingency, of Darwin’s view of life, as opposed to other possible views, to which I shall return presently. For the moment, I want to look at the image and indeed the concept of the tree–the tree of life and the tree of evolutionary theory–as governing Darwin and, via the image of Scilla’s coral, Gould’s view of both life itself and evolutionary theory. The tree of life (one would expect this) appears in the final sentence of Gould’s book as well. Even as it maps a radical revision of Darwin, this “vertical” view of evolutionary theory still implies a certain unifying attitude, whereby theories or sub-theories branch from a single ultimate lineage, without (ever?) leaving the tree and its hierarchy behind. Could it be the case even within evolutionary theory? Is it not possible to think of a different theoretical structure here (or, as I said, in physics as well) whereby we have a certain “horizontal” field of theories, interactive but not genealogically linked as branches within a single tree, theories that are heterogeneously interactive and interactively heterogeneous? This view may even be necessary if we want to pursue “the generation of theories appropriate to the characteristic rates and modalities of time’s higher tiers to explain the extensive range of macroevolutionary phenomena,” on which Gould insists (1340).

     

    Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari would speak of “rhizome,” which they juxtapose to “tree,” although they, correctly, acknowledge that we need both types of structuration. Rhizome may still be too connected. Horizontality, however, and the suspension of any ultimate hierarchy are crucial. One could think in particular of the extraordinary Chapter 3, “10,000. B.C.: The Geology of Morals (Who Does the Earth Think It Is?),” of A Thousand Plateaus, the book that also offers a correlatively rhizomatic philosophy of history (39-74). The title obviously alludes to Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals, so crucial to Gould but perhaps not followed by him to its ultimate Nietzschean limits, including on this point, that of heterogeneous, if interactive, genealogies of and relationships between different theories or different practices of morality. But the chapter explores, naturally, in philosophical, rather than scientific, terms and in an allegorical mode, the structure of–among others–evolutionary theory, including its relation to the geological and cosmological forces that shaped it. (It also contains an ironic play upon the title of Darwin’s Descent of Man.) In the process it also suggests that this structure may take the horizontal, rhizomatic, theoretical field. I can, however, only indicate this problematic here. To properly address it would require the scale of Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus (about 600 pages), if not of Gould’s book. Instead, I would like to close by returning, with Gould, to contingency.

     

    Gould adds an epilogue to his epilogue, on contingency in literature vs. science, thus finally ending his “interminable book” on a triple synthesis–philosophical, scientific, and cultural–of causality and chance, of two types of evolutionary theory, and, finally (and not coincidentally, only contingently), of science and literature, all of which are represented in Darwin’s work and life (1342-43). The subject, in all three of its aspects, is implicitly linked to a slightly earlier discussion of Darwin’s “tree of life” and Kauffman’s critique of it from complexity theory, on contingency in immanent and narrative style of explanations and modes of knowing correlative to them, and then to the discussion of contingency in history and biography (1335-37, 1338-39). Now Gould “risks” (chances) “a final statement about contingency”:

     

    And yet, as an epilog to this epilog and, honest to God, a true end to this interminable book, I risk a final statement about contingency, both to explicate the appeal of this subject, and to permit a recursion to my starting point in the most remarkable person and career of Charles Robert Darwin. Although contingency has been consistently underrated (or even unacknowledged) in stereotypical descriptions of scientific practice, the same subject remains a perennial favorite among literary folk, from the most snootily arcane to the most vigorously vernacular--and it behooves us to ask why. (1340)

     

    It is at this juncture that Gould invokes Brontë’s Wuthering Heights (1340). It is a pity that in his first example of Tolstoy’s War and Peace, Gould, while correct in his argument, makes a technical error. Tolstoy does indeed argue, as Gould says, that “Napoleon’s defeat in Moscow in 1812 rested upon a thicket of apparently inconsequential and independent details, and not upon any broad and abstract claim about the souls of nations or the predictable efficacy of Russia’s two greatest generals, November and December” (1340). I would contend that it rested on both, as the predictable evolution of the French campaign was also “punctuated” by the generals in question, while Brontë’s or earlier Stendhal’s (a key precursor of Tolstoy, not mentioned by Gould) would be closer to the quantum-mechanical view of chance. (Actually one finds both conceptions in Stendhal.) In any event, Tolstoy does not argue this in “both prefaces,” as Gould mistakenly says, but in both of his epilogues, just as Gould himself does–a missed chance by Gould.

     

    Gould’s own answer to his question is roughly that literature or art aims at the extraordinary, even in the ordinary, which could only be contingent and even singular, unique. Phenomena like Darwin or Newton, and their work and writings, are in the same category, as are certain phenomena in science itself. Gould says:

     

    We care for the same reasons we love okapis, delight in the fossil evidence of trilobites, and mourn the passage of the dodo. We care because the broad events that had to happen, happened to happen in a certain particular way. And something almost unspeakably holy--I don't know how else to say this--underlies our discovery and confirmation of the actual details that made our world and also, in realms of contingency, assured the minutiae of its construction in the manner we know, and not in any one of a trillion other ways, nearly all of which would not have included the evolution of a scribe to record the beauty, the cruelty, the fascination, and the mystery. (1342)

     

    He adds: “no difference truly separates science and art in this crucial respect. We only perceive a division because our disparate traditions lead us to focus upon different scales of identity” (1343). More specifically, the situation, according to Gould, is as follows. A different history of evolutionary theory or of physics (Newton is mentioned next, by way of the fact that Darwin is buried next to him in the Westminster Abbey), without Darwin or Newton, would be unlikely to change our theories of either physical nature or evolution. (To follow Gould’s view of biological evolution, the contingencies of the macroevolution of culture could do so, since they could deprive or relieve us of science, or of art, altogether.) This different history would, however, change our experience of either science or the history of both, in their particulars, as against those particulars that the work of Newton or that of Darwin brought into them. “We would [still] be enjoying an evolutionary view of life, but not the specific grandeur of ‘this [Darwin’s] view of life’” (1343). We would still be asking Shelley’s question “What is Life?,” but not in the way it is asked by Shelley’s poem, or by us after Shelley and Darwin, or both Darwins, Charles and Erasmus. Other particulars, perhaps equally grand, would take their place. Gould undoubtedly knew full well that this argument equally applies to his book, or his particular way of asking this question, Shelley’s and Darwin’s, the question of art and the question of science, and now (it’s been for a while, actually) Gould’s, “What is Life?.” Or, again, doubling the question mark, how do we ask this question, “What is Life?”?

     

    Notes

     

    1. “Spandrel” and “exaptation” are Gould’s key concepts developed in this central chapter (1214-95).

     

    2. Other interactive conceptual pairs or more multiple clusters, such as, and especially, unity and multiplicity, or general and particular, are significant as well and could be correlated with the problematics in question.

     

    3. Democritus appears to speak of necessity, as (with Democritus in mind) does Monod, which is not quite the same as causality, and the difference is not without significance in the present context. I shall, however, leave the subject aside here, and use primarily causality, and only invoke necessity on a few occasions.

     

    4. I follow Hermann Weyl’s formulation of the principle in his discussion of Riemann in his classic, Space, Time, Matter (92).

     

    5. This is a major theme throughout Derrida’s work, whose connections to evolutionary conceptuality are yet (thirty years in waiting) to be explored.

     

    6. These events may involve statistical correlations, but without causal connections between the events themselves.

     

    7. I cannot enter here into a detailed treatment of quantum theory and instead permit myself to refer to my discussion of the subject in The Knowable and the Unknowable: Modern Science, Nonclassical Theory, and the “Two Cultures” and references therein.

     

    8. Were such transitions to involve quantum processes, as is sometimes conjectured, they would, at least in part, obey the quantum-mechanical model of chance, as sketched here.

     

    9. It would not be possible to address Kauffman’s work here, in part in view of its technical complexity, although this work and complexity theory in general feature prominently in current discussions both in science and in the humanities and social sciences.

     

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Bohr, Niels. The Philosophical Writings of Niels Bohr. Vol. 2. Woodbridge, CT: Ox Bow P, 1987.
    • de Man, Paul. The Rhetoric of Romanticism. New York: Columbia UP, 1984.
    • Darwin, Charles. On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life. London: Murray, 1859.
    • Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus. Trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1987.
    • Derrida, Jacques. Margins of Philosophy. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1982.
    • Kuhn, Thomas. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1965.
    • Mermin, N. David. Boojums All the Way Through: Communicating Science is a Prosaic Age. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990.
    • Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Gay Science. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage, 1974.
    • —. On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage, 1989.
    • Plotnitsky, Arkady. The Knowable and the Unknowable: Modern Science, Nonclassical Theory, and the “Two Cultures.” Ann Arbor, MI: U of Michigan P, 2002.
    • Weyl, Hermann. Space, Time, Matter. Trans. Henry L. Brose. New York: Dover, 1952.

     

  • Montage/Critique: Another Way of Writing Social History

    George Dillon

    Department of English
    University of Washington
    dillon@u.washington.edu

     

    In the last 40 years, numbers of writers and artists have come to see Walter Benjamin as a pioneer who blazed a new way of writing historical and cultural critique. The drafts of and reflections upon his Arcades Project (Passagen-Werk) have been the subject of major textual scholarship (Tiedeman, 1982) and the focus of several full-scale critical discussions (Buck-Morss, 1989; Jennings, 1989). Over the same period, these writings have inspired artists to adopt and extend their method of critique by fragments and juxtaposition (“montage”), especially into mixed and electronic media (Berger and Mohr, 1975, 1982; Peaker, 1997-2000; Broadway, 1997-99; Michals, 2001; Lederman, 2000.) I do not mean to set the Benjamin scholars and artists at odds, nor to decide who among them is the more legitimate heir of Benjamin. Rather, I want to understand Benjamin’s theory and practice from the point of view of latter-day users of it–those who claim it as inspiration and method for their work, who attempt to do critique without an integrating authorial voice. Though I will discuss the works roughly in the order of their appearance, no development or progess is implied–just a series of responses to Benjamin’s Arcades Project. It should be held in mind that Benjamin’s method was for him a way of writing social history; we cannot expect it to transfer in tototo other, though related, deployments. I begin by outlining his project under the heads of fragment and juxtaposition.

     

    I

     

    fragment: Michael Jennings observes that a fondness for fragments and a suspicion of system characterize all of Benjamin’s work. He was temperamentally a modernist, and many commented on his remarkable eye for detail, especially for things deemed insignificant in standard views–the accounts that supported the interests of the ruling class. Benjamin was probably thinking of collage and photomontage with its inclusion of ticket stubs, pieces of newspaper, and magazine illustrations when he wrote the following:

     

    method of this project: literary montage. I needn't say anything. Merely show. I shall purloin no valuables, appropriate no ingenious formulations. But the rags, the refuse--these I will not inventory but allow, in the only way possible, to come into their own: by making use of them. (N1a,8)[1]

     

    The fragments that make up the Arcades Project are paragraphs of description and reflection and snippets of text cited from critics, commentators, and historians. These fragments are grouped by topic into 28 different bundles (or folders–Konvoluts) and there is a good bit of cross-referencing between individual fragments in different folders. The general look is of a set of notecards for a history about to be written. But Benjamin was strongly opposed to writing history in a way that suggested development, unfolding, emergence, or progress. The meaning Benjamin sought to disclose in his materials was to be found in many sudden illuminations triggered by his juxtapositions and “dialectical images” and not in the forces, movements, conflicts, and resolutions of academic history.

     

    In addition, Benjamin had come to see images–photographs, drawings, illustrations–as other fragments to be included and reportedly had amassed a very sizeable collection for inclusion in the project. Only sixteen remained when Tiedemann put the manuscripts in order (these are included in an appendix to volume V of the Gesammelte Schriften). Other images are so exactly described in the project that editors and scholars, especially Susan Buck-Morss, have been able to find specific ones, or even to photograph the object described in one case. Buck-Morss has greatly augmented the collection of images; Giles Peaker attached several new ones in his hypertext fragment of the Arcades; and Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin have supplied even more in the English translation. It is no wonder artists see the Arcades Project as an invitation to multimedia when the scholars each augment the text in this direction. Though leading away from the topic immediately at hand, there are further details about the deployment of images in this body of Benjamin scholarship. However, one should not forget that for Benjamin, images and especially dialectical images are to be encountered in language (N2a,3).

     

    Benjamin placed great value on discontinuity and decontextualization in his method, both to denaturalize the particular features in view and to prevent their being reinserted into conventional, uncritical pictures of the world. Buck-Morss discusses this point well (218-221). It is clear how this intention attracts photography and hypertext, since as we shall see photographs are often described (for instance, by Berger) as cited or torn from the living world they depict, and hypertext, jumping from screen to screen with no authoritative order, helps to inhibit reinsertion into a smooth and seamless world. Indeed, Eduardo Cadava presses Benjamin’s associations of photography and history very strongly.

     

    What we have in the Arcades Project manuscript that Adorno preserved and passed on to Tiedemann, however, are not photographs, or even reproduced illustrations, but short pieces of text, and it should be noted that the decontextualization effected by photography differs from the effect of quoting “verbal images” in that quite a large number of these are quoted from published academic histories and thus are snipped from contexts that had already woven them into continuous academic narratives. Each quote comes with complete bibliographic information which is like a link back to the original context. The quote borrows the words and authority of the source and positions the work in a web of intertextuality that is quite traditional, even if the position taken toward the web is not. Photographs do not imply other, larger photographs of the world; rather, they imply the physical world beyond the frame, which has no authority and no position. But perhaps the analogy with photographs applies only to verbal images that present uninterpreted facts unmediated by scholarly interpretation? Benjamin would be the first to reject that as an untenable distinction as well as a wholly misguided one, since many of the “interpretations” date from the period and are themselves the facts to be observed. Indeed, many, many fragments aim to evoke the lifeworld of nineteenth-century Parisians, which is one of the reasons the Baudelaire folder is the largest of the lot.

     

    juxtaposition: We say two things are juxtaposed when they are placed side by side or one after the other with no connecting matter or continuing thread or common topic. Some inexplicit connection is nonetheless implied, or else one would simply have a pile of spare parts–disjecta membra–which may not even be parts of the same thing or similar things. Juxtaposition can thus be a matter of degree. Within the individual folders of the Arcades Project, the juxtaposition effect is moderated by all of the pieces bearing on the topic of the folder (for example, Iron Construction, Gambling and Prostitution, etc.). The individual fragments are often linked (cross-referenced) to fragments in other folders, and so if one follows the cross links, it is easy to commence a skid that takes one rapidly away from the initial fragment and its topic. This quality is one of the reasons the Arcades Project has been described as hypertext-like, though the same quality is to be found in dictionaries and encyclopedias as well.

     

    The Arcades Project is not a reference work, however, but a history of Paris in the nineteenth century, so that within the folders and throughout there is a complex temporal layering of brief accounts of bits of the past, often dated with a year, with more recent observations and the opinions of scholars with or without Benjamin’s commentary. Temporal sequence is not the organizing principle, but rather a kind of dialectic between past and present in which the present can recognize itself in a bit of the past and the past yields up its meaning as it is read from the vantage point of the present. In addition, the revival of interest in the Arcades Project and the addition of photographs taken after 1940 create a new present which makes Benjamin’s present (1930s) into a past–a relay station, as it were, between the earlier nineteenth century and the late twentieth.

     

    The dialectic of past and present takes place in and around individual fragments: these are the dialetical images that have been the focus of one scholarly book and a chapter or extended sections of others (see especially Jennings, Pensky, and Buck-Morss). Understanding dialectical images is crucial to understanding how Benjamin wanted “montage” to work in his reading of the book of the nineteenth century. Understanding it is not crucial, however, for tracing references to Benjamin’s method by subsequent writers, who do not choose to pursue dialectical images in greater depth. One thing that they do extract from Benjamin, however, is a method of juxtaposing multiple and incompatible accounts of particular phenomena drawn from diverse sources, forcing readers who want to make a coherent account to do some work with the fragments.

     

    Jennings and others point also to Benjamin’s use of “constellation” and “force field” as metaphors for his method. These are ways of thinking beyond the level of juxtaposition, which always sounds directed at the edge or transition between two things. These are metaphors for a configuration of fragments, or a relation among several fragments, in which a sudden clarification or new grasp of the import of the fragments can occur. There is a perspectival thread here as well, as Benjamin comes close to saying that readers from different times and different angles of view may see different constellations and different meanings–which is to say that he does not intend a single best reading of the Arcades Project that would “get it all.”

     

    Though the Arcades Project was never finished or published in Benjamin’s lifetime, he did complete a sample of the method in the draft of one section of a long essay on Baudelaire that was submitted to Adorno for publication by the Institute for Social Research. The first thing he delivered was the middle section of the work; this draft has been translated and published as “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire” in Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism. It draws heavily on the Arcades Project folders. The “Flâneur” section, for example, averages two citations per page, almost all from the folders. Buck-Morss calls it a “dry wall:”

     

    This first essay is in fact constructed with so little theoretical mortar between the Passagen-Werk fragments that the essay stands like a dry wall, and Adorno rightly identified the (to him, lamentable) principle of montage that governed the form of the whole. (206)

     

    Benjamin agreed to a very substantial revision along traditional lines; tamely entitled “Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” it is included in Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism and in Illuminations, the collection edited by Hannah Arendt.

     

    In fact, Adorno’s criticisms were deep and far-reaching and have been discussed extensively by Jennings (1987), Buck-Morss (1991), and Pensky (1993) since they lead directly to the heart of the dialectical image. For our purpose, they point to certain practical issues about writing by juxtaposition and constellation of fragments (montage). The fragment, or more broadly, the constellation, must speak for itself: this means not only that a single definitive authorial perspective must be removed, but also that the fragment/constellation must remain open to further seeings. Adorno feared that by this evacuation of subjectivity (of the interpreter), Benjamin had inadvertently presented a view of the world as mere uninterpreted fact–of material, observable things and unique, unanalyzable events–which the reader would have no reason to connect through any theory at all. On the other hand, he found certain juxtapositions in the early manuscript between Baudelaire’s thoughts and the movements of social history to imply a naïve model of causation between social history and Baudelaire’s consciousness–that is, a model is applied, but it is an inadequate one. Jennings concedes the point about certain invitations to vulgar Marxism, but maintains that the deeper problem is esotericism:

     

    Actually, however, the weakness of the Baudelaire essay stems less from the directness of its causal connections--such one-to-one relationships are the exception in Benjamin's piece--than from the elliptical, often opaque quality of its form. The relationship of many of the images to their immediate context or even to the essay as a whole is by no means immediately clear. (32)

     

    Jennings goes on to suggest that Benjamin may indeed have expected to be understood only by the relatively small group that could draw upon the special body of knowledge and belief needed to discern the intended connections. This is not a matter of missing an allusion here or there, but of missing the true and revealing light that history can shed on the present. And, since Adorno was certainly one of that group, he found Adorno’s response extremely unsettling. In the end, Jennings concludes that Benjamin could not resolve the contrary objectives of author-evacuated montage presentation and the need to provide theoretical, ethical guidance for the reader. Pensky, reviewing Adorno’s response in relation to the issue of claims of truth about history, agrees.[2]

     

    Declaring oneself an adopter of Benjamin’s method of juxtaposition or montage does help to identify one’s intention as critique. One does also, however, inherit the unresolved tension which in practical terms is between saying too much and saying too little about the import or intention of a juxtaposition or constellation. I will illustrate with one juxtaposition from Buck-Morss’s “Afterimages,” where she is writing as an extender of the Arcades Project.

     

    Figure 1: Macy’s: The Benediction
    Ann Marie Rousseau (1980)
    (Click image for larger version)

     

    Figure 1 appears at the top of Buck-Morss’s page 347 with a credit to the photographer, Ann Marie Rousseau. Buck-Morss gives it the title “Shopping Bag Lady, 1980.” It is followed by a fragment from the Flâneur folder (M5,1) which quotes a description (Benjamin calls it a “brief description of misery”) of “a bohemian woman” from Marcel Jouhandeau’s Images de Paris(1934). Jouhandreau’s description is followed by several sentences of commentary by Buck-Morss, beginning:

     

    In the United States today her kind are call "bag ladies." They have been consumed by that society which makes of Woman the proto-typical consumer. Their appearance, in rags and carrying their worldly possessions in worn bags, is the grotesquely ironic gesture that they have just returned from a shopping spree.

     

    Her commentary continues by contrasting Benjamin’s line about the nineteenth-century flâneur inhabiting the streets as his living room with life in the streets for the homeless, concluding

     

    for the oppressed (a term that this century has learned is not limited to class), existence in public space is more likely to be synonymous with state surveillance, public censure, and political powerlessness.

     

    It is quite often problematic to let photographs speak for themselves; as Berger says, they only weakly convey their makers’ intentions. Framed in this fashion by Buck-Morss, this photo seems tiresomely polemical and contrived. One critic of Rousseau’s traveling exhibit offers a little relief on the contrivance charge but finds the import all too obvious in this and another of Rousseau’s photos:

     

    [they are] dependent on chance juxtapositions creating ironic social commentary, a strategy (most famously used during by Depression-era photographers) that now looks dated or didactic. (Curtis)[3]

     

    Another reviewer, Doree Dunlap, moralizes also:

     

    We would rather look at a plastic, anorexic mannequin in spiffy, two-piece swimwear than at a woman trying to survive on the street beneath a window display. She represents an ugly reality--one not easily faced.[4]

     

    Yet another such elaboration is found in Mark H. Van Hollebeke’s essay, “The Pathologies and Possibilities of Urban Life: Dialectical and Pragmatic Sightseeing in New York City,” which begins with this image (entitling it “A Dialectical Image”) and finds it a powerful though predictable “call for the messianic awakening of revolution.”

     

    General agreement notwithstanding, this way of reading expects very little from the image. All of these commentaries close down further readings, turning the image into a fairly discardable trigger for a bit of breast-beating or system-bashing. Once we begin to question the interpreters, certain warning flags spring up: Her type? Is the photograph just about bag ladies in cities? Jouhandeau describes a very particular woman with her few things spread out around her “creating almost an air of intimacy, the shadow of an interieur, around her” (qtd. in Eiland and McLaughlin 426). This commentary portrays her as making a living space for herself, not as a victim cast out like refuse on the street. So this photograph is not just temporally displaced, but quite different in what we see. In fact, we do not see much in these commentaries, though one does note the bald mannequins modeling bathing suits.

     

    The photograph originally appeared prefaced to Rousseau’s book Shopping Bag Ladies: Homeless Women Speak About Their Lives, and in that context, it is more a general indication of the theme of the book than a definitive statement. The rest of the images in the book follow individual women through their days and illustrate the text of interviews with them. As if contesting Buck-Morss’s interpretation, Rousseau has posted this photograph on her website with some explanation and commentary (which was not present in the book publication)–and also with the title “Macy’s: The Benediction.” She notes that she knew the woman and had worked with her in a shelter and that she happened to see the tableau as she rode her bicycle to work one morning. What caught her eye was the gesture of the two mannequins, which she says is like the Pope’s gesture when he gives a benediction. Rousseau continues:

     

    The homeless woman on the outside carries all her worldly possessions and wears everything she owns. The more privileged women (mannequins) on the inside advertise cruise wear in the dead of winter, and are portrayed half naked, bald and equally alienated. They bestow a blessing on their sister a world apart, yet only inches away on the other side of the glass. Both are in full view on public display and are at the same time, to the larger world, invisible.

     

    This commentary neutralizes class, domination, victimization, and oppression in favor of a surprising sisterhood of invisibility. That perception is in its turn a fragile moment that may give way to further thinking about the ethics and aesthetics of representing poor and suffering people and about documentary as a mode of not seeing. Invisibility is the issue for Rousseau in her extended project of photographing and studying homeless women; it is a pity, and a great irony, that her image can so readily be fed into the machine of What We Already Know. So, for the record, I do not think her photograph is a dialectical image; as the preface to her book, or with her commentary, it may function that way for some people, but commented on in other ways, it becomes a piece of shock documentary, which, John Berger suggests in another connection, “becomes evidence for the general human [here we might substitute urban] condition. It accuses nobody and everybody” (Looking 40)–and is about as revolutionary as a package of red licorice vines.

     

    Rousseau’s book, by the way, is a monument to the kind of engaged, humanistic documentary that tries to make contact with and reveal the subjectivity of its subjects. For this purpose, the interview text almost exactly complements the photographic images. It contrasts sharply with Martha Rosler’s avowedly anti-humanistic treatment of the male counterparts to the shopping bag ladies, “The Bowery in Two Inadequate Descriptive Systems” (1974). This exhibit of 21 black-and-white photographs of street scenes in the Bowery pairs each photo with a set of words used by the alcoholics to describe their favored state of consciousness (loopy, groggy, boozy, tight–and many, many more). These terms, however, are the only trace of the men’s subjectivity, for the pictures of the doorways and storefronts with their empty bottles have no people in them. Each member of the pair has only traces, for Rosler insists that neither words nor images are adequate to convey the human experience. There is no explanatory matter in the set as it was exhibited nor in the book published from it. Rosler clearly took the esoteric option, maintaining “The Bowery” was a gallery piece suitable for those who go to galleries. The general public doesn’t go to galleries and they are not concerned about the adequacy of descriptive systems (Buchloh 44-45). Also, they do not perhaps think of Walker Evans’s photographs of homeless and alcoholic men in the street as the immediate and obvious context for the work.

     

    II

     

    Although Benjamin did not live to develop his theory or practice, both were taken up by the very similar-minded team of John Berger and Jean Mohr in a series of photograph-texts beginning with A Fortunate Man in 1967. The second of these, A Seventh Man, comes closest to being a direct continuation of the Arcades Project. It too seeks to rouse readers from a collective dream world so that they may grasp the experience of migrant workers in Europe and also the political economy of that experience. It too is a social history of a transformation wrought by capitalism, though far more narrowly focused and more inclined to offer authoritative abstract guidance. Some of Mohr’s photographs are captioned at their place in the text (where they deem the caption helpful in getting into the photo) but they proclaim the general independence of the two “languages” and in particular the minimal role of illustration. The general theme of the photographs is contrast between the worlds that the migrants left behind and the ones they experience as “guests.” Some of these contrasts are extreme and unmistakable, as for example juxtapositions of a downtown Manhattan street at night and an unpaved road leading to a village. Others are more multidimensional and complex. Here is one double page that intrigues me:

     

    Figure 2: John Berger and Jean Mohr, A Seventh Man
    (Click image for larger version)

     

    The images fall generally within the then/there of peasant life and here/now of factory work. The paragraph on the constitution of the normal does not directly bear on them at all. The paragraph immediately preceding, however, does. It concludes, “he knows that what he is doing is separate from any skill he has. He can stuff a saddle with straw. He has been told that the factory makes washing machines” (99). The images do not directly illustrate these statements, which press the point of alienation of (migrant) production line labor, since the images cannot show us what “he” knows; rather, they give presence to hands as the means of skilled labor across widely different circumstances–cattle to clutch-plates. This is not a matter of failed control, or subversion of image by text and vice-versa, since we have been told not to expect illustration or dependence of the images on the text (or vice versa). Rather, there is a kind of double or triple montage going on here: image next to image, text next to text (sometimes hopping over an image) and text next to image. One can draw contrasts, trace similarities, analogize, and generalize across modes.

     

    Sometimes, indeed, there are almost too many contrasts for their purpose, since not all contrasts arise from contradictions in the socioeconomic structure. Here for example is one pairing that almost hurts the head with its contrasts:

     

    Figure 3. John Berger and Jean Mohr, A Seventh Man
    (Click image for larger version)

     

    The left side image has one of the longest captions in the book, and it certainly does make it “easier to look into” the picture:

     

    Turkish Carpet-seller in Germany. A number of migrants come privately to sell goods to their fellow countrymen. He is selling carpets by a road near a Turkish barracks. (222)

     

    The second is a full-page ad for Der Spiegel which begins “18 percent of all executives traveling by car would pick up a hitch-hiker in Hot Pants”–a reflection of sexist attitudes that would probably be suppressed today. Both figures are sitters by the roadside, but she is young, female, stylishly coiffed and dressed to kill (but not to walk), confident of her role and the rules she plays by. Though far from abject, the man is none of those things. It is hard to pick one contrast–one inequality–to focus on.

     

    Figure 4. John Roberts, The Art of Interruption (134)
    (Click image for larger version)

     

    Curiously, though John Roberts includes the image of the Turkish rug seller in his chapter on Berger and Mohr in The Art of Interruption, he recombines it (sans caption) with another photo of a migrant spending leisure time reading in his barracks room. This new context radically changes the image of the rug seller, who now looks like another migrant worker, and one considerably less well off than the man in his room. That is one effect of the power of juxtaposition.

     

    Writing about his practice seven years later, Berger emphasizes especially the function of movement from particular to general, partly because it is this that makes images usable in social analysis (and useful to social analysis in evoking the world as experienced). The more images, he says, the more possible connections. He cites (and in fact reproduces) a sequence of four images of women from A Seventh Man (see Figure 5) which is intended, he says

     

    to speak about a migrant worker's sexual deprivation. By using four photographs instead of one, the telling, we hoped, would go beyond the simple fact--which any good photo-reportage would show--that many migrant workers live without women. (281)[5]

     

    Astonishingly (for a literary person) this is all he says about the “going beyond” in this case.

     

    Figure 5. John Berger and Jean Mohr, A Seventh Man
    (Click here for larger version)

     

    Presented one-per-page and then two-per-page in Another Way, these images can be paired up as Virgin/Whore and Old/Young peasant girl, High and Low art, and other ways as well. You can think of representations as substitutions, as having different market values, and many other things. Berger in fact urges us to read in other orders after we have read left-to-right (Telling 284). I will not pursue the verbalizing of visual meanings here–Clive Scott has devoted several pages to this sequence (275-82–includes images) and has by no means exhausted it.

     

    Scott argues that Berger and Mohr’s confidence in the ability of images to speak for themselves (that is, without textual prompting and anchorage) increased considerably between the publication of these two books, so that the other way of telling they advance and illustrate in Another Way is almost exclusively visual (the “language of appearances”): the core of the book (“If Each Time…”) consists of 150 photographs with no text, titles, or captions (but with brief identifying captions at the end). Alternatively, it is worth pointing out that this core sequence differs in purpose from A Seventh Man. It is to “articulate a lived experience”–that of a Swiss peasant woman (invented). They have no argument to present, no documentation of exploitation, no rousing of opposition and concern as in A Seventh Man. The rhetorical argument of A Seventh Man employs a somewhat schematic linear narrative of Departure–Work–Return, and the text portions elaborate on the social and economic conditions of that experience. To use Habermas’s terms again, they join system to lifeworld, with images being the primary means of unfolding the latter. This is close to what Benjamin wanted his “images” to do, though one difference is that Benjamin had not developed Berger and Mohr’s attachment to the experience of relatively inarticulate people. In Another Way, however, Berger and Mohr turn toward explicating and illustrating a different function or aspect of the photograph, namely, photographic expressiveness.

     

    There are no comparable plots or threads organizing “If Each Time….” Nonetheless, as Berger notes in the penultimate section, “Stories,” the images–all 150 of them–are placed in one order rather than another and sustain what he wants to call, rather tentatively, photographic narrative. He cites two properties of a collection of photographs that induce him to speak of it as narrative: the first is gaps, since the photographs are moments snipped (“quoted”) from peoples’ lives. The second is what he calls “the reflective subject,” a notion which includes maker and reader/viewer as they assemble the photographs before them to re-embed them in experience, namely, their own experience. Here he explicitly draws on Eisenstein’s writings on cinematic montage, beginning with his notion of “a montage of attractions” which is to say that what precedes and follows a cut should attract each other as by contrast, equivalence, recurrence, or conflict (Telling 287-88). However, he notes that in film, there is a directionality of time and succession that as it were unbalances the attractions across the cut. With a set of photographs, however, the attractions can be mutual in the way, he suggests, that one memory triggers another, “irrespective of any hierarchy, chronology or duration,” speaking of the “sequence” of photographs as like a field of memory. It will not have escaped the attentive reader that narrative is an odd term to use for traversing a field of image-memories when chronology and duration do not signify. This final section ends with words that bear a more extended citation:

     

    Photographs so placed are restored to a living context: not of course to the original temporal context from which they were taken--that is impossible--but to a context of experience. And there, their ambiguity at last becomes true. It allows what they show to be appropriated by reflection. The world they reveal, frozen, becomes tractable. They information they contain becomes permeated by feeling. Appearances become the language of a lived life. (289)

     

    Clearly the spatial image of the field has displaced the temporal one of sequence in this passage, just as articulation replaces con-sequenceand reflection takes the place of discovery. One almost supposes that narrative was simply the most flexible and general term for a signifying sequence available to Berger. He seems to be following Susan Sontag, who writes

     

    in contrast to the amorous relation, which is based on how something looks, understanding is based on how it functions. And functioning takes place in time, and must be explained in time. Only that which narrates can make us understand. (Sontag 23)

     

    when he says

     

    and in life, meaning is not instantaneous. Meaning is discovered in what connects, and cannot exist without development. Without a story, without an unfolding, there is no meaning. (Another 89)

     

    But surely there are other ways to develop a point than making it into a story.

     

    Scott strives valiantly to explain Berger and Mohr’s notion of narrative in “If Each Time…,” expanding on the temporality of the various images, but concludes

     

    what is important, then, in this "sequence" of images is not the narrative as such, but the narratology; not the story, but the mechanisms which make it narratable and diversify its manners of being told. (Another 290)

     

    He then proceeds to trace repetitions, sometimes with shifts in scale, similarities and groupings, framing and layout–all good stuff, just not what comes immediately to mind when you hear the word narrative. Indeed, Geoff Dyer’s conclusion about this issue, namely that “If Each Time…” is not visual narrative but visual poetry, has much to recommend it.

     

    Scott welcomes the purely visual mode of “If Each Time…” partly because it has no authoritative voice setting the scope and frame of interpretation. This voice most definitely appears in A Seventh Man, and when it talks “economic theory,” it uses succinct Marxist terminology in a way that strikes some contemporary readers as hectoring and superior. It may be that the urgency of the immediate problem in Berger’s mind excuses shortcuts past the niceties (and risks) of letting the readers reach their own conclusions. Occasionally other voices are heard. A few lines from migrants are quoted, but they are outnumbered and greatly outweighed by authoritative academic sources and Marx himself. There are a couple of “their” images and a wonderful quote from Henry Ford about the harmlessness of repetitive line work. One can imagine that if Benjamin were to treat the subject, there would be many more such voices and much less “author and authorities.” As it is, one can see why Scott finally calls Berger “a nineteenth-century postmodernist” (291).

     

    John Roberts has also undertaken to explain Berger’s notion of “reconstructive narrative” and to differentiate between A Seventh Man and Another Way. Roberts points out that by focusing on the experience of a Swiss peasant woman, “If Each Time…” turns away from urban life and industrial work back toward a sense of life that runs by a different time and by different urgencies. Though the peasants are dairy farmers, there are no images of the mechanization which was already beginning to transform dairy farming elsewhere–no tractors or milking machines, no trucks or even cars, except in a couple of contrasting city images. Even to call it dairy farming seems wrong, as if applying occupation or business categories from a bureaucratized urban world. Roberts sees Berger and Mohr’s evocation of this world that is doomed and passing away as an attempt to turn critical documentary into an act of love. To be sure, this loving tracing and recording can be found in the “back home” sections in A Seventh Man, which contrast with the world of factory labor and dormitory living in the host country. And in the lives of the migrant workers, these are not worlds apart, but define the most significant polarity that they must live across. It is true that “If Each Time…” has contrasting city/country sets of images and brings the worlds into contact in a few scenes, but these scenes seem to be comic in their juxtaposition of peasant horse and buggy in city (Palermo) traffic, or peasant leading a nanny goat and two kids through a formal dining room of the Hotel Schweizerhof in Berne. These images show contradictions, but do not invite us to explore them as a major theme of the work. They do not function as dialectical images to push us to a deeper grasp of the forces at play in the world. Rather, they illustrate the notion of a “field” of relations in which the image stands/is placed and which in a sense it gathers into itself like so many associative threads. In this it resembles the workings of “the stimulus by which one memory triggers another, irrespective of any hierarchy, chronology, or duration” (Another 288). This effectively replaces the notion of signifying sequence with that of “coexistence in a field of memory.”

     

    Roberts, whose book The Interruptive Image is in many ways a working out of Benjamin’s notions of the dialectical image and constructive montage, is decidedly more enthusiastic about A Seventh Man than “If Each Time…” and directs some attention to distinguishing between the image breaking and generalizing of Heartfield and Tucholsky and the (Benjamin)/Berger/Mohr notion of reconstructive [re?] narrative: “the meanings of the photograph lie in how they are reconstructed discursively, and not in the discursive extraction of their truth content from the image” (134-35). This suggests that the meaning arises in readers as they build relations between images and images-and-texts, though it may include as well the point that when we give accounts of pictures of people in scenes, we often construct mini-narratives about them–mini-sociodramas, as it were. These together help explain why Berger and Mohr want to call the pattern of contrasts and connections synthesized by the reader/viewer narratives.

     

    There remains a troubling point about this vein of theorizing reconstructive narrative, which is the suggestion in Berger and Mohr’s writings that photography’s quoting of reality simply frees the image from its historical moorings so that it can resonate or evoke associations in the hearer/viewer. This misses the point that we are guided in our reconstructions by what we know about the circumstances in which the photograph was taken. That dimension of meaning is activated by even a few words of caption, and I find my reading of the Berger and Mohr books greatly enhanced by the table of short identifying captions at the ends of the books, as well as the occasional caption next to the image. The impact of this information is greater in the case of the A Seventh Man since the photos point toward geographical, political, economic, and historical objects and forces of the world as I know it, but it is important in establishing locale and contrasts even in “If Each Time….”

     

    Printed books are distinctly limited in their means for juxtaposing images with images and images with texts. Berger and Mohr may urge us to read first in linear sequence and then in other directions, but the sequences are bound in one way and not in others in a book. Since the order is fixed as printed, the reader must be urged to wander. What if there were several, even many possible orders in which the reader could experience the parts of a text? What if the text were hypertext?

     

    III

     

    From early 1997 on, Giles Peaker–art theorist, critic, and Lecturer at the University of Derby–has maintained a hypertext fragment of the Arcades Project, adding to it from time to time. The site has eleven pages, each one like a mini-folder of the Arcades Project containing a few short paragraphs and an image or two (and there is a twelfth bibliography page.) Many of the key categories are the same as those that appear in the Arcades Project (Flâneur, Arcades, Mirrors, Iron Construction, Fashion, Prostitutes) but a few are new (Dust, Surrealism, Detective, Feuilleton, Commodity). Each page has one to four paragraphs drawn from the 1938 “Paris in the Second Empire,” the 1935 exposé “Paris the Capital of Europe,” the folders, or an external source. The eleven pages contain multiple links to other pages in the set; sometimes different words on a page link to the same page. This is an unusual practice, and in fact, the amount of cross-linking (averaging over five per page) is unusual as well. (See Table of Links.) Most pages have one or two rather small images. Peaker describes his site as image heavy, but it is so only by 1997 standards.

     

    The high degree of cross-linking means that there are many links to each page, sometimes two from the same page. The link words are almost always different, so that one is never quite sure whether the link would return you to a page you have already seen. So, for example, the Prostitution page is pointed at by the following terms:

     

    • empathy with inorganic things
    • professions
    • sex appeal of the inorganic
    • cheap elegance
    • cocottes
    • whore

     

    There is a similar range for the Flâneur page:

     

    • flâneur (twice)
    • advertisements
    • unexpected
    • encountered
    • beloved self

     

    The individual pages thus become the centers for ad hoc semantic clusters. Peaker gives a few sentences to describing his intention with the piece, which basically is to use hypertext links to bring “elements into new juxtapositions and and hopefully generat[e] new meanings out of the debris of the era of high capitalism.” Since the link-anchoring word or words sets a certain semantic aspect and expectation for what completes the link, the same page can be entered from a different direction: “it is possible to recross areas from many different directions. Each time, the material is brought into a new relation and in this, a new aspect of it emerges.” Of the images he says very little: they are not link anchors and tend to be rather small and dark.

     

    Twelve pages is not a large site, but it seems bewilderingly large to start with because of the numerous links on pages leading we know not where. Peaker does provide a kind of top page with links to six of the twelve pages (and all of the pages have returns to this top page), but there is no map or overview that tells us how big the site is or where we are in it. This lack combines with the relatively large number of links on a page to produce a certain anxiety: we don’t know if there is a main path or center nor whether the proffered links will take us away from it. Faced with this type of site, and they are very common, we often try to “learn the site”–learn its structure and navigation scheme–and this can produce impatience and resentment, or simply divert attention from the meaning of what is on the page before us. We may urge reader/viewers to attempt a new way of reading, of simply traversing links in a network without attempting to master or direct one’s movement, but that new way of reading is especially difficult for people who don’t like to wander in strange places. Withholding structural information is the hypertext equivalent of modernist authorial reticence: the work should be experienced on its own terms, not through the interpretations and explanations of its author. The problem with navigational unease is that the viewer’s first question upon going to a page is “have I been here/read this before?” and that tends to distract from the context effect of coming at the page from a different direction. In any case, the power of the sending page to serve as a context for the new page is somewhat limited by its disappearance. One may experience a jump or gap and quickly try to come up with a meaningful connection from sending anchor to target page, but I doubt that we remember much about the exact sequence of pages, or even the exact pages, that we have viewed for more that a minute or so, or for very many pages back. Images, however, especially large images, can provide a context for words, as they seem to represent worlds, or locales within worlds, in which the words circulate. This chance was missed when Peaker’s concern with bandwidth led him to keep his images small. I have tried to maximize this effect of images in my revised Arcades fragment.

     

    e-Arcades (<www.e-arcades.com>) is a site by Robin Michals inspired by Benjamin’s Arcades Project:

     

    e-Arcades is an excursion of association among quotations concerning technology. Borrowing Benjamin's methodology of juxtaposing quotes, e-Arcades grasps at an understanding of the effect of our technologies on how we think as well as live. Enter.

     

    e-Arcades is a way of accessing and displaying 366 pithy quotations from (mostly contemporary) books, articles, and web pages concerning the impact of new technologies (internet, computers, the media, the human genome) on “our society and lives.” These quotations, identified usually only by author and date, each have at least two links to other of the 366 quotations. The links are not single, fixed links from page to page, but from a page to a group of thematically related pages, one of which is randomly selected as the target for display. So, for example, the four links visible in Figure 6 trigger selections from four different groups: market triggers a selection from a group with the theme of new world markets, hidden fist triggers a selection from a group with a war/military theme, and so on. Some groups are small–Disneyland/World has only four pages–but others are much larger, ranging up to a dozen or so and at least 25 in one case (theme: cognitive impact; these are my names, by the way). This guarantees that there will be at least some connection between the source and target quotations, though the connection is sometimes not much stronger than use of the same word. Most of the themes are controversial, and Michals’s sources are selected to give a spread of position and attitude on them, so that one can find oneself jumping from a direly negative observation to a buoyantly positive one on the same theme.

     

    Figure 6: e-Arcades Screenshot, Global Background (Quote 20)
    (Click image for larger version)

     

    In addition, each of these quotes is displayed over an image-rich background. There are eight sets of these backgrounds, each set having five different backgrounds (except for Media, which now has ten). These sets, which Michals calls templates, bear visually on Money, Globalization, Society, Technology, Internet, Computers, Media, and Body. Each quote is targeted for a template where it will acquire a background image, but which of the five backgrounds available in the set is actually chosen for displaying the quote is not fixed but again randomly selected. This procedure guarantees that the background image displayed with the quote will have some thematic consistency with the main theme of the quote, but it does not guarantee a best match between quote and background image. For example, clicking on Silicon Valley in Figure 6 could trigger the selection of quote 99, which has a Social background preferred; it is then assigned to the background templater, which assigns it one of the five Social backgrounds. Figure 7 shows one such pairing. Thus the same quote may appear with different backgrounds, but only from the preferred background set. If you want to try another match, you can click “Reload” which will give you another background from the set (or the same one again, if you are unlucky).

     

    Focusing on the backgrounds themselves, consider the background in Figure 6, which is the first in the Globalization set. This is about as explicit as photomontage ever gets, and it is unusually so for the backgrounds in e-Arcades. Most of the images are digital collage or a mixture of collage and montage (blending parts)[6] and, while the component images may not actually conflict, it is not always clear how or why they have been put together. Figure 7 (from the Social set) is still relatively straightforward:

     

    Figure 7: e-Arcades Screenshot, Social Background 1
    (Click image for larger version)

     

    Four of these parts deal with repetition in a marketing display, though the chickens are hung up for an old-style market. The figure in it appears that of a customer–blurred, as if excitedly moving. (We know surveillence cameras don’t produce this kind of color.) Given the text (one of maybe 45 that could appear here), we may see the shopper as exchanging subtle energies. One cannot expect ready connections between quote and background, however, when the same background has to serve for nearly 50 quotes. This consideration limits the developing of a strong theme in the background images or a specific relation to the quotes, and I find that after spending considerable time with the site, the images do indeed fade into the background and cease to intrigue me as a setting for individual quotes. Note that text overlays image, confirming the latter as a background and giving a distinctly modern, multilayered look. Perhaps if the backgrounds were not so multiple (that is, made up of so many subparts) and followed rather the model of the Globalization template Coke banner, they could more strongly stand in as counterparts to the quotes.

     

    e-Arcades makes good its professed descent from the Arcades Project in a number of ways. It touches on many of the themes that concerned Benjamin, as for example organic/inorganic, speed, dream worlds of technology and advertising (real/virtual), and progress/advancement. It eschews a master, authorial voice, offering instead a pastiche of other voices, some directly or indirectly critical of others, so that the links do offer meaningful connections for the reader/viewer. In fact, the thematic groupings resemble scaled-down Konvoluts, though the viewer cannot just open a thematic group and view its contents. But there are notable differences as well, suggesting that Benjamin’s method is not simply juxtaposition and that it is very much a part of a particular political-historical vision:

     
    e-Arcades is not a history, cultural or otherwise. Hence the play of perspectives from then and now–the continuities and changes of understanding and world view–do not get into the story. We do not learn about the past and we do not learn from the past.

     
    e-Arcades scants the operation of material forces in favor of “opinions” about what is going on and what it all means. There are for example a few quotes about Disneyland and Disney World. These touch on familiar points about fantasy and simulacra and exporting American culture, but the closest they get to material facts and forces is one quote about how more Americans visit Mall of America to shop than go to Disneyland. Disney’s swallowing of ABC (and ESPN) and astonishing ability to manipulate governments into fencing in the intellectual commons are not mentioned. The Arcades Project has plenty of statistics and telling facts that let the reader perform some of the synthesizing work of the historian. If, as with e-Arcades, what a reader gets is a bunch of already-interpreted opinions, she may agree or disagree, but she lacks the materials to do the work of historical understanding that Benjamin provides in such abundance. Most of the texts are conclusions or claims, the only evidence for most of which is the author’s name, and which place the reader in the consumer-of-opinions role–that is, take it or leave it.

     
    Though it juxtaposes contradictory opinions (“McDonalds abroad is a major form of cultural imperialism and a threat to indigenous cultures” v. “McDonalds offers a quick meal for people who want it”), e-Arcades is not critical, taking “critical” to include identifying more or less truthful and insightful statements, exposing injustice and exploitation, and the making visible of the socially invisible. e-Arcades relies heavily on opinion pieces which use the ideological consumerist “we” (“we the consumers and experiencers of the new technology”). People are not equally affected by the new technology and they are not affected in the same way.[7] It cites talk about robots without talking about the loss of manufacturing and service jobs. It cites talk about “netizens” and a dubious world-citizenship displacing community identifications, but includes nothing about migrant workers, immigration, and NAFTA. To be sure, the site is already very large and has to set some bounds, and that means leaving out some part of the picture. But the danger is that e-Arcades might end up as just a collection of multiple thoughts, perspectives, and opinions to which everyone is entitled.

     
    Note that these criticisms have little or nothing to do with the design of the interface. It, or one very like it, could be used successfully with the notes of the Arcades Project, suitably selected and adapted (abbreviated in many cases). I have in fact tried to do that as an extended trial or probe, and the result can be viewed here. Rather, the problem arises from the excessive number of opinion pieces, which leave the reader/viewer only the one role of consumer (connoisseur, collector) of opinions.

     

    We can also read this project through Berger’s notion of a field of inter-definining, inter-energizing pieces, though I will sketch this out only for the quotes, setting the images and quote-image relations aside. The field(s) here are not those of memory on the whole (though 1998 does occasionally seem quite old in this material) but of interpretation of current upheavals and transformations under the impact of new technologies. If all the quotes on a theme could be exhibited on one page, it would be possible to read across, back and forth, letting things stand out and trigger reflection, and then be modified in their turn by other adjacent quotes. For such a procedure, the interface is not very useful, as it only allows one to see one quote at a time, and it is disorienting to go back and find the previous page with a different background. The interface is good for shock or collision montage (in cinematic terms), but not to display a field. It is possible to display all of the quotes for many themes on single pages, and I have constructed a few such arrays for the themes of jargon (“parlance”), links, democracy, political economy, the Web, biological metaphor, and web community, and these too are attached. If you view these arrays, you will see something like a set of notecards laid out on a table, as if one had collected them and were scanning them looking for patterns, pairings, significant oppositions prior to writing a piece that would put them in their proper place. They would closely resemble the pages of the Arcades Project. Such a recoding, which ruthlessly strips the visual backgrounds to focus on the relations of quotations, might be said to be an entirely new work, although it does seem to fall within Michals’s intended “excursion of associations among quotations.”

     

    But, one might argue, these bits of text are not photographs and thus do not have the similarity to memory and access to memory-like processes that photographs do. Reflecting upon them does not memorialize life past (memorializing the present and emerging future?). And similarly, they don’t provide data or evidence for determining the truth in the present world. If they would work as fields for reflection, the reflection would work upon the language of their representations–the rhetoric of prophecy, as it were. That is perhaps why the group arrays I have called biological metaphor and web parlance do serve to heighten one’s awareness of how the passages are constructing the present, which is a move in the direction of critique. The site does not guide the viewer very far in that direction, however, presumably in the hope that the viewer’s sorting and connecting of the somewhat unpredictably juxtaposed quotes will not be wildly off the mark.

     

    Russet Lederman is another digital artist who describes her work as “emulating the fragmented, non-linear, montage-like construction” found in Benjamin’s writings. Even though that is all she says about Benjamin, it is clear in her work that she shares his concern with history and memory and the transformative power of capitalism and technology. She is a web developer for the activist artist collective REPOhistory, whose work for the last ten years “is informed by a multicultural re-reading of history which focuses on issues of race, gender, class and sexuality.” Her largest online piece, American Views: Stories of the Landscape, won the Smithsonian American Art Museum New Media/New Century award in 2001. It is built out of fragments of oral history narratives from three New Yorkers focusing on their relations to their landscapes. Each figure has about 30 fragments ranging from 15 to 50 seconds. Each of these is linked to a small image–often a personal snapshot, piece of the landscape, or a map section–seven of which are presented on a given page. Touching a center band with the mouse causes a quick shuffle and new deal, so that the fragments cannot generally be concatenated into a sequential narrative or discussion of a single topic. The narratives seem to have been prompted to some degree by interview or questionnaire, and have certainly been selected so that they have a common bearing. Here is a sample page from “Neil’s” portion of the site: the white X indicates a mouseover that has inserted and selected the grayed area. A click on this image would trigger the playing of an audio clip beginning with the words “When Walt Whitman was built” (note that you must click on the audio to get the whole text):

     

    Figure 8. Russet Lederman: First Mouseover on Neil’s Page
    (Click image for larger version)

     

    In addition, the site provides four theme pages (seen/scene, use/reuse, permanence/impermanence, and earth/unearth) that come up with simple line drawings, another semantic pairing (often antonyms), and links to pages of profound statements about the term or theme. Each page has ten such statements; four are displayed each time the page is loaded, but there are also audio boxes that let you select any of the ten to hear and read. These audio versions on the theme pages are redundant, since the display changes to show the entire selected statement, all of which are brief and most of which are fairly obvious. Here for example is one page with four of the ten “earth/unearth” maxims displayed, the eighth one selected:

     

    Figure 9. Russet Lederman: one earth/unearth page
    (Click image for larger version)

     

    The sound clips of each of the three figures are reflections about their engagements with their environments: Neil’s, in Syasset, New York, concern the emergence and subsequent loss of the suburban world where he grew up from 1955-1971. Cindi’s, in Irvine, Kentucky, reflect on difference between the New York City she knows and has moved from and the country of eastern Kentucky–and the forces that may push it into the past and make it more like New York. Adam’s, in Northern California, are the ruminations of an environmental pollution specialist about how development and technology have polluted and the resources of life in the area. But are these clips “dialectical images” in Benjamin’s sense? Do they push us to look beyond and behind what is said?

     

    It is certainly fair to say they are not like the audio clips in Broadway’s Glass (see below), which are ideologically positioned voices (and music) in the world–sound captures from the media. Lederman’s clips are taken from interviews and oral histories of three private individuals, and we imagine them as articulate, thoughtful people speaking into a microphone trying to give balanced, temperate accounts of their observations and actions. They do themselves provide some critique of the forces at work in the worlds they describe and also enough information for us to discern their social positioning. Their very accents are enough to locate them socially and by region (though Adam’s accent is light–he is a Californianized New Yorker).

     

    There is one voice on the site, however, that is not dialectical or concretely located: that of the man who reads the maxims. There is little regional or social coloration to his voice; rather, it is that of the voiceover in educational films and videos and could almost be an upper-end text-to-speech synthesizer. And it employs the techno-we noted above in relation to e-Arcades (see the screen capture of “earth/unearth,” Figure 9). I find this perplexing, for Lederman employs a similar voice in another piece (Congestion) where it seems clearly one pole of a dialectical split, opposed by the hysterical voice of New York radio traffic reports. Whatever the reason for the reading voice here, it reintroduces an authoritative perspective, apolitical and above the fray, that montage has consistently tried to eliminate from the work. One has to have some sympathy for the voiceover reader, however, for the content of what he is reading is quite elementary, and it is hard to read those maxims in a voice conveying excitement or conviction that the words are new, interesting, or important.

     

    IV

     

    As everyone who has worked with montage in the last 50 years eventually realizes, the power of juxtaposition to shock people into novel and more reflective awareness has long ago faded into the daylight of television and advertising uses.[8] Shock in any case is a very one-sided way to describe the effect of montage, since it says nothing about the work the reader/viewer must do to connect the juxtaposed parts and to order them into larger wholes. Theories of tearing from context (or quoting–all quotes, someone said, are out of context) and recombining into revealing configurations more directly acknowledge the synthesizing acts of reader/viewers, but leave the door open to the kind of surrealism that worried Adorno: things are recombined according to a logic of dream or personal association to constitute a surreal, fantasy world. The advent of digital collage and montage (or simply “digital compositing”), with its capacity for nearly seamless and effortless combination of images, has indeed stimulated a new rush of surrealist images. These can be found on digital art websites such as the Digital Arts Group and the Focus Gallery, especially such artists as Jochen Brennecke, Ron Brown, Randy Little, Tom Chambers, and Elfi Kaut.[9] Most of these exhibit at least one image online that alludes to Magritte, or is an outright remake (as Randy Little’s digital-photographic version of “Red Shoes”). Figure 10 (“Expired”) is by Jochen Brennecke and deals with humans and common human activity, but the very seamlessness of surrealist montage denies that the image is divided into parts which are juxtaposed. Such images do not attract dialectical readings.

     

    Figure 10. Jochen Brennecke: Expired (1998)
    (Click image for larger version)

     

    So how is critical digital montage possible? To answer that, I will look at the work of three artists who have adopted digital means of making images and who have chosen to work with public themes and issues: Esther Parada, Richard Ramsdell, and Geoff Broadway. All three exhibited pieces in the Livewire Exhibition of Images Received Over the Internet which was a part of the Derby 1995 National [UK] Photography Festival developed by the Design Research Centre in Derby.[10] Despite the title and appearance on a computer screen, these images were exhibited as digital prints and are quite large. The piece exhibited by Esther Parada, for instance (“A Thousand Centuries”) was 33″ x 55″. Here is a view of the center of the composition:

     

    Figure 11: Center view of “A Thousand Centuries”
    Esther Parada

    (Click image for larger version)

     

    This had been exhibited as part of a larger group (“2-3-4-D: Digital Revisions in Time and Space”) which included three others, most of them dealing in one way or another with the figure of Columbus in Latin America. In these works, Parada layers photographic images with texts and other images of colonialism to produce a very complex surface that does not shrink well to the dimensions of the computer display screen. To assist viewing, she identifies the component images and texts individually.[11] “A Thousand Centuries” takes its title from the inscription to Columbus’s effigy and tomb in Havana:

     

    O Remains and Countenance of Great Columbus Rest preserved a thousand centuries in this Urn And enshrined in the Memory of our Nation. [in Spanish, though overlaid here in English]

     

    It includes images of and from that tomb, some of Parada’s photographs of people in Havana streets, and two other texts, one by Oliver Wendell Holmes celebrating the stereoscope and one on a proposed standard definition of photo-composite:

     

    AN IMAGE CONSTRUCTED (A HISTORY NARRATED/ A MONUMENT ERECTED)/THROUGH THE ADDITION OR SUBTRACTION OF ELEMENTS/ THAT SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECT/ THE MEANING/ OF THE ORIGINAL [...]

     

    As the reader might suppose, this layering makes a very complicated composite that would be difficult to see without the assistance she provides. In the case of this image, she provides even more, pointing out some of the visual “contradictions” such as those between the light skin of the girl on the lad’s tee-shirt and his own dark complexion, and between Columbus’s pointing finger and the Cuban babe in arms. Other images of the series of four are somewhat less complex, reworking the street-life photographs with other texts and images in various ways. The needs of “seeing” in this mode are somewhat at odds with the visual message of merger or totality: we need to be able to see the parts as distinct and identifiable voices, stances, and views in order to identify them. In effect, these images convey snapshots of the historical consciousness of contemporary Cubans, or of a contemporary American visiting Cuba. They resemble the Arcades Project in their use of text and images from different points in the past with the interpreting and integrating work left to the viewer. The visual demands are too great for the Web, however; a close-up view close enough for the text to be read utterly sacrifices the design of the whole or integration of the parts. The method of superimposed images and texts here reaches a limit.

     

    Figure 12. Richard Ramsdell
    (Click image for larger version)

     

    At Livewire, Richard Ramsdell exhibited a piece from a larger set of triple-layered historical images bearing on the human body and sexuality over the last few millenia. The inset piece here (Figure 12) is one of the set of “body” images; like Parada, he identifies each of the three component layers. The first, and deepest, one is a Ukranian icon, a famous sculpture by Hiram Powers (“The Greek Slave”) said to be the most popular work of American art at mid-nineteenth century, and a piece by Yves Klein which was painted by having models smeared with International Klein Blue paint roll about on the canvas. So–three ways of depicting women, each deeply saturated with the cultural practices of its era. But what, we may ask, is gained by layering them earliest to latest and reducing their opacity so that the eye of the icon peers through the belly of the slave statue? The parts are easily distinguished by style and quite distant in era and culture, and yet made to talk to each other by sharing the same visual space. They are discontinuous slices of “Art History,” so sequence or development seems unlikely. The past-in-the-present (“O remains and countenance of great Columbus”) does not get us very far either. The Greek Slave was taken to express the epitome of Christian meekness and purity at the moment of being shown for sale as a sex slave (she has a cross nestled in her garments), and so we have two images representing ideals of female piety or sanctity, in relation to which the blue figures are not a representation so much as a sort of contact print. Here is a second image, composited from a tenth-century ivory carving of Christ sitting in Last Judgment, a porn pic of a bound, reclining girl, and a Rothko painting. Tempting though it is, I will leave it as an exercise for the reader. (Other Ramsdell photomontages can be seen at <www.richardramsdell.com/art/>.)

     

    The last of the Livewire exhibitors I will discuss is Geoff Broadway, who also exhibited a piece from a larger set titled the glass, which illustrates the theory in his Master of Philosophy thesis “Digital Realist Montage” in 1997. There is a link to the thesis and a substantial introduction by Giles Peaker. In its final form, the site with its six pieces was elaborated as a Flash file with sound in 2000. Although he uses some reduced opacity to allow images to shine through and merge with others, the individual components are clearly bounded and almost geometrically placed, as in the example here (“Mirage”) and in all six pieces in the glass. The images are each identified (in the non-Flash version); for “Mirage,” these are:

     

    • sixteenth century, Persian compass
    • Galloping Arab, Jules Etienne Marey, circa nineteenth century
    • Israeli soldier with Palestinian prisoner, 1986
    • burning oil well from the 1991 Gulf War

     

    One can readily see that these slices are all part of the Western construction of the Arab, though the compass reminds us of a commonly neglected (underconstructed?) point, namely the Muslim sophistication in numerous areas of the arts and sciences during centuries when Europe was distinctly more primitive, even “dark.”

     

    All of the pieces in the glass deal with Western/Third World or North/South relations (economic, political, and social) such as harvesting of hardwoods in Brazil, child labor in North Indian rug factories, Shell oil in Nigeria, Australian treatment of their indigenous peoples, and tea colonialism in India/Sri Lanka.

     

    Like Ramsdell’s pieces, Broadway’s are uncluttered by text overlays. This forces reliance on the images to convey historical and cultural consciousness, but in the Benjamin tradition (where Broadway clearly locates himself), language-slices are also powerful conveyors of consciousness. Broadway found a way to add voices, music, and other sounds to these images by placing them in Flash format with sound-zones attached to various areas like links to an imagemap, except that the sound zones actually intensify to full volume and then fade out again as you move the mouse over them. Each of the images in the glass has a few such audio clips. In “Mirage,” the clips are of an Arab correcting some English colonial stereotypes of the Arab, an NBC news broadcast of the Gulf War “Victory Parade” and interview, the theme of Lawrence of Arabia (in vicinity of the Marey Arab on horseback), a thunderstorm, and a British newsreel, “The Birth of Israel,” circa 1950 (near the image of the Israeli soldier and his Arab captive). These provide a second set of markers of a complex and long-contested space, with the American Gulf adventure as just the latest and most ignorant victory of Western arms. I find the sound clips extremely evocative of the world of my experience and memory: there is a specificity to the voice and resonances of the returning GI in the NBC interview, for example, that takes us far beyond where a picture of him could go. And even a few bars of the Lawrence of Arabia theme song with their sweeping, swelling grandeur remind us of this very popular packaging of European colonial mastery, which was impressed upon many of us before we had any means of crafting a critical understanding of it. Gathering all these threads into one screen insists that they are all part of the same story, the same world that is our common history.[12]

     

    Because they use no hypertext, these digital montages are limited to what they can get on a single screen (even with audio clips), but they do bring us back to the fundamental point that visual meanings are conveyed as positions in fields rather than steps in a sequence (or “narrative”). Hypertext has the capacity to display things in a multidimensional field or network and it can be experienced as such if we can be persuaded not to worry excessively about exact paths. This is the major reason for the slightly randomized links of the kind we find in e-Arcades: they change the virtual space from a network of connected points to a set of vicinities in which certain kinds of connections are likely.

     

    In his introduction to the glass, Giles Peaker calls Broadway’s work “realism,” and the term may be applied for the same reasons to the whole body of works that we have been examining. It is somewhat surprising to call these many montages of text and image–shot through as they are with fantasy, duplicity, and vapor–realistic, since we so often think of realism as something simplified, ordered, and stripped of illusion. The worlds that these works give us are not very orderly and are made up of glimpses through what now seem partial eyes. Very much in the tradition of Benjamin’s Arcades Project, they give us fragments and remain confident that we can integrate them into the real worlds of experience and history, that we will get it at least approximately right, and that we will derive special excitement and satisfaction from having done it, at least to some degree, ourselves.

     

    Notes

     

    This article is accompanied by another fragment of an e-text Arcades Project which illustrates several of the main ideas of this article.

     

    1. All citations from the Arcades Project are from the Eiland and McLaughlin translation, by folder and item number.

     

    2. For the record, not everyone who studies Benjamin’s claim for a new method of writing history with dialectical images is convinced that he has provided good examples that work the way he says they could. J. M. Coetzee has recently registered his disappointment that the images in the Arcades Project do not come alive. In “The Marvels of Walter Benjamin,” a review essay of several volumes of newly translated work, Coetzee finds some things of value in the Arcades Project and praises it for suggesting a new way of writing about civilization, using its rubbish rather than its artworks and centering on the sufferings of the vanquished, even as he thumps it rather vigorously as a failed project and unconvincing theory (or anti-theory).

     

    3. Curtis’s review is included under Reviews at <www.amrousseau.com>. Curtis is presumably thinking of something like Dorothea Lange’s photos of migrating farmers carrying their possessions past a billboard extolling the relaxing luxury of train travel, or Margaret Bourke-White’s picture of Louisville flood victims applying for flood relief under a billboard showing a white family in their car with the motto “there’s no way like the American Way.” Some of these are cited in Hunter 17-27.

     

    4. Dunlap’s review is included under Reviews at <www.amrousseau.com>. Dunlap acknowledges the gesture of benediction, but concludes it is empty whimsy: “the irony: this commercial gesture of benediction will amount to nothing for this woman, who will receive neither social blessing nor Club Med reservations.”

     

    5. Just as A Seventh Man was published, German law was modified to allow wives and families of the workers to come with them.

     

    6. Terminology is anything but standardized. The general category is assemblage: collage is the overlapping juxtaposition of fragments cut or torn from photographs, prints, printed texts and so on, and sometimes small objects (buttons, foil, ticket stubs). Photomontage (in a single image) involves overlaying images within a single space, where some of the images are semi-transparent and relatively edgeless. It is a photographic process, the precursor of digital montage. Montage in film refers to the sequence of shots at cuts. These may either be abrupt or joined by some fade-dissolve technique. Benjamin’s use of the term was strongly influence by the film theory of his time, especially Eisenstein. The terms are discussed extensively in my long study Writing with Images, especially the chapters on Photomontage and Collage.

     

    7. On this “we” as a feature of digital image rhetoric, see Henning 228-9.

     

    8. Theodor Adorno:”The principle of montage was supposed to shock people into realizing just how dubious any organic unity was. Now that the shock had lost its punch, the products of montage revert to being indifferent stuff or substance.” Adorno seems to be thinking of collage here.

     

    9. Digital Arts Group (<www.digitalartsgroup.com>); Focus Gallery (<tomchambers.0catch.com/index-145.html>); Jochen Brennecke (<hyperart.com>); Ron Brown (<www.xmission.com/~photofx/>); Randy Little (<www.rslittle.com>); Tom Chambers(<www.digitalartsgroup.com/Artist_Pages/TomChambers%20.htm>); Elfi Kaut (<kaut.org>)

     

    10. This exhibition lives on only as an archive at <www.intentional.co.uk/archive/livewire/>.

     

    11. This feature has been retained in the Web Parada site at DIF (Digital Imaging Forum), at <www.art.uh.edu/dif/paradaArtworks_2.html>.

     

    12. The use of audio clips also alleviates the problem of visual clutter, of course.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Adorno, Theodor. Aesthetic Theory. Trans. C. Lenhardt. Eds. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann. New York: Routledge, 1984.
    • Benjamin, Walter. The Arcades Project. Trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin. Cambridge, MA: Belknap P of Harvard UP, 1999.
    • —. Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism. Trans. Harry Zohn. London: NLB, 1973.
    • —. Illuminations. Ed. Hannah Arendt. New York: Schocken, 1968.
    • Berger, John. About Looking. New York: Pantheon, 1980.
    • —. Another Way of Telling. New York: Pantheon, 1982.
    • —, and Jean Mohr. A Seventh Man: Migrant Workers in Europe. New York: Penguin, 1975.
    • Broadway, Geoff. “Digital Realist Montage.” Thesis. University of Derby, 1997. <www.intentional.co.uk/glass/thesis/index.html>.
    • Buchloh, Benjamin. “A Conversation With Martha Rosler.” Martha Rosler: Positions in the Life World. Ed. Catherine deZegher. Cambridge, MA: MIT P, 1999.
    • Buck-Morss, Susan. The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project. Cambridge, MA: MIT P, 1989.
    • Cadava, Eduardo. Words of Light: Theses on the Photography of History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1997.
    • Coetzee, J. M. “The Marvels of Walter Benjamin.” The New York Review of Books 11 Jan. 2001: 28-33.
    • Curtis, Cathy. “Photos: Cruel World of Homelessness.” Los Angeles Times 7 Nov. 1996. <www.amrousseau.com/review1.html>.
    • Dillon, George L. Writing with Images. <faculty.washington.edu/dillon/rhethtml/imagewrite.html>.
    • Dunlap, Doree. “Days of Their Lives: Homeless Women on Film.” OC Weekly November 1995. <www.amrousseau.com/review6.html>.
    • Dyer, Geoff. The Ways of Telling: The Work of John Berger. CITY: Pluto, 1986.
    • Henning, Michelle. “Digital Encounters: Mythical Pasts and Electronic Presence.” The Photographic Image in Digital Culture. Ed. Martin Lister. New York: Routledge, 1995: 217-235.
    • Hunter, Jefferson. Image and Word: The Interaction of Twentieth-Century Photographs And Texts. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1987.
    • Jennings, Michael. Dialectical Images: Walter Benjamin’s Theory of Literary Criticism. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1987.
    • Lederman, Russet. “American Views: Stories of the Landscape.” <http://nmaa-ryder.si.edu/collections/exhibits/helios/newmedia/lederman/>
    • —. “Congestion.” <www.repohistory.org/circulation/russet/russet.html>.
    • Michals, Robin. e-Arcades. <www.e-arcades.com>. 2001.
    • Peaker, Giles. “Walter Benjamin’s Passagenwerk: Reading in the Ruins.” < http://www.othervoices.org/gpeaker/Passagenwerk.html>. c1997-2000.
    • Pensky, Max. Melancholy Dialects: Walter Benjamin and the Play of Mourning. Amherst, MA: U of Massachusetts P, 1993.
    • REPOhistory. <www.repohistory.org/repo/repo_who.php3>.
    • Roberts, John. The Art of Interruption: Realism, Photography, and the Everyday. Manchester, UK: Manchester UP, 1998.
    • Rosler, Martha. “The Bowery in Two Inadequate Descriptive Systems.” Whitney Museum and San Francisco MOMA. (1974-75).
    • Rousseau, Ann Marie. “Ann Marie Rousseau Collection–Benediction.” <www.amrousseau.com/benediction.html>.
    • —. Shopping Bag Ladies : Homeless Women Talk About Their Lives. New York: Pilgrim, 1982.
    • Scott, Clive. The Spoken Image: Photography and Language. London: Reaktion, 1999.
    • Sontag, Susan. On Photography. New York: Farrar, 1977.
    • Van Hollebeke, Mark H. “The Pathologies and Possibilities of Urban Life: Dialectical and Pragmatic Sight-seeing in New York City.” <http://trill.cis.fordham.edu/~gsas/philosophy/vanhollebeke.htm>.

     

  • “Eden or Ebb of the Sea”: Susan Howe’s Word Squares and Postlinear Poetics

    Brian Reed

    Department of English
    University of Washington, Seattle
    bmreed@u.washington.edu

     

    In Poetry On & Off the Page(1998), Marjorie Perloff argues that the era of free verse may be drawing to a close. She examines recent work by a number of avant-garde poets–among them Caroline Bergvall, Karen Mac Cormack, Susan Howe, Maggie O’Sullivan, Joan Retallack, and Rosmarie Waldrop–and concludes that, whereas classic free verse depends on lineation to distinguish itself from prose, today’s “postlinear” poetry considers “the line” to be “a boundary, a confining border, a form of packaging” (157). This new species of verse freely violates longstanding literary conventions governing such aspects of page design as white space, punctuation, capitalization, font type, font size, margins, word spacing, and word placement. These experiments typically result in unusual “visual constructs” that impede, deflect, and otherwise coax readers’ eyes out of their habitual, left-to-right, top-to-bottom progress through a text (160). The predictable “flow” of the old free verse line thereby gives way to a “multi-dimensional” field of unexpected movements, arrests, connections, and disjunctions (160-63).

     

    Perloff hesitates over how to define this emergent poetic sensibility. “I have no name for this new form,” she confesses. The “new exploratory poetry […] does not want to be labelized or categorized” (166). The individual works that Perloff examines vary so greatly in page layout–some resembling shaped prose, some Futurist words-in-freedom, some advertising copy–that it would be hard indeed to find shared identifying traits such as the left-justified and right-ragged margins that typify most twentieth-century free verse.

     

    This formal diversity signals more than the breakdown of the old paradigm for verse-writing. Postlinear poets have begun inquiring into what W.J.T. Mitchell calls the “image-text,” that is, the “whole ensemble of relations” between the visual and verbal (89). Moreover, as Mitchell alerts us, the “study of image-text relations” is far from a straightforward endeavor. Rarely do “image” and “text” work together in perfectly coordinated fashion. On the contrary, “difference is just as important as similarity, antagonism as crucial as collaboration, dissonance and division of labor as interesting as harmony and blending of function” (89-90). Postlinear poets revel in this ambiguity. They have recast their writing as a “composite art” that hybridizes “sensory and cognitive modes” while also “deconstructing the possibility of a pure image or pure text” (95).

     

    If some poets have thereby discovered liberating possibilities for self-expression, literary critics, in contrast, have been presented with a new challenge. Postlinear poetry presents in miniature a dilemma that Mitchell considers inherent to the problem of “the image-text.” He argues that there is no “metalanguage” available or possible that could enable critics to speak confidently, synoptically, and transhistorically about the interface between the verbal and the visual (83). Almost every artistic exploration of that interzone proceeds differently toward noncoincident ends. In response, critics have had to insist on “literalness and materiality” in their analyses instead of resorting to too-abstract or falsely generalizing statements (90). They have had to “approach language as a medium rather than a system, a heterogeneous field of discursive modes requiring pragmatic, dialectical description rather than a univocally coded scheme open to scientific description” (97).

     

    Developing a satisfactory account of postlinear poetics will almost certainly require a series of disparate but complementary forays into the concrete writerly practices of particular, relevant authors. As Mitchell warns us, induction and deduction would misconstrue the phenomenon, insofar as they seek to replace the messiness of individual cases with the cleanliness of “scientific description.” Only by amassing enough specifics, in all their idiosyncrasy and waywardness, will we gain a sufficiently detailed, trustworthy mapping of contemporary poetic involvement in “the image-text.”

     

    This scholarly task is complicated by the fact that many poets embarked on their postlinear experiments within the context of ambitious pre-existing projects. Most of the poets that Perloff identifies as postlinear have careers that stretch over decades, and several are also known for their work in other media and genres (Bergvall as a performance artist, O’Sullivan as a visual artist, Waldrop as a novelist). In each case, we may discover that there is a prodigious amount of prehistory and background to establish before one can speak meaningfully about a poet’s visual sensibility.

     

    This article seeks to demonstrate both the rewards and drawbacks of the quest for an adequate understanding of the emergent postlinear poetries. It concentrates on explaining the origins, functions, and value of a single visual device–the “word square”–in Susan Howe’s poetry. Though this might seem a narrowly focused topic, it quickly ramifies. One has to examine not only Howe’s verse but also her early work as an installation artist, her debts to the painters Ad Reinhardt and Agnes Martin, her apprenticeship to the Scottish writer Ian Hamilton Finlay, her qualified faith in the divine, and her recurrent fascination with the ocean. Howe’s visual experiments only attain their fullest significance when read against the backdrop of her career in its entirety. Perloff has warned that the end of free verse means we can no longer rely on the tried-and-true vocabulary of line breaks, stanzas, and enjambment to orient ourselves when analyzing verse; we will have to master “other principles” that await names, let alone workable definitions (Poetry On & Off the Page 166). The quest to understand Susan Howe’s word squares reveals just how arduous the road to such mastery will be.

     

    I. Introducing Word Squares

     

    Susan Howe first came to prominence as a writer affiliated with Language Poetry, an avant-garde literary movement that originated in New York, the San Francisco Bay Area, and Washington, D.C., in the 1970s.1 In the 1980s, her literary-critical study My Emily Dickinson and her long poems Defenestration of Prague, Pythagorean Silence, The Liberties, and Articulation of Sound Forms in Time attracted such academic partisans as Jerome McGann, Linda Reinfeld, and Marjorie Perloff. In the 1990s, further publications such as The Nonconformist’s Memorial, Pierce-Arrow, and The Birth-mark solidified her fame as one of the most original, erudite, and challenging of postmodern U.S. poets. The secondary literature on her writing is growing quickly–a search of the MLA Bibliography turns up more than forty articles–and the first monograph on Howe, Rachel Tzvia Back’s Led by Language, appeared in 2002.

     

    Since the 1970s, Howe has been known for her bold experiments with the look of her poetry.[2] Unlike such other postlinear poets as Bob Cobbing and Steve McCaffery, however, Howe has not invented new forms with almost every new volume. Instead, she has tended to repeat, with variations and refinements, a small set of characteristic layouts. Hannelore Möckel-Rieke has identified four principle page designs: (1) “more or less compromised regions of text” with assorted indentations and outtakes; (2) a form resembling that of ballads, often consisting of two-line stanzas; (3) a radicalized, “exploded” style with obliquely positioned, intersecting fragments of text; and (4) sections consisting of words, partial words, nonce words, numbers, punctuation marks and/or letters arranged into more-or-less rectangular shapes (291).

     

    Of these four kinds of layout, the fourth one has proved the most baffling. The other three are either conventional enough to escape comment (as with the second) or reassuringly similar to modernist precursors.[3] Howe’s “more or less compromised regions of text,” for instance, recall such Joycean episodes as the Aeolus chapter in Ulysses and the night lessons chapter in Finnegans Wake. These passages generally emphasize the author’s role as a redactor and manipulator of material originally written by others.[4] And the “exploded” pages occur at the points of maximum violence in Howe’s work, such as the execution of King Charles I in A Bibliography of the King’s Book or, Eikon Basilike (EB 56-57).[5] These episodes hark back to F.T. Marinetti’s wild typographical intimations of the clash and noise of modern warfare.

     

    In contrast, Howe’s ragged arrays of words, part words, and symbols–which, following Rachel Blau DuPlessis, I will be calling “word squares” (138)–have few or no obvious literary precedents.[6] One cannot rely on intertextuality or allusion to explain their meaning. Yet they recur mysteriously from poem to poem (see, for example, Figures 1-3).[7] Moreover, they always appear at charged junctures, when the writing confronts the limits of cognition and representation. Examining a particularly striking instance in its original context will demonstrate the enigmatic centrality of this technique in Howe’s work.

     

    Figure 1: Word Square.
    Susan Howe, The Liberties (204).

     

    Figure 2: Word Square.
    Susan Howe, “Heliopathy” (42).

     

    Figure 3: Word Square.
    Susan Howe, Secret History of the Dividing Line (122).

     

    Howe’s celebrated long poem Articulation of Sound Forms in Time opens with a section titled “The Falls Fight,” a detailed, three-page report of a historical event: a 1676 raid into Indian territory that ends in a rout.[8] Hope Atherton, a Protestant minister, is separated from his fellow raiders and spends an unspecified period of time wandering in the wilderness before returning to colonial lands and his congregation. He dies soon afterwards. Despite the general lucidity of “The Falls Fight,” on occasion Howe breaks into a more stumbling, repetitive, and speculative mode: “Putative author, premodern condition, presently present what future clamors for release?” (4).

     

    The poem’s second section, “Hope Atherton’s Wanderings,” accelerates the breakdown of conventional discourse. The section’s strangely sedimented, misleading half-statements tend to confirm, rather than disprove, the charge of “being beside himself” that supposedly “occasioned” Atherton’s written tale (5). Amidst this confusion, we discover several of Howe’s disorienting word squares:

     

    chaotic architect repudiate line Q confine lie link realm circle a euclidean curtail theme theme toll function coda severity whey crayon so distant grain scalp gnat carol omen Cur cornice zed primitive shad sac stone fur bray tub epoch too fum alter rude recess emblem sixty key (13)

     

     

    Howe the “chaotic architect” presents us word-rubble so pulverized that if it operates as an “omen” or an “emblem” its significance is deeply obscured. She gives us language so stripped down, so denuded of syntax that a reader could essay it in any direction–horizontally, vertically, diagonally, or at random–without finding a path capable of arranging the word-nuggets into a coherent picture or narrative. The word-sequence “severity, whey, crayon,” for instance, makes as much (or as little) logical sense as “severity, omen, tub.” One cannot, though, dismiss Howe’s word-array as arbitrary. She has limited her choices of words to a few isolable categories. One can discern traces of the Classical world: its mathematics (“circle a euclidean,” “line Q”), architecture (“cornice”), and language (“Cur” means “why” in Latin). Another set of words impressionistically sketches a rural scene (“whey,” “grain,” “gnat,” “shad,” “fur,” “bray,” “tub”), a further set suggests stern value judgments (“repudiate,” “severity,” “primitive,” “rude”), and yet another set enjoins particular kinds of artistic expression (“confine lie,” “curtail theme,” “toll function,” “crayon so distant grain”). Moreover, a scheme, however perverse, evidently dictates the placement of these words: individual clusters possess strong consonance (“line, lie, link”) or assonance (“scalp, gnat, carol”); one can detect a numerical ordering principle (the first three lines each contain nine elements, the last two lines ten); and the passage ends on something of a slant rhyme (“key” recalling “bray”). Nonetheless, these lineaments of order do not reduce but heighten the strangeness of the passage, since they provide little purchase for a reader intent upon deciphering it.

     

    Critics have, nonetheless, persevered, striving to discover some manner of commentary on Atherton’s plight encrypted in the word squares.[9] They have tried to pin down these “most open apparitions”:

     

    is notion most open apparition past Halo view border redden possess remote so abstract life are lost spatio-temporal hum Maoris empirical Kantian a little lesson concatenation up tree fifty shower see step shot Immanence force to Mohegan (14)

     

     

    If we imagine the word squares to be text “by,” “about,” or “from the point of view” of Atherton, the collapse of syntax inevitably leaves a reader with a multitude of questions. Fifty what? Trees, troops, or Indians? How does one “shoot Immanence”? With a camera? There are also perplexing anachronisms. Immanuel Kant was born five decades after the events that Howe recounts, and the Maori people were unknown to Europeans until after James Cook visited New Zealand in 1769.

     

    A persistent reader, though, can find residual traces of Atherton’s story. Howe provides the barest sketches of the “spatio-temporal” coordinates within which historical narratives such as the clergyman’s typically unfold. We have hints of a landscape (“tree,” “remote”) and perhaps a time of day (“view border redden”–sunset? dawn?). She gives us monosyllabic, vector-like indications of movement (“up,” “step”). She indicates, too, the means by which those who have been “lost” try to find their bearings in new, foreign surroundings: by quantification (“fifty”), by induction (“empirical”), by deduction (“concatenation”), by schematization (“abstract”), and by observation (“see”). The more unusual words in the passage (“Kantian,” “Mohegan,” “Maoris,” “Immanence,” and “Halo”) do not seem to represent agents so much as potential agents, or, better yet, word-nuggets around which sentences can or will take shape. One could easily project appropriately erudite asides concerning Hope’s “excursion” (4) within which these words might appear: an anthropological comment on the place of immanence in Mohegan cosmology, perhaps, or an apt citation from Kant on the universal applicability of the categorical imperative even among the wild Maoris of New Zealand. This impression of growth-toward-discourse is reinforced by the moments in this odd passage where words begin to behave in a somewhat orderly syntactical fashion (“a little lesson,” “most open apparition”). Such clusters suggest that these words are not only capable of generating conventional sentences but might already be in the process of doing so. Howe’s word-grid seems to present a primordial matrix somehow just prior to historical narrative, a condition in which, although the “past” is still no more than a heterogeneous collection of words, it is nonetheless poised to emerge from gross quiddity into intelligibility.[10]

     

    Alternatively–but, curiously, without contradicting the above interpretation–Howe’s word-array might be intended to depict language in a state of decomposition.[11] Howe could be presenting us with a scattering of language that we are supposed to interpret as the barest tracery of long-ago accounts of Hope Atherton’s time in the wilderness. We are perhaps to intuit that these accounts are now a “story so / Gone” (6), that is, that they have subsequently been damaged, circulated in faulty copies, or lost altogether, known only through repute or hearsay. The peculiar spacing of the words in the passage beginning “is notion most open” would then be seeking to render visible the historical, entropic erasure that has afflicted what once might have been a set of reliable, detailed documents upon which to base a more conventional historical fiction. Howe, in other words, could be compensating for her inability to represent what has disappeared from the historical record by calling attention to the very fact of its vanishing.

     

    Like a Necker cube, then, Howe’s array beginning “is notion most open” plots an arrangement of nodes in two dimensions that can ambivalently suggest both protension and recession–that is, on the one hand, a process of maturation into rational discourse or, on the other hand, the decay away from it (see Figure 4). Not coincidentally, these impersonal, recalcitrant word-grids also appear just before Atherton concludes with a platitude-rich homily (“Loving Friends and Kindred:– / When I look back / So short in charity and good works […] . ” [16]). The weirdly geometrical word-arrays mark, as it were, the furthest that Atherton ventures into the wilderness. Like Samuel Beckett in The Unnamable and Texts for Nothing, Howe situates us on the threshold where meaning abuts the incomprehensibility of the other-than-human.

     

    Figure 4: Necker Cube

    II. “All Things Double”

     

    A close reading of Articulation of Sound Forms in Time can help us appreciate how word squares function–at least on one occasion. We learn little, though, about why Howe has chosen to figure an encounter with the non- or superhuman by mechanically arranging stubbornly particulate words into near-grids. If we are to understand when, how, and why her verse turns “postlinear” in the form of word squares, we will have to cast our net both more broadly and more deeply.

     

    Geoffrey O’Brien’s remarkable series of reviews of Howe’s work can serve as a useful point from which to begin fishing for answers. He struggles to articulate why he finds her verse both ineffable and oddly superficial. Her “haunting tunes,” he asserts, seduce us by hinting that Truth, if not present here-and-now, nevertheless still exists: “Howe’s words give the impression of echoing another, hidden poetry of which we catch only fragments, like an opera sung in another room […] . The words are like magnetic filings that adhere uncertainly to a receding body of meaning” (“Meaningless” 11). These ghostly traces of a higher order of Being and Meaning seem sufficient to justify her use of resonant phrases that might otherwise seem laughable or irresponsible, such as “truth and glory” and “ideal city of immaculate beauty” (“Notes” 110). Howe’s poetry can free a reader to enter into the terrain of the Ideal. She opens up “a world ([is] it ours?) in constant metamorphosis, a swirl of depths and tides, a series of transient landscapes (woods, seas, marshes) dissolving even as they [are] named.”

     

    But O’Brien remarks that at other times, however, a reader can find access to these grand vistas impossible. The poetry then seems “hard, dry […] spare, fragmented, analytical.” What had seemed sublime insights couched in “Miltonic words” instead rather “brutally” turn out to be conjectures that “exist only in the mind” of the reader. “The interior spaces I’d glimpsed were not in the words but in their unstated connections: in the decisiveness and freedom with which the words were laid side by side, and the abysses which were permitted to open up between them.” Howe’s genius, O’Brien argues, lies in being able to write a fragmented poetry that is able to fulfill a desire for transcendence while also registering a cynical disbelief in it. In this ambivalent aesthetic, the “same word might be both opening and closure, reality and disguise, truth and a lie” (“The Way” 27).

     

    Again we encounter a dual movement, as with the Necker cube-like movement into and out of the discourse of history exhibited by the word squares in Articulation of Sound Forms in Time. O’Brien, however, helps us see that this doubling is fundamental to Howe’s writing more generally. A concrete–and visually conventional–example can help clarify Howe’s habitual practice of making two readings equally available (“All things double”–ASFT 28), as well as demonstrate what she gains by writing in such a manner. Stephen-Paul Martin, in his essay “Endless Protean Linkages,” comments upon Howe’s terse précis of the Tristram and Iseult myth in Defenestration of Prague:

     

    Iseult of Ireland Iseult of the snow-white hand Iseult seaward gazing (pale secret fair) allegorical Tristram his knights are at war Sleet whips the page (DP 100)

    Martin chooses to read Howe’s invocation of Iseult as if the poet were a feminist theorist bent on dismantling patriarchal ideology:

     

    We are not given the opportunity to lose ourselves in the glamor of "one of the world's greatest love stories." We are instead asked to see the "play of forces" that underscores it. Iseult is the conventional female "seaward gazing," pining for her lost lover. She is "(pale secret fair)," a mere feminine signifier who has all the qualities normally assigned to women in medieval legends or romances. Tristram is the masculine signifier, the "allegorical" warrior. In the original romance (and in the countless versions of it that have come down to us through the centuries) we are encouraged to think of Tristram and Iseult as "real" flesh-and-blood human beings. But Howe shows us what they actually are: patriarchal conventions, stick figures used to convey an ideological message under the guise of storytelling. When Howe tells us that "Sleet whips the page," she reminds us that the climate Tristram and Iseult inhabit is a fictive space whose purposes can and should be analyzed. (64-65)

     

     

    Martin’s interpretation has a great deal of merit. Iseult and Tristram appear only once in Defenestration of Prague, in this brief vignette, and they can indeed seem rather like “stick figures” trotted out and dismissed in a satiric pageant. Howe’s perpetual insistence on the fictive character of poetry (“a true world / fictively constructed”–PS 54) and on the materiality of the text do lay bare the workings of her verse to such an extent that it is hard to ignore the writerly artifice that culminates in what we see on the page. What Martin finds true of Defenestration of Prague‘s Iseult is even more evident in the opening lines of Howe’s 1999 work Rückenfigur:

     

    Iseult stands at Tintagelon the mid stairs between

    light and dark symbolism (129)

     

     

    Howe, in her brevity, seems to mock the elaborate atmospherics that often cue the introduction of a heroine in a novel or a romance. Here we discover no white dress, no ivory skin, no deep shadows nor silent, dark night–just a telegraphic indication of “light and dark symbolism.” Readers are coyly instructed to fill in the blanks with appropriate tropes. They thereby become complicitous in the mechanics and the production of the poem. And, if we are to believe Brecht and Benjamin, this kind of theatricalization of the artistic process operates in service of ideological critique by jolting an audience out of its customary passivity.[12] From this point of view, then, one can say that these schematic, cursory invocations of the Tristram story illustrate the “brutality” of Howe’s analytic mind as she probes the unsightly innards of literary tradition.

     

    But is Howe’s Iseult just a stick figure? “Iseult stands at Tintagel”: although it may sound brisk or even martial, for an informed reader the opening line of “Rückenfigur” can nonetheless strike a powerful chord. It evokes “Iseult at Tintagel,” the fifth book of Algernon Charles Swinburne’s Tristram of Lyonesse.[13] “Iseult at Tintagel” is one of the most extravagant of lovers’ plaints in English. The disconsolate Iseult, aria-like, recounts her grief, passion, and pain. She begs God to damn her if that sacrifice might spare her lover the same fate. She praises and abuses the absent Tristram to the accompaniment of a storm at sea. “Iseult stands at Tintagel / on the mid stairs between / light and dark symbolism.” In Swinburne’s Tristram, Iseult’s dramatic monologue revolves obsessively around tropes of light and dark and their horrifying failure to remain distinct: “dawn was as dawn of night / And noon as night’s noon” (94). Good and evil, heaven and hell, morn and eve–to the suffering soul, all such divisions are meaningless (“soul-sick till day be done, and weary till day rises” [97]). For a reader familiar with Tristram of Lyonesse, Howe’s statement that “Iseult stands […] between light and dark symbolism” is not satirical. It recalls a precursor poet writing magnificent verse at the height of his career. “Rückenfigur” could hardly begin on a more explosive note.

     

    Full or empty? Iseult and Tristram as names wonderfully redolent of myth and literary tradition, or as stick figures acting out tradition’s desiccation? Howe seems deliberately to make multiple, if contradictory, readings available to her audience.[14] In this respect, her verse resembles the optical illusions made famous by Gestalt psychologists–the rabbit-duck drawing, the young-old woman, the profiles-goblet puzzle. In each of these instances, a viewer can readily see one or the other option (rabbit or duck, young or old woman) but cannot easily see both simultaneously. The only place where both options coexist harmoniously is in the design of the artwork itself.[15] Similarly, Howe’s Iseult is just a stick figure. Sometimes. Other times she comes trailing clouds of glory. It depends on one’s point of view.

     

    As O’Brien’s reviews show, this dynamic is especially disconcerting in Howe’s poetry because she puts transcendence itself up for grabs. At almost every point in her work she can be read as critiquing and or offering access to Truth. In other words, the existence of a transcendental referent is perpetually put into doubt even as, paradoxically, that same existence is celebrated. The markedly undialectical character of this worldview is not unusual in the broader context of late twentieth-century literature. Linda Hutcheon contends that postmodern literature is, properly speaking, “neither ‘unificatory’ nor ‘contradictionist’ in a Marxist dialectical sense”:

     

    the visible paradoxes of the postmodern do not mask any hidden unity which analysis can reveal. Its irreconcilable incompatibilities are the very bases upon which the problematized discourses of postmodernism emerge [...] The differences that these contradictions foreground should not be dissipated. While unresolved paradoxes may be unsatisfying to those in need of absolute and final answers, to postmodernist thinkers and artists they have been the source of intellectual energy that has provoked new articulations of the postmodern condition. (21)

     

     

    In making this argument, Hutcheon has in mind the unresolved/irresolvable tension between fiction and history common in the contemporary novels that are her proximate subject. Although Howe’s poetry likewise mixes history and fiction, the un-dialectical “irreconcilable incompatibilities” in her work are so pervasive, in form as well as content, that its bipolarity seems to represent a sharp intensification of Hutcheon’s dynamic. From the microlevel of the line to the macrolevel of the long poem, Howe continually offers repleteness and/or emptiness, the skeptical and/or the visionary, Eden and/or Gethsemane. Moreover, the duality in Howe’s poetry is born neither of paranoia nor of paralyzing doubt. She does not plunge us into a regio dissimilitudinis in which we cannot distinguish true and false. Rather, we have the option of apprehending the true and/or the false while still wandering in the Dantean dark wood–a surprisingly optimistic prospect, all things told. In contrast to Hutcheon’s account, the “unresolved paradoxes” at the heart of her poetics do not inevitably and always frustrate “those in need of absolute and final answers.” Howe grants them the right to choose to read her words as revelation. Skeptics and believers can agree that Howe pierces the Veil of the Temple. The question is whether one decides to see nothing, or something, on the Veil’s other side.

     

    III. Howe’s Installation Art

     

    A duck-rabbit combination of skepticism and transcendentalism is such a foundational part of Howe’s worldview that one can trace it back to her earliest works. In her case, though, such a recounting takes us back into the years before she chose poetry as a vocation. Howe was in her forties before her first chapbook appeared. A graduate of the Boston Museum of Fine Arts School, she spent the late 1960s and early 1970s actively involved in the New York art world. By examining this early, under-studied phase in her career, one gains insight into the origins of her visual poetics and into the intense, ambivalent spirituality that subtends them.

     

    The Susan Howe Archive at the University of California, San Diego preserves written instructions, ephemera, photographs, and other materials relating to Howe’s installations of 1969-1971, which possessed such evocative names as Long Away Lightly, On the Highest Hill, and Wind Shift / Frost Smoke / Malachite Green / Rushlight.[16] These installations contained a heterogeneous mix of word and image: original verse; extracts from ecological and geological texts; extracts from historical sources; illustrations excised from books and journals; photographs; and Xerox copies. Howe mounted or pinned these diverse objects to paper, wood, or cloth supports according to precisely determined measurements.[17] She also typically added a few lines or rectangles with tape or pigment and, occasionally, blots of thinned paint.

     

    Howe’s installations were harshly rectilinear. The constituent polygons, cut-outs, and text blocks were uniformly rectangular, and the assorted elements in each installation were distributed as if they occupied coordinates on a Cartesian grid as well as aligned perfectly with implied horizontal and vertical axes. The often flimsy, always unframed supports were attached directly to blank expanses of wall. Finally, Howe left the vast majority of her supports untouched and uncovered. From any distance greater than arm’s length, one would have experienced these installations as fields of whiteness, interrupted by images too small to identify and short pieces of writing too distant to read.

     

    Significantly, as seen in the few photographs that document Howe’s actual exhibitions, the installations looked like her later word squares. One particularly suggestive (alas unidentified) photograph depicts a wall upon which Howe has hung nine rectangular pieces of what seems to be paper in the pattern of a tic-tac-toe board. Each piece of paper features images, texts, or a combination of the two, positioned, of course, on an implied grid. The rightmost piece of paper in the middle row has nine, very short statements or passages of verse arrayed, again, in a tic-tac-toe-like pattern, this time spread out across a veritable sea of white space.[18]

     

    Howe’s 1969-71 installations are very much of their time and place. Their understatement, relentless geometry, reliance on the written word, and recycling of banal, mass-produced images speak to her loose ties to Conceptual Art, more specifically to her then-fascination with the work of Robert Smithson.[19] Like Smithson, she mixes the creative and the documentary, intersperses poetic and scientific language, and makes use of deceptively “boring” images, mostly monochrome or sepia-tone reproductions cut haphazardly out of journals or books. She does, however, diverge from Smithson (and other contemporary conceptual artists) in several respects. First, she incorporates fiercely romantic verse into her installations, such as the following:

     

    on the highest hill of the heart
    the keen wind cuts
    ancient
    west through the slaty gray of space swash
    the long strand glints
    stale

     

     

    stars stars stars stars

    the heart’s sea shivers[20]

     

     

    The moral here is conventional: that one’s interior life is like a landscape and that, moreover, this landscape is an archetypal one, buffeted by “ancient” forces and offering no solace as one peers into the “west” and sees the “strand” of one’s future trailing into the “slaty gray” emptiness and twilight that portend death. The play throughout the lyric on the letters “s” and “t,” though, is effective, and, in such a short poem, the three parallel phrases “keen winds cut,” “long strand glints,” and “heart’s sea shivers” offer a marvelously heavy, decisive rebuttal to the Swinburnian lilt of the opening, anapestic line. Howe’s versecraft, even at this early stage, is incomparably superior to Smithson’s, whose pale imitations of Allen Ginsberg he rightly never published.[21] Moreover, Howe does not satirize romantic longings in the manner of Smithson, whose contemporary piece “Incidents of Mirror-Travel in the Yucatan” (1969) verges on the carnivalesque in its Beat-like, half-parodic celebration of Mayan cosmology. Instead, Howe subtly ironizes her poetry by submerging it in an oceanic “swash” of space. Blankness overwhelms expression; the indifferent white reduces a speaker’s emotions, whether melancholy or ecstatic, to minor, arabesque-like details on an otherwise uniform surface.

     

    To explain Howe’s plentiful use of white space, one has to look beyond her overt debts to conceptualism. It speaks to a powerfully quietist strain in her aesthetics that aligns her also with another canon of avant-garde artists, as a 1995 interview makes clear:

     

    Q. [An earlier interview] ends with your statement that if you had to paint your writing, "It would be blank. It would be a white canvas. White." I wondered if you could explain what you meant to suggest with that wonderfully evocative remark.A. Well, that statement springs from my love for minimalist painting and sculpture. Going all the way back to Malevich writing on suprematism. Then to Ad Reinhardt’s writing about art and to his painting. To the work of Agnes Martin, of Robert Ryman […] I can’t express how important Agnes Martin was to me at the point when I was shifting from painting to poetry. The combination in Martin’s work, say, of being spare and infinitely suggestive at the same time characterizes the art I respond to. And in poetry I am concerned with the space of the page apart from the words on it. I would say that the most beautiful thing of all is a page before the word interrupts it. A Robert Ryman white painting is there […] Infinitely open and anything possible. (Howe, Interview with Keller 7)

     

     

    Howe’s choice of “minimalist” heroes provides a context for her swerve away from Smithson’s aesthetic by underscoring the fact that she never really shared his passion for the muck, mess, and fracture of the natural world. Ad Reinhardt is best known for his “black paintings,” which are three-by-three grids of black squares that differ ever so slightly in luster and hue.[22] Agnes Martin is best known for her six-foot-by-six-foot canvases covered with tiny rectangles. Robert Ryman is best known for restricting his palette to the color white.[23] As her comments illustrate, Howe admires this particular set of painters for a specific reason: their art posits that the unsaid, the unpainted, can “suggest” the infinite more effectively than any attempt to represent it directly. Martin, Reinhardt, and Ryman reduce their painterly subject matter to a degree zero, a mere grid or a single pigment, in order to redirect a viewer’s attention to the vertiginous freedom that precedes any artistic gesture. Howe makes an analogy between her poetry and their art, seeing in the two kinds of material support–the page and the canvas–an intimation of an Absolute, pure and virginal, that precedes human endeavor and activity. The task of the poet and the painter alike is to let that primal “whiteness” shine out.

     

    Recognizing this principle can help one appreciate Howe’s later liberal use of white space in her poetry. She has a habit of including pages in her long poems that consist of no more than a handful of words isolated in the center of a page.[24] These words often look paltry or whispered, certainly chastened. In the small-press edition of Articulation of Sound Forms in Time, for instance, the phrases so treated are “Otherworld light into fable / Best plays are secret plays.”[25] The “Otherworld light” refers, at least in part, to the primal whiteness of the page that Howe has rendered so noticeable. This whiteness thereby enters “into fable,” in other words, into Hope Atherton’s story. It does so, however, as a “secret,” since in its pure potentiality it cannot be directly articulated–attempting to do so would grant it determinate form, hence violating the very open-endedness that made it valuable in the first place. “Best plays are secret plays.”

     

    Howe’s love for white space alone does not, however, explain her persistent preference for the rectilinear: squares, arrays, grids. Howe’s favored “minimalists,” though, all share her infatuation with grids, and by turning to an art critic who has famously written on this topic–Rosalind Krauss–we can begin to appreciate why rectilinearity proved essential to Howe’s developing aesthetic and spiritual sensibilities.

     

    IV. The Appeal of Grids, Clouds, and the Sea

     

    In her classic essay “Grids”–in which Reinhardt, Martin, and Ryman all make appearances–Rosalind Krauss takes up the problem of the insistent recurrence of grid-like patterns in modern and postmodern visual art. She claims for it a covert ideological role. As she sees it, artist after artist, from Piet Mondrian to Frank Stella to Andy Warhol to Sol LeWitt, discovers in the grid’s geometry a way of circumventing the age-old, ever-vexatious split between spirit and matter. That is, grids look scientific, like a return to the mathematical rigor that typified such Renaissance breakthroughs as vanishing-point perspective, but they also represent pure abstraction, an escape to the realm of universals. “The grid’s mythic power,” she writes, “is that it makes us able to think we are dealing with materialism (or sometimes science, or logic) while at the same time it provides us with a release into belief (illusion, or fiction)” (Originality 10).

     

    Krauss would probably diagnose Susan Howe as another victim of the grid’s insidious appeal–as well as object strenuously to Howe’s use of the word “minimalist” to refer to artists who likewise fall prey to the grid’s magic. An art historian who has written on 1960s and 70s minimalism as a phenomenological revolution in the arts, Krauss would likely contend that Howe fixates on the most backward, “modernist” aspects of the movement.[26] In fact, although Reinhardt and Martin are frequently labeled minimalists because of their limited, geometrical subject matter, a critic such as Krauss is liable to argue that they are better understood within the context of Abstract Expressionism. Reinhardt, after all, belongs to the same generation as Jackson Pollock and Willem de Kooning, and Martin explicitly styles herself as Barnett Newman’s heir.[27] Their grid-paintings are legible as acts of spiritual, aesthetic askesis, and they convey a sublimity entirely foreign to the post-Pop, cool sensibility of most late-1960s avant-garde art. In terms of affect, Reinhardt’s and Martin’s best paintings belong in the same class as Newman’s Stations of the Cross and the Rothko Chapel.[28]

     

    Accordingly, Krauss has written an essay, “The /Cloud/,” which presents Agnes Martin’s grids as an endgame in a senescent modernist tradition, not as a postmodern breakthrough. Whereas early-century grids by masters such as Piet Mondrian were able to resolve (that is, repress) the spirit/matter split through the creation of a single image, later artists discovered that grid-paintings no longer possessed that same “magical” potency. Over the years, grids gradually lost their original, spiritual force as a consequence of having become too closely associated–by critics and viewers alike–with the materiality of the canvas (164-65). Agnes Martin, according to Krauss, is unique in having found a way to revitalize an increasingly moribund device. To illustrate this fact, Krauss dwells on a curious feature of Martin’s paintings. Up close, one concentrates chiefly on the “tactile” qualities of her work: the tracery of the lines and the weave of the canvas. As one moves back, however, something odd happens. The canvas seems to dissolve into a haze or a mist, observable from any vantage, as with clouds, seas, or fields. One also has an experience of radiance, or directionless illumination. This middle distance is characterized by “illusion” and “atmosphere.” As one moves further away, though, the illusion collapses. The “painting closes down entirely,” and in its “opacity” it resembles a “wall-like stele” (158-59). Krauss marvels at the “closed system” that Martin thereby creates. The two “materialist extremes”–the fabric of the grid, as seen up close, and the impassive panel, as seen from a distance–frame the transcendent “opticality” of the middle distance. Whereas modernist grids, such as Mondrian’s, seek to express transcendence and materiality simultaneously, Martin renders those two qualities a function of a viewer’s position vis-á-vis the canvas (164-65).[29]

     

    Krauss’s “The /Cloud/” may have been conceived as an unflattering critique of Martin’s outmoded high modernist aesthetic, but, as with Krauss’s essay “Grids,” “The /Cloud/” is nonetheless most illuminating in the present, literary context. Howe, like Martin, separates out the spiritual and material aspects of her art. Howe, like Martin, makes her audience’s choice between the two a function of point of view, not a question of authorial intent. Thus, insofar as they are modeled on Agnes Martin’s paintings, one begins to see how Howe’s own “grids,” her word squares, might function as an extension of her duck-rabbit aesthetic. They prove ambivalently materialist and/or idealist.

     

    Howe’s comments on Martin can further refine this comparison. Not only does Howe credit Martin with being instrumental in her transition from painting to poetry, she verges on calling Martin herself a poet: “I remember a show Agnes Martin had at the Greene Gallery–small minimalist paintings, but each one had a title; it fascinated me how the title affected my reading of the lines and colors. I guess to me they were poems even then” (4). How, though, can a Martin painting be a “poem,” by any but the loosest definition? There are no words in a work by Martin, only rectangles. Can a title alone qualify a painting as a poem? As we have already seen, Howe pinpoints Martin’s ability to be “spare yet suggestive” as her defining characteristic. If a single word can completely alter the experience of a painting, then ought it qualify as a “minimalist” poem? Howe has argued something of the sort about a scrap of paper upon which Emily Dickinson wrote a single word: “Augustly” (BM 143). The contention that an isolated word can be a poem dovetails with Howe’s duck-rabbit outlook. “Augustly” could either be an infinitely evocative word–or a word reduced to its bare quiddity.

     

    What, one then wonders, were the poem-words that rendered Agnes Martin’s canvases so memorable? In her anecdote about the Greene Gallery, Howe does not mention specific titles, but one can make a reasonable guess. Howe’s transition from painting to poetry occurred in the early 1970s. Agnes Martin’s career happens to contain a long hiatus, from 1967 to 1974, during which time she either was traveling or living as a hermit in New Mexico, although her works continued to be exhibited and her fame continued to grow. In the years leading up to the publication of Howe’s first book, Hinge Picture, the poet would have known Martin primarily through her paintings of 1960-67, the ones most frequently seen in galleries at the time. These early works are notable for the recurrent use of two kinds of titles. A first set has marine monikers, such as Islands No. 1, Ocean Water, The Wave, and Night Sea. A second set of paintings has linguistic labels, such as Words and Song. These two classes of names enshrine Martin’s response upon completing her first grid drawing: “First I thought it was just like the sea […] then I thought it was like singing!” (Chave 144). In the catalog for her 1973 Philadelphia retrospective, the painter further comments,

     

    The ocean is deathless
    The islands rise and die
    Quietly come, quietly go
    A silent swaying breath
    I wish the idea of time would drain out of my cells and leave me quiet even on this shore. (“Selected” 26)

     

     

    Martin, it seems, hopes that her grid paintings give access to a timeless, spiritual realm that resembles an ocean, or silent speech. One can see why this aspect of Martin’s art might so forcefully capture Howe’s imagination. A single word or a phrase transforms a flat canvas into a doorway into a limitless wonderland of silent singing or washing waves.

     

    Agnes Martin, as understood first through Krauss’s “The /Cloud/” and second through the clues that Howe gives us, can be read as offering Howe a poetics in germ. Martin’s bipolar paintings represent a combination of vision and/or Vision, words and/or Silence, faktura and/or ecstasy. Which of these two paired terms is in the dominant depends, not on the artwork, but upon the viewer’s position in regards to it. Furthermore, Martin’s paintings suggest that poetic grids can grant an entrée to a sublime landscape, the “deathless” ocean, which is somehow interchangeable with “words” and “song.”

     

    Questions remain, though. Can one really transpose a painterly technique into another medium–language–without losing something essential? Also: Howe may think of a single word as a mini-poem, but she nonetheless characteristically writes long poems, and her word squares contain many heterogeneous elements. To explain how Martin’s painterly sensibility relates to Howe’s mature visual poetics, we need a better understanding of the route by which Howe made the transition from painter to poet.

     

    V. Language Is Aural and Visual

     

    During the early 1970s, finding her work more and more occupying the borderlands between the visual and literary arts, Howe sensibly began corresponding regularly with one of that region’s few éminences grises: Ian Hamilton Finlay, a Scottish poet, sculptor, and publisher who did much to popularize Concrete Poetry in the English-speaking world. Finlay happily played Chiron to her Jason.[30] This period of literary apprenticeship culminated in a 1974 article, “The End of Art,” which John Palatella has characterized as a veiled manifesto “mapping a genealogy of [Howe’s] aesthetic” (74). In “The End of Art” Howe proposes fundamental connections between Finlay’s poetry and the art of one of her minimalist heroes, Ad Reinhardt. Both, she claims, teach the same lesson: “to search for infinity inside simplicity will be to find simplicity alive with messages” (7).

     

    Given Howe’s enthusiastic endorsement of Finlay in the same breath with one of her favorite painters, it is plausible to conclude that Finlay’s work might provide the missing link between Martin’s painterly grids and Howe’s poetic equivalent, her word squares. But as John Palatella warns, it is not immediately apparent whether the man who made such famous works as Wave-Rock influenced Howe’s poetry in any measurable way, beyond, perhaps, reinforcing her interest in the materiality of the word and her distaste for conventional syntax (76). Some of Finlay’s poems, “Acrobats” for instance, could be called word squares, but they are ultimately closer to a stand-up comedian’s one-liners than the mysterious arrays of shattered words that one finds in Howe (see Figure 5).

     

    Figure 5: Ian Hamilton Finlay, “Acrobats.”

     

    I would argue that the crucial lesson Howe learned from Finlay was in the first instance thematic and only secondarily formal–the inverse of what one might expect, given Concrete Poetry’s reputation for sacrificing complexity of content in order to cultivate instantaneous perceptual effects. In the case of Finlay, that reputation is wholly unmerited. Among much else, he is a poet with an enduring passion for the ocean. Fishing boat names and registrations, for example, supply the words used in his “Sea Poppy” series, and references to boats and nets abound in his work down to the present day.[31] In addition, his love for the sea has influenced not only his choice of subject matter but also his poetry’s look. Again and again, Finlay recycles an implicit equation between page and sea that he borrows from a foundational text for much twentieth-century visual poetry, Stéphane Mallarmé’s Un Coup de dés. Un Coup de dés repeatedly compares its own lines, scattered across wide expanses of white space, to a plume of foam on the sea, or to the wreckage of a ship breaking apart in a storm.[32] Variations on Mallarmé’s conceit occur in such Finlay works as “drifter,” in which names for kinds of ships are positioned rather arbitrarily in “oceanic” white space, and in the octagonal poem-sculpture, Fisherman’s Cross (see Figure 6).

     

    Figure 6: Ian Hamilton Finlay, Fisherman’s Cross
    (Solt, Concrete Poetry 205).

     

    Howe’s “The End of Art” contains a passage of superb commentary on Fisherman’s Cross.[33] After praising Finlay for having bettered Mallarmé, she writes,

     

    The two words, seas and ease, are as close in value as two slightly different blacks are close. Here the words are close visually and rhythmically. The ea combination in the middle is in my memory as the ea in eat, ear, hear, cease, release, death, and east, where the sun rises. These are open words and the things they name are open. There are no vertical letters, just as there are no sharp sounds to pull the ear or eye up or down. Life (seas) rhymes with Death (ease). The cross made by the words has been placed inside a hexagonal form which blurs the edges. The eye wanders off toward the borders until ease (almost seas backward), in the center, draws it back as does sleep, or death, or the sea. (6)

     

    Words emerging from the deep. People sinking into the sea, as into death. Finlay is one of a long line of poets–including Walt Whitman, Hart Crane, and Wallace Stevens–who feel compelled to meditate on the mystery of the sea, genetrix and destroyer.[34]

     

    Howe is fully in sympathy with this point of view. The ocean is one of her favorite images. It appears in virtually all of her poems to date.[35] She has gone so far as to say, “the sea and poetry […] for me they are one and the same” (Howe, Interview with Keller 29). Her prose, too, is full of references to the ocean, and she frequently weaves into her argument other writers’ statements on the subject.[36] There are biographical reasons for Howe’s abiding interest in the sea–chiefly her Transatlantic upbringing and her late husband’s life-long involvement with ships and ship-building[37]–but the ocean usually enters her poetry as an impersonal archetype.[38] Among the many guises that the sea adopts in her work, the following are the most significant:

     

    • Chaos. The sea is a place of storms and pirates. It represents the blind violence that governs the course of history.[39]
    • Genesis. The sea is a place of origin. It is the First Cause that gives rise to sound, to soul, to language and poetry.[40]
    • Pax. The sea is a place of silence and unutterable peace.[41]
    • Peregrinatio. The sea is a place of exile, transit, drift, and pilgrimage, much as in Anglo-Saxon elegy.[42]
    • Thanatos. The sea is a place of death. It is where one dies, and it is either the avenue to, or the abode of, the dead.[43]

     

    Howe undoubtedly derives her mythology of the sea from a wide variety of literary sources, from the Bible to Moby Dick to Olson’s Maximus Poems, but she learns two invaluable lessons from Finlay’s particular inflection of this tradition. First is an association between the page and the ocean, and, further, the sense that words float upon, or emerge from, the ocean-page. Although two-dimensional, the page is, like the surface of the sea, a thin, variegated skin concealing depths upon “seacret” depths (EB 75). A written work is no more than a “Text of traces crossing orient // and occident” the “empyrean ocean” of white space (PS 56). As we have already seen, Howe considers the blank page expressive of an infinity comparable to that intimated by Agnes Martin and Ad Reinhardt. For Howe, the ocean is a figure that allows her to conceptualize, to discuss, and to gesture toward that primal and final absolute.

     

    The second lesson that Howe learns from Finlay is an appreciation for the gap between poetry and painting. In “The End of Art” she writes that “silence” is the only adequate response to a Reinhardt black painting (2). In contrast, Fisherman’s Cross may resemble a Reinhardt work on account of its use of the cross as a structuring principle and its symmetry and simplicity, but Finlay’s poem-sculpture uses words as its building blocks and hence introduces the problem of sound. Hence, in her interpretation of Fisherman’s Cross, she lingers over the vowel combination “ea” and over the “rhyme” that the poem proposes between “Life (seas)” and “Death (ease).” In her 1995 interview with Lynn Keller–the same interview in which she discusses her debts to Finlay, Martin, and Reinhardt –Howe again singles out the distinction between the absence and presence of sound as the crucial dividing line between the visual and written arts. She asserts that she forever crossed over from “drawing” into “writing” once she began to think about the aural impact of the words she had been using in her painting.

     

    I moved into writing physically because this was concerned with gesture, the mark of the hand and pen or pencil, the connection between eye and hand [...] There is another, more unconscious element here, of course: the mark as an acoustic signal or charge. I think you go one way or another--towards drawing or towards having words sound the meaning. Somehow I went the second way and began writing. (6)

     

     

    From the 1970s to the 1990s, Howe has emphasized the role that sound plays in her work. At almost every opportunity, she asserts that it determines the shape and character of each line she writes, both in verse and prose.[44] When at the “cross”-roads between Reinhardt’s silence and Finlay’s sound, she decisively opted to pursue the latter path.

     

    The two lessons that Howe learns from Finlay–about the look of the page and about its intrinsically aural character–govern her use of the open ocean as a figure for the creation, or emergence, of art from the matrix of infinity. Although writers since Antiquity have used encounters with the ocean as a myth of origins, traditionally, as in Swinburne’s “Thalassian” and Whitman’s “Out of the Cradle Endlessly Rocking,” the roar of the waves at seaside is the proximate cause for a poet’s desire to write. Howe, too, writes about seashores,[45] but for her the wide expanses of the ocean-wilderness–the terrain of Fisherman’s Cross–hold the ultimate allure. The “Unconfined […] ocean” (MM 146) is her personal symbol of sublimity, and to plunge into it entails great risk but can also yield revelation. “Out of deep drowning,” she writes, comes “prophetical / knowledge” (DP 88). But she also contends that gaining “prophetical knowledge” does not, in itself, make one a prophet. That knowledge must first be brought ashore. One has to give up the “ease” of the sea’s deathly quiet and re-enter the babble-roar of the human world. She hints at this transition from silence into speech in “Sorting Facts”:

     

    In English mole can mean, aside from a burrowing mammal, a mound or massive work formed of masonry and large stones or earth laid in the sea as a pier or breakwater. Thoreau calls a pier a "noble mole" because the sea is silent but as waves wash against and around it they sound and sound is language.[46] (319)

     

     

    If one does not return from sea to land–if the obdurate concreteness of the earth does not force Language-Ocean to yield up the “thud” of language (PS 53)–the result, as Howe tells Edward Foster in her Talismaninterview, is tantamount to death:

     

    If you follow the lure of the silence beyond the waves washing, you may enter the sea and drown. It's like Christ saying if you follow me, you give up your family, you have no family [...] If you follow the words to a certain extent, you may never come back. (BM 178)

     

     

    Finlay’s poetry, especially Fisherman’s Cross, instructs Howe how she might go about integrating these concepts into the very manner in which she wrote a poem. “Disciples are fishermen / Go to them for direction” (SWS 35). While writing and arranging her words on the page-sea, she can think of them as ones cast up from the deeps, written by a “foam pen” (L 204). This “brine testimony” (R 131), or “water-mark” (EB 63), is like a “raft in the drift” (DP 117) on the white of the page. Moreover, it may only be an “ebbing and nether / veiled Venus” (DP 128), more “wrack” (MM 145) and “broken oar or spar” (L 168) than epiphany on the half shell, but Howe, having “rowed as never woman rowed / rowed as never woman rowed” (L 168), is able to offer up at least “the echoing valediction / of […] gods crossing / and re-crossing” (H 52).

     

    VI. Spacing-Out the Ocean-Page

     

    Crosses, echoes, waves–the building blocks are now in place to answer the remaining questions posed by Susan Howe’s word squares. Krauss would have us believe that grids as a structuring device in art are calculated to suppress history and magically harmonize urges toward immersion in the material world and urges to escape it. Howe certainly writes as if her own word squares, and her poetry more generally, conflate the material presence of the word (its sound/its appearance) and an experience of the transcendental. “A poet sees arrays of sound in perfection,” Howe has written (“Women” 84), and on other occasions she has claimed that these perfect arrays of sound come to her from another, timeless plane of existence.[47]

     

    Writing [...] is never an end in itself but is in the service of something out of the world--God or the Word, a supreme Fiction. This central mystery--this huge Imagination of one form is both a lyric thing and a great "secresie," on the unbeaten way [...] A poet tries to sound every part.Sound is part of the mystery. But sounds are only the echoes of a place of first love […] I am part of one Imagination and the justice of Its ways may seem arbitrary but I have to follow Its voice. Sound is a key to the untranslatable hidden cause. It is the cause. (“Difficulties” 21)

     

     

    “Echoes of a place of first love”–Howe alludes to Robert Duncan’s signature poem, “The Opening of the Field,” in which he talks of returning to “the place of first permission” (Opening 7). One could, therefore, read Howe as a Duncan-style poet-mystic who desires her readers “to enter the mystery of language, and to follow words where they lead, to let language lead them” (Howe, Interview with Keller 31). Howe’s word squares assuredly do seem designed to open out into infinite possibility and into the unknown. With gnosis wrested from the heart of the sea, Howe comes to us: “I messenger of Power / salt-errand / sea-girt” (DP 96).

     

    But this is not the whole story. As we saw with Howe’s use of the Tristan myth, at every point in her work transcendental impulses coexist with their antitheses. As Möckel-Rieke has put it, Howe is uniformly contradictory, “teilweise strukturalistische, teilweise sprachmystische” (281). That is, if she is part speech-mystic, she also provides a structural anatomy of mysticism. One can witness this dynamic at work in her word squares, which do serve a definite analytical purpose. As we have seen in Articulation of Sound Forms in Time, they fail to present coherent narratives, and they fail to provide access to a stable “fictive world.” Instead, Howe seems to “spread […] words and words we can never touch hovering around subconscious life where enunciation is born” (“Ether” 119). She gives us not an enoncé, a statement concerning a defined topic, but rather a model of the process of “enunciation” itself.

     

    Having explored the relation between Howe and Finlay, we have a means for specifying further how Howe conceptualizes this process of “enunciation.” She frequently relies on an implicit metaphor between the page and the ocean. It is possible to say that in her word squares we observe words birthing from an ocean-matrix. But, as Howe’s comments about oceans reveal, this womb is a blank. An emptiness. “Loveless and sleepless the sea” (SWS 42) she cautions us, mere

     

    deep dead waves wher when I wende and wake how far I writ I can not see (L 164)

     

     

    This empty sea cannot, stricto sensu, be “seen.” That is, it contains, and is, nothing, and one cannot see what does not exist. Sight, and sound, can properly be said to belong only on this side of the land/ocean divide, in the realm of history and humanity. The world prior to, or beneath the level of, consciousness is an effect of writing as if such a thing existed, a point Howe makes at the conclusion of sequence Rückenfigur:

     

    Theomimesis divinity message I have loved come veiling Lyrists come veil come lure echo remnant sentence spar (144)

     

     

    Following this logic, the “spars” and “echoes” in the word squares are like “veils” that conceal nothing. They are, however, calculated to give the impression of Someone behind them. They are attempts at “Theomimesis,” at miming an absent God.

     

    When read aright, then, the “timeless place of existence” that Howe claims as the origin of her poetry does indeed turn out to be a “Supreme Fiction”–“fiction” understood in its original Latin sense as “something made.” Her word squares gesture toward an eternity that cannot pre-exist the act of writing or antedate the onset of history. “For me there was no silence before armies” (Europe 9). Jacques Derrida’s musings on the topic of “spacing” in his essay “Différance” can help clarify this point. Spacing, Derrida contends, is at once a spatial and a temporal process. An artificer introduces spaces–introduces emptiness, or “difference”–into a system in order to give it a defined spatial form. But the act of spacing is itself a temporal process, that is, an act. And a viewer necessarily takes in this spatial form in time, that is, by looking from node to node and observing their configuration (Margins 7-9). Derrida would agree with Rosalind Krauss that an array, by organizing space, strives to render time an extrinsic variable and thereby approximate a timeless Form. But Derrida would also go on to say that an array’s dependence on the act and consequences of “spacing” inescapably imports temporality back into its very structure and thus vitiates its aspiration to represent eternity (13).

     

    This deconstructive critique comes naturally to Howe. One of her recurrent themes is the inseparability of space and time.[48] “Concerning a voice through air // it takes space to fold time in feeling,” she writes in a recent essay (“Sorting” 302), and in a review of John Taggart’s work, she praises him for understanding that true poets have “visions of how one might articulate space in an audible way” (“Light in Darkness” 138).[49] The wonderfully ambiguous title of her long poem Articulation of Sound Forms in Time (is “forms” a noun or verb? “sound” an adjective or noun? “in time” as in “just in time”?) can be read as a concise expression of her belief that poetry, “sound forms,” are articulated within history, “in time,” and not outside of it.[50] “Our ears enclose us,” Howe reminds us,[51] and even if we are bent on “the mind’s absolute ideality,” in daily life “stray voices / Stray voices without bodies // Stray sense and sentences // Concerning the historicity of history” will penetrate our contemplation of things timeless (H 54).

     

    Howe’s word squares draw a reader’s attention toward the white space of the page in order (1) to intimate the Void out of which the perceptible world arises and (2) to expose that primordial nothingness as a fraud, or, more precisely, as a “fiction” arising from a certain use of words. For her, the page’s white space is the deathless ocean–the Void/the divine/Language–and the words are like the evanescent sea foam that rides upon it. The messiness of Howe’s word squares is a consequence of her awareness that poetry comes into being in time, that is, in the fallen world. Howe’s word squares all appear at particularly momentous points in her poetry, typically at the beginning or end of a work, or, in the case of The Liberties, when an author-figure is stripped of his or her social identity and confronts the linguistic and phenomenological grounds of selfhood.[52] The word squares mark the limits of the humanly knowable, and they indicate that beyond those limits lies God–if we choose to believe that (S)he exists.

     

    VII. Word Squares and Postlinear Poetry

     

    Surveying contemporary English-language verse, one will occasionally run into word squares in writings by authors other than Howe. Variations on the device appear, for example, in Christian Bök’s Crystallography, Kathleen Fraser’s il cuore, Jorie Graham’s Swarm, Myung Mi Kim’s Dura, Darren Wershler-Henry’s Nicholodeon, and C.D. Wright’s Tremble. Do these poets, too, give us sprays of catachrestic coinages afloat on a page-ocean?[53]

     

    One cannot make that assumption. Take the case of Myung Mi Kim: her long poem Dura is, among other things, a Korean-American’s meditation in seven parts on diasporic identity. The second part, “Measure,” obliquely recounts the Asian origins of paper and moveable type as well as their gradual diffusion westward to Europe. The declaration “A way is open(ed), a hole is made,” precedes a word square:

     

    Introduce single horse turnback

    Introduction ride alone

    (Capital) (fight alone) make a turn (27)

     

     

    The word-spacing here reflects the text’s struggle to speak about one place and time–medieval Korea–using an unrelated and ill-suited language–modern English. The grid-like arrangement of words attempts a compromise by permitting a reader to move through them both left-to-right, top-to-bottom (English) and top-to-bottom, right-to-left (traditional Korean). One “turns back” and “makes a turn” after each line, whether that line is horizontal (English) or vertical (Korean). The price of this compromise is degraded syntax. The words refuse straightforward integration into logical statements. Kim suggests one of the frustrations of bilingualism: a speaker endeavors to “translate” one heritage and its attendant social conventions into phrases intelligible to people for whom those things register as “foreign,” only then to discover the two languages brushing against and deforming each another, producing unexpected, hybrid results.[54]

     

    Today’s postlinear poets do not pursue a unified program, nor do they seek to establish a new, shared formal vocabulary. They work with and against normative reading procedures in their efforts to explore the full range of language’s visual, auditory, and conceptual possibilities. Their projects vary greatly. Howe’s quietism is in dialogue with the ascetic transcendentalism of the 1950s and 60s New York artworld, whereas Kim’s bilingualism belongs very much to the 1990s, a decade when U.S. poetry opened itself to experimental articulations of racial, ethnic, and gender identities.[55] By charting these disparate projects, however, we will gradually produce a topographical map of contemporary visual poetics. The fecundity of the artistry might be daunting, but the results will be correspondingly richer and wilder, unsettled and unsettling.

     

    Notes

     

    I would like to thank the Stanford Humanities Center and the University of Washington’s Royalty Research Fund for making this article possible. I would also like to thank Terry Castle, Bob Fink, Kornelia Freitag, Albert Gelpi, Nicholas Jenkins, Marjorie Perloff, and Susan Schultz.

     

    1. Although Susan Howe claims that the label Language Poet does not apply to her (see Interview with Keller 19-23) she nonetheless published in L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E, the poetics journal from which the movement takes its name, as well as other Language-affiliated periodicals, such as O.blek, Sulfur, and Temblor. She has also consistently appeared in the anthologies that have defined the movement for outsiders, such as Ron Silliman’s In the American Tree and Douglas Messerli’s “Language” Poetries.

     

    2. See Back 3-4 for summary comments on “Howe’s visual experiments” as the “distinguishing mark” and “signature” of her style. See Dworkin for a provocative overview of the subject.

     

    3. See Möckel-Rieke 291 for a rare discussion of Howe’s “ballad” style.

     

    4. See Dworkin for an extended analysis of the “static” and “noise” that Howe produces through her manipulation, superimposition, and violation of found texts.

     

    5. See Back 142-44 for an analysis of the “violence” conveyed by the “radically disrupted and chaotic” pages in Eikon Basilke. For the remainder of this article, I will be using the following abbreviations for Susan Howe’s long poems and works of criticism: ASFT for Articulation of Sound Forms in Time; BM for The Birth-mark; CG for Cabbage Gardens; CCS for Chanting at the Crystal Sea; DP for Defenestration of Prague; EB for A Bibliography of the King’s Book, or, Eikon Basilike; Fed for Federalist 10; H for Heliopathy; HP for Hinge Picture; LTC for Leisure of the Theory Class; L for The Liberties; MED for My Emily Dickinson; MM for Melville’s Marginalia; NCM for The Nonconformist’s Memorial [the long poem, not the collection]; PS for Pythagorean Silence; R for Rückenfigur; SBTR for Scattering as a Behavior Toward Risk; SHDL for Secret History of the Dividing Line; and SWS for Silence Wager Stories.

     

    6. For one possible exception, see the six-by-six word arrays in Robert Duncan’s “The Fire: Passages Thirteen” (Selected Poems 82-87). Howe may know this poem. See Howe, “For Robert Duncan” and “The Difficulties Interview” 17-18.

     

    7. See also e.g. ASFT 12, 14, 15; PS 78, 82-84; L 205-8, 216; and SHDL 89, 116.

     

    8. This preface appears only in the 1990 reprint of ASFT that is on the List of Works Cited. It does not appear in the 1987 version of ASFT published by Awede Press.

     

    9. See e.g. Back 42-44; Perloff, “Collision” 528-29; and Reinfeld 142. Compare McCorkle paragraphs 5-6, 13-16. For other efforts to close read Howe’s word squares, see e.g. Back 21-22, 27, 96-100, and 118-19; Green 86-87 and 99-100; Keller 231-35; and McGann 102.

     

    10. Compare Back 44 on the “multiple and generative landscape” of this word square.

     

    11. Compare Selinger 367 on Howe’s word-grids: “the raw material of a poem yet to be written or all that remains of a piece now decayed.”

     

    12. See Benjamin 150-51 and 153.

     

    13. Swinburne has recently become an important presence in Howe’s work. See “Frame Structures” (12) and “Ether Either” (122; 126-27). See esp. the 1999 long poem The Leisure of the Theory Class, which immediately precedes Rückenfigur in Howe’s book Pierce-Arrow (passim).

     

    14. Compare Back 46 (“tendency to contradict herself, every articulation containing itself and its opposite”).

     

    15. See Mitchell 45-56 for a discussion of “multistable” images such as the Duck-Rabbit.

     

    16. The installation materials are stored in Box 15 of the Susan Howe Papers (MSS0201) at the Mandeville Special Collections Library of the University of California, San Diego. Hereafter I will be citing unpublished materials in the Susan Howe Papers as SHP, followed by their box and (if relevant) folder numbers. For Long Away Lightly, see SHP Box 15, Folder 1. For On the Highest Hill, see Folder 4. For Wind Shift / Frost Smoke see Folder 8. Unfortunately, no dates are provided for individual pieces, and the various materials are unlabeled, rendering many of them mysterious or unidentifiable. Several of the scraps of poetry used in the installation pieces, such as that beginning “on the highest hill of the heart,” also appear in SHP Box 6, Folder 6, with Howe’s earliest poems. In fact, there one can find “Wall 1” and “Wall 2,” poem sequences that either derive entirely from the installation work or represent the installations’ poetic precursors.

     

    17. See esp. SHP Box 15, Folders 2-3 for some of Howe’s meticulous installation instructions.

     

    18. See SHP Box 15, Folder 5 for this photograph.

     

    19. See SHP Box 12 for the working notebook dated 26 April-15 July 1974, in which she declares herself Smithson’s lineal heir.

     

    20. See SHP Box 15, Folder 4.

     

    21. For Smithson’s Ginsberg imitations, see Smithson 315-19.

     

    22. Reinhardt’s “Black Paintings” are notoriously difficult to reproduce. For an example, go to the Guggenheim Museum’s online collection <http://www.guggenheimcollection.org>, search for “Ad Reinhardt,” and enlarge the available image.

     

    23. For samples of Martin’s and Ryman’s work, visit the Guggenheim online collections collection at <http://www.guggenheimcollection.org> and search on the artist’s name. For Martin, see also the online galleries available from the Los Angeles County Museum <http://moca-la.org> and the National Museum of Women in the Arts at <http://www.nmwa.org>.

     

    24. See e.g. DP 89; EB 61-62; L 162, 180; LTC 32; MM 103; NCM 20-21; PS 77; SBTR 70; SHDL 94, 113, and 114.

     

    25. The Awede Press edition of ASFT is unpaginated. When Wesleyan University Press reprinted ASFT, they crammed these two lines into a single page with another lyric (11).

     

    26. For Krauss’s influential account of minimalism, see Passages in Modern Sculpture 198-99, 236-42, and esp. 243-88.

     

    27. In a 1993 interview, Agnes Martin declares herself an abstract expressionist (15) in the “transcendental” mode of Rothko and Newman (13). She says that she has always sympathized with minimalism’s aspiration toward perfection, but intuition and inspiration are necessary to lead one beyond mere mechanical perfection to its “transcendental” corollary (Interview with Sander 13-15).

     

    28. I concede that Reinhardt was an advocate of art in its purity and that he considered any confusion between art and religion to be anathema. Nonetheless, as Krauss points out, “the motif that inescapably emerges” as one contemplates his black paintings “is the Greek cross” (Originality 10). For Howe’s transcendentalist reading of Reinhardt, see “The End of Art” 3-4.

     

    29. Agnes Martin’s paintings reproduce very poorly in digital formats, but for a hint at the dynamic Krauss describes, see the interactive “tour” of the Agnes Martin Gallery available on the web page of the Harwood Museum (Taos, New Mexico): <http://harwoodmuseum.org/gallery4.php>, last accessed 29 January 2003.

     

    30. See the Keller interview for Howe’s cursory recollection of this correspondence (20). For Finlay’s letters to Howe, see SHP Box 1, Folders 4-6.

     

    31. See Bann 55-57. See also Stewart 124, 129-30, and 139.n34. Stewart posits that around 1971 Finlay’s relation to the sea shifted, and that fishing boats gave way to warships in his work (124-25).

     

    31. The original is unpaginated. See esp. the second, third, fifth, sixth, and eighth openings. I have included in the List of Works Cited a recent, readily available translation of Un Coup de dés that respects Mallarmé’s original layout.

     

    33. See Palatella 74-76 for more analysis of Howe’s commentary on Fisherman’s Cross.

     

    34. See E. Joyce, paragraph seven for a comparison between Mallarmé’s Un Coup de dés and Howe’s compositional practice.

     

    35. See for example: ASFT 1, 23, 25, 29, 35, 38; CCS 61, 63, 68; CG 79, 79, 80, 81, 85, 86; DP 88, 96, 100, 101, 103, 117, 124, 135, 146; EB 75, 79; H 43; HP 53, 54, 55; L 158, 164, 168, 172, 173, 174, 187, 196, 198, 199, 213; MM 123, 134, 145, 146, 150; NCM 17, 19, 26, 33; PS 28, 30, 31, 42, 45, 48, 51, 53, 56, 60, 64, 80; R 131, 136; SBTR 66; SHDL 90, 105, 110, 111; and SWS 36, 42.

     

    36. See for example BM 17, 18, 26, 28, 32, 37, 46, 50, 55, 61, 69, 82, 83, 132, 150, 166, 178; “Ether Either” 119, 123; “For Robert Duncan” 54, 55, 57; MED 45, 87, 106, 109; “Since a Dialogue” 172; “Sorting” 297, 308, 311, 319, 320, 326-327, 323, 325, 328, 338, 342; “Where” 4, 11, 12, 18, 19; and “Women” 63, 88.

     

    37. Howe spent her childhood and youth split between the United States and Ireland. See “Ether Either” 112-13 and 118-19. See also a letter by Howe qtd. in Möckel-Rieke 303.n92. And see BM 166 and “Sorting” 320. Ireland in Howe’s work is identified strongly with the ocean and ocean-crossing–see HP 54, L 213, “Sorting” 338 and the first page of WB. For Howe’s discussion of her husband’s love for the ocean and ship-design, see “Sorting” 295-97 and the Keller interview 4-5 and 29.

     

    38. The ocean’s central role in her poetics deserves comparison to that of the wilderness, a related concept upon which critics have frequently commented. See e.g. Back 176-77; Dworkin 399-400; Möckel-Rieke 290-91; Nicholls 589; Palatella 91-92; Schultz paragraph 3; and Vogler 220-23. See Middleton (esp. 87) for a rare statement on the centrality of the ocean in Howe’s work. Compare Reinfeld 126 and 142; and Perloff, “Collision” 518-19.

     

    39. For the violent sea, the realm of history’s nightmare, see BM 61; CCS 63; EB 70; PS 48; DP 100; “For Robert Duncan” 54; L 160, 196; and SHDL 91, 105, 110.

     

    40. For invocations of the sea as a place of origins, see ASFT 1, 35; BM 82; CG 85; DP 88, 101, 123-24; EB 63; H 43; HP 53; L 168, 173, 204, 212; MM 146; NCM 8, 19; PS 53, 60, 80; R 136; “Sorting” 311, 328; and SWS 36, 42.

     

    41. For the sea as a place of peace and silence, see BM 17; CG 86; DP 103; L 199; PS 28, 30, 53; “Sorting” 338; SWS 42. Compare NCM 26 and 33.

     

    42. For the sea as a place of peregrinatio in the medieval sense of sojourning in a fallen world, see ASFT 35, 38; BM 83; CCS 63, 68; CG 81; DP 117; L 158, 164, 168, 173, 174, 213; MED 45; PS 42, 56; SHDL 90, 111; “Sorting” 297, 308, 325. For the sea in its more neutral aspect as a place of drift, see BM 156; DP 117; EB 75; L 195; and SWS 39.

     

    43. For the association between the ocean and death, esp. drowning, see BM 37, 178; CCS 63; CG 79, 86; DP 88; HP 54, 55; L 161, 187, 198; MED 109; EB 79; MM 123, 145, 150; “Where” 18. “To ebb” in Howe is a recurrent verb that calls to mind the ocean in its aspect as a metaphor for death and mortality. See DP 128, 146; L 178, 212.

     

    44. See BM 47, 48, 49, 68, 164; NCM 18; “Difficulties Interview” 17, 21, 24; Falon interview 31, 37; and Keller interview 13, 19, 26-27, 31.

     

    45. See BM 28, 55; HP 46; MM 116; and PS 45.

     

    47. Howe apparently learned of Thoreau’s idea of the “noble mole” from Ed Foster during the course of an interview. See BM 178.

     

    47. See NCM 18 and 30 for poetic moments when Howe explicitly connects “sound” and “perfection.” See also BM 172 and MED 55.

     

    48. According to Ming-Qian Ma, Howe conceives of poetry as taking shape in a “space-time dimension” that permits her poetry to act as a corrective to traditional historiography (“Poetry as History Revised” 719-21). Ma does not specifically connect Howe’s concept of “space-time” to Derrida or to deconstruction, but his argument made it possible for me to make that connection.

     

    49. For other examples of Howe’s habitual synaesthetic confusion of sight and sound see “Ether” 119, “Women” 84, HP 56, and BM 139.

     

    50. See Perloff, “Collision” 524 for the source of this argument. See too McCorkle paragraph 7.

     

    51. See the sixteenth page of Fed. The original is unpaginated.

     

    52. See H 42 (the poem’s beginning); PS 78, 82-84 (the end of the poem); L 216 (the poem’s conclusion); and SHDL 89, 116, and 122 (word squares at the poem’s beginning and end). For an author-figure confronting her (non)existence, see L 204-8 (a section titled “Formation of a Separatist, I”).

     

    53. See Fraser 167-68, Graham 68, and Wright 58. Bök and Wershler-Henry are unpaginated. For Bök, see the section titled “Euclid and His Modern Rivals.” For Wershler-Henry see the unfolding page near the book’s center.

     

    54. My thanks to Grace Ku for pointing me to this passage and helping me navigate the thoroughgoing bilingualism of Kim’s Dura.

     

    55. See Beach 184-87 for his contention that the 1990s saw the “combination of the linguistic and formal energies of the avant-garde or experimental tradition with the transcultural and interpersonal energies of an expanded racial and ethnic context” (185).

    Works Cited

     

    • Back, Rachel Tzvia. Led by Language: The Poetry and Poetics of Susan Howe. Tuscaloosa, AL: U of Alabama P, 2002.
    • Bann, Stephen. Afterword. Honey by the Water. Ian Hamilton Finlay. Los Angeles: Black Sparrow, 1972. 51-57.
    • Benjamin, Walter. Illuminations. New York: Schocken, 1985.
    • Blau DuPlessis, Rachel. “‘Whowe’: On Susan Howe.” The Pink Guitar: Writing as Feminist Practice. New York: Routledge, 1990. 123-39.
    • Bök, Christian. Crystallography. Toronto: Coach House P, 1994.
    • Chave, Anna. “Agnes Martin: ‘Humility, the Beautiful Daughter […]. All of Her Ways Are Empty.’” Haskell 131-53.
    • Derrida, Jacques. Margins of Philosophy. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1982.
    • Duncan, Robert. The Opening of the Field. New York: Grove, 1960.
    • —. Selected Poems. New York: New Directions, 1993.
    • Dworkin, Craig Douglas. “‘Waging Political Babble’: Susan Howe’s Visual Prosody and the Politics of Noise.” Word & Image 12.4 (Oct.-Dec. 1996): 389-405.
    • Finlay, Ian Hamilton. “Acrobats.” Poems to Hear and See. New York: Macmillan, 1971. Unpaginated.
    • Fraser, Kathleen. il cuore: the heart: Selected Poems 1970-1995. Hanover, NH: Wesleyan UP, 1997.
    • Graham, Jorie. Swarm. New York: Ecco, 2000.
    • Frost, Elisabeth. “Susan Howe, Modernism, and Antinomian Tradition.” How2 1.3 (Feb. 2000). 29 January 2003 <http://www.scc.rutgers.edu/however/v1_3_2000/ current/readings/frost.html>.
    • Green, Fiona. “‘Plainly on the Other Side’: Susan Howe’s Recovery.” Contemporary Literature 42.1 (Spr. 2001): 78-101.
    • Guest, Barbara. Seeking Air. Santa Barbara, CA: Black Sparrow, 1978.
    • Haskell, Barbara, ed. Agnes Martin. New York: Whitney Museum of American Art, 1992.
    • Howe, Susan. Articulation of Sound Forms in Time. Howe, Singularities 1-38.
    • —. A Bibliography of the King’s Book or, Eikon Basilike. Howe, Nonconformist’s 45-82.
    • —. The Birth-mark: Unsettling the Wilderness in American Literary History. Hanover, NH: Wesleyan UP, 1993.
    • —. Cabbage Gardens. Howe, Frame Structures 73-86.
    • —. Chanting at the Crystal Sea. Howe, Frame Structures 57-72.
    • —. Defenestration of Prague. Howe, Europe of Trusts 85-146.
    • —. “The Difficulties Interview.” Interview with Tom Beckett. The Difficulties 3.2 (1989): 17-27.
    • —. “The End of Art.” Archives of American Art Journal. 14.4 (1974): 2-7.
    • —. “Ether Either.” Close Listening: Poetry and the Performed Word. Ed. Charles Bernstein. New York: Oxford UP, 1998. 111-27.
    • —. The Europe of Trusts. Los Angeles: Sun & Moon, 1990.
    • —. Federalist 10. [Issued as Abacus 30.] Elmwood, CT: Potes & Poets, 1987.
    • —. “For Robert Duncan.” American Poetry 6.1 (Fall 1988): 54-57.
    • —. “Frame Structures.” 1995. Howe, Frame Structures 1-29.
    • —. Frame Structures: Early Poems 1974-1979. New York: New Directions, 1996.
    • —. “Heliopathy.” Temblor 4 (1986): 42-54.
    • —. Hinge Picture. Howe, Frame Structures 31-56.
    • —. Interview with Lynn Keller. Contemporary Literature 36.1 (Spring 1995): 1-34.
    • —. Interview with Ruth Falon. The Difficulties 3.2 (1989): 28-42.
    • —. Leisure of the Theory Class. Howe, Pierce-Arrow 31-126.
    • —. The Liberties. Howe, Europe of Trusts 147-218.
    • —. “Light in Darkness.” Rev. of Peace on Earth by John Taggart. Hambone 2 (Fall 1982): 135-38.
    • —. Melville’s Marginalia. Howe, Nonconformist’s 83-150.
    • —. My Emily Dickinson. Berkeley: North Atlantic, 1985.
    • —. The Nonconformist’s Memorial [the collection]. New York: New Directions, 1993.
    • —. The Nonconformist’s Memorial [the long poem]. Howe, Nonconformist’s 3-33.
    • —. Pierce-Arrow. New York: New Directions, 1999.
    • —. Pythagorean Silence. Howe, Europe of Trusts 15-84.
    • —. Rückenfigur. Howe, Pierce-Arrow 127-44.
    • —. Scattering as Behavior Toward Risk. Howe, Singularities 61-70.
    • —. Secret History of the Dividing Line. Howe, Frame Structures 87-122.
    • —. Silence Wager Stories. Howe, Nonconformist’s 34-42.
    • —. “Since a Dialogue We Are.” Acts 10 (1989): 166-73.
    • —. Singularities. Hanover, NH: Wesleyan UP, 1990.
    • —. “Sorting Facts; or, Nineteen Ways of Looking at Marker.” Beyond Document: Essays on Nonfiction Film. Ed. Charles Warren. Hanover, NH: Wesleyan UP, 1996. 295-343.
    • —. Thorow. Howe, Singularities 39-59.
    • —. The Western Borders. Willits, CA: Tuumba, 1976.
    • —. “Where Should the Commander Be.” Writing 19 (Nov. 1987): 3-20.
    • —. “Women and Their Effect in the Distance.” Ironwood 28 (Nov. 1986): 58-91.
    • Hutcheon, Linda. A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction. New York: Routledge, 1988.
    • Keller, Lynn. Forms of Expansion: Recent Long Poems by Women. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1997.
    • Kim, Myung Mi. Dura. Los Angeles: Sun and Moon P, 1998.
    • Krauss, Rosalind. “The /Cloud/.” Haskell 155-65.
    • —. The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths. Cambridge, MA: MIT P, 1985.
    • —. Passages in Modern Sculpture. New York: Viking, 1977.
    • Ma, Ming-Qian “Poetry as History Revised: Susan Howe’s ‘Scattering as Behavior Toward Risk.’” American Literary History 6.4 (Winter 1994): 716-37.
    • McCorkle, James. “Prophecy and the Figure of the Reader in Susan Howe’s Articulation of Sound Forms in Time.Postmodern Culture 9.3 (May 1999). 29 January 2003 <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/pmc/v009/9.3mccorkle.html>.
    • Mallarmé, Stéphane. “A Throw of the Dice Never Will Abolish Chance.” [English translation of Un Coup de dés by Mary Ann Caws and Daisy Aldan.] Poems for the Millennium, vol. 1. Eds. Jerome Rothenberg and Pierre Joris. Berkeley: U of California P, 1995. 53-76.
    • Martin, Agnes. Interview with Irving Sandler. July 1993. Agnes Martin: Paintings and Drawings 1977-1991. London: Serpentine Gallery, 1993. 12-15.
    • —. “Selected Writings.” Haskell 9-31.
    • Martin, Stephen-Paul. Open Form and the Feminine Imagination: The Politics of Reading in Twentieth-Century Innovative Writing. Washington, D.C.: Maisonneuve, 1988.
    • McGann, Jerome. Black Riders: The Visible Language of Modernism. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1993.
    • Messerli, Douglas. “Language” Poetries: An Anthology. New York: New Directions, 1987.
    • Middleton, Peter. “On Ice: Julia Kristeva, Susan Howe, and Avant-Garde Poetics.” Contemporary Poetry Meets Modern Theory. Eds. Antony Easthope and John O. Thompson. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991. 81-95.
    • Mitchell, W.J.T. Picture Theory. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1994.
    • Möckel-Rieke, Hannelore. Fiktionen von Natur und Weiblichkeit. Trier, Germany: WVT Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier, 1991.
    • Nicholls, Peter. “Unsettling the Wilderness: Susan Howe and American History.” Contemporary Literature 37.4 (Winter 1996): 586-601.
    • O’Brien, Geoffrey. “Meaningless Relationships: Banging Against the Edge of Language.” Rev. of The L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Book, eds. Bruce Andrews and Charles Bernstein; Code of Signals, ed. Michael Palmer; Resistance by Charles Bernstein; ABC by Ron Silliman; and Defenestration of Prague by Susan Howe. Voice Literary Supplement Apr. 1984: 10-11.
    • —. “Notes While Reading Susan Howe.” Talisman 4 (Spring 1990): 110-11.
    • —. “The Way We Word: Susan Howe Names Names.” Voice Literary Supplement Dec. 1990: 27.
    • Palatella, John. “An End of Abstraction: An Essay on Susan Howe’s Historicism.” Denver Quarterly 29.3 (Winter 1995): 74-97.
    • Perloff, Marjorie. “‘Collision or Collusion with History’: The Narrative Lyric of Susan Howe.” Contemporary Literature 30.4 (Winter 1989): 518-33.
    • —. Poetry On & Off the Page: Essays for Emergent Occasions. Evanston, IL: Northwestern UP, 1998.
    • Reinfeld, Linda. Language Poetry: Writing as Rescue. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State UP, 1992.
    • Schultz, Susan. “Exaggerated History.” Rev. of The Birth-mark and The Nonconformist’s Memorial by Susan Howe. Postmodern Culture 4.2 (Jan. 1994). 29 January 2003 <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/postmodern_culture/v004/4.2r_schultz.html>.
    • Selinger, Eric. “My Susan Howe.” Parnassus 20.1-2 (1995): 359-85.
    • Silliman, Ron, ed. In the American Tree: Language, Realism, Thought. Orono, ME: National Poetry Foundation, 1986.
    • Smithson, Robert. The Collected Writings. Berkeley: U of California P, 1996.
    • Solt, Mary Ellen, ed. Concrete Poetry: A World View. Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1968.
    • Stewart, Susan. “Garden Agon.” Representations 62 (Spring 1998): 111-43.
    • Swinburne, A.C. Tristram of Lyonesse. The Complete Works Vol. 4. London: William Heineman, 1925. 25-168.
    • Vogler, Thomas. “‘Into / The Very of Silence’: Reading Susan Howe.” Hambone 12 (Fall 1995): 220-52.
    • Wershler-Henry, Darren. Nicholodeon: a Book of Lowerglyphs. Toronto: Coach House P, 1997.
    • Wright, C.D. Tremble. Hopewell, NJ: Ecco, 1996.

     

  • Reading Game/Text: EverQuest, Alienation, and Digital Communities

    Eric Hayot
    Department of English
    University of Arizona
    ehayot@u.arizona.edu
     
    Edward Wesp
    Department of English
    University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee
    edwesp@uwm.edu

     

    A lot had to happen between 1915, when the U.S. Supreme Court first ruled that cinema was not “speech” and was thus unprotected by the First Amendment, and 1982, when the Court decided that films were one of the “traditional forms of expression such as books” and ought to be considered “pure speech” (Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm’n).1The 1915 Court justified its decision at least in part through reference to “common-sense,” a category whose later reversal neatly sums up the changed sense of film’s legitimacy as a medium: today the opinion that film is not speech would get its proponent laughed out of the room, even if the film in question were silent.

     

    The history of film’s gradual acceptance as an expressive medium–an acceptance mirrored in the academic reception of film studies over roughly that same period–is worth keeping in mind as one approaches new media today. Because while the issue of film as speech has been settled for film and, on the basis of their similarities, television,2 the issue remains alive for new forms of digital culture, especially video games, whose legal history extends back only twenty years. In the early 1980s, courts reviewing cases involving the zoning and licensing of video game arcades generally agreed that video games were not speech, with one court asserting that “in no sense can it be said that video games are meant to inform. Rather, a video game, like a pinball game, a game of chess, or a game of baseball, is pure entertainment with no informational element” (America’s Best v. New York).3 The comparison to baseball or chess is telling, as is the reference to “information”; the test applied to video games in these early court cases draws explicitly from the early legal history of film, in which the expressiveness of the medium (and thus its ability to “inform” its viewers) was deemed secondary to an “entertainment” value that disqualified it as serious “speech.”

     

    But as video games have become more complex–a complexity enabled by the exponential growth in computer processing power–and as they have moved from arcades to home computers and the Internet, it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish them from other constitutionally protected media. As newer games approach the conditions by which we identify mainstream literature and film–that is, as they begin to express ideas, develop characters, and tell stories4–the claim that they do not “inform” their players seems harder and harder to make.5 Indeed, the difference between Pac-Man and a contemporary, story-driven game featuring Hollywood actors (Christopher Walken appears, for instance, in 1996’s Privateer 2) might well be said to redefine the scope of the entire genre. And the court record reflects this shift in scope. In a 1991 decision, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals wrote that there was no record that might allow it to decide “whether the video games at issue here are simply modern day pinball machines or whether they are more sophisticated presentations involving storyline and plot that convey to the user a significant artistic message protected by the first amendment” (Rothner v. Chicago). In 2001 that same court upheld a ruling that argued that “at least some contemporary video games include protected forms of expression,” even while it held that several of the games “described in the record are relatively inconsequential–perhaps even so inconsequential as to remove the game from the protection of the First Amendment” (American Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick). Although neither decision ultimately settled the question of video games’ expressiveness, their ambivalence seemed promising, and the 1991 decision’s reference to “storyline and plot” offered another dimension by which games might be judged to be “speaking.” Though neither film nor literature is currently held to that standard (books that have neither storyline nor message are still protected by the First Amendment), the demand that video games express either information or a narrative remains, in these decisions as it was in the 1980s, the sine qua non of First Amendment protection.

     

    But if the complication introduced by the Seventh Circuit had seemed to open the door to video games’ eventual acceptance as speech (thereby giving them a trajectory to mirror film’s), a recent decision in U.S. District Court has closed it with a vengeance. In April 2002, Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh issued a judgment in which he declared that any expression or communication “during the playing of a video game is purely inconsequential,” and that video games “have more in common with board games and sports than they do with motion pictures.” The case in question, Interactive Digital Software Association v. St. Louis County, involved an attempt by the St. Louis County Council to restrict access to violent video games. Backed by research showing that playing games incites children to violent play and encourages them to identify with perpetrators of deadly violence–and reacting in part to a series of school shootings, most notably the ones in Littleton, Colorado committed by avid players of violent video games–the Council voted in October 2000 to require parental permission for the sale of video and computer games (and the playing of video games in arcades) rated by the gaming industry’s own system as designed for “mature” audiences. The Interactive Digital Software Association sued, arguing that the ordinance violated the First Amendment and was unconstitutionally broad and vague. In April 2002, Limbaugh rejected all of the IDSA’s arguments, dismissing the case in summary judgment, before it could come to trial.

     

    Drawing on a case history involving both video games and film, Limbaugh’s decision is unequivocal about both the standards it uses to judge video games and the degree to which games measure up to those standards. When deciding whether a new medium qualifies for First Amendment protection, Limbaugh writes, one must find “at least some type of communication of ideas in that medium. It has to be designed to express or inform, and there has to be a likelihood that others will understand that there has been some type of expression.” Limbaugh finds that video games cannot pass even this minimal standard, and goes on to reject the Seventh Circuit’s arguments that some video games might merit First Amendment protection: “The Court has difficulty accepting that some video games do contain expression while others do not. […] Either a ‘medium’ provides sufficient elements of communication and expressiveness to fall under the scope of the First Amendment, or it does not.” Limbaugh later claims that even though the plaintiffs presented him with scripts of video games to suggest that the games contained “extensive plot and character development,” this creative detritus, while itself expressive, did not confer any of that expressiveness on its own final products.

     

    Limbaugh’s decision ultimately to deny First Amendment protection to video games depends, then, on his judgment that their expression is “purely inconsequential,” that whatever gets expressed during the game remains effectively extraneous to the main “work” of the game experience. Strangely enough, although the video games were initially regulated on the basis of their degree of “violence”–which would appear to let expressiveness out of the digital bag6–Limbaugh argues that “‘violence’ does not automatically create expression,” that violent games are no more expressive than other video games just because they are violent. This blanket rejection of the idea that video games might have expressive content allows Limbaugh absolutely to forego the ambivalence of the Seventh Circuit decisions; instead, he classes video games with a group of cultural activities that includes baseball, chess, and bingo: that is, as games.

     

    What the decision thus makes clear is that the status of contemporary video games as a medium effectively hinges on a comparison to two related types of culture: film on one hand, and entertainment activities on the other. And the comparison is definitive: if video games are like film, they are expressive, constitute their own medium, and deserve First Amendment protection (indeed the plaintiffs in the Limbaugh case ask the judge to treat the game medium as “no less expressive than its ‘motion picture counterpart’”). But if video games are like activities (pinball, chess, baseball), they not only are not covered by the First Amendment, but also may not even be a “medium” at all (any more than baseball is a “medium”). The decision therefore clarifies the degree to which status as a “medium” confers a priori on a cultural object the privilege of being assumed to mediate between an expressor of some kind (a person or an idea) and the receiver of that expression; the idea that video games do not “express” is thus tantamount to declaring that they cannot transmit content at all.

     

    One potential response to such an argument–one especially tempting for scholars trained in reading texts–argues insistently for expressiveness. Indeed, much work done recently would insist not only that video games express meaning, but that any number of cultural activities or objects not currently granted First Amendment protection are expressive as well; baseball, one might argue, teaches its viewers or players something about teamwork, about labor-management disputes, about geometries of space, and so on. As literature departments have aggregated more and more of the culture to their own field of study, and as the term “text” has come to mean any expressive (or signifying) surface of the real, the drive towards a consideration of everything as (at least potentially) expressive has left less and less outside the category of meaningfulness.

     

    Something like this defense of the “medium” of video games has been articulated by Wagner James Au, who, writing for Salon, calls Limbaugh’s decision “a disaster for anyone who wants to see games evolve into a medium every bit as culturally relevant as movies or books.” Au argues that Limbaugh’s decision demonstrates the need for a “preemptive attack” from the gaming industry, designed to show that the expressions of ideas in a number of recent video games are “inextricably woven into the experience” of the games themselves. Au ultimately suggests that the video game industry borrow a page from the history of motion pictures, whose Hollywood studios, he writes,

     

    regularly produced a few films every year whose main intent was to dramatize social issues and give their more ambitious artists room to breathe [...]. Imagine what could happen if the game industry followed this example. Successful game publishers could invest a portion of their profits into games conceived with explicit social and artistic goals in mind.

     

     

    Only by effectively making games as much like (serious) films as possible (and thereby treating the game medium as “no less expressive than its ‘motion picture counterpart’”), Au believes, can the game industry secure for its products the kind of legal status and cultural respect that now accrues to film.

     

    Au’s plan may well be the best way to legitimize games as a form of expression, but the impulse to develop a legal solution out of a shift in video game production ought not simply to carry over to video game hermeneutics; that is, while it may be legally useful to make games as much like (serious) films as possible, the legal benefits of such a move ought not to determine in advance the interpretive strategies available to the study of games as cultural objects. Video games are, of course, expressive; they contain narrative elements. But they are not exclusively expressive (in a conventional sense) or narrative.7 Evaluating video games exclusively on the basis of those features–and inviting them to take their seat at the First Amendment table by defining themselves largely in relation to narrativity or expressiveness–ignores the other side of their cultural position: the degree to which video games resemble gaming.

     

    This is where one learns something from the legal case: though Limbaugh is wrong to decide that video games are entirely like other games, his comparison opens up interesting possibilities for anyone wanting to develop a theory of video games as a medium because it suggests that any such theory ought to deal with both sides of video gaming’s cultural history. Though many readers in English departments will be more comfortable with the expressive aspects of games that essentially resemble those of more familiar forms like film or literature (even as they may be suspicious of the right of any popular medium to claim for itself the relevance of those forms), the present seems an opportune time for expanding the range of what literary and cultural study might do with new media.

     

    In a recent essay on this issue, Jesper Juul notes that the “narrative turn of the last 20 years has seen the concept of narrative emerge as a privileged master concept in the description of all aspects of human society and sign-production.” But he goes on to argue that some of the main features of narrative analysis cannot be applied to the study of games without substantial modification. For instance, he writes, though narratives “rely heavily on [the] distance or non-identity between the events and the presentation of these events” (what Christian Metz calls “the time of the signified and the time of the signifier”), any game in which the user can act (by firing a weapon, by kicking a ball, by driving a car) necessarily unites those two times as closely as possible. Even when they present players with narrative experiences, then, video games force an experience of that narrative that differs in vital ways from getting a story through a film or novel.

     

    That video games, even when narrative, present a fundamentally different experience of that narrative’s topology, suggests that Limbaugh’s decision–despite its somewhat primitive notion of expressiveness and the odd logic of its position on “violent” content–might point the way to one possible mode of reading. Caught between entertainment “media” like film and television and entertainment “activities” like baseball and bingo, video games require an evaluation that registers those differences without collapsing them. In what follows we intend, in a reading of the online role-playing game EverQuest, to develop a theory of reading video games that might account for the legal bind in which they find themselves, that might read in and through that bind rather than choosing one side or the other. We would like this approach to EverQuest to illustrate the potential for the apparently irreconcilable elements of video games–their status as game, cultural practice, narrative, or visual text–to be pulled together into a coherent analysis, one that acknowledges both the ways EverQuest is like a game and the ways its “game” elements might lead to a reading of the “expression” of ideas.

     

    EverQuest

     

    EverQuest, the most successful “Massively Multi-Player Online Role-Playing Game,” is one of the most complicated video games available today, involving hundreds of thousands of players, an immense imaginary world, and large, involved fan communities. Designed by Verant Interactive, a subsidiary of Sony Online Entertainment, EverQuest has, since its release in March 1999, set the standard for games of its type; the game boasts more than 430,000 playing (and paying) customers8 spread across forty-eight servers, each of which runs a separate version of the game world for up to approximately 3,000 players at any given time.9 EverQuest‘s visual- and text-based world, a rough descendant of J.R.R. Tolkien’s Middle Earth, allows players to choose an avatar and go out into the world to fight, trade, make friends with other players, and explore the expansive virtual geography.

     

    Because our reading proceeds structurally, we will not be taking on a number of promising approaches to the study of video games, including sociological studies of players, questions of masquerade and identification (when male players play female characters, for instance), individual game sequences or narratives, or the game’s internal economics (the platinum piece, the basic monetary unit in EverQuest, trades on the Internet at a rate of about 1000 to the U.S. dollar). Rather, our approach focuses on the aspects of EverQuest that make it like a “game,” namely the formal structures that frame player experience. These formal structures include the rules of the game that limit and direct players’ actions, the goals and obstacles set out for players, and the strategies and practices adopted by players as they navigate the game’s rules and goals. Like visual and aural conventions of film, the interactive circuit between game and player constitutes a register of meaning independent from narrative content or the conditions of a game’s production. EverQuest‘s rules and goals constitute the core of what defines it as a game, and what establishes the terms by which it participates in the production of cultural meaning.

     

    While online, EverQuest players can freely pursue a wide variety of in-game activities, including casual conversation with other players about characters or places in the game world or the fictive history that provides EverQuest‘s back-story. Nonetheless, the vast majority of the interaction between players on an EverQuest server focuses on issues more specific to the achievement of the game’s basic goals–defeating monsters, acquiring powerful or valuable items, and traversing dangerous territory. Though the pictorial or visual aspects of the game constitute an important part of an EverQuest player’s experience, the vast majority of the detailed information required to succeed in the game and to communicate with others appears in a “text box” on the player’s screen. In that box, players receive automatic updates on their status and the status of the monsters they fight (e.g., “You slash a drakkel dire wolf for 24 points of damage”), but also spend a great deal of time discussing strategy or the game situation with one another, which would, for example, appear as “Braxis tells the group, ‘I need a heal now.’”

     

    This fact in some ways confirms Limbaugh’s argument that video games resemble any other type of game or sport. Limbaugh cites an earlier decision about the lack of “expressive” content in a game of Bingo in which

     

    the court went on to hold that Bingo may involve interaction and communication between runners and participants, but any such communication is "singularly in furtherance of the game; it is totally divorced from a purpose of expressing ideas, impressions, feelings, or information unrelated to the game itself."

     

     

    Limbaugh’s sense that communication can happen solely “in furtherance of the game” grants messages like “I need a heal” a peculiar legal status: they do not count as “speech,” perhaps not even as “expression,” even though they communicate meaning. Inside the world of the game, Limbaugh seems to argue, all speech happens in quotation marks, “divorced,” in his phrase, from any serious, real-world meaning. Though we are essentially arguing against the conclusion Limbaugh and his judicial predecessors draw from this fact (and it is worth noting that much player-to-player communication does not serve so strictly to further the game as in the examples above),10 EverQuest‘s design has a powerful structuring impact on the interaction of the players and their experience of playing the game. But an awareness that players engage in a specialized kind of discourse that derives from the conditions of the game in which they are involved doesn’t close the door on an expressivist argument. While the interactions surrounding games of bridge, soccer, or EverQuest may share a structural similarity in that they are primarily instrumental, the fact that those specialized modes of discourse are so closely tied to their associated games suggests that those discourses can be reasonably distinguished from one another. That is, we do not follow the court’s assumption that communication “singularly in furtherance of the game” is necessarily “divorced from a purpose of expressing ideas, impressions, feelings, or information unrelated to the game itself.” Rather the specificity of the discursive exchange surrounding activities like games carries with it the means by which one can interpret the way a particular game structures the experience of its players: the discursive exchange signifies. By arguing that the game-like elements of EverQuest do not limit or confound those elements of the game that mark it more visibly as a mode of expression, we are in essence arguing that those things that make EverQuest a game can be interpreted, and that in so doing we can develop a more complete understanding of how a video game might in fact express “ideas, impressions, feelings, or information unrelated to the game itself.”

     

    In what follows, then, we focus extensively on the interaction between the rules and practices of the game and the in-game interactions that those structural elements inspire. In the case of EverQuest, the rules of the game emphasize two major ideas that establish the structure of relationships between the players in ways that, as we will argue, centrally shape an understanding of the game’s place as a medium of cultural expression. The first of these ideas involves a push for the integration of the character within local groups, required by virtue of the obstacles EverQuest creates between players and the goals of the game, and by the nature of the game world’s geography and characters–a practice that in the game goes by the term “grouping.” The second involves the production of what EverQuest designers and players term “balance”–an ongoing effort to ensure that all characters of equivalent experience are equally powerful and have the same ability to advance.

    Grouping and Community Formation

     

    The creation of local group identifications within EverQuest represents a particular way of modulating the “massively multiplayer” experience that defines it. While the special appeal of EverQuest (and the cornerstone of its marketing) is the large player population that can interact within the game, much about the structure of the game itself encourages characters to develop a sense of distinction and to feel a part of smaller communities within the game. One of the most basic ways in which this happens derives from the fact that the game is conceived geographically. The action in EverQuest takes place within a virtual geographic space divided into connected but discrete “zones” that are modeled to represent a variety of external and interior locales.11 While players can communicate with players in other zones, it is only with players located near a character in the imagined space of the game world that characters can engage in more complex interactions or work to pursue the goals of the game (that is, defeating enemies, gaining wealth or equipment for one’s character). While the creation of a virtual space for the game may seem like an obvious approach for an interactive game, such a decision carries with it a variety of implications related to the interaction of space and personal interaction.

     

    For instance, when a player creates a new EverQuest character, he or she chooses a “race” for that character (from a variety of Tolkien-esque choices including Elves, Dwarves, and Halflings) that also determines where in the EverQuest world that character will begin play.12 Without assistance from other players, beginning characters will not be able to travel far from their starting locations, so characters tend to spend much of their early careers near their home city in the company of other characters of the same race.13 As a result of the game’s efforts to enforce these geographic limitations, players cannot help but encounter and become familiar early on with characters of their own race near their “home” town, thereby encouraging from the beginning of the player’s experience a sense of locality and distinction within an online community of players defined by its vastness.14

     

    In addition to the effects of the geographic nature of the EverQuest world, the way the game structures its goals directs the characters to form a variety of formal and informal groups in order to progress. At the smallest scale, the design of the game nearly requires that players band together in order to venture into areas of the game world that would be too dangerous to traverse alone, but which players must enter in order to develop their character’s skills and to gain wealth or equipment. It is as a part of these groups that most players engage in the central activities of the game. These groups may be impromptu gatherings of players who are all interested in exploring the same area or pre-planned groups of players who know each other from previous experience in the game or friendships outside EverQuest. Because obtaining power and wealth in EverQuest requires killing monsters, players will gather at known “camps,” and the vast majority of these camps require groups, either by virtue of the relative strength of the monsters that appear there or the rate at which they “spawn” in the game world. This structural encouragement to group increases exponentially as characters become more powerful, with many high-level encounters (at which players may acquire the most powerful and valuable items in the game) requiring the presence not only of one or two groups (each group with a maximum of six people) but of as many as thirty or forty players. These large group endeavors are undertaken by “guilds,” long-standing formal associations of players who agree to cooperate in all manner of in-game activities.

     

    The structure of the game in a variety of ways thus encourages people to find smaller communities, conceived either in response to local proximity within the imagined space of the game or to the difficulty of the challenges the game presents to its players. EverQuest therefore ought to be considered not simply in terms of the numbers of people who are able to play the game together simultaneously, but also by the degree to which those people all experience the game as part of smaller, more local communities. For instance: 100,000 people playing simultaneously will be divided into forty-eight servers with around 2,000 to 3,000 players each, further divided into geographic “zones” containing as many as 100 people, many of whom have organized themselves into groups composed of two to six individuals. While this description does not make EverQuest “about” the creation of local community in the explicit way a film could be, the game’s structure nonetheless leads players to experience a necessity for organization at various scales and gives them the chance to identify that imperative consciously or unconsciously. Though we are attempting to argue for the meaning of games as a medium apart from film, it is an instructive analogy to suggest that if a film can convey an experience of forming local communities through its visual depiction of characters and events, then EverQuest can be said to communicate these concepts through its depiction of such activities on the computer screen and through the processes of actually playing the game of EverQuest, bound by its design and its rules.15 This structural analysis of EverQuest, in which one sees and reads aspects of the game that are like “grouping,” might be thought of therefore as an attempt to develop a “grammar” for the game, an understanding not so much of its specific expressions but rather of the modes through which those expressions articulate themselves.

     

    Balance, Homogeneity, and Alienation

     

    While community formation is an important underlying theme implied by the rules of EverQuest, “game balance” remains the concept most explicitly central to the design of the game’s rules. EverQuest gives players a wide variety of choices in the design of the character they will play in the game. In addition to the aforementioned choice of character race, players assign their characters a “class” or profession (classes include Warriors, Wizards, Rogues, and Druids) that defines the character’s skills. Additionally, players may assign their characters physical and mental attributes, choosing to develop a character that is physically strong, agile, highly intelligent, or some combination of those traits.

     

    Bounding all of the diversity of these decisions, however, is an explicit assurance that each of the individual races and classes “balance” in terms of their effectiveness in the game. While certain combinations may provide a short-term advantage–physically strong races such as Barbarians or Ogres will start the game as particularly effective warriors–the game is designed so that these initial differences can be erased (largely through the purchase of equipment) as the player progresses through the game; in other words, the game effectively promises that no class will, in the long run, outshine its peers in terms of power or ability.

     

    No concept contributes more visibly to the discussion of what EverQuest is and how it should work than the idea of balance; in message board discussions by fans and official communiqués from the Verant Interactive team, “balance” dominates the continued development of the game. Because it is relatively difficult for the creators of EverQuest to predict the effect of specific game rules on the dynamics of game play, EverQuest is designed to be continuously altered and updated. Periodically, players must download updates of the game software that alter the rules of the game in various ways, making certain pieces of equipment more or less powerful, or adding to a class’s ability to perform magic or heal injuries. The overwhelming majority of these changes expressly address the issue of balance, correcting some perceived weakness or strength of a class relative to all others.16

     

    This premise is repeated by the conditions in which the character starts, outside the race’s home city, with the same rudimentary equipment as any other character of the same class, and, like all other new characters, with no money. While it seems reasonable enough to have characters start from the same position, this is in no way mandatory or even conventional for some of the sub-genres from which EverQuest borrows. Characters in other video role-playing games, as well as pen and paper role-playing games like Dungeons & Dragons, can start with much greater differentiation both in terms of physical and mental abilities and in terms of initial wealth, allowing the game to model the advantages of class privilege or genetic predisposition. As the EverQuest player begins play, the pronounced equality of the character’s starting situation translates the structural concept of balance into the played experience of potential or opportunity. Though EverQuest‘s goals are open-ended, its players’ most consistent long-term project requires developing a character’s abilities, enabling the character to explore the game world more extensively and to obtain items that both enhance the character’s powers and serve as a mark of status. In this context, the assurance of balance and the equality of starting condition situate characters within an apparently neutral conception of personal achievement based solely on perseverance and effort.

     

    Through “balance,” then, the game conveys a set of ideas about identity, community, and time that are central to the game’s participation in a broader cultural expression. By effectively creating a situation in which everyone is “equal” in game terms–and by making that situation a stated goal of the software development–the makers of EverQuest establish a framework that echoes an idealized vision of American, and more broadly capitalist, culture; in turn, the player community’s visceral investment in “balance” as a game concept points to the ideological drive towards not simply a form of consumerist “choice” but rather more deeply held ideas about the kind of world players want to “live” and play in.17

     

    The disjunction between the game’s combination of a character system based on idealized equality and the high fantasy setting of the game’s imagined world produces a deep and revealing irony. The latter carries with it a generic tradition of heroic individualism: characters in popular fantasy novels, as well as characters played in sessions of Dungeons & Dragons or single-player computer fantasy role-playing games, are almost inevitably depicted as uniquely heroic. Whether born with some special gift or fated to play a pivotal role in their fictive world, these characters do things that no others could do, confirming their distinction from the ordinary with their dramatic, singular achievements. But in order for EverQuest to allow all of its players the chance to assume this kind of heroic role, it must ensure that all players have the same opportunities for heroism. This is the logic behind the game’s insistence on “balance,” but of course it has the paradoxical effect of eliminating the possibility of uniquely talented, exceptional heroes who might play a one-of-a-kind role in the unfolding of the game world’s history. Thus, the promise of developing one’s character to greater and greater power, defeating ever more powerful enemies and acquiring greater wealth, is always undercut by the knowledge that there are in the world other heroes exactly as powerful as your character and a host of other characters who will be in time.

     

    The drive towards balance and homogeneity means that the only distinction between any two characters in EverQuest can be understood simply as a difference in time. Because of balance, the external limiting factor on a character’s success is the amount of time it is played: today’s brand-new character can, within a year or so, be as powerful as any other character. One of the effects of this structure is to inspire many players to focus intensely on “the furtherance of the game” so as to translate their playing time into as much character advancement as possible–and since advancement is always possible, no structural feature of the game itself offers players a reason to ever stop playing. Understanding the structural relationship between time and game balance emphasizes the usefulness of reading the game elements of EverQuest, since doing so demonstrates one of the ways that the game encourages players to focus on the furtherance of the game in preference to either the development of narrative18 or even the types of less-directed online interaction (via the Web, chat rooms, message boards, and so on) that have garnered more academic attention than have video games themselves. Indeed, as the players interact, kill things, advance their characters, and organize themselves into imagined communities, it may be that they experience little that is narrative at all.

     

    The phrase “imagined communities” belongs, of course, to Benedict Anderson, who uses it to describe the processes that undergird modern nation-formation: that series of cultural and political developments–particularly the development of print capitalism as expressed in the widespread availability of the modern novel and newspapers–that linked disparate individuals to “socioscapes” providing a shared sense of time and space, a “deep, horizontal comradeship” (7).19 While such a concept might have a limited application to the sense in which EverQuest creates online communities of players, we want to bring a more developed version of Anderson’s ideas about community and the socioscape to bear on the way EverQuest structures its players’ relationships to time and identity regardless of the relation of those relationships to actual circumstance outside the game because, as Anderson notes, “communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined” (6).

     

    For Anderson, the time of the imagined community of the nation is “based on a conception of ‘meanwhile,’” a neutral temporality that a citizen might imagine sharing with his or her unseen fellow countrymen. As Anderson writes of two theoretical characters, A and D:

     

    What then actually links A to D? First, that they are embedded in "societies" [...]. These societies are sociological entities of such firm and stable reality that their members (A and D) can even be described as passing each other on the street, without ever becoming acquainted, and still be connected. (25)

     

     

    In the context of a cultural sense of “meanwhile,” citizens can imagine the simultaneous participation of thousands of other unseen citizens; a temporal common ground comes to replace the geographical proximity that united premodern, pre-national communities, as citizens imagine themselves in relation to a series of anonymous others to whom they are tied through affiliation, not filiation proper.

     

    Anderson’s interest in the novel as a cultural form is based on key formal elements of the novel that encourage and illustrate the kind of thinking that makes imagining national community possible. In particular, he argues, the structure of the novel conditions its readers to accept an understanding of social activity as embedded in a free-flowing, neutral temporality that Walter Benjamin describes as “homogenous, empty time.” The novel’s contribution to the cultural development of nationalism thus derives not from its specific plots or characters, but rather from its ability to schematize the relationship between time, space, and community that induces affiliation with anonymous others.

     

    Anderson’s reading of the novel’s formal and temporal structure makes his observations useful for a reading of EverQuest without forcing an equation between computer games and novels. By abstracting the premise of Anderson’s observation, we have a way to pursue a reading of how a game might be able to reflect and shape its culture despite the fact that it lacks those elements–narrative, literary or filmic symbolism, allegory–that seem to be prerequisites for consideration under legal or academic tests of expression. The arrangement of characters, space, and temporality in EverQuest creates a substantive instance of an Andersonian socioscape, the imagined framework of social organization in time and space shared by the fictional narrative and the real world of the reader.20 This is especially important to the way EverQuest structures character development and relationships around time. Because game balance creates a situation in which the primary goal of character development depends almost exclusively on the amount of time played, EverQuest presents its players with “homogeneous, empty time” taken up only by segments of the character’s theoretically infinite progression. Similarly, the distinction between characters of varied levels of power is rendered, in large part, as a difference of time. Especially powerful characters are the object of envy or admiration from other players, but the temporal basis of characters’ power always allows a lower-level character to imagine that he or she could at some future moment be as powerful as any other character on the server. No EverQuest character can be so singled out by fate or circumstance that it could present a unique and unrepeatable model of heroism. Meanwhile, the promise of game balance assures any player with a low-level character that his or her character’s rise to the highest levels of development will be just as easy or difficult as it was for the more powerful character that preceded it. This evokes a temporal frame in which characters are to some extent earlier or later versions of each other, at different points in the same progression.

     

    All of this happens within the temporality of EverQuest‘s “persistent world”–a term used in EverQuest and similar online multiplayer role-playing games to denote the fact that time passes in the game world no matter how many players happen to be online. Thus, during the time that a player is not playing EverQuest, thousands of players are online, exploring areas, gaining virtual wealth, and developing the power of their characters. A player might return after a week’s hiatus to find that another player’s character has in the interim changed considerably, had any number of adventures, and relocated to a distant part of the game world.

     

    We see in this a remarkable manifestation of the temporal logic expressed or implied by certain novels, films, and especially television series in which it seems as if the viewer is stopping in periodically to look at an ongoing timeline of events. While this impression is a narrative illusion in the case of a weekly television series (it would be difficult to argue that the characters in ER are doing anything between the times depicted by the show), in the case of EverQuest it is essentially true that the game-time does keep moving when an individual player is not playing.

     

    EverQuest‘s persistence is thus a temporal persistence, deepening the player’s experience of a temporality so “empty” that it proceeds unaltered by the player’s presence or absence within the game. Indeed, the player knows whether or not he or she is playing, but the game-time of EverQuest does not honor that distinction for any individual player. More than the overwhelming scale of the online population or geographic separation, the temporality of EverQuest offers the player the very real potential of an existential alienation: one’s participation in the game forces one to confront the fact of a virtually global indifference. This is true both while playing the game, as players feel an obligation to use their time to develop their characters, and especially while not playing, as EverQuest players experience a very literal form of alienation, entirely removed from the still-active game world while it continues without them.

     

    Balance and Grouping: the Dialectics of Online Community

     

    This powerful form of alienation is absolutely central to the experience of EverQuest, as it provides the dynamic tension for the game’s push toward grouping. In the context of a fictional construction in which a player is always missing something when not playing, the formation of group-based identities provides the consolation that the player will be missed in return. The importance of limited communities as a resistance to the game’s threat of alienation is thus repeated in the way it modulates the player’s development in the context of game balance.

     

    In the absence of uniquely heroic characters, the formation of smaller communities within EverQuest provides at least partial resistance to the homogenization of identity, as interaction within these groups interrupts both the equality of characters and uninterrupted flow of time that provides the medium of that equality. At the smallest scale, for example, characters in adventuring groups rely heavily on each other’s abilities to defeat enemies and avoid being killed. This provides a context in which players can focus intently on their own activities and accomplishments and provide each other with an audience prepared to appreciate each character’s vital contributions to the group. The structure of the group simultaneously highlights the capabilities and usefulness of its characters and provides a more limited context in which a player can measure his or her character’s abilities. Additionally, as the group discusses its strategies and recalls its successes and failures, the players layer a narrative structure over the time they spend together, shaping and distinguishing a segment of EverQuest‘s otherwise empty time.

     

    One might argue, then, that EverQuest allows its players, indeed encourages them, to seek community in the face of a spatial and above all temporal vastness that threatens their character with dismaying anonymity. But at the same time, it must be noted that the game is as responsible for providing its players with the alienating temporal/spatial structure as it is for providing them with the means by which to resist or avoid it. This opposition or bind between alienation and community is the central effect of the game elements on the players’ experience of EverQuest; that is, the relation between these two fundamental structures in the game establishes, dialectically, both the reason to avoid playing the game (the alienating, temporal vastness of unheroic indifference) and the reason that the game is so compelling to play (the opportunity to overcome that vastness and indifference through community formation).

     

    A more thorough analysis of EverQuest would have to explain why designers engineered this bind at the core of the game, and perhaps more importantly, why players find the experience so compelling. For instance, one could ask whether EverQuest‘s homogenous time is compelling because it creates a bridge for players, matching the in-game experience of social time to players’ sense of time in the world around them, thereby producing a subtle but compelling reality-effect that undergirds the game’s otherwise fantastic setting. Or one could ask whether the representation of an “empty, homogenous” temporal structure exists only to create the dynamic of its resistance through the formation of small communities and whether players accept the threat of alienation because it raises the stakes for the pleasure derived from the formation of community within the game (much in the way that the prospects of loss create the thrill of gambling). In either case, there remain questions as to the tenor of the game’s central tension. Does the formation of community in the face of alienation offer a cultural critique, modeling social practices that offer solutions to the dilemmas of time conceived under national and/or capitalistic cultures? Or does the game’s simulation offer a false confirmation of community, defusing players’ frustration with the very sense of social dislocation in the real world that drives them to find virtual community online?

     

    The goal of this essay is not to answer these specific questions, but to illustrate the way we might read the specificity of the video game form by concentrating on formal elements that distinguish these games from other expressive media. This avoids the temptation to subsume the computer game form under a generalized conception of “texts” or “culture” and accommodates the unexpected paths a game like EverQuest might take to intelligibility.

     

    The fact that EverQuest is played online, over the Internet, clearly makes possible many of the structural qualities (continuous time, for instance) we have been discussing. Our discussion of the game, and of Anderson’s Imagined Communities, has yet to substantially address the implications of EverQuest‘s community formation for theories of citizenship and identity that see the Internet as a potentially revolutionary, or at least historically significant, development in the possibilities of political being. While we are sympathetic to the argument, our reading of EverQuest–arguably one of the most complex forms of interaction on the Internet today–suggests that the political question is complicated. Though some elements of the game may well be pushing players towards new forms of experience and identification, the political value of those forms remains difficult to parse.

     

    In a recent essay published as part of a special section in PMLA on “Mobile Citizens, Media States,” Mark Poster offers a replacement for the term “citizen”–the neologism “netizen,” to denote what he calls “the formative figure in a new kind of political relation, one that shares allegiance to the nation with allegiance to the Internet and to the planetary political spaces it inaugurates” (101). Though we agree with Poster that “certain structural features of the Internet encourage, promote, or at least allow exchanges across national borders” (101)–and believe that EverQuest is one of those features–the kind of political relation EverQuest‘s players are involved in, or rather, the kinds of communities that the game structurally encourages them to form, nonetheless remain readable within a framework that resembles the one Anderson uses for the modern novel (even if, as we have argued, there is no easy formal equivalence between video games and literature). That is, though the communities EverQuest forms (or encourages players to conceive and form) may well be “new,” the difference that newness makes may simply be a difference we already know.

     

    Poster dismisses comparisons between forms, arguing that the difference between the novel and digital media is one of kind, not degree; he writes that “a novel does not constitute subjects in the same manner as a digitized narrative inscribed in the Internet” and adds that “humanists too often diminish the cultural significance of technological innovations” (102). While we have been insisting on the importance of understanding video games (and by extension, the technological innovations that produce them) as culturally significant, our reading of EverQuest suggests that in at least one important instance the innovation in form might not immediately produce utopian forms of citizenship or cultural experience–or rather, that it may not create forms of citizenship that cannot be created by novels or films. By virtue of its position as (one of) the most extensively structured and complex forms of Internet experience, EverQuest seems to present, if nothing else, a substantial obstacle to Poster’s claim that what is “new” about new forms translates into something as radical as “bringing forth […] a humanity adhering not to nature but to machines” (103).

     

    Poster argues that the Internet may introduce “new postnational political forms because of its internal architecture; its new register of time and space; its new relation of human being to machine, of body to mind; its new imaginary; and its new articulation between culture and reality” (103). Certainly EverQuest players experience their communities transnationally and outside traditional forms of the local–there are large numbers of players in Western Europe and in East Asia (especially Japan, Korea, and Hong Kong). But as we have shown, the political forms suggested by the game’s complex register of time and space are, for all that, not necessarily different than ones we already know. Though players may identify with a transnational EverQuest community at the expense of their local political districts, they do so within a space that is busy constituting them in terms that are recognizably political and national themselves (the drive towards “balance” draws, for instance, upon a very clearly American ideology about equality and opportunity, one likely to support bootstrapping over the welfare state). Though the “digitized narrative” and form of EverQuest do not “constitute subjects in the same manner” as a novel, the game nonetheless seems capable of producing political identities and experiences of time and space that resemble those that novels can produce–even as it puts its players in a complex and addictive bind. To say this is not to dismiss the Internet’s potential, nor is it to deny the possibility that new identities might be created there. What the EverQuest example suggests, however, is that liberating possibilities do not inhere in digital forms, but rather develop out of the uses to which they are put.

     

    In a review essay of Poster’s “Digital Networks and Citizenship” published as part of that same PMLA section, N. Katherine Hayles argues for the seriated (rather than absolute) nature and value of technological change and its effects on individual experience, suggesting that there exists a more general “cultural heterogeneity, in which older cultural formations exist side by side with the technologies that are supposedly rendering them obsolete” (119). The word “supposedly” is vital here, as it suggests that the perception of obsolescence is simply an effect of (and coming to terms with) technological change. Obsolescence in such a scenario figures a more general acceptance of and discomfort with the passage of time, the moving of the future into the present, and the present into the past. One might say the same thing about the perception of “newness,” particularly as it gets described as utopian (as is Poster’s view) or dystopian (as in the many critiques of the Internet’s effect on local communities, or on video games’ effect on “genuine” human interaction): it is an effect of coming to terms with technological change that insists on absolute differences between the present and the past and which, in doing so, forgets that such change will probably “take shape as it has in the past, as heterogeneous striations overlapping and interpenetrating areas of innovation and replication” (Hayles 119).21 Cultural change–and political value–articulates itself at different rates, even in the same object.

     

    EverQuest, we have been arguing, is one such object. And its striations are multiple: formally, it juxtaposes a highly visible form of technology as technology with a much older, seemingly non-technological form of entertainment (most elegantly articulated in the divide between video or computer and game); it brings together an emphasis on text-based communication (between the game world and players, and between players themselves) with explicitly filmic codes that allow for viewing in-game action through a number of different “cameras” or “views”; it mediates its broadly transnational community of players through divisions into smaller, local communities defined by either “geographic,” “ethnic,” or goal-oriented affiliations (that is, groups or guilds); it unites seemingly new experiences of both space and time with older notions (as Anderson describes them) of what those experiences ought to mean; and it establishes at its most fundamental structural levels an unresolved tension between the formation of community and a powerful experience of cultural alienation.

     

    As we have suggested all along, only by remaining aware of the productive interactions of these differences (beginning with the basic difference between “film” and “game” at the heart of Interactive Digital v. St. Louis County) does such a reading of EverQuest become possible. This is not to deny the utility or value of other kinds of readings–one could read the game purely in terms of its narratives, or its production of identification, or the sociological makeup of its players (their gender, their race, their class, their sexuality, their politics)–but rather to suggest that converting new media to textual or other analogous forms is not the only way to read. Within the terms laid out by the discipline of English as it currently exists in the American academy, one can take seriously the “game” in “video game” and still claim it as readable within a framework of (con)textual practices with which we are familiar. Such a reading–and readings of cultural practices like games more generally–will always tend towards the ideological, as readers will inevitably want to evaluate how that practice makes people act (in the “real” world) in political terms. But the material here can be read in multiple ways, and one of our goals has been to suggest that the complexity of a game like EverQuest requires a specific and careful analysis (which is why we have left open the question of whether it does “good” or “bad” work, in political terms, to the people who play it). Beyond that general proposition, however, the goal here has been to illustrate through the reading of EverQuest not simply the degree to which it represents and/or shapes the real experience of hundreds of thousands of players, but also to suggest that those representations (and the structures that make them possible) constitute an important site for the articulation and experience of cultural and political value, of broader understandings of communities and what they mean, of time and its relation to individual lives, and of one especially compelling form of alienation and its endlessly present solution. That our structural reading of EverQuest can be turned to make an argument about the uneven development of new media and technologies in the digital age, we take simply as evidence that video games are (and are readable as) culturally significant sites of the production and reception of capital, identity, and their pleasures.

     

    Notes

     

    1. In 1952, the Supreme Court had already written that “it cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a significant medium for the communication of ideas” (Burstyn v. Wilson); the decision, however, extended only limited First Amendment protection to film. Film censorship lasted slightly longer–the last censorship board in the United States closed its doors in 1993, some seventy-seven years after the Supreme Court’s first review of film’s status as film.

     

    2. At least legally–the academic place of television studies is marginal in comparison to film and literature.

     

    3. Other cases include Malden Amusement Co. v. City of Malden (1983); Tommy & Tina, Inc. v. Department of Consumer Affairs, (1983); Kaye v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n (1983); Caswell v. Licensing Comm’n (1983).

     

    4. Avant-garde work in any of these media is excepted from these definitions, as Jesper Juul notes.

     

    5. At some basic level, of course, even the simplest video games express ideas and tell stories: Pac-Man tells the story of a brave circular creature chased by evil ghosts; the arrival of Ms. Pac-Man places the characters of both games within an easily recognizable conventional narrative. This may well be said to express the idea that heterosexual marriage, even for non-humanoid creatures whose major form of existence is to be chased through mazes, is the end-point of all play. But in something like Privateer 2–which includes cut-scenes, dialogue, and a large backstory involving one character’s mysterious parentage–narrative elements are much more visible as such to an “average” reader.

     

    6. The ratings systems used for video games specify that to be considered “violent” the game must include violence done to humans or human-like creatures; in such a scenario Pac-Man is not “violent” even though it involves “eating” ghosts. This seems to require recognizing that video games can have “content,” though Limbaugh disagrees.

     

    7. Neither, for that matter, are books or films.

     

    8. At $12 per month each, EverQuest‘s 430,000 players generate some $62 million in annual revenue.

     

    9. No matter which server a player chooses to play on, they will encounter exactly the same geography and computer-controlled monsters. However, players can only encounter other players who are on that same server.

     

    10. Players tell jokes, discuss their (real-life) social situations, politics, and sports, or gossip about other players in both private discussions and larger groups; none of these furthers the game, strictly conceived. Or, if one adopts a broader view of what a “game” is and does–if one imagines that games exist for social reasons furthered by phatic communication–then such communication does indeed further those purposes. The fact that EverQuest players simply cannot have such discussions unless they are actively within the game world, unless they are connected to the Internet and running the EverQuest software, suggests something of the need to more broadly consider what the “furtherance” of the game means in this case.

     

    11. For instance: cities, open plains, dungeons, mountainous regions, deserts, and the like.

     

    12. Each player is allowed to create up to eight characters to play on any of the EverQuest servers. It is very common for players to alternate their gaming sessions between one or more characters, and players will often create extra characters in order to experience the geography and “culture” of a different region of the game world.

     

    13. Or similar races: home cities for “good” races like dwarves and elves are near each other, but far from home cities of such “evil” races as trolls and ogres. Recent changes in the game’s structure, through an optional software expansion known as “Planes of Power,” have given low-level characters a much higher degree of mobility.

     

    14. The sense of community encouraged by the geographic division of the game space is often very persistent. It is a common for players to recognize each other’s characters from their early days and hail each other as old friends might. Thus, for instance two players playing Wood Elf characters might express a sense of expatriate community upon encountering each other in a distant city that is home to Halflings.

     

    15. To be sure, it is possible to play EverQuest idiosyncratically–refusing to group or communicate with other players, or to otherwise advance a character. One could, of course, do the same in other games; a soccer player who insisted on always heading the ball rather than kicking it might achieve some personal pleasure at the cost of team success. But EverQuest, like soccer, will not reward idiosyncratic players in the game’s terms.

     

    16. It is worth noting that these changes are generally called for by the community of players. In general, players seem to accept the concept of balance enthusiastically; some portion of the agitation for game changes in the name of balance, however, simply conceals lobbying efforts to increase the ability of players’ own preferred character types.

     

    17. In fact, on the face of things, it is not clear why “balance” would be a problem–if warriors are more efficient or fun to play than wizards, a purely consumerist chooser would play a warrior every time. But players on message boards not only articulate their insistence on playing a certain class (combined with a directive to Verant Interactive to balance the class fairly) but also a refusal to play other classes that they feel uncomfortable with. What the players therefore want is the opportunity to make a “choice” that does not have to be based on in-game efficiency but can stem from other (cultural, emotional) factors.

     

    18. The structure of such a feature can be translated, to be sure, into narrative terms (the game is, in some conceptions, a “neverending” story), but it seems to us that such a reading might make the structural importance of “balance” harder rather than easier to see, while a reckoning with EverQuest as a game brings it into relief.

     

    19. As Anderson notes in his preface to the second edition of Imagined Communities, the original edition deals primarily with the problem of time; the second edition (1990) adds a chapter on space and “mapping” (xiv).

     

    20. In an essay offering a revision and extension of Anderson’s “socioscape” designed to remark the degree to which the imagination, in late capitalism, functions as a “social practice,” Arjun Appadurai writes that “the imagination has become […] a form of work […] and a form of negotiation between sites of agency (‘individuals’) and globally defined fields of possibility” (327). In Appadurai’s terms, EverQuest occurs at an especially intense node of the global “mediascape” (it is, after all, owned by Sony) but, by virtue of the kind of world it invites players to spend time in, maps that mediascape onto a landscape involving ideologies, technologies, and the flow of money.

     

    21. Hayles thus insists that striation is not so much a new condition as one which new situations make easier to see. In How We Became Posthuman, Hayles argues against the idea that the digital age is creating an entirely new type of human and destroying the older, Cartesian model, that the “becoming” in question has been ongoing and diachronic rather than the product of any recent, synchronic break in the fabric of human experience (283-91).

     

    Works Cited

     

    • American Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick. 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001).
    • America’s Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York. 536 F. Supp. 170, 173-174 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
    • Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. New York: Verso, 1991.
    • Appadurai, Arjun. “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Economy.” The Post-colonial Studies Reader. Eds. Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin. London: Routledge, 1995. 324-339.
    • Au, Wagner James. “Playing Games With Free Speech.” Salon.com < http://archive.salon.com/tech/feature/2002/05/06/games_as_speech/>. 22 Aug. 2002.
    • Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-503 (1952).
    • Caswell v. Licensing Comm’n. 444 N.E.2d 922 (Mass. 1983).
    • EverQuest. Computer software. Verant Interactive, 1999.
    • Hayles, N. Katherine. How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1999.
    • —-. “The Complexities of Seriation.” PMLA 117:1 (January 2002): 117-21.
    • Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis County. 200 F.Supp.2d 1126 (E.D. Mo. 2002).
    • Juul, Jesper. “Games Telling Stories? A Brief Note on Games and Narratives.” Game Studies 1:1. < http://www.gamestudies.org/0101/juul-gts/>. 22 Aug. 2002.
    • Kaye v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n. 472 A.2d 809 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1983).
    • Malden Amusement Co. v. City of Malden. 582 F. Supp. 297 (D. Mass. 1983).
    • Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm’n. 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915).
    • New York v. Ferber. 458 U.S. 747, 771 (1982).
    • Poster, Mark. “Digital Networks and Citizenship.” PMLA 117:1 (January 2002): 98-103.
    • Tommy & Tina, Inc. v. Department of Consumer Affairs. 459 N.Y.S.2d 220, 227 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff’d on other grounds, 464 N.Y.S.2d 132 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983.
    • Rothner v. Chicago. 929 F.2d 297, 303 (7th Cir. 1991).

     

  • From Advertising to the Avant-Garde: Rethinking the Invention of Collage

    David Banash

    Department of English
    Western Illinois University
    D-Banash@wiu.edu

     

    I see no reason why the artistic world can’t absolutely merge with Madison Avenue

     

    –William S. Burroughs (“Art of Fiction” 29)

     

    Cutting Up Consumer Culture: “Big Daddy”

     

    In her article “The Invention of Collage,” Marjorie Perloff begins the story of collage at what she considers its end, a playful and private work created by her own children. Nancy and Carey Perloff have cut up newspapers and magazines to create a sentimental birthday card for their father, “Big Daddy” (see Figure 1).

     

     
    Figure 1: Nancy and Carey Perloff, Birthday Collage for Daddy
    (Perloff 5)
    (Click image for larger version)

     

    This collage has been made by taking ready-made texts and images and reassembling the fragments into a new composition; in both its private context and its sentimental application, it calls to mind a long tradition of homespun collage creations that date back centuries but are most commonly found in the domestic scrapbooks and novelty creations of thousands of anonymous collagists of the nineteenth century. These works of folk art, rarely displayed and almost always made for private use and pleasure, were created out of whatever material was at hand–photographs, stamps, illustrations and text from books, newspapers, or other printed matter. In “Big Daddy,” according to Perloff, “the pleasure and fun for both the collage makers and for the recipient arise from the realization that items already in print–found objects, as it were–can be spliced and recombined so as to transfer reference from the impersonal to the personal domain” (6). Perloff’s observation is readily confirmed if one remembers at least one version of the Dadaist inspiration for collage at the beginning of the century:

     

    [Raoul Hausmann] asserts that the germ of the idea was planted while he and Hannah Höch were on holiday in the summer of 1918 on the Baltic coast, where they saw in almost every house a framed coloured lithograph with the image of a soldier against a background of barracks. “To make this military memento more personal, a photographic portrait had been stuck on in the place of the head.” (Ades 19)

     

    The family of a soldier pasting in the picture of their own son’s face over the anonymous image on the patriotic, illustrated postcards of the time performs the public-to-private transformation that Perloff identifies in “Big Daddy.” However, the Dadaists saw this as more than a one-way street. The patriotic postcard could not be a more literal expression of ideological interpolation, as the individual is literally inserted into an abstract image of official patriotism. Yet the Dadaists also recognized the power of such cut-and-paste techniques to challenge the very forces which in this case it served.

     

    There is a strange, one-way logic to Perloff’s playful evocation of her own family’s private use of collage. She concludes her survey of collage, which concentrates almost exclusively on avant-garde works, with the following statement:

     

    Indeed, to collage elements from impersonal, external sources–the newspaper, magazines, television, billboards–as did my daughters in their birthday collage is, as it were, to establish continuity between one’s own private universe and the world outside, to make from what is already there something that is one’s own. (43)

     

    While Perloff is certainly right that making such ready-made elements something of one’s own is an important part of the collage impulse, she nonetheless presents it as a process in which the artistic act of appropriation completely transforms the materials that the artist has chosen to cut up. She does not, for instance, suggest that the materials her daughters have chosen are primarily propaganda for an abstract notion of the California Lifestyle: “‘The Best of the Beaches’ is removed from its Sunday Supplement context [. . . ] to poke gentle fun at Daddy’s chauvinistic enthusiasm for the California he had just moved to after years in the cold grey east” (6). Far from being turned into some completely personal artifact, these choices might just as well reveal the way such commercial images and ideologies have penetrated the private, domestic space of the family, even becoming a means to express affection itself through ready-made images. Indeed, what is most striking about “Big Daddy” as a collage is that all of its elements are of purely commercial origins. Perloff’s analysis is of a piece with the critical tendency in discussions of collage to insist, emphatically, that the technique is itself almost a guarantee of a critical position, but in the celebratory images and exclamations of this work such a critical posture is not quite so obvious.

     
    Like critics such as David Antin, Gregory Ulmer, and many others, Perloff locates what is most important about collage, its particular power, in its severing of narrative and syntactic relationships. Unlike traditional modes of narrative and visual art, collage technique is based on radical parataxis. According to Perloff,

     

    collage, even at this rudimentary level [“Big Daddy”], is thus quite unlike traditional modes of discourse, whether verbal or visual. Regarded historically, this “revolution in picture making” as Robert Rosenblum calls it, is the peculiar invention of the first two decades of the twentieth century. (8)

     

    Perloff goes on to identify Picasso and Braque as the real inventors of collage. However, Perloff’s decision to concentrate on the role of these heroic modernists occludes the role of one of the most significant discourses to transform aesthetics and everyday life in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: the mass media in the form of newspapers and advertising. The very materials that the creators of “Big Daddy” cut up were themselves already cut-ups, paratactic assemblages of ready-made materials. As I will argue at length, collage has deep roots in the rise of mass media and commercial culture that both precede and make possible the avant-garde innovations of modernists and postmodernists. It is the ubiquity of the mass media spectacle and the attendant typographical and visual forms and techniques of advertising that provide the context, inspiration, and technical means for the collage culture of the twentieth century, and thus the very genealogy of collage brings with it not only critical possibilities and formal innovations, but also the problems that animate consumer culture as a whole: reification and alienation in the face of the commodities and ideologies of consumer capitalism.

     

    Rethinking Collage

     

    Critics readily recognize collage as one of the most important techniques of the twentieth century. For Katherine Hoffman, “collage may be seen as a quintessential twentieth-century art form with multiple layers and signposts pointing to a variety of forms and realities and to the possibility or suggestion of countless new realities” (1). Even more emphatically, Ulmer argues that “collage is the single most revolutionary formal innovation in artistic representation to occur in our century” (84). This view is echoed by Jochen Schulte-Sasse in his forward to Peter Bürger’s Theory of the Avant-Garde, where he argues that understanding collage is the key to understanding the most important and radical developments of the historical avant-garde of the twentieth century: “the success of any theory of the avant-garde can be measured by how convincingly it can anchor the avant-garde formal principle of the collage and montage” (xxix). Schulte-Sasse’s association of collage with the historical avant-garde and Ulmer’s assertion that collage carries a revolutionary potential both rest on assumptions about the invention of collage itself. However, the story that art historians usually tell is deeply problematic in the context of modernism’s complex relationship to the emergent mass media.

     
    According to most critics, collage was invented by Georges Braque and Pablo Picasso on the eve of World War I. Picasso’s Still Life with Chair Caning (see Figure 2) is usually put forward as the first true collage, as it incorporates a ready-made oilcloth print of chair caning and a frame made out of a rope. In an encyclopedic study entitled Collage, Herta Wescher examines this work closely:

     

    The first time that some component was ever glued into a Cubist painting was early in 1912, when Pablo Picasso inserted a piece of oilcloth into a still life. The design on the oilcloth was an imitation of chair caning, and Picasso painted wooden strips around it to enhance the illusion of a piece of furniture. Behind it, their planes overlapping in typical Cubist fashion, painted glass, pipe, and newspaper, lemon, and other objects are so crammed together that what strikes the eye is the large and otherwise empty insert of oilcloth, without which the small oval picture, painted in subdued, mat colors and framed with twisted cord, would have little interest. (20)

     

    What is most striking about Picasso’s collage, and Wescher’s reading of it, is not its radical incorporation of ready-made materials, but the formalism. After all, the chair caning that most distinguishes this work as a collage is not itself real caning, but only a manufactured reproduction.

     

     
    Figure 2: Pablo Picasso, Still Life with Chair Caning.
    (Click image for larger version)

     

    The other ready-made element, the rope, serves not as an element of the canvas, but as a frame; this function minimalizes its impact as a collaged element of the picture. It is subtle collages such as this that provide the best evidence to substantiate the claims of formalist critics. The formalist view also best reflects the few comments that both Picasso and Braque made on the subject of collage, and it is perhaps best articulated by Clement Greenberg, for whom the actual particulars of the collaged material were beside the point. From his relentlessly formalist perspective, Greenberg argues that by 1912

     

    the process of flattening seemed inexorable, and it became necessary to emphasize the surface still further in order to prevent it from fusing with the illusion. It was for this reason, and no other that I can see, that in September 1912, Braque took the radical and revolutionary step of pasting actual pieces of imitation woodgrain wallpaper to a drawing paper. (71)

     

    Thus, in Greenberg’s account, the abundant use of facet planes in analytic Cubism threatened the mimetic function of the picture plane: “depicted flatness–that is, the facet-planes–had to be kept separate from literal flatness to permit a minimal illusion of three dimensional space to survive between the two” (69). Collage provided the answer, but it did so only to the extent that the pasted elements thematized the flatness of the canvas or paper itself. The function of the collage elements was completely formal, a technical solution to a technical problem.

     

    That the formalist view of Cubist collage is so widespread is in part due to comments made by Picasso and Braque themselves. For instance, in her Life with Picasso, Françoise Gilot records one of Picasso’s frequently reiterated explanations of Cubist collage:

     

    The purpose of papier collé was to give the idea that different textures can enter into composition to become the reality in the painting that competes with the reality in nature. We tried to get rid of trompe l’oeil to find a trompe-l’esprit. We didn’t any longer want to fool the eye; we wanted to fool the mind. The sheet of newspaper was never used to make a newspaper. It was used to become a bottle or something like that. It was never used literally but always as an element displaced from its habitual meaning into another meaning to produce a shock between the usual definition at the point of departure and its new definition at the point of arrival. (77)

     

    In “The Invention of Collage,” Perloff reproduces the essential details of this story, taking Picasso at his word. She gives little attention to the context of advertising, the rise of the mass media, and the relationship of such popular discourses to the work of collage for the Cubists or later practitioners. For Perloff, collage is essentially another technical innovation which allows the artist to call “into question the representability of the sign” (10). Why collage should emerge during the avant-guerre is far from clear.

     

    If for Greenberg collage is merely a self-referential development which thematizes painting itself, for Perloff collage is simply a formalist device of parataxis which completely transforms its material. As she puts it, “the cutting up and fragmenting of the newspapers forces us to see them as compositional rather than referential entities” (12). In both cases, the invention of collage is an affair of artists, and if it did exist as a response to a changing world there is no suggestion that the rise of advertising and the mass media were themselves a major factor in the appearance of collage on the eve of World War I. In part, this typical conclusion has allowed critics to situate the invention of collage as a sui generis revolutionary moment.
    Just as art historians occlude the role of the mass media, Picasso’s disingenuous claims about the role of ready-made elements in Cubist collage should be taken with more than a grain of salt. For instance, there are numerous collages in which the title includes the word “newspaper,” and the banner of the Paris Journal clearly plays the role of newspaper itself. In essence, the banner must be read as an element of the real rupturing the painter’s presentation of an illusionistic imaginary. Consider Picasso’s Table with Bottle, Wineglass and Newspaper from 1912 (see Figure 3). In this simple collage, it is clear that the fragment of the Journal‘s banner is a part neither of the bottle nor the glass. And while the newspaper is represented through a series of broad, straight lines in the background, this fragment of the banner is the newspaper as well, presented not as an illusion but as the thing in itself. There is no shortage of examples of such literal use of ready-made elements. Whatever claims Picasso may want to make about the role of ready-made elements, in this typical case it is clear that the real has entered the picture plane, and it is doing something more than metonymically becoming something else.

     

     
    Figure 3: Pablo Picasso, Table with Bottle, Wineglass and Newspaper.
    (Click image for larger version)

     

    The very presence of the newspaper in these early Cubist collages is itself a clue to the changes in the relationship between art and the emerging mass media, which Christine Poggi explores in her article “Mallarmé, Picasso, and the Newspaper as Commodity.” According to Poggi, the “eruption of the newspaper fragments within the previously homogeneous and pure domain of painting must be interpreted as a critique of Symbolist ideals and, indeed, of Symbolist theories of representation” (180). For Poggi, the newspaper is the very antithesis of the “autonomous, pure realm of art” (180). Through the medium of the newspaper and advertisements, the space of painting is put in conversation with popular culture in the form of “political and social events, serialized romances, scientific discoveries, advertisements of all kinds, the want ads” (180). However, while Poggi and other critics are quick to investigate the ways Picasso uses this material to initiate a conversation about aesthetics, there is still little sense that this was also a conversation with and about popular culture. Indeed, critics have done little to investigate the ways in which the emerging mass media must surely have been part of what prompted the Cubist invention of collage itself.

     
    If, as I am arguing, the rise of the mass media and the discourse of advertising are major influences in the invention of collage, why should critics consistently avoid a thorough investigation of it? The answer is rooted in the ideologies of high art and avant-gardism which coordinate most discussions of modernism. As Renato Poggioli argues in his seminal book The Theory of the Avant-Garde, antagonism is an essential characteristic of almost all avant-garde movements. For Poggioli, antagonism is “certainly the most noticeable and showy avant-garde posture” (30). Antagonism is essential, argues Poggioli, because

     

    on the one hand, the anarchistic state of mind presupposes the individualistic revolt of the “unique’ against society in the largest sense. On the other, it presupposes solidarity within a society in the restricted sense of that word–that is to say, solidarity within the community of rebels and libertarians. (30)

     

    Though many critics have questioned to what extent the historical avant-garde offered any sort of efficacious or legitimate forms of resistance to dominant cultural norms, few will debate that the rhetorical pose of antagonism–understood as critique of norms and the creation of revolutionary alternatives–has in fact been a defining element of the avant-garde in almost all critical appraisals. Insofar as collage is seen as the most characteristic avant-garde technique, it has been associated with just such resistance. In the introduction to his Faces of Modernity: Avant-garde, Decadence, Kitsch, Matei Calinescu describes the oppositional posture associated with all the movements of modernism: “What we have to deal with here is a major cultural shift from a time-honored aesthetics of permanence, based on a belief in an unchanging and transcendent ideal of beauty, to an aesthetics of transitoriness and immanence, whose central values are change and novelty” (3). Calinescu captures the oppositional values of modernity, and his description is telling insofar as it all but outlines an aesthetic based on the principles of collage. Not only is collage the most innovative form of modernism, it is also an aesthetic defined by its use of ephemeral materials presented tel quel within both visual and literary works–in short, an art defined by the transitory and the immanent.

     
    Critics far more invested in the fine art traditions of high modernism tend to focus on the relationship of radical modernism to fine art traditions rather than social norms and practices broadly understood. Yet, even for such formalist critics the idea of antagonism remains a central tenet of their understanding of the modernist movement. For instance, Clement Greenberg characterizes the invention of collage as a critical moment which turns the means of representation against their own illusions, thus forcing the audience to rethink the very notion of painting itself. Formalist critics tend to limit their investigations to the relation of collage to the hermetic discourse of the fine arts, articulating even collage as a technique hostile to artistic traditions, popular culture, and the advertisers of the mass media. Both socially oriented avant-garde theorists and the more narrow scope of fine art formalists find their synthesis in the work of Peter Bürger. Bürger’s Theory of the Avant-garde also tells the orthodox story of the invention of collage, which he subsumes under the broader category of montage: “montage first emerges in connection with cubism, that movement in modern painting which most consciously destroyed the representational system that had prevailed since the Renaissance” (73). Thus Bürger, like other theorists of the avant-garde, situates collage in the familiar position of oppositional technique. However, like other formalists, Bürger sees collage as an affair of the fine arts, designed to simply shock traditionalists, and, according to Bürger, “nothing loses its effectiveness more quickly than shock, it is a unique experience. As a result of repetition, it changes fundamentally” (81). Thus collage, though initially antithetical to both traditional means of representation and popular culture, is finally a dead-end: “the recipient’s attention no longer turns to a meaning of the work that might be grasped by a reading of its constituent elements, but to the principle of construction” (81). For Bürger, collage fails in just the same ways that he feels the entire avant-garde failed, deteriorating into something much too close to a reactionary “commodity aesthetics” (54). Of course Bürger is writing against the more utopian claims that animate the work of earlier theorists of the avant-garde, especially that of Poggioli and Calinescu. The problem for Bürger is not that the avant-garde did little more than adopt the collage means that already dominated consumer aesthetics of advertising, but that the avant-garde’s critique of art was co-opted into advertising. As I hope to show below, Bürger and others have missed the crucial fact that advertising preceded and informed the avant-garde invention of collage.

     
    For formalist critics and more politically committed theorists of the avant-garde alike, collage is always opposed to whatever it is that the critic considers the dominant mode: collage is a critique of traditional modes of pictorial illusion, collage deconstructs the very concept of the sign itself, and collage is always a liberation. In part, it is this temptation that makes collage so important to theorists of the avant-garde. After all, any avant-garde worthy of the name must present itself in a posture that is oppositional to popular culture. Just as the formalists want to protect Picasso’s invention of collage for a revolution in painting by occluding the role of the mass media itself, the theorists of the avant-garde want to guarantee the oppositional posture of collage by separating it from the instrumental means and ends of the rising mass media. To redraw the genealogy of collage, identifying it first and foremost as a technique of the advertising industry and its attendant mass media is to put more traditional ideas about both advertising and the avant-garde into question. It is indeed a troubling move given the Frankfurt School’s critique of mass culture coupled with a more general theoretical tendency to equate formally difficult art with progressive politics. The theory of mass media developed in the work of Horkheimer and Adorno suggests that the culture industry is incapable of producing anything but works in which “the whole and the parts are alike; there is no antithesis and no connection. Their prearranged harmony is a mockery of what had to be striven against in the great bourgeois works of art” (126). This evaluation of the culture industry is all but universal in critical theory, for a formally complex text which provides the space for active reading, or which demands an engaged reading, would seem to be antithetical to the purposes of advertising. For example, consider Roland Barthes’s distinction between readerly and writerly texts. For Barthes, the texts of advertisements and most popular culture fall into the category of the readerly, those texts which can only be consumed. In contrast, and here Barthes certainly has in mind the more formally complex texts of modernism and the avant-garde, the writerly text is that which forces the reader into the position of author, producer, and, by extension, politically engaged and progressive subject. With few exceptions, the above represents the pervasive attitude of criticism and theoretical models toward the text of the advertisement.

     
    To locate the invention of collage solely in the work of Picasso and Braque is to miss the ways in which it was implicated in the complex and ambivalent relations between serious art and the rise of mass media. The fundamental moves of collage techniques, cutting and pasting ready-made materials, chance juxtaposition, and paratactic relationships, were in the air of the avant-guerre. It was in the techniques of advertising, with their reliance on the ready-made and radically abstract forms, that the materials and basic elements of collage first emerged. The first true mass medium of industrialism was the newspaper.[1]

     
    With the rise of the newspaper and other forms of mass media, and especially its saturation by advertising, formally transgressive techniques that had been developing for over two hundred years become ubiquitous in public spaces and discourses. In Advertising Fictions, Jennifer Wicke exhaustively traces the tremendous changes wrought by the development of industrial capitalism and mass media: “the sudden profusion of ads and their creation of social narrative in a newly discontinuous way naturally reshaped the reception of narrativity as a whole” (120). Coextensive with the rise of newspapers, consumerism becomes a new way of reading and representing the world, a method that is based on discontinuity and rupture at a number of levels. Newspapers themselves represent an assemblage of fragments. As for advertisements, Wicke explains that, in the interest of concision and power, “advertising succeeded because it pried loose other languages from their referents, and set them in juxtaposition, creating a new representational system” (120). For Wicke, the narrative world of early advertising is thus coordinated by the same kinds of moves that animate the paretic essence of collage. As advertisers abandoned any respect for notions of aesthetic wholeness and work with the incorporation of fragmented images, names, typography, and hype, they moved beyond the rules governing fine art painting and literature. This formulation is extraordinarily suggestive, for not only does the advertisement work through the violation of aesthetic wholeness and the valorization of the fragment and the image, but there also seems to be something of this process in the very machines and techniques of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Hand in hand with capital, advertising disseminates the radical fragmentation that would define collage throughout the emerging mass media. Certainly, the use of collage in advertising is one of the key moments of a vast and alienating reification. The inflated claims of advertising mobilize the strategies of collage to disguise a product’s lack of use value and, by associating it with som

     

    Advertising and collage both have long histories; they surely encompass the entire nineteenth century. For instance, both private scrapbooks and the carnivalesque chromolithographic advertising posters demonstrate the ways in which private individuals and public businesses transgressed the tightly regulated ideologies and techniques that governed fine art and literature well before the rise of the modernists. While advertising and collage have many antecedents, I would like to demonstrate the ways in which advertising and newspapers were developing disjunctive, paratactic, and progressive modes of representation in the years just before the fine art invention of collage. My purpose is not to claim that these particular images are themselves some pure and more authentic origin of collage, but rather that the context of the avant-garde invention and use of these techniques should be understood in the context of these commercial and popular developments. Too often developments in advertising emphasize the work of fine art painters such as Toulouse-Lautrec, Gustave Mucha, and others who created some of the colorful advertising posters of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. This emphasis supports the idea that advertising and mass media simply co-opted the developments of artists. However, I hope to show that the anonymous illustrators, copywriters, and graphic designers also contributed significantly to the revolutions in representation that would make collage the definitive technique of the twentieth century.

     
    By the 1880s, the process of creating text and illustrations for advertisements could make use of assembly line processes. Newspaper ads, handbills, and posters were created, at least in part, with ready-made elements. In fact, type foundries in Europe and America created not only typefaces, borders, and other decorative elements, but also detailed illustrations of every imaginable object. As Irving Zucker notes, the catalogs of French type foundries “represent a pictorial social history of the affluent French society at the turn of the century” (3) (see Figure 4).

     

     
    Figure 4: Ready-made items from type foundry catalog, circa 1890.
    (Zucker 3)
    (Click image for larger version)

     

    The very existence of such catalogs, with their endless examples of desks, dressers, spoons, jackets, chocolate grinders, drums, tubs, combs, bottles, wrenches, watches, and every other conceivable commodity, allowed graphic designers to operate as conceptual artists. Rather than putting pen to paper, the creator of advertisements need only select the ready-made illustrations, assemble the illustrations with copy created from ready-made fonts, and arrange the disparate elements into the suitable advertisement. In both fin-de-siècle Europe and America, the imaginary world of the illustrated advertisement prefigures the innovations of the Cubists and other avant-gardes.

     

    Johanna Drucker was one of the first critics to challenge formalist and avant-gardist accounts of the invention of collage and other modernist techniques. In The Visible Word: Experimental Typography and Modern Art, 1909-1923, she identifies the importance of advertising to avant-garde sensibilities. According to Drucker, the incorporation of innovative typography into both literary and visual works of the avant-garde was, in large part, made possible by the discourse of advertising, which was revolutionizing the possibilities of representation:

     

    But the most important context for the typographic experimentation, the realm in which these printed artifacts gain their specificity, is in their relation to mainstream publications, including advertising graphics. The graphic arts witnessed the development of typographic forms to accommodate the burgeoning needs of the advertising industry. In tandem with the increased production of consumer goods resulting from industrial capitalism, the advertising industry provoked production of an unprecedented variety of typographic means. These had been fully exploited by compositors stretching to invent ways of catching the attention of the reading public, and the forms of graphic design which would become hallmark elements of avant-garde typography were already fully in place in advertising and commercial work by the end of the nineteenth century. (3)

     

    Drucker goes on to offer a comprehensive series of examples of commercial typography which anticipates, and indeed makes possible, the innovative typography usually attributed to the avant-garde work of the Cubists, Futurists, and Dadaists. Indeed, she identifies in commercial typography the initial impulses that would later remake the very look of modernism in all its forms. Just as typography was being revolutionized by advertising, so advertising contributed to a new approach to images and their relationship to traditional, illusionistic painting. Drucker’s analysis is supported by Arthur Cohen in his article “The Typographic Revolution.” According to Cohen, developments of innovative and paratactic typography such as Marinetti’s “Words in Freedom” is made possible against a horizon of “the placard, the sandwich man, the poster, the sign, the advertisement, the leaflet, the broadside, prospectus, prier d’inserer, ticket, handbill.” As Cohen has it, “typographic novelty began in the marketplace” (76).

     

    The most ambitious and rigorous investigation of the relationships among Cubism, other emerging modernisms, and the mass media is Art et Publicité 1890-1990, an exhibition presented by Le Centre Georges Pompidou in 1990. Focusing on the relationship between Cubism and advertising, Pierre Daix argues that “the increasingly marked intrusion of advertising in the visual field of city dwellers [. . . ] created a reflection in painting” (136). The overwhelming presence of advertising images and the rise of posters are thus, for Daix, a major influence on the modernist rethinking of both the formal constraints of painting, and the relationship between fine art and commercial culture. Taking the cue from the abstract and conceptual images of advertising, artists began to see that “the space of painting was no longer a corollary of illusion but an autonomous field” (137). In a fascinating observation, which Daix himself does little to develop, he notes that advertising’s technical developments were part of “the reorganization of graphic space indispensable for the diffusion of commercial messages” (136). In short, the rise of advertising changed the formal constraints of picture making, introducing radical elements of abstraction and fragmentation. Take for instance a series of ads which appeared in the Paris newspaper Le Journal on December 10th, 11th, and 12th, 1900 (see Figure 5). The ad itself is for a serialized novel by Daniel Lesueur entitled L’Honneur d’une Femme. Mimicking the serialization of the novel, the complete ad appears as a series of installments over the course of several days. However, what is striking is that in the first ad, fully two thirds of the picture remains as empty space, the askew slogan in the lower right merely assuring us that the rest will eventually appear. The ad presents itself to us as an autonomous, abstract space that might contain anything. The necessity of the advertisement to sell the novel results in a strikingly innovative use of space and images.

     

     

     

     

     

     
    Figure 5: A serial ad appearing in Le Journal, 1900.
    (Click image for larger version)

     

    There is more to the series than the fact that it highlights the growing autonomy of advertising from fine art conventions. This particular ad also highlights the increasingly anti-mimetic and fragmentary tendencies in mass media advertising in the years just before the Cubist revolution. While the major scene in the ad depicts a duel between two rival lovers, at the top of the ad there appears a small portrait of the beloved. There is no extra frame placed around this insert, and its presentation suggests nothing so much as a collage. Taken as a whole, this series of ads confirms that the conjunction of images, words, and space in advertisements need make no unified sense: anything might appear in any form (that is, the insert of the picture or the askew slogan assuring us there is more to come) without respect to traditional conventions of representation.

     

    Perhaps just as striking is the tension between the content of the ad, or more properly its product, and the ad itself. Where the novel is an utterly traditional work of art, the advertisement which sells it could not be more modern. In short, the progressive and fragmentary technique of the advertisement is in the service of the traditional. Even the most casual observers of fin-de-siècle and early twentieth-century newspapers and illustrated magazines cannot help but notice this tension. While the advertised novel will dutifully follow the conventions of mimeticism established over the previous two hundred years, the ad itself dispenses with concerns for verisimilitude. Other examples of these techniques and tendencies are not difficult to find.

     
    Consider Le Figaro Illustré, a deluxe, folio-sized illustrated magazine. The content itself consists of photographs, lavish engravings, and lithographs in both black and white and color. Throughout, the featured pictures are often reproductions of old masterworks, or they are newer paintings that follow conventional modes of representation which do not significantly differ from those developed in the Renaissance. The presentation of these lavish features is marked by a thoroughly bourgeois devotion to the ideals of fine art in tasteful arrangements. However, the back pages are filled with ads that abandon any and all of these conventions, frequently using impossible perspectives, abstractions, and what can only be described as cut-and-paste techniques. For instance, take an advertisement for the Charron automobile from 1910 (see Figure 6).

     

     
    Figure 6: Charron advertisement
    (Click image for larger version)

     

    Here, the advertiser has purchased a half-page ad, which in this folio format occupies close to 10×8 inches of space. Yet for the most part the ad remains a blank field of white with a small image of the car in the top right-hand corner and the name of the company occupying the lower left. This ad emphasizes the radically abstract nature of space used in advertising. The car itself exists in a seeming nowhere, requiring no further contextualization. It floats in the autonomous space of the ad, a commodity ripped away from any suggestion of a more complex socio-political situation. This strongly suggests the fragmentation that would later be developed for more immediately political ends by the Dadaists and other collagists. This decontextualization further suggests that the image of the car itself was ready-made previous to the ad. There is nothing at all to suggest that it was created for this specific ad, and it might just as well appear in another ad. Lurking in ads such as this one is the context that must be accounted for in any appraisal of modernist collage practices. The same analysis might just as well apply to a full-page ad for Waring’s furniture published in the same issue of Le Figaro Illustré(see Figure 7).

     

     
    Figure 7: Warings’ Furniture advertisement
    (Click image for larger version)

     

    Here a series of tables occupies the full page. However, these tables too have no context, except perhaps one another. However, even more striking, the images that represent the tables were certainly individual to begin with. The graphic designer simply took the ready-mades and arranged them in the space of the ad. In short, here is the assemblage, the cutting and pasting so characteristic of collage itself.

     

    This process of cutting and pasting is further emphasized in another ad in Le Figaro Illustré for High-Life Tailor (see Figure 8).

     

     
    Figure 8: High Life Tailor advertisement
    (Click for larger version)

     

    In this ad, the image of a mountain top has been combined with the image of a man in the stylish overcoat. However, there is not even an attempt to place the model on the mountain in any way that would make illusionistic sense. To begin with, the relationship of perspectives between the model and the mountain is one of impossibility. Quite simply, the model’s feet have no ground beneath them. Both images are brought together as autonomous fragments. There is no question that the model is not supposed to be standing on an actual mountain. As if to emphasize this very point, the engraving of the model is surrounded by a halo that strongly suggests that it was simply cut from another page and placed on top of the ready-made mountain. The ad itself all but begs its reader to take it as a collage. The many violations of conventional representationality do however make a certain kind of sense. After all, this is not an ad for what one might expect to be wearing on the top of a mountain, but for the fashionable dress of the urban bourgeois gentleman. The mountain itself has become a metaphor for whatever the viewer aspires to–class status, masculinity, etc. As such, the man and the mountain need only come together conceptually; there is no need for some faithful, mimetic contextualization. In fact, that more traditional sort of representation might even undercut the conceptual connections the ad makes. However, in the service of making this point, the ad has done so through radical fragmentation and parataxis. While the ad itself doesn’t use this technique to make a political point, it nonetheless makes the technique a part of a public mediascape.

     

    The technique of bringing together disparate images and texts into an abstract field is a staple of advertising that predates the avant-garde significantly. Consider the American Writing Machine Company’s 1894 advertisement (see Figure 9).

     

     
    Figure 9: American Writing Machine Company advertisement
    (Sutphen 105)

    (Click image for larger version)

     

    There are three elements to this text: typewriter, text, and a figure representing Mercury. Clearly the company is attempting to associate its product with the god Mercury, the divine messenger. Yet what is amazing in this simple and typical advertisement is how it articulates with the norms of fine art. The figure of Mercury and the typewriter occupy an abstract plane, a virtual nowhere. There is no attempt to represent these two elements in any sort of mimetic or organic place. They float as independent fragments drawn together simply by the needs of the advertisement to communicate its message. What I want to emphasize here is the absolute abstraction, fragmentation, and unreality of the ad. The very plane of the ad is a nowhere in which any elements might appear since there is no larger mimetic logic or necessity to guarantee the picture plane. Rather like a Wonderland or the space of a dream, there can be no expectation that these elements will make any consistent representational sense. They must be read as the fragmented elements of a radical metonomy. The typography, which makes spatial sense only in relation to the reader, further emphasizes this point. What this ad shows so well is the need of advertisements to associate incongruous elements. The typewriter must be made more appealing; it might become memorable and desirable through its association with the god. Similarly, the economy of the ad is coordinated by a need to disguise limited or questionable use value and emphasize the most questionable kinds of exchange values or cultural capital. It seems as if the fame of the commodity is more important than the thing itself. The needs of advertisers move representation away from mimesis and toward the creation of a new kind of representation that has more in common with dream texts and dream-logic, the cut-and-paste associations of fragmented images that define collage practices.

     

    The sense of parataxis, the feeling and logic of collage, is further underscored in the presentation of multiple ads on a single page. In both the newspapers and illustrated magazines of the period, most advertisements were kept together in discrete sections. Thus ads for the most disparate products, created with vastly different techniques, occupy adjacent space with no regard for their obvious differences. Simply the fact that they are ads seems to provide a plane of equivalence. Consider a typical page from the advertising section of Le Figaro Illustré (see Figure 10).

     

     
    Figure 10: A full page of ads from Le Figaro Illustré 246 (Sept. 1910)
    (Click image for larger version)

     

    On a single page the reader is presented with ads for a water sterilizer, a psychic, an automobile engine alternator, perfume, a bowling alley. The ads themselves range from the completely typographic to those which incorporate engravings, lithographs, photographs, or a combination of these elements. At the level of the page, each ad seems to present itself as a ready-made element in its own right, assuming strange and unexpected relationships with the other ads on the page. As Christine Poggi has pointed out, Mallarmé attacked the newspaper as a degraded and degrading form precisely for such irrational juxtaposition and equivalence. Indeed, Mallarmé had reason for such a reaction, for collage presentation is not at all unusual in advertising. In his essay “The Book as Spiritual Instrument,” he attacks the random juxtaposition of elements that defines the form and could equally apply to the random groups of ads in illustrated magazines or billboards on a street. The fault, as Mallarmé makes clear, lies with the technical developments of printing:

     

    Every discovery made by printers has hitherto been absorbed in the most elementary fashion by the newspaper, and can be summed up in the word: Press. the result has been simply a plain sheet of paper upon which a flow of words is printed in the most unrefined manner. The immediacy of this system (which preceded the production of books) has undeniable advantages for the writer; with its endless line of posters and proof sheets it makes for improvisation. We have, in other words, a “daily paper.” But who, then, can make the gradual discovery of the meaning of this format, or even of a sort of popular fairyland charm about it? [. . . ] The newspaper with its full sheet on display makes improper use of that is it makes good packing paper. (??)

     

    Mallarmé opposes the random, simultaneous play of surfaces that define the newspaper to the mysterious depths of the book, which he calls “that divine and intricate organism” (28).

     

    The radical differences between traditional fine-art painting and advertising, or between the careful and ordered layout of the book and the radical columns of the newspaper, suggest that many of the most celebrated techniques of the avant-garde were already a part of the growing mass media, emergent elements that were present to some degree for some two hundred years. It should come as no surprise that the newspaper is the primary material of almost every twentieth-century invention of collage. For instance, consider its importance to Tristan Tzara. Tzara was fascinated with newspapers, and angered André Breton by reading from one as a provocation at an early Littérature Friday when he first came to Paris. Tzara was also profoundly conscious of the role of newspapers in creating realities, and he employed clipping services the world over to send him every mention of Dada in any paper. Just as innovative typography and paratactic juxtaposition provided the Cubists and the Futurists with collage materials, Tzara all but inaugurated the practice of literary collage with his famous newspaper recipe. In his “Manifesto on Feeble and Bitter Love,” Tzara offers the following instructions to the would-be Dadaist:

     

    To make a dadaist poem
    Take a newspaper.
    Take a pair of scissors.
    Choose an article as long as you are planning to make your poem.
    Cut out the article.
    Then cut out each of the words that make up this article and put them in a bag.
    Shake it gently.
    Then take out the scraps one after another in the order in which they left the bag.
    Copy conscientiously.
    The poem will be like you. And here you are a writer, infinitely original and endowed with a sensibility that is charming beyond the understanding of the vulgar. (92)

     

    The implications of Tzara’s collage poems are explained by Rudolf Kuenzli:

     

    By literally cutting the grid of semantic connections Tzara liberates the words and forms with them an arbitrary collage in which the signifying aspect of the sign is stressed. The function of these liberated signs seems to be a metasemiotic one: to point out that the daily historiography of newspapers, their reproduction of the state of the world consists of arbitrary cultural signs which can only produce illusions. (59)

     

    Kuenzli emphasizes the critical function of Tzara’s uses of collage as a technique to deconstruct the truth claims of journalism. From Kuenzli’s perspective, Tzara is cutting through the ideology of journalism as a reflection of the true state of the world. This is certainly the critical target of Tzara’s recipe, but to articulate it as such does not acknowledge that Tzara’s operation is taking advantage of the form of the paper itself. The newspaper is already a paratactic, random assemblage of elements. Cutting up the newspaper simply brings this formal aspect of it into extreme relief, in essence mobilizing the form against the content. Tzara’s recipe is thus less a radical departure from the form of mass media than a tactic which takes advantage of it. Rather than cutting up a monolithic form, Tzara’s collage tactic reminds us that a newspaper is a fragmented and intertextual work from the beginnning. The heroic story of the avant-garde suggests that the mass media co-opts the innovations of the outsider artist, but careful attention to these forms suggests a more complicated dialectic in which avant-garde artists like Tzara recognize potentials emerging in these forms and emphasize them in new, extreme, or unexpected modes.

     

    William S. Burroughs: The Subversive Ad Man

     

    William S. Burroughs is arguably the most innovative and influential collage artist of the postwar period. Though Burroughs is best known for his literary collages, throughout the 1960s he developed collage techniques in a variety of media, including film, audiotape, and less well-known visual assemblages composed of found mass-media elements including newspapers, advertisements, photographs, and other fragments of media culture. Throughout this period, Burroughs believed that collage techniques held incredible powers, which he described in both scientific and supernatural terms. He believed that collage techniques held tactical abilities to diagnose and disrupt the ideological functions of the mass media, as well as supernatural potentials for communicating with the dead. In The Third Mind he writes, “cut the word lines and see how they fall. Shakespeare Rimbaud live in their words. Cut the word lines and you will hear their voices. Cut-ups often come through as code messages with special meaning for the cutter. Table tapping? Perhaps” (32). Indeed, Burroughs became so convinced of the powers of cut-up techniques that he would slice and rearrange letters from his friends and associates, close reading the results to ascertain just who they might be working for or what they really meant.[2] Asked if he believed that cut-ups could uncover subliminal meanings, Burroughs replied that “you’ll find this when you cut-up political speeches. Here, quite often, you’ll find that some of the real meanings will emerge. And you’ll also find that the politician usually means the exact opposite of what he’s saying” (qtd. in Lotringer 262). In The Electronic Revolution, Burroughs recommends the use of collage techniques to effect material resistance to government powers by starting riots, disrupting official ideologies, and creating ex niliho a variety of events, from the assassination of leaders to revolutions in consciousness: “so stir in news stories, TV plays, stock market quotations, adverts and put the altered mutter line out on the streets” (8). Burroughs’s emphasis on collage as a form of political resistance aligns him with the projects of this historical avant-garde. However, where these more militantly organized movements had an interest in drawing clearer rhetorical lines between their work and the popular media, Burroughs was consistently and unflinchingly frank about his complicated relationship to mass media.

     
    Burroughs’s interest in collage was inspired by his collaboration with the artist Brion Gysin. Gysin, primarily a painter, had been experimenting with the use of calligraphy as the basis for a new style of painting that emphasized the materiality of language. In 1959, while living in Paris with Burroughs at the Beat Hotel, Gysin rediscovered the collage techniques of the historical avant-garde. On a September afternoon, Gysin was alone in his room working on his drawings:

     

    While cutting a mount for a drawing in room #15, I sliced through a pile of newspapers with my Stanley blade and thought of what I had said to Burroughs some six months earlier about the necessity for turning painters’ techniques directly into writing. I picked up the raw words and began to piece together texts that later appeared as “First Cut-Ups” in “Minutes to Go.” At the time I thought them hilariously funny and hysterically meaningful. I laughed so hard my neighbors thought I’d flipped. I hope you may discover this unusual pleasure for yourselves–this short lived but unique intoxication. Cut up this page you are reading and see what happens. See what I say as well as hear it. (Burroughs and Gysin 44)

     

    Gysin’s account, frequently retold by everyone from Allen Ginsberg to Genesis P-Orridge, has become a kind of myth about the origins of postmodernism itself. Once again, it is the newspaper, this most ubiquitous form of mass media, that provides the initial example and inspiration for a fundamental avant-garde technique. Like Picasso, Tzara, and Breton, Gysin had found in the material of newspapers a powerful means to reinvent public discourses, transform and critique ideology, and ultimately to transform reality. However, the cut-ups produced by these methods depended in no small part on the very same chance techniques that were at work structurally in the layout of any newspaper, illustrated magazine, or advertisement. Rather than inventing something entirely new, Gysin was more precisely actualizing potentials in the medium that were already there. Burroughs himself makes this point as he demonstrates one way to produce a cut-up literary collage:

     

    Now for example, if I wanted to make a cut-up of this (picking up a copy of The Nation), there are many ways I could do it. I could read cross-column. I could say: “Today’s men’s nerves surround us. Each technological extension gone outside is electrical involves as act of collective environment. The human nervous system itself can be reprogrammed with all its private and social values because it is content. He programs logically as readily as any radio net is swallowed by the new environment. The sensory order.” You find that it often makes quite as much sense as the original [. . . ] . Somebody is reading a newspaper, and his eye follows the column in the proper Aristotelian manner, one idea and sentence at a time. But subliminally he is reading the columns on either side and is aware of the person sitting next to him. That’s a cut-up. (Burroughs and Gysin 4)

     

    Burroughs makes explicit the random structure of newspaper pages that so vexed Mallarmé. However, Burroughs was a good deal more sanguine about the role and possibilities of mass media than many other artists and critics both before and after him.

     

    Like other intellectuals of the early 1960s, Burroughs had a complex attitude toward the media environment that Guy Debord would describe as the spectacle. Indeed, Debord and Burroughs shared a similar analysis of the media, as well as a belief in the power of collage to transform consciousness. However, unlike Debord and most Marxist intellectuals, Burroughs credits the media as a progressive force favorably transforming everyday life, and throughout the 1960s and 1970s he frequently made comments about the liberatory possibilities of mass media: “the media are really accessible to everyone. People talk about establishment media, but the establishment itself would like to suppress the media altogether” (qtd. in Lotringer 262). In 1972 Burrroughs went so far as to credit the social transformations of the 1960s to technologies such as television: “a real revolution would have to involve a total change in consciousness, using television and other media that have been responsible for most of the evolution in the last ten years” (qtd. in Lotringer 133). For Burroughs, “establishment” power meant the rigid and repressive forces of inherited wealth, religion, and unchecked governmental power, and he believed that in comparison commercial mass media held a tremendous possibility for resisting such forces. He attributes the key social changes of the 1960s to sitting in front of televisions rather than to sit-ins. In this, Burroughs is most typically postmodern in his insistence that the social transformations are more a matter of media than muscle. In a 1970 interview, he forcefully articulates his position:

     

    A great deal of revolutionary tactics I see now are really 19th century tactics. People think in terms of small arms and barricades, in terms of bombing police stations and post offices like the IRA of 1916. What I’m taking about in The Job, and in this treatise [The Electronic Revolution] is bringing the revolution into the 20th century which includes, above all, the use of mass media. That’s where the real battle will be fought. (qtd. in Lotringer 150)

     

    Burroughs would maintain that even mainstream media had an important role in progressive social transformations throughout his life. In 1983, Burroughs could confidently proclaim the success of the media:

     

    The past 40 years has seen a worldwide revolution without precedent owing to the mass media which has cursed and blessed us with immediate worldwide communication. Everything that happens anywhere now happens everywhere on the TV screen. I am old enough to remember when the idea that Gays, Hispanics, and Blacks had any rights at all was simply absurd. A Black was a nigger, a Hispanic was a spic and a Gay was a fucking queer. And that was that. Tremendous progress has been made in leading ordinary people to confront these issues which now crop up in soap operas. Gay and junky are household words. Believe me, they were not household words 40 years ago. (qtd. in Lotringer 588)

     

    Burroughs’s critique of repression, and especially his attacks against the establishment in the form of big business (i.e. Coca-Cola, etc. in Nova Express) coexist with a strange attraction to the darker side of advertising. One of Burroughs’s short-lived jobs after graduating from college was as an ad copywriter, and he frequently mentioned Ivy Lee, his maternal uncle, who worked as a public relations agent for both the Rockefellers and, briefly, for Adolf Hitler. It is not difficult to find examples of Burroughs commenting on the beauty of advertisements, and in one surprising example, imagining himself in the role of literary ad man. Speaking about J. Paul Getty’s rather dull autobiography, Burroughs suggests that he might have been hired to do a better job for the tycoon, and this prompts him to imagine rather accurately the future of art and advertising:

     

    Well, yes, I wouldn’t mind doing that sort of job myself. I’d like to take somebody like Getty and try to find an image for him that would be of some interest. If Getty wants to build an image, why doesn’t he hire a first-class writer to write his story? For that matter, advertising has a long way to go. I’d like to see a story by Norman Mailer or John O’Hara which just makes some mention of a product, say Southern Comfort. I can see the O’Hara story. It would be about someone who went into a bar and asked for Southern Comfort; they didn’t have it, and he gets in to a long stupid argument with the bartender. It shouldn’t be obtrusive; the story must be interesting in itself so that people read this just as they read any story in Playboy, and Southern Comfort would be guaranteed that people will look at that advertisement for a certain number of minutes. You see what I mean? Now, there are many other ideas; you could have serialized comic strips, serial stories. Well, all we have to do is have James Bond smoking a certain brand of cigarettes. (“Art of Fiction” 39)

     

    Burroughs’s sympathy for advertising is not generally mentioned in critical accounts of his work. However, he was given to exaggerated statements about it. In the same interview, he goes on to say

     

    I see no reason why the artistic world can’t absolutely merge with Madison Avenue. Pop art is a move in that direction. Why can’t we have advertisements with beautiful words and beautiful images? Already some of the very beautiful color photography appears in whisky ads, I notice. Science will also discover for us how association blocks actually form. (“Art of Fiction” 29)

     

    It is no coincidence that Burroughs should be thinking about the relationship between advertisements and the total immediacy of thought through simultaneous associations. After all, the ideal advertisement is apprehended and understood immediately, its words and images creating an overwhelming desire for its product. For Burroughs, narrative itself, with its dependence on verbal units such as sentences, forcing the reader to plod through individual words, traps people in routine patterns of thought. To escape this aspect of language would mean moving beyond words. As he explains it, “a special use of words and pictures can conduce silence. The scrapbooks and time travel are exercises to expand consciousness, to teach me to think in association blocks rather than word” (“Art of Fiction” 22). In a series of largely unpublished scrapbooks, Burroughs constructed thousands of collages which he used to think through simultaneous associations. Sometimes commenting directly on his writing, sometimes reworking themes from his books or providing images for them, and sometimes existing as purely independent works, these visual collages provided Burroughs a new means of thinking, but one that is often more reminiscent of newspapers, illustrated magazines, and their ubiquitous advertisements than of the Egyptian hieroglyphics he often invoked to explain the idea of associational blocks.

     
    Much of Burroughs’s visual art remains to be published, but Ports of Entry: William Burroughs and the Visual Arts provides beautiful reproductions of some of the most suggestive collages Burroughs created. Quickly glancing through the reproductions, one is immediately struck by the fact that Burroughs constantly made use of media forms, parodying the layouts of newspapers and illustrated magazines, even going so far as to make treated copies of Time (see Figure 11) as well as many pages of his fictional Coldspring News (see Figure 12), whose slogan he invented as a parody of The New York Times, “All the news that fits we print.”

     

     
    Figure 11: A treated copy of Time
    (Ports 36)
    (Click image for larger version)

     

     
    Figure 12: A page from The Coldspring News.
    (Burroughs File 171)
    (Click image for larger version)

     

    In addition to his own writing and personal photographs, Burroughs based most of these collages on ready-made materials from advertisements, and often created collages inspired by advertisements. Many of these collages are critical interventions into the public discourse of the time, operating in the same critical modes in which collage has been used since the earliest days of Dada photomontage. Like a Heartfield montage, a Burroughs collage cuts and parodies the mass media, continuing visually the critique of power and ideology developed in his cut-up trilogy (see Figure 13). Clearly, “Mr. Anshelinger, Hurst, Ford, Rockefeller, and you Board members” is a powerful indictment of these tycoons, associating their names with apocalyptic disaster (68). Burroughs is presented as a witness of the damage that these powerful establishment figures have perpetrated, as he stands in a personal photograph before a derelict. The edges of this collage are jagged, and some singed, suggesting that they have been recovered from some violent disaster, such as the sinking of an ocean liner, the other major image of the collage. There are a significant number of these collages in both the scrapbooks and The Third Mind, taking on interests from oil companies (the Esso logo making frequent appearances) to parodies of the sensational appeals of tabloids. In one collage, disaster headlines containing the number 23 cover an entire page (see Figure 14) (69).

     

     
    Figure 13: William Burroughs, Untitled Collage
    (Sobieszek 70)
    (Click image for larger version)

     

     
    Figure 14: William Burroughs, Untitled Collage
    (Ports 60)
    (Click image for larger version)

     

    Collages such as these, which operate with clearly legible critical agendas, fit comfortably into the conception of the avant-garde as an oppositional force operating within yet against a media apparatus that does little more than disseminate dominant ideologies. Yet, beside these collages frequently appear other collages which present no such critical agenda.

     

    In many of his collage creations, Burroughs seems to be doing all he can to take advantage of the fragmented, chance-ridden, and immediate forms of mass media. Consider the following untitled collage on which he collaborated with Gysin in 1965 (see Figure 15). Indeed, rather than a critique of mass media, this collage invokes its power. The collage is laid out in the form of a newspaper’s front page, or perhaps that of a regular feature in an illustrated magazine, entitled “España Sucesos.”

     

     
    Figure 15: William Burroughs and Brion Gysin, Untitled Collage.
    (Third Mind 60)
    (Click image for larger version)

     

    The headlines, cut from Spanish papers, refer to the deaths of four soldiers. Three of the four cut-up fragments of prose refer to either created or predicted future events: “you are reading the future.” Burroughs provides the image of several trains, taken from a newspaper, which he coordinates with the title of his novel, The Nova Express. Burroughs includes a photograph of himself in the lower corner, preparing proper English tea. There is no absolutely clear or legible relationship between the elements of this collage. In The Electronic Revolution, Burroughs argues that the mass media can make events happen, and in his scrapbooks Burroughs would often try to coordinate fragments of his own writing with chance events. In some instances, Burroughs believed that his own writing was responsible for these events in the same way that the media functioned (Morgan 323). Perhaps Burroughs believed that in this case the four deaths from the headlines were again evidence of the power of his writing. Just as newspapers and advertisements worked through the assemblage of fragmented words and images, this collage operates by bringing together a heterogeneous selection of materials into paratactic relationships. For Burroughs, creating a collage like this as an associational block provided the possibilities of new powers and insights.

     

    Burroughs’s concept of associational blocks, and the collages that he created based on this concept, are deeply indebted to the procedures of advertising. In another scrapbook collage (see Figure 16), Burroughs brings together two moonscapes, a fragment of prose, and an image of the Mary Celeste, the nineteenth-century ghost ship made famous by Arthur Conan Doyle. The upper panel in Burroughs’s collage has pasted onto it Michelangelo’s David, while the bottom shows an astronaut confronting a gigantic rock.

     

     
    Figure 16: William Burrouhgs, Untitled Collage.
    (Burroughs, Burroughs File 183)
    (Click image for larger version)

     

    The sources for the images are all from the mass media. Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s the moon had become invested with tremendous cultural power, and the 1969 moon landing represented the fulfillment of the space age. Images of the moonscape peopled with incongruous images are not difficult to find. For instance, an ad for United Aircraft (see Figure 17) explains how the company’s development of air supplies for spacecraft translates into the technology for better health care on earth.

     

     
    Figure 17: United Aircraft advertisement
    (Click for larger version)

     

    The image they choose to illustrate this claim borders on the surreal, as a fragile patient and his nurse find themselves in a forbidding situation. Like ads from earlier in the century, these two incongruous images meet with no attempt to present them as anything other than a collage. It is obvious to the reader that the nurse and patient are not on the moon, but are being brought together conceptually. The text of the advertisement attempts to contain the possible meanings of this image, associating it simply with a better life through space. The image itself carries no such guarantees. Indeed, one might read it as a signal that the space age itself is dying, or that the entire culture has fallen under a moon virus. It short, it is unclear from the image itself if the moon is responsible for greater health or for illness.

     

    Burroughs’s collage (see Figure 16) is hardly more legible than the advertisement, and more significantly it clearly operates using the same principles. Instead of the image of the nurse and patient, Burroughs has placed Michelangelo’s statue on the moonscape. This placement is mirrored below by the image of an astronaut confronting a large moon rock. Does this image suggest that, just as the artist saw in the stone an ideal human form, so too the astronaut might see similar ideal possibilities in the rock he confronts? Does the image suggest that humanity has attained an artistic ideal simply by arriving on the moon? Such readings are all possible but must be tempered by the other image in the collage, that of the Marie Celeste. The prose cut-ups in Burroughs’s collage all deal with what seems to be a sea disaster. In the fragments he presents we see gulls circling, as well as images of blood and starvation. Yet how should we make sense of this in relation to the moonscape? Is this to suggest that a voyage in space is a similarly doomed endeavor, or that either the moon or the earth itself should be seen as an abandoned wreck? Burroughs’s choice of these images and words suggests a deep caution about the moon shot and the space age. Yet is there substantially more caution or criticism in Burroughs’s images than in those of the commercial advertisement? Both present deeply ambiguous images through virtually identical means. While the advertisement is arguably more legible, leaving less room for critical play, the same is certainly true of Burroughs’s more explicitly critical collages as well, where its targets, from tycoons to tabloids, are clear. Similarly, there are many deeply ambiguous advertising images which are quite difficult to read. While advertising and the avant-garde hardly share the same rhetorical aims, the former has had a large influence on the development of collage, providing not only a great deal of the raw material, but more often than not pioneering the techniques of which the latter takes advantage. In large part, this is because advertising itself is animated by a critical dialectic between the instrumental management of desire and carnivalesque excess.

     
    What Burroughs’s collages show so clearly is that avant-garde practice and advertising are not so far apart, and neither comes with any guarantees. Burroughs’s belief that it was necessary to “rub out the word” and find a new way of thinking bears more than a passing resemblance to Jackson Lears’s analysis of advertising in Fables of Abundance: A Cultural History of Advertising in America. According to Lears, America’s Puritan roots instilled in the culture a strong distrust of images, which depend upon the immediate play of surfaces, and promoted a preference for the depths of words. Throughout the nineteenth century, advertising grew in sophistication, reinforcing the need for the educated classes to make distinctions between the superficial play of advertising images and the deeper truths of serious literature and art. As Lears argues, “the puritanical tendency to prefer depths to surfaces survived in secular idioms and shaped Americans’ perception of a novel situation: the emergence of art in the market place, the development of graven images as mass-produced commodities” (323). This fundamental split would remain throughout the twentieth century, animating the modernist hostility toward popular culture, the critical desire to distinguish the avant-garde from the mass media, and culminating in a situation where “dualism has inhibited the free play of ideas by implying the existence of only two alternatives: to relax our critical sensibilities in a warm bath of floating signifiers, embracing the emancipatory potential of commodity civilization; or to base our critique in a an attitude of renunciation, devaluing the here and now of immediate sensuous experience” (263). Lears chooses Joseph Cornell as the exemplary artist to bridge this divide, for Cornell’s surreal boxes were more often than not financed by his work as a freelance commercial artist at Vogue and other popular magazines, and depended largely upon the images and object of consumer culture. Yet he might just as well have chosen Burroughs to make much the same point. If the avant-garde uses collage techniques as a way to cut the control lines of larger ideological forces, advertising and the mass media have themselves had more complex relationships to those same forces than most critics typically acknowledge. Both formalist accounts of collage techniques and postmodern analysis of media spectacles must be rethought with a clearer eye toward the relationship between avant-garde collage and mass media and advertising techniques and images.

     

    Notes

     

    1. However, even at the beginning of the nineteenth century, newspapers were still distributed irregularly (usually weekly rather than daily) and were still too expensive to have a mass audience. There were a number of technological reasons for this. Prior to the introduction of the steam-driven cylinder press, the printing time for even a modest newspaper prevented a daily circulation. In addition, even with the introduction of the steam press, the time-consuming art of cold typesetting remained both costly and slow, usually keeping papers to eight pages or less. Though job printing and newspapers continued to become more important throughout the nineteenth century, it was the invention of the linotype machine in the early 1880s that made the newspaper a mass medium. According to Meggs, the introduction of the linotype machine fundamentally altered the place of the newspaper: “the three-cent price of an 1880s newspaper, which was too steep for the average citizen, plunged to one or two pennies, while the number of pages multiplied and circulation soared” (199).

     

    2. An account of Burroughs’s paranoia and the role of cut-ups can be found in Miles.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Ades, Dawn. Photomontage. London: Thames, 1986.
    • Bürger, Peter. Theory of the Avant-Garde. Trans. Michael Shaw. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1984.
    • Burroughs, William S. “The Art of Fiction XXXVI.” Interview with Conrad Knickerbocker. Paris Review 35 (Fall 1965): 13-45.
    • —. The Burroughs File. San Francisco: City Lights, 1984.
    • —. The Electronic Revolution: 1970-71 . Cambridge: Blackmoor Head, 1971.
    • —. Treated Copy of Time. Image. Ports of Entry: William S. Burroughs and the Arts. Ed. Robert A. Sobieszek. Los Angeles: Los Angeles County Museum of Art, 1996. 36.
    • Burroughs, William, and Brion Gysin. The Third Mind. New York: Seaver, 1978.
    • Calinescu, Matei. Faces of Modernity: Avant-garde, Decadence, Kitsch. Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1977.
    • Charron automobile. Advertisement. Le Figaro Illustré 246 (September 1910): n.p.
    • Cohen, Arthur. “The Typographic Revolution.” Foster and Kuenzli 71-89.
    • Daix, Pierre. “Le Cubisme de Picasso, Braque, Gris et la Publicité.” Art et Pub: Art and Publicité 1890-1900. Ed. Jean-Hubert Martin, et al. Paris: Editions du Centre Pompidou, 1990: 136-151.
    • Drucker, Johanna. The Visible Word: Experimental Typography and Modern Art, 1909-1923. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1994.
    • Foster, Stephen C., and Rudolf E. Kuenzli, eds. Dada Spectrum: The Dialectic of Revolt. Iowa City, IA: U of Iowa P, 1979.
    • Gilot, Françoise. Life with Picasso. New York: Anchor, 1964.
    • Greenberg, Clement. “Collage.” Hoffman 67-78.
    • High Life Tailor. Advertisment. Le Figaro Illustré 249 (December 1910): n.p.
    • Hoffman, Katherine, ed. Collage: Critical Views. Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research, 1989.
    • Hoffman, Katherine. Foreward. Hoffman 1-37.
    • Horkheimer, Max, and Theodor Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment. New York: Continum, 1998.
    • Kuenzli, Rudolf. “The Semiotics of Dada Poetry.” Foster and Kuenzli 51-70.
    • Lears, Jackson. Fables of Abundance: A Cultural History of Advertising in America. New York: Basic, 1994.
    • L’Honneur d’une Femme. Advertisement. Le Journal 10, 11, 12 Dec. 1900: n.p.
    • Lotringer, Sylvère, ed. Burroughs Live: The Collected Interviews of William S. Burroughs 1960-1997. New York: Semiotext(e), 2001.
    • Mallarmé, Stephane. “The Book: A Spiritual Instrument.” Mallarmé: Selected Prose, Poems, Essays, and Letters. Trans. Bradford Cook. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1956.
    • Meggs, Phillip. A History of Graphic Design. New York: Van Nostrand, 1983.
    • Miles, Barry. The Beat Hotel: Ginsberg, Burroughs, and Corso in Paris, 1957-1963. New York: Grove, 2000.
    • Morgan, Ted. Literary Outlaw: The Life and Times of William S. Burroughs. New York: Avon, 1988.
    • Perloff, Marjorie. “The Invention of Collage.” New York Literary Forum 10-11 (1983): 5-47.
    • Picasso, Pablo. Still Life with Chair Caning. 1912. Musée Picaso, Paris.
    • —. Table with Bottle, Wineglass and Newspaper. 1912. Centre Georges Pompidou, Paris.
    • Poggi, Christine. “Mallarmé, Picasso, and the Newspaper as Commodity.” Hoffman 171-192.
    • Poggioli, Renato. The Theory of the Avant-Garde. Trans. Gerald Fitzgerald. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1968.
    • Schulte-Sasse, Jochen. Foreward. Bürger iii-xlviii.
    • Sutphen, Richard. The Mad Old Ads. Minneapolis: Sutphen Studio, 1966.
    • Tzara, Tristan. “Manifesto on Feeble and Bitter Love.” The Dada Painters and Poets: An Anthology. Ed. Robert Motherwell. Cambridge: Belknap P of Harvard UP, 1989. 92.
    • United Aircraft. Advertisement. Time 6 Jul. 1970: 50-51.
    • Ulmer, Gregory. “The Object of Post-Criticism.” The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays in Postmodern Culture. Ed. Hal Foster. Seattle: Bay, 1983: 83-110.
    • Warings’ Furniture. Advertisment. Le Figaro Illustré 246 (September 1910): n.p.
    • Wescher, Herta. Collage. Trans. Robert E. Wolf. New York: Harry Abrams, 1968.
    • Wicke, Jennifer. Advertising Fictions: Literature, Advertisement, and Social Reading. New York: Columbia UP, 1988.
    • Zucker, Irving. A Source Book of French Advertising Art. New York: Braziller, 1964.

     

  • Notices

     

     

     

    Volume 14, Number 3
    May, 2004
    Every issue of Postmodern Culturecarries notices of events, calls for papers, and other announcements, free of charge. Advertisements will also be published on an exchange basis. If you respond to one of the ads or announcements below, please mention that you saw the notice in PMC.

     


     

    Publication Announcements

    • Biomedia
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    Calls for Papers

    • Women and Performance: A Journal of Feminist Theory
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    General Announcements

    • DRH 2004: Digital Resources for the Humanities

     

  • Spectres of Freedom in Stirner and Foucault: A Response to Caleb Smith’s “Solitude and Freedom”

    Saul Newman

    Department of Political Science
    University of Western Australia
    snewman@cyllene.uwa.edu.au

     

    I am grateful to Caleb Smith for his response to my essay “Stirner and Foucault: Towards a Post-Kantian Freedom,” and I particularly like the way he links my discussion of a post-Kantian freedom to strategies of resistance against contemporary forms of incarceration. Already, back in the early 1970s, in response to a series of prison revolts in France, Michel Foucault was talking about the emergence of a “carceral archipelago”–a network of punitive institutions, discourses, and practices that had been progressively spreading throughout the social fabric since the late eighteenth century (297). It was as if the prison had become a metaphor for society as a whole–with the same techniques of surveillance and coercion appearing in schools, hospitals, factories, and psychiatric institutions. Today, unprecedented technological developments have made possible an intensification of social control to levels beyond what even Foucault could have imagined–the proliferation, for instance, of surveillance cameras in public spaces indicates a blurring of the distinction between the institution and life outside. Indeed, in light of the new forms of incarceration that are appearing today–the extra-legal detention facilities in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for example–perhaps we should take note of Giorgio Agamben’s disturbing insight that what is paradigmatic of modern life is not the prison, as Foucault believed, but rather the camp(20). The slogan posted above the detention camp at Guantanamo Bay–“Honor Bound to Defend Freedom”–is chillingly and ironically reminiscent of another infamous slogan, the one posted above Auschwitz: “Arbeit Macht Frei” (“Work Makes One Free”).

     

    Given this proliferation today of spaces of incarceration and detention–which are, at the same time, becoming virtually indistinguishable from everyday life–questions of freedom and emancipation, always central to political discourse, are perhaps more crucial now than ever before. It is here that Smith raises some very interesting questions about how Stirner’s and Foucault’s emancipatory strategies might be useful today in challenging contemporary institutions, and practices of incarceration, particularly solitary confinement. As Smith shows, solitary confinement has been employed as a punitive tool since the inception of the modern prison in the early nineteenth century, and is now undergoing a massive resurgence in prisons in the U.S. It was originally believed that if prisoners were isolated within their own individual cells, not only could they be more easily controlled and supervised, but their very “souls” could be redeemed through a process of self-reflection. Solitary confinement thus served as a sort of moral experiment upon the subjectivity of the individual inmate–an experiment in which the criminal’s soul was constructed as a discursive object to be corrected and reformed. A similar approach can be seen in contemporary practices of solitary confinement in detention camps, where the psyches of inmates are carefully monitored in an effort to unlock their “secrets.” Smith is right in suggesting, moreover, that this has become a “postmodern” form of punishment–one that relies on sophisticated and subtle techniques of psychological manipulation, rather than clumsy physical coercion (though of course, as we have been amply reminded by events in Iraq, the latter has by no means been expunged from contemporary carceral practice).

     

    However, the question remains as to what sort of strategies of freedom are effective in resisting these new postmodern regimes of punishment? Smith suggests that the post-Kantian or “postmodern” notion of freedom that I have theorized in my paper–one that is derived from the interventions of Foucault and Stirner–is not only somewhat limited in resisting “concrete” practices of incarceration, but, because it is based largely on a notion of individual autonomy that may be achieved even within oppressive conditions, may actually sustain these very practices. There are three separate, yet related, points that Smith is making here: firstly, that, despite my emphasis on concreteness and particularity as opposed to abstract universals, I have to some extent ignored concrete practices or institutions–like the prison–and have thus remained within the very abstract world I am attacking; secondly, that my attempt to theorize a notion of freedom and individual autonomy–“ownness”–that can be realized even in conditions of oppression is of limited use against the practice of solitary confinement, and may even sustain it; and thirdly, that this notion of individual autonomy, developed from Stirner and Foucault, has ignored a very important dimension of their thinking that supports the idea of collective insurgency–one that would be more relevant to the question of prison revolt. I think Smith raises some very interesting points here, and in answering his criticisms my aim is not simply to defend my own argument but rather to expand the terms of the discussion so that it may develop in new theoretical directions. In this sense, I shall approach Smith’s intervention in the spirit of agonism, rather than antagonism–that is, as a theoretical challenge that opens up new ways of thinking, new “lines of flight.”

     

    “Lines of flight” are exactly what we want here, after all. How to construct new lines of flight, new strategies that will liberate people from institutions like the prison, and, more broadly, from the carceral/bio-political society we are living in today? Concrete practices and institutions of coercion and surveillance are all around us–not just in the prison, but, as I have suggested, at all levels of the social network. Why, then, resurrect Max Stirner, the thinker who was obsessed with ghosts, “spooks,” and ideological apparitions, and who claimed that we can be dominated and oppressed as much by an abstract idea as we can by a “real” institution or social relation? How useful is Stirner’s critique of the abstract world of universal ideals–the spectres of humanity, rationality, and morality–in combating very real practices and institutions of domination? How is Stirner’s diagnosis of a spectral world relevant to a world that seems ever more frighteningly real?

     

    Many people, including, most famously, Marx, have suggested that because the target of Stirner’s critique is the abstract world of idealism, he neglects the “real” material world of concrete relations and institutions. Indeed, Marx and Engels devoted the largest part of The German Ideology to attacking Stirner, accusing him of the worst kind of naïvety and idealism. They repeatedly parody Stirner as “Saint Max” or “Saint Sancho”–as one who mistakes illusions for reality. Stirner, Marx and Engels argue, attempts to overcome religious alienation by condemning the dominance of abstract “fixed ideas” but, in doing so, overestimates the importance of these ideas in the real world, thus falling into the idealist trap himself. In other words, Stirner, in focusing on the way that abstract ideas dominate our lives, sees these ideas as all-determining, thus neglecting their basis in real material and social conditions. Stirner is therefore characterized as an ideologist par excellence–one who ignores the concrete material world and conjures up instead a word of illusions and apparitions.

     

    This idealist illusion is most apparent, Marx and Engels argue, in Stirner’s understanding of the State. Stirner sees the State as itself an ideological abstraction, much like God–it only exists because we allow it to exist, because we abdicate to it our own authority, in the same way that we create God by abdicating our authority and placing it outside ourselves. What is more important than the institution of the State is the “ruling principle”–it is the idea of the State, in other words, that dominates us (Stirner 200). The State’s unity and dominance exist mostly in the minds of its subjects. The State’s power is really based on our power, according to Stirner. It is only because the individual has not recognized this power, because he humbles himself before authority, that the State continues to exist. As Stirner correctly surmised, the State cannot function only through top-down repression and coercion, as this would expose its power in all its nakedness, brutality, and illegitimacy. Rather, the State relies on our allowing it to dominate us. Stirner wants to show that ideological apparatuses are not only concerned with economic or political questions–they are also rooted in psychological needs. The dominance of the State, Stirner suggests, depends on our willingness to let it dominate us, on our complicit desire for our own subordination. Therefore, the State must first be overcome as an idea before it can be overcome in reality–or more precisely, they are two sides of the same coin. According to Marx and Engels, however, this ignores the economic and class relations that form the material basis of the state: Stirner’s “idealism” would absurdly allow the state to be dismissed by an act of “wishful thinking” (374).

     

    Now this critique of Stirner’s “idealist” approach to the State goes to the heart of the debate between me and Smith. Indeed, Smith’s suggestion that I, in my critique (via Stirner) of abstract universal ideals, fail fully to acknowledge or account for the concreteness of institutions like the prison, uncannily resembles Marx and Engels’s attack on Stirner for not recognizing the concreteness of institutions like the State. As with the critique of Stirner, it is objected that my thinking in effect proposes the existence of “abstract” prisons from which there can only be “abstract” forms of escape. Like the unfortunate Saint Max, who stumbles foggily through the world of illusions, I am said to be gesturing toward the concrete world “as if toward something half-real.” Now my response to this is as follows: Smith’s objection, which so closely parallels Marx and Engels’s materialist critique of Stirner, is itself based on a sort of illusory separation between discourse and reality, in which “reality” is privileged as “concrete” and as having an immediacy that ideas and theoretical concepts do not. However, I would suggest here not only that “concrete” objects and practices are meaningless outside discourse (that is, the linguistic, symbolic, and ideological networks within which they are constituted) but, more precisely, that these institutions and practices themselves have a sort of spectral ideological dimension that gives them consistency. In the same way, for instance, that Stirner argues that the State cannot be understood, let alone resisted, without an understanding of the abstract ideological systems that legitimize it, I am suggesting that “concrete” institutions and practices cannot be separated from the spectral ideological and symbolic systems that give them meaning–and that, in order to resist these institutions and practices, we have first to attack their spectral underside. For instance, Foucault shows that the “abstract” concept of the soul–which Smith himself has drawn upon–has very real material effects, allowing a sort of discursive cage to be constructed for the prisoner: as he expresses it in his famous inversion of the traditional formula, “the soul is the prison of the body” (30).

     

    What I am suggesting here is that, paradoxically, in order for us to perceive what is concrete we must go through the abstract, or at least the symbolic. That is to say, we can only grasp institutions and practices in their concrete materiality through an “abstract” symbolic and ideological framework which constitutes their meaning. They cannot be seen as somehow outside or separate from this. As Slavoj Zizek argues, there is nothing more ideological than the belief that we can somehow step outside ideological systems and see things for the “way they really are” (60). The world of abstract ideas and ideological systems does not somehow stand apart from and opposed to the world of concrete, material practices and institutions, as Smith seems to suggest; but rather, each can only be articulated through the other. While it is true that I have not referred in my paper directly to “concrete” institutions and practices, my contention is that they can only be grasped through their spectral, abstract, “half-real” dimension–and it is this dimension that I have focused on in discussing Stirner’s critique. It is a mistake to believe that Stirner’s critique of abstract universals implies that they can be simply dismissed, and that a new world of reality and concreteness will be revealed to us–it is more sophisticated than this. Just because this world is spectral and ideological does not mean that it is not, at the same time, very real–on the contrary, ideology is all around us, materially present and deeply entrenched in our psyches. And what Stirner is interested in unmasking is the way that these abstract ideals, such as morality, rationality, and human essence, find their logical expression in concrete practices of domination–for instance, in punishment, which Stirner sees as a form of moral hygiene (213). It is precisely the abstract notions of morality and humanity that make this new system of punishment intelligible–that form the ideological and discursive apparatus that gives it meaning. That is why the State, for Stirner, is as much ideological and spectral as it is “real.” Indeed, it is constituted in its materiality precisely through this abstract, ideological dimension. This is what Marx and Engels did not understand–and it could be argued here that in neglecting the State’s ideological dimension, and by reducing it to the “materiality” of economic relations, they have themselves failed to grasp its reality–that is, its political specificity and autonomy. To suggest, as Smith seems to, that my focus on abstract structures of idealism has obscured or neglected the real, material world, is simply to repeat Marx’s and Engel’s error.

     

    The second point that Smith makes is that Stirner’s idea of “ownness” as a form of radical freedom that is possible even in oppressive conditions may actually contribute to the practice of solitary confinement. This is because solitary confinement is based on the notion of a “cellular soul” that can be self-correcting, and Stirner’s notion of ownness, though it seeks to throw off repressive moral constraints, nevertheless sustains the idea of a soul that can be redeemed–this time in egoism rather than morality. Smith raises an interesting point–that because the egoist, for Stirner, creates his own forms of freedom, he can maintain a Buddhist-like spiritual detachment from the real conditions of restraint and coercion that he is subjected to, and that this may actually sustain, or at any rate allow to be sustained, the practice of incarceration in solitary confinement. In other words, the implications of Stirner’s theory of ownness would seem to be that the egoist can be free even in a prison cell. It is certainly the case that ownness is largely based on the individual seizing for himself a radical autonomy through the rejection of universal essences and fixed ideas. Moreover, Stirner does indeed say that this form of autonomy can be experienced even in the most oppressive conditions: “under the dominion of a cruel master my body is not ‘free’ from torments and lashes; but it is my bones that moan under the torture, my fibres that quiver under the blows […]” (143). What Stirner is suggesting here is that even in conditions of abject slavery, in which the concept of freedom as an ideal becomes meaningless, there is nevertheless a more immediate form of autonomy or “self-ownership” available to the subject. Moreover, this internal autonomy is something upon which the concrete act of resistance and liberation can be based: the egoist, Stirner says, bides his time while submitting to punishment, and “as I keep my eye on myself and my selfishness, I take by the forelock the first good opportunity to trample the slaveholder into the dust” (143). So what Stirner is trying to develop here is similar to the notion of positive freedom–a form of internal freedom or autonomy that goes beyond simple freedom from external constraint. While it is usually the case that positive freedom presupposes a basic negative freedom, in the case of incarceration or slavery, there is no possibility of this prior condition of negative freedom. Positive internal freedom must therefore form the a priori condition for any act of resistance. An example of this strategy of ownness in action might be found in the film Cool Hand Luke. “Cool Hand” Luke, played by Paul Newman, is a convict on a chain gang. In one scene the prisoners are building a road with picks and shovels, and they are working at a slow, monotonous pace that is regulated, not only by the enforced generalized boredom of the task, but also by the watchful gaze of the guards. The prisoners are languidly dreaming of their freedom, of life on the “outside.” Luke suddenly urges his fellow prisoners to intensify the pace of the digging, saying all time “Go hard! Beat the Man!” The building of the road becomes a frenetic collective activity that causes profound consternation amongst the prison guards. Here we see the convicts taking a kind of self-ownership over their activity, an activity from which they were hitherto alienated because it was seen as something that had to be done for the authorities, for “the Man.” By the convicts owning their own labor, by making it theirs, it becomes an act of resistance.

     

    Stirner is also making another, more subtle point here: as well as the act of resistance being based on a radical internal freedom, the reverse of this is that practices and institutions of domination actually rely on an internalized oppression, whereby the subject is not only externally coerced and incarcerated but is also tied, in more profound ways, to this very identity of oppression. That is, institutions do not only oppress and coerce the subject from the outside–they also dominate the subject inwardly. In other words, they rely on an active self-domination–the subject is tied psychologically to the very institution that dominates him, and this might continue even after the institution itself has disappeared. The subject is tied to a kind of spectral shadow of the institution, precisely through an internalization of the moral and rational norms upon which the institution is based. This spectral shadow is precisely the hidden “authoritarian obverse” that I have referred to. The State, for instance, relies on certain forms of subjectification, so that the individual comes to willingly submit himself to its authority–so that, in the words of Stirner, “its permanence is to be sacred to me” (161). So, for Stirner, any concrete liberation from the institution must begin with a sort of self-liberation–a liberation of the self from the forms of subjectivity that are tied to the institution. This is what Stirner means by “ownness.” My point is, therefore, that Stirner’s theory of ownness–although it would seem to mirror, as Smith suggests, a fantasy of “corrective solitude”–can actually be interpreted in another, much more radical way. It can be seen as a way of overcoming the forms of self-domination and servitude upon which practices of incarceration are ultimately based.

     

    Although any act of liberation must begin with a personal individual liberation, it will ultimately be ineffective unless it incorporates a collective dimension–and it is here that I am inclined to agree with Smith in his emphasis on collective insurgency. I believe that notions of collective action and identity are very much implicit in both Stirner’s and Foucault’s politics, despite the way that they are usually perceived as valorizing only individual acts of resistance. Elsewhere I have insisted on a collective dimension in their thought, drawing on Stirner’s important notion of the “union of egoists,” as well as Foucault’s writings on the Iranian Revolution (Newman). As Smith points out, Stirner himself talks about the way that the prison system, although designed to isolate individuals, actually creates the conditions for a new kind of collective intercourse and identity–one that constitutes a significant threat to the prison system. So while in my article I have focused on the individual–both in terms of the effect of abstract ideals and ideological systems on the individual, as well as on different forms of individual autonomy and resistance–there is no doubt that, for Stirner at least, this can form the basis for a collective insurgency. There is certainly nothing in either what I have said, or what Stirner and Foucault have said, that rules this out. How else can we hope to challenge the systems of power, surveillance, and domination in which we are all increasingly being inscribed?

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Agamben, Giorgio. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford UP, 1998.
    • Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Penguin, 1991.
    • Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. The German Ideology. Collected Works Vol. 5. New York: International; London: Lawrence & Wishart; Moscow: Progress, 1976.
    • Newman, Saul. “For Collective Social Action: Towards a Postmodern Theory of Collective Identity.” Philosophy and Social Action 27.1 (2001): 37-47.
    • Stirner, Max. The Ego and Its Own. Ed. David Leopold. Cambridge: Cambridge UP: 1995.
    • Zizek, Slavoj. “The Spectre of Ideology.” The Zizek Reader. Ed. Elizabeth Wright and Edmond Wright. Oxford: Blackwell, 1999. 55-86.

     

  • Solitude and Freedom: A Response to Saul Newman on Stirner and Foucault

    Caleb Smith

    Department of English
    Duke University
    cjs5@duke.edu

     

    In a recent essay on “Stirner and Foucault,” Saul Newman brings these “two thinkers not often examined together” into a conversation about freedom, coercion, and individual subjectivity. Newman uses Stirner and Foucault to explore a discourse of freedom formulated by Kant and dominant since the Enlightenment, a discourse based on universal moral abstractions that subtly coerce the mind even as they promise to liberate it. The aim of Newman’s interrogation, as I understand it, is finally to dismantle these abstractions, and to imagine an individual freedom that would not have an “authoritarian obverse,” an oppressive shadow–a new freedom not chained to universal norms, but grounded in the world of power and practice, in “concrete and contingent strategies of the self.” My own research into the modern prison and its cultural consequences has also approached Stirner and Foucault, also on the themes of freedom, coercion, and the shape of the mind, and I’m glad to discover Newman’s work. This essay is my effort to answer its provocations.

     

    Max Stirner’s major text, The Ego and His Own, is long, strange, and fitful–and the same can be said of its afterlife.1 Why revive Stirner now? The answer must be, at least partly, strategic. The “egoist,” Stirner writes, “never takes trouble about a thing for the sake of the thing, but for his sake: the thing must serve him” (221). Similarly, The Ego and His Own is awakened when it becomes useful, when it helps critics to oppose some oppressive structure in their own time. Newman writes with this urgency; Kant is a bogey-man in his critique because Kant’s theory of freedom seems to Newman to be shaping contemporary discourse, dispensing an “illusory” freedom, a disguised oppression, in our own present tense. But where Newman wishes to reveal the hidden constraints in a theory of freedom–a theory that, he intimates, has endured the modernist and postmodernist ruptures and affects the present–I would measure Stirner’s worth against a form of coercion that is partly hidden but not simply theoretical: the modern prison built for solitary confinement. The Stirner-Foucault connection becomes strongest and most material here, in relation to an oppressive form developed in Stirner’s time and given its definitive theoretical treatment by Foucault, a form that is being reborn and expanded right now in the United States, in “super-max” prisons and in the cells for suspected “enemy combatants” on Guantanamo Bay. If Stirner is going to be roused and put to use again, it might be against these very “concrete and contingent” institutions of solitude and unfreedom.

     

    Concreteness, contingency, “this world”–material institutions and practices suggest themselves everywhere in Newman’s essay, but he gestures toward them as if toward something half-real. The opposite of abstract universals never quite takes a shape of its own. How might a contingent liberation be achieved by real people? How might concrete freedom feel? The trouble may be that escape from an abstract prison can only be, itself, abstract. A metaphoric jailbreak–where can we hide from such guards, except in another metaphor? But the prison is not only an idea. It is first of all a concrete coercive institution. It is an architecture, a practice and a policy with a specific history, and its history is not over. Today the United States is involved in the reconstruction of solitary confinement on a massive scale, the largest experiment in coercive isolation since the middle nineteenth century. The modern institution whose genesis was witnessed by Stirner and carefully traced by Foucault is coming back in a postmodern form. It is this return that gives the Stirner-Foucault connection its urgency now.

     

    I don’t wish to quarrel with Saul Newman. I’ll grasp and develop some of his ideas and depart from others, but this is a correspondence, not an attempt at correction. My thoughts are offered in a spirit of collaboration.

     

    I

     

    The modern prison takes shape in the American northeast between 1815 and 1840. Two rival “systems,” “Auburn” and “Philadelphia,” emerge, but their competition masks an underlying unity: both accept the crucial idea of solitary confinement (Beaumont and Tocqueville 54-55; Foucault 237-39). The main line of cultural criticism since Foucault has developed his formulations around the processes of surveillance and social control, but just as important to the modern prison and to the Stirner-Foucault connection is the architecture of solitude and, with it, the architectural figure of the criminal soul conceived by reformers.

     

    Prison reform, the discursive and political movement that transforms institutions, is itself transformed by them. To break up conspiracies and riots, to quarantine disease and contain sex, the architecture of solitude is designed. Once established, the new architecture, in turn, changes the meaning of solitude.2 From the engagement of reform discourse and cellular architecture a new image of the criminal is conceived–a cellular soul. This soul has its own internal architecture; it is divided and binds itself, struggling to correct itself through “reflection” into a redeemed and reunified entity. The spiritual “cell” is the convict’s guilt, the flaw that corrupts him; working to repair this flaw is his repentance, a corrective agency within that masters guilt and reshapes the soul.

     

    A crucial fiction of reform in the golden age of solitude is that the prisoner’s suffering is mainly spiritual. The real struggle of inmates against the forces that hold them is sublimated, obscured, into the image of a divided and self-binding soul struggling toward redemption. According to reformers, it is not the granite walls, the guards and wardens, but the convict’s private guilt that, in solitude, “will come to assail him.” Self-correction, in the discourse of reform, happens through a process of “reflection”: “thrown into solitude [the convict] reflects. Placed alone, in view of his crime, he learns to hate it” (Beaumont and Tocqueville 55). Again, a tactical reform is ennobled with spiritual imagery. Prisoners prove resourceful and inventive in the use of objects as weapons, so any potential weapon is removed from their reach. Cells are stripped of furniture, accessories, any adornment not biologically necessary and that cannot be bolted to the floor. In the imagination of prison reform, this necessary redesign becomes an aid to redemption: the bare walls become a “reflective” surface where the convict sees not a wall but the image of his guilt–what the English reformer Jonas Hanway calls “the true resemblance of [the prisoner’s] mind” (65). The convict burns to repair this reflection, as if his spiritual correction would liberate him from the torments of confinement.

     

    Foucault traces the subtle consequences of reform’s alchemy:

     

    solitude assures a sort of self-regulation of the penalty and makes possible a spontaneous individualization of the punishment: the more a convict is capable of reflectingo , the more capable he was of committing his crime; but, also, the more lively his remorse, the more painful his solitude; on the other hand, when he has profoundly repented and made amends without the least dissimulation, solitude will no longer weigh upon him. (237)

     

     

    The startling last turn is central to the mythology of reform. The corrected criminal, though still confined to his cell and awaiting the end of his sentence like any other, waits without suffering, without experiencing his confinement as a punishment. He sits in the tranquility of his redemption, liberated from guilt. His soul is of a piece, no longer its own cell. Despite his shackles, his forced labor, his bodily exposure to the various tortures wielded by guards, the prisoner is already “free.”

     

    The modern prison, then, depends upon a cellular figure of the soul. Stirner’s The Ego and His Own grasps precisely this figure, and subverts it. Stirner’s contention is that the deviant, criminalized dimension of the soul is really its better half, its true calling, while the spirit of “repentance” is an oppressive social force, conformity and obedience internalized. Stirner protests solitary confinement, in other words, by a reversal, by turning its figure of the cellular soul inside-out: “turn to yourselves,” he preaches, “rather than to your gods or idols. Bring out from yourselves what is in you, bring it to the light, bring yourselves to revelation” (211).

     

    But Stirner’s protest, because it accepts a cellular architecture of the soul, remains deeply bound to the fantasy of corrective solitude. Despite a certain structural rearrangement, an inversion of values like a switching of magnetic poles, the soul stays cellular, provoked to correct itself by an authority (Stirner) promising a new redemption (“ownness”). Freedom is a spiritual matter; as a consequence, the institutions that coerce people in the material world disappear. Like the jailers he attacks, Stirner obscures the violent struggle between inmates and their keepers.

     

    Stirner’s critique of modern confinement would appear, in this light, locked in an irresolvable conflict with the prison’s cellular figure of the soul. The terms of redemption are reversed, but the soul remains its own cell, still isolated and charged with the task of correcting itself: imprisonment remains an individual matter, and freedom a state of mind. What saves The Ego and His Own from this stalemate is nothing but the work’s fitfulness, the shifty self-disruption of Stirner’s prose and of his line of thought. Just as the circle seems ready to close, as the prison is about to complete its horizon around Stirner’s protest, there is an interruption, a heave, and another possibility breaks open. Explicitly considering the modern prison and the “saintly” reformers who wish to introduce solitary confinement, Stirner perceives an insurgent collectivity, a collaborative uprising by inmates as the menace that these architects are trying to exterminate. With this insight into origins, Stirner intimates that the same possibility continues to hold a liberating promise. Not individual redemption but riotous, collective “intercourse” now appears as the opposite of solitary confinement:

     

    That we jointly execute a job, run a machine, effectuate anything in general,--for this a prison will indeed provide; but that I forget that I am a prisoner, and engage in intercourse with you who likewise disregard it, brings danger to the prison, and not only cannot be caused by it, but must not even be permitted. For this reason the saintly and moral-minded French chamber decides to introduce solitary confinement, and other saints will do the like in order to cut off "demoralizing intercourse." Imprisonment is the established and--sacred condition, to injure which no attempt must be made. The slightest push of that kind is punishable, as is every uprising against a sacred thing by which man is to be charmed and chained. (287)

     

     

    Stirner’s brief but important treatment of insurgent collectivity suggests an absence in his own design, and in Newman’s. Between the isolated, oppressed individual and the oppressive “society” or “authority” lies a contested middle ground, where individuals might commune and move together toward resistance: “every union in the prison bears within it the dangerous seed of a ‘plot,’ which under favorable circumstances might spring up and bear fruit” (287). I would develop Newman’s account by restoring not just the material institutions of oppression, but also the possibility of collective uprising. Toward the material world, toward insurgent collectivity–critics of Stirner and Foucault have not generally seen these two movements in their work3; Newman tries to make do without them, but his undertaking will be incomplete, I believe, until they are restored.

     

    Stirner, when he considers the prison explicitly, becomes unusually conscious of the material processes of coercion. The material “space,” the concrete “building” of the prison, he writes, is what “gives a common stamp to those who are gathered in it” and “determines the manner of life of the prison society” (286). Similarly, Stirner and Foucault, faced with the material prison, suggest that liberation might be achieved not by a solitary turn inward, which the prison is built to enforce, but by communion and riot. Edward Said, interrogating Foucault’s theory of power, insists that “in human history there is always something beyond the reach of dominating systems, no matter how deeply they saturate society, and this is obviously what makes change possible, limits power in Foucault’s sense, and hobbles the theory of that power” (216). Apparently against Foucault, Said holds to “some modest […] belief in noncoercive human community” (217). But what Said misses is that the idea of insurgent collectivity, prisoners and the dominated communing and moving against their confinement, is in Foucault’s own vision of the prison, just as it is in Stirner’s. “In this central and centralized humanity,” Foucault writes, “the effect and instrument of complex power relations, bodies and forces subjected by multiple mechanisms of ‘incarceration,’ […] we must hear the distant roar of battle” (308).

     

    II

     

    Newman’s essay announces itself as more than an exercise in intellectual history or a theoretical comparison; its Stirner-Foucault connections work against oppressive, illusory models of freedom that “continue to dominate” in the present. Stirner and Foucault matter because they are useful to us now in our efforts to imagine and realize freedom. I would follow Newman here, and submit that the history of solitary confinement has a new urgency in this postmodern moment. “While society in the United States gives the example of the most extended liberty,” wrote Beaumont and Tocqueville in 1833, “the prisons of the same country offer the spectacle of the most complete despotism” (79). Today, as the United States declares itself the worldwide defender of freedom, it incarcerates a higher percentage of its own subjects than any other country, over two million in all (Shane).4 I make these connections not for the satisfaction of “exposing” some hypocrisy, but as a point of departure, a way of establishing what is at stake in the relation between freedom and incarceration today. At the entrance to the prison camp on Guantanamo Bay is a posted slogan: “Honor Bound to Defend Freedom” (Conover 42).

     

    We have in the United States a whole new generation of prisons built for solitary confinement. The line connecting them to the penitentiaries of the early-middle nineteenth century is not at all continuous–the last thirty years have seen not so much an evolution as a rebirth and redefinition of the modern prison.5 The super-max prisons and the isolation facility at Guantanamo represent the largest experiment in solitude since the nineteenth century. Long discredited as a form of torture that actually ravages the minds it pretends to correct, displaced for a century and a half by less expensive practices, solitude is suddenly a major part of corrections again. And the criminal soul that lay dormant for so long is reappearing with the cell, though both have been transformed by technology and new power structures.

     

    Built by Halliburton and operated by the U.S. military, the Guantanamo Bay prison takes an acute interest in the psychic lives of its inmates. The prisoner’s mind is to be carefully managed in an effort to extract its secrets. Lt. Col. Barry Johnson describes the balance: “This is not a coercive effort,” he says, “because as you coerce people, they will tell you exactly what they want you to hear–and that does us no good. We have to have accuracy and facts, and people need to be willing to give you that. It takes motivation, not coercion.” On the difference between motivation and coercion, Johnson is evasive, except to offer the cryptic remark that “fear is very different than pain” (Conover 45). The high-tech solitary chambers in super-max prisons also hold inmates for a complicated range of reasons, some of them clearly political–Ray Luc Levasseur, convicted of bombing a Union Carbide facility, was transferred to a solitary cell in Colorado’s ADX super-max when he refused to work in a prison factory because the coaxial cable produced there was for U.S. military use. According to official policy, Levasseur had refused to perform labor necessary to his “rehabilitation” (Franzen 219-20). The old criminal soul may not have expired as a disciplinary tactic, after all.

     

    The sophisticated architecture and functioning of the new solitary prisons raises more questions than I can hope to answer here, but these seem to me the crucial questions for the contemporary value of Stirner and Foucault, writers who engage and resist the solitary cell at its modern genesis. The point is not to reveal some supposedly hidden mechanism, or to speak with pious outrage, the usual tone of prison reform itself, which produced the cell in the first place. But neither will these troubling questions be quieted by Newman’s “affirmation of the possibilities of individual autonomy within power” (my emphasis). What kind of insurgent collectivity might develop inside a super-max unit? How do its technologies of deprivation and computerized video-surveillance connect to the old barren reflective surfaces and panoptic supervision? Finally, can theory shift from the bound figure of the cellular soul, as Stirner and Foucault do, to a vision of practical communion and collaborative resistance? My sense, only half-formed, is that we might move toward a collective critical practice whose proper adversary is not so much Immanuel Kant as the modern prison and its postmodern reincarnations.

     

    Notes

     

    1. Conceived in a revolutionary moment, in the European 1840s, the book attacks, by turns sneering and raging, the authorities of religion and government and, as Newman shows, a version of Enlightenment humanism. A few years later, Stirner himself becomes an authority under attack in Marx’s The German Ideology, where Marx’s emergent materialism in philosophy and revolutionary politics defines itself against the idealism of “Saint Max” and his generation. In the late nineteenth century, Stirner enters and helps to form Nietzsche’s writing, but he remains fairly obscure outside Germany until about 1907. In the decade just before the Great War, a group of Anglo-American anarchists takes a new interest in Stirner as a source of insight and energy. The American radicals Steven Byington and Benjamin Tucker produce a translation, and Stirner’s work moves to the center of the early modernism developing in Dora Marsden’s London journal, The Egoist. A Stirnerite anarcho-individualist cultural politics has been traced through Marsden’s journal to the works of its contributors, among them Ezra Pound, T.S. Eliot, James Joyce, Rebecca West, Richard Aldington, H.D., Ford Madox Ford, Marianne Moore, D.H. Lawrence, and other experimental writers. With the genesis of English modernism, Stirner is invoked as the spokesman of a radical politics against the liberal state and against socialism, whose forms seemed, to Marsden, sentimental and ineffectual. See Levenson and Clarke.

     

    2. On the architecture of solitary confinement in modern prisons, see Evans and Johnston.

     

    3. I refer specifically to Marx’s treatment of Stirner as a deluded idealist in The German Ideology and to a series of responses to Foucault’s Discipline and Punish that includes Frederic Jameson and Edward Said. Jameson, introducing his own periodizing thesis in Postmodernism, describes a “winner loses” paradox in Foucault:

     

    the more powerful the vision of some increasingly total system or logic--the Foucault of the prisons book is the obvious example--the more powerless the reader comes to feel. Insofar as the theorist wins, therefore, by constructing an increasingly closed and terrifying machine, to that very degree he loses, since the critical capacity of his work is thereby paralyzed, and the impulses of negation and revolt, not to speak of those of social transformation, are increasingly perceived as vain and trivial in the face of the model itself. (5-6)

     

     

    4. On these themes in general, and on the particular relation between Tocqueville’s study of the American penitentiary and his study of Democracy in America, see Dumm.

     

    5. The modern solitary prison had its golden age in the U.S. between 1820 and the Civil War. Even during these years, solitude was never an established fact of life for most American prisoners; rather, 1820-1860 marks the period when a faith in the corrective function of solitude and reflection dominated the discourse of prison reform. This is the golden age of an institutional fantasy, the desire to rebuild American discipline around solitude, the expressed belief that such a rebuilding was socially practical and that it would, if achieved, produce a better society. With the Civil War, the dream of a solitary confinement regime encountered vast new problems–in particular, vast new populations to incarnate. Captives taken in battle, emancipated slaves, new waves of immigrants: these criminalized populations were far too large for the existing reformed prisons, and authorities could not afford to build enough cells for them all. See Rotman, especially pages 169-176.

     

    Still, isolation persisted in prisons, no longer as the standard confinement for all convicts but as a special punishment for the unruly–or, more recently, as a technique of “segregation” to protect vulnerable inmates from the general population, or the vulnerable general population from the “worst of the worst.” In the last quarter century, the days of the War on Drugs and the War on Terror, American prison populations have doubled and then doubled again, yet solitary confinement has made a surprising return.

     

    A curious reversal: solitary confinement falls from dominance during a period of exploding convict populations; now, in another period of exploding numbers, it comes back. The trick, the difference, may lie in the new economic structure of postmodern discipline. Many of the new solitary prisons are built and operated by private contractors, paid by states and by the federal government but working for profit. These businesses–the two largest are the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and Wackenhut–in turn, contribute to the campaigns of “tough on crime” candidates, fund research into their own effectiveness, and lobby for longer, more standardized sentencing rules like California’s “three strikes” law. Solitary confinement may be coming under private contracting for the same reason it faded from its golden age: because it is expensive. (A note to my Australian correspondent: Wackenhut runs prisons there, too.)

     

    If the aim of privately contracted discipline is to increase construction of new prisons, to incarcerate more people for longer periods of time because more prisoners now mean more business, more profits, higher stock prices, then the postmodern turn would seem to be away from the interior life of the convict. Containment, an industry in itself, has less and less interest in producing repentant souls, and mandatory sentencing rules appear to signal a shift away from “individualized and individuating” corrections. This characterization may well fit the majority of our prisons–but the solitary lockdowns, I submit, are an exception, a special circumstance.

     

    On the continuities and mutations in the history of American solitary confinement, see Dayan’s compelling and haunting essay, “Held in the Body of the State.” On contemporary prison trends and the new solitary facilities, see Parenti’s major study, Lockdown America, and Herivel and Wright’s new edited collection, Prison Nation. Franzen’s essay, “Control Units” in How to Be Alone, is an elegant introduction. Studies of the new Guantanamo Bay prison are harder to find, the circulation around it monitored and controlled, but its mechanics and economics are interrogated in Ted Conover’s “In the Land of Guantanamo.”

     

    Works Cited

     

    • de Beaumont, Gustave, and Alexis de Tocqueville. On the Penitentiary System in the United States and Its Application in France. (1833). Trans. Francis Lieber. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois UP, 1964.
    • Clarke, Bruce. Dora Marsden and Early Modernism: Gender, Individualism, Science. Ann Arbor, MI: U of Michigan P, 1996.
    • Conover, Ted. “In the Land of Guantanamo.” New York Times Sunday Magazine 29 Jun. 2003: 40-45.
    • Dayan, Joan. “Held in the Body of the State: Prisons and the Law.” History, Memory, and the Law. Eds. Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns. Ann Arbor, MI: U of Michigan P, 1999. 183-247.
    • Dumm, Thomas L. Democracy and Punishment: Disciplinary Origins of the United States. Madison, WI: U of Wisconsin P, 1987.
    • Evans, Robin. The Fabrication of Virtue: English Prison Architecture, 1750-1840. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1982.
    • Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage, 1977.
    • Franzen, Jonathan. “Control Units.” How to Be Alone. New York: Farrar, 2002. 211-41.
    • Hanway, Jonas. “Distributive Justice and Mercy.” London: J. Dodsey, 1781. Goldsmiths’-Kress Library of Economic Literature 12217. New Haven, CT.: Research Publications, 1976.
    • Herivel, Tara, and Paul Wright. Prison Nation: The Warehousing of America’s Poor. New York: Routledge, 2003.
    • Jameson, Fredric. Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1991.
    • Johnston, Norman. Forms of Constraint: A History of Prison Architecture. Urbana, IL: U of Illinois P, 2000.
    • Levenson, Michael. A Genealogy of Modernism: A Study of English Literary Doctrine, 1908-1922. New York: Cambridge UP, 1984.
    • Marx, Karl, and Frederick Engels. The German Ideology. Collected Works. Vol. 5. New York: International, 1975.
    • Newman, Saul. “Stirner and Foucault: Toward a Post-Kantian Freedom.” Postmodern Culture 13:2 (Jan. 2003). <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/postmodern_culture/v013/13.2newman.html>
    • Parenti, Christian. Lockdown America: Police and Prisons in the Age of Crisis. London: Verso, 1999.
    • Rotman, Edgardo. “The Failure of Reform: United States, 1865-1965.” The Oxford History of the Prison: The Practice of Punishment in Western Society. Eds. Norval Morris and David J. Rothman. New York: Oxford UP, 1995.
    • Said, Edward. “Traveling Theory.” The Edward Said Reader. Eds. Moustafa Bayoumi and Andrew Rubin. New York: Vintage, 2000.
    • Shane, Scott. “Locked Up in the Land of the Free.” Baltimore Sun 1 June 2003 final ed.: 2A.
    • Stirner, Max. The Ego and His Own. Trans. Steven Byington. New York: Tucker, 1907.

     

  • Excursions into Everyday Life

    David Alvarez

    Department of English
    Grand Valley State University
    alvarezd@gvsu.edu

     

    Review of: Ben Highmore, ed., The Everyday Life Reader.London: Routledge, 2002.

     

    Perhaps it is one of the symptoms of our theory-saturated, post-everything moment that everyday life has recently become not just an object of cultural analysis, but a crucial interpretive category in its own right. Actually existing theory (by which I mean those forms of theorizing that reduce reality to textuality) is now adjudged by some commentators to be languishing not merely in a state of crisis, but of impending extinction. In a recent tract, one such critic, Terry Eagleton, advocates abandoning hitherto hegemonic theoretical excavations in favor of grounding cultural analysis in the deep soils of morality and metaphysics, among others. For his part, in a posthumously published polemic, the late Edward Said attempts to reclaim a beachhead of neo-humanistic terra firma from the murkily indeterminate waters of post-humanist theory, as well as from the slough of stagnant humanisms of the Samuel Huntington persuasion.

     

    This search for socially relevant significance in theory’s aftermath is one of the contexts in which Ben Highmore–Senior Lecturer in Cultural and Media Studies at the University of the West of England–situates the revival of academic interest in everyday life that his Reader both heralds and enhances. Toward the end of the engaging essay that introduces his tome, Highmore notes that the emergence of what he dubs “everyday life studies” can be regarded as a response to the remorseless textualization of lived experience by apolitical strains of poststructuralism, as well as to the depthless exaltation of the present that characterizes the giddier celebrations of postmodernism (31). As Highmore has it, theory’s frequently self-enclosed spurning of sensuous life seems to have led to a reassertion of the bracingly real. What better way, perhaps, to dispel the mustiness of the House of Theory’s rooms than by opening up its windows and letting the limpid light of everyday life illuminate the dust motes?

     

    But what is it precisely that the study of everyday life can shed light on? Whose everyday life are we talking about? Where can everyday life be located? How can it be accessed? Indeed, what exactly is meant by the terms “everyday life,” “the everyday,” “the daily,” and their many cognates? Before broaching these matters, it is well to point out that in the Anglophone academy, signs of the arrival of “everyday life studies” abound: among them, special issues of sundry learned journals devoted to the quotidian as problematic, numerous studies foregrounding a focus on the everyday in contexts as seemingly unrelated as Stalin’s Russia or London’s supermarkets, and the long-overdue translation into English of pioneering disquisitions on daily experience by the French polymath Henri Lefebvre. Further, the publication of a reader on the subject also marks its official academic acceptance, as Highmore himself almost ruefully observes (xiii).

     

    But as the contributions by conceptual artists, avant-garde filmmakers, and amateur ethnographers collected here make clear, “everyday life studies” is not purely the purview of academics and scholars. Moreover, as befits an arena of study as vast as daily life, the Reader covers a correspondingly wide-ranging array of orientations and preoccupations. Thus, in addition to such talismanic meditations on the quotidian as Raymond Williams’s “Culture is Ordinary” and Erving Goffman’s discussion of “front and back regions” in the performance of daily self-representation, we find here newer material on topics such as the significance of everyday objects and practices like bags or cooking, as well as older but lesser known work on daily life, such as the auto-ethnographic reports of the Mass Observation project that briefly bloomed in 1930s and ’40s Britain. Despite the anxiety of representativity that Highmore confesses to have felt in assembling the book, he has succeeded in bringing together between its covers an intertextually suggestive sample of extracts (xii). More importantly, the Reader announces the discovery of a connected cluster of cognitive energies whose reach and density betoken the existence of a hitherto concealed sector of the intellectual cosmos. Like a constellation of distant stars, the elements of this newly sighted portion of the heavens have been emitting photons for a long time, but their collective light-rays are only now reaching our retinas.

     

    Pursuing this cosmological metaphor, we can say that the general introduction to the Reader serves as a kind of Hubble telescope with which to acquire a sense of the dense diachronic and synchronic dimensions of this universe of discourse, while the terse introductions to the book’s five sections and its thirty-eight chapters serve as precision prisms with which to scan the many bodies that constitute it, as well as the spaces that lie between them. In explaining the realities that these lenses espy, Highmore often avails himself of a neutral-sounding verb, “to register,” and its cognates. This move often makes it seem as if the approximations to the study of everyday life that Highmore proffers perform in a manner akin to that of a primitive camera. That is, Highmore’s use of “to register” may seem to suggest that the diverse approaches on display in the Reader passively record the assorted phenomena that make up the stuff of daily life, and that his own commentary on these approaches fulfills a similar function.

     

    But just as a photograph is more than the impression of light particles on contact paper, so of course is every act of registration an interpretative performance, whether consciously or no. Thus, Highmore does more than merely “register” the different approaches to everyday life that he makes available in the Reader. For one thing, through the five categories into which he organizes the various modalities of attending to the daily and through which he frames the field (“Situating the everyday,” “Everyday life and ‘national’ culture,” “Ethnography near and far,” “Reclamation work,” and “Everyday things”), Highmore implicitly foregrounds a certain set of emphases while eclipsing others, such as, for instance, the relationship between everyday life and political revolution. For another, in his own commentary Highmore also explicitly interprets the diverse origins and trajectories of these approaches, as well as their nature, usefulness, and potential. For instance, he is careful to note that portrayals of daily life do not provide a direct, unmediated, transparent picture of reality. In part this is so because day-to-day life is almost impossibly heterogeneous and heteroglossic. What is more, our methods of accessing the everyday are provisional and awkward, when not inadequate and opaque. Highmore repeatedly dwells on the diverse ways in which meditations on everydayness are couched, and he rightly notes that a focus on finding appropriate representational forms underlies the wide assortment of attempts to depict the quiddity of the quotidian.

     

    I now wish to enter a caveat: a brief review of a book as wide-ranging as The Everyday Life Reader can in no wise do justice to the smorgasbord of ideas, styles, and subjects that the book summons. Thus, instead of engaging in a Sisyphean struggle to describe the book’s entire contents, in what follows I stress the significance of one tendency within everyday life studies that is represented in it: belief in the left-oppositional political value of focusing on day-to-day experience. In emphasizing this tendency, I am going against the grain of Highmore’s endorsement of Michel de Certeau’s view that any declaration of a politics of the everyday is as yet “simply premature” (13). At the same time, however, the remainder of my review takes advantage of the politically pluralist spirit that animates Highmore’s editorial endeavor.

     

    Having said that, I should note another point of slippage between my review and one feature of its object. In a crucial sense, the cosmological figure with which I have represented the Reader as intellectual construct is not altogether apt. One of the understandings that underlie such disparate delvings into the daily as George Simmel’s scrutiny of the fragment and Dorothy Smith’s feminist sociology of subject-hood (see Chapters 29 and 27 respectively) is that the study of everyday life remits us not to the starry heavens, but to the teeming terrain of the social. Indeed, one way in which critical analysis of everyday life differs markedly from the more socially detached strains of sundry post-isms is in its rather old-fashioned faith that however culturally constructed or codified it may be, “the real” really exists and is neither a ragbag of mystifications nor a never-endingly deferred relay of textual effects. However, to accept this understanding of everyday life does not entail a reversion either to militant pre- or anti-theoretical fundamentalism, or to a naïvely reflectionist faith in one or another convention of realism. Rather, among other things, it entails an eye for the traces of social meaning in everyday phenomena and their forms, as well as an ear for the harmony that underpins the din of daily life and its representations. An awareness of poststructuralism’s lessons about the ways in which regimes of representation operate can clearly be of assistance in this enterprise, as can a Marxist-inflected appreciation of contradiction. In this volume, Stuart Hall’s essay on photographic representations of West Indian immigrants to Britain evinces a particularly telling instance of how the study of everyday life can effectively integrate textual and materialist analyses of people and their representations.

     

    Hall’s merger of analytic modes is echoed in another text reproduced here, the introduction to a Yale French Studies special issue on everyday life. Editors Alice Kaplan and Kristin Ross aver that everyday life analysis can offer an alternative to the subject/object opposition that lies at the core of much European thought and is exemplified by such contrasting intellectual currents as phenomenology on one side of the divide and structuralism on the other. They further assert that, as against the subjectivist ascription of pure intentionality to social agents on the one hand and the dour designation of discursive determinism to structures and systems on the other, everyday life insists on the centrality of in-betweenness, on the irreducible liminality of lived experience, and on the mediational and strange-making mettle of many attempts at representing its character. Furthermore, they suggest that to read everyday life is as much an act of poeisis (understood as creative or transformational act), as it is of the realist representations of mimesis: “everyday life harbors the texture of social change; to perceive it at all is to recognize the necessity of its conscious transformation” (79).

     

    Questions of consciousness, creativity, and perception loom large in the work of one of the twentieth century’s most influential and productive advocates of attending to the everyday, Sigmund Freud. Indeed, as Highmore notes, the notion of Everyday Life is analogous to the core Freudian concept of the Unconscious (6). Both are often understood in spatial terms, inasmuch as they designate a reality that hovers behind or below or above or aslant the seeming self-evidence of the senses, and both are only partly accessible to rational inquiry. As with the Unconscious, there is something at once searchingly intimate and stubbornly ungraspable about everyday life (and as Highmore suggests, about “every-night” life as well). Yet just as Freud ascribed preternatural powers to the Unconscious in his explanations of the well-springs of human action and emotion, so too do some of everyday life’s most distinguished students accord the latter an originary primacy, in intellectual life as well as in our daily, non-specialized being-in-the-world. Indeed, for figures such as Agnes Heller (who is not featured here), everyday life is the ultimate source and horizon of knowledge, critique, and action. Moreover, the meanings of the real may reside not only at the official addresses to which its study has traditionally referred us, but also in such unsuspected locations as those zones of experience we habitually designate as being drearily devoid of significance–among them, anomie, ennui, and reverie. Furthermore, according to a prominent strain of everyday life studies to which I have already alluded, it is also in the realm of the seemingly superficial that indirect forms of resistance to dominant and oppressive socio-political and economic structures may be found. Thus, for instance, in certain contexts critical readings of clothing styles may yield as much politically relevant meaning as sober analyses of state-forms.

     

    At this point in my exposition of the Reader, it is perhaps pertinent to question the extent to which its content brings us genuine news. After all, to insist nowadays on the political significance of scrutinizing soap operas or on the celebration of style as subversion is to court a languid yawn of unsurprised assent in response. However, Highmore is quite alert to the fact that the everyday has been the object of scrutiny for decades across a range of disciplines and departments in the Humanities and Social Sciences, as well as in cultural practices such as literary writing and photography. In literature, Joyce’s Ulysses stands as an early example of the critical privileging of the quotidian, even earlier instances of which may be found in Baudelaire’s poems about Paris or in the photographs of daily Parisian scenes taken by his contemporary, Charles Negre. As for theoretical reflections on everyday life, the Reader reproduces work from the 1920s by Walter Benjamin and Siegfried Krackauer on topics as stolidly quotidian as repetitive labor and boredom. Thus, the insistence on the significance of the everyday is hardly novel. What is new, by contrast, is that hitherto disparate and diverse disciplinary and interdisciplinary approximations to the quotidian have within the past two decades begun to coalesce into a more or less coherent academic-artistic-intellectual formation, one that has established itself “in contradistinction to other tendencies within the human sciences” (31).

     

    In the English-speaking academy, this formation’s most immediate institutional precursor was cultural studies. Highmore is particularly cognizant of the parallels between the work of cultural studies and the labor of bestowing significance upon quotidian life, and he notes the many points at which the modus operandi of both projects intersect. Indeed, Highmore’s announced agenda is to develop a cultural studies approach to everyday life. What might such an approach entail? Highmore advances several methods as being particularly apposite in attacking the tangled underbrush of the everyday, among them, thick description in the ethnographic and sociological mode, and defamiliarization in the writing of history and literary criticism. In making the ordinary extraordinary, and the familiar unfamiliar, Highmore observes, artists and others can detach the dull veneer of everydayness that clings to daily life and masks the latter’s manifold meanings (25).

     

    Again, at this juncture one might reasonably ask whether we have not been here before. Yes and no, Highmore seems to be saying. Yes, inasmuch as anthropological and sociological ethnographies, for instance, have been querying the quotidian for many a decade. No, insofar as they have not done so from the standpoint of the self-aware and pluralistic ingathering of intersecting perspectives that Highmore convenes under the rubrics of “everyday life theory” or “everyday life studies,” both of which stand athwart conventional circumscriptions of knowledge production. Apropos this point, Highmore notes that academic engagement with the everyday constitutes itself not so much into a field tout court, as into a “para-” or “meta-” field, one that is often interstitial in aim and idiom. Furthermore, the sometimes surplus or supplementary status of everyday theorizing, he ventures, is consonant (or as he puts it, “contiguous”) with the vague and vast nature of its problematic referent, which is by definition abundant in content and amorphous in shape.

     

    But neither the blurredness of everyday life’s boundaries or its holdings, nor the imprecise ways in which we register its meanings, ought to result in resignation or self-recrimination, Highmore insists. Rather, to acknowledge the messiness of construction-work at the site of the everyday is to breathe the heady air that animates the building of a new conceptual edifice. Furthermore, this work is, or can be, at once the turf of skilled builder and bricoleur alike. What, then, is the purview of everyday life studies? How do its transdisciplinary modes of knowing clash or coalesce? In addressing the second of these questions, Highmore sketches out a vector of tendencies that typify the study of everyday life. In his view, such tendencies can be provisionally grouped into a series of dyads: particular/general, agency/structure, experiences/institutions, feelings/discourses, and resistance/power. In turn, these dyads are linked to the methodological operations of micro- and macro-analysis (5). Those aspects of daily life that are often approached through these conceptual and methodological rubrics also seem to lend themselves to binary enumeration: the street and the home, the private and the public, prescribed rites and spontaneous moments, among others. But these pairs are by no means to be regarded as fixed. Rather, to return to a point made earlier, they are to be understood relationally: it is in the state of flux between–or sparked by–such pairs that many everyday-life theories seek to find meaning.

     

    There is of course a tension between the desire to wrest concrete sense out of a phenomenon as enormous as everyday life and the shape shifting and hard-to-apprehend quality of its character. Highmore poses the question as to whether rigor and systemic analysis–an orientation and a practice beloved of social scientists in general and Marxists in particular–can be adequate to the task of reckoning with everyday life. Can the filigreed and fugitive meanings often associated with the realm of quotidian experience be properly captured by the freeze-framing operations of rigorous analysis? Conversely, how can the study of social minutiae transcend the mere cataloguing of heterogeneous data? In his own commentary, Highmore leaves these questions open, and collectively the texts assembled in the Reader provide us with no hard and fast answers either. Jacques Rancière–historian of proletarian dreams and desires–captures the tentative and exploratory nature of much everyday life theorizing: “those who venture into this labyrinth must be honestly forewarned that no answers will be supplied” (250).

     

    A need for cut-and-dried answers can sometimes give evidence of anxiety. Among leftists (such as this reviewer), such anxiety may derive from deep-rooted doubts about the political efficacy or desirability of researching or representing everyday life. If, as a Communist commentator whose work is presented here once observed, “life is conservative,” and if, as he also noted, “art, by nature, is conservative; it is removed from life,” then what for left-wingers would be the point of studying the one or practicing the other (86, 87)? The identity of that commentator supplies us with one possible answer. Leon Trotsky, Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army and theorist of permanent revolution, strongly advocated the study of everyday life, precisely because he thought that therein lay both the seeds of Russia’s revolutionary transformation and the obstacles to the latter’s realization. In fact, the Marxist canon provides contemporary leftist approaches to the study of quotidian experience with an ample archive of usable ideas and attitudes. After all, Das Kapital famously begins with an empirico-philosophical discussion of the ubiquitous presence and power of the commodity form in modern capitalist life. Commodities, as Marx taught us, lead a peculiar dual existence, and do so in at least two ways: first, by virtue of their Janus-faced identity as use- and exchange-values; second, by presenting a pristine face to consumers that often occludes their sullied origins at the point of production. As Highmore suggests, this classic Marxian insight is being rediscovered by a new generation of radicals who are denouncing the extensive structures of everyday neo-imperial exploitation that are typically obscured by the branding of such ostensibly banal objects as sneakers and bananas (18).

     

    Such commodities are often produced or assembled by young women who constitute a large component of the new supra-national proletariat that has emerged in the so-called Free-Trade Zones implanted by Northern financial institutions, governments, and corporations in Southern nations, in collusion with local comprador capital and neo-liberal regimes. Subjected to harsh working conditions and paid a pittance for their arduously repetitive labor, such women have also been at the forefront of efforts to organize against these and other forms of everyday exploitation. Kaplan and Ross note that everyday life “has always lain heavily on the shoulders of women” (78). It is no accident, therefore, that much of the most productive work on daily experience has been undertaken by women engaged in struggles for their emancipation from patriarchal paradigms and practices, such as the British feminist social historian Carolyn Steedman, whose writings on gendered narration and remembering are excerpted in Chapter 26. Often, such work has frowned upon the social remoteness of much theoretical discourse, even that of an avowedly feminist stripe. In “Notes toward a Politics of Location,” the poet Adrienne Rich articulated an emblematic questioning of the priorities and protocols of certain strains within critical theory:

     

    theory--the seeing of patterns, showing the forest as well as the trees--theory can be a dew that rises from the earth and collects in the rain cloud and returns to earth over and over. But if it doesn't smell of the earth, it isn't good for the earth. (213-14)

     

    In her essay, Rich also laments the distorting effects of material, “racial,” and national privilege on the outlook of white North American feminists such as herself. Responding to stories about, and reflections by, working women the world over, she asks why their ideas and inclinations are rarely allowed admittance to the rather rarefied regions of First World theorizing.

     

    In 2004, twenty years after the first publication of Rich’s essay, thousands of students at U.S. universities are involved in extracurricular efforts to reclaim the Commons by making common cause with workers in the archipelago of apparel-producing sweatshops scattered across the global South.1 By so doing, these students are puncturing the bubble of their insulated privilege and effectively heeding Rich’s appeal for the de-centering of Euro-American critical theories. Moreover, in supporting the struggles for justice waged by the producers of such everyday student garb as collegiate caps, anti-sweatshop activists take as their point of departure what their international allies themselves regard as just wages and working conditions. Simultaneously, they seek to educate university administrators, fellow students, and brand-shoppers about the troubled trajectory of the commodities that they purchase and endorse. Recently, the movement has moved a step further by paying attention to exploitative everyday economic relations on their own campuses. In its multi-pronged and knowledge-rich activism, the U.S. student-labor solidarity movement–and its counterparts abroad–evinces a profound practical and theoretical understanding of several motifs that mark the landscape of everyday life studies, among them the idea that alienated everyday life contains the seeds of its own de-alienation and the notion that heterogeneous regional and national responses to everyday modernity make manifest both the discontinuity of global capitalism’s reach and the unitary nature of its expansion.

     

    How global in origin or identity is the study of everyday life? Highmore notes that, thus far, everyday life studies seems to be a resolutely Euro-American enterprise, and he worries that this might result in an unwelcome if unwitting ethnocentrism (xiii). A cursory scan of the table of contents indeed confirms that most of the excerpted texts are by British, French, German, and North American authors, and that those contributors whose national origins lie outside the Euro-American belt either labor within it or have their books published there. Nonetheless, perhaps Highmore is worrying unduly. For one thing, in these interconnected times, clear-cut divisions between North and South are as dated as unblurred genres. (Rural revolutionaries ensconced in the remote highlands of Mexico’s Southeast have made this point evident by networking via border-crossing email with Northern urban internautas.) For another, the critical study of everyday life and its representation in cultural artifacts is already quite global in scope and has been for some time. In support of this claim, one could cite texts such as the short stories of the Argentinean writer, Julio Cortázar, with their quixotic explorations of the infra-ordinary world of quotidian existence, or the work by critical South African anthropologists on everyday forms of resistance to apartheid. Moreover, a new generation of anti-neo-liberal activists in the South–from Buenos Aires to Cochabamba to Delhi and beyond–is engaged in crafting novel political practices that are based on the need to satisfy with dignity the multiple daily demands of social reproduction. One such group, Johannesburg’s Electricity Crisis Committee–whose “struggle electricians” illegally (and freely) reconnect to the grid indigent consumers who have been disconnected by newly privatized utility companies–exemplifies the everyday-focused ruses and strategies that have emerged in the counter-capitals of modernity. Thus while the fear that the study of everyday life can degenerate into self-regarding ethnocentric superficiality is not entirely baseless, an awareness of the daily work of border-crossing social movements makes it clear that things need not be so.

     

    Nonetheless, it remains the case that the study of everyday life does not in itself necessarily entail either an internationalist or a progressive outlook. The contrasting attitudes to everyday modernity evidenced by George Simmel (Chapter 29) and his student Walter Benjamin (Chapter 2) make this clear. In scrutinizing sundry signs and objects for their social significance, Benjamin was motivated by the stubborn optimism of one who believed that modernity’s edifice could be rebuilt from the bricks strewn amid its rubble. Benjamin’s onetime teacher Simmel also rummaged amid modernity’s debris, but where his famous pupil espied evidence of salvation, Simmel drew repeated attention to the sharp shocks sustained by the human sensorium in the hurly burly of modern life. Still others, such as Guy Debord (Chapter 23), have spoken starkly about the all-embracing alienation that enervates daily experience while counterintuitively celebrating the utopian undercurrents that inhere in dailiness. Yet all three thinkers–along with myriad others–insist doggedly upon the importance of understanding the everydayness of everyday life. Moreover, while thus reiterating the significance of registering the quotidian, many such figures have resisted or rejected the will to conceptual coherence that often accompanies the championing of a paradigm. Whatever the reasons for this dual doggedness and demureness may be, and they are surely multiple, it is at least clear that any attempt to capture the totality of everyday life studies must perforce fall short of its aim. It is perhaps for this reason that many of those who attend to the everyday frequently express themselves metaphorically. Debord, for instance, denounced everyday life as “a sort of reservation for good natives who keep modern society running without understanding it” (240). But not all is opaque in the study of la vie quotidienne. Debord, after all, could also declare with lapidary limpidity that “everyday life is the measure of all things: of the fulfillment or rather the nonfulfillment of human relations; of the use of lived time; of artistic experimentation; of revolutionary politics” (239). Doubtless, the steering of a passage from social unreadability to readability (or from invisibility to visibility) is one of the governing tropes and operations among the panoply of perspectives represented in the Reader.

     

    At any rate, the Reader provides proof, if proof were still needed, of why everyday matters matter a great deal. (Newcomers to everyday life studies can complement their exploration of the Reader with a perusal of its companion volume, Highmore’s Everyday Life and Cultural Theory: An Introduction.) Located at the fountainhead of some of the most influential paradigms and procedures of knowledge production of the twentieth century–and now newly re-emergent in the first decade of the twenty-first–the concept of everyday life is enormously consequential for the study of human thought and action. That much, surely, is by now beyond doubt. What is still up for grabs, is how best to approach and assess its protean personality. With its wide-ranging selections and its thought-provoking framings, Highmore’s Everyday Life Reader provides us with multiple points of entry into the study of that complex congeries of times, spaces, technologies, practices, institutions, ideologies, material conditions, emotional states, thoughts, sensations, signs, and symbols in the midst of whose force-field we all live.

     

    Notes

     

    1. For an overview of the movement’s origins, activities, and goals, see Featherstone.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Eagleton, Terry. After Theory. New York: Basic, 2003.
    • Featherstone, Liza, and United Students against Sweatshops: The Making of a Movement. Students against Sweatshops. New York: Verso, 2002.
    • Highmore, Ben. Everyday Life and Cultural Theory: An Introduction. London: Routledge, 2002.
    • Said, Edward W. Humanism and Democratic Criticism. New York: Columbia UP, 2004.
    • Rich, Adrienne. “Notes Toward a Politics of Location.” Blood, Bread, and Poetry: Selected Prose, 1979-1985. New York: Norton, 1986.

     

  • Supporting the Cage

    Andy Weaver

    Department of English
    University of Alberta
    aweaver@ualberta.ca

     

    Review of: David W. Bernstein and Christopher Hatch, eds., Writings through John Cage’s Music, Poetry, and Art.Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2001.

     

    Agree or disagree with his aesthetics, his ideas, or his politics, no one seriously engaged in studying the arts of the twentieth century can afford to ignore John Cage or his wide-ranging body of work. His influence on experimental forms of music is well documented, but his achievements and influence in the fields of literature, visual arts, and film are also significant and worthy of more discussion. Writings through John Cage’s Music, Poetry, and Art, edited by David W. Bernstein and Christopher Hatch, is an attempt, as Bernstein states in his introduction, to “give readers a sense of the importance of Cage’s creative activities in a variety of fields and an understanding of how much research has yet to be done” (6). It is both the book’s greatest achievement and most significant failure that it accomplishes both of these aims.

     

    The book is an extension of the “Here Comes Everybody: The Music, Poetry, and Art of John Cage” conference, which took place at Mills College in Oakland, California in the autumn of 1995, and so “was the first international assemblage of scholars and creative artists to examine Cage’s work after his death on August 12, 1992” (1); indeed, the idea for the conference developed less than a year after Cage’s death (ix). This link between Cage’s death and the conference is carried over in the essays included in Writings, as almost all of the authors implicitly focus on the absence of John Cage, the man, either through intricately describing his working practices, relating personal anecdotes about Cage, describing what Cage meant to them and their work, or, sometimes, by mixing all three of these perspectives. For this reason, the book becomes a celebration of John Cage’s life and his art. Perhaps due to the short time that passed between Cage’s death and the germination of this project, the book is, for the most part, more of a wake for a great man than a critical examination of Cage’s works.

     

    This is not to say that there isn’t useful information in the book; each essay offers interesting facts about Cage’s creative process, the performance of his work, and the scoring of his work. The problem is that there is often a lack of critical examination of many of these facts. The result is that the essays in the book could be divided into two distinct types: those offering ideological critiques of Cage’s work and those documenting Cage’s formal procedures. The former engage intellectually with Cage’s aesthetics, his beliefs, and his politics and seek to open up ways to engage Cage’s work critically; they offer important insights into how Cage’s personal beliefs, such as his devotion to Zen, chance, and political and social anarchy, both affected his work and offer insights into the works themselves. The second type of essays, those documenting Cage’s creative process, generally avoids issues of ideology in an attempt to describe objectively how Cage created his works. These essays, it seems to me, are less valuable, precisely because they refuse to deal with the issues that Cage found so important in life and art; they focus on Cage, not on his works, and so they fail to open up avenues of investigation into Cage’s music, visual art, or literary texts.

     

    The book starts quite strongly. The first essay, by David W. Bernstein, examines Cage’s music in relation to the large umbrella terms “avant-garde,” “modernism,” and “postmodernism.” Bernstein offers a nuanced investigation of Cage’s art and his politics in order to highlight both the experimental as well as the traditional aspects of Cage’s music. Bernstein argues against the unexamined conflation of experimentation with postmodernism and tradition with modernism, instead showing how Cage exemplified aspects of both those terms. By drawing on the influence that the early avant-garde, especially dadaism but also futurism, had on Cage, Bernstein argues persuasively that Cage’s chance-based musical works do indeed have a distinct political agenda:

     

    when considering Cage's compositional methods, one finds that the postmodern and the modern coexist without contradiction. The same is true of Cage's political and social agenda. Through his redefinition of musical form Cage created works modeling desirable political and social structures. He was able to renew the modernist project dedicated to political and social change through art using postmodernist artistic techniques. As we assess Cage's role within the development of twentieth-century thought and musical style and intensify the critical evaluation of his creative output, it is crucial that we consider both the traditional and the radical aspects of his aesthetics and compositional style. This formidable task may very well occupy scholars for many years to come. (40)

     

    The essay refuses to categorize Cage within the unproductive binaries that Cage himself constantly railed against; the result is an appreciation of the complex balancing job Cage performed as a political artist who avoided politics in his art and as a man who respected earlier traditions at the same time that he worked to dismantle their influences. Bernstein addresses the interplay between Cage’s political anarchy and his use of chance operations, and, more importantly, he historicizes Cage within a continuum. Cage, Bernstein argues, openly borrowed from earlier avant-garde movements while he also updated their methods; he remained committed to the modernist avant-garde’s belief in social improvement through art, but refocused artistic practice around an anarchistic refusal to engage in oppositional politics.

     

    Jonathan D. Katz, in the essay that follows Bernstein’s, expands on Cage’s political beliefs and strategies while refocusing the area of investigation onto and through Cage’s closeted homosexuality. Katz proposes that Cage’s silence over his own sexuality strengthened his interest both in the use of silence in music and in Eastern philosophies such as Zen, which stress the positive aspects of silence. Biographical criticism is a dangerous method to use when dealing with an artist like Cage, who attempted to remove as much of his personality from his work as he could, but Katz offers a convincing argument as to why he believes this approach is appropriate: “there is a substantial difference between saying that the work is not about the life (antiexpressionism) and saying that the life has nothing to do with the work. There are, after all, modes of revelation of self that have nothing to do with expressionism” (47). Here Katz distinguishes between conventional biographical criticism, which uses the artist’s life to explain the meaning of a work of art, and a criticism that acknowledges the importance of biography to the interests and predispositions from which an artist will draw when producing art. Katz deftly uses Cage’s homosexuality, or more specifically his refusal to acknowledge his homosexuality, as the primary reason for Cage’s use of silence in his works. From this starting point, Cage became increasingly interested in Zen’s belief that silence was necessary to inner harmony, since “Zen repositioned the closet, not as a source of repression or anxiety, but as a means to achieve healing; it was in not talking about–and hence not reifying–one’s troubles that healing began” (45). Katz also points out the revolutionary nature of Cage’s use of silence, considering that the use of silence was developed during the height of public popularity for abstract expressionism, an art movement that concentrated on creating grand Romantic myths about artists such as Jackson Pollock and Robert Motherwell. But perhaps most importantly, Katz draws a parallel between Cage’s silence and his political beliefs. Like Bernstein, Katz argues that Cage’s art was implicitly political; for Katz, silence provided Cage with a way to critique society’s values without engaging in oppositional politics, something that Cage believed only perpetuated what was supposedly being argued against:

     

    silence was much more than conventionally unmusical; it provided a route toward an active challenge of the assumptions and prejudices that gave rise to homophobic oppression in the first place. For Cage, silence was an ideal form of resistance, carefully attuned to the requirements of the cold war consensus, at least in its originary social-historical context. There are both surrender and resistance in these silences, in relation not of either/or but of both/and[...]. That Cage's self-silencing was in keeping with the requirements of the infamously homophobic McCarthy era should not obscure the fact that it was also internally and ideologically consistent with his larger aesthetic politics. (53-4)

     

    While Katz’s essay does not deal with all of the political aspects of Cage’s work (for example, an analysis of Cage’s commitment to political anarchism would have been interesting in this context), Katz effectively brings to the forefront the often-overlooked political aspects of Cage’s work.

     

    Austin Clarkson’s essay, “The Intent of the Musical Moment: Cage and the Transpersonal,” offers interesting insights into how Cage’s music was presentational, not representational. Presentational arts, Clarkson argues, create their own codes of meaning as they are expressed, while representational arts rely on a prior understanding of the codes by both the artist and the recipients. For this reason, Clarkson argues that Cage was not avant-garde; the avant-gardists still believed their art to be representational, since they “took their works to be fully realized creations and not experiments in the sense of trials or tests” (66). Clarkson’s emphasis on the creative role of the audience in the presentational arts, a belief that Cage held, is an important point, and it might allow Clarkson to draw connections between Cage’s music and other contemporary fields that share this belief, such as L=A=N=G=U=A=G=Epoetry (or even Cage’s own poetry). However, Clarkson does not draw these connections and remains somewhat narrowly focused on the world of music. Moreover, Clarkson’s assertion that Cage was purely an experimental artist and not an avant-gardist reinforces the strict and rather unhelpful divisions between aesthetic camps, divisions that all of Cage’s mature work attempted to undercut. Unlike Bernstein and Katz, who work to show how these boundaries are far more fluid than critics would admit, Clarkson mans the barricades. For example, Clarkson does not address the fact that the conflation between art and life that he states lies at the heart of presentational art also forms the core of the historical avant-garde movements.1 Moreover, he also overlooks the connection between Cage’s political and social anarchy and his desire to make the audience part of the creative element of the work. Still, despite these drawbacks, Clarkson’s focus on the creative relationship called for by presentational art is an important point, especially since he stresses that both the audience and the artist must learn to adapt to these new roles.

     

    Bernstein’s, Katz’s, and Clarkson’s essays are particularly illuminating because they demonstrate that an awareness of Cage’s aesthetic and political beliefs adds to the levels of possible meaning in all of Cage’s post-1950 work. These writers focus on explaining and expanding possible nuances in the works through a knowledge of Cage’s personal beliefs. However, most of the remaining essays abandon this practice of theorizing levels of meaning in Cage’s oeuvre in favor of merely describing Cage’s compositional processes. The result is that, while useful facts are offered, there are very few moments of true critical insight into Cage’s aesthetics or his works in the bulk of the book.

     

    In the essay “Cage as Performer,” Gordon Mumma offers an interesting but standard brief biography of Cage as a performer. Deborah Campana, in “As Time Passes,” discusses how time remained central to Cage’s compositional strategies throughout his different musical periods, but she offers no ideas about why this was so or what light it might shed on his work. In “David Tudor and the Solo for Piano,” John Holzapfel discusses Tudor’s active role in interpreting Cage’s music, stressing the collaborative nature of their relationship but offers no thoughts on how this affects Cage’s music. Jackson Mac Low offers a necessarily brief and admittedly limited discussion of Cage’s writings in “Cage’s Writings up to the Late 1980s.” Mac Low argues that Cage never sought to expunge personal decisions from his writings, but the broad overview that Mac Low offers doesn’t allow for in-depth analysis.

     

    The collection also includes the transcripts from two panel discussions at the “Here Comes Everybody” conference. The panel on “Cage’s Influence” was composed of Gordon Mumma (chair), Allan Kaprow, James Tenney, Christian Wolff, Alvin Curram, and Maryanne Amasher. More so than most of the pieces included, this discussion is openly laudatory of Cage; it offers few insights and serves more as a chance for those involved to thank Cage publicly for opening avenues of investigation that allowed them to form their careers. In fact, they all agree that Cage’s influence was more indirect, through his role as a trailblazer, than direct. The second panel discussion, “Cage and the Computer,” offers more insight, but in terms of detailing Cage’s compositional practices rather than advancing any theoretical insights into the importance of the computer to Cage. Composed of James Pritchett (chair), James Tenney, Frances White, and Andrew Culver (Cage’s long-serving computer assistant), the panel describes how early work with computers developed, but mostly this piece is interesting for Culver’s anecdotes about how Cage worked with the computer: he didn’t. Culver did all of the computer work himself, finding out what Cage wanted and then making it happen.

     

    Henning Lohner’s discussion of “The Making of Cage’s One” closes the book. It is an interesting blend of interview, personal anecdote, documentation, and critical discussion on the topic of Lohner’s collaboration with Cage on the experimental film One (Cage’s last major work). The piece serves as a biography of the collaboration, an elegy (Cage died after the film was completed but before it was premiered), and as a witness to Cage’s compositional strategies. Moreover, it is a fractured piece of writing, paratactically juxtaposing interviews with Cage, documentation surrounding the film, anecdotes of working with Cage, and thoughts on the medium of film. As such, it is the only non-linear piece of writing in the book (Clarkson does attempt something different in his essay, where he includes a series of quotes from Cage after his essay, but that essay is straightforward in terms of structure). This point leads me to one of the major drawbacks of this collection: there is too much similarity and consensus among the writers and essays included.

     

    Considering the short time-span between Cage’s death and the germination of the conference from which this book sprang, it is hardly surprising that the essayists came together to praise Cage, not to bury him. However, considering Cage’s incessant search for experimentation in all of his artistic endeavors, it seems a poor tribute to him to ignore the practices and aesthetics that he worked so hard to establish. Cage, for example, was a noted anarchist (a fact rarely addressed or even acknowledged in most of the essays); part of his desire to do away with the conventional structures of music, language, and the visual arts sprang directly from his belief that these structures upheld conventional opinions about society, opinions that Cage certainly did not share. For example, Cage often stated his preference for “nonsyntaxed” language: “Due to N. O. Brown’s remark that syntax is the arrangement of the army, and Thoreau’s that when he heard a sentence he heard feet marching, I became devoted to nonsytactical ‘demilitarized’ language” (Introduction). The connection between doing away with the accepted codes of language and critiquing the status quo is obvious in Cage’s statement; for the authors in the book to undertake such standard investigations of Cage and his work is to turn away from his implicit critiques of logical communication and stifle these critiques under the weight of convention. Moreover, Cage constantly and often proudly contradicted himself; this was not merely an attempt to be difficult or inscrutable (both ideas were tied in Cage’s mind with the Romantic myth of the artist, and were to be avoided at all cost).2 Cage’s contradictions came from his distrust of consensus (a point which only Bernstein and Katz make), a distrust that arose partly from his belief in anarchy (which holds that reifications of any type, even personal characteristics, should be avoided in favor of openness to circumstances), and partly from his interest in Zen (which states that logic is not the only way, or indeed the best way to understand the world). It would be a far greater tribute to Cage and his work if his critics here openly debated the ideas, importance, and merit of Cage’s work. As he so often stated, Cage was not interested in creating art, which in his mind was dead and reified; however, the consistently laudatory tone of the essays implicitly moves Cage’s works toward that category, toward installing him as another Great Artist within the canon.3

     

    Perhaps the greatest drawback to the collection, though, can be illustrated in relation to the two essays not yet discusssed: Constance Lewallen’s “Cage and the Structure of Chance” and Ray Kass’s “Diary: Cage’s Mountain Lake Workshop, April 8-15, 1990.” Coincidentally, both of these essays address Cage’s visual works; this, however, isn’t the problem. Both Lewallen and Kass attempt to detail Cage’s creative process, and it is this attempt that leads to the problem: both essays focus on Cage, the man as artist, and, as such, both essays undercut Cage’s attempt to divorce his own ego from his work. Indeed, neither Lewallen nor Kass deal critically with Cage’s works at all. Instead, they focus on Cage’s creative process in minute detail, cataloging his every decision. The result is that, although Cage does appear to be rather idiosyncratic, he is once again reshaped in the critics’ minds as a Great Artist. For example, note the laudatory tone and the emphasis on Cage the Artist (not on the works that Cage happened to produce) in the following:

     

    Cage managed to challenge just about all of Western culture's received ideas about what art is. If, from the Renaissance on, art has been regarded as a means of communication, Cage instead defined art as self-alteration, a means to "sober the mind." If art has served to give form to the chaos of life's experiences, he created an art that as nearly as possible combines with, rather than gives shape to, life. If art has been regarded as a giver of truths through the "self-expressed individuality of artist," Cage saw it rather as an exploration of how nature itself functions as a means to open the mind and spirit to the beauty of life with a minimum of artistic expression or interpenetration. Finally, if art has traditionally expressed meaning through symbol or metaphor, he preferred that viewers provide their own meaning according to their individual personality and experience. (Lewallen 242-3)

     

    One can’t help but feel that no matter what “art has been regarded as,” for Lewallen, Cage would have heroically challenged it. I don’t mean to downplay Cage’s sense of experimentation, but the Romantic myth of the artist is strikingly apparent in both Lewallen’s and Kass’s pieces (and runs implicitly through most of the other essays). Lewallen refuses to contextualize Cage, and thus there is no sense of how Cage learned from others (Suzuki, Fuller, Thoreau, Kropotkin, etc.) the challenges that he put into place. This decontextualization fuels the transformation of Cage from experimenter in the arts into one of the reified, understandable Artists of the Canon by writing the narrative of Cage’s life and artistic achievements within the frame of the grand, solitary, creative genius. Not only does this transformation violate Cage’s beliefs, but it also serves to tame his challenges, which become recuperated within the framework of Art (Peter Bürger and Paul Mann, for example, both describe how the art world recuperated the challenges against the institution of art made by the avant-garde movements by first claiming these challenges as art). Furthermore, Cage’s works are themselves overlooked in an attempt to install him firmly within the tradition of artistic revolution, a type of artistic anti-tradition that in every way deeply depends on what it supposedly is trying to undermine.

     

    In the end, what a book like Writings through John Cage’s Music, Poetry, and Art does is to display the conservatism of most criticism of experimental art. Despite the constant challenges offered by artists in all of the different media–challenges which Cage in many ways helped to nurture and perpetuate–critics refuse to adapt either the form or the content of their discussions. As such, the critics play a front-line role in recuperating experimental art and artists such as John Cage. Having said that, I’m not entirely sure how to avoid playing this role; however, we might learn from the example of the experimental artists themselves and break down the conventions of academic criticism. If Cage taught us nothing else, it is that there are ways outside of conventional logic to understand the world and all things in it; perhaps, then, it is time for critics at least to gesture toward the idea that conventional logic is not necessarily the most appropriate nor the only way to engage with experimental art.

     

    Writings through John Cage’s Music, Poetry, and Art could serve as a useful introduction to John Cage’s work, especially in the field of music. It contains many useful facts about his working process; however, this raw data is not examined effectively by the essayists included in this book. Aside from the first three essays and a few of the later ones, there is little here that will significantly expand the way readers might encounter John Cage’s works. What the book points to is the divide in Cage studies between those critics offering ideological critiques of his works, critiques which actively engage with the ideas and beliefs that Cage brought to his works, and those who focus on Cage himself. In the end, Writings shows that the focus must shift from the latter to the former if studies of Cage are going to increase the critical appreciation of John Cage’s music, poetry, and art.

     

    Notes

     

    1. Peter Bürger, for example, sees the conflation of art and life as one of the fundamental tenets of the early avant-garde. In Theory of the Avant-Garde, he states that “the European avant-garde movements can be defined as an attack on the status of art in bourgeois society. What is negated is not an earlier form of art (a style) but art as an institution that is unassociated with the life praxis of men” (49).

     

    2. Take, for example, this exchange between Richard Kostelanetz and Cage in Kostelanetz’s Conversing With Cage:

     

    [Kostelanetz] Once someone asked you a very dull question, trying to show that you had been inconsistent in a line of reasoning, and I remember that with that marvelous laugh of yours you said, 'Well, you won't find me consistent.' [Cage] Emerson felt this way about consistency, you know; but our education leads us to think that it's wrong to be inconsistent. All consistency is, really, is getting one idea and not deviating from it, even if the circumstances change so radically that one ought to deviate [...]. (45)

     

    3. Cage made it clear that he did not want to create art, which, like the dadaists, he saw as cut-off from life:

     

    I RATHER THINK THAT CONTEMPORARY MUSIC WOULD BE THERE IN THE DARK TOO, BUMPING INTO THINGS, KNOCKING OTHERS OVER AND IN GENERAL ADDING TO THE DISORDER THAT CHARACTERIZES LIFE (IF IT IS OPPOSED TO ART) RATHER THAN ADDING TO THE ORDER AND STABILIZED TRUTH BEAUTY AND POWER THAT CHARACTERIZE A MASTERPIECE (IF IT IS OPPOSED TO LIFE). AND IS IT? YES IT IS. (Silence 46)

     

    Works Cited:

     

    • Bürger, Peter. Theory of the Avant-Garde. Trans. Michael Shaw. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1984.
    • Cage, John. Introduction. Writing Through Finnegans Wake. Spec. supplement to James Joyce Quarterly. Vol. 15, U of Tulsa Monograph Ser. 16. N.p.: n.p., 1978.
    • —. Silence. Hanover: Wesleyan UP, 1973.
    • Kostelanetz, Richard. Conversing With Cage. New York: Limelight, 1988.

     

  • Aesthetic Primacy, Cultural Identity, and Human Agency

    Michael S. Martin

    English Department
    Temple University
    msmartin@temple.edu

     

    Review of: Emory Elliott, Louis Fretas Caton, and Jeffrey Rhyne, eds., Aesthetics in a Multicultural Age.New York and Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002.

     

    “Let us, for example, credit it to the honor of Kant that he should expatiate on the peculiar properties of the sense of touch with the naïveté of a country parson!”

     

    –Nietzsche, 3rd Essay, Section 6, in The Genealogy of Morals

     

    If we are to believe the arguments made by the contributors to Aesthetics in a Multicultural Age, aesthetics has been much maligned in twentieth-century literary theory, film studies, and art history. As an instance of this critical tendency, Winfried Fluck, whose essay “Aesthetics and Cultural Studies” foregrounds many of the central dilemmas inherent to any aesthetic judgment, invokes the contemporary German critic Urlich Schödlbauer when the latter writes, “whoever deals with aesthetics nowadays, dissects a corpse” (80). While the death of aesthetics is perhaps overstated here, the contributors to this volume all make separate, and mostly compelling, cases for the revitalization of the aesthetic in textual and extra-textual cultural productions. The formative problem in determining aesthetic judgment is perhaps best stated by Emory Elliott in the introduction when he writes that, because of multiculturalism and changes in canon formation, “many of the prior aesthetic criteria need to be re-examined and certainly the traditional hierarchies of merit need to be challenged” (5). Instead of being a methodology that discounts the aesthetic, he argues, multiculturalism makes it possible “to formulate new terminologies, categories, and processes of assessment” and is thus firmly grounded in the act of judgment (6).

     

    The essays in Aesthetics in a Multicultural Age were collected from a major conference held by the Center for Ideas and Society at the University of California, Riverside, in 1998. The conference attracted over 600 attendees, received substantial coverage in the Los Angeles Times, and was featured in a cover story for the 6 December 1998 edition of the Chronicle of Higher Education. In an attempt to add continuity and cohesion to the sometimes disparately themed essays, the editors have divided the book into three rubrics: “Challenges to Aesthetics of Diversity,” “Redefining Categories of Value and Difference,” and “Aesthetic Judgment and the Public Sphere.” Coeditor Elliott, an English professor at Riverside, has assembled a diverse field for this collection, including scholars in film studies, art history, African-American literature, and women’s studies. By and large, however, the majority of the theorists in this volume are well-known names from American Studies, predominantly nineteenth-century American literary critics, and most of them can be aligned with a neopragmatist school of thought, borrowing from the works of John Dewey and William James. Dewey provides a recurring point of reference for Fluck, Giles Gunn, and Heinz Ickstadt, all of whom consider Dewey’s Art as Experience (1934) as a model for a contingent, experiential basis for aesthetic interpretation. The other text most frequently referenced here is, not surprisingly, Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgment (1790). But whereas Dewey is generally enlisted on the side of a new and reoriented aesthetic project, Kant is usually associated with a threatened and possibly unworkable paradigm, his notion of disinterested beauty running counter to the contemporary emphasis on the political and social investments that must inevitably inform aesthetic judgment. Still, the best essays in the volume resist any tendency simply to pronounce aesthetic distinctions contingent or relative and leave it at that; they undertake to advance a new aesthetics in which something of Kant’s enlightenment project persists.

     

    Under the rubric of “Challenges to an Aesthetics of Diversity,” the first essay in the volume is perhaps also the finest: Satya P. Mohanty’s “Can Our Values Be Objective? On Ethics, Aesthetics, and Progressive Politics” is an extended criticism of the postmodern tendency to devalue any form of critical judgment. In response to the postmodern vantage, which is wary of universal normative values and claims and lacks grounding in the empirical method, Mohanty proffers a nuanced, fluid conception of objectivity. For Mohanty, Michel Foucault represents an ideological holism, or skepticism, while Noam Chomsky, with his theory of human betterment, provides an applicable model for a new version of objectivity that can indeed make a claim for that which is just, beautiful, and good. Mohanty supports a position that he terms “post-positivist” realism, though he recognizes that human beings are inevitably shaped by ideology and thus can never proceed with “theoretical innocence” (33). Instead, Mohanty posits a new version of objectivity, one that affirms the role of social and ideological error in any human inquiry, recognizes the primacy of empiricism (or referentiality) in any evaluation, and establishes a cross-cultural conception of knowledge.

     

    Giles Gunn, editor of the collection Early American Writing (1994), is also concerned with heuristic potential and the importance of culture in shaping human experience, yet his essay “The Pragmatics of the Aesthetic” argues more overtly for the virtues of specifically aesthetic texts. Gunn writes of the primacy of the imagination in such an experience, stating that “the imagination provides the motive for all those symbolic stratagems by which a culture’s wisdom or ignorance is refracted and transmitted” (64). The benefit of such an interpretation of cultural symbols is that both expression and human interaction have an ethical dimension, and this quality is linked with an imperative to understand aesthetic tastes and judgments within a specifically public sphere. Gunn’s argument centers on a suppositional structure that guides experience with an original premise, but aesthetic modes of thinking are central to organizing the work of the imagination with that of “practical exploration”; therefore, the aesthetic is never really severed from the pragmatic (73).

     

    An equally comprehensive and forceful essay, Fluck’s “Aesthetics and Cultural Studies” has a similar leitmotif: aesthetic practice is never separate from the referential dimension, and an aesthetic moment, or “attitude” as Fluck calls it, has a potentially transformative value. Fluck’s approach is a genealogical one, as he outlines how aesthetics have been categorized because of normative models of what defines the aesthetic, and this includes the modernist turn toward New Critical protocols that create a separate ontological category for understanding the intrinsic worth of a text. The aesthetic, however, is never merely a function to be encountered objectively and is instead one of many functions, including the political and the subjective, that become manifest when interacting with a work, whether it is of “high” culture or “low” culture, a distinction cultural studies seeks to efface. Fluck’s example of a subway map is appropriate; that is, a subway map has its referential dimension always intact–it is used for finding directions–yet one cannot access its aesthetic function (perhaps its correlation to Egyptian hieroglyphics), Fluck conjectures, without first touching upon its direct rapport with the objective realm. By illustrating how cultural studies always must work with some movement toward the aesthetic, whether in matters of beauty or judgment, Fluck articulates the strongest critique of cultural studies in this volume. Along with Gunn and Mohanty, he attempts to fulfill the underlying ambition of this volume, that is, to re-envision aesthetic judgment in a way that situates praxis within a multicultural framework rather than simply accepting the death of aesthetics at the hands of postmodern theory and cultural studies. The force of these authors’ arguments is never quite counterbalanced by essays such as John Carlos Rowe’s, which offers effusive praise for and defense of cultural studies methodologies.

     

    Rowe (editor of Culture and the Problem of the Disciplines, reviewed in the May 2000 issue of Postmodern Culture) provides the most systematic argument in the collection in his defense of the methodologies of cultural studies, “The Resistance to Cultural Studies,” the final essay in the “Challenges to an Aesthetics of Diversity” section. For Rowe and most of the contributors to this volume, the promotion of cultural studies to the forefront of literary criticism does not diminish the role of aesthetics, but Rowe’s argument is almost purely focused on the benefits of cultural studies, both as a hermeneutic operation and as a dehierarchizing force vis-à-vis traditional, ahistorical criticism. For example, one of the several critiques of cultural studies that Rowe argues against is the notion that the topics cultural studies critics teach “are easy and superficially relevant” (109). Instead, cultural studies, with its emphasis on popular and “low” cultural texts, presents a new hermeneutic implication for the interpreter: the text in question, whether films such as Rambo or Titanic, or “indisputable” literary classics such as Henry James’s Portrait of a Lady or Wings of the Dove, requires a new mode of theoretical and practical inquiry. Rowe combines the theoretical complexity of de Man and Lyotard with this form of inquiry, noting the postmodern implications within cultural studies methodology, and he argues that in the social relevance, cultural pertinence, and historical grounding of cultural studies, there is a pragmatic goal: “What will this interpretation do?” (107). What the interpretation does is contingent because cultural studies, like postmodernism, does not affirm a “governing narrative” from which the critic can step outside her particular, historically grounded interpretive situation.

     

    The first essay in the “Redefining Categories of Value and Difference” section is Shelley Fisher Fishkin’s study of white and black American authors being rewritten or forgotten in literary history because of prescribed ideas on how each should write. In “Desegregating American Literary Studies,” Fishkin uses a variety of examples of nontraditional racial texts and their subsequent critical reception to argue that black authors’ literary reputations are diminished by their use of white characters, just as white authors, such as Sinclair Lewis, are marginalized when they write about African-American experience. Fishkin ends her essay with a call to revise current notions of canonicity and exclusiveness in American literary studies: “American literary studies will not be segregated until […] books by both groups of writers [African American and white authors] are featured in publishers’ African American Studies and American literature catalogs,” as well as taught in both American literature and African-American literature courses (131). This essay is arguably one of the more important critical works on American Studies in recent years, though its narrowly literary-historical emphasis on reception and canonicity makes it a slightly disconcerting inclusion in this largely theory-and-praxis-oriented volume.

     

    Fishkin’s essay, however, is a fitting preamble to the subsequent piece by Robyn Wiegman, whose “Difference and Disciplinarity” considers how identity politics are reinscribed within the academic institution. Wiegman presents perhaps the most complex argument in Aesthetics in a Multicultural Age, and her consideration of national and transnational identities–as well as her resistance to forcing identities into binary systems–is also explored in other essays in the volume, including Gunn’s contribution. Wiegman argues that feminist studies has been co-opted by two positions: the category of “women” is often equated by African-American and postcolonial critics to some universalizing white norm, while poststructuralist critics consider any reference to identity to be essentializing and thus reductive (137-38). One essay on which she centers her argument is Susan Gubar’s “What Ails Feminist Criticism?,” a piece that begins by recalling the various stages in feminist criticism and outlines some reasons for the schism between generations of feminist scholars. Wiegman’s answer for how institutions contribute to and reify identity politics and formations of national identities is a method that she terms “the metacritics of difference”; this method can be understood as a genealogical approach to feminist studies that uncovers how feminism is produced as an object of knowledge, what Wiegman calls “the problematic of identitarian social forms and formations” (147). Wiegman calls forcefully for replacing the aesthetic with a consideration of difference, but her essay would have contributed more centrally to this volume if she had attempted to elaborate some definition of an aesthetic judgment of difference.

     

    Americanist Donald E. Pease, in an essay critiquing the traditional aesthetic criteria that were levied at C.L.R. James, focuses on individual, rather than social, empowerment and on its relation to the modern liberal state rather than the academic institution. “Doing Justice to C.L.R. James’s Mariners, Renegades, and Castaways [1953],” included in the section “Redefining Categories of Value and Difference,” is, on one hand, Pease’s individual argument for the importance to literary scholarship of James’s book of Melville criticism precisely because James challenges Moby-Dick (1851) in his act of writing an interested interpretation, reimagining the canonical work with a political imperative in mind and substituting the narration of the crew over that of Ahab. On the other hand, Pease is making the case that the criticism (or deliberate ignoring) of James is rooted in his book’s call for an aesthetic categorization outside of “the norms and assumptions […] of which the field was organized” (159). The aesthetic sphere, here represented by James’s book, became a site of free subjectivity and utopian resistance, as James was writing his book while he was a prisoner of the state at Ellis Island, hovering between the rights and dignities afforded to a person of citizenship and the lack of these rights and dignities of a subject with noncitizenship. In response, Pease argues, James “disidentif[ies] with the categories through which he would also practice U.S. citizenship” and also makes the case for an unstated metanarrative within Moby-Dick, one that, in the spirit of equality, moves the locus of power in the novel from Ahab to that of the crew (170).

     

    The next essay in this section is Johnella E. Butler’s “Mumbo Jumbo, Theory, and the Aesthetics of Wholeness,” which argues that Western forms of evaluation, particularly the unifying idea of logos, do not provoke a communitarian standard of judgment. Butler’s piece is one of the most complex, yet rewarding, contributions to this volume, and though her argument emphasizes the reconceptualization of African-American theory in order to “reveal the full significance of the complexities of that literature’s aesthetics,” she makes the case for a larger aesthetic reconstitution (177). In dividing Western consciousness under the rubric of “Logos/Dialogics,” Butler establishes her case for another form of understanding African-American double-consciousness (and, presumably, aesthetic consciousness): through the dialectic of “Nommo/Dianommic.” In contrast to the forced dialectic of Logos, which disaffirms interconnectedness, the Nommo emphasizes the sacredness of the written word (“the life force that comes from the divine”), the dominance of multiplicity over fragmentation, and the confluence of past, present, and future to inform decisions (183). Butler’s argument is compelling and provocative, but I wonder whether her faith in the sacredness of the written text, which is understood via the tropes of ancestral spirituality in texts such as Mumbo Jumbo, does not in fact reify some of the same metaphysical problems of destructive fragmentation and isolation that she successfully exposes as inherent in the Logos/Dialogics tradition.

     

    Butler is followed by one of the most prominent voices in revealing the ideological stakes in the canon formation of nineteenth-century American literature, Paul Lauter. Lauter analyzes the aesthetics of tradition, audience, and discourse in his essay “Aesthetics Again?: The Pleasures and the Dangers,” the first essay in the section “Aesthetic Judgment and the Public Sphere.” To do this aesthetic analysis, Lauter supplements his essay with photographs of Native American artworks that were recently displayed in both museum and art exhibits across the United States. The inherent problem in assimilating these new artistic forms, he argues, is that Western culture does not have aesthetic principles from which to understand the discourse of these art objects. Questions of “audience, function, and conventions” inform our judgments, and these forms of discourse are not readily apparent or transferable to an unaccustomed Western audience (210). The Native American artworks that Lauter chooses to accompany his essay are stunning and, to his credit, do indeed implore the reader to embrace the contradictions in applying Western criteria of art evaluation to works that defy such application. In comparison to the other theorists’ work represented in this volume, however, Lauter’s argument is too abbreviated to be completely effective, and his central thesis–that is, we should adjust our aesthetic understanding when encountering new and unconventional artistic forms–is somewhat naïve when considered next to the multilayered, expansive theories of judgment from other theorists (McHugh, Ickstadt) in this section.

     

    In a similar vein, Amelia Jones challenges a prominent critical position, this one proffered by art historian David Hickey, that emphasizes the exclusivity of art appreciation and the self-evident beauty of a cultural production. Jones argues in “Beauty Discourse and the Logic of Aesthetics” that Hickey, whose book The Invisible Dragon (1993) won the most distinguished art criticism prize, invokes Ruskin-esque qualitative, universal judgments about art and has “occlud[ed] the contingency of meaning and value and the role of the interpreter” (216). The aesthetic is then used for purposes of naturalized, institutional normative values, values that, while unstated, attempt to distance the art object from identity and cultural politics. Referring once again to Kant, Jones makes the argument that interest, or a “stench of ideology,” is inevitably involved in any judgment of beauty, and she incorporates such classical and contemporary figures as Francois Boucher and Robert Mapplethorpe to substantiate her claim (220). I find Jones’s criticism of Hickey’s aesthetic values particularly convincing, but her gendered critique of Denis Diderot’s Kantian aesthetic of disinterestedness is not as thorough as it needs to be. Her forthright final admission in the essay, that she wants “to be” Renee Cox–Cox is represented in one of her own photographs–lends a degree of trust to her preceding argument, as she acknowledges her own interest in the project she has just covered.

     

    The next essay in the collection is by Kathleen McHugh, and her argument is a fluid, connective one for understanding aesthetic criticism through trauma theory. In “The Aesthetics of Wounding: Trauma, Self-Representation, and the Critical Voice,” McHugh correlates a Kantian understanding of the imagination, which must reconstitute itself after encountering something beyond its scope of understanding, with traumatic experiences in the human psyche; the subject cannot have access to the event itself and is thus disconnected from history and also from what is “unrepresentable.” McHugh makes her argument more concrete by referring to a 1995 article in the New Yorker by art critic Arlene Croce, who dismisses an AIDS-themed art exhibit without actually seeing it. Croce’s case, as McHugh describes it, is Neo-Kantian in its elevation of a particular aesthetic standard to that of a universal norm, and Croce enacts the psychological trait of “resistance response” because she self-consciously refers to her understanding of the artwork as beyond her comprehension (245). Roland Barthes’s autobiographical writings provide McHugh with a model for an aesthetics of wounding: Barthes disassociates his interest in specific photographs from any concept of beauty and instead, McHugh contends, “identifies photography ‘as a wound,’ the field in which he considers its meaning and effects is his affect, not that of the objective meaning of photography” (247). McHugh’s interest in visual culture helps establish a structural mapping of her central theses throughout this essay, and I consider her consequent theory of autobiography–a genre that she argues can “provide a way to apprehend more fully” the “ineffable and mysteries remainder” outside of the subject during the aesthetic moment–to be particularly useful for teaching this literary genre (250).

     

    The next essay under “Aesthetic Judgment and the Public Sphere” comes from the field of film studies, Chan A. Noriega’s “Beautiful Identities: When History Turns State’s Evidence.” As with Butler’s article, Noriega’s piece has far-reaching implications, this time with the formation of the aesthetic within the realm of the political. Earlier in the volume, Fluck concludes his essay “Aesthetics and Cultural Studies” with an acknowledgment of the reintegration of the aesthetic into political forms, as political forms naturally invoke an aesthetic attitude (93). Noriega perceives the two forms, the aesthetic and the political, as necessarily interwoven functions and specifically refers to the case of the Federal Trade Commission establishing what Noriega terms a “beautiful identity” for Chicano literature to prove such a plurality of genres (257). For Noriega, historiography comes before history, and the FTC helped establish Chicano cinema in order to recognize the emerging Chicano cultural identity. The state thus acted as an intermediary agent between “the mass media and disenfranchised groups,” and the historiographical project was the state’s creation of an identity, or community, of the disenfranchised before such a group was distinctively formed and empowered on a social level (257).

     

    The final essay in this collection, Heinz Ickstadt’s “Toward a Pluralist Aesthetics,” implicitly integrates many of the theories presented by Noriega, Butler, Fluck, Gunn, and Mohanty. (He does so, however, without directly referring to them or their work–sharing, in this respect, the rather too discreet or isolated character of all the essays in the volume.) This shared stance favors a contingent, inconclusive, historically grounded aesthetic model that would recognize “practical, moral, and aesthetic functions as mutually dependent” (267). Such a model would be conversant with “changing social and cultural conditions” (267), Ickstadt argues, and would not eliminate one of the central questions raised in this volume: do universal standards of judgment exist, or can there be a plurality of possible answers to such standards? Ickstadt is careful to distinguish between aesthetic value and aesthetic practice, yet if we are to incorporate his functional, experiential imperative toward cultural productions, then the question of what constitutes an agreed-upon criterion for judgment will still inevitably come into play.

     

    The contemplation of such questions should not be restricted to individual disciplines and categories of experience, and for this reason the volume is pertinent to the whole range of literary and theoretical discussion beyond the field of American Studies, its most immediate object of study. To take a tentative stance toward a plurality of aesthetics provides a model to address what Elliott calls in his introduction “a system […] aligned with current theories and cultural conditions,” and such a system is necessary if we are to continue to work outside of disciplinary boundaries and across cultural identities in our respective fields of study (18). Even if aesthetics is not quite so seriously imperiled as this volume suggests, the book remains valuable for detailing its continued relevance and even necessity for contemporary cultural study.

     

  • Poet, Actor, Spectator

    Stuart Kendall

    stuartkendall@kanandesign.com

     

    Review of: Clayton Eshleman, Juniper Fuse: Upper Paleolithic Imagination and the Construction of the Underworld.Middleton, CT: Wesleyan UP, 2003.

     

    Section five of Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy ends with a curious figure, a “weird image from a fairy tale which can turn its eyes at will and behold itself […] at once subject and object, at once poet, actor, and spectator” (52). The figure weds Dionysus and Apollo as Nietzsche conceives them. The Dionysian musician surrenders his subjectivity by sinking into identification with the primal unity of the world in all its pain and contradiction. But the Apollonian dream conjures images–symbols, metaphors–from this identification: “Then the Dionysian-musical enchantment of the sleeper seems to emit image sparks, lyrical poems” (50). Nietzsche distinguishes the lyric poet from the epic poet, who is nevertheless related to him, with the fact that while the epic poet loses him or herself in the pure contemplation of images, as in the relentless unfurling of poetic language, the lyric poet loses him or herself in the pain and contradiction of the world; lyric images, charged with meaning, burst with the brevity of sparks. Through the “mirror of illusion” that is poetic language, the epic poet is “protected from becoming one and fused with his figures. In contrast to this, the images of the lyrist are nothing but his very self and, as it were, only different projections of himself, so he, as the moving center of this world, may say ‘I’” (50). Unprotected, the lyric poet becomes fused with the world and with his or her images. The hybrid figure of Nietzsche’s imagining–at once poet, actor, and spectator–is such a lyrist: a poet in the world, a performer of flesh and blood, and an observer, conscious of himself in his turns.

     

    In Juniper Fuse: Upper Paleolithic Imagination and the Construction of the Underworld, Clayton Eshleman cuts just such a figure. Three distinct, but intersecting and overlapping, areas of interest animate the text. The book is at once a book of poetry, a poet’s autobiography, a memoir of his life in and life reflected in prehistoric painted caves, and an extended scholarly engagement with the anthropology of prehistory. At its best, and most complex, Eshleman challenges academic anthropology with the test of his own experience and the imagination of a visionary poet. “Instead of solely employing rational documentation (as have the archeologists), it struck me that this ‘inseparable mix’ might be approached using poetic imagination as well as through fieldwork and research” (xv). Eshleman’s method, then, is not one but many. It is a gesture of what he calls disciplinary pluralism (xii). In this way, significantly and occasionally disastrously, among its other pleasures, Juniper Fuse offers a test case for reflections on interdisciplinarity as well as for the limits and uses of each of the disciplines involved. Readers are challenged to follow him, and this is no easy task.

     

    Eshleman’s subject is not cave painting per se but rather the imagination that is recorded in cave wall imagery (xi). Because he tracks this “Paleolithic imagination” primarily through the roots of his own experience and sensibility, his subject is also his subjectivity. The underworld of Eshleman’s title is first and foremost the human unconscious, an unconscious which he believes can be made conscious through the symbolic consciousness expressed in poetry. (Here Eshleman owes these ideas to James Hillman’s essay “The Dream and the Underworld” and Norman O. Brown’s argument from “Fulfillment,” chapter eight of Love’s Body.) The underworld is secondly all that has been repressed or rejected from human psychology, experience, and history: unacceptable acts and urges, animal instincts, the extinction of species and potential extinction of the human race through ecological disaster. The underworld, then, is the Hell of man. It is the bottom rung of consciousness and what lies beneath. It is the back wall of human history. His guiding assumption is succinctly stated: “Consciousness […] seems to be the upswing of a ‘fall’ from the seamless animal web, in which a certain amount of sexual energy was transformed into fantasy energy, and the loss partially and hauntingly compensated for by dreaming and imagining–processes not directly related to survival” (30). What Eshleman elsewhere terms the “autonomous imagination,” the ability to think and speak in symbolic terms, in metaphors and images, is born of a moment of loss, when early humanity began to conceive of itself as distinct from the world it inhabited. Already in this passage one observes the extent to which Eshleman borrows his terms from William Blake and from psychoanalysis more so than from the staid, responsible, objective terms of prehistoric anthropology. (Significantly, David Lewis-Williams, one of the foremost living prehistorians, argues in his book The Mind in the Cave that symbolic consciousness is in fact essential to the success and survival of our species: it participates in and permits social organization and the division of labor in a more effective, because hierarchical, way than was previously possible.)

     

    Eshleman and his wife Caryl began visiting the caves of the Dordogne in 1974. Resonating with themes and images long established in Eshleman’s work, the galvanizing experience occasioned a shift in the tone and topic of the poet’s corpus: where his previous major collections of verse (Indiana, Altars) focused with often ferocious, even embarrassing, psychological honesty on the poet’s own life, his WASP upbringing, and his education, his writing after the encounter with the caves, while retaining its rootedness in the poet’s inner life, turned more resolutely outward. Juniper Fuse took shape across the volumes of poetry and prose Eshleman published since the late 1970s: Hades in Manganese (1981), Fracture (1983), The Name Encanyoned River (1986), Hotel Cro-Magnon (1989), Antiphonal Swing (1989), Under World Arrest (1994), and From Scratch (1998). Juniper Fuse then is an anthology. It gathers perhaps a third of Eshleman’s poetry and prose on its topic, undeniably the most significant third. The first two parts of Juniper Fuse represent selections from Hades in Manganese and Fracture. The latter parts more radically commingle materials from the later books.

     

    But to say that much of Juniper Fuse has previously appeared in print is misleading on at least four counts. First, Eshleman’s collections of verse are in fact often anthologies of previously published materials. His poems first appear in journals, as broadsides or in chapbooks, before finding their way into larger, more widely distributed collections. “A Cosmogonic Collage” and The Aranea Constellation are two sections of Juniper Fuse that before now have only appeared in minor or small-circulation formats.

     

    Second, each republication occasions a subtle shift in the meaning of a poem or prose piece through its new context. In From Scratch, Eshleman compares and contrasts his process to that of Robert Duncan in Duncan’s “Passages” series (From Scratch 182). For Duncan, the “Passages” poems, published in sections within separate volumes, stood apart from the books in which they appeared. For Eshleman, the writings which comprise Juniper Fuse fit into the books where they made their first appearance and the larger project as well. In this way, the earlier collections each include poems specifically concerned with questions of the Paleolithic imagination as well as other poems which may or may not take up these questions. Each of these collections presents a narrative, however loose, of the author’s life, among other things, in the years of its composition. Juniper Fuse, however, while still charting such a narrative, presents itself as tightly focused on the Paleolithic imagination. Furthermore, Juniper Fuse presents itself as an anthology of both prose and poetry: here, prose pieces that once served to preface or annotate collections of poetry mingle with the poems they once prefaced in an entirely different constellation.

     

    Third, each republication often includes revisions: changes of words or phrases, of lineation, occasionally massive reordering, additions to or subtractions from the text. Some of these revisions are minor; others, obviously, are not. In “Silence Raving,” the first poem in Juniper Fuse, originally published in Hades in Manganese, Eshleman changes, among other things, the phrase “the power/ the Cro-Magnons bequeathed to me, to make an altar of my throat” to “the power/ the Cro-Magnons bequeathed to us: / to make an altar of our throats” (Juniper Fuse 3). In poems concerned with the nature of subjectivity, such shifts from the personal to the universal are enormously significant. (In this particular case, they damage the poem by coming too easily.)

     

    Fourth, Eshleman’s previous collections, generally published through Black Sparrow Press, were rarely and sparingly illustrated. Juniper Fuse, however, is illustrated and the book benefits from it. “Indeterminate, Open” constitutes a poem in the form of notes on a set of photographs and drawings by Monique and Claude Archambeau. The poem in From Scratch did not include the drawings and it reads like a series of captions to absent images. By including the images, Juniper Fuse permits the piece to serve as a demonstration of the primary gesture of the text as a whole: the intermingling of word and image, image and word.

     

    Though Eshleman’s writing has long incorporated prose prefaces and annotations, he regards “Notes on a Visit to Le Tuc d’Audoubert,” originally published in Fracture (1983), as inaugurating a definitive stylistic shift to a pluralistic or hybrid textual “anatomy.” Ostensibly notes taken on a visit to the cave, the mosaic includes photographs and sketches, roughly descriptive and allusive notes, and passages of dense poetic meditation. Eshleman borrows the word “anatomy” from Northrop Frye, who used it to describe William Blake’s “The Marriage of Heaven and Hell,” another collection of poems and prose, of fables, epigrams, and images. For Eshleman, the “term also evokes the writing that Artaud did beginning in 1945: a fusion of genres incorporating letters, poetry, prose, and glossolalia” (254). An anatomy is a text incarnate: a body of many organs and members. Eshleman’s anatomy includes poetry, prose poetry, essays, lectures, notes, dreams, and black-and-white and color images. Forty of the book’s three hundred pages consist of notes and commentary. Like “The Waste Land,” Juniper Fuse is a poem including footnotes, but Eshleman pushes this notion farther, in keeping with Charles Olson’s dictum that one should “leave the roots attached” (Olson 106). Juniper Fuse is a collection of poems but it is also a notebook on the composition of those poems.

     

    Juniper Fuse is a self-proclaimed poet’s book, written to “reclaim the caves […] for poets as geo-mythical sites in which early intimations of what we call ‘muse’ may have been experienced” (xii). The Vézère valley in the Dordogne–where many of these caves are to be found–is a region of France, but it is also a moment in time–the Upper Paleolithic–and a mythic space–Paradise, for Eshleman–all of which can be reclaimed by the poets (see “Cemeteries of Paradise” 101). Eshleman’s travels through and observations of the region form part of his autobiography. His appreciation of the period in time reflects his study of and contributions to prehistoric anthropology. His appeal to myth recalls his vocation as a poet. Paradise, for Eshleman, is a designation for the place first offered by Henry Miller, but it is also a religious sphere of primary concern to William Blake. The poetic tradition informs not only the language but the agenda of Juniper Fuse, a book that marshals the resources of poetic language in its investigation of the Paleolithic imagination and the hidden depths of the human mind. Poetic language, literature, according to Ezra Pound, is “language charged with meaning” or “news that STAYS news” (28, 29). The charge of Eshleman’s poetic language follows from its dense imbrication with complex meanings and associations.

     

    The “fuse” of the title, for example, is first and foremost historical, factual: it refers to the juniper wicks used in Paleolithic lamps found in the caves. The juniper fuse is the wick that provided the light by which prehistoric man painted the caves. Now, for us, the book casts a similar light on the paintings; not the light of creation, but that of a particularly active and engaged mode of interpretation. Eshleman’s primary question is why “such imagery sparked when and where it did” (xi, emphasis added). The spark of the image ignites the fuse. “Image sparks” is Nietzsche’s phrase for lyric poetry in section five of The Birth of Tragedy. The fuse is also the fuse of fusion: the fusion of man and cave wall in the process of engraving and image making; the fusion of poet and cave image casting image sparks, lyric poems. The fuse is also the fuse of a bomb (xi). The fuse is the fuse of fission, of atomic disaster, which haunts these pages: the images cast by the atomic blast at Hiroshima. “When such words fuse,/ they thirst in us, thus do not fuse,/ because we are fission incarnate” (112).

     

    Fusion is the fusion of language in puns. Here again Eshleman borrows his terms from Brown’s Love’s Body. Brown writes: “In puns, ‘two words get on top of each other and become sexual’; in metaphor, two become one” (252). Puns are the essence of symbolic consciousness, and symbolic consciousness is Dionysian consciousness; the erotic sense of reality; the fusion of subject and object via symbolism. This is not to say clarity.

     

    If there must be clarity,
    let it be opaque, let the word be
    convexcavatious, deep
    with distance, a clear
    and dense mosaic, desiring
    undermining.
    (Eshleman 19)

     

    Eshleman’s poetry is often a poetics in poetry: a meditation on and demonstration of the workings of the poem as they are at work. His poetic language is often, and often best, a language of puns, of slang, and of neologisms. It is a poetics of force and fracture: a contorted speech of words twisted and turned as Eshleman sifts the “etymological compost” of language (51). In “Winding Windows,” the word “convexcavatious” recalls Sandor Ferenzci’s exaggerated and visionary psychoanalysis wherein every convex surface is a phallus and every concavity a vagina. But it mingles the convex with its opposite through the notion of excavation, and thereby discovers the great theme of the book as a whole: the figure of the “hole that becomes a pole”; the vulva that seems to produce the phallus which Eshleman posits as the “core gesture” and “generator of image-making” (235):

     

    The hole that grows [...] may be one of the most fundamental versions of the logos or story. [...] Increasing in height or depth as the gods or shamanic familiars ascend or dive, the soul's end, or purpose is always beyond our own, a tunnel generating its own light--or crown of flame. It is a hole grounded in both absence and appearance, a convexcavatious abyss. (235-36)

     

    This poetics of force and fracture affiliates Eshleman’s poetic practice with that of a formidable if “minor” strain of twentieth-century writing whose exemplars include Raymond Roussel, the Joyce of Finnegans Wake, Antonin Artaud, Paul Celan, John Cage, Pierre Guyotat, Valère Novarina: writers who, in Novarina’s phrase, chew their words; they crush language, ruminate on its syntactic building blocks, and reveal its hidden histories and futures.

     

    Crawling through Le Tuc d’Audoubert, Eshleman “is stimulated to desire to enter cavities within [him]self where dead men can be heard talking” (72). “I feel,” he writes, “the extent to which I am storied” (92). Juniper Fuse begins, in epigram, with a poem by Paul Celan (in Cid Corman’s translation). Thereafter it borrows its terms and agenda from William Blake, Charles Olson, Hart Crane, César Vallejo, Antonin Artaud, and Aimée Césaire, among others. As a poem including history it must be read in the tradition of Pound, Williams, and Olson.

     

    But the poet here is also among prehistorians: the Abbés Breuil and Glory, Annette Laming, André Leroi-Gourhan, Siegfried Giedion, Max Raphael, Paolo Graziosi, Alexander Marshack, Jean Clottes, Margaret W. Conkey, Paul Bahn, David Lewis Williams, and Richard Leakey (xv). Eshleman’s dialogue with the discipline of prehistory is conducted more overtly than is his often-implicit continuance of the poetic tradition. This dialogue too is odd for its adherence to Blake’s maxim that opposition is the truest form of friendship. Eshleman argues with André Leroi-Gourhan, in particular, over and over again in Juniper Fuse. He writes as a perpetual outsider, even after twenty-five years of research and exploration in the caves; he refuses full participation in the dominant and dominating anthropological discourse on the caves.

     

    Another degree of disciplinary pluralism: the poet among psychologists and cultural theorists. Eshleman supplements the archeologists and anthropologists with reference to C. G. Jung, Sandor Ferenzci, Geza Róheim, Erich Neumann, Mikhail Bakhtin, Weston La Barre, Charles Olson’s Call Me Ishmael, Norman O. Brown, Kenneth Grant, James Hillman, Hans Peter Duerr and Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (xv). Here too is a tradition, this time in cultural theory. It is the countercultural tradition in cultural theory.

     

    Finally, though most importantly perhaps, the poet is among people. Jacques Marsal (1925-1988), for example, was among the children who tumbled into Lascaux in 1940: he never really left. He stayed nearby, leading tours and attending to the cave for the rest of his life. Eshleman celebrates him in “Like Violets, He Said,” a short text of prose and poetry accompanied by the famous photo which documents, in its way, the cave’s discovery. “I’m overwhelmed,” Eshleman observes, “by the difference one person can make in the personality of a place, not via declaration or sheer information, but by being folded in, obliquely, wearing Lascaux, allowing its grace to loom, allowing us, hardly aware of his movements, our own reading through his light” (98). The title of the piece comes from Charles Olson’s line, quoted in Eshleman’s poem: “Men spring up like violets when needed.” Paul Blackburn also appears. The piece is elegiac, moving. For Eshleman, the spirit of a place includes the spirits of those who have passed through it. The piece is metatextual, the stories layered in dense mosaic: Olson and Blackburn taught Eshleman to perceive such spirits, and Marsal became one of them just as Eshleman himself has now, for us.

     

    Juniper Fuse, far more so than the writings of the prehistorians, courses with reference, with story. The central contrast of the text is that between Eshleman’s subjectivity and the layers of reference–to poets, prehistorians, psychologists, and those others who have peopled his experience–through which he experiences not only the caves but the world. The motion of the text is characterized by Eshleman’s attempt to excavate, to get beneath these layers of meaning, reference, or explanation, to sift beneath these presences to what he only experiences as absence, loss, the zero, the hole (26, 235). “Pure loss pours through. I’m home” (100).

     

    Eshleman’s subjectivity, often present in rough physical terms, in-the-minute descriptions of the physical experiences of the caves, grounds the book. His response to the writings of the prehistorians is always to test their maps, their drawings, or their descriptions, finally their theories, against his own experience of the caves. If he corrects any given theory or explanation, as he often does, it is based on personal observation. He offers a careful description of crawling through caves, or of standing in a space that lacks sufficient oxygen, or of his eyes adjusting to the light of the dark. Such observations are denied us by the disciplinary responsibility of the anthropologists, the objective necessity of science. Juniper Fuse offers a phenomenology of the painted caves.

     

    The subject of the book, then, is decidedly Clayton Eshleman. But Eshleman both is and is not alone. A self-proclaimed and perennial amateur before the culturally legitimated authorities–the scientists, the anthropologists–Eshleman nevertheless speaks from the ground of a different authority. Awed and annihilated by the cave imagery that is his concern, he rediscovers himself in the animals and hybrid humanoids pictured therein. “If the figure of the interior leper took me backward, it was also a comment on the present: the rediscovery of my own monstrosity while studying the grotesqueness of hybrid cave image” (48).

     

    For Eshleman, “a single smoking road leads from Indianapolis [where he grew up] to Lascaux” (91). It runs via Auschwitz and Hiroshima. The history of man is a history of horrors.

     

    Faced with so much story, I release my grip
    from Whitman's hand, "agonies are one of my changes of
    garments"--in the face of Auschwitz?
    (93)

     

    In tracing the roots of symbolic consciousness, Eshleman has written a book of the dead, an incantation for absent beasts and beings. Odysseus stands in Hades as his tutelary figure (67).

     

    We are thus, in the late twentieth century, witness to the following phantasmagorical and physical spectacle: The animal images in the Ice Age caves are also the ghosts of species wiped out at the beginning of our Holocene epoch; today they "stand in" for the species we are daily eliminating. [...] Such images are primogeneous to the extinction of possibly all animal life. (248)

     

    Eshleman’s postmodernism is that of Charles Olson. In response to the totalizing, exclusionary, hierarchical trend in modernity, he speaks for those who cannot. In Juniper Fuse, he gives voice to the animals and humans, prehistoric or present, who haunt the caves. His celebrated corpus in translation–of César Vallejo, of Aimée Césaire, of Antonin Artaud and others–is but another form of this same project.


    Works Cited

     

    • Brown, Norman O. Love’s Body. New York: Vintage, 1966.
    • Eshleman, Clayton. Altars. Santa Barbara, CA: Black Sparrow, 1971.
    • —. Antiphonal Swing: Selected Prose 1960-1985. Ed. Caryl Eshleman. Kingston, NY: McPherson, 1989.
    • —. Fracture. Santa Barbara, CA: Black Sparrow, 1983.
    • —. From Scratch. Santa Barbara, CA: Black Sparrow, 1998.
    • —. Hades in Manganese. Santa Barbara, CA: Black Sparrow, 1981.
    • —. Hotel Cro-Magnon. Santa Barbara, CA: Black Sparrow, 1989.
    • —. Indiana. Santa Barbara, CA: Black Sparrow, 1969.
    • —. The Name Encanyoned River: Selected Poems 1960-1985. Santa Barbara, CA: Black Sparrow, 1986.
    • —. Under World Arrest. Santa Barbara, CA: Black Sparrow, 1994.
    • Ferenczi, Sandor. Thalassa: A Theory of Genitality. Trans. Henry Alden Bunker, M.D. NewYork: Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 1938.
    • Lewis-Williams, David. The Mind in the Cave: Consciousness and the Origins of Art. London: Thames & Hudson, 2002.
    • Hillman, James. “The Dream and the Underworld.” The Dream and the Underworld. New York: Harper, 1979.
    • Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Birth of Tragedy and the Case of Wagner . Trans. Walter Kaufman. New York: Vintage, 1967.
    • Olson, Charles. “These Days.” The Collected Poems of Charles Olson, Excluding the Maximus Poems. Ed. George F. Butterick. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.
    • Pound, Ezra. ABC of Reading. New York: New Directions, 1960.

     

  • Lyotard’s Anti-Aesthetics: Voice and Immateriality in Postmodern Art

    Gillian B. Pierce

    Department of Foreign Languages
    Ashland University
    gpierce@ashland.edu

     

    Review of: Jean-François Lyotard, Soundproof Room: Malraux’s Anti-Aesthetics. Trans. David Harvey. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2001. (Originally published in French under the title Chambre Sourde: L’Antiesthétique de Malraux.Paris: Editions Galilée, 1998.)

     

    Soundproof Room, the final completed work by the cultural philosopher Jean-François Lyotard, reads like a crystallization of the essential elements of his 1996 biography of André Malraux, entitled Signed, Malraux (and also translated into English by David Harvey). Soundproof Room is rich in references to that text, but abandons the “junkyard writing” of the earlier work–a style that purportedly “apes” Malraux’s own writing–to return to the dense, poetic style more familiar to Lyotard’s readers.1 Although Signed, Malraux is a narrative of Malraux’s work and the life that is indistinguishable from it (and this from one who famously declared himself suspicious of “grand narratives”), Lyotard creates a new genre he calls “hypobiography,” declaring in effect that postmodern biography will be scenic, much as Malraux’s own work has often been called cinematic for its syncopated rhythms evocative of physical sensations. In Soundproof Room, subtitled “Malraux’s Anti-Aesthetics,” Lyotard clearly strives to elucidate the relationships between Malraux, politics, aesthetics, and Lyotard’s own body of work. The biographical concerns of Signed, Malraux are further condensed into moments or scenes of ontological questioning that beautifully, if stridently, illustrate the central concerns of periodization in art and the fragile status of the individual political or aesthetic gesture that have animated all of Lyotard’s work.

     

    Robert Harvey’s facing-page translation makes it convenient to consult the original French, which is useful for a text that rests so heavily on Lyotard’s previous work on Malraux, and on his own prior writings on aesthetics, notably in The Inhuman. For in positing the work of art as a soundproof room, as an “empty trachea […] in which silence might stir,” Lyotard further develops his fascination for the inhuman in art, for the way in which the work of art bears witness to the unpresentable, the “it happens” of the sublime developed throughout his oeuvre. Malraux as historical individual is subsumed; voice and ego are eclipsed, having gone over to the side of the third person, and out of this death comes an account of the renewal of the rise of the work of art. As Lyotard writes, “man is only that which exceeds the inhuman of artwork” (38).

     

    Malraux is not the first thinker Lyotard has adopted from an earlier period in the service of postmodernism: He is indebted to Kant (in The Differend and Lessons in the Analytic of the Sublime), Freud (in The Libidinal Economy), Diderot, Newmann, Duchamp, and even Rabelais–and yet it would be wrong to accuse him, as some have, of “modernist” tendencies. Postmodernism is a non-periodizing concept for Lyotard, one that arises out of a differend or irreducible heterogeneity, and must be viewed as a critical stance. Language is insufficient to convey an incommunicable content, and the postmodern arises out of this incommensurability. Malraux, in his life and work, repeatedly comes up against precisely this kind of a differend in which death (Lyotard’s La Redite, which Harvey renders as “the Redundant One”) appears as the only possible outlet. Lyotard has always interpreted postmodern politics and thought in terms of this sort of aesthetic formulation, and in Soundproof Room he reduces the biography of Malraux to its aesthetic heart: the quest for the limits of experience and the eclipse of the first person of biography by the annihilating, redundant force of death.

     

    Why should one talk about “anti-aesthetics” in Malraux? Aesthetics refers to the analysis of things perceived by the senses, to material forms, and has further come to connote a response to the beautiful in art or in nature, “taste” deriving from the Kantian sensus communis. But for Lyotard, as for Malraux, art evokes the sublime. There is no community of feeling or of like-minded connoisseurs, no recourse to reassuring forms. In The Inhuman, Lyotard writes, “we find sublime those spectacles which exceed any real presentation of a form” and “these works appear to the public of taste to be ‘monsters, ‘formless’ objects, purely ‘negative’ entities,” deliberately using the Kantian terms for the occasions that provoke the sublime sentiment (113, 125). An anti-aesthetics, then, would refer to the negative presentation of the sublime; that is, one can present merely that there is an immaterial absolute that can be thought beyond material representation. Throughout Soundproof Room, Lyotard will use the term “stridency” to refer to this monstrous apparition beyond the harmony of accepted forms, and he sees throughout Malraux’s life and work (as the two become indistinguishable, one “signing” the other) the attempt to bear witness to this unpresentable content.

     

    Soundproof Room follows no linear argument and develops instead according to the elaboration of a concept or theme in each chapter–for example, “Lost Voice,” “Scene,” “War,” “Stridency,” and “Throat”–just as Malraux himself rejected chronology in favor of the development of “scenes” in his writing. The first chapter, “To End, To Begin,” addresses precisely this question of linear development. Ending for Lyotard always implies continuation; the “break” of the end always presupposes the thinking of an “after,” a “post” (leading him to state that “modernity is constitutionally and ceaselessly pregnant with its postmodernity” [Inhuman 25]). In this proposition of the “post” Lyotard sees two heterogeneous levels: “the one on which things take place, and the one on which they are recounted” (4). In the words of Malraux’s Lazarus, “one has no biography except for others” (42). The modern, with its impulsion to exceed itself, upsets the principle of this gap to privilege the present, and for this precarious present moment Lyotard introduces the idea of “voice,” thereby summarizing the history of twentieth-century politics:

     

    The voice is incarnated and promises ultimate fulfillment through redemption from the pain of enduring. Such is the Christic mystery elaborated by Saul of Tarsus and Augustine and propagated by the West across two millennia of Western thought and practice. The diverse modernities that follow this initial move repeat the incredible gesture: Here is my body, says the voice, here and now. [...] In the American and French Declarations, the same ostentation: Here we are, free peoples. And in the Bolshevik Revolution: Power to the Worker's Councils (Soviets), right away and here. (6)

     

    Against the immediacy of the voice, Lyotard (with Malraux) locates the redundant and inexorable motion of history that dooms each of these narratives (or meta-narratives) to the pourrisoir or “rotting pit” of history. The voice is extinguished repeatedly and becomes inaudible, as “the West is condemned to this obscenity of repeating the gesture of beginning” (10).

     

    Lyotard situates Malraux’s work within the tradition of “writing at the limit of writing” (10) that includes Céline, Bataille, Artaud, and Camus:

     

    To append Malraux's oeuvre to this group is what I intend to do here. Despite some compositional shortcomings, a tendency toward the epic, a public speaker's eloquence--all of which caused it to be underrated--his work plunged no less than the others into the ontological nausea, was no less anxious to understand and to show how the miracle of artworks can arise. (10-12)

     

    In Signed, Malraux Lyotard fully demonstrates the theme of decay in Malraux’s life and work, in which death is not an end, but an endless recurrence of the same (l’éternelle redite). For in that work Lyotard concludes that the relationship between the living body (the bios) and the writing (the graph) are intertwined in such a way that Malraux’s life is “written” for his oeuvre, an oeuvre that draws so much from it. And life has no meaning for Malraux other than constant contact with death, which he defines in turn as a moment of life which can be metamorphosed into an artwork. This moment of creation is privileged by both Lyotard and Malraux.

     

    In a lengthy passage from Malraux’s The Royal Way, Lyotard demonstrates the continuity of the cycle of decay and regeneration in the oneness of the Khmer forest:

     

    Claude [...] had given up trying to distinguish living beings from their setting, life that moves from life that oozes; some unknown power assimilated the trees with the fungoid growths upon them, and quickened the restless movements of all the rudimentary creatures darting to and fro upon the soil like march-scum amid the steaming vegetation of a planet in the making. Here what act of man had any meaning, what human will could conserve its staying power? Here everything frayed out, grew soft and flabby, assimilated itself with its surroundings [...]. (14)

     

    This moment of ontological doubt in fact has its analogue in Lyotard’s thinking on the sublime, and his debt to Kant becomes clear. For out of the dissolution of the self and its assimilation into the surrounding landscape comes the reassertion of being through language. As Lyotard writes, “in the ostensibly mute swamp where everything gets engulfed, larvae stagnate by the billions, fomenting renewal. Plants, animals, humans, cultures: everything will begin again. Plots resume” (12).

     

    A central question of Lyotard’s book, then, concerns the state of first-person subjectivity in the face of death and so many “isms,” both political and artistic, doomed to decline, sameness, and assimilation. “What ‘I’ would still dare to introduce itself as master of narrative when the promise of final freedom that it proffers instantly runs aground on the inextricable and restrictive perversity of the language in which it is formulated?” (32) Malraux is acutely aware of the precariousness of the subjective voice, as evidenced by his interest in Jewish history and the “recounting of the forgotten voice” (26). Further, Lyotard sees a correspondence between Malraux’s psychology of art and the validity bestowed upon artworks and “this unforgetting of forgetting and listening to the inaudible whose is paradox is sustained in the Jewish tradition” (28). Malraux’s theory of art, his “anti-aesthetic,” may therefore be summed up by his realization that the artwork simply is without reference to a voice, an author, a reader, or a hero. It is authorized by no voice, and aims at no end.

     

    Art, for Malraux as for Lyotard, takes on the status of event, a birth outside of narrative in the face of the disappearance of the ego, at the very moment when it is no longer capable of “hearing its own voice” (36). The subjective element (ego) dissipates, making way for an absolute writing. At this moment “a ‘there, now’ oblivious to history slices the interminable ebb and flow with the thinnest of wires” (38). In this sense, the artwork means nothing, but is rather a singular arrangement of its constituent elements. It does not serve as self-expression or expose the subjectivity of its author, hence its “inhuman” stature. As Lyotard writes, “the artwork breaks with convention, with the commonplace, with the flow. It is obtained through a conscious and conscientious labor that relentlessly endeavors to lay bare the ego. Through art the human bends its will to strive toward this inhuman that sometimes forces it wide open” (50).

     

    What Lyotard admires in Malraux is his repeated gesture to transform the “staged idleness” of Europe in the 1920’s into an artwork, to take the raw material of life and impose on it a style. For it is the act of metamorphosis or rebellion that is valuable for Lyotard/Malraux more than the result of any such act. Human endeavors are doomed to redundancy at the hands of history, but something in the artwork resists this motion; the artist “plants his claw right into the event, and signs it” (64). The artwork thus produced is “reality gashed, short-circuited at a given moment on itself, a wounded mouth gaping over the void” (64). Following the logic of simulation, by substituting another world for the paucity of reality the work of art in fact forces the real world to confess that it is an illusion, an idea that Lyotard elaborates with respect to Diderot’s Salons in an earlier essay. For Lyotard, the act of metamorphosis (or the act of rebellion on the political plane) is essential as an assertion of being, whether or not it is doomed to failure. The gesture is born of nothing (“idleness,” or “the void,” to use two other of Lyotard’s formulations), and makes war with this nothingness; as such it is an indispensable affirmation of being or presence.

     

    The metaphor of war is central to Malraux’s life as well as to his art. Not only is life a continual war with death, but artistic creation is a war with nothingness. Lyotard contends that wars and revolutions are opportunities for Malraux to come to terms with the limits of experience and to demonstrate that “we die and write for nothing” (66). And writing does entail a kind of death, that is to say the eclipse of the ego in favor of a different “I”: the monstrous “I without a self.” For this reason, Lyotard contends that “war is not the confrontation one thinks it is” and the battlefield is not a place so much as an internal struggle between ego (le moi) and the “I” of writing (le je d’écriture) (68). The image recalls Baudelaire’s image of the artist as escrimeur in “The Painter of Modern Life,” his essay on Constantin Guys: “c’est un moi insatiable du non-moi” (552). This same impulse causes Lyotard to ask, in his introduction to The Inhuman, “what if human beings […] were constrained into, becoming inhuman?” (2). War, indeed, is a differend.

     

    The thesis of the “I-without a self” in Malraux and throughout Soundproof Room refers to the dimension of a self that is not within life–one might say the inhuman. According to Lyotard, “it evokes a closure, a deafness, but also the insistence of an anguish that biographical time, which resists it, does not sweep away in its flow” (86). Having written extensively about visual artists and art throughout his lifetime (Duchamp, Monory, Adami, Newmann), Lyotard nonetheless introduces an aural metaphor to describe this anguish: “painting is not for seeing,” writes Lyotard; “it demands this listening: the eye listens to something beyond the harmonious music of the visible” (100). This “something” is what Lyotard calls stridency, a sound lacking bearing and restraint through which “the unheard-of is exhibited, in a flash, at the threshold of the audible.” (76).

     

    We don’t hear ourselves through our ears, according to Malraux, but rather through the throat. The figure of “hearing through the throat” also leads Malraux to a figure for communion, since “one hears that other whom one loves, if one loves him like a brother, with one’s throat” (86). For Lyotard, this is the central intuition of Malraux’s theory of aesthetic creation as elaborated in his numerous essays on the psychology of art. This is the essence of Malraux’s anti-aesthetics, in which what is left of subjects communes through what cannot be shared–something like the return to the ineffable in art, a response to the work of art as event or happening in all its singularity. Art is thus an expression of stridency, the unheard-of, a violent act of giving form to the formless, with all of its parallels in the Kantian sublime.

     

    The Kantian sublime resists the sensus communis and the “good taste” of the beautiful, but Lyotard’s formulation of the “it happens” of aesthetic experience seems to offer the hope of communion, albeit of a limited sort: “just as we are lovers or brothers through fusion of airtight throats, the artwork places absolute solitudes in communion with each other and with the stridulation of the cosmos” (102). And yet there is no hope for mediation or dialogue between or among these solitary entities. “Singularities fuse only to the extent that they cannot exchange or hear each other” (102). The outer form of the work, its facies is a mere simulation, or dissimulation; the “soundproof room” of its empty inside “allows the mask to pick up the truth–nothingness–in the form of strident apparitions” (104).

     

    In the final chapter of Signed, Malraux Lyotard evokes Malraux’s concept of a museum without walls, a “place of the mind” impossible to visit that rather inhabits us (304). For Lyotard, as for Malraux, great works of art are sublime epiphanies, “brush strokes of the absolute” (303). A precarious museum that lives within, apart from the corrupting narrative of art history, Malraux’s gallery exists in limbo, in this zone of the ineffable. The museum without walls represents what Lyotard calls “a perpetual disturbance”; no institution can be established based upon it. Art offers the promise of escape (rather than escape itself), and an intimation of truth as stridency.

     

    The question of biography and the dynamic by which a body of work can “sign” a life and vice versa surface at the end of the philosopher’s life in Signed, Malraux and Soundproof Room. The idea of an inhuman art that regenerates beyond the grave is therefore all the more pressing. Lyotard’s works have asked the most provocative questions of postmodern theory: From “What is the Postmodern?” to “Can Thought Go on Without a Body?,” Lyotard persistently returns to questions of presence and the status of the human, often expressed in terms of an irreconcilable differend. Soundproof Room is an important culmination of this body of writing and necessary reading for theorists of the postmodern in art and politics.

     

    Notes

     

    1. Robert Harvey has commented on the heterogeneity of Lyotard’s writing, and thus characterized the style of Signed, Malraux, following Lyotard’s own characterization of Malraux; see Harvey 99.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Baudelaire, Charles. “Peintre de la vie moderne.” Oeuvre completes. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1968.
    • Harvey, Robert. “Telltale at the Passages.” Yale French Studies 99 (2001): 102-16.
    • Lyotard, Jean-François. The Inhuman: Reflections on Time. Trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1991.
    • —. Signed, Malraux. Trans. Robert Harvey. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1999.

     

  • Virtually: The Refreshment of Interface Value

    Robert Payne

    School of Humanities
    University of Western Sydney
    r.j.payne@uws.edu.au

     

    In April 2002, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down its ruling of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, a case in which a certain semantic specificity seemed ultimately to take precedence over the moral and emotional imperatives that propelled the central argument of the petitioner. The U.S. government (nominally represented by Attorney-General Ashcroft) was seeking to overturn a Court of Appeals ruling against the constitutionality of its Child Pornography Prevention Act (1996), which had greatly–through a significant conceptual leap–expanded the category of what would count as child pornography. As cited in the Supreme Court ruling, the bill (CPPA) now prohibited not only pornographic images produced using actual children, but also “any visual depiction” that “is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct,” as well as any sexually explicit image that is “advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression” that it depicts a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct (1).

     

    These qualifying phrases (which I have emphasized), designed to make child-harming pornography harder to produce and distribute, opened the frame of prohibition to extremely nebulous territory. In so doing, they curiously destabilized a conventional application of visual epistemology: one based on the evidentiary function of photographic and video images, of the kind frequently upheld in legal contexts. A distinction between the actual and the virtual was inscribed in the bill and instantaneously erased. The government’s petition to the Supreme Court describes Congress’s findings that it is possible to produce pornographic images of “what appear to be” children “that are virtually indistinguishable to the unsuspecting viewer from unretouched photographic images of actual children” (4). In their zeal to speak for and to protect the unnamed and “unsuspecting” viewer, the legislators of the CPPA betrayed their own oversuspecting unwillingness to tell actual and virtual children apart, and transposed this into both an assumed inability on the part of their constituents at large, and a projected criminal exploitation of the potential representational ambivalence that is permitted by new media technology.

     

    In ruling against the government’s petition, the opinion of the Supreme Court delivered by Justice Kennedy questions the logic of the CPPA’s definitional expansion, noting that the production of virtual child pornography can scarcely harm children if none are involved in the process. It is here that the government’s position makes a further leap of presumption, now explicitly naming its legislative target and the kinds of harm that might be inflicted by pornographic images of “what appear to be” children. In its Congressional Findings, supplementary to the CPPA, the government claims that

     

    child pornography is often used as part of a method of seducing other children into sexual activity; a child who is reluctant to engage in sexual activity with an adult, or to pose for sexually explicit photographs, can sometimes be convinced by viewing depictions of other children "having fun" participating in such activity

     

    and furthermore that

     

    child pornography is often used by pedophiles and child sexual abusers to stimulate and whet their own sexual appetites, and as a model for sexual acting out with children; such use of child pornography can desensitize the viewer to the pathology of sexual abuse or exploitation of children, so that it can become acceptable to and even preferred by the viewer (n.3, 4).

     

    One wonders whether “the viewer” in question here is the same “unsuspecting viewer” to be protected from the burden of virtual indistinguishability, and by extension whether members of Congress who were initially able to tell actual children from virtual (if only then to deny the distinction) were themselves subject to the insidious desensitization of which they warn. The wording of the findings would seem to demarcate “pedophiles and child sexual abusers” as a discrete unit of pathological individuals, one which maintains some exclusivity over such “use of child pornography.” If, however, the material in question is able to “desensitize” its viewer, and if such images are ineffably capable of transmuting appetite into conduct and also of “seducing other children into sexual activity,” might such slippages be as logically applicable to determining who is susceptible? In other words, if such material is as contagiously effectual as these findings imply, why are only “pedophiles and child sexual abusers” incriminated? The possibility of desensitized viewing is opened to those for whom child pornography has not yet “become acceptable […] and even preferred,” where this is apparently a desire that might be learned by effectively anyone who comes into contact with the material.

     

    Also in 1996, Congress passed a similarly censorious legislative act, framed more specifically around prohibiting the provision to minors of “indecent” material on the Internet. The Communications Decency Act (CDA) sought to incriminate anyone who “knowingly”

     

    initiates the transmission of [...] any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the communication is under 18 years of age (§223(a)(1)(B)(ii))

     

    as well as sending to a minor via “interactive computer service”

     

    any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs. (§223(d)(1)(B)

     

    The act was successfully challenged in a district court by the American Civil Liberties Union, and this decision was later appealed and affirmed in the Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLU (1997). That court ruled the act unconstitutional on the grounds that the above provisions inhibited free speech. Where the constitutional legalities of this bill were informed by precedent cases that had defined current understandings of “obscene” and “indecent” and the relationship of these terms to freedom of speech, the more significant elements for my reading are the cultural implications that derive from the terms “transmission” and “communication.” I am suggesting these terms render more explicit an anxiety about the contagious effects of “patently offensive” material, especially when that material describes a corporeality centering on the contentious zones of “sexual or excretory” organs. As Judith Butler argues in Gender Trouble, these anatomical parts and their function as orifices of sexual and excretory activity locate points of weakness in the fictional seamlessness of the body as a discrete subject, the maintenance of which serves the political imperatives of a larger social body (14ff).

     

    The open textuality of the Internet as a literal web of image and information availability suggests fertile conditions for a promiscuity that incites the spread of moral panic. Particularly, as the above cases demonstrate, the Internet provides a freedom deemed too dangerous in proximity–the proximity of transmissible contact–to society’s putatively vulnerable populations. In these specific ways, the charge of “knowingly” transmitting obscene material implicitly tropes the vindictive homophobia inherent to certain AIDS panics: namely, that HIV-positive gay men might target “the general population” for deliberate infection; or, relatedly, that HIV transmission establishes categories of innocent reception and, therefore, of guilty perpetration (see Watney; Sontag).

     

    That Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition and Reno v. ACLU were decided according to legal precedents around speech, and its protection under constitutional amendment, offers further instances of what Butler (in her later work Excitable Speech) terms the law’s “catachrestic extensions of ordinary understandings of speech” (72). Butler’s context is the performativity of speech into action, and she discusses examples of the transitive relations between the two: where an act (placing a burning cross on an African American family’s front lawn) may be legally protected as speech, or where utterance (members of the U.S. military announcing their homosexual identity) may be construed to be and punished as conduct. The cases she explores hinge on the arbitrary placement of limits to self-expression, and the political negotiations around the purported freedom thereof. According to her sustained analysis of the U.S. government’s policy on gays in the military, in which the verbal self-expression of homosexual identity becomes a punishable offense, the word “homosexual” becomes a medium of contagion, “whereby to hear the utterance is to ‘contract’ the sexuality to which it refers” (113). It is this conceit of contagion, in which homosexuality is “figured implicitly on the model of AIDS,” that allows Butler to elaborate meanings of “communication”: the utterance of speech–of a particular word laden with contagious cultural implications–is received as having communicated “along the lines of a disease” (110).

     

    The concept of moral panic was elaborated by Stanley Cohen in this now-famous opening passage to his 1972 study of “deviant” youth culture and conflict in Britain:

     

    Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people. (9)

     

    Where Cohen highlights the role of the mass media in “defining and shaping social problems” in such a way as to generate “concern, anxiety, indignation or panic,” I am concerned to identify more complexity in the role of mass media in the contemporary context: as the site of the threat itself, where media representations are regarded to be as dangerous as that which, previously and concurrently, the media merely reported to be dangerous (17). A central feature of moral panic in this context is that its own defining dynamic echoes that which provokes its outrage. Panic spreads in proportion to the epidemic social ills whose momentum and dispersal it fears. Curiously, while in the legislation I have discussed speech is figured as the performance of dangerous acts, these laws are themselves prohibitions of speech by acts of Congress. Indeed, the name Congress might be said to perform the very same communicative, infectious dynamic that its acts wanted to prohibit.

     

    For Simon Watney, writing of media representations of AIDS in the 1980s, moral panic theories fall short in that they are “always obliged in the final instance to refer and contrast ‘representation’ to the arbitration of ‘the real’,” overlooking the workings of ideology “within all representational systems” (41-2). In other words, an oppositional politics of dismissing the ideologically panicked inaccuracies or misrepresentations of a verifiably “real” situation (such as an overrepresentational link between AIDS and homosexuality) must still recognize that this position of dismissal is no less discursively constructed and dependent upon its own biased representations. Where media representation is the source of moral alarm (Internet obscenity, virtual child pornography) as well a site for the sounding of this alarm, the very nature of representation becomes ever more contentious. As Watney reminds us, representation locates a “permanent ideological struggle over the meaning of signs. A particular ‘moral panic’ merely marks the site of the current front-line in such struggles” (42).

     

    In the panic I have been discussing, it is the particular kind of media representation that lends itself to an increased struggle for meaning, precisely as conventional holds on “the real” fall away. The censorious legislative attempts of both the CPPA and the CDA constitute anxious responses to the disappearance of the real into the virtual, a terrain in which existing legal sanctions (as the Supreme Court affirmed) fail to apprehend the representational relations that are ruptured and renewed in digital and online technologies. The specific virtualities named by Congress’s acts of censorship are recent technological developments: digital enhancement, alteration, or fabrication of images, and the Internet’s networks of teleconnectivity in which identities as well as images may be subject to enhancement, alteration, or fabrication. Concrete framings of law are clearly challenged by the inherent immateriality of these new modes of representation.

     

    The concept of virtuality itself is not exclusive to the late twentieth century and the postmodern cultural frame as innovations such as virtual reality might have us believe. New media parlance has appropriated the word “virtual” as a prefix, akin to “cyber” or “hyper,” denoting the new ontologies of digital experience. Margaret Morse discusses virtuality as “the present subjunctive mode of a fictively shared present,” a definition which might encompass, as Morse outlines, the collective and yet individuating address offered by radio and television, or even less technologically advanced forms of interaction:

     

    Cultural forms from television graphics and shopping malls to the apparatus of virtual reality, as well as practices from driving to conducting a war to making art employ various forms of engagement to construct a virtual relationship between subjects in a here-and-now. (4)

     

    Virtual relationships exist between reader and fictional character, spectator and film or theater character; between shoppers in the fictional enclosure of a mall, tourists mediating their presence at a tourist attraction, and computer users communicating in an online chatroom. Internet users worldwide are engaged in a shared fiction, built around a joint practice that resembles the common experience of TV viewing. Even on a basic level, the computer screen deliberately remodels the design and function of the TV screen and relies to some extent upon our familiarity with these features. The virtuality of the Internet, however, lies more fully in the fictions of connectivity that its networking function allows: the various forms of physical and interpersonal telepresence promised to anyone who gains access to its web. The Internet creates the ability to achieve virtual contact with virtually any person, image, or information where optical and aural contact stand in for the tangible, which cannot cross (but can equally pertain to) the mediating apparatus. In this sense, it brings together and capitalizes on other virtualities (including tourism, television, shopping malls) with a much greater technological capacity and a much increased aptitude for the elaboration of its fictional ontologies.

     

    In what ways might these notions of the virtual imply the viral? How are virtual relationships, which theoretically do not require actual contact or proximity between subjects, deemed to be viral relationships in which dangerous or unhealthy matter might be communicated? The textuality of the Internet permits anxieties of authentic subjectivity to surface, where the coherence of the individual subject and the body to which it is believed intrinsic are superseded by relationality: the network of possibilities in which the subject might find multiple connection. This form of interaction marks not the loss of subjectivity but the appearance and reproduction of new, posthuman, noncorporeal subjectivities that can, nonetheless, be launched from the corporeality of computer users who might only be connecting, in actuality, with their interface. As several scholars including Sherry Turkle have noted of their own interface connections, the relationship between computer user and the apparatus itself should not be overlooked. Emotional and physical responses to the apparatus, attached to which users may frequently spend many hours a day, constitute moments of actual, corporeal tangibility that not only shadow but precede any instances of virtual connection within the cyberspatial network.

     

    In the rest of this essay, I will focus on a mode of constructing online identity that, while ostensibly received by users through a relationship of telepresence, significantly foregrounds its own mediating apparatus. Where personal webcams intend to engage the ontology of transparent surveillance available through user screens, I will suggest that in effect they offer a representation of life (after Turkle) very much on the screen.

     

    I

     

    Personal webcams are a genre of Internet sites devoted to the broadcasting of live, digital video images, captured by a web camera itself, from inside private homes and workplaces. Such sites, which are also known as “homecams,” “livecams,” “girlcams,” “gaycams” and so on, have exploded in number and popularity since the late 1990s, partly for their ease of operation: the operator need merely attach a relatively inexpensive webcam to his or her personal computer and, having met specific hardware and software requirements, upload its images on to the Internet. When images appear on viewer screens, they are usually still and will “refresh” (update) with a regularity that varies from site to site–generally within a range of once every 30 seconds to once every 15 minutes. Few sites have an increased capacity to provide “streaming” images, like video. The formal defining features of personal webcams are liveness and constancy, creating the effect of an ongoing and indiscriminate visual record of everything taking place within the camera’s field of visibility while it takes place. If not for physical distance, we understand, the viewer could be overcoming barriers of privacy to witness everything taking place firsthand.

     

    Unlike the significant raft of outdoor webcams (whose framing of scenic or otherwise notable sites provides universalized views of nothingness), domestic webcams offer at a basic level the conceptual titillation of access to private space, and an apparently uncomplicated fulfillment of peepshow voyeurism. Numerous webcam sites capitalize on this specific market potential, some allowing viewers to pay for increasing levels of access to variously sexualized or pornographic displays. Other similar sites offer the viewer an interactive role in requesting the details of such displays: a kind of sexual “telerobotics” that conflates the performativity of computer command with sexual command.1 Many noninteractive webcams feature generic disclaimers about sexual content, as a counterpoint to acknowledging incidental nudity or sex. The now-defunct Sean Patrick Live! (formerly www.seanpatricklive.com), the webcam of a young gay Washington D.C. man, featured a common version: “There is no planned nudity or ‘shows’. However, as this is a candid view into another persons life, it is not intended for children [sic].” Interestingly, Williams’s appearances on cam were frequently nude, and his site’s selective archive of previous cam shots (also available for purchase) contained a high proportion of nudity and some sexual activity. The cam shot, in its commodifiable format, here converges with the pornographic “cum shot” or “money shot” (Williams). The archive is a display of highlights to advertise what was only rarely visible, and would not necessarily be again.

     

    Jennifer Ringley, a pioneer of personal webcams through her site JenniCam, continued to display herself on camera for over seven years, “not because I want to be watched,” she wrote on her site, “but because I simply don’t mind being watched” (<www.jennicam.org>).2 Her rationale addresses a common anecdotal belief that webcams are borne necessarily of simple exhibitionism, and by extension that the basis of self-display is sexual exchange. Visitors to JenniCam were greeted with two viewer category options: member or guest access, where members were required to pay a subscription fee for images that refreshed more frequently (every minute rather than every 15 minutes). Membership also afforded access to a fuller archive of previous JenniCam image galleries, whereas guests could only view a selection that the site nonetheless called a “pretty comprehensive overview.” Notions of member and guest access encapsulate the entirely ambiguous relation between publicity and privacy that the Internet inheres. Member and guest status both connote a minimum of invitation and discrimination, a limited accessibility that the promiscuous nature of Internet browsing denies in advance. JenniCam‘s constancy of access and complete lack of visitor discrimination subverted any attempt at exclusivity that notions of membership, and even access to private space, might hope to offer. The extra level of access afforded members compounded the site’s knotting of privacy and publicity: while members were permitted the privilege of increased privacy, or access to 14 images per 15 minutes that remain private to others, what was actually offered to members was an increased unveiling or publication of private space. More of the private equates with more of the public. Any seeming opportunity to attain proximity to Ringley through the financially driven priority access on which her site literally traded needed to be content with her simulation projected on that which separated her from us. JenniCam‘s seduction into increased privacy encouraged viewers to overcome the surveillance apparatus–to look through the obstacle of the screen–but only by focusing on the textuality of this very apparatus and the finite potential that it offered.

     

    In an article purportedly analyzing the post-feminist implications of the increased number of young women and teenage girls operating personal webcams, Susan Hopkins arrives at some ideological difficulty absorbing the practice among these “Camgirls” of posting “wish lists” on their sites. As a form of online gift registry, often linked to sites such as the Internet-based bookseller Amazon.com, the posting of wish lists is a phenomenon not exclusive to webcam operators or even young female webcam operators. For Hopkins, wishlists are “the most controversial feature” of camgirl sites, whose operators “encourage their fans to buy them books, CDs and other gifts.” Despite warning against generalizing about the vast range of these sites, Hopkins goes on to claim that it is “no surprise that the most attractive Camgirls–with exhibitionist tendencies–tend to receive the most gifts.” Aside from the simplifying assumption that webcams are necessarily exhibitionist–manifesting what she calls “the urge to be on camera 24 hours a day”–there is little understanding in Hopkins’s observation of the pragmatic utility of the wishlist. Rather, she focuses on an unsubstantiated dynamic of transactional expectation, of some moral concern, which she considers to be “virtual prostitution.”

     

    The term “virtual” here interfaces two connected meanings: the current synonymity with “online” I have already mentioned, connoting a digital or specifically Internet-based status; but also a more general sense of adequate approximation, the tantamount. “Virtual prostitution” stands as a brisk conclusion, then, to Hopkins’s own virtual analysis, which discerns and then appears to ignore that online relations–not to mention post-feminism–discourage being described in oppositional binaries:

     

    Men have been exploiting and objectifying women in cyberspace for years. What's new is that the Camgirls have taken control of this process--and cut out the middleman. So the line between victim and perpetrator is blurred. These young women offer only their image, while lonely (typically male) spectators send fan mail, gifts and cash "donations." Well might we then ask, who is exploiting whom?

     

    In a similarly pitched article in online magazine Salon (which Hopkins refers to), Katharine Mieszkowski attempts vernacular detachment to disguise her suspicious unease, suggesting webcam-based wishlists as “an online beg-fest that makes it easy to take candy from strangers on the Internet.”3 While being sure to deny the false representation of the Internet as “one big cesspool of pedophiles and pervs searching for unsuspecting and underage kids to prey upon,” Mieszkowski nonetheless finds this profile hard to ignore, presuming to universalize what is merely her own distaste: that “the spectacle of teenagers displaying themselves online in exchange for material favors is something that could make anyone a little queasy.” Mieszkowski shares Hopkins’s eventual, conceptual approval that camgirl sites, and their posting of wishlists, represent an empowering set of self-determining practices for young women. It is their contextual ambiguity that remains of inexplicit concern to her, however. She argues that “the Web has a way of making even the most straightforward picture of a 14-year-old caught on her webcam into a pornographic image,” a claim that appears to refer to the practice of various other websites of archiving a mixture of camgirl shots with unrelated pornography, and perhaps to the potential for digital alteration of images.

     

    The anxiety these writers share seems to derive less from a view of webcams as morally suspect or of wishlists as an incitement to predation than from vaguer but deeper insecurities of unknowing that are inherent in these media. Both articles operate, albeit with considerably less rhetorical outrage, on a similar conceptual plane to the semantic and legislative flounderings of Congress’s attempts to criminalize what was, by its own logic, entirely imprecise and perhaps even unrecognizable. Ambivalent charges of “virtual prostitution” and of the susceptibility to exploitation of images amidst the Internet’s virtuality of relations point to the failings, for these writers, of conventional epistemology and the insidious treachery of telepistemology. To reiterate Morse’s definition, virtuality operates in a “subjunctive” mode, implying a grammar of conditional, hypothetical, or contingent relations to a predominant ontology. That which is subject to this mode (uncertain relations between camgirls and their fans; images that “appear to be” of children engaging in sex acts) refuses to make its status known, or even knowable, forcing a continuous hedging of bets. The virtual occupies, then, the indefinable and liminal space on the threshold between known and unknown, knowing and unknowing. The disquiet that preoccupies the above accounts of virtuality focuses, I propose, on the presumed and inexact performativity of the virtual; the failure of the threshold of knowing to contain the flow of the unknowable. At the same time, it is this very imprecision that renders the virtual so compelling.

     

    In a discussion of her acquiescence to the “holding power” of personal computers, Sherry Turkle notes it is “striking that the word ‘user’ is associated mainly with computers and drugs” (30). The trope of addiction that she acknowledges would figure computer use as an everyday dependency or habit. Turkle prefers to articulate her own use in terms of “seduction” rather than the “cliché of addiction,” and locates her attraction in the “possibilities of ‘conversation’ among the multiple windows on my screen and the way an instantly responsive machine allays my anxieties about perfection” (30). A sense of relationality with her computer seduces Turkle, and not the machine’s external agency, like that of a drug acting upon her. What she shares, then, is the virtuality of fictional presence. And in the fact that seduction operates at least initially on the level of appearances, the virtuality that seduces Turkle is (as she affirms) that between herself and the interface, and not between herself and what this seductive surface claims to disclose. For Jean Baudrillard, seduction is that which challenges the order of production; as a strategy of pure surfaces, it battles our cultural impetus “to produce meaning, to make the world signify, to render it visible” (63). Seduction is complicit in the fabrication of the fulfillment of its own goal: it champions the attraction of a surface that promises and ultimately outshines a cache of meaning beneath.

     

    In that the personal webcam is formally structured by a continuous visual unfurling, it resembles a kind of striptease: the very topos of seduction whose narrative at once manufactures a secret of invisibility and continuously reproduces its own narrative process toward this goal. The webcam more closely approaches Baudrillard’s notion of seduction in that its seductive effectuality is to deny the teleology of the striptease narrative. The webcam’s resolute and noninteractive performance of everydayness perverts this teleology entirely by failing even to fabricate a secret of invisibility. Rather, it enacts a counternarrative of unlayering and relayering, a continual promise and denial of fulfillment. Paradoxically, this counternarrative is based on the narrative of temporal routine; and in that the mechanical process of image refreshment constitutes, by technological default, only an approximation of the moving image of film or video, we read the images as a narrative sequence. Just as the continued use of a drug of dependency gradually fails to provide the satisfaction inherent in its initial seductiveness, the personal webcam may recreate an analogous pattern of habituation. Seducing the user by the interface’s promise of access to a deeper level of fulfillment–beneath the surface, through the window–the webcam encourages habitual viewing by appearing with every new image to come closer to spectatorial satisfaction but simultaneously deferring to the potential of the next image.

     

    But how satisfying can the seduction of constant deferral be? The webcam frame need not and frequently does not contain any evidence of its subject. Hours may pass in which the camera captures an empty room. And even if its operator does appear in the frame, she may not be doing anything more “performative” than sleeping, possibly turning over in bed every now and again. Given that these hours constitute a significant proportion of available viewing, why do we still bother to watch? Moreover, if the seduction of the webcam interface is that it promises to disclose a kernel of identity, in a regulated and iterative process, are we really coming closer with each image to gaining insight into webcam operators’ lives and identity? Are we really seeing through the screen?

     

    In their use of the transparent window device, webcams most obviously demonstrate their lineal connection to television, and especially to what Jane Feuer calls “the ontological glory of [that] medium” (15). Television relies partly upon a perceptive agreement to the transparency of its screen, where the screen is merely a frame through which the viewer is able to see events that are, ideally, taking place instantaneously. Rather than exploiting a viewer’s naïveté, according to Morse, the transparency effect of television entails viewers’ “willing collusion in rituals and conventions” that comprise the televisual experience: a process of disavowal of what may defy logic or fact (18). Viewers agree to suspend disbelief in the unknowable virtuality of television’s liveness and its direct mode of address to them: to incorporate the televisual interface’s imposition of various intermediary devices, such as the graphics and multiple viewing frames.

     

    Raised on television, Internet users approach the webcam frame with the same split belief system. The webcam’s interface both encourages and discourages the transparency effect of its post-televisual surveillance function. Arguing that panoptic societies manufacture the illusion of privacy and secrets as accessible realities behind screens of surveillance, William Bogard questions the conceptual validity of disclosure in telematic societies. “There, if we can still speak about the secret at all,” he writes, “it is only in relation to a private space, a private person, that has been absorbed into the screen itself” (126). The personal webcam’s hyperreal body is not so much beyond or behind the screen as on the screen. The screen defines and sustains it. In Bogard’s terms, webcams simulate the surveillance common to earlier screen forms, such as closed circuit TV. Where surveillance unmasks the presence of the real, Bogard argues, simulation masks its absence. The surveillance apparatus attempts to render the mediating surface of the screen transparent; simulation dissolves the surface as a medium of appearances to provide immediacy, not to the real but to the hyperreal (19-21). The seductive impetus of telepresence in this technology–to achieve mutual proximity with a remote body or location–becomes irrelevant in that the remote bodies of webcam operators are immutable. Rather, simulated versions of their authentic identity are all that is available to viewers, and these exist solely on the interface that claims to make visible their reality.

     

    The interface and its various formal features, however, remain constantly present and tangible to the viewer. When Turkle writes that we have “learned to take things at interface value” (23), she is drawing an explicit link between users’ increasing comfort with the multiple-windowed interface of current computer technology and a broader cultural shift toward the acceptance of simulation and away from the epistemological impetus of transparency. “We are increasingly accustomed to navigating screen simulations,” she claims, and this is part of a reduced “modernist desire to see beneath the surface into the mechanics of the operating system” (41-2). The ongoing popularity of personal webcams attests to the continuance of a not insignificant desire in our culture to see through various screens of interpersonal separation. My argument, however, shares Turkle’s belief in interface seduction: there is a major and even defining sense of tactility to webcam use, based not simply on the thrill of technological innovation but also on the seamless integration of this technology into our everyday experiences and practices.

     

    While the imposition of multiple interface elements aims, like broadcast TV, to assist a project of transparent transmission, it is these elements (and not what they make visible) that form the means to compel the webcam viewer. If the webcam window provides an automated oscillation between the spectacle of nothing and the promise of something, it is in this formal process (and not in its dubious content) that lies the webcam’s narrative. And while the regulated rhythms of image refreshment render this process strictly mechanical, the seconds taken for each new frame to open simultaneously locate the spatial compression of narrative contingency. The intervening download time while each image discloses itself offers the webcam’s only limited opportunity for the viewer to interpret the hypothetical and unexpected nature of its virtuality. Sometimes known as “Reload,” “Refresh” is a standard command on web browsers, allowing the user to recommence or update the downloading of a site. The image or site is at its most fresh during this process, given that it may be refreshed again at any time after the download. If the webcam image refreshes itself every time it updates, during the very moment of changeover, what happens to it in between? For the image to require refreshment implies its gradually decreasing freshness and, therefore, its gradually increasing staleness. Replaced with a fresh image after a programmed delay, each previous image is deemed to have gone stale, no longer fresh with narrative possibility.

     

    Marina Grzinic’s comments on the frustrations and imperfections of telepresent technologies are resonant here. Drawing on Walter Benjamin’s famous theory that an object’s aura–its “unique appearance or semblance of distance” (cited Grzinic 215)–is destroyed by its reproduction, Grzinic attempts to recover aura in telerobotic technologies. She proposes transmission time as the digital media counterpart to photography’s exposure time, which she discusses, after Benjamin, as allowing the spatio-temporal specificities of the object to be traceable in its image. Where the transmission time of telerobotic (and by extension webcam) technologies manifests in download delays, it “forces us to think about the network of modems, routers, servers, and telephone lines that the image must travel in order to get to us” (221). Time delay confirms both the spatial and temporal distance of the object. Furthermore, Grzinic continues, these technical practicalities tend to produce discontinuities in the image, such as the “choppy and unnatural” motion of objects hopping that slow image refresh rates generate (221).

     

    Grzinic’s argument for the compelling visual quality–the aura–of these imperfections supports my contention that the potential for narrative involvement in webcams lies in the textuality of their interface. Jon Dovey has commented on the perplexing realist authority invested in the aesthetic of “wobblyscope” video images, particularly in conjunction with surveillance media and home video (64). By the same token, the imprecision of unclear image quality and delays in the unfurling of webcam images provides the very points of interest for viewing in that they necessarily leave room for epistemological frustration. Grzinic likens transmission delays and slow refresh rates to “a fingerprint on the film, a drop of water on the lens”: they are “evidence of the image” (224). To my analysis, they are also evidence of virtuality and a tantalising, compelling hindrance to visual certainty. They offer viewers recourse to narrative precisely where the image content deters narrative. Nonetheless, the webcam image’s random availability makes available inferred narratives of sexual promiscuity–sexual freshness–as well as questions of its cleanliness. One critical incident in the JenniCam history reverberates with the ambiguous charge of promiscuity. In July 2000, the webcam both lost and gained viewers when Ringley’s sexual propriety was called into question. She was accused, according to one report, of “stealing her best friend’s boyfriend in full view of thousands of outraged fans” (Lipowicz). Some boycotted the site, while others–40 percent more viewers than usual–logged on in anticipation of increased sexual activity, the report implies, allowing the further inference that Ringley would knowingly trade on this express traffic to garner relief from financial debt. One of Ringley’s online journal entries at the time playfully masked her knowingness with a barely euphemistic image of performative fluidity: “JenniCam, instead of being a window into my regular boring life, will be a window into love. I’m convinced it will utterly ooze through the Internet” (cited in Lipowicz). Where the electronic display of an image of identity via promiscuous contact is figured as transmission or communication, the narrative of sexualization accrues intensity by the associative anxieties of contagion. The exponential and apparently unintentional growth in the number of visits to JenniCam–its “catching on”–is a cellular instance of what is figured as the Internet’s promiscuous transmissibility.

     

    Several scholars have noted the common application of discourses of contagion to the transmission of computer viruses. In particular, the success of this metaphor draws on the shared unknowing of epidemic danger that exacerbated public misperceptions of AIDS at its most prolific and the contemporaneous phenomenon of computer hacking (Lupton; Kember). I began this essay with a reading of two pieces of U.S. legislation born from this exact fear: the harmful performativity of viral attacks on those points of the body (the human, social, and political body) deemed most vulnerable. Like the uncontainable damage caused by the electronic letter bomb, benevolently disguised and voluntarily received, exploding on arrival in the host’s email inbox, the Child Pornography Prevention Act imagined the desensitized catching on to dangerous behaviors by mere transmissible contact with unrecognizable agents of harm. The Communications Decency Act rendered the metaphor more explicit still, hoping to outlaw similar “transmission” and “communication” specifically centering on the body’s sexual and excretory orifices. As enactments of the state’s legal and political subjection of its citizens, the penetrating gaze of these bills aims to bring into visibility certain deviant behaviors, and to demarcate a sterilized zone from which contagion may be expelled. The surveillance of the U.S. military by the military, a surveillance that, as Butler discusses in Excitable Speech, aims at abjecting by “discharge” the “dangerous fluid” of homosexual communication, marks an analogous production of a purified body (110).

     

    In his condemnatory discussion of the Supreme Court’s striking down of the CPPA (in another of its “extraordinarily permissive rulings”), Robert H. Bork writes that “it would seem merely common sense to think that graphic depictions of children in sexual acts would likely result in some action by pedophiles,” but he stops short of considering the “likely result” of virtual or less obviously fictitious depictions.4 Bork’s position itself lacks mere “common sense” in its failure to specify beyond the likelihood of “some action” by presumably all “pedophiles.” Indeed, for Bork, child pornography–virtual or otherwise–exists in the same reprehensible category as all pornography, along with “nude dancing” and “raw profanity,” around which there has been “no good reason to throw free speech protections” as guaranteed by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Pornography of any kind should not be available even to adults, he opines, and therefore the question of virtuality–of whether actual children are involved in any way–is irrelevant to his argument. Nonetheless, Bork subscribes to Congress’s series of easy elisions–of sexual imagery with sexual conduct, of pornographer with pedophile, and of pornography viewer with pedophile–arguing for a clear, performative link between virtual representation and imagined actions upon unrelated children.

     

    In an effort to analogize this causality, Bork draws on another, more literal form of speech “exempt from regulation”: the broadcasting of “the rawest forms of profanity” on television.

     

    Cable television is saturated with words never before used in public, and the broadcast networks are racing to catch up. [...] The industry response to criticism on this score is that such words give the programs authenticity because this is the way people talk. In reality, however, the arrow probably points in the other direction. People increasingly talk this way because they hear the words on television, and they hear the words on television because the Supreme Court's rulings have deprived the government of any effective sanctions for profanity.

     

    Aside from the contention that both have been overlooked by the Supreme Court, Bork chooses not to trace the steps taken in his equation of profanity with child pornography. He also chooses not to entertain the question of how “sanctions for profanity” might be policed, let alone how they might actually function. His interpellation of a helplessly impressionable viewer, however, is clear and stands in accord with Congress’s equally monologic version of image reception. Like members of Congress, Bork fails to elaborate on his own apparent immunity to television’s believed contagious performativity, even as he concludes by acknowledging that “destroying limits to speech […] progressively liberates the worst in our natures.” Profanity, though, is apparently not in “our” nature: “never before used in public” and simply contracted from television. Having bundled profanity and pornography into the same basket of evil, Bork then applies different standards to each. His refusal to accept that representations of profanity can be authentic contradicts his understanding of pornography and its supposed performative function: that representations of child sex, even of the least “actual” authenticity, are “likely” to offer a template of behavior for real abuse.

     

    Where Bork’s article is particularly useful is in its propulsion of a familiar anxiety around the uncontrollability of representation and the channels of its circulation. His expedient conflation of photographic, televisual, video, and digital technologies disallows any discernment of epistemological nuance among these media. This slippage operates in service of a simplistic, oppositional image/reality binarism, and is fuelled by an inflated apprehension of immorality and harm. Paranoid voices like Bork’s and those of congressional legislators manifest a moral panic that the means of representation–the mass media generally–are disseminating contagious, dangerous matter. Just as Bork sees profanity spreading without regulation across the airwaves and into the public lexicon, images that merely “convey the impression” of involving children in sexual conduct are deemed capable of transmitting an infectious agency among susceptible individuals, and possibly further. Congress identified, for instance, the affective contagion that it imagined would endear children to images of other children “having fun” in even completely contrived “depictions” of sexual activity: a contagion of victimhood. And yet at the same time, a contagious perpetration was imagined by the congressional findings, where a desensitized predilection for the offending material might “catch on” among, we presume, not-yet-pedophiles in the same manner as it infects existing pedophiles with appetite-whetting stimulus. The projected sweep of the contagion is as oddly broad and indiscriminate as it initially seemed specific. The language of the CPPA bill–intended to serve a specific legislative function by closing what it perceived to be a representational loophole in opportunities for exploiting children–enacts a similar performativity to the contagiously regarded criminality of its content. This is not to say that its wording performs the abuse it names, but rather that its attempts to delineate with more qualitative focus its legislative domain (even if that domain was to be quantitatively expanded) resulted in a slippery imprecision and indiscrimination, ruled by the Supreme Court to be “overbroad.”5

     

    Despite the presumptuous evocation of community that subtends Bork’s calls for legislative stricture, his phrasing points more to contempt of an inadequately regulated public, to whose putative “common sense” he nonetheless defers. Further presuming moral commonality, his argument against profanity and the appearance of pornography alike yearns to reinstall a less “permissive” Supreme Court. Bork’s retrospective imaginary may find solace in that court’s landmark Bowers v. Hardwick ruling, the “inflammatory force” of which illustrates Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s broader elaboration of ignorance and its ambidextrous availability to the regulation of public and private spaces. Harnessing “an insolent display of legal illogic,” the Hardwick decision, Sedgwick writes, made “obtuse” and “contemptuous demonstration” of the court’s power to ratify homophobic discourse (6-7). Specifically, Justice White’s opinion found particular legal claims to a right to engage in sodomy–in one’s own bedroom–to be “at best, facetious” (qtd. in Sedgwick 6).6 Bork’s opinion, that for virtual child pornography to “likely result” in pedophilic activity is “merely common sense,” establishes by inversion a self-evidence of equal “mock-ignorant mock-jocose threat,” as Sedgwick describes White’s facetious “at best” (7; emphasis added). However, Bork’s prima facie condemnation of virtual material ignores the facetiousness of its avoidance of the categorical signifiers of actual pornography: that at best, virtual facetiae are merely euphemistically pornographic.

     

    Likewise, the virtual body of the webcam operator exists only on the screen that makes it visible, and from which it is indistinguishable. The screen represents a sustaining membrane without which that body would cease to exist. To puncture the screen, for that body to become merely flesh, would destroy the transparent seal of surveyed sterility that the webcam simulates as a means to making the body visible and, in viewer imaginations, variously sexual. The webcam enacts, then, what Bogard calls “the elaborate artifice of penetration” (38). This artifice manifests in the complex of interface features that encourage webcam viewers to believe they can telepresently “get hold of [the] object,” in whatever means they desire (Benjamin 217). In its automaticity, the webcam’s seductive main feature of image refreshment marks a constant reiteration of the screen as a seal of freshness: a continuous promise of the image’s availability, but of the body’s uncompromised prophylaxis.

     

    Notes

     

    1. “Telerobotics” is the technological capacity to control a robot or other machine from a distance. One famous example is Ken Goldberg’s Telegarden, an art installation allowing remote Internet users to tend an actual garden, first located in the Ars Electronica Center, Austria. <http://www.usc.edu/dept/garden/> See Goldberg.

     

    2. In late December 2003, without public explanation, Ringley ceased operation of the JenniCam website. Internet news reports suggest the decision may have come in response to online payment company PayPal’s cancellation of Ringley’s account because of the site’s supposed violation of PayPal’s non-nudity policy.

     

    3. This ease was demonstrated by Save Karyn <http://www.savekaryn.com>, a website audaciously (and successfully) dedicated to erasing Karyn’s $20,000 credit card debt. The site’s operator transparently acknowledged that she offered nothing in return for donations, which included money as well as all manner of other goods.

     

    4. A former judge and acting Attorney General under President Nixon at the height of the Watergate scandal, Bork’s own nomination to the Supreme Court by President Reagan in 1987 was lobbied against strongly by the American Civil Liberties Union and rejected by the Senate.

     

    5. “Overbreadth” is ascribed to legislation whose proscriptive sweep effectively covers that which is protected by the U.S. Constitution, namely freedom of speech, press, and assembly.

     

    6. Respondent Michael Hardwick had been arrested in his bedroom, where police found him engaging in the criminal act of sodomy with another adult male. He sued the state of Georgia for infringement of his fundamental rights, initially losing and later winning on appeal. The Supreme Court, in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), ultimately upheld the constitutionality of the Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition. No. 00-795. 535 US 234. U.S. Supreme Court 2002.
    • Baudrillard, Jean. The Ecstasy of Communication. Trans. Bernard and Caroline Schutze. New York: Semiotext(e), 1988.
    • Benjamin, Walter. “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” Illuminations. Trans. Harry Zohn. London: Fontana, 1992. 211-44.
    • Bogard, William. The Simulation of Surveillance: Hypercontrol in Telematic Societies. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996.
    • Bork, Robert H. “The Sanctity of Smut.” Wall Street Journal 27 Apr. 2002. 22 Aug. 2002 <http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=105001991>.
    • Butler, Judith. Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative. New York: Routledge, 1997.
    • —. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York: Routledge, 1990.
    • Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996. Pub. L. 104-208 30 Sep. 1996. 110 Stat. 3009.
    • Cohen, Stanley. Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers. London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1972.
    • Communications Decency Act of 1996. Pub L. 104-104. 1 Feb. 1996. Title V.
    • Dovey, Jon. Freakshow: First Person Media and Factual Television. London: Pluto, 2000.
    • Feuer, Jane. “The Concept of Live Television: Ontology as Ideology.” Regarding Television: Critical Approaches–an Anthology. Ed. E. Ann Kaplan. Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1983. 12-22.
    • Goldberg, Ken. “Introduction: The Unique Phenomenon of a Distance.” Goldberg 2-20.
    • Goldberg, Ken, ed. The Robot in the Garden: Telerobotics and Telepistemology in the Age of the Internet. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT P, 2000.
    • Grzinic, Marina. “Exposure Time, the Aura, and Telerobotics.” Goldberg 214-24.
    • Hopkins, Susan. “Camgirls: Live on the Net.” Sydney Morning Herald 10 Aug. 2002. 21 Aug. 2002 < http://www.smh.com.au/text/articles/2002/08/09/1028158010523.htm>.
    • Kember, Sarah. Virtual Anxiety: Photography, New Technologies, and Subjectivity. Manchester: Manchester UP, 1998.
    • Lipowicz, Alice. “Jenni’s in Love.” Salon 4 Aug. 2000. 21 Aug. 2002 <http://dir.salon.com/tech/log/2000/08/04/jennicam/index.html?sid=937137>.
    • Lupton, Deborah. “Panic Computing: The Viral Metaphor and Computer Technology.” Cultural Studies 8.3 (1994): 556-68.
    • Mieszkowski, Katharine. “Candy from Strangers.” Salon 13 Aug. 2001. 21 Aug. 2002 <http://archive.Salon.com/tech/feature/2001/08/13/cam_girls/index.html>.
    • Morse, Margaret. Virtualities: Television, Media Art, and Cyberculture. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1998.
    • Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union. No. 96-511. 521 US 844. U.S. Supreme Court 1997.
    • Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky. Epistemology of the Closet. Berkeley: U of California P, 1990.
    • Sontag, Susan. AIDS and Its Metaphors. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1989.
    • Turkle, Sherry. Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995.
    • Watney, Simon. Policing Desire: Pornography, AIDS and the Media. London: Methuen, 1987.
    • Williams, Linda. Hard Core: Power, Pleasure, and the “Frenzy of the Visible.” Berkeley: U of California P, 1989.

     

  • “Myriad Little Connections”: Minoritarian Movements in the Postmodernism Debate

     

    Pelagia Goulimari

    Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities
    goulimari@angelaki1.demon.co.uk

     

    The vast postmodernism debate, whose expansive and canonical phase spanned from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s but which has yet to reach a point of settlement or closure, engages with a multiplicity of questions, among which “what is postmodernism?” is not necessarily the most important. A more urgent question in the debate is that of minoritarian movements. In many of the most influential interrogations of postmodernism, one can discern the promise of unprecedented participation for everyone on a global terrain without frontiers. It is a promise, however, on which the canonical texts of the debate ultimately fail to deliver. An analysis of these texts shows them following a binary scheme of political analysis that is still with us today and which it is our challenge now to leave behind: fragmentation versus unification. Minoritarian movements are seen as non-communicating fragments in need of unification by an avant-garde hegemonic force. In our post-hegemonic world, this model locks minoritarian movements into a false dilemma and fails to acknowledge their fertile interaction. In search of a “new” model that acknowledges both the distinctness and unceasing interaction of minoritarian movements, I propose a return to Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus.Here unfolds a world of “myriad connections, disjunctions, and conjunctions” (315) across fields (such as Marxism, feminism, postcolonial theory, and queer theory): small collectivities, here, which neither have “anything in common, nor do they cease communicating.”

     

    Central to my account of the postmodernism debate will be Fredric Jameson’s canonical essay, “Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism” (1984).1 In The Success and Failure of Fredric Jameson (2001), based on a series of articles published in this journal between 1995 and 2000, Steven Helmling describes “Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism” as Jameson’s most accomplished attempt to date at success-as-failure: a dialectical model of writing full of contradictions, full of movement and agitation and vertiginous slippage of meaning (14-16, 110-11). Further, Helmling argues that between 1982 and 1984–between Jameson’s earliest piece on postmodernism, “Postmodernism and Consumer Society” and his definitive “Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism”–Jameson “augment[s] polysemy” (16, 169-70).2 In fact, however, when one reads these successive writings in relation to the question of minoritarian movements, one finds a reverse movement toward monosemy, accompanied by an increasingly insistent rejection of minoritarian movements.3

     

    In the first part of this essay, and in order to show this double movement, I will briefly review Jameson’s work on postmodernism between 1982 and 1984. In particular, I want to show how this work slowly crystallized a truth-claim about postmodernism as part of a triangle. First, postmodernism = minoritarian movements = sheer heterogeneity, radical difference, dispersal of non-communicating fragments. Second, late capitalism is a spectre of dissolution in that it is a total or global system paradoxically generating sheer heterogeneity, that is, generating minoritarian movements that are nothing but non-communicating islands of late capitalism. Third, the Left will overcome this spectre of dissolution and bring about a total systemic transformation by hegemonizing and thus unifying minoritarian movements. This hegemony is necessary rather than a matter of contingent, political articulation. The main theoretical element here is Lacan’s structuralist reading of schizophrenia as a breakdown of the signifying chain. Its main political element is that minoritarian movements are those disconnected signifiers and that the Left is the Lacanian “despotic signifier” or hegemonic force that will reunite them.

     

    In the second part of this essay, I look at the effective adoption of the Jamesonian triangle of fragmentation, total system, unification as total systemic transformation–in its formal outline rather than its particular contents–in three major works on postmodernism: David Harvey’s The Condition of Postmodernity: An Inquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (1989), Steven Connor’s Postmodernist Culture: An Introduction to Theories of the Contemporary (1989), and Linda Hutcheon’s The Politics of Postmodernism (1989), the latter of which simultaneously adopts and rejects this triangle. I follow the mutations of the Jamesonian triangle in these works, in relation to minoritarian movements. I also look at the effective rejection of the Jamesonian triangle in Ernesto Laclau’s “Politics and the Limits of Modernity” (1987), again in relation to minoritarian movements.

     

    In the third and final part of the essay, I turn to Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus for an alternative conception of minoritarian movements and their interaction, in order to escape what I see as the double bind between fragmentation and unification. Deleuze and Guattari developed a distinction between two types of relation: that of schizophrenia or “deterritorialization” and that of paranoia or “territorialization.” I try to show that the Jamesonian triangle initiated a powerful and persistent “territorializing” tendency in the postmodernism debate. Finally, I argue that the Jamesonian triangle leads perhaps for the first time to the fragmentation it purports to overcome.

     

    “Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism”

     

    In this section I will examine the movement from Jameson’s “Postmodernism and Consumer Society” (1982), “Cognitive Mapping” (1983), “Periodizing the 60s” (1984), and his Foreword to Jean-François Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition (1984), to the definitive “Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism” (1984). The section is divided into three parts named for the Jamesonian triangle of late capitalism, the Left, and minoritarian movements.

     

    Late Capitalism

     

    In the first paragraph of his Foreword to The Postmodern Condition, Jameson introduces his main thesis on postmodernism: postmodernism “involves […] a new social and economic moment” (vii).

     

    “Postmodernism and Consumer Society” already has recourse to a “new moment of late, consumer or multinational capitalism” but understands its link to postmodernism as only partially determining (125). Yes, postmodernism is “closely related” to consumer capitalism, and its “formal features in many ways [not in every way] express the deeper logic” of consumer capitalism; yet it remains distinct from consumer capitalism, so that Jameson can conclude: “there is a way in which postmodernism replicates […] the logic of consumer capitalism; the more significant question is whether there is also a way in which it resists that logic” (125, emphasis added). In “Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism,” with expressions such as “postmodern period” (62, emphasis added), no distance remains between postmodernism and the new economic moment; Jameson assimilates postmodernism to its logic.

     

    But what is this new “social and economic moment”? In “Postmodernism and Consumer Society” Jameson looks at two features of postmodernism–pastiche and schizophrenia–in order to deduce the nature of consumer capitalism. Through both pastiche and schizophrenia, as I will now explain, he detects social fragmentation. (Jameson seems to assume that social fragmentation expresses rather than resists consumer capitalism.)

     

    In “Postmodernism and Consumer Society,” postmodernism is still a phenomenon in the arts–later, poststructuralist theory will be included. Jameson briefly relates pastiche to “each group coming to speak a curious private language of its own,” at the expense and to the detriment of “normal language […] of the linguistic norm,” as well as at the expense of “a unique personality and individuality, which can be expected [unlike groups] to generate its own unique vision of the world” (114). This is the first instance–a mere suggestion–of a link between the proliferation of new micropolitical groups and consumer capitalism. Jameson’s discussion of schizophrenic art continues the problematic of, and the lack of enthusiasm for, new micropolitical groups–initiated in the last quotation–in that schizophrenic art involves “isolated, disconnected, discontinuous material signifiers which fail to link up into a coherent whole” (119).

     

    A quick comparison with Baudrillard’s La société de consommation (1970), to which Jameson’s “consumer society” refers, will show Jameson’s originality. Baudrillard’s “consumer society” has no dispersive or fragmentary effects. On the contrary, it is an expanded system of social reproduction, regulation, and control: “consumption is a system which assures the regulation of signs and the integration of the group […] a system of meaning” (“Consumer” 46). Further, consumer society is but a reaction to “the rise of new productive forces” (49). Baudrillard’s example of new productive forces, that of Puerto Rican workers in the U.S., might be seen to refer to all minoritarian groups. “Postmodernism and Consumer Society” seems to reverse this order, so that the proliferation of such new productive forces expresses consumer society.

     

    After “Postmodernism and Consumer Society,” the term “late capitalism” quickly becomes dominant. This is part of a broader shift. Here poststructuralism is still considered both to be “radical” (“Postmodernism and Consumer Society” 115) and to have cognitive value comparable to that of Mandel’s Late Capitalism (1975). By the time of “Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism,” Jameson has placed them on opposite sides of a distinction between the symptomatic and the cognitive. Poststructuralism is relegated to the symptomatic, while Mandel’s “late capitalism” represents the cognitive. “Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism” quickly slips from the initial statement that postructuralism is “a very significant symptom of […] postmodernist culture” to the equation, “poststructural or postmodern period” (61, 62); on the other hand “Marxian ‘science’ provides […] a way of knowing and conceptualizing the world abstractly, in the sense in which, e.g., Mandel’s great book offers a rich and elaborated knowledge of that global world system” (91).

     

    Jameson first develops his use of Mandel’s “late capitalism” in “Periodizing the 60s.” He adopts two main ideas. The first is that late capitalism is the purest and most extended form of capitalism so far. As Baudrillard and others wouldn’t disagree with this (see “Consumer Society” 50), the second idea is the crucial one: late capitalism is a spent force after the worldwide economic crisis of 1973-74.4 “Periodizing the 60s” quickly turns this “hypothesis” into a quasi-scientific prediction of the political fate of minoritarian movements (206): they were “produced” by late capitalism’s energy–now that this energy is exhausted, so are they (208). “Periodizing the 60s” continues to diagnose contemporary reality as fragmented–as “a now absolutely fragmented and anarchic social reality” (201)–but this reality is the work of a new subject of history, late capitalism.

     

    “Periodizing the 60s” opens with the proposition that “history is necessity” (178). It concludes accordingly: now that late capitalism has lost its dynamism, the “prodigious release of untheorized new forces” is over and is “(from the hindsight of the 80s) a historical illusion,” “inflationary,” a matter of “devalued signifiers” caused by an unwise “universal abandonment of the referential gold standard” (208). (The U.S. and then the IMF abandoned the actual gold standard in 1970s. Jameson’s argument seems to be that micropolitics abandoned “the referential gold standard” of the category of class.) Jameson predicts:

     

    the 80s will be characterized by an effort, on a world scale, to proletarianize all those unbound social forces[;] [...] by an extension of class struggle, in other words, into the farthest reaches of the globe [...] The unifying force here is the new vocation of a henceforth global capitalism, which may also be expected to unify the unequal, fragmented, or local resistances [...]. (208-09)

     

    This is how Marxism “must necessarily become true again” (209). “And this is finally also the solution to the so-called ‘crisis’ of Marxism” (209). It seems to me that capitalism plays the role of a deus ex machina here.

     

    What makes “Periodizing the 60s” fascinating is the fleeting presence, in this piece alone, of a second theoretical position–history as contingency–and a second affective position–an openness to minoritarian movements. The result is pure, unresolved contradiction. For example, Jameson’s genealogy of the 1960s incorporates political events: “a fundamental ‘condition of possibility’” for the unleashing of the new forces was McCarthyism and the merger of the AFL and the CIO in 1955, in that it led to “the expulsion of the Communists from the American labor movement” (181); or Jameson considers that “such newly released forces do not only not seem to compute in the dichotomous class model of traditional Marxism; they also seem to offer a realm of freedom and voluntarist possibility beyond the classical constraints of the economic infrastructure” (208).

     

    Similarly, as examples of a different affective tone toward minoritarian movements, Jameson speaks of feminism as “stunning and unforeseeable […] a Yenan of a new and unpredictable kind which is still impregnable” (189), and he salutes “the challenge of the women’s movement whose unique new strategies and concerns cut across (or in some cases undermine and discredit altogether) many classical inherited forms of […] political action” (192).5

     

    “Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism” leaves contingency and openness behind: minoritarian movements are but “symptoms” of late capitalism. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri make the reverse and, in my view, more convincing argument in Empire: capital is parasitic and reactive and simply borrows the inventions of the struggles of the proletariat to survive. They reject all “objective” theories of the dynamics of capital and all theories of cycles, in that such theories devalue the proletariat. The crux of their analysis lies in identifying the 1960s movements–in their indexes of “mobility, flexibility, knowledge, communication, cooperation, the affective”–as the new figure of the proletariat or the “multitude” (275).6

     

    While “Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism” is central to the postmodernism debate, while we still return to it, Jameson himself has moved on and has since said: “I have mainly singled out intellectual and social phenomena like ‘poststructuralism’ and the ‘new social movements,’ thus giving the impression, against my own deepest political convictions, that all the ‘enemies’ were on the left” (“Conclusion” 408).

     

    The New New Left

     

    “Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism” upholds a modern model of genuine political expression, of a “great collective project,” comprising three interrelated elements: the individual, the norm and, crucially, the avant-garde (always in the singular) (65).7 Here Jameson postulates, first, that the “collective ideals of […] political […] avant-garde […] stand or fall along with […] the so-called centred subject” or that political “expression requires the category of the individual monad” (63); second, that the “fragmentation of social life […] to the point where the norm itself is eclipsed” goes hand in hand with “the absence of any great collective project” (65); third, that minoritarian movements are part of this new fragmentation brought about by late capitalism.8 Minoritarian movements are, therefore, an impediment to collective projects, rather than their embodiment. Now that capitalism works by “heterogeneity without a norm,” minoritarian movements play into the hands of “faceless masters [who] continue to inflect the economic strategies which constrain our existence”–minoritarian movements are, in effect, the enemy (65). What is implicitly at work here is a distinction within collective projects, parallel to the distinction between cognitive and symptomatic theory discussed above. This is a distinction between authentic and inauthentic collective projects on grounds that are purely formal and a priori: an authentic collective project is necessarily “avant-garde,” in the sense of confronting a total system or norm. In other words, an authentic collective project aims at the total transformation of a total system.

     

    What is at stake here is much more than the validity of a modern triangle (the individual, the norm, the avant-garde). The important point, as I will now try to show, is that Jameson renews this triangle as part of the attempt to draw a clear line between minoritarian movements and what can be called the new New Left. This project is initiated in “Cognitive Mapping” and reaches its definitive formulation in the final pages of “Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism.”

     

    In “Cognitive Mapping,” Jameson defines cognitive mapping as that which “span[s] or coordinate[s] […] a gap between phenomenological perception and a reality that transcends all individual thinking or experience” (353, emphasis added). Here we have Jameson’s first attempt to revamp this modern triangle: cognitive mapping is defined in relation to the individual, on the one hand, and a global reality, a new norm, on the other, so that it occupies the position of the avant-garde. This new norm, to which the new avant-garde will respond, is minoritarian movements as fragmentation and as the new face of a now-global capitalism; this new norm is “a multidimensional set of discontinuous realities,” the “post-Marxian Nietzschean world of micropolitics,” “the random and undecidable world of microgroups” (351, 355, 356). Where there is global fragmentation and dissolution, cognitive mapping aspires to bring its opposite. As Jameson specifies, cognitive mapping attempts to map “the totality of class relations on a global […] scale” and is “an integral part of any socialist political project,” because “without a conception of the social totality (and the possibility of transforming a whole social system), no properly socialist politics is possible” (353, 355).

     

    In a moment augmenting polysemy, Jameson comments that cognitive mapping is “a kind of blind”–“little more than a pretext” for debating the issue of the relation of the American Left to minoritarian movements (347). “Our essential function for the moment […] involves the conquest of legitimacy in this country for socialist discourse” (358). This “conquest of legitimacy” seems to require for the Left to reap the surplus value of the cultural, artistic, and political output of minoritarian movements: “the question is how to think those local struggles, involving specific and often quite different groups, within some common project that is called, for want of a better word, socialism” (360). The task is international rather than national: the new New Left is to articulate local struggles everywhere, thereby transforming them from an epiphenomena of global capitalism to elements in the reconstructed chain, in the avant-garde project, of international socialism.

     

    Here, a couple of loose ends remain, which Jameson will attempt to tie up in “Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism.” First, if, as Jameson writes in “Cognitive Mapping,” socialism stands for “transforming a whole social system,” what about the claims of those minoritarian movements which also have recourse to a whole social system and its transformation (certain strains of “difference” feminism, for example, with their radical address to patriarchy and its transformation) (347)?9 In a passage already quoted above, “Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism” strengthens the link between Marxism and the cognitive: Mandel’s “hypothesis” (in “Periodizing the 60s”) now becomes “a rich and elaborated knowledge of that global world system” (91).

     

    Second, if the individual stood for the centered subject in the modern triangle, what exactly does it stand for here–what are we to understand by “phenomenological perception” and “individual thinking or experience” (above)? In the final pages of “Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism,” Jameson revises his account of cognitive mapping and now speaks of “individual and collective subjects” unable to grasp the totality and in need of cognitive mapping (92, emphasis added). It seems then that the individual is now another name for what Jameson sees as the isolated and fragmented perspective of minoritarian movements. So the three elements of Jameson’s new triangle are first, in the position of the individual, any minoritarian movement, understood as an isolated, spatialized, inert element; second, in the position of the norm, late capitalism as a field of minoritarian movements as isolated islands; and third, in the position of the avant-garde, international socialism as unification of minoritarian movements by the new New Left.

     

    A brief contrast with Raymond Williams’s The Country and the City (1973) would be instructive. In speaking of (and for) the rural laborer, Williams bumps against the fixation of the Left on the male metropolitan proletarian, at the expense of other kinds of work and exploitation, which become invisible. Williams links the Left’s fixation on this figure with three additional tendencies–tendencies which, I believe, may be discerned in “Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism.” These tendencies are the famous “simultaneous damnation and idealisation of capitalism”; the Left’s identification with “mastery–power”; and, finally, a specific dream of socialism as the first-born son of capitalism that will inherit all upon its demise:

     

    What they say is damn this, praise this; and the intellectual formula for this emotional confusion is, hopefully, the dialectic. All that needs to be added, as the climax to the muddle, is [...] the saving qualification, that at a certain stage [...] capitalism begins to lose this progressive character and [...] must be replaced, superseded, by socialism. (Williams 37)

     

    Throughout The Country and the City, Williams opens up, to the point of reversal, the distinction between the rural and the metropolitan. On the side of the rural he includes vagrant laborers (83-86), families without fathers–since even “in the villages what was most wanted was the abstract producer, the single able-bodied man” (85)–and Third-World laborers (279-88). On the side of the metropolitan he includes land enclosures, the laws restricting mobility, and, as we have seen, even a certain version of socialism.

     

    In an analysis resonant with that of Deleuze and Guattari’s in Anti-Oedipus, Williams discusses the sedentary ethic inextricably linked with the rise of capitalism, whose target and enemy is migrant and “unproductive” labor: poor labor. As a result, he recasts and expands the definition of labor–we can say that he recognizes the labor of many others besides that of the male metropolitan proletariat. We have seen Jameson, on the other hand, putting his faith in capitalism to “proletarianize” those others. We will now see him “dissolving […] the lives and work of others into an image” (Williams 77).

     

    Minoritarian Movements

     

    A good metaphor for Jameson’s perspective on minoritarian movements in “Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism” is that they are “scattered television screens positioned at intervals” (like the exemplary artwork by Nam June Paik he describes here); they force us to choose between two distinct ways of viewing them: either we “decide to concentrate on a single screen”–as for him, presumably, minorities do–or we attempt “to see all the screens at once, in their radical and random difference” (76). Needless to say, it is only the second, panoptic position that will “hold to the truth of postmodernism” and “do it justice” (92). Clearly, given Jameson’s choice of metaphor, the panoptic spectator he invokes is faced with a formidable challenge; indeed, that figure is “called upon to do the impossible” (76). But we are still a little taken aback when Jameson announces that our success in this undertaking involves “an imperative to grow new organs, to expand our sensorium and our body to some new, as yet unimaginable, perhaps ultimately impossible, dimensions” (80). Expanding our bodies to impossible dimensions? Is this a radical political enterprise, a cognitive enterprise, or some kind of a monstrous assimilation? How are we even to begin such a project of bodily transformation?

     

    As we have seen, from his earliest work on postmodernism, Jameson consistently understands minoritarian movements as isolated and non-communicating. At the same time, something like a common ground gradually emerges–the new economic system–to the point where, in “Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism,” minoritarian movements are “symptoms” on the body of late capitalism. Like TV screens, symptoms manifest a latent reality that is outside and beyond them–treating minoritarian movements as symptoms derealizes them, transfers their reality, vitality, and life onto something else. And yet, it seems to me that when the new economic system is described–as a world of micropolitics, micromultiplicities, and discontinuous realities–it is itself a figure for a world where the cultural, artistic, and political initiative has passed to minoritarian movements. In this state of affairs, Deleuze and Guattari, among others, look at lateral connections between movements. Jameson, on the other hand, adopts a conceptual framework that denies a priori the ability of minoritarian movements to enter into lateral connections or to confront and change oppressive doxas directly and without intermediaries.

     

    Key to Jameson’s ghettoization of minorities is his particular scheme or mode of spatialization, and his understanding of space and historical time in the works examined. In “Postmodernism and Consumer Society,” Jameson argues that postmodernism is marked by a “historical amnesia” that expresses the new economic system (125). To demonstrate this, he briefly analyzes an extract from Marguerite Séchehaye’s Autobiography of a Schizophrenic Girl (120). The extract is a first-person narration of a past “schizophrenic” incident. It opens with the words “I remember very well” and closes with the “schizophrenic” girl going back “home to our garden and beg[inning] to play,” as a return to reality. What is the incident? A girl is walking in the countryside when, “suddenly,” as she is passing a school, she hears a German song sung by the schoolchildren and she stops to listen. A double transformation then occurs. The school and the children become barracks with prisoners compelled to sing, a vision imbued with a “sense of unreality.” At the same time and “bound up with” this disorienting double vision, a field of wheat becomes “dazzling” and seemingly infinite, with “limits I could not see,” and this further intensification of the hallucinatory moment brings with it a profound “anxiety” (120).

     

    My understanding of this incident, indebted to Walter Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” is that, instead of being immersed in a pleasant walk in the countryside or enjoying nature as an idyllic spectacle as is customary, and instead of playing in the garden, this girl has a genuine historical experience. As Benjamin tells us, “to articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it ‘the way it really was’ […]. The true picture of the past flits by […] flashes up at the instant when it can be recognized and is never seen again” (247). The girl’s stroll is “suddenly” interrupted by the unexpected sound of a German song sung by children inside the school–perhaps this is holiday time, hence the surprise. This slight event sends her back into a time of war and concentration camps, “barracks” and “prisoners” (Autobiography of a Schizophrenic Girl was originally published in French in 1950). As a result, the familiar and timeless scenery of country fields is transfigured; “bound up with” barracks and prisoners, it is traversed by an added dimension, that of history, and becomes unlimited and dazzling.

     

    The historical time recalled here is not that of public history. This, Benjamin tells us, is the form (continuous and present) of the history of the victors. The “tradition of the oppressed,” on the other hand, a genuine experience, comes to us from the corner of the eye, the ear, as involuntary and irrepressible as “a tiger’s leap” (248, 253). “Tiger’s leap” because for Benjamin, far from being passive or idle, the genuine historical experience–in this instance, the “schizophrenic” arrest that is pregnant with the girl’s own unknown predicament–is vitally connected to a revolutionary moment, a moment of praxis. If this is not the case here, this might be because the girl returned to reality too quickly; because the girl is not “schizophrenic” enough, so to speak. As I have already indicated, the narrative where the incident belongs is exemplary in the incident’s overcoming–the narrative itself is anything but “schizophrenic.” The incident is firmly lodged in a sequence initiated by “I remember very well” and completed by “I ran home to our garden and began to play ‘to make things seem as they usually were,’ that is to return to reality.”

     

    Jameson, in his own interpretation, omits–I feel tempted to say symptomatically–the song, the children/prisoners, the school/barracks, and has eyes only for the unlimited wheat field now unbound from its connections and standing in sublime isolation. He therefore sees the incident as demonstrating that “the schizophrenic is thus given over to an undifferentiated vision of the world in the present”; “an experience of isolated, disconnected, discontinuous material signifiers which fail to link up into a coherent sequence” (“Postmodernism and Consumer Society” 120, 119). If, for Jameson, this is the definition of historical amnesia, a radical historical project would, by contrast, involve the unification of the disconnected.

     

    This becomes clear in “Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism.” Discussing E. L. Doctorow’s Ragtime (which Jameson argues is symptomatically ahistorical), Jameson claims that a radical historical project requires an intentional and active monadic subject grasping firmly the “historical referent” (71), that it requires a clear distinction between subject and object.10 He then argues that the postmodern version of this project would entail the active grasping of spatial fragments. He therefore repeats his analysis of the schizophrenic girl from “Postmodernism and Consumer Society” and adds the analysis of the exemplary TV screens discussed earlier and the two alternatives, contemporary and relevant, they offer. The first alternative, comparable to Jameson’s reading of the schizophrenic girl, is exemplary of minoritarian movements: impotent and symptomatic absorption in a TV screen. The second alternative, actively grasping all screens at once–that is, continuing the clear distinction between subject and object by new means–is exemplary of the Left as Jameson envisages it: it rises above ahistorical postmodernism toward a new historicity in the form of a “new mode of relationship” (75).

     

    Since the emergence of the New Left in the 1960s civil rights movement, the simultaneous explosion in the reinvention of group traditions, histories, and agendas for the future appears to Jameson as ahistorical.12 Linda Hutcheon, in The Politics of Postmodernism, contradicts Jameson directly on this point. Not only is postmodernism (understood as contemporary culture, including theory) historical, but it derives “its historical consciousness (and conscience) from the inscription into history of women and ethnic/racial minorities” during the 1960s (10). If postmodernism is “typically denounced as dehistoricized” by Marxist and right-wing critics alike, this is because “the problematized histories of postmodernism have little to do with the single totalizing History” in which both parties take refuge (57).13

     

    The Adoption of Jameson’s Triangle

     

    I have tried to show that Jameson’s “Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism” crystallizes the following triangle: late capitalism as system generating fragmentation, minoritarian movements as fragments symptomatic of late capitalism, international socialism as unification promising total systemic transformation. In this section, I look at two of the first major adoptions of the Jamesonian triangle, David Harvey’s The Condition of Postmodernity and Steven Connor’s Postmodernist Culture: An Introduction to Theories of the Contemporary; Linda Hutcheon’s simultaneous rejection and adoption of the triangle in The Politics of Postmodernism; and Ernesto Laclau’s rejection of the triangle in “Politics and the Limits of Modernity.” My argument will be that Jameson’s triangle initiated–provided the toolkit for–a “territorializing” tendency in the postmodernism debate. Then, in a final section, I will elucidate the Deleuzo-Guattarian distinction between “territorialization” and “deterritorialization.”

     

    The Condition of Postmodernity

     

    David Harvey’s The Condition of Postmodernity is a post-Jamesonian work in many ways. What is tentative in Jameson is asserted in Harvey. For example, even in the hardest version of “Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism,” Jameson is able to undermine the reality effect he is creating–of minoritarian movements as fragments symptomatic of late capitalism–when he says that we need to “project some conception of a new systemic cultural norm […] in order to reflect […] on the most effective forms of any radical cultural politics today” (57). For Harvey, on the other hand, the links between minoritarian movements, fragmentation, and late capitalism are self-evident. For example: “the reproduction of the social and symbolic order through the exploration of difference and ‘otherness’ is all too evident in the climate of postmodernism”; and “racial minorities, colonized peoples, women, etc. […] become a part of the very fragmentation which a mobile capitalism and flexible accumulation can feed upon” (345, 303).

     

    Most notably, The Condition of Postmodernity is a post-Jamesonian work in that “Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism” is here codified into a set of terms of participation in the postmodernism debate:

     

    • One cannot participate except as a representative and on behalf of a particular territoriality with avant-garde pretensions and promising total systemic transformation (in Jameson’s case, international socialism; in Harvey’s case the Anglo-American New Left).

     

    • Participants should invoke a global spectre of dissolution that their territoriality will confront and overcome (in both Jameson’s and Harvey’s case, capitalism; in, for example, Hutcheon’s case, patriarchy).

     

    • Participants project this global spectre of dissolution onto those threatening their territoriality (in Jameson’s case, both minoritarian movements and those Marxists or post-Marxists who do not subscribe to his versions of proper Marxism and proper socialism; in Harvey’s case, both minoritarian movements and those Marxists or post-Marxists who do not subscribe to historical materialism). On their own those others are at one with the spectre of dissolution, once within the territoriality in question they contribute to the spectre’s defeat.

     

    Harvey participates in the postmodernism debate explicitly as a representative of the New Left, on behalf of the New Left. He argues that a return to historical materialism will reverse the centrifugal tendencies within the New Left, as well as helping the New Left to expand its territoriality by incorporating gender, race, and the like. In relation to his title, Harvey asserts that “postmodernism does not reflect any fundamental change of social condition,” and he outlines two interpretative options (111). Postmodernism can be understood either as “a departure […] in ways of thinking about what could or should be done,” or as “a shift in the way capitalism is working these days” (111, 112, emphasis added). Harvey opts for the latter.14 In relation to his subtitle (An Inquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change), Harvey first argues that while “embrac[ing] the new social movements,” the New Left “tended to abandon […] historical materialism as a mode of analysis” and was left bereft of its traditional claim to understand the “social processes of transformation that underlay” such epiphenomena. Secondly, Harvey argues that the New Left tended to treat the “new social movements” as “something that should be omni-present from the very beginning in any attempt to grasp the dialectics of social change” (emphasis added). As a result, the New Left reduced itself to “compet[ing] on the same terrain,” politically and theoretically unarmed, with the “new social movements” and the poststructuralists. Harvey proposes that this dip into the phenomenal world, this misadventure, be viewed as necessary, in the sense of mediating the New Left’s rise from the “shackles of old left politics” toward “recuperating such aspects of social organization as race, gender, religion, within the overall frame of historical materialist inquiry” (353-55).

     

    Postmodernist Culture

     

    With Postmodernist Culture, Steven Connor participates in the postmodernism debate on behalf of the Anglo-American theoretical humanities. He presents the Anglo-American humanities as “the most significant and central determinant” of contemporary global culture (201). Their world-historical political mission is to bring about “an important, indeed, probably epochal stage in the development of ethical awareness” (244). Their political task is the “creation of a common frame of assent which alone can guarantee the continuation of a global diversity of voices”; the creation of a “horizon of universal value” (244, 243).

     

    Together with postcolonial studies, Connor views feminism not as part of the Anglo-American humanities but as a threat to it. Feminism leads to a “disastrous decompression” and “dissipat[ion]” of politics (226). Having devoted one and a half pages to this, by now, vast and illustrious critical field, he reproaches feminism for its “stance” of marginality, for “this strange tendency of authoritative marginality to flip over into its own dark side” and for the “irrationalist embrace of the agonistics of opposition” (231, 243).

     

    While elevating Anglo-American criticism to a new avant-garde defined by the recognition of diversity, Connor withdraws any actual recognition from the forces of diversity themselves.The world seems to be diverse for the sole purpose of giving the ethical consciousness occasion to show itself by recognizing diversity. Otherwise, for Connor the world in itself, diversity in itself, is unethical–as, for Jameson, the world of micromultiplicities is a fallen world redeemed only when it comes under the wing of international socialism.

     

    The Politics of Postmodernism

     

    Whereas Connor participates in the postmodernism debate on behalf of Anglo-American criticism, Hutcheon, in The Politics of Postmodernism, participates on behalf of feminism.15 We have already seen her arguing against Jameson’s monolithic view of history and in favor of a pluralized view of history: “we now get the histories (in the plural) of the losers as well as the winners, of the regional (and colonial) as well as the centrist, of the unsung many as well as of the sung few, and I might add, of women as well as men” (66). A pluralized view of history–a view that, instead of separating time and space, posits the existence of a multiplicity of time-spaces–enables the positive appraisal of minoritarian movements, and allows Hutcheon to undermine Jameson’s (and Harvey’s) calls for a new alliance under the wing of the Left.

     

    However, Hutcheon wants to go further: she wants to assign feminism an avant-garde role in the new postmodern world and, within feminism, she wants to assign an avant-garde role to “difference” feminism. Her argument is as follows: postmodernism and feminism share a common “problematizing of the body and its sexuality” (142). If “feminism is a politics […] [while] postmodernism is not,” if postmodernism is “complicit[ous] with power and domination” while feminism is “the single most powerful force in changing the direction in which (male) postmodernism was heading,” this is because feminism “radicalized the postmodern sense of difference” (4, 142). Feminism “made postmodernism think, not just about the body, but about the female body; not just about the female body, but about its desires” (143). So Hutcheon argues that there is a global status quo, patriarchy, which can be radically transformed only by “sexual difference” feminism; only within the context of “sexual difference” feminism can other minoritarian movements and other feminisms hope to end their complicity with a global system of oppression and work to overcome it.16 Hutcheon now finds herself using a conceptual schema formally indistinguishable from that of Jameson. The result is a pure contradiction at the heart of The Politics of Postmodernism. On the one hand, she rejects Jameson’s Big History and embraces “the lessons taught […] of the importance of context, of discursive situation”; at the same time she advocates a return to Big History, to a single global context and its single global transformation (67).

     

    “Politics and the Limits of Modernity”

     

    The immediate context for Ernesto Laclau’s “Politics and the Limits of Modernity” was the hostile reception of his and Chantal Mouffe’s new theory of hegemony among some Anglo-American Marxists.17 In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985), Laclau and Mouffe outline a theory of hegemony as the articulation of signifiers by means of a “hegemonic force” comparable to the Lacanian “despotic signifier.” The crucial and controversial aspect of their theory is that no element in a political alliance–no political group–can claim to be necessarily and a priori hegemonic. Alliances have to be articulated in practice, the identity of the hegemonic force in a particular articulation is purely contingent (and always transient) and cannot be determined a priori by recourse to a foundation (be it capitalism, patriarchy, etc.). This, on the one hand, requires a weakening of the aspirations of radical collective actors, but, on the other hand, enables a huge amplification of possibilities for their interaction.

     

    In “Politics and the Limits of Modernity,” Laclau draws from his theory of hegemony a new position for the Left–a position, in some respects, diametrically opposed to Jameson’s and Harvey’s. As we have seen, Harvey presents us with two pairs of interpretative options. First, postmodernism can be understood either as “a shift in the way capitalism is working these days” or as “a departure in ways of thinking about what could or should be done.” Second, the task of the New Left is either to “recuperat[e] […] race, gender,” etc. within a Marxist territoriality based on historical materialism and class politics or to assume that they “should be omnipresent from the very beginning in any attempt to grasp the dialectics of social change.” Harvey chose the first options, Laclau chooses the second.

     

    First, Laclau argues that “there has been a radical change in the thought and culture of the past few decades” (“Politics” 329). This radical change in emancipatory political thought is an ongoing reconstruction of the radical moments in the various traditions of modernity, conducted from within these traditions. In the case of the Marxist tradition, its genealogical reconstruction–“a living dialogue with that tradition, to endow it with a certain contemporaneity against the timelessness that its orthodox defenders attribute to it”–involves a recognition of its multiple fissures (from Lenin, to Luxemburg, to Sorel, to Gramsci), against “its myth of origins” and “the myth of its coherence and unity” (339).

     

    Second, the anti-foundationalist reconstruction of radical tradition requires the recognition not just of Marxism’s plurality, but of the plurality of the radical tradition itself.

     

    If we are to reconstruct radical tradition (because this is precisely what this is about), not as a necessary departure from a point of origin, but as a genealogy of the present, it is clear that Marxism cannot be its only point of reference. The plurality of current social struggles [...] entails the necessity of breaking with the provincial myth of the "universal class." If one can talk about universality, it is only in the sense of the relative centralities constructed hegemonically and pragmatically. The struggles of the working class, of women, gays, marginal populations, Third World masses, must result in the construction of their own reappropriations of tradition through their specific genealogical efforts. This means, of course, that there is no a priori centrality determined at the level of structure, simply because there is no rational foundation of History. The only "rationality" that History might possess is the relative rationality given to it by the struggles and the concrete pragmatic-hegemonic constructions. (340)

     

    In other words, as Laclau put it in “Building a New Left,” Marxism has to be reinscribed “as a historical, partial and limited moment within a wider historical line, that of the radical tradition of the West” (179). Laclau closes “Politics and the Limits of Modernity” with a proposition with far-reaching consequences: that the combination of anti-foundationalism and “metaphysical contingency,” contingency as a transcendental a priori, can in itself serve as the emancipatory metanarrative of our time (343).

     

    By contrast, Jameson’s “Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism” provides the tools for what Laclau calls a “homeland” Marxism as well as for a “homeland” feminism, etc.18 It provides the tools, as I will now go on to argue, for the construction of “artificial territorialities” which in their mutually exclusive avant-garde aspirations now lead to the feared fragmentation and dissolution.

     

    Anti-Oedipus

     

    Schematizing and simplifying greatly, whereas Jameson and Laclau propose two different models of hegemony–with Jameson the identity of the hegemonic force can be determined a priori, with Laclau the identity of the hegemonic force is contingent–Deleuze and Guattari propose a posthegemonic world. Laclau shares Jameson’s distinction between unification and fragmentation or dispersion, as well as his rejection of dispersive politics. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau and Mouffe write that “the role of theory is not to elaborate intellectually the observable tendencies of fragmentation and dispersion, but to ensure that such tendencies have a transitory character” (14). On the other hand, in Anti-Oedipus Deleuze and Guattari propose “couplings and connections” and “transverse communications,” by virtue of dispersion (1, 319). They describe “schizorevolutionary” processes constituting collectivities as pure multiplicities, and distinguish them from “paranoiac fascisizing” processes constituting collectivities caught in a double bind between fragmentation and unification (277).

     

    A pure multiplicity is “irreducible to any sort of unity” (42).19 Deleuze and Guattari borrow Melanie Klein’s concept of “partial objects” to describe the elements of a pure multiplicity. Partial objects are not “parts of even a fragmented whole”; they “are recognized by their mutual independence” and are “different or really-distinct […] disparate” (323). This dispersion goes hand in hand with “myriad” connections:20 “partial objects […] all have their positive determinations, and enter into aberrant communication following a transversal”; “neither is there anything in common [between them], nor do they cease communicating” (69, 60). This connection of the disparate, where each partial object can be connected to a number of other partial objects, Deleuze and Guattari call the “first synthesis” or “connective synthesis” or “production of production” (38).

     

    Then, in a moment of stasis, partial objects and their myriad connections–partial object coupled to partial object–turn into “a third term […] an enormous undifferentiated object” (7). Deleuze and Guattari, borrowing from Antonin Artaud, call this new part the “body without organs”: “The body without organs is produced as a whole […] alongside the [other] parts that it neither unifies nor totalizes. And […] it brings about [new] transverse communications” between them (43). That is, instead of the parts (the partial objects) being parts of the whole, the whole (the body without organs) is itself one of the parts of a pure multiplicity.21 The body without organs is “antiproduction” in the midst of production, but only in order to multiply the connections: “the body without organs […] reinjects producing into the product, extends the connections”; it is “perpetually reinserted into production” (72, 8).22 How? The body without organs is followed by a “distribution in relation to” itself; the coupled partial objects now appear as separate, as “co-ordinates” or as “points of disjunction [on the body without organs,] between which an entire network of new syntheses is now woven” (12).

     

    The second synthesis or disjunctive synthesis or “production of recording” works through “inclusive disjunction”–“either […] or […] or […]”–on the immanent field of the body without organs. The “paranoiac fascisizing” use of the second synthesis has two aspects. Firstly, it turns this immanent, produced field into a transcendent, producing, common field that (like capital and workers in Marx) appropriates the work–the connections–of partial objects while appearing as their mysterious “quasi cause” (10-11, 72-74).23 Deleuze and Guattari call this pseudo-transcendent, pseudo-producing, pseudo-common field an “artificial territoriality.” Secondly, the “paranoiac fascisizing” use of the second synthesis introduces differentiation by means of binary opposition–what Deleuze and Guattari call “exclusive disjunction” and “either/or”–including the binary opposition between binary opposition and a fearful chaos of undifferentiation, where “disjunctions are subjected to the alternative of the undifferentiated or exclusion” (120). While inclusive disjunctions on an immanent field multiply connections, exclusive disjunctions on a transcendent field halt connections, disallowing them in advance: what possible connection can there be between the two sides of an exclusive disjunction? Similarly, whereas, as we have seen, partial objects are both distinct and connected, a chaos of undifferentiation is comprised of elements as indistinct as they are incapable of connection to each other–once again connection is disallowed.

     

    Corresponding to inclusive disjunctions are “intense feeling[s] of transition” (18), “experience[s] of death” that are also “passage[s] or becoming[s]” (330). The third synthesis or conjunctive synthesis or “production of consumption/consummation” passes through the becomings toward a kind of subject: not a transcending subject, nor an agent, but something that follows events within the immanent field of the body without organs. This is a “faceless and transpositional subject,” “an apparent residual and nomadic subject,” “a transpositional subject […] collecting everywhere the fraudulent premium of its avatars” (77, 330, 88). After the partial objects and the body without organs, this is the third and last part of the pure multiplicity that Deleuze and Guattari call the “desiring-machine”: the “adjacent part” (330, 338).24 Deleuze and Guattari call this connective, inclusively disjunctive, nomadic, polyvocal, transversal, nonhierarchical, mortal, collective subject in transition a “subject-group” and distinguish it from the “subjugated group”: “[Our] […] final thesis […] is therefore the distinction between […] the paranoiac, reactionary, and fascisizing pole, and the schizoid revolutionary pole […] the one is defined by subjugated groups, the other by subject-groups” (348-49, 366-67).

     

    Subjugated groups could very well have revolutionary aims. What distinguish them are not their aims but their processes of constitution. Emerging from exclusive disjunction in relation to a transcendent field, they have two aspects. First, they are segregated and segregative: incapable of connection, they are constituted as isolated islands of a superior people surrounded by inferior enemies (103, 269). Second, in the meeting of a segregative group and a transcendent field, the polyvocality of subject-groups gives way to what Deleuze and Guattari call “biunivocalization.” The subjugated group expresses a meaning residing in a transcendent field: biunivocalization is “the flattening of the polyvocal real in favor of a symbolic relationship between two articulations: so that is what this meant” (101).

     

    Subject-groups, on the other hand, are always “at grips with, and directly coupled to, the [other] elements of the political and historical situation” which “they express all the less” (97, 100). In spite of their names–Deleuze and Guattari also call them “active groups” (94)–they bypass distinctions between subject and object, active and passive; they neither express nor are expressed, they neither cause nor are causing.25 Subject-groups are not those groups striving for self-realization, but those capable of being affected by others, those capable of interaction, impurity, and inauthenticity. Instead of constituting itself as an island whose superior self-identity (a=a) is threatened by enemies, a subject group is constituted as a, b, c…

     

    To summarize so far, Deleuze and Guattari outline three syntheses–connection, disjunction, conjunction–and three parts–partial objects, the body without organs, and the adjacent part–of a pure multiplicity, the desiring machine. They distinguish between two uses of these syntheses and parts: a schizorevolutionary and a paranoiac use. The schizorevolutionary use, associated with subject groups, involves partial and non-specific connections: connections are partial in that they do not refer to a global entity, but by the same token they are each complete and lacking in nothing; there can be several connections between two partial objects. The schizorevolutionary use, as we have seen, also involves inclusive and non-restrictive disjunctions, as well as polyvocal and nomadic conjunctions. The paranoiac use, associated with subjugated groups, involves global and specific connections: partial objects are now seen as parts of a pre-existing global entity to which they refer, in relation to which they are lacking, and which alone completes them; connections are seen as taking place between these pre-existing parts, so that a connection is always secondary and incomplete. The paranoiac use, as we have seen, also involves exclusive and restrictive disjunctions, as well as biunivocal and segregative conjunctions.26 Why? Deleuze and Guattari’s distinction between the paranoiac and the schizorevolutionary is indissociable from their analysis of capitalism.

     

    In brief, Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between three societies–primitive territorial, despotic, and capitalist–in their “history of contingencies, and not the history of necessity” (140). Starting from the postulate that “society is not first of all a milieu for exchange […] but rather a socius of inscription”, they name the three socii as the body of the earth, the body of the despot, and the body of capital (142). Whereas the immanent body of the earth codes population and other flows (into, for example, tribes) and whereas the transcendent body of the despot recodes them (into, for example, castes), capital decodes: as Marx and Engels said, all that is solid melts into air. Whereas precapitalist socii code flows, capitalism is based on a conjunction of decoded flows–for example, conjunction of decoded flows of population and decoded flows of money–that Deleuze and Guattari call an “axiomatic” (139). In order to survive, capitalism needs to regulate the axiomatic with a resurrection of the transcendent despotic state “under other guises” and “in unexpected forms” (220, 223). These instances of fake transcendence immanent to capitalism are “artificial territorialities” and the processes of their constitution are “(artificial) reterritorializations.”27

     

    Capitalism oscillates between two poles–reterritorialization, which preserves it, and deterritorialization, an unfettered decoding threatening it with extinction.28 “Capitalism is inseparable from the movement of deterritorialization, but this movement is exorcised through factitious and artificial reterritorializations”; “capitalism is continually reterritorializing with one hand what it was deterritorializing with the other” (303, 259).29 What exactly do deterritorialization and artificial reterritorialization consist of and how exactly do they work? We have now gone full circle. Deterritorialization involves the schizorevolutionary connections, disjunctions, and conjunctions, while artificial reterritorialization involves paranoiac-fascisizing connections, disjunctions, and conjunctions, as outlined above. In some sense, the schizorevolutionary–desiring-machines and their desiring-production–“functions at the end,” “under the conditions determined by an apparently victorious capitalism” (130, 139). For Anti-Oedipus the fight against capitalism is defined as careful and patient invention of deterritorialization in relation to a singular situation opening onto an immanent cosmopolitan field (319-20, 380). (As we have seen, Anti-Oedipus bypasses the opposition of part versus whole with the alliance of singularity and multiplicity.)

     

    If we use this quick sketch of the conceptual apparatus of Anti-Oedipus to look back on Jameson’s diagnosis of late capitalism and his prescription of a way out through international socialism, what strikes us is this: our enslavement (fragmentation) and our liberation (unification) are indistinguishable, in that they are both reterritorializing. In spite of their apparent opposition, they stand together in their common exclusion of deterritorialization–of the schizorevolutionary processes outlined in Anti-Oedipus. As we have seen, Jameson diagnoses minoritarian movements in their enslaved (so to speak) state as disconnected and, in their disconnectedness, as symptoms of late capitalism, while he announces minoritarian movements in their liberated state to come as parts of international socialism. The former (fragmentation) and the latter (unification) are in a relation of exclusive disjunction. This analysis is reterritorializing in different respects. The exclusive disjunction between late capitalism (fragmentation) versus international socialism (unification) is itself reterritorializing. Also, in spite of their apparent opposition, both late capitalism and international socialism are transcendent fields: Jameson “biunivocalizes” minoritarian movements in that he sees them as expressing a transcendent field that is late capitalism; he sees international socialism not as a pure multiplicity but as a whole unifying the parts. From the point of view of Anti-Oedipus, all instances of transcendence are now fake, so that both late capitalism and international socialism extract a surplus value from minoritarian movements while keeping them unconnected to each other–in the latter case, minoritarian movements are unified by their common participation in international socialism but remain laterally unconnected. As between them late capitalism and international socialism appear to exhaust the realm of the possible, the lateral, unmediated connections between minoritarian movements become a constitutive impossibility.

     

    With Jameson’s international socialism, as with Harvey’s American New Left, as with Connor’s Anglo-American humanities, as with Hutcheon’s sexual difference feminism, one of the elements of an unimaginably multidimensional and interconnected political situation aspires to play an avant-garde role by lifting itself above the immanent field. But in doing so, it behaves as a segregative and segregated territoriality (we are a superior people surrounded by an inferior world), now creating the fragmentation it purports to overcome. (It seems that avant-gardism and segregative territorialities are not in exclusive disjunction, either.) As participants representing minoritarian movements imported Jameson’s triangle, and as they matched his avant-garde aspirations with their own, the postmodernism debate, promising unprecedented participation for everyone, risked generating unprecedented reterritorialization. Deterritorialization and schizorevolutionary processes, on the other hand, could bring to the postmodernism debate the other, double life of minoritarian movements: a vibrant life of partial, inclusive, polyvocal, and nomadic political encounters, an already emerging post-hegemonic world.

     

    Anti-Oedipus moves through a dizzying array of concepts, conceptual distinctions, and registers. In this brief account I have concentrated on the concepts, distinctions, and registers I deemed pertinent in understanding the situation of minoritarian movements within the postmodernism debate, thereby perhaps giving the misleading impression that Anti-Oedipus offers a closed system. What it does do, though, is explicitly leave behind established oppositions, exclusive disjunctions, such as unification/fragmentation and undifferentiation/exclusive differentiation (a full list would be very long), replacing them with a proliferating array of new inclusive disjunctions. From register to register and from distinction to distinction, Anti-Oedipus stresses the “simultaneity,” “coexistence” (117, 278, 375), and inseparability (318) of the two terms of its distinctions; between the two terms, there are oscillations (260, 278, 315, 376), perpetual, subtle and uncertain shiftings, “border or frontier phenomena ready to cross over to one side or the other” (126), “underground passages” (278), the possibility of “going from one side […] to this other side” (380); the two terms “interpenetrate” (378), are “contained in […] one another” (324), “continually deriving from” each other (349). In short, ” it is clear how everything can coexist and intermix” (377).31 32 33 When Anti-Oedipus declares that “we live today in the age of partial objects,” it brings into focus not a world of fragmentation in need of unification, but a “world of transverse communications,” with its “myriad little connections, disjunctions, and conjunctions,” threatening late capitalism with extinction (42, 319, 315).

     

    This world finally enters the postmodernism debate in 2000, with Hardt and Negri’s Empire. Profoundly influenced by Deleuze and Guattari, Empire continues, updates, and renews their work. It announces the end of a postmodernism debate dominated by the “alternatives” of unification versus fragmentation; instead it views both “alternatives” as part of “corruption,” the Empire’s ontological nullification of Deleuzo-Guattarian “pure multiplicity,” or what Empire calls “multitude” (both names for the creativity interaction of minoritarian movements). Corruption is the “substance and totality of Empire”–of the new societies of control (391). “At the base of all these forms of corruption there is an operation of ontological nullification”: “the multitude must be unified or segmented into different unities: this is how the multitude has to be corrupted” (391, emphasis added).

     

    To elaborate further the possibilities and challenges of this “deterritorializing” and “schizorevolutionary” turn in the postmodernism debate would require us to consider Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of “becoming minoritarian” as it is developed in Kafka, their sequel to Anti-Oedipus; in A Thousand Plateaus, (especially in reference to Deleuze’s quick sketch there of the new “societies of control”); and, finally, in Hardt and Negri’s Empire.34 We can only say here that such a turn offers our best hope of an escape from both fragmentation and unification toward “myriad little” minoritarian interconnections. While the contribution of minoritarian movements to academic scholarship in the humanities is now undeniable, their very institutional success is presenting us with a new challenge: as we jettison the canonical treatises on postmodernism which would relegate these movements to the status of troubling symptoms, will the movements themselves prove better able to tolerate the seeming loss or chaos of intermixing, better able to produce a new kind of thinking that takes place across, between, and together?

     

    Notes

     

    A version of this essay was delivered at the “Effects of Reading” seminar at Merton College, Oxford University, on 9 November 2001. I would like to thank the organizers, Clare Connors, Lydia Rainford, and Sarah Wood, and the participants for their helpful comments. Thank you to Gerard Greenway for his many criticisms. I would also like to thank Postmodern Culture‘s reader and editors for their helpful suggestions for revision–I am especially grateful to Jim English for his generous help.

     

    1. The case for the centrality, in the postmodernism debate, of “Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism” and its earlier version, “Postmodernism and Consumer Society” (1982), is strongly made by Anderson. I agree with the general point but understand this centrality differently.

     

    2. A note informs us that “this essay was originally a talk, portions of which were presented as a Whitney Museum Lecture in fall, 1982; it is published here essentially unrevised” (111).

     

    3. I am indebted to Kellner.

     

    4. “What is decisive in the present context is his [Mandel’s] notion that, with the worldwide recession of 1973-74, the dynamics of this latest ‘long wave’ are spent” (“Periodizing” 206).

     

    5. In the texts by Jameson I examine, there is only one other such instance, one moment of “juncture” between Marxism and feminism: see “Cognitive Mapping” 355.

     

    6. See, for example, Hardt and Negri 234-39, 268-69, 272-76, 402-03. What they call the “multitude” is a Deleuzo-Guattarian “pure multiplicity” (see final part of this essay).

     

    7. We have already seen above an early version of this argument in “Postmodernism and Consumer Society,” including two of the three elements of genuine political expression, the individual and the norm: Jameson argues that “each group com[es] to speak a curious private language of its own,” at the expense and to the detriment of “normal language […] of the linguistic norm,” as well as at the expense of “a unique personality and individuality, which can be expected [unlike groups] to generate its own unique vision of the world” (114).

     

    8. This fragmentation is “also a political phenomenon, [as] the problem of micropolitics sufficiently demonstrates” (“Postmodernism, or the Cultural” 65).

     

    9. Throughout the pieces I examine, the only content Jameson ever gives socialism is in a sentence in “Cognitive Mapping”: socialism is “a society without hierarchy, a society of free people” (355); at the same time, the road to socialism seems to require a rigid hierarchical distinction between the unifier (the Left) and those in need of unification (minoritarian movements).

     

    10. The “disappearance of the American radical past” involves the loss of the “activities and the intentionalities” that focus the present and anchor the past so that it neither drifts away nor suddenly and unintentionally invades the present (as in the schizophrenic incident discussed above which Jameson considers ahistorical); it also involves “some degraded collective ‘objective spirit’” rather than “the old monadic subject” (“Postmodernism, or the Cultural” 70, 73, 71).

     

    The voice that speaks is that of a degraded collective spirit rather than that of an individual; grasping the “historical referent” with a firm hand is replaced by sudden invasions of the past into the present–Toni Morrison’s Beloved seems a good example of what Jameson would call ahistorical.

     

    12. See, for example, Arendt.

     

    13. In this context, Hutcheon reverses Jameson’s argument in relation to Doctorow’s Ragtime (see n11): “it could be argued that a relatively unproblematized view of historical continuity and the context of representation offers a stable plot structure to Dos Passos’s USA trilogy. But this very stability is called into question in Doctorow’s […] Ragtime” (95).

     

    14. See also The Condition of Postmodernity 98.

     

    15. Hutcheon had already published A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction (London: Routledge, 1988).

     

    16. Intriguingly, Hutcheon doesn’t even mention the name of Luce Irigaray, the feminist philosopher most closely associated with “sexual difference.”

     

    17.The hostile reception to Hegemony and Socialist Strategy crystallized in Geras.

     

    18. See “Building a New Left”: “I have never been a ‘total’ Marxist, someone who sought in Marxism a ‘homeland'[…] The ‘language games’ I played with Marxism were always more complicated, and they always tried to articulate Marxism to something else” (178).

     

    19. This is “a pure dispersed and anarchic multiplicity, without unity or totality, and whose elements are welded, pasted together by the real distinction or the very absence of a link” (324).

     

    20. “Myriad break-flows […] determine the positive dispersion in a molecular multiplicity” (342).

     

    21. The body without organs and the partial objects can be described in terms of Spinoza’s substance and attributes, in that the body without organs is immanent while the partial objects are “distinct and cannot […] exclude or oppose one another” (327, see also 309).

     

    22. That the body without organs allows a permanent revolution–breaking and remaking–of connections which might otherwise become fixed is an important point stressed by. Holland, throughout his articles and books on Deleuze and Guattari. See, for example, Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus 28, 35-36, 96-97. However, as we will see, the body without organs also lends itself to a “paranoiac fascisizing” use, hence what Holland calls its “constitutive ambivalence” (38).

     

    23. In the so-called “sixth chapter” of Capital, Marx shows how capital comes to appear as “a quite mysterious being” (516).

     

    24. The body without organs and the partial objects are “two kinds of desiring-machine parts, in the dispersion of the machine itself” (329); the desiring-machine “brings together–without unifying or uniting them–the body without organs and the partial objects” (327); then comes “the last part of the desiring-machine, the adjacent part” (330). “Here are the desiring-machines, with their three parts: the working parts, the immobile motor, the adjacent part” (338).

     

    25. The segregative use of the conjunctive synthesis “brings about the feeling of ‘indeed being one of us,’ of being part of a superior race threatened by enemies from outside” (103). When God is dead, and when modernity has destroyed all that is solid, the segregative use involves “an enormous archaism,” a spiritual, transcendent, eternal entity (104). The “segregative use […] does not coincide with divisions between classes, although it is an incomparable weapon in the service of a dominating class” (103). While there are obvious examples which turn this argument into a truism–such as the Jewish conspiracy against the spirit of the German people in the eyes of the Nazi–the edge of this argument becomes more clear with less obvious examples. To give one, in relation to the agonizing debate in feminism as to whether or not feminism needs a strategic essentialism, that is, recourse to an essence of women as a common ground, the answer here would be: no, strategic essentialism is neither necessary nor helpful.

     

    26. For example, see: “objective or subjective […] That is not the distinction: the distinction to be made” is between paranoiac and schizorevolutionary investments (345); or “desire and its object are one and the same thing […] Desire is a machine, and the object of desire is another machine connected to it” (26). “Subject-groups […] have as their sole cause a rupture with causality” (377).

     

    27. See Anti-Oedipus 68-106.

     

    28. Artificial territorialities–as pseudo-transcendent objects “borrowed” from the despotic state and as “feeble archaisms bearing the greatest burden of current functions”–are immanent to capitalism yet “more and more spiritualised” (236, 268, 177). They are diffuse, so that “no one escapes”–not even groups with revolutionary aims (236).

     

    29. Deterritorialization, the axiomatic and reterritorialization are the three “surface elements” of capitalism (262).

     

    30. Jameson calls this latter passage “remarkable” (see “Marxism and Dualism in Deleuze” 19, 35 n.6) and describes Anti-Oedipus‘s analysis of capitalism as “surely one of the most interesting and promising lines of investigation opened up by the ‘Marxism’ of L’Anti-Oedipe” (20). See also Anti-Oedipus 257-58, 261.

     

    31. I agree with Paul Patton’s conclusion that “the concept of deterritorialisation [understood as connection of deterritorialisations] lies at the heart of Deleuzian ethics and politics, to the extent that Deleuze and Guattari’s mature political philosophy might be regarded as a politics of deterritorialisation” (136).

     

    32. See the “simultaneity of the two movements of deterritorialization and reterritorialization” (260).

     

    33. Subject-groups and subjugated groups “are perpetually shifting”; between the “paranoiac-segregative and schizonomadic […] [there are] ever so many subtle, uncertain shiftings” (64, 105).

     

    34. In a subtle and nuanced account of Anti-Oedipus and its sequel, A Thousand Plateaus, Jameson’s starting point is that Deleuze and Guattari use “great mythic dualisms such as the Schizophrenic and the molar or Paranoid” (“Marxism” 15) but he moves to the position that Anti-Oedipus “complexifies” some oppositions, though it retains “the great opposition between the molecular and the moral” (29). He concludes with the suggestion that such great mythic oppositions be grasped as reterritorializations carrying “the call of utopian transfiguration” (34). Anti-Oedipus makes clear on two occasions that reterritorializations are “ambiguous”–they can have a positive role when they are part of a movement of deterritorialization (258, 260). It also states that “everywhere there exist the molecular and the molar: their disjunction is a relation of included disjunction” (340).

     

    35. See Deleuze, “Control and Becoming” and “Postscript on the Societies of Control.”

     

    36. Corruption is the “substance and totality of Empire”–of the new societies of control (Hardt and Negri 391). “At the base of all these forms of corruption there is an operation of ontological nullification”: “The multitude has to be unified or segmented into different unities: this is how the multitude has to be corrupted” (391).

    Works Cited

    • Anderson, Perry The Origins of Postmodernity. London: Verso, 1998.
    • Arendt, Hannah. On Violence.London: Allen Lane, 1970.
    • Baudrillard, Jean. “Consumer Society.” Trans. Jacques Mourrain. Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings. Ed. Mark Poster. Cambridge: Polity, 1988. 29-56.
    • —. La société de consommation. Paris: Denoël, 1970.
    • Benjamin, Walter. “Theses on the Philosophy of History.” Illuminations. Ed. Hannah Arendt. Trans. Harry Zohn. London: Fontana, 1992. 245-55.
    • Connor, Steven. Postmodernist Culture: An Introduction to Theories of the Contemporary. Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1989.
    • Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Trans. R. Hurley, M. Seem, and H.R. Lane. London: Athlone, 1984.
    • —. Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature. Trans. Dana Polan. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1986.
    • —. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Trans. Brian Massumi. London: Athlone, 1988.
    • Deleuze, Gilles. Negotiations 1972-1990. Trans. Martin Joughin. New York: Columbia UP, 1995.
    • —. “Control and Becoming.” Interview with Antonio Negri. Negotiations. 169-76.
    • —. “Postscript on Control Societies.” Negotiations. 177-82.
    • Geras, Norman. “Post-Marxism?” New Left Review 163 (May-June 1987): 40-82.
    • Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2000.
    • Harvey, David. The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1989.
    • Helmling, Steven. The Success and Failure of Fredric Jameson: Writing, the Sublime, and the Dialectic of Critique. Albany, NY: SUNY P, 2001.
    • Holland, Eugene W. Deleuze and Guattari’sAnti-Oedipus: Introduction to Schizoanalysis. London: Routledge, 1999.
    • Hutcheon, Linda. The Politics of Postmodernism. London: Routledge, 1989.
    • Jameson, Frederic. “Cognitive Mapping.” Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. Eds. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg. Urbana, IL: U of Illinois P, 1988. 347-60.
    • —. “Conclusion: Secondary Elaborations.” Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. London: Verso, 1991. 297-418.
    • —. Foreword. The Postmodern Condition. Jean-François Lyotard. Trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi. Manchester: Manchester UP, 1984. vii-xxi.
    • —. “Marxism and Dualism in Deleuze.” A Deleuzian Century? Ed. Ian Buchanan. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1999. 13-36.
    • —. “Periodizing the 60s.” The Sixties without Apology. Spec. issue of Social Text. Ed. S. Sayres. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1984. 178-209.
    • —. “Postmodernism and Consumer Society.” Postmodern Culture. Ed. Hal Foster. London: Pluto, 1985. 111-25.
    • —. “Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism.” New Left Review 146 (1984): 53-92.
    • Kellner, Douglas, ed. Postmodernism–Jameson–Critique. Washington, DC: Maisonneuve, 1989.
    • Laclau, Ernesto. “Building a New Left.” New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time. Ernesto Laclau. London: Verso, 1990. 177-96.
    • —. “Politics and the Limits of Modernity.” Postmodernism: A Reader. Ed. Thomas Docherty. Hempstead, UK: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993. 329-43.
    • Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. London: Verso, 1985.
    • Mandel, Ernest. Late Capitalism. London: New Left, 1975.
    • Marx, Karl. Karl Marx: Selected Writings. Ed. David McLellan. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1977.
    • Patton, Paul. Deleuze and the Political. London: Routledge, 2000.
    • Williams, Raymond. The Country and the City. London: Hogarth, 1985.

     

  • The Time of Interpretation: Psychoanalysis and the Past

    Jason B. Jones

    Department of English
    Central Connecticut State University
    jonesjason1@ccsu.edu

     

    In his seminar of 1966-67 on the logic of fantasy, Jacques Lacan reported to his audience that he had recently been asked what need, what exigency drove him to theorize the objet a as object/cause of desire. According to the transcripts of this unpublished seminar, Lacan also passed along his answer: it was about time. This witty response discloses an important insight into Lacan’s re-reading of Freud: psychoanalysis, in its metapsychology and its clinical orientation, is fundamentally a theory of temporality and history. When we speak of sexuality or the unconscious, for instance, we are essentially just euphemizing the past. And although psychoanalysis is obsessed with the past, it also, in the Lacanian approach, demands that we reject memory and our common experiences of the past. In its place, we are offered retroaction or Nachträglichkeit, deferred action: a system whereby future events control the meaning of ones in the past. To put all of this a slightly different way: within psychoanalysis, effects frequently determine their causes, rather than the other way around. This way of thinking, I want to suggest, is psychoanalysis’s most original interpretive contribution, and recalling its structure may be helpful to humanists and psychoanalysts alike. For, culturally as in the clinic, the best interpretations arise from a proper understanding of retroaction.

     

    If “everyone knows” that Lacan emphasizes deferred action, nonetheless it is the case that the peculiar mode of causality this implies is still far from understood. Joël Dor has argued that the problem with so-called “wild” analysis–and, implicitly, the sociocultural or literary application of psychoanalysis–is its application of a positivistic causal model to psychoanalytic theory (5-6). And as I will show, even sophisticated versions of political analysis often fall on the side of memory or reminiscence rather than history, properly (or, at any rate, psychoanalytically) speaking. The bizarre temporal logic of Lacanian psychoanalysis, in other words, potentially clarifies the stakes of social and cultural psychoanalysis, especially as such a project seeks to grapple with the “mutual foundering of the subjective and the social” (Jones, “Revisiting” 29).

     

    I. Two Sides of the Ahistorical Coin

     

    Before turning to the particulars of this argument, I want briefly to acknowledge two widely held criticisms of psychoanalysis, both founded on the idea that it is either ahistorical or aggressively hostile to history. We can call these criticisms “universalist” and “deterministic.”

     

    Many people of course reject psychoanalysis for purporting to discover universal traits, such as the Oedipus complex, the fact of castration, or even the unconscious. In this argument, universal traits are supposed to be outside of history, present in all cultures and across all times. Some people accept that universal traits are in principle possible, but claim that Freud’s “discoveries” are unverifiable. For others–and perhaps this route has been more common in the humanities over the past two decades–universality itself has come under suspicion, generally as a masquerade for power.1 Whatever the particular objection, critics who lament psychoanalysis’s universalism typically point to the variety of human sexual and familial relations as a prima facie disproof of Freud. The best response to these objections has come from writers such as Joan Copjec, Charles Shepherdson, and Slavoj Zizek, who, each in their different ways, observe that the universalist argument misses the point: rather than prescribing a single model of development for everyone, psychoanalysis instead sets itself the task of explaining why sexuality and identity are not natural.2 Freud himself puts this well in the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905), explaining that “the sexual instinct and the sexual object are merely soldered together,” which means that every person’s sexual choices warrant explanation, rather than being self-evident or only biological (148). The florid variance of sexual and familial dispositions, and their shifts over time, confirm psychoanalysis rather than contradict it. In fact, we could turn the universalist criticism around: psychoanalysis would be at a loss to interpret a symptom-free society with static family and sexual arrangements. Psychoanalysis explains how we can experience history at all, complete with a distinct past, present, and future, as opposed to a ceaseless and cyclical natural rhythm, where temporality is not in question.

     

    While the universalist view is now espoused mainly (though not exclusively) by psychoanalysis’s critics, the determinist view is, as it were, analysts’ and theoreticians’ in-house way of denying history. There is of course a grain of truth in the popular notion that psychoanalysts always blame childhood wishes and conflicts for adults’ suffering. According to the cliché, the analyst begins by asking the analysand to “tell me about your mother”–suggesting that the root of one’s problems is to be discovered in the history of the mother’s misdeeds. But of course if suffering stems from infantile desires, then we are essentially saying that, in some basic way, people never grow up: we are, in effect, denying the operative force of history. Any theory of history has to be able to accommodate change, and, in too many versions of psychoanalysis, change is essentially ruled out. And though I will return to this point in some detail later, let me say briefly that developmental versions of psychoanalysis reproduce this difficulty in a more putatively scientific form. By taking the fables and mythologies of psychoanalysis literally, rather than as logical explications of fantasy, developmental accounts of psychoanalysis tend to deny the contingency of events in favor of a schematic, and therefore nonhistorical, approach to the past. A more insidious version of determinism arises when we conceive of the restoration of the past as an important goal of analysis–when we try, as the expression goes, to make the telling fit the experience–rather than conceiving of that restoration as merely an early step to be overcome. This mode of analysis depends on the coercive demands of shared reality and on the tyranny of the past. Moreover–and this is a point I will return to soon–it assumes that the subject “fits” the world.

     

    This version of determinism is, as I have said, insidious, because it’s nearly impossible to avoid. I can illustrate this difficulty with a recent example. In “The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of Its Power” (1958), Jacques Lacan dismisses the recuperative powers of memory. Here’s how Bruce Fink renders the passage in his new re-translation:

     

    But that, of course, is no more than a misconception: one does not get better because one remembers. One remembers because one gets better. Since this formulation was found, there has no longer been any question regarding the reproduction of symptoms, but only regarding the reproduction of analysts; the reproduction of patients has been resolved. (249)3

     

    Fink glosses this paragraph with a footnote: “this entire paragraph seems to be ironic, Lacan clearly agreeing with Freud that one gets better because one remembers” (“Direction” Fink 345n). What’s notable about this footnote is the way that a moment of doubt–registered by seems–is immediately braced into certainty by a foregone conclusion of what Lacan must mean–registered by clearly (and when has it ever been safe to describe the Écrits as “clear”?). But Fink’s certainty is arguably too hasty. This paragraph from “The Direction of the Treatment” is consistent, for example, with Lacan’s explicit insistence, in Seminar I: Freud’s Papers on Technique (1953-54), that “it is less a matter of remembering than rewriting history” (Seminar I 14/Le séminaire I 20). In an analysis, Lacan emphasizes, it is rewriting history that makes one better, and which then allows one to “remember” more. As I will be arguing throughout this essay, the crucial thing to keep in mind is that Lacan means this point about rewriting history literally: it’s not a question of making one’s contemporary telling fit the past experience; instead, it’s a matter of changing the past experience–or, perhaps more precisely, of changing its structural inscription in the signifying chain–such that it corresponds with one’s contemporary telling. The paradox of psychoanalysis is that this historical writing is undertaken in the name of futurity, not revisionism. Indeed, the first two seminars carefully distinguish between the everyday experience of memory, which Lacan deprecates as reminiscence, and the structuring effects of symbolic memory, which he often calls rememoration. His disdain for reminiscence persists throughout the decades of the seminar. In the passage from “The Direction of the Treatment,” Lacan means that the efflorescence of memory that accompanies a successful interpretation reflects rather than produces the rewriting of the symbolic necessary to an effective treatment. Rather than being “ironic” in this passage, Lacan is stating his point in plain speech: interpretation provides meaning and truth to otherwise senseless events.

     

    One need not be especially adept in either psychoanalysis or literary criticism to recognize that such precipitous certainty suggests anxious defense. (Especially Fink, in The Lacanian Subject [1995], afforded such painstaking and enlightening scrutiny to Lacan’s claims about symbolic memory from the first two seminars and “Direction.”) The cherished dogma, in this instance, is that the truth–represented by memory–will set us free. The claim that remembering makes one better salves the ego, and serves as a palliative to those anxious about psychoanalysis’s status as a science or therapeutic practice. The analyst makes a pact with the analysand’s ego, saying, in effect, “Come with me, and I will help you discover the truth about your past, and how you have come to be what you are. It may be difficult, and you will have to overcome resistances, but ultimately you will conquer the unconscious’s fantasmatic version of reality. You will soon learn that you and reality are not in conflict, but fundamentally in accord.” And that means psychoanalysis is really and truly a science, because it is oriented toward reality, appealing constantly to it as the guarantor of psychic health. While of course most analysts have–and certainly Bruce Fink has–a more complex view of how analysis works, I think it’s fair to characterize this view as the unacknowledged or unconscious fantasy of analysis itself, and to say that it constantly threatens to override psychoanalysis’s distinctive approach to causality and the past.

     

    Despite my criticisms of the determinist view, I want to acknowledge that psychoanalysis does accept a certain determinism, albeit an inverted determinism according to which the future determines the past. For the time of psychoanalysis is neither developmental nor experiential, but retroactive. Freud ceases to be a psychologist and becomes the inventor of psychoanalysis when he rethinks the etiology of hysteria: in Studies on Hysteria (1895), Freud maintained that “hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences” (7)–which means that they suffer from their past–while in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900 [1899]) he shifts ground, arguing “hysterical symptoms are not attached to actual memories, but to phantasies erected on the basis of memories” (529-30)–which means that their unconscious has literally changed their past. Instead of suggesting that psychoanalysis aims to recover the past, then, I want to suggest that its sense of the past is logical, not experiential. Its temporality emerges in phrases like Freud’s claim that every finding of an object is in fact a re-finding (Three 222); in Jean Laplanche’s observation that sexuality and the unconscious lean upon the biological order (15-18); and in Lacan’s mathemes and topological fever-dreams. The point is that causality and history work retroactively, belatedly–in a word, according to Nachträglichkeit. On the one hand, this is a point obvious to anyone who has read Freud or Lacan. Lacan’s discovery, in Freud’s text, of deferred action ought incessantly to remind us of the doubtful relevance of what we usually think of as memory, and of what we normally think of as the past.

     

    II. The Picture of the Past

     

    Psychoanalysis, Lacan always says, has no tools at its disposal but speech. Psychoanalysis speaks to the subject of enunciation–of speaking as such–rather than the subject of the enunciated–of the particular thing that is said: “there is no unconscious except for the speaking being” (Television 5). This focus emphasizes two temporal dimensions of analysis. First, an abyss of time yawns between the beginning and ending of an utterance: in that abyss, and in no other time or place, can you find the subject. Second, by focusing on speech, Lacan emphasizes a retroaction proper to subjectivity: the end of the utterance completes the meaning of the beginning, and in some instances radically revises it. But Lacan also means that what the subject says is a bit of a ruse, a lure, a trick. The subject is always saying one thing and unknowingly meaning another. This is commonly misunderstood: it’s not so much that the subject’s speech is a kind of double entendre in its content; rather, the point is that there’s a structural double entendre inherent to speech. The hysteric’s symptoms and refusals amount to a kind of question: che vuoi? Why am I what you say that I am? No matter what the content of the speech, the message is always elsewhere, on that Other stage.

     

    The point of dwelling on this aspect of analysis is that the subject’s speech is so frequently obsessed with the past. In five texts from the 1950s–Seminar I (1953-1954), Seminar II: The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis (1954-55), “The Freudian Thing” (1955), “The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, or, Reason since Freud” (1957), and “The Direction of the Treatment” (1958), Lacan repeatedly makes the same two arguments: if you think you understand what the analysand is saying, you’re wrong; and you’re never more wrong than when the analysand is speaking of the past. He argues that in most analyses, the analyst and analysand make the same mistake: both believe in the truth of what they are saying about the patient’s past, symptoms, and “cure.” Perhaps more precisely, they are alike deluded by the emotional verisimilitude of the analysand’s memories.

     

    For the seductiveness of the past constitutes the engine and the risk of analysis–a Janus-faced reality that emerges immediately whenever Freud writes on technique. Consider, for instance, this remarkable description of psychoanalytic progress from “The Future Prospects of Psycho-Analytic Therapy” (1910):

     

    At its beginning psycho-analytic treatment was inexorable and exhausting. The patient had to say everything himself, and the physician's activity consisted of urging him on incessantly. To-day things have a more friendly air. The treatment is made up of two parts--what the physician infers and tells the patient, and the patient's working-over of what he has heard. (141)

     

    Even granting the Rotary Club atmosphere of this particular essay, in which Freud tries to recruit more adherents to the psychoanalytic movement, there is something a little disquieting about a description in which the only person who speaks is the analyst! A more typical view–and one that is often quoted–is found in “Constructions in Analysis” (1937), where he claims that “what we are in search of is a picture of the patient’s forgotten years that shall be alike trustworthy and in all essential respects complete” (258). What I will be claiming throughout this section is that this view of analysis is a sort of trick. Certainly, there is an attempt to attain a complete version of the past, but not because it is valuable in itself. Narratives about the past turn out to be a sort of royal road to the unconscious, better even than dreams, because the constant disruptions of the “picture […] in all essential respects complete” force the analysand into a dawning recognition that language speaks us.

     

    This emphasis on the self-estrangement of historical narrative emerges early in Freud’s descriptions of technique. In a short, eponymous encyclopedia article, called “Freud’s Psycho-Analytic Procedure” (1904), he declares that, after explaining the analytic rule to his analysands, he immediately asks for a “detailed account of their case history” (251). At first glance, this seems trivial and self-evident: of course the doctor will want to know his patient’s history. But surely if the idea of repression means anything it means this: that analysands are constitutively incapable of delivering the goods when it comes to their own illness. It is not only that they will have forgotten or confused key details, but that the story they want to tell is almost certainly not the story that they should be telling, at least not if they want to improve. (And, for that matter, there is no reason to trust that the analysand will want to improve–after all, the subject has a passion for ignorance, and if improvement were simply a matter of wanting to, psychoanalysis would just be an especially trite form of self-help.)4 In other words, a founding axiom of Freudian technique is that anything the analysand says during this “detailed account” will be misleading.

     

    Misleading, at least, at the level of content. Freud declares in this encyclopedia article that asking for a history of the case has a pragmatic benefit: the analysand’s historical narrative will produce a useful number of “associations,” which Freud defines as “the involuntary thoughts (most frequently regarded as disturbing elements and therefore ordinarily pushed aside) which so often break across the continuity of a consecutive narrative” (251). In other words, Freud asks for a narrative because he knows he will not get one. If analysands follows the analytic rule, then their narratives will always be interrupted. The claim here is not that the associations are the “true” history, or that they inadvertently provide relevant facts that the analysand has forgotten. Instead, Freud calls our attention to their meaningless disruptiveness. Put another way, it is the disruption that is the meaning, insofar as it signifies the existence of an Other speaker. Lacan characterizes this emphasis on disruption thus: “following the thread of analytic discourse goes in the direction of nothing less than breaking up anew, inflecting, marking with its own camber–a camber that could not even be sustained as that of lines of force–that which produces the break or discontinuity” (Seminar XX 44/ Le séminaire XX 44). The analyst must, on the one hand, inflect the analysand’s discourse otherwise, in order to note moments of disruption, but as he says here, this marking cannot be sustained–it cannot, in other words, support a new narrative. In a Lacanian analysis, this point is embodied in the technique of punctuation, which enables the analysand to see that, to a certain degree, even the purportedly consecutive narrative is in fact a failure to master speech. As Lacan succinctly explains in “The Function and Field of Speech in Psychoanalysis” (1953), “punctuation, once inserted, establishes the meaning; changing the punctuation renews or upsets it; and incorrect punctuation distorts it” (96/”Fonction” 313-14). In other words, in the course of their narratives, analysands will naturally lend emphasis to certain words or phrases, an emphasis that is as much a part of their meaning as any lexical definition. The analyst tries to shift that emphasis in a variety of ways–by ending the session, by a request to repeat a word, or even by a well-timed “Hmm?” The effect, Lacan asserts, is to reveal to the analysand that there is an unconscious: “in order to free the subject’s speech, we introduce him to the language of his desire, that is, to the primary language in which–beyond what he tells us of himself–he is already speaking to us unbeknown to himself, first and foremost, in the symbols of his symptom” (80/”Fonction” 293). This amounts to a lesson in non-mastery: that the stories analysands want to tell about their past are not the whole story. During the first months of an analysis, the analyst’s interventions may well be confined simply to punctuating the analysand’s speech in this fashion. In section three, we will reconsider punctuation and its relation to what is called regression; for now it is enough to note that for both Freud and Lacan, what is punctuated, early in the analysis, is analysands’ narratives about the past.

     

    Why does the past need to be punctuated so aggressively? What is it about analysands’ narratives of their past that cries out for resignification? To answer these questions, Lacan distinguishes two kinds of memory, reminiscence and rememoration. In effect, reminiscence is our everyday experience of memory, the historical narrative offered up by the analysand; as I will show in section three, rememoration is Lacan’s name for the work of symbolic memory, the structural history of the subject, which organizes its existence but which cannot be brought forward into consciousness.

     

    The first two seminars, and many of the early écrits, devote themselves to Lacan’s critique of aiming at reminiscences as an analytic end in themselves. He claims, in Seminar II, that “reminiscence properly speaking […] is the passage into the imaginary” (320/Le séminaire II 369). The argument here is obviously not that the memories are false, though that may be the case. Instead, Lacan wants us to see that reminiscences buttress, or, at the bare minimum, refuse to challenge, our self-image. The specificity of psychoanalysis’s approach to memory emerges when we recall that even traumatic memories are imaginary in this way. Freud repudiates the seduction hypothesis in 1897, when he decides that his patients are at least sometimes not remembering actual events of abuse, but rather reporting fantasies that enact unacknowledged desires. Psychoanalysis begins with the observation that sometimes it is more comforting to imagine oneself a victim than to acknowledge experiencing certain desires.

     

    Lacan’s point is not merely that reminiscences can bolster the self-esteem of analysands. The term imaginary designates also the structuring fantasy of a unified body–that is, it refers to our psychic picture of our bodily unity, a unity that often clashes with our experience of our bodily life. It is this imaginary unity that justifies Freud’s claim that the ego is a bodily ego. In “The Freudian Thing,” Lacan observes that reminiscences will always be voiced in relation to this unity:

     

    It is not because of some mystery concerning the indestructibility of certain childhood desires that the laws of the unconscious determine analyzable symptoms. The subject's imaginary shaping by his desires--which are more or less fixated or regressed in relation to the object--is too inadequate and partial to provide the key. (133/"La chose freudienne" 431)

     

    What persists from childhood is less a particular wish or desire that could be recalled to mind than a structuring outlook on the world, a tendency to assume that a present-day desire means one thing and not another, or at any rate, that it can be alleviated or satisfied one way and not another. Lacan instead wants to emphasize memory’s signifying structure, and the metaphorical transformations through which trauma becomes represented in the psyche.

     

    Lacan also claims that reminiscences mistake the subject’s relationship to objects. Freud said that every object is in fact a re-found one. As we have just seen, a reminiscence associates a particular object with a recollected desire–that is, it specifies a particular object as the source of satisfaction or trauma. Viewed this way, the history offered by the analysand will be the story of innumerable inadequate substitutes for the one real loss. But such a perspective misunderstands the relationships of objects out there in the world to the subject’s objects:

     

    Freud distinguishes two completely different structurations of human experience--one which, along with Kierkegaard, I called ancient, based on reminiscence, presupposing agreement, harmony between man and the world of his objects, which means that he recognizes them, because in some way, he has always known them--and, on the contrary, the conquest, the structuration of the world through the effort of labour, along the path of repetition [...]. The object is encountered and is structured along the path of a repetition--to find the object again, to repeat the object. Except, it is never the same object which the subject encounters. In other words, he never ceases generating substitutive objects. (Seminar II 100/Le séminaire II 124-25)

     

    The proximate target of this argument is, of course, Plato’s theory of reminiscence, which holds that the soul recognizes truth in the world because it has always known it (in the eternal forms). The analogy is explicit: if every finding is a re-finding, as Freud says, then this must mean that objects in the world elicit desire because they correspond with some lost object that once provided satisfaction. Memory, on this reading, consists of the more-or-less passive reception of impressions from the world.

     

    Lacan rejects this view utterly, arguing that we are constantly making the world, including the world of desire. Every new object substitutes for an object that was primally lost, not thanks to a putative correspondence, but because of the structure of signification. In “The Instance of the Letter,” Lacan writes that only because remembering can be “rooted in the signifier” that it “resolves the Platonic aporias of reminscence” (158/”L’instance” 519), a point he glosses in the seminar this way: “the object of the human quest is never an object of rediscovery in the sense of reminiscence. The subject doesn’t rediscover the preformed tracks of his natural relation to the external world. The human object always constitutes itself through the intermediary of a first loss. Nothing fruitful takes place in man save through the intermediary of a loss of an object” (Seminar II 136/Le séminaire II 165). Two things are worth emphasizing here: the first is that the subject does not so much remember the past as recreate it, in part because what the subject remembers is the wrong thing: “in man, it is the wrong form which prevails” (Seminar II 86/Le séminaire II 109). The second point is that conceptualizing analysis as the restoration of the past is wrongheaded. If the restoration of the original object were even possible, it would spell the death of desire. As Lacan will argue in the seminar on anxiety, “the subject must fail, necessarily, so that its desire is not suffocated” (Harari 99). Every object is a re-found object, but happily, not the original one.

     

    Like Freud, Lacan claims that an analysis progresses toward the past: “the path of restitution of the subject’s history takes the form of a quest for the restitution of the past” (Seminar I 12/Le séminaire I 19). The key words here are “history” and “takes the form of,” since at those moments Lacan distinguishes between what analysands believe they are being asked to produce–that is, memories in the form of reminiscence–and the level at which the analysis is intervening–that is, history and rememoration. You cannot simply explain to the analysand that what is unfolding is imaginary, because, of course, this would elicit aggression. In other words, as he declared in the seminar on “The Names-of-the-Father,” “the praxis of analysis is obliged to advance toward a conquest of the truth via the pathways of deception” (“Names” 95). Or, somewhat less provocatively: “what is involved is a reading, a qualified and skilled translation of the cryptogram representing what the subject is conscious of at the moment” (Seminar I 13-14/Le séminaire I 20). The shift from “a picture of the past […] essentially complete” to a “cryptogram” of the analysand’s consciousness during a session gestures beyond the imaginary, to the symbolic rewriting of history that characterizes a Lacanian analysis.

     

    III. “Making the Telling Fit the Experience”

     

    Ni du côté de la nature, de sa splendour ou de sa méchanceté, ni du côté du destin, la psychanalyse ne fait de l’interprétation une herméneutique, une conaissance, d’aucune façon, illuminante ou transformante.

     

    –Lacan, “De la psychanalyse dans ses rapports avec la réalité” (352)5

     

    Some of the issues I have been raising may come into clearer focus if I acknowledge one of the meanings of my title: a chief “time of interpretation” is, of course, the notorious Lacanian principle of the variable-length session, derisively referred to as the “short session” by Lacan’s critics. By varying the length of sessions, Lacan is able to make the temporal experience of a session meaningful; what’s most relevant here is his corollary assertion that restoring meaning to the analytic session is what makes authentic regression possible.

     

    Lacan’s argument for the variable-length session can be found most clearly in “The Function and Field of Speech” (1953):

     

    It is [...] a propitious punctuation that gives meaning to the subject's discourse. This is why the ending of the session--which current technique makes into an interruption that is determined purely by the clock and, as such, takes no account of the thread of the subject's discourse--plays the part of a scansion which has the full value of an intervention by the analyst that is designed to precipitate concluding moments. Thus we must free the ending from its routine framework and employ it for all the useful aims of analytic technique. (44/"Fonction" 252)

     

    If the session is over at the analyst’s discretion, rather than at the end of the fifty minutes, then the analysand is always left to consider why the session ended at that time: was it because something important was said, or because nothing at all had been said, and I was wasting time? Did the analyst have someplace to be? It stirs up the analysand’s discourse, making it more productive and responsive, if perhaps less comfortable. This provocation turns out to facilitate the reworking of symbolic history.

     

    When that has occurred, Lacan goes on to say in his next sentence, authentic regression can come into being:

     

    This is how regression can occur, regression being but the bringing into the present in the subject's discourse of the fantasmatic relations discharged by an ego at each stage in the decomposition of its structure. After all, the regression is not real; even in language it manifests itself only by inflections, turns of phrase, and 'stumblings so slight' that even in the extreme case they cannot go beyond the artifice of 'baby talk' engaged in by adults. Imputing to regression the reality of a current relation to the object amounts to projecting the subject into an alienating illusion that merely echoes one of the analyst's own alibis. (44/"Fonction" 252)

     

    As always, Lacan emphasizes here the gap between the act of utterance and what is being said. As we have seen, the subject’s speech, especially the narrative he tells of his history, is fundamentally imaginary: consistent with the ego and with the subject’s self-image. When variable-length sessions stir the subject up, they can potentially change the frame of such narratives, “decomposing” the ego that otherwise strives for unity. It is only as the subject recognizes the extent to which the ego’s tale is not the full story of his desire that some sort of change could be effected. And as Lacan suggests, inferring from the subject’s narrative that relations with the object are currently regressed is a kind of causalist myth of the type that he derided earlier.

     

    The variable-length session interferes with the analysand’s attempt to maintain the self-consistency of her discourse. In this sense, it echoes Freud’s advice from “On Beginning the Treatment” (1913), where he claims that a “systematic narrative should never be expected and nothing should be done to encourage it. Every detail of the story will have to be told afresh later on, and it is only with these repetitions that additional material will appear” (136). A systematic narrative should not be encouraged, of course, because that violates the analytic rule and impedes associations, as I discussed in the previous section. The argument here is not only that additional material will come into consciousness–though Freud partly means this; instead, the repetition of the narrative continually presses against the ego’s attempt at self-mastery. Since such imaginary unity is simply not possible, ever more material becomes available. The silent common ground between this early essay by Freud and Lacan’s controversial variable-length session is, simply, surprise: they alike emphasize ways of artificially disrupting the routine of everyday speech and narrative, in the name of a higher end: the truth.

     

    Truth has nothing to do with historical fact. Truth has nothing to with “what really happened.” Truth in analysis is an interpretation that functions as a cause, one that effects change. The analyst cannot know whether an interpretation will yield truth, because, as Lacan writes, the subject receives from interpretation “the meaning that makes this act an act of his history and gives it its truth” (“Function” 50/”Fonction” 259). In other words, an interpretation works because of the subject, not because of anything inherent in the offered interpretation. Again, the example of the variable-length session illustrates this nicely: if ending a session quickly produces a change in the analysand, it is not because the “message” from the analyst got through. It is because the meaning the analysand attributed to that interpretive act changed her approach to the analysis. And in Seminar IV, Lacan claims that all successful interpretation depends on misunderstanding: “C’est la façon dont il faut s’attendre à ce qu’elle se développe, c’est la moins anormale qui soit, et c’est justement dans la béance de ce malentendu que se développera autre chose qui aura sa fécondité” (341).6 Or, as he would put it a decade later, “an interpretation whose effects are understood is not a psychoanalytic interpretation” (“Responses” 114/”Réponses” 211). As we saw earlier, failure is crucial to the maintenance of desire; from a Lacanian point of view, analysis is partially about pushing a particular failed narrative until it has to be abandoned, leaving a space for a more tolerable narrative to emerge.

     

    In keeping with Freud’s notion of the association, the Lacanian re-reading of psychoanalysis uses fantasy and imaginary narrative at cross-purposes. Lacan famously begins his video Television with just this point: “I always speak the truth. Not the whole truth, because there’s no way, to say it all. Saying it all is literally impossible: words fail. Yet it’s through this very impossibility that the truth holds onto the real” (3/”Télévision” 509). What Lacan means here is that the failure of words to refer adequately to their meanings leaves a space for the subject to come into being. Because arriving at a final meaning is impossible, the subject has to commit itself to one meaning over others, and must suffer the consequences of that commitment. Viewed from this perspective, the gaps in the analysand’s narrative have an importance as gaps–as spaces of possibility for a different understanding–rather than simply as holes that would ideally be filled up.

     

    Psychoanalysis is therefore not a hermeneutics. It is not a question of uncovering hidden or secret meanings, but, rather, a question of making possible the discovery of truth. This discovery begins, as I have been insisting, when the subject accepts that imaginary unity is not the whole, or even the most interesting, story:

     

    In the course of analysis, as I have pointed out to you, it is when the traumatic elements--grounded in an image which has never been integrated--draw near that holes, points of fracture appear in the unification, the synthesis, of the subject's history. I have pointed out how it is in starting from these holes that the subject can realign himself within the different symbolic determinations which make him a subject with a history. Well, in the same way, for every human being, everything personal which can happen to him is located in the relation to the law to which he is bound. His history is unified by the law, by his symbolic universe, which is not the same for everyone. (Seminar I 197/Le séminaire I 222)

     

    This passage’s otherwise exemplary clarity is blurred by the use of “subject” to refer both to the person in analysis and the virtual subject on whose behalf an analysis typically is directed. Lacan here foregrounds the distinction between the “unification, the synthesis of the subject’s history”–that is, the imaginary narrative that the analysand wants to tell–and the “symbolic determinations” that give the subject a history. The trauma is “impossible” or unintegrated at the level of the imaginary (at the level of the ego), all the while registering itself in the subject’s symbolic history.

     

    This symbolic history is rememoration, and refers to the idea that the syntax or grammar of the psyche is itself a mode of memory–in fact, it is the only efficacious memory in an analysis, despite the fact that it cannot be invoked directly. Lacan sees the role of this rememoration as a way of negotiating the ego’s imaginary demands for unity and the traumatic “impossible” of the real. In Seminar XI (1964), he describes it this way: “When the subject tells his story, something acts, in a latent way, that governs this syntax and makes it more and more condensed” (68/Le séminaire XI 66). It is this syntax that an interpretation aims at, because it is what keeps the subject at a specified distance from the real. This is described in the Ethics seminar (1959-1960) through the notion of das Ding, the extimate arbiter of symbolic efficacy: “there is not a good and a bad object; there is good and bad, and then there is the Thing. The good and the bad already belong to the order of the Vorstellung; they exist there as clues to that which orients the position of the subject according to the pleasure principle” (63/Le séminaire VII 78). As we saw earlier, Lacan observes that the subject emerges against the backdrop of a primal loss, a loss that allows its desire to come into being and, indeed, which allows the existence of the subject itself. In the Ethics seminar, that lost item is das Ding, and the job of the pleasure principle and the various unconscious representations (Vorstellungen) is to remember precisely where that object was lost, so that it will not be directly refound. Instead, the symbolic order ceaselessly throws up substitutive objects that provide satisfactions at the level of Vorstellung, without threatening to approach too close to das Ding. An analysand will present for analysis because something at this level has gotten “jammed.” The task of interpretation is to “hit the real,” ideally allowing the subject to come unstuck.

     

    Symbolic memory is what functions according to the combinatory of metaphor and metonymy. Metonymy names, for Lacan, the sliding of desire from substitute object to substitute object. Metaphor, by contrast, “is the very mechanism by which symptoms […] are determined. Between the enigmatic signifier of sexual trauma and the term it comes to replace in a current signifying chain, a spark flies that fixes in a symptom–a metaphor in which flesh or function is taken as a signifying element–the signification, that is inaccessible to the conscious subject, by which the symptom may be dissolved” (“Instance” 158/” L’instance” 518). We should not be confused by the reference to “enigmatic signifier”: in contrast to Jean Laplanche, Lacan is not claiming that there is an original message to be deciphered. Instead, the signifier is enigmatic because it is both lost and remembered–lost, primally lost, but registered all the same within the symbolic. Metaphor names the process by which that signifier annexes others to itself. And because, as Lacan observes, a symptom is just an interpretation that doesn’t work, interpretation has to aim beyond the symbolic, trying to shift or uncouple das Ding from its formal representations. Symbolic memory is thus at a wholly other level than reminiscence, “even if the elements organized by the former as signifiers are borrowed from the material to which the latter give signification” (“Freudian Thing” 133/”La chose freudienne” 431). In other words, of course it is true that the signifiers that hold off das Ding are drawn from the subject’s experience. Yet they serve so different a purpose in the symbolic–being organized entirely in reference to an object that never existed in experience–that they are finally incommensurate with the subject’s own account of its life.

     

    This incommensurateness is, at the end of the day, the good news. Because there is only a metaphorical connection between the traumatic real and the experienced events of a person’s life, there is always an opportunity for new metaphors to emerge that will enable the analysand to find new sources for pleasure, new chances for satisfaction. And indeed, because symptoms work according to a process of signification and metaphor, their meaning is always deferred–including, paradoxically, the question of whether or not they are actually symptoms! The inference Lacan draws is that the future determines the past:

     

    The past and the future correspond precisely to one another. And not any old how--not in the sense that you might believe that analysis indicates, namely from the past to the future. On the contrary, precisely in analysis, because its technique works, it happens in the right order--from the future to the past. You may think that you are engaged in looking for the patient's past in a dustbin, whereas on the contrary, it is as a function of the fact that the patient has a future that you can move in the regressive sense. (Seminar I 157/Le séminaire I 180)

     

    Psychoanalytic interpretation creates a past for the analysand. On the one hand, as Dany Nobus has argued, this makes Lacanian analysis “less deterministic, for including more radical options of freedom, less historical, for [being] strictly future-orientated, and less restrictive, for also accommodating psychotic patients” (88). Yet it does not turn psychoanalysis into voluntarism, for the exact same reason that the “cure” works at all. You can’t make an efficacious intervention by simply repeating the truths of psychoanalysis: “Do not give way on your desire!” “There is no guarantor of virtue!” and so forth. After all, words fail. They fail because of the subject’s commitment to its imaginary narrative, but they also fail because history is real–because its thorny perdurability cleaves the subject’s discourse, resisting assimilation to either symbolic or imaginary memories.7

     

    IV. Time for Concluding

     

    People do History precisely in order to make us believe that it has some sort of meaning. On the contrary, the first thing we must do is begin from the following: we are confronted with a saying, the saying of another person who recounts his stupidities, embarrassments, inhibitions, and emotions. What is it that we must read therein? Nothing but the effects of those instances of saying. We see in what sense these effects agitate, stir things up, and bother speaking beings. Of course, for that to lead to something, it must serve them, and it does serve them, by God, in working things out, accommodating themselves, and managing all the same–in a bumbling, stumbling sort of way–to give a shadow of life to the feeling known as love.

     

    –Lacan, Seminar XX, Encore (45-46/Le séminaire XX 45)

     

    By way of conclusion, I want briefly to note the value of reframing Lacanian concepts in their clinical orientation. A couple of different kinds of advantages accrue. The first is that this optic corrects a series of difficulties in the American reception of Lacan, including the pervasive judgment that Lacan is more interested in philosophy than in the clinic. As Charles Shepherdson’s Vital Signs explains, until we start to understand the conceptual specificity of the Lacanian field, we can’t understand the projects of writers like Kristeva, Irigaray, and Foucault. Further, we will be encouraged to remember that Lacan is not a poststructuralist in the American sense–not, in other words, interested in the free play of the signifier, but rather the opposite of this: obsessed with why signifiers get “stuck” for a particular subject. We come closer to the real praxis of psychoanalysis when we insist on the clinical dimension of these texts. When we strip away Lacan’s concepts from their clinical dimension, we are oriented toward the empty speech of imaginary narratives.

     

    A second reason to think about the Lacanian clinic is that it will help us do our humanistic business. We better understand the complex structure of, say, Jameson’s “political unconscious” when we read his claim that “it is in detecting the traces of that uninterrupted narrative, in restoring to the surface of the text the repressed and buried reality of this fundamental history, that the doctrine of a political unconscious finds its function and necessity” (20). We can better understand the limits of traditional applied psychoanalysis, and renounce the practice of “psychoanalyzing” authors–or, at least, we can recognize this practice as a kind of folk psychology, fully responsive to the interpretive demands neither of psychoanalysis nor of literary criticism. It also reminds us of the privileged relationship–for both Freud and Lacan–between literature and analysis. Not only in the sense that Freud and Lacan both insisted that the preponderance of psychoanalytic training should involve a wide and deep reading in literature, either. According to Serge André, in Seminar XXIV: The Non-Known (1976-77), Lacan argues that “in contrast to the fraudulence of meaning, […] there is poetry, which can accomplish the feat of making a meaning absent. He invites his audience to find in poetry what psychoanalytic interpretation can hope to be […]. ‘Only poetry […] permits interpretation’” (327). Literature offers a field in which we can learn to break up the congealed meanings impeding our own psychic life. The analogy between an interpretation and, say, a poem is helpful: the “point” of an interpretation or a poem–whatever paraphrase of their meaning we could develop–is far removed from the material effects of their language. Tracking the effects of the signifier in language gives us the opportunity to watch our assumptions about the world fail: an aesthetic and ethical opportunity alive to the specificity alike of psychoanalysis and literature, and binding them both to the world.

     

    Notes

     

    I would like to thank several people for their comments on earlier versions of this essay: Kate Briggs, Kate Brown, Stephanie Cherolis, Dan Collins, Angela Hunter, Walter Kalaidjian, Howard Kushner, Gaurav Majumdar, Kareen Malone, Elissa Marder, and especially Adrian Johnston and Aimee Pozorski. Christopher Lane and Robert A. Paul also guided its development.

     

    1. Sometimes even psychoanalysts make this criticism–see, for instance, the introduction to the recent collection Bringing the Plague, which argues that “from a poststructuralist standpoint, the classical psychoanalytic notion of a psychic apparatus wholly or largely unformed by the multiple contingencies of a specific place, time, and society serves to naturalize and reinforce the privilege of those who hold power in the dominant culture of the West” (18).

     

    2. See Copjec, Shepherdson, and Zizek Sublime. I discuss Shepherdson’s argument in more detail in “Sexuality’s Failure.” Also relevant is the distinction Eric Santner draws between “universal” and “global” approaches to difference, in the opening pages of On the Psychotheology of Everyday Life (1-8).

     

    3. Fink’s translation here is essentially the same as Sheridan’s (see Sheridan 260). The French provides no insight as to the putative irony: “Mais ce n’est là bien entendu qu’une maldonne: on ne guérit pas parce qu’on se remémore. On se remémore parce qu’on guérit. Depuis qu’on a trouvé cette formule, la reproduction des symptoms n’est plus une question, mais seulement la reproduction des analystes; celle des patients est résolue” (“La direction” 624).

     

    4. See “Direction” Fink 252 (“La direction 627).

     

    5. Dany Nobus translates this passage thus: “neither on the side of nature, its splendour or evil, nor on the side of destiny, psychoanalysis does not make interpretation into a hermeneutics, a knowledge in no way illuminating or transformative” (176).

     

    6. In Nobus’s translation: “this is the way one has to expect interpretation to develop, it is the least abnormal of all, and it is precisely in the gap of this misunderstanding that something else will develop, that will have its fecundity” (160).

     

    7. The argument that history is real is of course associated with Slavoj Zizek. Space precludes a full discussion of his multifaceted approach to historicity, which argues simultaneous that the real is a meaningless kernel and that certain apocalyptic events come to stand in for the real. For my purposes, the first version–the historical real as unsymbolizable kernel–is most useful (see Sublime 119-20 and “Class” 110-11).

     

    Works Cited

     

    • André, Serge. What Does a Woman Want? Ed. Judith Feher Gurewich with Susan Fairfield. Trans. Susan Fairfield. New York: Other P, 1999.
    • Breuer, Josef, and Sigmund Freud. Studies on Hysteria. 1895. Trans. James Strachey. New York: Basic, 2000.
    • Butler, Judith, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Zizek. Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left. New York: Verso, 2000.
    • Copjec, Joan. Read My Desire: Lacan against the Historicists. Cambridge: MIT P, 1994.
    • Dor, Joël. The Clinical Lacan. Ed. Judith Feher Gurewich and Susan Fairfield. Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1997.
    • Fairfield, Susan, Lynne Layton, and Carolyn Stack. Bringing the Plague: Toward a Postmodern Psychoanalysis. New York: The Other P, 2002.
    • Fink, Bruce. The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1995.
    • Freud, Sigmund. “Constructions in Analysis.” 1937. Standard 23: 255-69.
    • —. “Freud’s Psycho-Analytic Procedure.” 1904. Standard 7: 247-54.
    • —. “The Future Prospects of Psycho-Analytic Therapy.” 1910. Standard 11: 139-51.
    • —. The Interpretation of Dreams. 1900 (1899). Trans. James Strachey. New York: Bard, 1998.
    • —. “On Beginning the Treatment.” 1913. Standard 12: 121-44.
    • —. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. Ed. and trans. James Strachey. 24 vols. London: Hogarth, 1953-1974.
    • —. Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. 1905. Standard 7: 123-243.
    • Harari, Roberto. Lacan’s Seminar on “Anxiety”: An Introduction. Trans. Jane C. Lamb-Ruiz. Ed. Rico Franses. New York: Other P, 2001.
    • Jameson, Fredric. The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1981.
    • Jones, Jason B. “Revisiting ‘Mr. Bennett’: Pleasure, Aversion, and the Social in The Old Wives’ Tale and Riceyman Steps.English Literature in Transition, 1880-1920 (ELT) 46.1 (Jan. 2003): 29-52.
    • —. “Sexuality’s Failure, the Birth of History.” Postmodern Culture 12.2 (January 2002). <http://www.iath.virginia.edu/pmc/text-only/issue.102/12.2.r_jones.txt>.
    • Lacan, Jacques. Autres écrits. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2001.
    • —. “La chose freudienne ou Sens du retour à Freud en psychanalyse.” 1955, 1956. Écrits 401-36.
    • —. “De la psychanalyse dans ses rapports avec la réalité.” Autres écrits 351-61.
    • —. “La direction de la cure et les principes de son pouvoir.” 1958, 1961. Écrits 585-646.
    • —. “The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of Its Power.” 1958, 1961. Écrits. Trans. Fink 215-70.
    • —. “The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of Its Power.” 1958, 1961. Écrits. Trans. Sheridan 226-80.
    • —. Écrits. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1966.
    • —. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Bruce Fink. New York: Norton, 2002.
    • —. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Norton, 1977.
    • —. “Fonction et champ de la parole et du langage en psychanalyse.” 1953, 1956. Écrits 237-322.
    • —. “The Freudian Thing, or the Meaning of the Return to Freud in Psychoanalysis.” 1955, 1956. Écrits. Trans. Fink 107-37.
    • —. “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis.” 1953, 1956. Écrits. Trans. Fink 31-106.
    • —. “The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason Since Freud.” 1957. Écrits Trans. Fink 138-69.
    • —. “L’instance de la lettre dans l’inconscient ou la raison depuis Freud.” 1957. Écrits 493-528.
    • —. “Introduction to the Names-of-the-Father Seminar.” 1963. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. Trans. Jeffrey Mehlman. Television 81-96.
    • —. “Réponses à des étudiants en philosophie.” 1966. Autres écrits 203-11.
    • —. “Responses to Students of Philosophy Concerning the Object of Psychoanalysis.” 1966. Trans. Jeffrey Mehlman. Television 107-14.
    • —. Le séminaire de Jacques Lacan, livre I: Les écrits techniques de Freud, 1953-1954. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1975.
    • —. Le séminaire de Jacques Lacan, livre II: Le moi dans la théorie de Freud et dans la technique de la psychanalyse, 1954-1955. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1978.
    • —. Le séminaire de Jacques Lacan, livre IV: La relation d’objet, 1956-1957. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1994.
    • —. Le séminaire de Jacques Lacan, livre VII: L’éthique de la psychanalyse, 1959-1960. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1986.
    • —. Le séminaire de Jacques Lacan, livre XI: Les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse, 1964. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1973.
    • —. Le séminaire de Jacques Lacan, livre XX: Encore, 1972-1973. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1975.
    • —. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I: Freud’s Papers on Technique, 1953-1954. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. Trans. John Forrester. New York: Norton, 1988.
    • —. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book II: The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1955-1956. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. Trans. Sylvana Tomaselli. New York: Norton, 1988.
    • —. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959-1960. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. Trans. Dennis Porter. New York: Norton, 1992.
    • —. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1964. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Norton, 1977, 1998.
    • —. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX: Encore: On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge, 1972-1973. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. Trans. Bruce Fink. New York: Norton, 1998.
    • —. “Télévision.” 1973. Autres écrits. 509-45.
    • —. “Television.” 1973. Television. Trans. Denis Hollier, Rosalind Krauss, and Annette Michelson. 3-46.
    • —. Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment. Ed. Joan Copjec. New York: Norton, 1990.
    • Laplanche, Jean. Life and Death in Psychoanalysis. 1970. Trans. Jeffrey Mehlman. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1976.
    • Nobus, Dany. Jacques Lacan and the Freudian Practice of Psychoanalysis. London: Routledge, 2000.
    • Santner, Eric L. On the Psychotheology of Everyday Life: Reflections on Freud and Rosenzweig. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2001.
    • Shepherdson, Charles. Vital Signs: Nature, Culture, Psychoanalysis. New York: Routledge, 2000.
    • Zizek, Slavoj. “Class Struggle or Postmodernism? Yes, Please!” Butler, Laclau, and Zizek 90-135.
    • —. The Sublime Object of Ideology. New York: Verso, 1989.

     

  • The Human and his Spectacular Autumn, or, Informatics after Philosophy

    Anustup Basu

    Department of English
    University of Pittsburgh
    anbst42@pitt.edu

     

    Toward the beginning of Gabriel García Márquez’s novel El Otono del Patriarca, the protagonist, who is the dictator of an imaginary Latin American republic, is seen to witness his own funeral. That is, he sees himself being buried de facto, in terms of an ordering of words (“the king is dead”) and visibilities (the public rituals of the royal funeral) that creates sovereign publicity and power. However, by a profound trick of fate, it so happens that the physical body of the king that graces this occasion does not belong to the protagonist himself–it is of his double Patricio Aragonés, who has recently been killed by a poisoned dart. The corpse of the official imposter is interred with full state honors. When the dictator peeks out of his half-ajar bedroom door to watch the ceremony taking place in the audience hall of the presidential palace, he is offered a glimpse of what may be called the televisual in its most sublime form. By virtue of this unusual situation, he temporarily assumes a godly, panoptic perspective that he will never achieve again in his career.

     

    I am using the concept of the televisual in its basic sense, that of projection and reception of visibilities across distances–in other words, as a primary cognitive task of the human who wants to read the world. But we face a profound question in trying to see matters from the dictator’s “televisual” point of view: what exactly must be the nature of “distance” in this case, when the “self” is paradoxically made to see the “self” being buried afar? It is the mysterious and extraordinary body of the sovereign himself that needs to be unraveled before one can even begin entering that ontological conundrum. We can say that “distance” here is manifested first of all by a death-induced split between the phenomenal and the epistemo-constitutive poles of the king’s body; the mortal carcass of the sovereign is thereby detached from the abstract stately form endowed with the iron deathmask of power. The patriarch (we will call him by this name to distinguish him as the not-named son of Bendición Alvarado who was, till now, holding the post of the dictator) feels alarmed and powerless because he, for the time being, is the bearer of none of the aforementioned bodies. Patricio Aragonés hijacks the first of the two to be buried with him, while the mask and the regalia, which ensure that the king lives long after the king is dead, are left intact but vacant. The patriarch realizes–even as contending forces belonging to the church, the cabinet, and the military get ready to compete for the throne–that the paraphernalia of power make an inhuman terminal that is presently empty, but always with a life of its own. This distinction between the two bodies of the sovereign is a fundamental one that Marx makes between the “mediocre and grotesque” protagonist and the hero’s part he assumes in the farce in Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (144). In our present case, Patricio Aragonés the double, by dying and being buried spectacularly, has, for all practical purposes, pushed the “real person” out of his earthly mantle. This is established in the “audience room” as an event in the public domain of knowledge through a ceremonial bringing together of signs, affects, and things: there is the royal corpse with its “chest armored with military decorations, the showy dress uniform with the ten pips of general of the universe, […] the king-of-spades saber he never used, the patent leather boots with two gold spurs” (García Márquez 28), as well as the people brought to bear witness–the old man who gives the Masonic salute, the one who kisses the ring, the schoolgirl who lays a flower on him, or the fishwife who embraces his body and sobs. And then there are the sounds–the sudden cannon shots from the fortress on the harbor and the rolling of the cathedral bells.

     

    The production of the corpse as spectacle in “direct telecast” causes much consternation in the mind of the patriarch. After all,

     

    the vast paraphernalia of power and the lugubrious martial glories reduced to his human size of a fagot lying in state, God damn it, that can't be me, he said to himself in a fury it's not right, God damn it, he said to himself, contemplating the procession that was parading around his corpse, and for an instant he forgot the murky reasons for the farce and felt raped and diminished by the inclemency of death toward the majesty of power [...]. (García Márquez 28)

     

    The moment of panic is hence that in which the patriarch realizes that he is not the powerful author of the scene being realized below with the dictator at the center. He discovers that he is not controlling the perceptual universe around him; it is rather because of the very facticity of his “death” that he is able momentarily to occupy the omniscient, inhuman point of view that is at the heart of the visual architecture of power itself. It is clearly a publicity stunt gotten out of “hand,” a situation in which the image no longer represents an essence of the self, but has become a perverse automaton. From the point of view of the patriarch, the non-temporality of such a perception is out of joint with history as autobiography, simply because it cannot fall within the order of living consciousness and the finite human’s being in the world. Only when the patriarch becomes a ghost and transcends the eschatological limitations of the human is the theatre of the rotten state–with its body of secrets, constellation of forces, subjects, interests, conflicts, and corrosive intrigues–revealed to him. This is thus a magical truth that is produced, an otherworldly knowledge that only Hamlet’s father and those he haunts can possess–a “total” and inhuman picture of the world fomented by the spirit.

     

    Hence, what seems “unreal” is only so from the vantage point of the individual reduced to his own ghost. It becomes clear that the erstwhile dictator can subsequently “come back” from the dead not by reentering the stage as the “real” persona and thereby proving the previous spectacle to be a false one, but by casting himself as “double of the double,” the next one in a long line of imposters–indeed, by way of an all new coup d’état that inserts his face into the mask left behind by Patricio Aragonés. The return is possible not by disrupting the “direct telecast” and revealing it to be illusory, but by violently reinstating its realness in letting oneself be claimed by it completely. Hence, from the phenomenological point of view of the average spectator and as per the uninterrupted flow of the direct telecast, it would be such that it is never Patricio Aragonés who is assassinated, but the patriarch himself who goes into and returns from the dead. And that is exactly how it happens subsequently: it is the “unburied” president who comes back triumphantly, chasing away the bishop primate, Ambassador Schontner, and other conspirators who have been exposed by a televisuality that only a ghost or a god could have witnessed. If the mask of the “dictator” (as opposed to the faces of the patriarch or Aragonés) is a special instance of the televisual, it is because it preserves an inorganic continuity for itself, independent of all those incessant ebbs and flows of doublings. It is assumed by individuals who slide into it or slip out of it without being able to make it into an expressive tool to be used solely for their personal ends. The mask as televisual therefore becomes an aspect of power itself, rather than a reflection, image, or possession of powerful men who may be mediocre or grotesque, or patriarchs with herniated testicles underneath their uniforms. But then, the question becomes, what can be the nature of such a mask? In what sense is it always already televisual, with or without the presence of television as a technological reality? What we will be trying to examine by starting from the premise of the televisual mask is a modality of power that organizes distances, bodies, movements, statements, and visibilities in a certain manner. In modern telematic societies, this process of publicity becomes far more complex.

     

    Fascism and the Dictatorship of the “Other”

     

    We need to pause for a minute to dwell on the existential predicament of the patriarch and to “world” it comically, even philosophically, in the light of our occasion. It would be pertinent to recall Heidegger’s concern with the lure of modern technology that causes Dasein to lose itself through a massified familiarity with the world. Mass technology in that sense, becomes a

     

    Being-with-one-another [that] dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the kind of Being of "the Others," in such a way, indeed, that the Others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the "they" is unfolded. (164)

     

    As a freakish and exceptional case, the status of a “super-spectator” can be ascribed to the patriarch since for him the extinguishing of the self and the revelation of the being of dictator as being of “others” is staged figurallyin front of him. He is thus able to descend from the skies and locate the dead “self” as a “human size of a fagot” in the landscape of the other. A more illustrative example, one that involves “real” televisual technology rather than the metaphysical situation we have been discussing so far, comes later in the novel. The old, weak, and dying patriarch once again witnesses the dictator as the televisual other. This time, as his body grows more and more decrepit, his wits dull, and his memories fade, the image on the screen grows younger:

     

    He recognized his own amplified voice in the quarters of the presidential guard and he looked in through the half-open window and saw a group of officers dozing in the smoke-filled room opposite the sad glow of the television screen and there he was on the screen thinner and trimmer, [...] sitting in the office where he was to die with the coat of arms of the nation behind him and three pairs of gold eyeglasses on the desk, and he was reciting from memory an analysis of the nation's finances with the words of a sage that he never would have dared repeat, damn it, it was a more upsetting sight than that of his dead body among the flowers because now he was seeing himself alive and listening to himself speak with his own voice, [...] I who had never had been able to bear the embarrassment of appearing on a balcony and had never overcome the shyness about speaking in public [...]. (233)

     

    Many more years later, after ruling the land for over a hundred years, when the patriarch dies inside the palace, people watching from a forbidding distance come to know of the passing away only when the regime that endows signs with meaning and valence–the architectural compact of words and things in a given situation of power–throws up a wondrous spectacle, one which crosses the thresholds of human presence, agency, and judgment, and passes onto a realm of the absurd only an animal can dare enter: a wandering cow appears on the balcony of the presidential palace.

     

    We are, in a general way, already talking about fascism and the strange existential predicament of the individual grappling with it. This, despite the fact that the individual in this case may either be the Fuhrer himself, or the enlightened philosopher trying to understand this modality of power through a meaningful reading of the world. Both García Márquez’s patriarch, who thinks he “holds” power and the primordial Heideggerian thinker–whose inventory of tasks include avoiding this or that ensnarement of being as subject, staying away from the herd, and thinking about Being–are seen to be already inducted into an overall mass-technological production of “they-selves.” In bringing these two figures together in a constellation of thought, we are trying to understand a historical turn in Western industrial societies when the autumn of the patriarch (who may or may not have an enlightened head on his shoulders, but who always “holds” the scepter of power with a despotic sway) also proves to be the twilight of the disinterested philosopher. These figures “represent” two important aspects of the historical agency of the Western subject of enlightenment. As we know, Kantian modernity was founded on these two agents and their respective executive-juridical and moral-legislative authorities as caretakers of the political state and the ethical one.1 It was this secular compact between power and knowledge in the body politic that created the epistemological figure of the European human who presumed to make history exactly the way he liked it. While the Heideggerian project was to announce the end of that philosophy of progress and deconstruct the transcendental subject that it proposed as the free-willed agent of history, it also entailed an atavistic and agrarian denial of industrial modernity.2

     

    I want to draw out several points here. The first concerns the relation between distance and power. The patriarch realizes that the mask of power is not an aspect naturalized to him, by the dint of his own activity. The televisual visage of the dictator–which is made omnipotent through the technological erasure of distance–is that which powerfully animates his human face, and not the other way round. In “dying” and acquiring the panoptic vision, what the patriarch sees is much more than various subjects breaking their conspiracies of silence and registering support for or antagonism against him. Over and above that, he is disturbed in hearing that great monologue of a language instrumentalized by the state–power speaking to itself, as Heidegger puts it–that reduces his faggot self, friends, and foes, to a vast herd of “they selves.” The “Master” of the land understands that even he, once pressed into the production of information values in terms of the televisual, is not free from what Walter Benjamin called the “growing proletarianization of modern man and the increasing formation of masses” (“Work of Art” 234). The patriarch is therefore alienated from the dictator as televised icon only by a lesser degree than the pauper, in terms of a graduated and differential hierarchy of distance and accessibility.

     

    When we transpose the problem from the landscape of “primitive accumulation” in Garcia Márquez’s novel to modern metropolitan societies, the situation becomes more dense and intricate in its alignment of forces. If modern technology is that which massifies and disempowers the human subject who had formerly killed god and taken his place, it is equally important to understand that this fateful loss of agency shared by the patriarch and the beggar alike can be defined only in terms of formalistic positionalities of power, as in a chess game, unless it is related to production and the laboring process. It would be a mistake to account for lines of force, energies, visibilities, words, and things that constitute flexible and dynamic diagrams of power purely in terms of the self-conscious human and his conspiratorial or benevolent intentionalities. But the point is also to understand that such diagrams certainly have something to do with bodies of “interest,” congealment of some desires and foreclosure of others, density and regularity of some ideology statements and rarefactions of others, and uneven circuits of social rewards that gather and group humans together in the registers of class, caste, race, religion, gender, or nation. Also, thinking the televisual in terms of such complex forms of metropolitan power has to involve pondering over technologies of the social that de-essentialize classic self-other categories, making them into flexible and mobile Benettonesque visages that can transform peoples into multiculturalist populations, and ways of life into marketable lifestyles.3 I am speaking, for instance, of that form of televisuality that can generate the most celebratory image of “in-corporation” in the racial history of the United States, one that can spectacularly compound the figure of the prince with that of the pauper–in the form of William Jefferson Clinton as the first American “black president.”

     

    Secondly, I would like to relate the Heideggerian anxiety about an increasing erosion of distance between the earth and the sky not to the obsolescence of being in the world, but to a question that seems to have resonated in various conceptual forms in the works of a long line of Western thinkers, from Antonio Gramsci to Gilles Deleuze: how was it possible that modern technologies of mechanical reproduction and electrification of public communication should produce European fascism as one of its first, grotesque world historical spectacles? The paradox, as it is expressed in Benjamin’s “Work of Art,” can be outlined as follows: from the perspective of the enlightenment humanist one could say that mechanized mass culture in the twentieth century was supposed to “de-auratize” the work of art and make it more democratically available; but what Benjamin notices in his time is a disturbing incursion of aesthetics into politics, rather than the politicization of art that could have been possible. This, for him, constitutes a “violation” of the technologies of mass culture, by which the “Fuhrer cult” produces its ritual values of aesthecizing war and destruction (234-35). Benjamin formulates the problem as belonging to a society not yet “mature” enough to “incorporate technology as its organ” (235, emphasis added).

     

    Thirdly, I would note here that the problem extends to the act of communication itself as conceptualized in hallowed liberal democratic categories; that is, in terms of he who speaks and he who listens, various social, moral, and juridical contracts, and consequent rights, freedoms, and the choices that are said to facilitate rational exchanges and consensus. During the publicity drive toward building up domestic and international support for the 2003 war on Iraq, no functionary of the United States government (except U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney) actually made a public statement directly suggesting that Saddam Hussain had an active part to play in the devastation of 11 September 2001. Nevertheless, it was subsequently noted in the opinion polls that an alarming number of American people believed that the Iraqi despot was involved in the conspiracy and its execution. Hence the two propositions–Saddam the evil one, and 9/11, the horrible crime–seem to be associated in a demographic intelligence without having any narrative obligation to each other; that is, without being part of the same “story.” The outcome, it would seem, was achieved by a mathematical chain of chance, by which two disparate postulates, in being publicized with adequate proximity, frequency, and density, gravitate toward each other in an inhuman plane of massified thought. They, in other words, are bits and bytes of newspeak which come to share what I will call an “informatic” affinity with each other, without being organically enjoined by constitutive knowledge.

     

    The formation of the latter entity is of course something we are prone to consider a primary task of the philosophical human subject, who is also the modern citizen with rights and responsibilities. Attaining knowledge by reading the world is how we are supposed to self-consciously exercise reason, form views, and partake in an enlightened project of democratic consensus and legislation. Hence, insofar as these pious protocols of liberal politics are concerned, the presence of this mass prejudice4 poses some disconcerting questions: How does one account for the fact that what is, at face value, the most sophisticated technological assemblage for worldly communication and dissemination of “truth,” should sublimate what, in Kantian terms, must be called an unscientific belief or dogma? To be mediatized literally means to lose one’s sovereign rights. Hence, what happens to the idea of government by the people and for the people if the “false” is produced as a third relation which is not the synthetic union of two ideas in the conscious mind of the citizen or in the general intellect of the organic community, but is a statistical coming together of variables? How is the cynical intelligence of power that calls this sublimation into being to be configured and what consequences does it have for human politics? Lastly, this manufacture of the false as “informatic” perception requires money, in order not only to bring the variables Saddam Hussain and 9/11 into a state of associative frequency, but also to minimize and regulate the appearance of other variables from appearing in the scenario. For instance, in this case, to reduce, for the time being, the frequency of the proper name Osama. Hence, the obvious question–what is the role of money in a purportedly postmodern, increasingly technologized sphere of communicative action? What does one do when Hitler’s lie proliferates without Hitler the liar? In a way, this anxious query seems to yet again resonate the old Pascalian question posed at the very gestative period of a godless modern world: how does one protect the interests of abstract justice from being outfunded and dominated by real, material interests of power in the world?

     

    Hitler as Information

     

    The title of this subsection is clearly paradoxical. We need to create a clearing in our inherited discursive domains in order to broach this figure of thought in a satisfactory manner. Let us briefly return to the concept metaphor of organicity that Benjamin invokes in his diagnosis of a technologization of mass society in his times.5 The statement comes under considerable duress and loses its positivistic, idealistic charge if it is located in the overall context of Benjamin’s oeuvre. The historical landscape of politics, aesthetics, and culture Benjamin draws up in his major works–pertaining to Baudelaire’s Paris, the German trauerspiel, the works of Kafka and Brecht, or a possible philosophy of history–is indeed one of ruins. It is not spirited by an otherworldly and inevitable Hegelian impulse of progress–as an ongoing chronicle of constitution already foretold. Society in that sense is not a vegetative mass that builds itself relentlessly by subsuming the fall of heroes and other tragedies; it is perpetually giving rise to and destroying institutions that are at once pillars of civilization and of barbarity. The social as such is always fraught with anarchic fragmentations, discontinuities, and with the event as unforeseen catastrophe. There is indeed an inhuman aspect about the very process of figuration in Benjamin’s thinking–in the helpless movement of the angel of history blind to the future and caught in tempestuous circumstances, in the welter of shock and distraction (rather than contemplative stances of the human) of moving traffic in Paris and of the moving image, or in the past that indeterminately strives to turn toward a rising sun in the historical sky like a flower induced by a secret heliotropism. These concept metaphors of supra-normalcy, machinism, mysticism, and a magical naturalism that abound in Benjamin’s work, are features that can be located in a general temper of disenchantment in Western thought between the great wars–one that pertained to a rigorous questioning, after Husserl, of a unified phenomenology of the subject, of closed scientifico-propositional systems of logic, and of a Hegelian positivistic philosophy of historical progress. Benjamin’s work, in that sense, can be placed alongside Marcuse’s return to Nietzsche and Freud, or Adorno and Horkheimer’s analysis of the culture industry and the instrumentalization of reason. The logic of this grouping lies in proposing not a common methodological home for these thinkers, but a common historical understanding: namely, that fascisms in the world, more than ever, render philosophy absolutely homeless and in dire poverty. The greatness of these thinkers lay in the fact that in their examination of mediatization and reification, degradation of aesthetic and intellectual culture, and a corrosive Weberian rationalization of society into bureaucracies and markets, they chose to be in a perpetual state of critical exile, without seeking assuring, administered shelters of the subject, unity, and law.

     

    Gilles Deleuze has rearticulated Benjamin’s argument about the work of art and technologies of mass reproduction by transposing it from its organicist parabasis into a subhuman, machinic, and molecular-pragmatic one. In invoking Deleuze in conjunction with Benjamin, I am not trying to harness them, with their obvious methodological differences, into a synthetic metacommentary.6 Neither is my objective that of proposing a dynastic continuity that could eclectically house them in a peaceful philosophical tradition of the West. Indeed, there can be no bridge of “truth” between them. The purpose on the other hand, is perhaps to do violence to pieties of propositional logic and bring the two discourses together in a constellation, or a catachrestic assemblage. In other words, to read them historically as powerful theoretical fictions that disrupt habits of the commonsensical–as instances of thinking which are, at once, political and taking place in a moment of danger. Such a critical but disjunctive bringing together of Benjamin and Deleuze would recognize and take into consideration the shifting epistemic configurations of knowledge and power in the world, locating the former in a scenario where the great edifices of Newtonian geometry, the moral subject of Kant and Hegel, and the Darwinian positivisms of the previous two centuries are in a state of ruinous dispersal, while placing the latter in a universe of Heisenbergian uncertainties.

     

    According to Deleuze, the discourses of fascism, as the dominant myth of our time, establish themselves by an imperial-linguistic takeover of a whole socius of expressive potentialities. The latter, for him, constitutes an immanent field of particle signs, of matters, perceptions, and memories that become attributes of consciousness models (like in the phenomenology of the subject) and deictic enunciations (like that of the Nazi mythology) only on a secondary level. In other words, the relationship between a diffuse semiotics and a molar semiology is always one where the latter is a part of the former, and not the other way round (for instance, it is not an essential, organic act of national narration that imperially and categorically imparts meaning to all signs). The relationship between the two is always that of either catastrophic balance or antagonistic movement. That is not to say that we have languages without language systems, but that language systems exist only in relation to the expressive nonlinguistic materials that they continually transform.7 What is also important here is that eruptive singularities and anarchy of signs and expressions always harbor potentials to transvaluate and alter normalizing enunciations of the subject or grand metanarratives of history. Without sharing Deleuze’s occasional impulses toward a transcendental empiricism or an acosmic vitalism, one can find in him a consistent effort toward thinking the battleground of language in terms of perpetually altering disjunctive assemblages, rather than in those of synthetic, organicist propositions pertaining to culture, nation, or narration. The “maturity” of society, as per a Deleuzian critique, can be understood to be a perpetually dangling holy carrot of Western-style modernity that promises a moment of synthetic arrival–an ideal state of perpetual peace when the organs of culture are no longer abused, but incorporated into the being and destiny of the national, or even the world spirit as a whole.

     

    According to liberal historicist imaginations that take social maturity all too seriously, the basic fault of the Nazi party would simply lie in the fact that it proposed an “inauthentic” founding myth of the state, in the form of the psychobiography of the white Aryan male. The root of the error thus was only in the content, in Adolf’s perversion and lies, and not in the technological form of the proposition or its social relations of production. The money-technology assemblage of propaganda, as such, is therefore taken to be value-neutral–it is only the voluntarism of the human that decides its deployment between truth and falsehood, between good and evil. It is the same historicism that proposes that the present global dominance of neo-liberalism has at last created the post-historical moment of a finally naturalized episteme and a union devoutly desired between the earth and the sky.8 It is, in other words, a historicism that announces its own dazzling and spectacular death, and in the process tries to foreclose historical thinking in toto. As a result, unlike the inauthentic rampage of the Nazi pretender’s war machine, the founding violence of a neo-liberal, transnational sovereignty in the world, from Rwanda, to the Middle East, to the Phillipines, is seen by such an ideology to have a totalizing legitimacy drawn from the jealous and vituperative religiosity of a Market Being. It is in the auspices of such a naturalized episteme, when state language becomes global to a degree unprecedented in history, that the category “information” assumes a special “postmodern” status, in contrast to traditional and modern ways of reading the world through revelation, grace, discovery, or knowledge.

     

    Deleuze on the other hand leads us toward a machinic understanding of fascism, rather than one that diagnoses the body politic in terms of sickness and health. In such a conception, Adolf does not feature as the madman who abuses technology, but is himself a grotesque, spectacular production of technologism itself. As we were saying, there are different forms of life and expressive energies in any situation of the historical which are capable of generating multiple instances of thought, imaginative actions, creative impulses and wills to art. Fascism destroys such pre-signifying and prelinguistic energies of the world, extinguishes pluralities, and replaces them with a monologue of power that saturates space with, and only with, the immanent will of the dictator. This is the moment in which the language system sponsored by the sovereign is at its most violent; it seeks to efface historical memory by denying its constitutive or legislative relation with non-linguistic energies of life and the socius; it casts itself and its monologous doctrines as absolute and natural. For Deleuze, this is a psychomechanical production of social reality, more than an organicity of community torn asunder by human alienation and the incursion of reactionary ideologies, false consciousnesses, and agents. Not that the latter do not exist, or are unimportant components in this world picture, but that this technology of power cannot be seen simply as a value-free arrangement of tools misused by evil ones. The figure of the dictator is therefore not that of the aberrant individual madman, but a psychological automaton that becomes insidiously present in all, in the technology of massification itself. The images and objects that mass hallucination, somnambulism, and trance produce are attributes of this immanent will to power.9 The hypnotic, fascinating drive of fascism is seen paradoxically to operate below the radar of a moral and voluntaristic consciousness of the human subject; fascism becomes a political reality when knowledge-based exchanges between entities of intelligence give way to a biotechnologism of informatics. The elaboration of the latter term requires caution and patience.

     

    In Benjamin, we can see this being articulated in terms of a situation in which forms of storytelling (which are at once educative and exemplary to the citizen for his cosmopolitan education, and also amenable to his freedom of critical interpretation and judgment) are replaced by a new form of communication that he calls information. The first characteristic of information is its erasure of distance–it is its near-at-hand-ness that gets information a “readiest hearing” and makes it appear “understandable in itself” (“Storyteller” 88). The dissemination and reception of information are thus predicated on the production of the event as “local,” as “already being shot through with explanation.” For the conscious subject, this also entails the disappearance of a temporal interval required for movement within the faculties from cognition to understanding and then finally to knowledge. Information is that which is accompanied by the entropic violence brought about by a supercession of the commonplace, and a reduction of language into clichés. It is therefore in the ruins of a constitutive or legislative language that the instantaneous circuit of the commonsensical comes into being.

     

    Thinking, knowledge, or communicability (which is different from this or that technologism of communication) become foreclosed in such an order of power because one cannot really say anything that the social habit does not designate as already thought of and prejudged by the dictator. The publicity of fascism is one where friend and foe alike are seen to be engaged in tauto-talk, repeating what the dictator has already said or warned about. Benjamin calls this an eclipse of the order of cosmological mystery and secular miracles that the European humanist sciences of self and nature and an enlightened novelization of the arts sought to delineate and solve. There can be neither secrecy in fascism, nor anything unknown. Conspiracies, in that sense, can only be manifestations of what is already foretold and waiting to be confessed. The SS (or sometimes, the CIA) can of course procure and store “classified information,” but it can never say anything that the Fuhrer does not know better. Information therefore becomes an incessant and emphatic localization of the global will of the dictator; in its seriality and movement, it can only keep repeating, illustrating, and reporting the self-evident truth of the dictatorial monologue.10 For Deleuze, it is in this sense of the immanent dictatorial will that Hitler becomes information itself. Also, it is precisely because of this that one cannot wage a battle against Hitlerism by embarking on a battle of truth and falsehood without questioning, but taking for granted, the very parabasis of information and its social relations of production. Hence, “No information, whatever it might be, is sufficient to defeat Hitler” (Cinema 2 269).

     

    Like the patriarch in Garcia Márquez’s novel whose face was animated by the dictator’s mask, Adolf the Aryan anti-Semite does not exhaust the figure of Hitler. Informatics has not ceased after the death of Adolf and his propaganda machine, or the passing away of the particular discourse of the Adolphic oracle and its immediate historical context. As a figural diagram, as a special shorthand for a particular technology of power, Hitler subsequently must have only become stronger–that is, if indeed we are still to account for him as an immanent will to information that invests modern societies. But how can one conceptualize him without the formalist baggage of a historicist understanding of Hitler? In other words, without the grotesque, arborescent institutions of repression, like the secret police or the concentration camps, that constitute an armada of affects frequently used to domesticate the concept of fascism to Europe between the wars? If one were to put the question differently, that is, occasion it in terms of a present global order of neo-liberalism, marked by American-style individualism, consumer choices, democracy, and free markets that supposedly come to us after the agonistic struggles of liberation in the modern era are already settled, how can one enfigure the dead and buried tyrant in our midst in such an “untimely” manner? How is Hitler possible in a liberal constitution?

     

    Perhaps one has to begin by not trying to enfigure Hitler in the contours of the human–as the irrational apex of the suicidal state, or the pathological Goebbelsian liar who perverted the tools of human communication into mass propaganda machines. Hitler in that sense, would not simply be the mediocre and grotesque madman who uses or abuses technology (apart from that, he of course is long dead and buried beneath the dazzling obscurity of a sanitized spectacle–a museum piece of mass culture). Rather, in his latest neo-liberal incarnation, he would still be a proper name for technology itself, but not as the figure of the psychopathic individual who simply imprisons the human in enclosed spaces like the death camp or exercises a Faustian domination over him through arborescent structures like the Nazi war/propaganda machine. The “postmodern” technology of information that we are talking about qua Hitler is neither external nor internal to the human individual; it is one that is a part of the latter’s self-making as well as that of the bio-anthropological environment he lives in. Hitler enters us through a socialization of life itself, through a technology of habituation that involves our willingness to be informed. It is a diffuse modality of power that perpetually communicates between the inside and the outside, erasing distance between them. It is in this context that Deleuze’s statement, that there is a Hitler inside us, modern abjects of capital, becomes particularly significant. Hitler, as per this formulation, becomes an immanent form of sovereignty that is bio-politically present, percolating individuals and communities in an osmotic manner. Hitler as information, is not the addressor who speaks to us while we listen. It was only Adolf who did that in the old days, as the anachronistic caricature of the sovereign who had not yet had his head cut off, but had simply “lost it.” Information on the other hand, is a metropolitan habit of instant signification; it is an administered social automaton that does not presume a contract between the speaker and the hearer. Since it has no point of origin other than the person informed, the instance of information is thus always one where the self listens to the “they-self,” to the point where the two become indistinguishable and unavailable as separate instances of an agonistic self-other psychodrama of the integrated Western subject. This, however, needs to be understood not in terms of the patriarch’s crisis, or the existentialist anxieties of the Heideggerian philosopher, but in terms of labor and production: information as value has no source other than the person informed because it is he who labors to produce social meaning. It is only then that we can understand technology according to its logic of production, rather than solely as an externalized “other”–a Frankensteinian monster seen from the point of view of the individual. But the obvious query here would be, if information has something to do with capital, does that make it essentially fascistic? More specifically, in a “postmodern age” witnessing the obsolescence of modern cultural institutions, when Hitler is to be understood in terms of a diffuse, horizontal presence rather than as a vertical axiomatic in human form, the question to ask, perhaps, is who or what is the dictator?

     

    Theses on Informatics

     

    It is impossible to talk about information from the beginning, since it is always already on its way, unlike the story that originates somewhere and ends somewhere. I thus choose to assemble a scattered inventory of postulates.

     

    Thesis 1: First, let me attempt to clarify, as best as possible, some categories that have been anarchically intersecting with each other in our discussion. By the term televisuality (as with telephonicity), I mean a simple mechanism of projecting and receiving visibilities and sounds across distances. It is in this basic form that the telescope or the postcard is televisual. The invention of the former was one of the signal events that created the human as a global postulate; indeed, the European anthropos was a sublime creation that emerged from the Pascalian horror at seeing an interstellar space without the face of the Holy Ghost hovering over the martins. The disenchanted birth of the self was coincident with the twilight of the starry sky which was a map of the epic world; it was, in other words, a genesis of a novel and secular cosmology itself, one that could be understood through cognitive functions of the transcendental human subject rather than through a patient wait for revelatory happenings. Televisuality in this abstract sense, has something to do with the primary epistemological tasks of the modern man–that of reading his godless, degraded universe in terms of a world historical totality. It is to be located in the very interstice between the home and the world that multiple strands of Western philosophy after the Greeks have tried to reconcile in different ways. For our immediate project, it is important to understand is that all conceptual forms of the televisual are not informatic, just as many incarnations of the televisual (the Internet or smart bombs for instance) may not have anything to do with this or that institution of television. We need to distinguish televisuality as techne, art, science, or fabrication, from the televisuality that is claimed by informatics.

     

    What we are interested in is the moment in which televisuality becomes technologistic in a specific sense, as part of an overall social command of capital. Here, in using the proper name “technology,” we refer to a form of production (as distinguished from making or fabrication as potentia) that is, in toto, underwritten by the logic of capital alone. This technology of televisuality comes with an ideological baggage of “progress,” with a faith of technologism that is part of a global imperative of profit. Questioning technology as such is not to propose a primitivistic, Luddite-romantic return to an unmediated state of nature, but to understand historically, in terms of imminent potentialities of the world, whether one cannot think of forms of life and forms of making that are different. In terms of culture and politics, this also pertains to a basic distinction between a globality of exchanges between societies and a particular managerial-financial project of globalization. Hence, in suggesting that we need to make a distinction between televisuality in a simple form and a technologism of informatics qua capital, I am insisting on a pure, conceptual force of difference, as Marx does in making a distinction between use value and exchange value. That is, I am not positing an originary moment when the televisual was a pure event of the primitive, yet to be capitalized by informatics. It would be instructive to recall here how Marx designates primitive accumulation as a determinate extraction from the historicity of capital formation itself:

     

    We have seen how money is transformed into capital; how surplus-value is made through capital, and how more capital is made from surplus-value. But the accumulation of capital presupposes surplus-value; surplus-value presupposes capitalist production; capitalist production presupposes the availability of considerable masses of capital and labor power in the hands of commodity producers. The whole movement, therefore, seems to turn around in a never-ending circle, which we can only get out of by assuming a "primitive" accumulation [...]; an accumulation which is not the result of the capitalist mode of production but its point of departure.This primitive accumulation plays approximately the same role in political economy as original sin does in theology. Adam bit the apple, and thereupon sin fell on the human race. (Capital 873)

     

    Hence, to talk about the televisual as a nascent, prelapsarian moment in gross empirico-historicist terms is to subscribe to the same onto-theology of capitalism. That is, in terms of a secular narrative of progress, before informatics there could have been the televisual only as a magical revelatory task of God. After the fall, the history of the human thereby becomes a gradual but irresistible coming into being of informatics qua capital, starting with the fire and the wheel. The original “sin” of capital and the technological omnipresence of informatics would be seen to constitute the only mode of being for a species cursed with the labor of Adam. As per this logic, “after” information there can be only apocalypse and death; pure televisuality, without capitalist social relations, can only be of the epic order of gods and monsters. It is precisely to demystify informatics as a science of Power qua capital (potestas in the Spinozist sense) that one needs to understand televisuality as power (potentia) that is productive activity pertaining to labor.11

     

    Thesis 2: Informatics is the technology which capitalizes and translates televisuality into value as information. It is the circulation of different kinds of words and images across global distances, in the least amount of time possible. Moreover, the mechanism of value in such a turnover is computed according to a digital architecture of temporality, where time is money. Informatics therefore creates value not in terms of veracity of knowledge (which is settled through rational debates between experts), but in terms of abridgement of reporting time. Hence, it does not rely upon modern cognitive-representational prejudices (the camera does not lie), but a machinic coda of efficiency (the camera has had no time to lie). This is where informatics differs from what can be called news in an older sense. The latter can be accounted for as a secular verification of rumor, a process of expert scientific recoding of the world, absolving it of miracles and magic. Informatics on the other hand is a pure force of circulating commonsense, in which the temporal logic of the bomb and that of the image coincide. Hence, in this realm of massified common sense, the specular pleasure of seeing the bomb drop is accompanied by the casting of the legitimacy of the bombing as an ongoing, “already explained” clearing for the immanent entry of the post-historical. Like capital, informatics tends toward the abolishment of circulation time; it is, in fact, capital itself (and not a reflection of it) precisely because it acquires a “life of its own” by the virtue of being value in serial flow.12 Marx makes this important distinction between money as simple medium of exchange, as in Aristotelian economics, and money that becomes capital precisely because it is in circulation. Put simply, the military-industrial assemblage that makes the moment of the bomb coincide with that of the image does not belong to an older paradigm in which societies at war exchanged violence through a terminal and fatalistic deployment of weapons and resources. Rather, it is one in which capital never ceases to flow–the bomb as money is immediately translated into image as money. In a figural sense, that is how we can understand “embeddedness”–as that which tends to informationize the temporal and spatial distance between making war and making news.

     

    The relation between informatics and capital that I am proposing here is not that of a superstructural aspect of public culture reflecting the machinations of the economic base. In the general capitalistic production of social life itself, informatics does not mirror realities, but produces them. Informatics as such, is thus possible when money as capital increasingly becomes immediately socialized value, without going through formal mediating circuits of society, law, and culture. Apart from Antonio Negri’s thesis in Marx Beyond Marx, here I of course have Guy Debord’s observation in mind–that spectacle is capital accumulated to the point of image.13 Hence, in speaking of an immanent flow of capital qua informatics, I am not suggesting that money is translated into image-commodity on the screen and subsequently returned to its original form as televisual revenue. Rather, the movement is that of money through and throughout. In the Grundrisse, Marx makes a very important distinction between money and coin that may be instructive here:

     

    Money is the negation of the medium of circulation as such, of the coin. But it also contains the latter at the same time as an aspect, negatively, since it can always be transformed into coin; positively, as world coin, but, as such, its formal character is irrelevant, and it is essentially a commodity as such, the omnipresent commodity, not determined by location. (228)

     

    Hence, both the coin that goes into the making of the image, and the image itself, are only different moments of money as value in continuous, “omnipresent” circulation. Marx calls money a “mental relation” that can be seen to be emphatically in currency all the time, regardless of perceptual transformations from coin to image and back to coin again, in capital’s conditions of command (Grundrisse 191). It is in this sense that money does not stop being money once the image is produced; as Goddard puts it, there is always money “burning on screen,” or as Fellini says about the ancient curse of money on cinema, “when the money runs out, the film will be over.”14

     

    Thesis 3: The televisual, as techne, becomes a part of informatics in the same manner as general attributes of social life become increasingly capitalized. Televisuality as a phenomenological proposition is of the order of the subject (he who posts the card and she who sees or reads out of love), and the distance between its origin and its telos is the enunciative space between the positions of the addresser and the addressee, where the card can be said to “world” itself in transit. It is this bipolar communicative arrangement between subjects (one of the many social contracts of the human) that is translated into immanent value on the move when televisuality is informationized, since, as we have said earlier, informatics, or the circulation of information, tends to erase all distance between the speaker and the listener. It is the habit of massification that reduces love to a cliché.

     

    Thesis 4: This is not to say that informatics or the flow of information has nothing to do with institutions of truth, culture, representation, or art. Simply put, the forces of global informatics “report” such events whenever and wherever they happen by instantaneously translating them into value in circulation (screentime = money time). For instance, there are many ways of claiming “authenticity” for the art work, one of them being the originality of inscription in conjugation with the originality of the substrate. As per this logic, the piece garners auratic value only when the brush stroke of Van Gogh, as a geometric, tactile, or formal inscription, is seen to be in assemblage with the original substrate used (the paint, the canvas). The camera and print capitalism detached the two in the latter half of the nineteenth century, as Benjamin so astutely observed, when copies were produced by the mechanical substitution of the canvas and paint with ink and paper–in other words, by changing the substrate while keeping the abstract diagram of the painting intact. The work of art, in becoming capable of democratic dissemination, acquired what we have been calling a televisual potential in the simple form. But today, it becomes properly informationized when its abstract diagram is electronically transcoded, circulated, and then erased instantaneously from a substrate of pixels or digits in order to make room for the next one. It is in this sense that cinema or video–media that involve leaving lasting impressions on permanent bases like celluloid–are industrial recording technologies that are not informatic, but ones that can be subsequently informationized. The camera of informatics on the other hand, can “scan” one thing after another–the sunflowers, the Taj Mahal, a film by Rossellini, an advertisement–translating them into the same pulsating substrate of information, just as capital liquefies everything by translating them into money in transit. The Age of Information is indeed one in which all things solid melt into pulses and copies proliferate without originals. Different forms of artistic, cultural, social, and political activities, various bodies and objects, are all potentially informatic, but only in differential degrees of “newsworthiness” and other forms of commodity value. In concrete terms, what we are talking about thus has much to do with the increasing corporatization of the public sphere and the gradual obsolescence of institutions of public culture, “art” or pedagogic cinema, and public television like the BBC, PBS, or Doordarshan that the postwar developmentalist welfare state invested in.

     

    Thesis 5: Scanning and transmission create images that are more matter and energy in the social circulation of value, rather than simulations of a “real” that is perceptually distant from the viewer but brought nearer to him through electrified re-presentation. As money on the move, information is not immediately knowledge, although knowledge can certainly be derived from it. For a classically defined individual subject contemplating the world, knowledge can be said to be formed in the temporal interval that houses the movement of the faculties from sense perception, to intuition, to understanding, and finally to reason; it therefore, is always “belated” in the order of the present. Knowledge thus can only follow the Taylorized seriality of informatics, which presents the now as an instant of socialized production that produces image-realities only on a commonsensical, psychologically automotive parabasis. The machinic intelligence of informatics can accommodate the self-conscious human only in an environment of habitual distraction, in an automotive sensory-motor engagement that can present the world as “shot through with explanation” by an already-generated body of clichés. Knowledge can only be a distant afterthought of the human, when informatics has already passed on, leaving “news” at its wake, to be analyzed by disciplinary experts. This is also why, properly speaking, there can be no “misinformation,” only different kinds of reported knowledge, some of which may be true and some false. All “false” publications circulated by the Enron management before 2002 were indeed information of the real order because they did not disrupt the circulation of value as informatics. Similarly, the “true” revelations about the company that followed were also information in the same sense–as screen time, they made money. The digitized memory of informatics, reliant on a continuous flow of impression and erasure, does not aim to produce a book of the world; the two moments, one pertaining to the “false” and the other to the “true” are only so from the retroactive perceptual universe of the citizen who is a student of history. The systemic intelligence of information does not seek to tie the two happenings in an obligatory relationship of causality that would be essential for dominant forms of metanarration. In the age of secular novelization, that was the task of the storyteller, whose modernist agon was to connect the past with the present via a weak messianic power. On the other hand, the organization of forms of life and intelligence into a global dynamics of information creates an epoch where it is only the “superstate,” as a transnational military-corporate diagram of governance, that is rendered capable of reading the book of the world. This is because if information is something that produces realities rather than reflecting them, it is only global superstatal formations of capital, like CNN or Fox, that can adequately invest in molar instruments of command and dominance in this field. It is thus here that the operative logic of the satellite intersects with that of the cannon; the phenomenology of information coincides with that of the bomb. No one can out-war the transnational corporate state because it has the bomb; no one can out-inform the same because it has the satellite. It also goes without saying that power based on informatics has serious consequences for human politics and governance. When state activity is based on an organizing principle of information rather than politics, (such as instant management of security and policing terror induced “emergencies”), governance includes legislative actions, rational debates, or knowledge formations only as “afterthoughts” that follow the instantaneous, preemptive reflex of informatic action. Informatics, as we have noted earlier, is that which makes the will of the state, rather than its word as law, immanently operable. This is done through a performative, on-the-spot surveillance and management of variables instead of traditional juridical protocols involving law, its interpretation, and its application. Elsewhere I have elaborated in greater detail how, in our post-9/11 world, informatization and policing on a global scale has become indistinguishable from militarization of civic spaces.15

     

    Thesis 6: An ideology critique of CNN is quite useless if it is conducted purely on the basis of politico-ethical responsibilities and Kantian ideas of public exercise of reason. Such a discourse would locate the problem squarely on the question of voluntarism that idealistic modernity demands from its citizens, including the administrative heads of public media houses. The human intentionalities of CNN need to be understood only as attributes of a corporate body of “trans-human” interests–that of capital and its circulation.16 In that sense, CNN always telecasts the unfolding, circulating story of CNN itself, as value in a perpetual state of making on screen, where time, no matter what it reflects, champions, denigrates, or represses, is always money. A nominalist denunciation of media politics, based on categorical notions of “rights” and “representation,” is akin to a wishful critique of “capitalism” from a checks and balances perspective of liberal humanism–that is, a critique of predatory capital without a critique of wage labor or the money form. To go back to Deleuze’s formulation, such an effort would be to revise and reform Hitler with information itself, when no amount of the latter can be sufficient to defeat him. In nominal terms of the liberty that the free market brings, there actually can be no vertical installations of power or spaces of enclosure (the factory, prison, gulag, or concentration camps in their classic carceral incarnations, Hitler in his paradigmatic human figuration) to prevent the subaltern from speaking. It is an entirely different matter that she cannot speak either because it takes money to do so or because the speech itself has to accrue value in terms of global interests of money. The meritorious communicative actions between publics and counterpublics are thus always informed by the great monologue of power, in which money alone speaks to itself. In an immanent, multifarious global domain of bodies, statements, practices, lifestyles, and ideologies, it is the circulating logic of capital as informatics that determines the newsworthiness of each. Undeniably, it is also the radically innovative and revolutionary nature of capital that allows for a global panorama of activities without the graduated, hierarchical mediation of the priest or the king. However, the head of the sovereign that was cut off now micropunctually appears on the currency note. Nominally thus, in a postmodern theater of consumer capital, everyone can play the game of representations, since everyone has money. It is a different matter altogether, one that has not much to do with the language games of neo-liberal economics and ideology, that increasingly, to a degree unprecedented in history, some have a lot more of it than others.

     

    Thesis 7: A Kantian understanding of modern culture would suggest that it is a “commanded effect” of social pedagogy–a real compulsion to be free–that allows the citizen to voluntarily submit to the ethical mass of a cosmopolitan whole.17 It is only by being cooked in culture that the citizen can be trained to follow the categorical imperatives of a secular morality out of his own reasonable volition and agency, rather than through a dogmatic and virtuous fear of an angry and jealous Jehovah. Kant’s formulation is of course only a special instance in a general Western aesthetics of teaching, moving, and delighting that determine the ethical value of art. It is important to note that in Kant this idealistic proposition is immediately and anxiously related to social relations of production: culture requires the development of skills that can lead only to “inequality among men” and the institution of private property (Critique of Judgment 356).18 In this light, we can formulate a working theory of the “postmodern” (which is not something that comes after the modern, but which is simply outside the categorical logic of modernity19) as per which the extension of industry into all domains of social life, and the financialization of the globe has, in the last century, led to a gradual obsolescence of an aesthetic of high modernism–that is, art with a pedagogical function. Informatics, in that sense, is a technology that is no longer subservient to the cultural skills of the human or his civil conversations. As a form of production, metropolitan informatics calibrates and reports cosmopolitan culture according to a differential and relative matrix of value and commodity relations. When we speak of a dominant ideology of global capital in its present form, we speak of a horizontal proliferation of energies and a particle semiotics of Anglo-American pragmaticist commonplaces20; in other words, of an immanent form of power that is quite different from the agonistic, transcendental battles of old Europe qua German idealism in particular, battles in which the human found a reasonable freedom in the historical task of supplanting the god or the tyrant. The point is, informatics, as a technology of the social, gains supremacy precisely in a so called post-historical, post-political world, where a massification of common sense states that there is nothing new to narrate at all, in terms of a “totality” of the “human” project.

     

    Thesis 8: In the ancient Greek polis, the classical form of public action that the citizens undertook to achieve immortality was possible only in a spatial and temporal order free of the necessities of the household. The latter space was for production of goods and valuables for the animal existence of man; it was the domestic enclave of the Negro, the woman, or the infant (as in in-fans, or the one without language) as various incarnations of the animal laborans.21 Public action, or the task of the citizen, could thus begin only after the questions of property and labor were settled, after “man” had, through the labors of the woman and the Negro, provided for his animal existence. In the epoch of enlightenment modernity, we see a similar formulation in Kant, who suggests that it is only the man of property who is capable of disinterested public exercise of reason.22 Property, however, in the sense Kant uses it, is static and has value primarily as Vermögen–that is fixed capital, or ground rent, to use a term from nineteenth-century political economy. The German thinker is very careful to deny it the dynamic and expansive interest of capital. It is useful to recall here Kant’s anxious warnings against “dangerous money power” and too much foreign trade as being detrimental to the freedom of individual states and their co-existence in “eternal peace.”23 When it came to dictatorship of political realities of the republic, that is, the very question I began this essay with, Kant famously opted for enlightened, republican monarchy instead of aristocracy or democracy precisely to ensure that the spheres of interest-free public reason and interest-driven private practice were kept separate.24 Now the question therefore becomes, in an era of multinational capital, neo-liberal ideology, and unprecedented global trade, where the household and its logic of production extend completely over the public sphere, when all of us become shareholders in the public tasks of the animal laborans, who or what may be the monarch that says, “Argue as much as you want and about whatever you want, but obey!”?25 It is indeed money that is the sovereign in our occasion, in moving from being “a servant of commerce” to the position of the latter’s “despot” (Marx, Grundrisse 199).

     

    Postscript on the Political

     

    What the patriarch in Garcia Márquez’s El Otono del Patriarca dreads is not the televisual as such, but the mysterious force of transfer, by which the televisual, without his command or approval has already become informatic. During the royal burial ceremony, the mask of power becomes televisual not just in the old ritualistic sense of seeing the sovereign in the distance through a series of graduated, hierarchical mediations; it becomes bewitchingly informatic for the patriarch after his “death,” precisely when the order of spectacle (of which he thought he was the author) and the dictatorial visage that it creates refuses to die with him. The mask as information merely circulates between heads of pretenders that climb into it from time to time, for their proverbial fifteen minutes, almost as if by a mathematical chain of chance that is inhuman in its operative intelligence. The patriarch’s dead, “fagot self” thus becomes the latest calendrical newsbyte in the eternity of circulating informatics and the deathlessness of the mask which is always on the screen. When the televisual becomes “live” as in informatics, it does not monumentalize the mortal son of Bendición Alvarado in his afterlife, as an arrested profile of power itself. The perpetual iconography of the dictatorial mask, telecast “live” amidst the ebb and flow of human fortunes, presents the figure of power as catachresis, as an unstable conglomeration of forces which deterritorializes and reconfigures from moment to moment, as it flows from head to head.

     

    But the predicament, in our occasion, is of course not just the old patriarch’s alone. This metropolitan geometry of producing social meaning seems, to a far greater degree, to have inducted both the silent subaltern as well as the “interest free” humanist intellectual who presumed to speak for him to differential states of global in fan-ness–beings without language. By that token, one can certainly talk about a functional equation between “wealth, sufficiency, and truth” that fragments and destroys the constitutive, world historical impulse of the political which various strands of enlightenment modernity had propounded.26 Indeed, the habit of information becomes a technical possibility in what is called a post-historical landscape of ruins, where nature is gone for good, where the great pedagogical and exemplary institutions of culture are inducted into a transnational museum of images, and where it becomes increasingly difficult to make a categorical distinction between documents of civilization and those of barbarity. After all, how can one even speak of a public exercise of reason amidst an operational logic of capital that reduces discussion and consensus to the business of adequately investing in public relations, mathematizing and controlling the “free” information environment through a strategic saturation of images, and finally getting a desired feedback in terms of sales or opinion poll numbers? If, in social terms of massification (the tasteful individual or group can always switch off CNN or engage in parodic motions of culture and art without any socially transformative potential) we are all virtual laborers of consumption and consensus, how can man even presume to make history, with or without deliberative choice? Perhaps in understanding this systemic picture of global informatics we need to avoid the mistake of granting it a total moment of worldly arrival, that is, picture it as an instant that, in its all encompassing finality, extinguishes history itself (the meaning of history would then be confined to a charter of tasks and contracts attributable to the epistemological fiction of the self-conscious “human” subject). In other words, we need to understand that a working notion of virtual labor should not virtualize the concept of living labor itself, with its massive antagonistic energies directed against capital globally. Indeed the question of habit is a tricky one: it could be a fundamental Eurocentric habit of thinking politics solely in terms of representation, rights, property, law, legislation, and justice as per the normative protocols of liberal democracy that could lead us to the mistake that both history as a chaosmos of interacting forces and politics as class struggle are either over or mediatized beyond redemption.

     

    The point is thus to understand that the metropolis, as a managerial and marketing terminal of power that besieges the global countryside through informatics and militarization, can generate the surplus energy to sustain itself only by perpetually producing the Negro at the frontiers. The metropolis, we must make clear at this point, is not the same as the modern city. The modern city had evolved a few centuries ago, through the creation of avenues and alleys of production, labor, and communication in between the great feudal estates, surreptitiously or dramatically cutting the bonds of filiality and rentiership. The metropolis, on the other hand, is an abstract diagram of an urban value system that informs the city, recasting the latter as a center for managerial, technocratic, and military governance. It is thus a site for news, surveillance, security, advertising, entertainment, consumer choices, products, marketing, spying, war, and communications. When the diagram of the metropolis inscribes the city, it reinvents the latter as a center of financialization rather than industrialization. Hence, the metropolis, as a figure of thought, should not be considered in an empiricist manner; real cities like San Francisco and Bangalore are merely dense, topological assemblages of money, technology, and goods in such a worldwide web of urbanity. This is also why the latter can be called the Silicon Valley of India, as a terminal of power that is different from its counterpart in the West only in terms of degrees and intensities of value-laden happenings. This is also the driving logic that increasingly redresses all urban formations in the world, in differential degrees, like rich and poor cousins of Las Vegas. According to this metropolitan cartography, there can be no political citizens in the old historical sense within a city now reserved for denizens employed in managerial action, because the worker engaged in class struggle and the conscientious Kantian legislator would be simply anachronistic figures–displaced refugees momentarily trespassing into prime real estate. If the latter figure is gone for good, the former is relocated, with the classical factory itself, in the “third world” elsewhere.27 In this context one could mention a recent statement made by the U.S. administration pertaining to an unreal and frightening diagram of an “ownership society”28, a violent and abstract coda of metropolitan conformity which constitutes the ultimate fantasy of capital–a totalized and consummate social vanishing of labor.

     

    The search for another form of politics has to begin with a critique of the aphasic, self-conscious navel-gazing of the North Atlantic intellectual, who approaches a state of stupefied entropy on looking at a monstrous military-informatic-financial assemblage which has reduced the great modernist projects of culture and ideology to incidental arrangements that can be only locally applied. To restrict an understanding of the political that is emergent to a set of cognitive phenomenological tasks of the human subject, who, as Foucault points out, is an empirico-transcendental fiction of the West very much in the twilight of his career29, would be, in the last instance, subscribing to a transcendental stupidity not dissimilar from that of informatics itself. That is, the assumption that today everything and everybody is already spoken for, evaluated, and ordered by the hidden tongue of the market, instead of by the king or the philosopher of yore. This is why, when all of us are irremediably tinged with the curse of money, a caricature of liberal political action, conducted through conservative channels of human conscience and morality, becomes part of an overall shareholding of neo-imperial “guilt.”

     

    A new form of political thinking has to begin by taking into account vast amounts of energies in the world antagonistic to capital in terms that do not refer back to the normalcy of the human subject inaugurated by the classical enlightenment of Europe. It is part of the transcendental stupidity of geo-televisuality to impart such hostile energies with a catalogue of profiles: the criminal, the delinquent, the madman, the Negro, the woman, the child, the African AIDS victim, the poor, the unemployed, the illegal immigrant, or the terrorist. Informatics is about the reporting of the state’s pharmacopic action on these bodies, as objects of charity, aid, medication, schooling, or military intervention. This is why the unspeakable antagonism of living labor in the world is never “visible” on CNN or any other corporate geo-televisual schema of metropolitan representation. The latter can discern only the ontology of money and its coalitionary interests; humans, who are only refugees great and small, can only climb into one or many of the designated profiles of massification. The centralizing, perspectivist drive of CNN–as a repetitive human psychodrama of development, birthpangs of modernity in the frontier, subjugated and freed consumer desires–overlooks forces from the margins of the frame in trying to fit entire crowds into the telegenic face. Labor and its multiple wills to antagonism (of which various narratives of resistance are only partial but undeniably important molar expressions) are actually unrepresentable precisely because they lack a “human” face. Global antagonisms to capital are at once utopic (as in “non-place,” since the logic of globalization cannot posit an “outside”) and pantopic; they are, in multiple forms, and in different degrees of sublimation, nowhere and everywhere. They constitute a gargantuan beastly body that Hegel feared, in being a passional, multitudinal formation no longer guided by the soul of humanism.

     

    A judgment of the panorama of expressions of this global antagonistic will along the lines of good and bad can only be an afterthought; political thinking in our occasion can begin only with the acknowledgement of these energies as eventful, and not subject to essential categories of a state language that has become global. In other words, thinking has to proceed acutely, from an awareness of that very point of danger where the state fails to “translate” such affective hostilities into repetitive instances of its own psychobiography. It is this dire poverty of political language that the neo-liberal state tries to cover up with violence dictated in a situation of “emergency,” legitimized by an emotionalist, alternately folksy and biblical rhetoric of “good” and “evil.” Here I must strongly clarify that I am not registering support for this or that statist ideology of violence such as that of Al Qaida which, like its Western counterparts, merely captures and mobilizes some of these energies. But it is not difficult to see how informatics peddles the worst clichés of neo-liberalism in trying to enframe antagonism through a host of good and evil profile doublets according to which a population is invented and managed, or policed and fed–the model minority contra the inner city delinquent, the healthy contra the mad, the peaceful Arab contra the Islamic bigot. In terms of spectacle and violence, it thus falls perfectly within the logic of war/information to have the yellow cluster bomb interspersed with the yellow food packet during the recent war in Afghanistan. The global state of security today violently tries to foreclose the political by informationizing complex insurrectionary potentialities in terms of a simplistic, self-evident, and bipolar logic of peace and terror. The latter thus becomes a generic term to describe reductively a multiplicity of forces–from Latin American guerilla movements to African tribal formations to Islamic militancy in the Middle-East or Maoist rebellions in Nepal. The freedom of choice offered by the globally rampant North Atlantic machine of war and informatics is no longer between dwelling as a poet or as an assassin, but between being a statistic or a terrorist.

     

    Informatics, in our occasion, is a form of power that, in its transcendental stupidity, tries to harness all antagonistic desires into a hermeneutic of consumer culture and a behavioralist sociology of the human. A functionary of the United States Federal Government once described a discontented lot at some part of the world as people who basically want refrigerators. The reportage in CNN takes place on the same parabasis of value as, and of, capital alone–one that always seeks to translate political energy into configurations of consumer desire, that of seeing and being seen on CNN. The old Clausewitzian exchanges between war and politics thus become mode retro moments of crises management in a general metanarrative of development; the agonistic dialectic of Hegelian history gives way to functionalist modalities of facilitation and investment–adequate CNN and adequate refrigeration. Thinking the new, thinking politically in our time, should begin with a radical questioning of the money form and its production of global social life. It needs to proceed without the comforting assurance of ready-at-hand narratives of resistance and has to explore existing practices and potentialities of antagonism, not only in terms of how, in moments of danger, they are sometimes territorialized by fundamentalist ideologies, but also in terms of how they perpetually, insidiously, and in completely inhuman ways, transvaluate values.

     

    Notes

     

    Brief portions of this essay have been published as Anustup Basu, “Bombs and Bytes,” Metamute 27 (Winter/Spring 2004).

     

    1. See Kant, “Eternal Peace”: “It is not to be expected that kings philosophize or that philosophers become kings, nor is it to be desired because the possession of power corrupts the free judgment of reason inevitably. But kings or self governing nations will not allow the class of philosophers to disappear or to become silent, but will let them speak publicly” (456). From such a premise Kant creates the compound, secular figure of the moral politician who “employs the principles of political prudence in such a way that they can co-exist with morals” (459).

     

    2. I will not open the can of worms about the fascist Heidegger here, who identifies the German volk as being qua Being and ironically ends up supporting the Nazi party, although perhaps one can say, not in the hope that it would develop a monstrous technological war assemblage which would require millions of human bodies as basic raw material.

     

    3. For instance, one could consider in this respect Etienne Balibar’s argument about new racism as a differential index of exclusion and discrimination, a racism without a categorical deployment of race as a biological essence. In other words, Balibar argues that in the aftermath of the civil rights struggles of the 1960s, culture has increasingly replaced biology as a chief operative force in the modalities of racism. The celebratory spirit of Clintonian multiculturalism of the 1990s can be seen in this light.

     

    4. To clarify the obvious: even if further “investigations” were to reveal a logical link between Saddam Hussain and Al Qaeda, it would not dispel this thesis about the present circumstances.

     

    5. It must be understood that the version of the “Work of Art” essay I am discussing here is the one translated (often with unhappy results) by Harry Zohn in Illuminations. There are about eleven drafts of the essay. I also need to make clear that the hope in the ultimate maturing of society, in an irresistible dialectical development of the socius toward a politicization of aesthetics, is a Hegelian positivism that Benjamin inherits from the German idealist tradition and begins to discard in the “Work of Art” essay itself. The critique of such historicism arrives more memorably later in Benjamin’s study of Western modernity in “Theses on the Philosophy of History.”

     

    6. The point, perhaps, is to commit a disciplinary sacrilege. A political departure from the comforts of metaphysical and ontological truths should not lead to a professional-academic hermeneutics of sanitized repetition, or to a domestication of thought into neatly separated and hermetically sealed categories like modernism and postmodernism.

     

    7. See Deleuze Cinema 2 28-29 and 264-70.

     

    8. I am of course alluding to Francis Fukuyama’s Kojevian-Hegelian thesis in The End of History and the Last Man.

     

    9. See Deleuze, Cinema 2 263-69.

     

    10. In this context see Arendt’s useful elaborations in The Origins of Totalitarianism.

     

    11. See Negri, The Savage Anomaly 10-11 for a remarkable elaboration of these concepts.

     

    12. See for instance in the Grundrisse: the “tendency of capital is circulation without circulation time; hence also the positing of the instruments which merely serve to abbreviate circulation time as mere formal aspects posited by it” (671).

     

    13. See Negri, Marx Beyond Marx: Lessons from the Grundrisse, and Debord, Society of the Spectacle 24.

     

    14. See Deleuze, Cinema 2 77-78.

     

    15. See Basu.

     

    16. Does the corporation have a persona in terms of the human figure? Perhaps we need to talk a bit more concretely, in terms of an illustrative feature of the American style neo-liberalism that is now rampant all over the world. In 1886, a bizarre distortion of the Santa Clara Supreme Court decision by the Court’s reporter led to corporations claiming that that they were also entitled to human rights laid out for the “people” in the Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment that ended slavery. This “corporate personhood,” as an inhuman concentration of immanently flowing money, a dense accumulation of interest-bearing forces, is the figure that has taken the business of rightful representation away from the hands of the human agent. As giant assemblages in a great civilizational plane of interest group maneuvers, advertising, propaganda, law, legislation, justice and consensus, corporate personas are to be seen as individual entities that share the same rights (including those of privacy) as humans, but also as bodies that have more to do with R&D than Homboltian education, lobbying than polity, managerial intelligence rather than the tics of the human. In contradistinction to the individual, they also incidentally have more money, more processing power, more energy, and more technical intelligence at their disposal.

     

    17. See Kant, The Critique of Judgment 355-57.

     

    18. Elsewhere, of course, in “Idea for a Universal History,” Kant suggests that man, with his “egoistic animal inclination,” needs a master who “is supposed to be just in himself and yet a man” (122-23). When we talk about enlightenment and Kant, it is always productive to remember that the ideal of normative freedom that is so essential for the moral education of the modern citizen, was, in his historical context, very anxiously located in a state that rested its fragile body-politic on the benevolent but despotic shoulders of Frederick the Great.

     

    19. Indeed, in recent times it has become plainly evident that postmodern metropolitan formations can operate very effectively in tribalistic modes.

     

    20. It needs to be made clear that I am not categorically tying this to a philosophical tradition of pragmatism. This robust anti-formalist, anti-Cartesian line of thinking that began in the nineteenth century with Charles Sanders Peirce was founded on the rejection of the individual as the sole custodian of truth, a critique of a medieval scholasticism that traced all knowledge back to one authority on the one hand and of massified commonsense as bad logic combined with metaphysics on the other. The call for Peirce was thus for an irreverent scientific experimental community that would not allow thought to ossify into dogma. Thinking pragmatically entailed a fundamental refutation of the subject-object duality endemic in continental thinking; reality was to be accounted for as an adequate, for-the-moment coming together of sensations and beliefs. It is not possible here to discuss this variegated tradition, including its later instances of conservative defense of American capitalism, but one can perhaps point out briefly that what we have been talking about so far qua informatics is precisely that form of power that forecloses “experience” or “action” in this sense. Informatics (rather than communitarian-experimental experience) is that which increasingly dominates the space of action between a globality of managerial, military, and money interests, and a locality of professional and familial satisfaction. Politics and knowledge thus threaten to become precisely what John Dewey warned against–merely spectatorial, with the correspondence between a locality of American communal belief, and a global materiality of Americanization in the world becoming increasingly informationized, taking place only through planetary circuits of investment, charity, terror, and militarization. Democracy too tends to become what Dewey, speaking in terms of human governance, called sovereignty chopped into mincemeat, buttressed by opinion poll demographics of power based on a numerical notion of equality and a formalistic isolation of the “I.”

     

    21. See Arendt, The Human Condition for an elaboration of this theme.

     

    22. See Kant, “Theory and Practice”:

     

    He who has the right to vote on basic legislation is called a citizen [...]. The requisite quality for this [status], apart from the natural one that the person not be a child or a woman, is only this: that such a person be his own master (sui iuris) and hence that he have some property (under which we may include any art, craft or science) that would provide him with sustenance. [...] a man who, when he must earn a livelihood from others, acquires property only by selling what is his own and not by conceding to others the right to make use of his strength. Consequently he serves no one, in the strict sense of the word, but the commonweal. (420)

     

    Kant is however careful in clarifying that the legislative equality among citizens should be dictated by a qualitative aspect of property, not a quantitative one: “Not the amount of property, but merely the number of those owning any property, should serve as a basis for the number of voters” (421).

     

    23. See Kant, “Eternal Peace.” This is postulation 4: ” No debts shall be contracted in connection with the foreign affairs of the state.” While Kant is ready to admit state borrowing for the purposes of internal development, he is against debt

     

    as an instrument of the struggle between the powers, a credit system of debts endlessly growing though always safe against immediate demand (the demand for payment not being made by all the creditors at the same time)--such a system, the ingenious invention of a trading people in this century, constitutes a dangerous money power. It is a resource for carrying on war which surpasses the resources of all other states taken together. (433)

     

    24. See Kant, “Eternal Peace” 437-41 and “What is Enlightenment?” 137-39.

     

    25. This is the disposition Kant attributes to the enlightened princely figure of Fredrick the Great. See “What is Enlightenment?.” The secular monarch permits his subjects to “make public use of their own reason and to submit publicly their thoughts regarding a better framing of such laws together with a frank criticism of existing legislation” (139).

     

    26. I am of course referring to Lyotard’s thesis in The Postmodern Condition.

     

    27. One has to be careful here; I am not proposing the category “third world” in a positive territorial sense, informed by traditional Eurocentric discourses of self and other. The relation between the globalized third world and the metropolitan diagram as planet city is a dispersed, micropunctual one that infectiously erodes classic inside/outside divisions: the country and the city, the East and the West, the home and the world. The international division of labor is a useful determination to make, but not in categorical terms of molar identities like nationhood.

     

    28. See Bush.

     

    29. See for instance Foucault: “man is neither the oldest not the most constant problem that has been posed for human knowledge […] […] As the archaeology of our thought easily shows, man is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end” (386-87).

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. Intro. Margaret Canovan. 2nd. ed. Chicago: Chicago UP, 1998.
    • —. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt-Harvest, 1973.
    • Balibar, Etienne. “Is There a New Racism?” Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities. Eds. Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein. London: Verso, 1991. 17-28.
    • Basu, Anustup. “The State of Security and Warfare of Demons.” Critical Quarterly 45. 1-2 (Spring/Summer 2003): 11-32.
    • Benjamin, Walter. “The Storyteller: Reflections on the Works of Nikolai Leskov” Illuminations. Ed. Hannah Arendt. Trans. Harry Zohn. London: Fontana, 1973. 83-107.
    • —. “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” Illuminations 211-44.
    • —. “Theses on the Philosophy of History.” Illuminations 245-55.
    • Bush, George W. “President Bush Discusses Economy, Small Business in Wisconsin.” Office of the Press Secretary. 3 Oct. 2003 < http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/20031003-4.html>.
    • Debord, Guy. Society of the Spectacle. Trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith. New York: Zone, 1995.
    • Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 2: The Time Image. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1989.
    • Foucault, Michel. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. New York: Vintage, 1970.
    • Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Avon, 1992.
    • García Márquez, Gabriel. The Autumn of the Patriarch. Trans. Gregory Rabassa. New York: Harper, 1976.
    • Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. Oxford: Blackwell. 1962.
    • Kant, Immanuel. The Critique of Judgment. Trans. J.H. Bernard. New York: Prometheus, 2000.
    • —. “Eternal Peace.” Philosophy of Kant 430-76.
    • —. “Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent.” Philosophy of Kant 116-31.
    • —. The Philosophy of Kant: Immanuel Kant’s Moral and Political Writings. Ed. Carl J. Friedrich. New York: Modern Library, 1948.
    • —. “Theory and Practice: Concerning the Common Saying: This May be True in Theory But does not Apply to Practice.” Philosophy of Kant 412-429.
    • —. “What is Enlightenment?” Philosophy of Kant 132-39.
    • Lyotard, Jean-François. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1984.
    • Marx, Karl. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Vol. 1. Trans. Ben Fowkes. Intro. Ernest Mandel. London: Penguin, 1976.
    • —. Grundrisse. Trans. Martin Nicolaus. London: Penguin, 1973.
    • —. Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. New York: International, 1972.
    • Negri, Antonio. The Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza’s Metaphysics and Politics. Trans. Michael Hardt. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1991.
    • —. Marx Beyond Marx: Lessons from the Grundrisse. Trans. Michael Ryan et al. New York: Autonomedia, 1989.

     

  • Aesthetics without Art: The Para-Epistemic Project of Kant’s Third Critique

    Christopher Forster

    English Department
    University of Virginia
    csf2g@virginia.edu

     

    Review of: Rodolphe Gasché. The Idea of Form: Rethinking Kant’s Aesthetics. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003.

     

    When poststructuralists return to “classics” of Western philosophy, it is often in a spirit of revision. When Lacan turns his attention to Kant, it is to insist, against prevailing wisdom, that Kant must be read “avec Sade.” When Foucault reads Kant’s “What is Enlightenment?” it is largely to appropriate a notion of enlightenment for Foucault’s own project. Rodolphe Gasché’s project in The Idea of Form is decidedly different. More in the tradition of the explication du texte than that of the hermeneutic of suspicion, Gasché returns to the Critique of Judgment in order to reinforce its position within the Kantian corpus.

     

    Gasché shares with his poststructuralist peers a practice of meticulous close reading which guides The Idea of Form. Having published books on Derrida and Paul de Man, Gasché’s credentials may ally him with deconstruction. The Idea of Form, however, is not a “deconstruction of the Third Critique.” Rather than borrowing his vocabulary from deconstruction, or any other critical tradition, Gasché offers a thoroughly Kantian reading of the Third Critique. Gasché attempts to take seriously Kant’s famously obtuse claim that the Third Critique completes the critical project of the first two critiques. Judgment, Kant claims, is “suitable for mediating the connection of the domain of the concept of nature with that of the concept of freedom, as regards freedom’s consequences, inasmuch as this harmony also promotes the mind’s receptivity to moral feeling” (Kant 38). Gasché focuses on what he calls the “para-epistemic” role of the faculty of judgment, exploring the capacity of aesthetic judgment to mediate between the realm of the understanding (deterministically governed by laws) and the realm of reason (which is the domain of freedom and morality).

     

    While Gasché is not the only critic to take seriously Kant’s claim that the Third Critique bridges the chasm between the other two, his analysis nevertheless operates as a helpful corrective to the manner in which we may normally understand the Third Critique.1 Too often the province of the First Critique is taken to be epistemology, that of the Second morality, while the Third, a somewhat inexplicable addition, is thought to deal with aesthetics. This model is an oversimplification that does not respect the complexity of Kant’s texts, yet it remains the prevailing model. Gasché offers a compelling corrective, demonstrating how Kantian aesthetics emerges from the subject’s confrontation with objects for which it has no concepts.

     

    As its title suggests, the Third Critique is not primarily concerned with aesthetics, but with the faculty of judgment. Kant explains, “judgment in general is the ability to think the particular as contained under the universal” (18). As it appears in the Critique of Pure Reason, judgment is at the disposal of the understanding as the faculty which subsumes the particular, which is given from intuition, under the universal concepts of the understanding. In the Third Critique, Kant identifies this type of judgment as “determining” or “determinative” and posits another form of judgment. “If the universal (the rule, principle, law) is given, then judgment, which subsumes the particular under it, is determinative. . . . But if only the particular is given and judgment has to find the universal for it, then this power is merely reflective” (Kant 18-19). Reflective judgment provides most of the subject matter for the Critique of Judgment, and it is as a form of reflective judgment that aesthetic judgment emerges in the Third Critique.

     

    Reflective judgment has the singular function of securing a minimum level of cognition when the subject confronts a seemingly uncognizable object. Gasché explains,

     

    in the case of certain objects of experience or empirical representations, determining–that is to say, cognitive–judgments are at a loss . . . and thus reflective judgment, whether aesthetic or teleological, is needed. The task of such judgment consists in nothing less than “discovering” concepts and rules that the particular obeys. In short, the task of reflective judgment, as distinct from the task of determining judgment, is to render intelligible what is particular and contingent by showing it to have a unity that is thinkable by us, although it does not rest on the objective rules that are, of course, the prerogative of determining judgment. (16)

     

    It is this peculiar epistemic situation that Kant’s aesthetics seeks to address, and it is in this situation that judgment discovers its “para-epistemic” task as reflective judgment. “Such judgment is not ‘ante-‘ or ‘proto-‘ epistemic, since these qualifications would suggest, of course, that its achievements precede epistemic accomplishments properly speaking. . . . But the accomplishments of aesthetic reflective judgment stand beside and on a par with cognitive accomplishments; thus aesthetic judgment holds its place as equal to cognition” (Gasché 4). Explaining precisely how the particular and contingent, for which the mind has no concept, comes to be interpreted by purely subjective principles provides the bulk of the material of both the Third Critique and The Idea of Form.

     

    At the end of the published introduction to the Third Critique, Kant provides a table which lists the three cognitive powers (understanding, judgment, reason) alongside each other (38). Such a schema seems to suggest that each of these “cognitive powers” is somehow equal, legislating over its own domain. In the first two critiques, Kant goes to great lengths to demonstrate how reason and understanding each legislates over its own domain. The reader of the Critique of Judgment might easily be misled into believing that the judgment is just another faculty, with its own distinct sphere of legislation. While capable of autonomy in aesthetic judgments, judgment is typically at the service of the understanding:

     

    However autonomous reflective judgment may be, we must recall that its autonomy exists only in distinction from the reflection that takes place in the understanding. In mere reflection upon particulars without objective concepts, the exercise of autonomy remains a function of the judgment’s divestment of something that it ordinarily achieves. (Gasché 24)

     

     

    The Third Critique itself, like the judgment, is not simply another critique, but is comprehensible only in terms of the other critiques. The judgment emerges as the unifying faculty, and the Third Critique proves the completion of the Kantian system, only once we understand that the failure of determining judgment opens up the possibility of another level of judgment, predicated upon an a priori principle that is subjective, rather than the objective concepts of the understanding. It is only its status as “mere” reflection, operating as not quite a faculty, as a para-epistemic power, that allows reflective judgment to unify the reason and the understanding.

     

    In an act of brilliant textual analysis, Gasché highlights the peculiar position of reflective judgment by tracing the qualifiers by which Kant describes it, particularly the German adjective bloss, normally translated as “mere.” Over and over again, Kant speaks of “mere judgment” or of judgments upon the “mere form” of an object. “Mere” captures the way in which reflective judgment represents an achievement in the wake of determining judgment’s failure. Gasché explains,

     

    I believe that his abundant use of these restrictive terms betrays the difficulty of the task faced by Kant in this last critical work–the difficulty of isolating, with the required purity, the realm to be delimited. It could thus well be that rather than occurring incidentally in Kant’s texts, merely is used for systematic reasons, and that its status is that of a philosophical concept comparable, say, to that of the pure. (19)

     

    In The Idea of Form, Gasché charts the development of the Kantian “mere” as one of his key terms.

     

    The sense of “mereness” is captured when Gasché suggests that the a priori principle which governs reflecting judgment, the principle of purposiveness, is “one principle more.” In his discussion of teleological judgments, Gasché highlights purposiveness as something merely added to a failed determining judgment. After differentiating determining judgments from reflecting judgments, Kant further divides the latter category into aesthetic and teleological judgments. By placing his discussion of teleological judgments at the beginning of The Idea of Form, Gasché reverses the order in which Kant discusses the different forms of reflective judgments, and in doing so suggests that aesthetic judgments are of greater concern in the Third Critique. Gasché establishes the priority of the aesthetic by pointing out that only in aesthetic judgment is the judging faculty completely free of the understanding:

     

    Aesthetic judgment precedes all conceptual understanding of the object and hence has its determining basis in the power of judgment alone, free from any admixture of the other cognitive faculties. Teleological judgment, on the other hand, is based on “the concept of a natural end” (27)

     

     

    Faced with an object to which no concept of the understanding applies, the reflective judgment attempts to secure a minimal cognition of the object. In the case of teleological judgments, this is achieved by adding the rational principle of “inner purposiveness” to the perception of the object.

     

    Teleological, rather than aesthetic, judgment imposes itself when confronted with objects of nature, with “its life forms and organisms. From the perspective of the understanding (which knows only mechanical causality), the forms of such objects of nature are contingent, since it cannot come up with any necessary concepts for these natural phenomena” (28). While such objects cannot be comprehended by the understanding, they nonetheless seem as if they are governed by some concept. Teleological judgment operates by adding “one principle more” to the otherwise incomprehensible object–the principle of a natural purpose. “In order to make the organized forms of nature available to possible observation and investigation, teleological judgment follows a guideline, which is the rational concept of a thing as a natural purpose (Naturzweck)” (30). As Gasché points out, because teleological judgment borrows its principle from reason, it is not, like aesthetic judgment, “a faculty that really has its own distinctive and a priori principle” (27). Its principle is, instead, borrowed from reason. Even though the “Critique of Teleological Judgment” is included within the Critique of Judgment, it could as easily have been “appended to the theoretical part of philosophy” (Kant qtd. in Gasché 27).

     

    One implication of this claim, which Gasché’s analysis seems to imply, though he does not comment on it, is the unified epistemic ground of science and aesthetics. Such a unification would not be a facile return to the vainglorious dream of a “scientific” form of aesthetics (as in the more vulgar claims of structuralist literary criticism). In fact, it suggests quite the opposite–that science and aesthetics, while sharing the common ground of reflective judgment, are two clearly demarcated domains: the domain of aesthetic judgment and the domain of teleological judgment. Sciences such as biology and to some extent physics require precisely the sort of assumption that teleological judgments make–assumptions of rationality, comprehensibility, and systematicity in nature. With such an assumption, phenomena are rendered “susceptible to observation and investigation” (Gasché 31). The a priori principle which governs all reflective judgments, that of purposiveness, undergirds both aesthetic and teleological judgments. It is at this level that science and aesthetics are unified within the Kantian framework.

     

    Just as the Third Critique may offer an epistemic model that unifies science and aesthetics, it dissolves any strict division between art and nature. Against most understandings of aesthetics, Kant’s is not particularly concerned with art.

     

    The meaning of “aesthetic” in [the Third Critique], moreover, bears little resemblance to what is known under that title in the history of aesthetics, both before and after Kant. As Kant uses the term it does not refer to artistic representation at all, but to that which concerns the senses in judgments, and is subjective. (90)

     

     

    One consequence of Kant’s subjective criteria is the irrelevance of the origin of the aesthetic object. Aesthetic judgment arises when the mind is confronted with an object for which it has no determinate concept, and yet experiences pleasure in its judging of that object. It is therefore as likely to occur in the presence of objects of nature (such as Kant’s perennial example of the beautiful–a flower) as in the presence of human art. By defining aesthetics with reference to subjective experience, Kant radically reorients the domain of aesthetics. Among other pesky aesthetic issues that Kant sweeps aside is the question of the ontological status of art. Kantian aesthetics, as epistemic phenomenology, is concerned with the entire realm of experience. In place of the question of ontology, as Gasché argues, the central preoccupation of the Third Critique is the nature of the beautiful.

     

    The notion of the beautiful is likely to strike the reader as quaint and unimportant for whatever we might describe as “contemporary aesthetics.” The Third Critique, upon first examination, is likely to seem hopelessly mired in the eighteenth century. Yet, if Kant speaks of the sublime and the beautiful, and fastidiously divides the realm of aesthetic experience into a hierarchical catalog, he nonetheless breaks with eighteenth-century aesthetics in many significant ways. One such break is the complete absence of any notion of “perfection” from the beautiful. More broadly, the Kantian beautiful provides no standards or rules for evaluating art. Instead, what a judgment of the beautiful “is concerned with is exclusively whether the objects under consideration have an indeterminately purposive natural form; in other words, whether they have the form of an object of empirical experience at all” (Gasché 80).

     

    The key word here, and the key to Gasché’s book, is the notion of form–“beauty resides in the form of an object” (60). As Gasché is at pains to demonstrate, this does not make Kant’s aesthetics formalist, in the usual sense of the term. Kant’s sense of form completely evades the form/content division. “Rather than being opposed to content, form, in [Kant’s] sense, gestures toward what is otherwise than form and content–an exuberance of indeterminateness prior to any fixing of objective meaning and its constraining formal characteristics” (Gasché 66). Kant’s formalism refers to the para-epistemic place that aesthetic judgments occupy within his framework.

     

    We must remember that aesthetic judgment, as a type of reflective judgment, concerns objects for which the mind has no concept. If, in spite of the absence of any determinate concept, an object may be judged purposive, “this is because this object displays form” (Gasché 80). Such a display of form occurs when the power of imagination (which apprehends the empirical object as a perception) unites harmoniously with the understanding–but only in a free, undetermined way. If the union of understanding and imagination were determining, the judgment would not be aesthetic at all.

     

    Under the condition that the merely apprehended intuitive manifold of a single object lends itself to being collected into the presentation of a concept in general, a harmonious agreement of the imagination and the understanding takes place, and thereby represents the minimal condition for cognition in general. (80)

     

     

    Like “mere,” the qualifier “in general” highlights the strange position occupied by the aesthetic. While it is not determined, it has the property of determinability, purposiveness without purpose.

     

    A beautiful object is not determined by a concept, nor is it simply undetermined; it is “marked by open determinability” (Gasché 81). As Gasché states,

     

    to put it bluntly, what is found beautiful in the judgment upon the mere form of an object is that the thing judged conforms to the form of an empirical object or thing (irrespective of what it is), rather than refusing itself to such representation (and consequently to representation as such). (80)

     

     

    Beauty is therefore pleasure in the cognizability of an uncognized object, the determinability of an undetermined object. Gasché captures the nature of the Kantian beautiful most succinctly when he writes that “a judgment of taste savors not the phenomenal nature of what is judged but its susceptibility to empirical concepts. Because of its form, a beautiful object is, as it were, exquisitely cognizable” (80). More than any other, the notion of an object that is exquisitely cognizable captures the pleasure that inheres in the act of judging an object. The very act of judging becomes pleasurable, even as the work of judgment is undetermined and necessarily incapable of completion.

     

    Against the beautiful, which resides in form, the sublime is formless. While this sounds like a straightforward recapitulation of the traditional opposition between the beautiful and the sublime, Gasché provocatively re-reads this division. While postmodern criticism has largely forgotten the “beautiful” in favor of the notion of the sublime, Gasché not only reasserts the place of the beautiful, but relegates the category of the sublime to an appendicular position, neither equal nor alternative to the beautiful, but an “appendage to the beautiful” (121).
    Formlessness is only capable of being judged sublime, however, when it also exhibits totality. “Boundless chaos is not enough to suggest sublimity; it must be such that it allows thinking to add (hinzugedacht wird) totality to it. If Kant’s strict terminology did not prohibit it, one would be inclined to say that boundless formlessness must have the ‘form’ of a whole, in order for it to be sublime” (Gasché 123-4). As in judgments on the beautiful, determining judgment fails in the face of the sublime. This failure is experienced as sublime only when the notion of totality can be added to the perception of formlessness.

     

    The notion of totality, however, does not arise in the judgment, but comes from the reason. “In the sublime, there is a presentation of a power that subtends cognizability and its intelligibility, namely reason. This presentation takes place precisely at moments when a given thing not only cannot be subsumed under given concepts but refuses even to be a presentation of the powers of cognition in general” (Gasché 125). The beautiful, while it fails to be subsumed under any particular concept, harmoniously unites the powers of cognition in general. The sublime, on the other hand, represents the complete failure of such powers. The subject, when faced with such failure, nevertheless feels its own power beyond cognition through the reason. This experience of its own power allows the subject to experience formless objects as sublime. “What is judged sublime is the mind’s capacity to form an apprehension of something that thwarts even the possibility of minimal objectification” (Gasché 127). This apprehension only occurs through the intervention of the reason. Strictly speaking, only feelings, and not objects, may be properly judged sublime. The objects which inspire sublimity, inspire only incomprehensibility. Yet reason (through the rational concept of totality) masters this incomprehensibility, leading to an experience of pleasure in the subject as it experiences its own ability to overcome formlessness.

     

    Judgment on the sublime is “an aesthetic judgment at the very limits of aesthetics. . . . it gestures toward something else, namely, practical reason and morality” (Gasché 154). The intervention of reason, necessary for the experience of sublimity, lends a moral dimension to the sublime. Judgments on the beautiful remain pure judgments of taste, representing a harmonious relation between the imagination and the understanding, while judgments on the sublime enter into a relation with the faculty of reason.2 It is this adding of reason to failed judgment that makes the “Analytic of the Sublime” an appendix to the “Analytic to the Beautiful.”

     

    The appendicular nature of “The Analytic of the Sublime” thus consists also in this: that it adds the problematic of reason . . . to the analytic of the reflective aesthetic judgment that has been illustrated by privileging the beautiful. In the discussion of the sublime, it becomes clear that there is an autonomous kind of reflective judgment in which reason, rather than the understanding, plays the major role. (130)

     

    Gasché reorients our understanding of the Critique of Judgment by revealing the para-epistemic role of judgment in cognition and re-centering the text around the “Analytic of the Beautiful.” While the primary division in Kant’s text is the division between the “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment” and the “Critique of Teleological Judgment,” Gasché compellingly argues for the centrality of the former. And while Kant divides aesthetic judgments into judgments on the sublime and judgments on the beautiful, Gasché insists that the former is simply an appendix to the latter. Kant’s text, in eighteenth-century fashion, takes as its province the entire faculty of judgment and proceeds to catalog every appearance of that faculty. Gasché’s focuses the energy of Kant’s text, revealing the centrality of the beautiful in the Third Critique and, more specifically, the notion of form which undergirds it. By doing so, Gasché fleshes out the claim that the Third Critique is not concerned with aesthetics as a theory of art, but with the para-epistemic task of representing an object for which judgment has no concept.

     

    Gasché proceeds to discuss Kant’s notion of interest and disinterestedness, how reason and aesthetic judgments interact, and what special provisions must be made for our understanding of the fine arts in contradistinction to nature. The final chapter, on the role of the rhetorical figure of “hypotyposis,” though a previously published essay, manages to distill and collect much of what has come before. In discussing poetry, in this closing chapter Gasché writes,

     

    the free play of imagination produces only presentation as such, that is, not determinate intuitive fulfillment of concepts but their fullness, their vivid lively filling out in general. This indeterminate, intuitive fullness of the concepts that occurs in the play of the imagination in poetry livens up the mind. It conveys life to the mind, a life yet indeterminate, but purposive to the extent that it brings about the minimal arrangement of the faculties necessary for cognition in general. (204)

     

    It is hard to imagine a clearer, more concise statement of Gasché’s argument for a para-epistemic reading of the role of judgment in Kant’s aesthetics.

     

    Gasché accomplishes a great deal largely as a function of his ability to wed close textual analysis brilliantly to a philosophical discussion of Kant’s system. The drawback of such an approach is its tendency to insulate itself. Gasché explains,

     

    I have also sought to avoid, whenever possible, a critical debate with the various and often contradictory interpretations that these and the related issues have received in Kant scholarship. Rather than challenging Kant’s commentators, I have endeavored to think with Kant. (11)

     

     

    Yet without an engagement with a larger critical discourse the reader is left wondering what implications Gasché’s reading of Kant might have for larger critical debates. Gasché suggests cryptically that the Critique of Judgment “is important for the understanding of the fine arts, and particularly of modern and postmodern art” (3). Yet exactly how it is important he never makes clear.

     

    As a reading of the Third Critique, The Idea of Form is a difficult but compelling account of the Critique of Judgment. Its failure to engage larger conversations within Kant criticism or contemporary aesthetics leaves the significance of Gasché’s re-thinking of Kant’s aesthetics largely undetermined. Gasché highlights a number of aspects of the Third Critique which seem resonant with contemporary critical theory. Kant’s subject-centered aesthetic theory is consistent with that strain of contemporary theory interested in artistic consumption rather than production. Kant’s stress on an aesthetic treatment of nature would seem to be useful for eco-criticism. For my own part, what is particularly compelling about Gasché’s vision of Kant’s aesthetics is its success as a description of our actual experience of aesthetic objects. Eschewing any normative judgment on the role of art, the aesthetic object according to Kant’s model becomes absolutely individual and semantically rich. Because it is indeterminability which defines the work of art, such work enjoins endless interpretation. It is, therefore, the very possibility of infinite interpretability that defines the Kantian beautiful.

    Notes

     

    1. Gilles Deleuze’s lucid, and notably concise, Kant’s Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Philosophy, similarly locates the Third Critique as the capstone of Kantian philosophy.

     

    2. It worth noting, however, that the relation between judgment and reason in judgments on the sublime is not symmetrical with a relation established between the reason and the understanding in judgments on the beautiful. Kant’s schematic style might lead one to this incorrect conclusion, for which Gasché’s reading is a helpful corrective.

    Works Cited

     

    • Deleuze, Gilles. Kant’s Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjan. London: Athlone, 1984.
    • Kant, Immanuel. The Critique of Judgment. Trans. Werner S. Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987.

     

  • How Postmodern Is It?

    Mark A. Cohen

    French Department
    Sarah Lawrence College
    mcohen@slc.edu

     

    Review of: Maurice Blanchot, The Book to Come. Trans. Charlotte Mandell. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003.

     

    The Book to Come was published in 1959 and is composed entirely of articles written for the Chroniques section of the Nouvelle Revue Française between 1953 and 1958.1 It came at a particular juncture in Blanchot’s career, marking the end of his period of “retreat” into literature. After his passionate involvement with right-wing journalism, which had culminated in anti-Semitic articles against the Blum government in 1936-37, Blanchot refrained from making any direct political statements for another two decades. Instead he became a highly productive and widely recognized literary critic and novelist. In the 1950s alone, he wrote a hundred articles as well as four novellas or récits (as Blanchot called them then). Although these reflections on literature incorporated philosophical and political references, the latter always remained subordinate to literary concerns. In 1958, however, what Blanchot considered to be De Gaulle’s legalized coup d’état and the revelations of French war crimes in the Algerian conflict roused him to enter the political arena once more, this time on the left wing. Over the next three decades his writing and activities become more broadly engaged with issues that went beyond the strictly literary, in particular in the form of anguished reflections on the Holocaust and “Jewishness,” understood more as an existential category than as one restricted to a real historical or religious group. He also participated actively in the événements of 1968 on the side of the insurgent students. In a similar move toward engagement, responding to new art forms and philosophies, he abandoned fiction for a hybrid form of discourse that incorporated criticism, dialogue, and the fragmentary, becoming in turn a highly influential figure for radical French philosophy and writing of the 1960s and 70s.

     

    The Book to Come represents then the purest version we have of Blanchot littérateur in what proved to be his last major work of literary criticism. Emblematic of its exclusiveness in this regard was its close association with the NRF, which began publication in the 1950s after a ten-year hiatus. It became a flagship for a certain small-scale, even “provincial” variant of modernism in its apolitical promotion of a “pure” literature untethered to either ideological statements or grand projects. Under the guidance of the legendary Jean Paulhan, it promoted an investigation of the workshop of writing, printing short excerpts of novels, notebooks, diaries, and reflections by writer-aestheticians like Caillois, Cioran, Jouhandeau, Malraux, and others. Blanchot’s tortuous avoidance of direct reference to his prewar mésalliance has been dealt with at length by American critics. Steven Ungar, for one, finds in the title of The Book to Come an uncanny repression of one of Blanchot’s fascist essays of 1938 entitled “The Revolution to Come.” Indeed, looking at the structure and institutional self-identification of The Book to Come affirms just how comfortable he was in his attachment to the literary. The NRF was a tolerant milieu, defiantly indifferent to partisan, résistant polemics, and thus accommodating of former right-wingers like Blanchot. He quickly came to occupy a special role in the review, becoming what amounted to its house critic during the 1950s, well-placed to create an audience for his own fiction and that of others working in the same vein. The secure position he enjoyed is evidenced in a prefatory note that not only foregrounds his dual activities as both writer and critic but gives biographical information (however exiguous) that is completely uncharacteristic of his habitual reticence about such matters: “Maurice Blanchot, novelist and critic, was born in 1907. His life is wholly devoted to literature and the silence unique to it.”2 Equally unprecedented in the Blanchot corpus is a postfacial note referring to the essays’ provenance–“A little modified, these texts belong to a series of little essays published starting in 1953, in La Nouvelle Revue Française.”

     

    In comparison with his other nonfiction prose, The Book to Come lacks the central theoretical essay of its predecessors Faux pas (1943) and The Work of Fire (1949), the high level of abstraction and metaphysical drama of its sister-work The Space of Literature (1955), and the broad cultural-philosophical sweep of The Infinite Conversation (1969) and Friendship (1971).3 To be sure, the roughly contemporaneous Space of Literature shares with The Book to Come the same abyssal view of literature, a common metaphorics, and rhapsodic style. Nevertheless the former operates on a far more rarified level of ontology, in which a dramatic metaphysics of solitude, death, inspiration, and experience are programmatically interconnected with one another throughout the book as a whole. The Book to Come‘s essays, in contrast, converge toward the same end but separately. Even the opening essay, a retelling of the Sirens myth that describes how narrative works, is immediately followed not by a look at Kafka or Mallarmé’s treatment of Sirens, of which Blanchot was well aware, but by a specific case study of narrative in which Sirens have no obvious place: a review of Proust’s Jean Santeuil. This ad hoc alternation of general and particular is typical throughout.

     

    The essays in The Book to Come can be conveniently divided into three types: 1) the study of an individual author’s path to his Blanchottian masterpiece, including a subset of shorter pieces on contemporary works (by Beckett, Duras, Robbe-Grillet) that, as Blanchot sees it, simply perform in one way or another the essence of literature; 2) the generic study of narrative, notebook, diary, correspondence as they limn, resist, and adumbrate the same; 3) more general meditations on reading, a speculation on the “last” writer, symbolic interpretation, and publicity. It is precisely the relative dispersion of its essays and their corresponding embeddedness in the practical activity (as opposed to the ontology) of writing that reveals Blanchot’s aims so well. In The Book to Come we witness what amounts to an inductive procedure of collecting quite a wide range of examples of authors and genres with the intention of analyzing them in such a way that they confirm his own theoretical insights, literary historical intuitions, and fictional practices.4 The random spread of the monthly reviewer dovetails with the forging of an artistic credo. Many of these authors–Musil, Broch, Borges, and Hesse, for example–did not form part of Blanchot’s preferred modernist canon, and he never wrote about them again. An illustration of this more “professionalized” emphasis can be gleaned from a brief comparison of statements written more or less contemporaneously on the same topic taken from each of the respective books. In The Space of Literature, “to write is to enter into the affirmation of the solitude in which fascination threatens” (33); in The Book to Come, “every writer feels called to answer alone, through his own ignorance, for literature, for its future” (201). It is the difference between an ontological state in which one exists and a specific condition in which one fulfills a task, between space and time.

     

    The stakes of The Book to Come are well captured in the opening lines of “The Disappearance of Literature , ” the essay that begins the fourth section: “Where is literature going? . . . towards itself, its essence, which is disappearance” (195). Blanchot’s criticism from the 1950s charts this strangely circular journey to extinction and explains that literature must be understood to take place in a wholly other time and space than we are accustomed to. Because, strangely, it is precisely literature’s weakness that is its strength or rather its being. It brings a difference into human life in which the systems and ontologies that govern the real world of everyday exchange and rationality no longer apply. But this opposition is not underwritten by the ideology of the Romantic artist or utopian dreamer. The imaginary world is not a better world or more authentic–indeed it can only be truly critical of the existing world by not assuming any such implicit mastery. For substantive critique would require literature to take up the modalities of the non-literary, which for Blanchot means the successful carrying out of a project, the desire to represent, to claim authority, relay tradition, or move others to feel or do. Instead modern literature now tends to examine itself, the nature of the fictive act, and all this entails in terms of speaker, addressee, thought, and temporality/ies. (The difficulties of fitting this into any standard literary history are not something Blanchot examines with any rigor.)

     

    The basic trope governing the Blanchottian ontology of literature in The Book to Come might be called the recursive future and can be described in a simple equation: x = not-yet x. The equation works in both directions, both as a logical and as a temporal description. The being of x is only truly grasped as not yet existing. Any attempt (the result of what Blanchot calls “impatience”) to finish something and achieve it once and for all means that one will fail to do so. Only by realizing that it would be impossible does one do justice to it. This leaves us with the approach to the object and the experience of approaching. The whole linear apparatus of plan, execution, and goal is no longer applicable. The future of a book armed with this consciousness is not in its worldly future–who will read it, the world it will create, the imitators it will spawn, its place in literary history–but the reiteration of its quest to become literature, which is, paradoxically, a search for its original moment of emergence from the silence. Its future is a now that searches back in the past. The eponymous “book to come” then is not only the future of literature in history (though Blanchot does think that on some level), but books like Blanchot’s fiction that in conventional terms never end or even begin. The past here, likewise, does not mean the publicly historical past but the past that is always presupposed as the past in relation to this present moment in which we are reading. Such an unwonted order of temporality also has repercussions for all the components of the world that are presented (if not represented) in texts: the self in literature is always a moment within the text, a fading-reappearing instance of enunciation rather than a substantial, well-defined character; the encounter with others is always impossible yet framed by desire and curiosity; the event is no longer something represented as if it had existed but is the ever-receding quest for its own existence as we experience it in the performative instant. In this intensively temporalized view of literature there is no place for literature as a monumental achievement. Reversing the usual worldly valuations, in Blanchot’s view success in fulfilling one’s projects would be failure in terms of the search for literature and vice versa. As a result, in the The Book to Come‘s penultimate essay, Mallarmé’s oeuvre is said to be most truly formed not from a triumphant sequence of masterpieces but from the detritus of his never-carried-out plan to write an encyclopedic sequence of works to replace the world. According to Blanchot, its wild ambition is realized not because it does replace the world with another but because it reveals so clearly literature’s inevitable failure to do so. Similarly, in the essay on Artaud, Blanchot homes in on the fact that it is Artaud’s failed poems that arouse Jacques Rivière’s interest. Ultimately, it is the penumbra of the poem, his correspondence with Artaud about the latter’s state of mind, that ends up becoming a successful work.

     

    Each of the authors surveyed is shown in The Book to Come arriving at the same conclusions about the nature of literature as Blanchot, whether consciously or unconsciously. The works Blanchot discusses and celebrates are shown to triumph when they have successfully avoided two temptations of the modern writer that are metaphysically impossible to attain and in any case undesirable: the Scylla of immediacy, a return to nature or pure self-expression, and the Charybdis of reference (novelistic “thickness,” the evocation of a milieu, encyclopedic completeness) or culture (copying the great styles of French literature). This tale is retailed over and over again. Proust in Jean Santeuil is caught between a wish to transcribe simple unconnected moments of experience and the desire to provide a detailed depiction of France during the Dreyfus Affair. Broch wants his great work to cover both scientific rationality and cultural dissolution. Rousseau oscillates between the desire for immediacy and the hope of communicating his great vision of human justice, which necessarily requires the adoption of social conventions and so on. In each case what they have to learn is that the right path for them to take as writers is the path that leads in neither of these directions, one that in fact leads to the full assumption of literary language and the depersonalized form of open, mobile temporality that comes with it. Something in each writer resists the final step but their masterpieces take it.

     

    In the generic essays (as I called them above), Blanchot articulates the idea that the specific temporality of literature is opposed to that of everyday life and rational calculation and that literature is able nevertheless to seep into the world surreptitiously–not necessarily to substitute for the everyday but rather to be always available to problematize it unremittingly. In the essay “Diary and Story,” for instance, diaries and notebooks are clearly separated from the work by Blanchot, who sees them as tied to the everyday because they use dates and events to act as a timorous defense against the radicality of what he considers the truly literary. Yet by the end of this essay, the diary’s “quest without concern for results” looks a lot like a Blanchottian work, whereas the quotidian is now said to be infected by literature once it has been reconfigured as diary (188). This whirligig of apparently separate categories that end up intermingling offers an early, abstract template for Blanchot’s complex and obscure “politics” of literature.

     

    The famous opening essay, entitled “Encountering the Imaginary,” uses Ulysses’s non-meeting with the Sirens to reveal how even as he, the man of technique, can experience the reality of a dangerous discovery, he makes sure he is in no real danger.5 By employing his technology in the form of wax in the ears of his men and ropes to hold himself fast, he in fact ensures that no meeting took place.6 Yet as Blanchot views it, Ulysses loses out anyway because he ends up telling the story of the Sirens and becomes Homer in the process. He tells of his failure to reach them even as they have arrived and keep on arriving in the imaginary medium of his discourse. This now-installed impossibility of completion gives birth to its own genre-to-come: the récit. Technique is something that operates in the world of everyday exchange and the linear temporality of calculation. It lends itself quite comfortably to the creation of narratives, too, describing exciting events, and holding the interest of its listeners. But Blanchot shifts the focus from the telling of an adventure (Ulysses meeting the Sirens) to the defeat of the adventure genre itself from within (Homer-Ulysses telling his story). The revelation of the literariness of the adventure story means that the adventure itself becomes interminable in the constant possibility of its retelling (on the syntagmatic plane) and of its being told differently (on the paradigmatic plane). This is Blanchot’s mythic retelling of his own coming to narrative. The non-meeting of Siren and Navigator is structurally parallel to the basic setting of Blanchot’s novellas of the 1950s: two or three individuals approaching, exploring, but never finally knowing each other. It is one more sign of how closely The Book to Come is linked in practical terms to Blanchot’s contemporaneously written fictional works–his own books to come in both senses of the expression–that in this opening chapter he is actually defining the genre of his own fiction, the récit: “Narrative [récit] is not the relating of an event but this event itself, the approach of this event, the place where it is called on to unfold” (6). Elsewhere in his critical pieces, he virtually never refers to his fictional work, even obliquely.

     

    It is one of the fervent hopes of the “Crossing Aesthetics” series, edited by Werner Hamacher, to promote the passage for aesthetics to politics from within deconstruction itself and thereby preserve the halting, involuted complexity of deconstructive reading in the public sphere. Blanchot can fairly be considered the series’ most honored figure: no fewer than three of his books are represented in its catalogue as well as a number of others that are inspired by or directly devoted to him. Yet we should note that this much desired passage does not occur in The Book to Come, which figures politics only in filigree. Blanchot is truly an uncanny precursor for deconstruction here because his politics remain obstinately veiled, retaining a troubling and insistent vehemence that is, as always, coupled with an equally unflappable lack of specificity. A number of the more general essays do allude to important Blanchottian notions of questioning and resistance, that is, the refusal to accept anything as such, a sort of anarchic negativity without any positive component or utopian hope beyond it. Literature is said to make all events equal and equally possible, thus challenging–implicitly–all fixed hierarchies and established values. The fundamental opposition of literary modes of operation to those of the bourgeois world with its goal-oriented work, time, and technology is clear but left without any details or applications to the contemporary context. The beginnings of Blanchot’s deep critical engagement with Judaism, which is an essential element in his politics of the 1960s, can certainly be discerned in the titles of the essays “Prophetic Speech” and “The Secret of the Golem”–but only in their titles. “The Secret of the Golem,” for instance, discusses the confident use of symbolism in literature as emblematic of wrong-headed attempts to make language represent the world. Jews and “Jewish-ness” as such are otherwise absent.

     

    The most overtly political moment in The Book to Come comes at the end. The final essay, “The Power and the Glory,” does bring up an important cultural theme very much in the air in France in the 1950s: the relationship of the writer to mass culture. Blanchot in effect compares the alienation imposed on the reader by literature with that of the public on the individual. What might in Heideggerian terms look like a fall into the “they” or more conventionally and nostalgically the loss of identifiable human beings (“friends”) who might read one’s books is actually embraced by Blanchot as a happy meeting of the twain. In his closing lines, he is implicitly celebrating the equalizing powerlessness that language can, if understood properly, induce us to accept and thus clearing the ground for his, the writer’s, return to politics. In a rarely remarked allusion to Orpheus that is no longer that of The Space of Literature, where it is used as an allegory of Blanchottian creation, here the poet is said not to find the artwork by losing its object but to arrive at his speech by joining the flow of his song with the indifferent murmur of public culture:

     

    If today the writer, thinking of going down to the underworld, is content with going out into the street, that is because the two rivers [the underground and above-ground Styx] . . . passing through each other, tend to be confused. . . . the profound original rumor . . . is not unlike the unspeaking speech . . . the "public mind." (250)

     

     

    Notes

     

    chercher, recherche, navigation
    1. With the exception of his brief review of Bataille’s Madame Edwarda.
    2. “Maurice Blanchot, romancier et critique, est né en 1907. Sa vie est entièrement vouée à la littérature et au silence qui lui est propre.” The expression “lui est propre” could also be translated “which belongs to it” or “which is properly its own.”
    3. The latter two books contained essays from the 1950s as well as the 1960s that Blanchot had not collected in book form at the time but were philosophical and cultural in nature and so more congruent with his later interests.
    4. Space does not permit any detailed consideration of the numerous echoes of his 1957 récit Le Dernier Homme. One essay, for instance, is about “The Death of the Last Writer.”
    5. Mandell’s felicitous translation for “La rencontre de l’imaginaire.”
    6. The French word Blanchot uses is technique, which recalls Heidegger’s 1953 essay attacking the nihilism produced by modern Technik.

     

    Work Cited

     

    • Blanchot, Maurice. The Space of Literature. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003.

     

  • Danger Mouse’s Grey Album, Mash-Ups, and the Age of Composition

    Philip A. Gunderson

    English Department
    San Diego Miramar College
    pgunders73@hotmail.com

     

    Review of: Danger Mouse (Brian Burton), The Grey Album, Bootleg Recording

     

    Depending on one’s perspective, Danger Mouse’s (Brian Burton’s) Grey Album represents a highpoint or a nadir in the state of the recording arts in 2004. From the perspective of music fans and critics, Burton’s creation–a daring “mash-up” of Jay-Z’s The Black Album and the Beatles’ eponymous 1969 work (popularly known as The White Album)–shows that, despite the continued corporatization of music, the DIY ethos of 1970s punk remains alive and well, manifesting in sampling and low-budget, “bedroom studio” production values. From the perspective of the recording industry, Danger Mouse’s album represents the illegal plundering of some of the most valuable property in the history of pop music (the Beatles’ sound recordings), the sacrilegious re-mixing of said recordings with a capella tracks of an African American rapper, and the electronic distribution of the entire album to hundreds of thousands of listeners who appear vexingly oblivious to current copyright law. That there would be a schism between the interests of consumers and the recording industry is hardly surprising; tension and antagonism characterize virtually all forms of exchange in capitalist economies. What is perhaps of note is that these tensions have escalated to the point of the abandonment of the exchange relationship itself. Music fans, fed up with the high prices (and outright price-fixing) of commercially available music, have opted to share music files via peer-to-peer file sharing networks, and record labels are attempting in response to coerce music fans back into the exchange relationship. The Grey Album and the mash-up form in general are symptomatic of an historical moment in which the forces of music production (production technology, artistic invention, and web-based networks of music distribution) have greatly exceeded the present relations of production expressed by artist/label contracts, music property rights, and traditional producer/consumer dichotomies.

     

    The Forces of Production

     

    Mash-up artists such as Danger Mouse have shown how the recording industry has been rendered superfluous by advances in music production technology. Artists once had to play the record companies’ games in order to gain access to precious time in a recording studio; today, a “bedroom producer” can create a professional sounding album with a personal computer alone. (Brian Burton is known to have used Sony’s Acid Pro.) Indeed, insofar as they want to survive, real studios have had to integrate “virtual” studios into their setup. Many commercial production houses incorporate software into their own environments so that their customers will be able to transfer their work between PC and studio, where it can be further processed. One is tempted to speculate that late capitalist society is on the cusp of the “composition” stage of musical development, as described in Jacques Attali’s Noise: The Political Economy of Music. Attali argues that music’s social function has passed through three distinct stages: sacrifice (the assertion of control over violence), representation (the creation of socially meaningful works), and repetition (the reproduction and dissemination of music apart from social context). The fourth and final stage, “composition,” is essentially utopian: the production of music by and for its own consumers. The traditional opposition of the active producer and passive consumer disappears in the age of composition. Although music production software remains far from universally accessible (most of the planet’s population does not have easy access to a telephone, let alone a computer), the increasingly wide availability of powerful computers in advanced capitalist countries suggests a gradual democratization of technology that does foster utopian impulses.

     

    This change in the material conditions of production has significant aesthetic consequences. Noodling about in a studio was not an option except for the wealthiest bands (such as the Beatles), and, as a result, most artists treated the recording environment more as a mimetic recording instrument, as a means of capturing a live musical performance or at least creating the semblance of a live musical performance, than as a musical instrument in its own right. Liberated from the traditional recording studio (and its institutional supports), the contemporary musician is free to experiment at his or her leisure with ideas and recording techniques that would have been considered too unconventional and even risky in the past. The Grey Album is a perfect example of the kind of artistic experimentation that can result: combining a capella tracks of a famous rapper with pop classics by a band whose record label has never licensed samples of their music for use by other artists is something that would not have happened in a professional recording studio under any circumstances. When artists cease to be constrained by the demands of the market (which include both studio executives’ demands for a hit single and the restrictive demands of today’s consumer, who has been conditioned to dislike any music that makes its own demands on the listener), they may pursue other logics internal to their work. In Attali’s age of composition, the idea of aesthetic autonomy appears on the horizon.

     

    The audio cut-and-paste, pastiche technique of The Grey Album might seem an unlikely candidate for such a modernist notion as “aesthetic autonomy,” but in a culture saturated by sham originality (and the actualization of art in the commodity form) the only viable gesture towards autonomy would have to be the representation of cultural contradiction itself. The Grey Album, with its violation of copyright laws, realizes the extent to which said laws have been put to purposes in contradiction with their original intent. That is, the original function of copyright was to encourage social advance by giving creators a financial stake in their work and by insisting that intellectual property become, after a reasonable period of time, public property. Walt Disney has long since been dead, but his intellectual property, Mickey Mouse and friends, has passed on to another legal “person,” i.e., Disney, Inc., who/that has successfully fought to extend copyright protections for reasons of “personal” profit. Public benefit has been effectively factored out of current copyright law. Monopoly capital has turned a legal spur to innovation and creativity into a tool for artistic repression.

     

    Although its title might suggest a homogenizing synthesis of opposites (the admixture of black and white to form grey–a dialectical fog in which all musicians are grey, as it were), part of The Grey Album‘s vibrancy comes from the way it highlights the culture industry’s specious opposition of white 1960s Brit-pop and twenty-first century black American hip-hop. In the contemporary climate of administrated music, in which radio bandwidth has been exploded into a stelliferous system of synchronic generic differences (classic rock, alternative rock, “urban,” classical, country, etc.) and which interpellates a corresponding “type” of consumer, The Grey Album‘s juxtaposition of the Beatles and Jay-Z takes on the character of a musical contradiction in terms. That The Grey Album can be regarded as such a novelty (even as a musical miracle) belies the extent to which the enforcement of categorical differences in administrated music discourages critical reflection on–and simple awareness of–the history of popular music and its innate syncretism, its vital habit of “borrowing” across the lines of race, class, gender, and national identity. Danger Mouse’s Grey Album forcibly reminds its listeners of the diachronic becoming of popular music. By mashing-up Jay-Z and the Beatles, Danger Mouse, himself a black Briton, highlights the fact that African American hip hop is in many ways a direct descendent of sixties-era British rock–and that British rock is largely a descendent of early twentieth century African American blues, which in turn owes something to Christian spirituals sung on plantations. Introspective listeners will recognize the album’s dialogic structure, and some may even be moved to ask questions about the asymmetrical relations of power that saturate the evolution of popular music.

     

    The Grey Album is not, however, only a history lesson–it is itself an act of resistance. It is, to employ Deleuzian terminology, a kind of “war machine” at work within and against the edifice of mass music. It is rhizomatic in the way it forms transversal relations between genres that have been arborescently structured by the recording industry. The bastard births of the mash-up form–the offspring of forbidden sonic cross-pollinations–tangle the genealogical lines of musical descent, thus leading to the common disparagement of sampling as a form of musical incest. Indeed, the very metaphor of the “mash-up” suggests a process of destructuring, an introduction of confusion, a production of indistinction in which this cannot be told from that. One could look askance at mash-ups, viewing them as puerile, disrespectful mucking about with other people’s property, but one could also celebrate that very puerility insofar as it is anti-oedipal–insofar as it short-circuits the culture industry’s normally enforced boundaries between disparate genres of music. The sense of humor immanent to a good mash-up (such as Soulwax’s “Smells Like Booty,” a fusion of Nirvana and Destiny’s Child), seems particularly amenable to explanation in terms of Freud’s theory of humor as a mechanism that relies on the sudden lifting of the repression on psychic energy. Our smiles and laughter signify our liberation from an excessively restrictive horizon of musical expectations. Psychic energy that had been channeled into rote pathways suddenly streams in unpredictable directions across the surface of culture. The mash-up artist is not at all the sad militant bemoaned by Foucault in his preface to Anti-Oedipus but rather an ethicist in the most Spinozist sense, perpetually in battle with the sad passions that prevent our bodies from realizing their affective powers.

     

    Another undeniably “puerile” pleasure in the mash-up form (in addition to its proclivity for crossing genres) is its willingness to dance on the graves of pop music’s forbears. Danger Mouse’s gesture with The Grey Album is in some ways analogous to Duchamp’s gesture with L.H.O.O.Q. Just as Duchamp scandalized bourgeois fetishists of Renaissance art by painting a mustache on the Mona Lisa (and implying with his title that the original model had a “hot ass”), Danger Mouse zeroes in on the musical institution the Beatles have become and appropriates their sounds into a new, critical context. If art is to move forward, both artists seem to be implying, it can only do so when repressive pieties are broken down and humor injected into the mix.

     

    Distribution Networks

     

    Danger Mouse initially produced a few thousand copies of The Grey Album for friends and distributed copies to independent music retailers. The modest scale of production suggests that the artist’s motivations were far from mercenary. Danger Mouse stood to gain little profit, if any, from his efforts. The Grey Album CD featured Jay-Z in the foreground with his “backing band” arrayed behind him:

     

    Figure 1: The Grey Album
    Design © 2004 kaos
    <worldofkaos.com>

     

    As soon as it became aware of the compact disc, EMI issued cease-and-desist papers to Brian Burton–he was not to produce additional copies of the album and all distributors were to destroy any copies remaining in their possession. EMI’s ham-fisted attempts at repression provoked a grass-roots Internet campaign that effectively demonstrated the ability of peer-to-peer file sharing technology to supplant the distribution of data encoded physical media (CDs, tapes, records, etc). On 26 February, “Grey Tuesday,” nearly two hundred websites defied EMI and posted the entirety of The Grey Album in MP3 file format for easy, free download to any computer connected to the Internet. Well publicized by word of mouth, popular media, and the Web, Grey Tuesday was an unqualified (and unauthorized) success. Disobedient consumers, who had not been given the option of purchasing the album through “legitimate” commercial channels, downloaded in excess of one million Grey Album tracks. Had it been available for purchase at a brick-and-mortar store, such numbers would have put the album firmly in Billboard’s Top Ten.

     

    Grey Tuesday, in its scope and success, can be taken as something akin to the dawning of a consumer class consciousness–members of the Internet community had the collective knowledge and means to put a popular work of art into circulation without the support or permission of the recording industry. One could say that consumers have taken over the distribution of musical goods and services to the detriment of those who have heretofore controlled the means of musical production. The near-instantaneous, viral replication of information on a global network renders moot the legal formalities of trademark and copyright. The traditional radio station, with its fixed formats and mind-numbingly repetitive playlists, has been effectively displaced by technologies that allow music fans to specify what they want to hear and when they want to hear it. Radio and online broadcasting remain useful avenues for discovering new artists, but control over the music is no longer contingent upon the exchange of cash. In the age of digital communism, a song’s exchange value evaporates as soon as that song hits the network.

     

    And it is a matter of communism. Although file-sharing has been besmirched with the label of “piracy” by the institutional purveyors of pop, the phenomenon actually suggests a heartening generosity on the part of consumers. As much as consumers are taught to fetishize status symbols (commodities that identify one as a member of the “haves” as opposed to the “have-nots”), file-swapping suggests that they are inclined to share whenever they stand to lose nothing. The record labels will, or course, respond that consumers will collectively lose when the industry can no longer afford to develop and market new talent. To this objection one may answer that the atrophy of one arm of the culture industry hardly amounts to public hardship. As consumers become accustomed to looking for good music online, they will need to rely on commercial tastemakers less. They may, indeed, find the industry’s “pushing” of mass entertainment increasingly odious. To approach the same issue from a slightly different angle, file sharing threatens to dispel musical ignorance and the industry that profits there from. Music fans trained to think that the major labels are the only sources of music worth listening to discover in the Internet a repository of innovative, challenging music–music, indeed, whose only evident failing has been that it is perhaps too innovative and too challenging for benumbed Clear Channel Communications listeners.

     

    If Attali is correct that music acts as a harbinger of social change, then artists like Danger Mouse may be taken as cultural prophets. They preach a new economics: the communism of simulacra, the unrestricted sharing of digital copies without originals. This new economics deterritorializes the culture industry; it threatens all industries that have traditionally profited as the producers and gatekeepers of information. Whereas communist regimes in the previous century could not withstand the onslaught of cheap commodities from capitalist countries, today we find capitalist countries increasingly vulnerable to the world’s data commies–Danger Mouse, Linus Torvald, Shawn Fanning, and all those who are dedicated to the free flow of information.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Attali, Jacques. Noise: The Political Economy of Music. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1985.
    • Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. New York: Viking, 1977.
    • Freud, Sigmund. Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious. New York: Norton, 1963.

     

  • Theory’s Hubris

    Andrew Timms

    Department of Music
    University of Bristol
    A.Timms@bristol.ac.uk

     

    Review of: Helmling, Steven. The Success and Failure of Fredric Jameson: Writing, the Sublime, and the Dialectic of Critique.Albany: SUNY P, 2001.

     

    While Fredric Jameson’s status as Marxism’s leading theorist of postmodernity is secure–and his influence on many arts and humanities disciplines undeniable–his work, when considered as a whole, has provoked comparatively little secondary literature.1 There are several possible explanations for this situation, not the least of which is the fact that Jameson is still a very active writer. Recent years, for instance, have witnessed the production of a theoretical study of modernity and modernism (A Singular Modernity), as well as the publication in the New Left Review of several important articles (“Globalization and Political Strategy,” “The Politics of Utopia”) covering issues that have long awaited an extended Jamesonian treatment. Significantly, this recent work has tended to add something new to the critical mix. One suspects that Jameson’s theoretical position is not yet completely unfurled, which makes it hard for the critic to treat his oeuvre in terms of any finalized trajectory. But it is surely the sheer difficulty of Jameson’s writing that has discouraged critics from engaging with it at length. Steven Helmling’s excellent recent study, The Success and Failure of Fredric Jameson, is not the first book devoted to Jameson, but it is the first to capture and address the peculiar nature of this difficulty, which Helmling recognizes as arising not merely from the complexity of Jameson’s ideas but, to an even greater extent, from the special qualities of his style. Helmling gives this difficult style of writing a convincing theoretical exegesis and defense, one that grows out of Jameson’s own work in a manner that is intensely enjoyable. The result is a study that should set the tone for future treatments of Jameson, whether or not one agrees with its final evaluation.

     

    Helmling’s Success

     

    What Helmling latches onto first of all is the extraordinary degree to which, in Jameson’s work, style is written into the very textures of the ideas that it carries. As anyone who has ever tried to summarize Jameson’s seminal text on postmodernism will know, the attempt leads only toward an unsettling and wholly unsatisfactory scholarly asymptote. If you condense or restate a passage from Jameson, you seem to lose all its meaning, its force, its gestural value. As with other figures in the Western Marxist tradition–most notably Theodor Adorno–the very notion of secondary literature thus becomes intensely problematic: the critic must manage to acknowledge the inconsumable nature of the text while at the same time consuming it for his or her own purposes. And, as also with Adorno, no thoughtful reader can deny, even in the midst of these obstacles to paraphrasis or assimilation, the formidable agitation, depth, insight, and provocation of the writing. Indeed, the underlying appeal of Jameson’s work, at a time when synchrony and surface predominate–a time, in other words, that no one has theorized more adequately than Jameson himself–might well be one final glimmer of the essential redemptive promise of Marxist culture-criticism. Somehow, almost despite itself, each one of Jameson’s books tempts the reader even while inevitably proving too testing, too damn high-handed, too beautiful for its own good.

     

    No doubt this all sounds faintly ridiculous to analytical Anglo-American ears. Straight-talking–the markets hate uncertainty–can surely get the job done. What place might Jameson’s texts, packed full of qualifiers, pitfalls, reversals, subordinations, find in the world of just-in-time delivery? The answer is: a rather small one. To those who have no time for Jameson, one can only reply, with heavy heart, that Jameson’s writing might at least inform them why they have no time for it; certainly one can agree with Helmling when he says that the “smallest of Jameson’s detractors–the ones, say, who establish a ‘bad writing’ contest for the express purpose of annually awarding him the first prize–need not detain us” (143). It seems more appropriate to acknowledge Perry Anderson’s assessment of Jameson: “we are dealing with a great writer” (72). But this itself must be radically contextualized by Jameson’s own frequent assertions that the time of the daunting modernist styles, the great auteurs, has passed. What might underlie the dizzying interplay of intellectual cross-currents in such a situation?

     

    At the very least, we have come a long way from Jameson’s early Marxism and Form, whose conclusion remarked that even “if ours is a critical age, it does not seem to me very becoming in critics to exalt their activity to the level of literary creation, as is loosely done in France today” (415). Later, in his 1982 Diacritics interview, Jameson remarked that while

     

    I don’t share the widely spread and self-serving attitude that today criticism and theory are as “creative” as creative writing used to be, still there is the private matter of my own pleasure in writing these texts; it is a pleasure tied up in the peculiarities of my “difficult” style (if that’s what it is). I wouldn’t write them unless there were some minimal gratification in it for myself, and I hope we are not yet too alienated or instrumentalized to reserve some small place for what used to be handicraft satisfaction, even in the composition of abstract theory. (88)

     

    The much more recent The Cultural Turn, however, casts matters in an altogether different light: the difference between creation and criticism is merely an “old anti-intellectual distinction,” which casts only a “dreary light” on our present situation (85). One of that volume’s most powerful essays, “‘End of Art’ or ‘End of History’?,” argues that “theory emerged from the aesthetic itself, from the culture of the modern” (85)–a phrase that one can imagine functioning in the future as yet another Jamesonian sound-bite–so the transferral of creative energies from one to the other, particularly in those theorists such as Barthes and Derrida (not to mention Jameson himself) whose writing is calculatedly stylized in ways that suggest modernist experimentation, turns out to be much more significant than the younger Jameson once expected.

     

    Not everyone would accept the supposed narrowing of this gap between criticism and creativity, of course. But regardless of whether this theory is at all convincing, it does at least point back to one of Marxism and Form‘s most persistent themes, namely, the difficulty of dialectical thought. In that early study, the links between criticism and its object were typically construed so as to allow dialectical thought its intransigent, challenging resistance as a corollary of the inherent contradictions of its objects. This resistance was designed to highlight the possible ideological function of much bourgeois criticism, with its “anaemic transparency” (in Terry Eagleton’s words [68]), but it was also quite specifically deployed against the frictionless surfaces of Anglo-American contemporary cultural experience–“a dream world of artificial stimuli and televised experience,” to quote Jameson’s prescient, almost Baudrillardian phrase (Marxism and Form xviii). Another of Jameson’s most evocative sentences from Marxism and Form‘s memorable preface puts this in rather more physical terms: “real thought demands a descent into the materiality of language and a consent to time itself in the form of the sentence” (xiii). It is ironic that Jameson himself thus offers the most persuasive analysis of the effects of his own texts, for there can be no better way than this to conjure up the aching appeal of Jameson’s books in situations far more unreal than was ever the case in 1971; faced with the essential triviality of contemporary Anglo-American life, each of Jameson’s volumes tempts us cruelly with promises of a redemption for which few have time or a care. How many people do not toss Postmodernism aside (no mean feat!), turning instead to the cherry-picking anthologies which really are “intended to speed the reader across a sentence in such a way that he can salute a readymade idea in passing” (Marxism and Form xiii), wondering why this pretentious stylist could not say what he has to say in a fraction of the space, and without constructing such a trenchant, brick wall of knowledge–the brusque authority of style itself, with all its gnarled roots and branches?

     

    This, at least, is one possible and probably frequent reaction to Jameson’s writing–that is, according to Helmling, the “not uncommon view that Jameson’s work is important despite the turgid writing” (146-47). Helmling’s survey of Jameson’s work and achievement foregrounds in what seems to be a wholly novel manner the centrality of Jameson’s writing to his critical enterprise, and claims with considerable justification that such readings as I have here caricatured are “failed reading[s] altogether, and of a peculiarly ironic sort.” For

     

    Jameson himself insists that “dialectical” writing itself must be the measure and the authentication of any project of critique, and to miss that–not as a talking point but as the very quick and shudder of the experience of reading Jameson–is to miss very nearly all. (147)

     

    This “quick and shudder” must surely be some logical descendant of the dialectical shock explicated so warmly in Marxism and Form. Helmling, however, takes this effect further and demands it of critical responses to Jameson just as it is a feature of Jameson’s critical writing.

     

    What Helmling proposes here is not a kind of endless dialectical torture, or undue critical agitation or difficulty for the mere sake of itself: instead, his study manages cogently to explain why such responses cut straight to the heart of the Jamesonian matter. Central to this is what Helmling terms the dialectic of the scriptible: this familiar term of Barthes (from S/Z) originally designated those types of text whose very writing invited, encouraged, or forced the reader into a creative role of actually producing the text while reading it, as opposed to the more consumable lisible text, one written to read itself, as it were (Helmling 22-3). Helmling shows how Jameson subtly transfers the meaning of scriptible from that of reading to writing; so in Jameson, the scriptible comes to designate “sentences whose gestus arouses the desire to emulate it, sentences that make you want to write sentences of your own” (“The Ideology of the Text” 21), or as he puts it in Signatures of the Visible, “Barthes thought certain kinds of writing–perhaps we should say, certain kinds of sentences–to be scriptible, because they made you wish to write further yourself; they stimulated imitation, and promised a pleasure in combining language that had little enough to do with the notation of new ideas” (2). The scriptible thus foregrounds the sentence and the style which is manifested in–as well as created by–such sentences. In such a way do we begin to read off from a writer’s semantic units the fundamental historical marker–style–through which the various contradictions of a moment will be agitated, repressed, or dealt with in any number of ways.

     

    This, then, is something like Jameson’s use of the notion of scriptible, and one which, as Helmling points out, is far from the more fashionable ideas of intertextuality or the heavily aestheticized écriture. It should be quite obvious that the scriptible is thus, for want of a better mode of description, a way in which dialectical criticism can, literally, get close to its objects–and, remembering Marxism and Form, work through the insights of various “competing” theories before subsuming them in some larger body of thought that can adequately theorize both their advantages and their limitations. And as Helmling notes, in Jameson’s study of Sartre,

     

    “style” finally means something like the total meaning or (better) the cumulative authorial “gestus,” the characteristic movement, the (as it were) authorial carriage, the verbal body language, of an oeuvre–a way of conceiving literary labor (and success) rooted in the thematics of the writer as culture-hero, a producer of “works”–indeed, in all its most fully-blown romantic/modernist senses, an “author.” (24)

     

    So the scriptible does not imply a sell-out in the face of the various slogans proclaiming the death of both authors and even subjects; in fact, Jameson purposefully refashions it into a much more nuanced tool, one that is fundamental to the dialectical method.

     

    But the scriptible is, to be sure, some kind of measure of influence, although (as Helmling cautions) it works in no simple causal manner: compare, for instance, the very different mannerisms of Barthes and Jameson: “no particularity of Jameson’s verbal style or mannerism would ever ‘remind’ anyone of Barthes” (25). And it clearly does not measure ideological influence or sympathy, since Jameson has written with considerable brio on Wyndham Lewis (a study subtitled “The Modernist as Fascist”), and he has retained throughout his career an interest in Heidegger, even going so far as to admit having “some sneaking admiration for Heidegger’s attempt at political commitment, and find[ing] the attempt itself morally and aesthetically preferable to apolitical liberalism (provided its ideals remain unrealized)” (Postmodernism 257)–a statement that truly makes one blink, even if its sentiment–the value of commitment over hands-off liberalism–is familiar enough. Instead of simple homage, the scriptible seems often to be prompted by and to entail difficulty: the figures to whom Jameson is attracted are often, especially in his earlier writings, authors whose work is calculatedly impenetrable, from Heidegger to Lyotard, from Deleuze and Guattari to Lacan (Helmling 26). The sheer effort that these writers’ prose demands becomes a style that Jameson’s work will also deploy.

     

    Evidently, however, the scriptible as a mode of criticism, even when “successfully” executed, risks failures of various kinds. The most signal of these is the implication that such a writerly style may be regarded as mere ornament: hence the possible view that Jameson is profound despite his style. Another of the more obvious ways in which such a criticism might fail is by its reversion to a mere promotion or evocation of textuality, the sort of aestheticizing mentioned earlier that might aim to distort the underlying contradictions that motivate the text’s form, or even to bracket them (and reality) altogether (Helmling 27). More damaging still is what Jameson calls “thematization,” by which it seems he means the sort of undialectical analytical habits so beloved of Anglo-American intellectuals, whereby positions are briskly summarized with none of the hard graft of Jameson’s laborious workings, which typically give opponents their due. In other words, the resistance to thematization is closely related to a resistance to commodification in particular and mystification more generally–and with this we begin to see that the entire problematic is ultimately that of reification itself.

     

    These are some of the ways in which critical practice might fail in its pursuit or cautious emulation of a scriptible; Helmling, however, adds to these by considering the particular styles of Barthes and Adorno, two of Jameson’s most important influences. From Barthes it is clear that style itself can become a Sartrean piece of historical baggage, merely a marker of the guilt that literature brings with itself. Barthes’s notion of white writing, an ascetic, style-less style, is one attempt to renounce this guilt or at least deal with it in some way that remains utopian; but such a style cannot be hypostasized, and sooner or later it falls beneath the feet of history to be imprinted with the stamp of its own distinctive moment. What had been a utopian gesture is gradually estranged, in the Brechtian sense, to become just another stylistic convention among others. Adorno, however, is a very different matter: he does not express utopian thoughts so openly, even where they scar and bruise the skin of his texts. Here the question of failure is asked with troubling urgency, and the failures themselves are asserted “so potently that even the most ‘numbed’ or conscienceless reader cannot help [feel] their sting” (Helmling 37):

     

    some kinds of “success”–the kind likeliest to be acclaimed as such by the dominant culture apparatuses–are of interest only as symptoms, if they aspire to no more than a facile manipulation of audience responses; whereas some kinds of “failure”–what the culture apparatuses ignore or shrug off–achieve something more dialectical and authentic precisely because (or to the extent that) they eschew such easy aims to probe, to force themselves up against, the limits of the possible itself. . . . The truest “success” . . . results from a calculated, deliberate, and self-conscious embrace of failure–though that way of putting it (indeed, any way of putting it that so baldly uses the word “success”) risks seeming to have mistaken the point of the exercise. (Helmling 39)

     

    Criticism cannot free itself from the problems of ideological failure or the guilt inherent in art, even if Barthes thinks that “literature itself just might” (Helmling 43). In this way the dialectic of the scriptible is really a rewriting of what Jameson (in The Political Unconscious) calls the dialectic of utopia and ideology, the way in which utopian visions are perpetually challenged by their propensity to dissolve into ideology. But as Helmling notes in a marvellous passage that radiates signs of its author’s own attraction to Jameson’s scriptiblesentences,

     

    Jameson’s own writing re-enacts the exemplary failures he identifies in Barthes and Adorno, thereby securing (or “emulating”) some measure of the success he praises them for. That is, there is an emancipatory leavening of “linguistic optimism” in the scriptible that can enact necessity and failure, yet still attest at least some (utopian) possibility of their being overcome. Hence the excitement of Jameson’s early prose: it can project a failure imperative so bracingly as to seem to loosen its strictures. Those labyrinthine sentences, zigzagging between qualifiers and hedges, subordinations and sub-subordinations, feeling their way as if to a period not foreseen when the sentence began, whose surprises prompt fresh departures in their turn, enact the obstacles, limits, or contradictions they pursue and confront, but also, paradoxically, suspend or “neutralize,” ad lib., some of the law-like force of those very contradictions and limits that ought to have proscribed such suspensions or neutralizations in the first place. (45)

     

    From difficulty, in other words, comes a faint glimmer of redemptive light.

     

    All of this changes as postmodernism gradually comes onto the scene. Helmling argues that the earlier stoic and tragic style gives way to something that feels very different: “the prose remains as allusive and inward as ever, but with an affective charge much larger and more accessible, more immediate (in the colloquial sense) than before” (122). Anyone who has read Marxism and Form will immediately notice the very different texture of the famous essay on postmodernism (Postmodernism 1-54), over whose surface it is so much easier to skid (which presumably accounts to some extent for the essay’s wide dissemination). In fact, the Postmodernism book is arguably anomalous in Jameson’s output: there is simply nothing like it, barring perhaps The Cultural Turn. That the Postmodernism book is something of a one-off as well as simultaneously the volume through which many people first encounter Jameson should give us pause: one wonders how many people have an inaccurate or inadequate appreciation of Jameson as a result. But regardless of the different feel of Postmodernism, it is still characteristically difficult, even if it deploys that difficulty in different ways. In fact, Helmling claims convincingly that, once again, we have to read the difficulties as part and parcel of the writing of the criticism itself. So whereas in the early works the dialectic of ideology and utopia loomed large through a scriptible that retained hope, however faint, of redemption, in Postmodernism the possibility of this redemption has gradually faded, even though it is more or less explicitly a theme of the closing sections of both the famous essay and the book’s huge conclusion. This situation is foregrounded by the problem of textual determinism, by which is meant the power of theoretical models to become so compellingly total as to bludgeon the reader into a submission from which no resistance can emanate. In Jameson’s elegant formulation,

     

    it is certain that there is a strange quasi-Sartrean irony–a “winner loses” logic–which tends to surround any effort to describe a “system,” a totalizing dynamic, as these are detected in the movement of contemporary society. What happens is that the more powerful the vision of some increasingly total system or logic–the Foucault of the prisons book is the obvious example–the more powerless the reader comes to feel. Insofar as the theorist wins, therefore, by constructing an increasingly closed and terrifying machine, to that very degree he loses, since the critical capacity of his work is thereby paralyzed, and the impulses of negation and revolt, not to speak of those of social transformation, are increasingly perceived as vain and trivial in the face of the model itself. (Postmodernism 5-6)

     

    The very status of totalizing dialectical thought is plagued by anxieties of a slightly different kind from the ones that haunt the dialectic of ideology and utopia. But it is also possible to read this passage as a moment of searing candor in which we see the doubts Jameson has about the sorts of theoretical models he himself constructs. For there is a take-it-or-leave-it terseness about some of Jameson’s early theorizing (not that he would see it that way: for Jameson, one can only “leave” dialectical problems at the cost of rediscovering them later), particularly in that unconvincingly worded moment when he argues that the pleasure of (Adorno’s) dialectical thought is “not . . . a question of taste, any more than the validity of dialectical thinking is a question of opinion; but it is also true that there can be no reply to anyone choosing to discuss the matter in those terms” (Marxism and Form xiii-iv). In light of this, the hesitation in the essay on postmodernism can be read as a revealing moment of equivocation.

     

    As Helmling realizes, this theoretical impasse becomes extraordinarily tense, even as its working-out provokes ever more supercharged Jamesonian writing. By the time “The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism” is assembled, an important change has occurred, however, in which fairly suddenly the problems have been found to be figurable in a way that leaves some space for the theorist to enjoy himself. This moment of ease is, I should hasten to add, comparative; the book on Postmodernism is still a challenging read, but some of it is a good deal less difficult than the contemporaneous Late Marxism, Jameson’s book-length study of Adorno. Some passages in Postmodernism even present a level of private reflection that Jameson has, with career-long discipline, normally eschewed–notably his comments on his friend and former Yale colleague Paul de Man, but also his remark that he writes as “a relatively enthusiastic consumer of postmodernism, at least of some parts of it” (298).

     

    Helmling reads this momentary relaxation as a corollary of Jameson’s discovery of the notion of the sublime as a suitable representative/unrepresentable figure for postmodernism. At a time when the possibility of critique is seemingly problematized as never before–not just because of the abolition of critical distance, but also because of the hesitancy over totalizing theoretical models–Jameson turns to the very dynamics of representation itself to dramatize the dilemmas posed by the transition into what he calls full postmodernism (Helmling 107-10). As the sublime is re-motivated as the unfigurable networks of global capitalism, the resultant conspiracy-theory-like schizophrenia (in its poststructural sense) marries off our dread and foreboding with a most unlikely Jamesonian idea: relief. As he himself writes, “I think we now have to talk about the relief of the postmodern generally, a thunderous unblocking of logjams and a release of new productivity that was somehow tensed up and frozen, locked like cramped muscles, at the latter end of the modern period” (Postmodernism 313). Quite apart from this description, conspicuous enough in its use of the word relief to characterize a period of ever more systemic capitalism, postmodernism becomes ever more difficult to figure because it completes the movement of modern theory away from meaning (Helmling 115-6).2 Indeed, using the sublime as a way of theorizing the postmodern actually reinscribes one of Jameson’s earlier problems, namely, how to interpret the unrepresentable (Helmling 118). Failure again of a familiar sort, then, but one that points back toward The Political Unconscious, with its Althusserian placement of history in some realm beyond knowledge–with all the Lacanian and Kantian resonance of the ultimately unknowable. As Helmling argues, the great metaphysical spin-offs of these concerns seem all the more meaningless in a world that is so outwardly unconcerned with sublimity; to quote one of his purpler patches once again,

     

    this globally oppressive atmosphere of muzak and of bar-codes, of transnational designer logos as legible “fashion statement” or willing self-commodification, of smiley-faces and franchiser’s manual courtesies, where shopping is the only leisure activity there is, and for increasingly large numbers of people, the only leisure activity they are “good at”–how to make the narcosis of such a commodity-scape interesting at all, let alone juice it up with the excitements of “the sublime”? . . . Alas, “boredom” and “waning of affect” seem rubrics all too adequate to the postmodern vécu. (116-17)

     

    If this historicizes Jameson’s sublime, then the sheer unlikeliness of the sublime’s use only makes Jameson’s deployment of it that much more devastating; and it is in this highly distinctive embrace of the motif of the sublime, however brief, that some of the postmodernism essay’s longevity is surely founded.

     

    One other way that the sublime might be invoked in a discussion of Jameson’s style, however, is from the standpoint of the reader (Helmling 122). The totalizing dynamics of dialectical thought continually shift us to ever-widening horizons;

     

    the moments are quite frequent in Jameson when the reader can feel engulfed by the threatened onset of an ideational congestion, a cerebral meltdown or synaptic overload, a sense of argumentative threads and suggestions, themes and variations, multiplying beyond any hope of keeping track of them, an intellectual levitation at once exhilarating and daunting, illuminating and befuddling. (Helmling 122)

     

     

    Difficulty remains, as do the dialectical shocks, and it might be revealing to juxtapose the persistence of this difficulty with a couple of remarks made by Jameson in his 1982 Diacriticsinterview. When Leonard Green notes that “one feels at times to be pushing against an almost encyclopaedic accumulation of knowledge in your work,” Jameson replies:

     

    I’m in a poor position to judge the difficulty of my own work or to defend its stylistic qualities, particularly since with more time and work no doubt even the most complicated thoughts might have been made more accessible. If one defends difficulty a priori (as I have allowed myself to do occasionally), this can be taken as an ominous pretext for all kinds of self-indulgence. But in a general way (and leaving myself out of it), it is always surprising how many people in other disciplines still take a relatively belle-lettristic view of the problems of culture and make the assumption, which they would never make in the area of nuclear physics, linguistics, symbolic logic, or urbanism, that such problems can still be laid out with all the leisurely elegance of a coffee-table magazine (which is not to be taken as a slur on high-class journalism, of which we have little enough as it is). But the problems of cultural theory–which address the relationship between, let’s say, consciousness and representation, the unconscious, narrative, the social matrix, symbolic syntax and symbolic capital–why should there be any reason to feel that these problems are less complex than those of bio-chemistry? (Green, Culler, and Klein 87-8)

     

    Jameson himself appears to speak of difficulty here in the accessible rhetoric of the higher journalism. And yet, it is notable that even in this comparatively simple reply we may discern a whole nest of assertions and counterclaims: one begins to wonder on what level difficulty is to be shunned in favor of clarity; or whether the latter must always be regarded as too naïvely utopian, too easily programmed to the logic of the sublime system of late capitalism.

     

    Helmling has an answer for this and several related questions, but it is one that is more provocative than the rest of his study, and it latches onto the change in the assessment of theory’s creativity with which I began this discussion of Jameson’s style. For there is in Helmling’s view a further change in Jameson’s style after Postmodernism. In essays such as “The Existence of Italy” (Signatures of the Visible 155-229), “The Antinomies of Postmodernity” (The Seeds of Time 1-71), and particularly the powerful “‘End of Art’ or ‘End of History’?” (The Cultural Turn 73-92), the largely Hegelian-Marxist concerns of the earlier work return in all their glory, branded anew, or so the postmodernist might imagine. It will be clear that this return is nothing more than a resurfacing of career-long concerns, and that even “The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism” never constituted a very sharp departure, much less any sort of repudiation. All the same, there does seem to be a marked change of emphasis in the work of the 1990s, from Late Marxism onward. Specifically, Helmling explains this as a return “to the supposedly retro interests (Hegelian, Marxist, phenomenological) that Postmodernism had seemed to downplay or eschew” (138). But there is something else that has dropped out of Jameson’s writing, in Helmling’s opinion–something that has once again freed Jameson’s criticism from its earlier tragic accents: namely,

     

    the inexorable “winner loses” logic of “inevitable failure” that Jameson in The Political Unconscious posited as the necessary condition, the specific “vision” incumbent upon “dialectical historiography” as such. (142)

     

    What has gradually become less and less visible has been the Adornian constraints that seemed to charge critical writing with a necessary failure. Instead of this deadlock, Jameson has been able to substitute a

     

    discussion able to proceed with evident confidence in the programs it proposes for itself, the ambitions it entertains, the desires it hopes to realize, operating in the process a renewal of the genuine utopian potential of “the sublime” and of sundry other critical projects or “desires”–including not least that generic hybrid, or hubristic genre, where critique aspires to sublimity, in “theory” itself. (142-3)

     

    Later on it becomes clear just how important this rapprochement with theory is:

     

    It is customary these days to deplore criticism’s vainglorious usurpation of the privileges properly attaching to “literature,” but, our well-advertised “information glut” notwithstanding, just what “literature” is there, these days, for people like us to read? . . . for me it is a simple statement of fact that “the way we live now”–or at least the way some of us read and (try to) write now–becomes actually exciting almost nowhere else than in the writing of a very few highrolling superstar professors. . . . for a few centuries now our culture has produced a minority audience that hungers to see the challenges of its own time written about in relevantly challenging ways. The greats of the past are still great, but they are not our greats. Nor is there any question of Derrida being “as great” as Joyce, or Goethe or whomever; it is rather that the sort of intellectually ambitious reader who sought out Joyce or Goethe in their day is the sort of reader who today will find the challenges of Derrida or Jameson more demanding, the difficulties more difficult in pertinently “contemporary” ways, the rewards proportionally more complicatedly satisfying, than those of Don DeLillo, Toni Morrison, or–who you will. (Saul Bellow?) (147-8)

     

    I have here indulged Helmling’s own indulgence (as he himself describes it [148]), partly because it is moving and revealing on its own terms, but also because it poses interesting questions about (and of) criticism and theory. It is quite obvious when reading The Success and Failure of Fredric Jameson that Helmling must surely have intended to finish at this point: the ending of the “Jameson Post-Postmodernism” chapter is saturated with closural elegance, winding up his lucid study with a slightly more personal assessment of Jameson’s writing than at any other place in the book. But as Helmling admits in his coda–“Beyond Success and Failure”–his closing of the book was continually problematized by Jameson’s continuing productivity. It says much for Helmling’s ideas that they can so easily be tweaked to accommodate Jameson’s recent study Brecht and Method, which exhibits a style somewhat different from that of most of the rest of his oeuvre. But the coda nevertheless sits rather uncomfortably next to the grand claims quoted above, and it is to these–to theory’s hubris–that I shall now turn.

     

    Helmling’s Failure?

     

    A study, then, that begins by remarking that the “American cultural system affords its intellectuals no eminence of prestige and controversy comparable to that of Derrida in France, or Habermas in Germany” ends up by elevating Fredric Jameson to this premier status, albeit–thankfully?–without igniting any real controversy along the way (1). In doing this Steven Helmling has produced a major piece of interpretative literature on one of the foremost intellectuals of our time, and even those who mock and mimic the verbal contortions of contemporary literary criticism would admit that this study employs such a language with no little style of its own. For that we can all be more or less grateful; but in broader terms the study, pleasurable and successful as it is, seems to want to be included within the ambit of its own concerns: in Helmling’s terms, it is as if his own scriptible text is a peculiarly reflexive one, much as he judges Jameson’s achievements by the very terms on which Jameson conducts his work and writes his texts. And with this concern we are propelled onto perhaps an inevitable but also one of the most pressing terrains of all, at least for Marxist intellectuals: the tortuous relations between theory and practice.

     

    The problems revolve primarily around Helmling’s conclusion. Here, it will be recalled, Jameson is seen as offering the type of difficult experience that it was formerly the business of the greatest writers to provide. This argument–that the difficult theory that swept over the Anglo-American world in the 1970s and 80s is the place to which “high” artistic creativity ultimately migrated–is certainly not implausible. Indeed, in “‘End of Art’ or ‘End of History’?” it is deployed by Jameson himself. But while I do not wish to dismiss the argument, it seems to me that in the very way he presents it Helmling invites strong challenge. And there are, I believe, some respects in which defending difficult theory on the grounds of its aesthetic creativity may ultimately be incompatible with the aims of a truly radical criticism.

     

    There would seem to be at least four lines of challenge, all of them certainly interrelated, but each with slightly different emphases and concerns. First of all, one might challenge the sheer self-serving hubris of such a position. It must be reassuring to learn that one is working on the deepest thinkers of the age; and since, as a salaried academic, one is paid to teach and explicate this great material, one’s own validation of it becomes implicitly a validation of one’s own admittedly subordinate status. Of course, we all need to convince ourselves in various ways that what we are doing is worthwhile and constructive; but when working on someone like Jameson, few people, perhaps nobody at all (Perry Anderson excepted), would reckon themselves able to evaluate the claim that he is one of the great writers of our age, so an element of circularity creeps into the position of the critic who is simultaneously one of the few people to designate him as worthy of study and one of the few people actually qualified to study him. But this is only one cynical view of a much bigger problem, which is a return of all sorts of issues that tend to get designated as modernist rather than postmodernist. The elevation of Jameson’s difficulty, something that feeds the needs of the eminent intellectuals of our age, seems to ensure that he remains a minority pursuit, not least because if we follow Helmling, then to sweep away the difficulty in Jameson would be to miss the point and merely fall victim to the various paradigms of clarity or thematization that Jameson’s prose intransigently sets itself against. To caricature the situation (but certainly not Helmling’s own position), it is my dialectical brilliance versus your reified ignorance; that is why I see this stuff as wonderful dialectical prose, whereas you find it turgid nonsense. And since I have already realized that this writing is the most profound intellectual challenge of the age, what does that say about you?

     

    These are not new intellectual issues and I raise them not because one must accept them as the final word on the value of theory, but merely because they seem to cause ripples in all sorts of unexpected places. The sort of status that Helmling wants to accord to Jameson seems to be the very plausible accolade of being a great thinker. But since the Jamesonian text sets itself so resolutely against any form of mass consumption, to recognize that he is a great thinker seems to elevate him to the position of the academic high-priest who alone can see clearly to the contradictions of the age. Seeing as we are ultimately dealing with a seminal theorist of postmodernism, that sticks in the throat somewhat: has so little changed? Or is the position of the theorist one of the remaining vestiges of modernism in the new era of the postmodern? What would a postmodernist theory of postmodernism look like?3 (The question is surely valid, because earlier on it seemed as if Jameson’s “The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism” was not just a theory but also an exemplar; clearly this now seems more questionable.)

     

    To say this, however, is to garnish a modernist position with a healthy dollop of avant-garde problematics: would mass dissemination of Jameson risk its status? But mass dissemination is as good as impossible (unless dialectical thinking suddenly stages an unexpected resurgence in its popularity), since if it happened, one would simply claim that the theory had been commodified, thematized, separated from the way in which it is expressed, and so on. Theory quite clearly does not risk that sort of popularity, but it does risk the relative popularity of a wide dissemination within the academy. So do we simply see here a recapitulation of the problems of certain anti-institutional movements, whose success rests on their very failure and obscurity, rather than canonization and elevation to the status of institutional doctrine? Perhaps the one thing that could really dent the radical edge of Jameson’s theory would be the type of academic hysteria that has attached itself to figures such as Derrida–and this is presumably why there has been so much righteous anger from the left that the revolutionary aspects and indeed foundations of much of Derrida’s own work were quietly removed in the course of its American reception and translation (Eagleton 52-3). Seen in this way, the notion of scriptible serves its masters well, since it ensures a transferral of difficulty and close dialectical reading to one’s own criticism (for which few have time or patience), while at the same time designating it as the master key to Jameson’s work.

     

    So at length we arrive at the inevitable question: what has this theory achieved? What might it achieve? The pragmatic argument, addressed by Helmling, might “blow the whistle” on the whole affair and simply see it as melodrama, because Jameson has enjoyed institutional privilege in a distinguished academic career (125). This, as Helmling notes, can be easily answered as a far too simple acquiescence in “the reifications of a system that, in other precincts of its operation, daily inflicts, on a mass scale, violences for which Prometheus’s torment is if anything too soothing a figure” (125). But this answer is as unsatisfactory as it is compelling: we simply arrive at notions of reification and false consciousness that are always, for a rather vulgar Marxism, going to win the argument, since not to realize this is to fall victim to the problems they solve. In other words, we have clambered, I hope dialectically, onto the untranscendable horizon of Marxist theory itself, which will not go away no matter how familiar or tediously inevitable it seems. Difficulty runs through this field as surely as blood pumps through our veins: “difficult texts, difficult issues, difficult problems, a (very) difficult history, difficult political conditions, difficult rhetorical burdens–a dauntingly overdetermined multiplicity of ways, in short, in which Marxist critique might succeed or fail” (Helmling 3). Most pressing of these is surely the brutal question of what theory can do to change the world: some would argue, simplistically but not ineffectively, that if Jameson’s work has peered into and theorized the darkest corners of our contemporary cultural experiences, it might yet be time–for the acolytes, at least–to put down the pen and make the move from thinking about the world to actually altering it.

     

    Who could doubt that this is difficult and depressing? Like any revolutionary, Jameson utilizes the system he is opposing in order to defeat it (or at least to critique it); but when that system has triumphed so conclusively, when it can afford eminence even to those who are, basically, plotting its downfall, one is entitled to ask whether any of their efforts could be called successes. The bleakest alternative is the horrible thought that perhaps Jameson’s work has already been defused of its radical dynamite, softened and subsumed by the very system it has theorized so cogently. Yes, of course Jameson succeeds in the tortuous dialectical ways that Helmling says he does; but these successes seem to be undercut by the greater failure of Western Marxism. In the end, one cannot help but wonder whether this failure might not derive from the profound lack of accordance between academic theory and lived experience in the contemporary West, and whether the speculative daydreams of theory, institutionally viable though they undoubtedly still are, might be rather more proximate to our problems than to their solutions. To entertain such dismal questions is to confront a failure that is Jameson’s but, of course, not only his. As for “success”–whether institutional, theoretical, aesthetic, or otherwise–to speak undialectically of that would be sheer delusion, the mark of a failure altogether more serious than that of the scriptible.

     

    Notes

     

    1. The principal texts are those by Homer, Anderson, Burnham, and Roberts.

     

    2. The “contradiction” here is obviously the ideological effect of the postmodern: the theory both encapsulates and describes the predicament, a choice raised by Jameson himself in the book’s preface (Postmodernism x).

     

    3. Clint Burnham’s study, The Jamesonian Unconscious, might well be taken as an answer to this question.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Anderson, Perry. The Origins of Postmodernity. London: Verso, 1998.
    • Barthes, Roland. S/Z. Trans. Richard Miller. Farrar: New York, 1974.
    • Burnham, Clint. The Jamesonian Unconscious: The Aesthetics of Marxist Theory. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1995.
    • Eagleton, Terry. “Fredric Jameson: The Politics of Style.” Against the Grain. London: Verso, 1986. 65-78.
    • Green, Leonard, Jonathan Culler, and Richard Klein. Untitled interview with Fredric Jameson. Diacritics 12:3 (1982): 72-91.
    • Homer, Sean. Fredric Jameson: Marxism, Hermeneutics, Postmodernism. Cambridge: Polity, 1998.
    • Jameson, Fredric. The Cultural Turn. London: Verso, 1998.
    • —. “Globalization and Political Strategy.” New Left Review 4 (2000): 49-68.
    • —. “The Ideology of the Text.” The Ideologies of Theory. London: Routledge, 1988. 17-71.
    • —. Marxism and Form. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1971.
    • —. “The Politics of Utopia.” New Left Review 25 (2004): 35-54.
    • —. Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. London: Verso, 1991.
    • —. The Seeds of Time. New York: Columbia UP, 1994.
    • —. Signatures of the Visible. London: Routledge, 1992.
    • —. A Singular Modernity. London: Verso, 2002.
    • Roberts, Adam. Fredric Jameson. London: Routledge, 2000.

     

  • Identity Poetics? or, The Norton Anthology of Modern and Contemporary Poetry

    V. Nicholas LoLordo

    Department of English
    University of Nevada at Las Vegas
    lolordov@unlv.nevada.edu

     

    Review of: Ramazani, Jahan, Richard Ellmann, and Robert O’Clair, eds. The Norton Anthology of Modern and Contemporary Poetry.3rd ed. New York: Norton, 2003.

     

     

    Authors are the sentimental background of literature.

     

    –Laura (Riding) Jackson

     

    poets are retreating into–or is it out of?–academia, beset by the
    usual pit-bulls and well-meaning little old ladies in tennis shoes. And discovering
    and assimilating new bastions of indifference and comprehension. What else?
    That was some storm we had last week. The webs intersect at certain points where baubles
    are glued to them; readers think this is nice. What else? Oh, stop badgering–
    where were you in the fifties?

     

    –John Ashbery, Flow Chart

     

    Ten years ago, in his long poem Flow Chart, John Ashbery surveyed the literary landscape with a mild surmise: so much for the poetry wars. Yet the critic can hardly afford to greet missionary zeal with this melancholy bemusement. The position of the academic anthologizer is still more difficult. It has long since become common knowledge that the “anthology wars” (marked by the appearance of Donald Allen’s 1960 anthology The New American Poetry and Hall, Pack, and Simpson’s New Poets of England and America) divided American poetry into two armed camps. (A recent update on this tradition of conflict is provided by Marjorie Perloff’s “Whose New American Poetry?: Anthologizing in the 1990s.”) John Guillory’s work on canon formation assumes the university literature department to be the institutional locus of canonization, but to my mind such a claim becomes increasingly untenable in the post-WWII U.S. poetry scene, where the aforementioned anthologies, among others, testify to the co-presence of academic canons and anti-academic poets’ canons, a pairing best seen in the context of various related sets of polemic adversaries from the recent literary past: Beat vs. academic, raw vs. cooked, margin vs. mainstream, and so on.1 Given this history, a basic problem remains for any teaching anthology published in 2003 that seeks to encompass the past century’s poetry: on the one hand, its own institutional frame is academic; on the other, it must acknowledge contemporary poetry’s foundational narrative of division, this blesséd or curséd break, seeking to contain (in both senses of the word?) both sides within its bipartisan pages. Jahan Ramazani seems to meet the challenge head on: he opens the second volume of the new Norton Anthology of Modern and Contemporary Poetry with substantial selections from Elizabeth Bishop and Charles Olson, a pairing straight from central casting. Olson’s harpoon, Bishop’s bit of ivory: the lady, in the role of minimus, gets more pages.

     

    A prefatory observation: in what follows, I’ve chosen to neglect the question of cuts. Even a not entirely cynical critic might believe, with Marianne Moore, that “omissions are no accident,” while noting that they are also invisible to theory: the experience of classroom teachers is always invoked to explain them. We are more forthright about discovering neglected poetry of value than about discovering that what we once thought valuable no longer seems as necessary. The relative number of poets from Canada and Great Britain has dropped considerably in the latest Norton. (Writing, for this moment, as a Canadian, I note that Earl Birney, A.M. Klein, Irving Layton and Al Purdy have been expunged; P.K. Page, Margaret Atwood, and Michael Ondaatje remain; Anne Carson has been added.) This particular set of cuts might suggest that gender was an important factor; but other decisions I find arguable obey different logics. To name only one: Ramazani is unwilling to remove even relatively minor poets associated with the New Criticism or with the Movement–to name a few: Ransom, Tate, Winters, Penn Warren, Delmore Schwartz, Davie, Amis–poets peripheral to the revival of modernist studies in whom I can hardly think my own generation of university teachers is heavily invested.

     

    This newly revised Norton appears at a moment when “mainstream” poetry is marked by a bewildering heterogeneity, while questions of eclecticism, pluralism, rapprochement have been the subject of much debate at the “margins.” The entry of a number of writers identified with “Language-centered writing”–Lyn Hejinian, Bob Perelman, Barrett Watten, Charles Bernstein–into academic positions has been taken to mark the end of the movement as a cohesive avant-garde, yet in this “post-language” moment an oppositional understanding of the poetic field remains possible, as is indicated by, for example, the recent volume published by the University of Alabama Press, Telling it Slant: Avant-Garde Poetics of the 90s, which collects critical and polemical work by writers very few of whom at date of publication had a volume of poetry in print from an established press. (I note two exceptions, Elizabeth Willis and Juliana Spahr. The original publication dates of these pieces span the era between the 2nd and 3rd editions of the Norton, 1988-2002.) And these oppositional understandings–those associated with, to list the most commonly used terms, radical innovative, experimental, or avant-garde practice–typically seek to legitimate themselves through readings of modernist tradition.

     

    But such binaries can seem increasingly quaint, relics of the Poetry Wars–a battle that, as Jed Rasula has observed, anthologizers continued to reenact, as if in period dress, into the 1990s. The new Norton gives U.S. Eliot’s modernism carried on by Tate, Schwartz, and Lowell side by side with the modernism of Stein carried on by Zukofsky, Bernstein, and Hejinian; whether we speak of the modernisms of metaphor and of metonymy or of Symbolism and Objectivism, it would appear that both sides are fairly accounted for. Indeed, the book’s treatment of modernism registers as one of its most significant corrections. Added to the first volume of this new edition are Mina Loy, Charles Reznikoff, Laura (Riding) Jackson, Lorine Niedecker, Louis Zukofsky, George Oppen; the acknowledgment of experimental modernist registers–along with English-language modernist writing outside of the U.S., Britain, and Ireland–constitutes the revision’s primary accomplishment. But what is the position of this text, within the poetic field I’ve roughly sketched out? To whom does it speak?

     

    Here, I will argue, the book’s selection of contemporary poets is of particular significance. For literary academics, the brand “Norton” and canonicity are synonymous; each published sigh or murmur of dissent, it might be argued, only confirms this status. Oxford’s recent set of anthologies of modern poetry (Cary Nelson’s American and Keith Tuma’s British and Irish) lays claim to much the same terrain, but the new Norton attempts to cover the entirety of English-language poetry since modernism. This should be seen in the context of Anglo-American modernism’s decline as a category–Norton both occupies this declining place and revises it. Another apparently fading category, at least within discussions of poetry and poetics, is instanced by a volume now almost ten years old, Paul Hoover’s Postmodern American Poetry: A Norton Anthology. Note the properly postmodern indefinite article, which attempts to finesse the awkward fact that there is only one Norton anthology of such poetry! “From the modernism you want,” observed David Antin in a remark often quoted, “you get the postmodernism you deserve”; but the implicit abandonment of the latter concept by the Norton suggests that such teleological claims about literary history have been shelved: from a still-ideologically charged “modern,” we move to a neutral “contemporary.”

     

    Which is not to say the anthology tries to be apolitical. The Norton now for the first time registers a meeting between postcolonial studies and twentieth-century poetry. Its first edition represented poetry from the U.S., Britain, Ireland, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand; to the work of Derek Walcott in the 2nd edition, the 3rd edition adds poems of other English-language poets–African, Indian, and Caribbean (ten in all). In his preface, attached to both volumes, Ramazani summarizes the anthology’s mission: to present “an international vision of modern and contemporary poetry in English …. many key poets of the 20th century led migratory lives …. Like these transnational lives, literary influence has … continually crossed national boundaries, so that much modern poetry is transatlantic, and much contemporary poetry is in its bearings global.” A qualification follows: “Not that this anthology aims to give equal representation to every anglophone nation. Produced in the United States, its center of gravity is American” (1, xxviii).

     

    This last phrase is intriguing. Certainly, the book’s literary-historical imagination–as in the Bishop/Olson juxtaposition–tends to work with the myths of American poetry. But my concern is with the rhetoric of “representation.” For Ramazani’s disavowal of “equal representation” is puzzling. What would be the internationalist political source of this reference to every anglophone nation; in what geopolitical terms are all anglophone nations commensurate? The very strangeness of this denial of equal representation calls attention to a politics of comparative representation characteristically invoked not in international, but in American contexts. In other words, the metaphor calls up the paradigm we know as identity politics–a particularly American paradigm. I want to suggest that the 3rd Norton is in this sense doubly American-centered; if its selection is consciously weighted in favor of poets from the U. S., at the same time contemporary “American values” govern the anthology as a whole. (Nationality is after all a predicate of poets as subjects before it develops the complexly nuanced meaning that issues in a term like “American poetry.”) In its treatment of recent poetry, the new Norton embodies a particular version of academic leftism: identity politics, a doctrine, as Guillory has argued, itself related to the tradition of American pluralism. The anthology’s place of origin and intended market, the North American university, governs not merely the numbers of poets, but the very language of representation underlying anthologization.

     

    On one level this is hardly surprising: any overtly academic anthology will necessarily be governed by the representational logic of the academy. But if the dominant logic of the academy is pluralism, how do the pluralistic predicates of social identity interlock with poetic values? Poets exist for the anthology as subjects marked by the predicates of identity before they exist as the embodiment of any particular poetics. While the new Norton borrows a strategy from Allen’s anthology, that of including “poetics statements,” none of the younger American poets on whom I’ll be focusing have such statements included.

     

    Ramazani’s account of the priorities that motivated changes made in the current Norton reinforces this logic of identity. Three priorities are particularly relevant to my concerns: First, to “represent the accelerated globalization of English-language poetry in the second half of the twentieth century, particularly in the work of postcolonial poets who creatively hybridize indigenous traditions with British and American influences”; second, to “welcome into the anthology what John Ashbery has called an ‘other tradition’–experimental poetry by modern avant-garde writers…extending to the contemporary avant-garde”; third, “to present various modern and contemporary poets who have only recently emerged into prominence” (xxix). Different notions of anthologizing agency are in play here: the Norton, accurately if perhaps inexplicitly, portrays itself as both judging and validating or reproducing received judgments. To “represent” postwar postcolonial poets acknowledges their having been present within anglophone poetry as an ongoing process of creative hybridization; the “welcome” extended to avant-garde poetry, somewhat differently, would seem to bring it into the fold while still preserving its separate status, apart from the polity of modern and contemporary poetry within or alongside which it exists; finally, the inclusion of “recently emerged” modern and contemporary poets indicates that the anthology sees itself as recognizing preexisting judgments–judgments, of course, which its own acknowledgment will considerably, at least for a time, solidify.

     

    The Norton’s “emergent” poets have themselves been sorted into groups, and the criteria of their emergence prove to be primarily criteria of identity: “poets of the Harlem Renaissance and African American modernism,” “female modern poets…and their contemporary counterparts,” “poets of ethnic American minorities,” “poets of Ireland and Northern Ireland,” “poets of gay experience,” “poets influenced by European surrealism and East Asian literature,” “an influential poet of World War I,” and “an eminent Australian” (xxix). In such descriptions, identity and subject matter generally seem to coincide. But one should notice a crucial and neglected asymmetry. Poets who wrote at an earlier historical moment do not “emerge” as contemporary poets do, having been positioned within the literary field of their own moment; rather, revisions to literary history allow them to come into focus. The conditions of reception under which any poet will be seen to “emerge” are specifically contemporary ones, but the conditions that make available both contemporary and historical poets as the subjects of such a process vary. The poets of the Harlem Renaissance and of African-American modernism (and of which, one might ask, was Jean Toomer?) are, after all, African-American poets–and might thus be included within the set of “poets of ethnic American minorities.” Such a separation of terms here acknowledges, without examination, the fact that “modernism” and the “Harlem Renaissance” are complex signifiers, dense with sedimented aesthetic history. The notion of “ethnic American minorities,” by contrast, implying as it does a certain commensurability, evokes the discourse by which races are compared–the discourse of racism. This of course is not to accuse the anthology of any such attitudes, but to notice that category of minority identity is organized around the experience of oppression (one aspect of which, of course, might be under-representation at the level of canonical textbooks).

     

    One must, then, derive the poetics of identity inductively from the examples at hand. Just as the anthology’s national breakdown does not aspire to equality, its breakdown of American identities does not seek to “represent” the current demographic diversity of the United States, or even of those Americans who write poetry; rather, the overall image of the canon is adjusted in the direction of contemporary values, and the nature of these values will be most clearly visible in the selection of new poets. As the conditions of canonicity change, they interlock with the (limited) availability of historical writers who embody these changing values. A list of the American poets under 50 included in the new Norton may suffice to suggest that we remain in this historical moment. These names are given in order of appearance in the second volume; I have appended to each name bracketed descriptions in the language of the anthology:

     

    • Charles Bernstein [born “in New York City, his father the head of a dressmaking company”]
    • Carolyn Forché [born “in Detroit, Michigan”]
    • Jorie Graham [born “in New York, to an Irish American father and a Jewish American mother”]
    • Joy Harjo [of “Muskogee Creek Heritage”]
    • Gary Soto [a “Chicano writer”]
    • Rita Dove [“African American”]
    • Alberto Rios [a “Chicano poet”]
    • Mark Doty [ born “in Maryville, Tennessee,” he “works in the tradition of American autobiographical poetry”]
    • Thylias Moss [“African American”]
    • Louise Erdrich [“French Ojibwa” mother and “German-born father”]
    • Lorna Dee Cervantes [“Chicano/a,” “of Mexican and Native American ancestry”]
    • Marilyn Chin [quoted: “I am a Chinese American poet”]
    • Cathy Song [“born … in Honolulu, Hawaii to a Chinese American mother and a Korean American father”]
    • Dionisio Martinez [born “in Cuba … he grew up in Glendale, California”]
    • Henri Cole [“Beset with contradictions between his homosexuality and his Catholicism”]
    • Li-Young Lee [born “to Chinese parents in Jakarta, Indonesia, [he] is one of the preeminent poets of the East Asian diaspora in the United States”]
    • Sherman Alexie [“A ‘registered’ (in the bureaucratic jargon) Spokane/Coeur d’Alene Indian, Alexie is a master of the trickster aesthetic”]

     

    Insofar as individual poets, rather than poems, are selected for anthologizing, they become to a degree commensurate: one may be tempted to count them. (No prominent teaching anthology has yet decentered the poet.) Nevertheless, a list like the one I’ve just presented can hardly be produced, let alone discussed, without a certain awkwardness.2 What stands out here, I hope, is not any sense that I’ve quoted insidiously, but rather the sheer variety of formulations that may be subsumed under the category of “social identity.” Any such collection of poets can only be seen as a marvelous example of diversity–yet the particular version of diversity as instantiated by the Norton deserves closer examination. The cited phrases that follow each name are meant to suggest the variety of national, racial, ethnic, class, and gender identities explicitly or implicitly predicated to the poet as subject. I cite language about every poet, language which may or may not suggest their affiliation with a “marked” identity. I do not introduce what seemed more interpretive comments: that Carolyn Forché writes a poetry “of psychological and sexual experience” (915), for example. If we attempt to reduce this bewildering complexity of identities to the question of marked and unmarked identities, among these seventeen American poets the “unmarked” identity of the white male is conspicuous by its relative absence–Doty, Cole, and Bernstein. And the former two of these poets are marked as interpreters of gay experience (Cole in the cited note, Doty in his authorship of the powerful “Homo Will Not Inherit.”) But Bernstein is not only the one straight white male among these poets; he is also the only experimentalist–the only one of these poets who, given the “two traditions” symbolically represented by the juxtaposition of Bishop and Olson, would be taken by critics generally to stand in the latter line (and the only one of these contemporaries whose “poetics statement” is included in the anthology).

     

    The Norton, I would argue, gives its presumptive audience an alternative perspective on its own selection of recent poetry, as when Ramazani summarizes Bernstein’s stance: “Despite its pretense of diversity, ‘mainstream poetry’ assumes a restrictive norm in which a single voice expresses personal feeling” (909). In this sense the Norton, in however limited a sense, does attempt what Gerald Graff has referred to as “teaching the conflicts.” Given this opportunity, I’ll now take advantage of Ramazani’s (pluralist) generosity of spirit by introducing the wedge of a still more pointed quotation, from Bernstein’s “States of the Art,” the first essay in A Poetics: “Too often, the works selected to represent cultural diversity are those that accept the model of representation assumed by the dominant culture in the first place…I see my yiddishe mama on Hester street / Next to all the pushcarts I can no longer peddle” (6). The word “representation” marks the spot where political and anthological discourses coincide.

     

    This is not to say that Ramazani sees himself as engaged in an aesthetics of partisan representation. Ramazani introduces the question of identity very differently in different contexts; moreover, the anthology’s headnotes are consistently concerned to assert that no single social identity can exhaust poetic motivation. Thus Gary Soto “both emerged from this cultural moment [Chicano nationalism] and felt distinct from it” (969); Rita Dove “wants less to separate the African American aesthetic from other cultural traditions than to offer a synthesis” (975); Li-Young Lee’s work “bears the imprint of his Chinese background [but] it should not be exoticized” (1040); Thylias Moss “says she avoids ‘imposing certain agendas’ on her poems, such as those of ‘identity’ politics” (999). These, of course, are admirable cautions–but, in the context of the anthology, a remark such as Moss’s is perhaps deceptive, insofar as it misidentifies its own adversary. To what extent might identity politics be primarily an “agenda,” imposed upon the poem with presumably crushing effect? At the most literal level, one might think of a poem that plays with precisely that question, Amiri Baraka’s “SOS,” which I’ll quote in full:

     

    Calling black people
    Calling all black people, man woman child
    Wherever you are, calling you, urgent, come in
    Black People, come in, wherever you are, urgent, calling
    you, calling all black people
    calling all black people, come in, black people, come
    on in. (Reader 218)

     

    Baraka’s lyric seeks to call black subjects into existence–more precisely, to hail “Black” subjects, in the specific Black Arts racial-nationalist sense of that designation. This brotherly hailing is itself a complex process; its double address is attested to by a palpable shift, emphasized by the final line-break, from the abstract, neutral repetitions of “come in” to the spoken–even ideolectal, I’d suggest, potentially Black–invitation: “come on in.” The poem’s very purpose, its insistence on its own status as performance (its own awareness, one might say, of the difference between address and apostrophe) poses a dilemma: can Baraka call directly and efficaciously to “all black people,” thus transcending the mediation not just of the white world but of the “poetry world”?

     

    Such questions adamantly resist a formalist reading, pointing us back out into the world of publishers, audience, and ever-widening circles of context where the effect of a poem as such an action might conceivably be measured. But such poems are rare. Insofar as Ramazani chooses not to anthologize them–works that in a real sense reject the reader who cannot respond to such an address–he is consistent with the stance implied by Thylias Moss’s words. But in so doing he does not reject the discourse of identity politics: far from it. In the realm of poetry, identity politics is more usefully conceived of as an agenda whose effects are visible at the level of canon formation. In this sense, what individual poets think about identity politics doesn’t matter: the selection of contemporary poetry as a whole issues out of liberal pluralism, the scheme of representation by which our society negotiates the relations between competing identities. Ramazani’s own editorial remark is particularly revealing: he suggests that the “neoconfessional mode that seems to have lost much of its force for Anglo-American poets has been renewed and adapted by poets such as [Li-Young] Lee, Alberto Ríos, and Joy Harjo, who write poems that straddle the introspection of confessional poetry and the communal reach of ‘identity poetry’ ” (2, lxvii). Of course, one can find enormous numbers of American poets who still work in a neoconfessional mode, but what I find striking is how the sample of (non-Anglo-American) poets Ramazani has gathered privileges introspection over “communal reach,” a phrase, indeed, more aptly attached to Baraka’s “SOS” than to virtually any of the “identity” poems anthologized in this Norton.

     

    The idea that the poem, possessed of “voice,” provides unmediated access to experience must also be maintained if the relation between particular subjectivities and particular lyrics is to remain stable. After all, the lyric poem–which, among other things, is the poem of a length amenable to anthologizing–has long been conceived of as the bearer par excellence of experiential particulars. Given such a conception, one might argue the liberal-pluralist canon logically follows. Indeed, the narrative of identity–of immigrant experience–is perhaps the literary genre par excellence in the contemporary American academy. I conclude by considering the poetics of identity–the way in which poetic language “represents” the subject–and by considering briefly, by way of contrast, a poet for whom identity is constituted within language.

     

    Certainly, Ramazani does not regard identity as immutable. Yet if one looks for a recent poem in the Norton that treats the relation between language and identity as a problem, the pickings are slim. Poem after poem uses its particular diction, pared-down or lush, formal or colloquial, to narrate a slice of life. On one poetic occasion, however, the arbitrariness of the signifier does appear as a social fact–as does the institution where the anthology will be used. This is Exhibit A: Li-Young Lee’s “Persimmons” (1041-42):[e]

     

    In sixth grade Mrs. Walker
    slapped the back of my head
    and made me stand in the corner
    for not knowing the difference
    between persimmon and precision.
    How to choose

     

    persimmons. This is precision.
    Ripe ones are soft and brown-spotted.
    Sniff the bottoms. The sweet one
    will be fragrant. How to eat:
    put the knife away, lay down newspaper.
    Peel the skin tenderly, not to tear the meat.
    Chew the skin, suck it,
    and swallow. Now, eat
    the meat of the fruit,
    so sweet,
    all of it, to the heart.

     

    The topic of “difference,” for Lee’s poem, begins with language: with two metrically identical English words (one Latinate, the other a corruption of an Algonquin name)–and with a scene of discipline by which the difference between the two words is enforced. Mrs. Walker, representing the educational institution, seeks to correct the boy’s imprecise use of language, or to enforce the status–slow, backward–to which such imprecision dooms him. The second stanza, as it unfolds in a kind of manual for the persimmon, continues to provide double evidence of mastery: the speaker’s assumed familiarity with the “exotic” fruit modulates into a display of familiarity with the musical resources of English. To “choose” persimmons, in this sense, is to select them as fit subject for lyric meditation–as the full-ripened signs of a particular ethnic identity.

     

    Donna undresses, her stomach is white.
    In the yard, dewy and shivering
    with crickets, we lie naked,
    face-up, face-down.
    I teach her Chinese.
    Crickets: chiu chiu. Dew: I’ve forgotten.
    Naked: I’ve forgotten.
    Ni, wo: you and me.
    I part her legs,
    remember to tell her
    she is beautiful as the moon.

     

    Other words
    that got me into trouble were
    fight and fright, wren and yarn.
    Fight was what I did when I was frightened,
    fright was what I felt when I was fighting.
    Wrens are small, plain birds,
    yarn is what one knits with.
    Wrens are soft as yarn.
    My mother made birds out of yarn.
    I loved to watch her tie the stuff;
    a bird, a rabbit, a wee man.

     

    This dynamic–the linguistic failure of the immigrant speaker replaced by a mastery on other levels–characterizes the poem’s movement. Moving from scenic memory to more generalized recollections, the poet as language learner attempts to separate language from experience: pairs of near-homonyms are further confounded as they prove to stand for associated experiences. Yet again, the slippage of the signifier is halted by the introduction of primal, childhood realities: mother’s handiwork is an art of confident connectivity: once given form, her yarn will not unravel. The poem then returns to the schoolroom–and when teacher imagines, as teachers will, that her classificatory powers over the signifier extend to the referent itself, the poet gains a certain revenge:

     

    Mrs. Walker brought a persimmon to class
    and cut it up
    so everyone could taste
    a Chinese apple. Knowing
    it wasn’t ripe or sweet, I didn’t eat
    but watched the other faces.

     

    The poem ends with the son’s return home, where he looks “for something I lost”–thus adult poet allegorizes immigrant child’s search for origins. Now blind, his father waits on the stairs as he searches for and finds his father’s precise painting of persimmons:

     

    Some things never leave a person:
    scent of the hair of one you love,
    the texture of persimmons,
    in your palm, the ripe weight.

     

    The precision of the father’s painting and the precision of his son’s poem are drawn together: “this” is “Persimmons.” Precision, incarnated in the persimmon, its subject, ripens with time; record of the hand, the father’s precision, passed on to the son, will stand. The adult speaking-self, throughout the poem, will clarify distinctions–will, quite exactly, “choose” precision, writing a masterful lyric organized around a central image. And so the slippery signifiers of childhood by poem’s end are nowhere to be found. The deictic This of presence is mobilized against loss, even as the question of loss is shifted from the linguistic register to the anticipated loss of a beloved parent who has already lost his sight. In the headnote to his selection of Lee’s poetry, Ramazani comments: “Imperfectly grounded in English as a child, the adult speaker, likewise unable to remember some Chinese words, is completely at home in neither language” (1039). Yet what Lee writes stabilizes the language of poetry in a lyric conclusion that takes shelter in tangible experience.

     

    What makes the Norton‘s emphasis on such poetry seem a partial reading of the contemporary is its own treatment of historical modernism. After all, the writing of non-native speakers has come to be seen as increasingly fundamental to our definition of poetic modernism: Gertrude Stein, Mina Loy, Louis Zukofsky (all of whom in childhood used at least in part a language other than English)–modernist experimentation can be said to stem from the explosion of unified national poetic traditions. Indeed, all these aforementioned poets are included in the first volume of the new Norton. But the story this anthology tells us about our own moment is of the replacement of modernist mongrelism with a standardized workshop dialect–a dialect spoken by the current generation of immigrants, a dialect of which their mastery can signify successful poetic assimilation even as they thematize the ironies and complexities of double consciousness.

     

    The larger irony here is that the contemporary experimental scene–if it can even be thought of as a single scene–is anything but an old boys club. Take, for example, Harryette Mullen. Hardly an obscure avant-gardiste, she teaches African-American literature at UCLA. In an essay first published in 1996, “Poetry and Identity,” Mullen suggested that “minority” and “experimental” poets were equally marginal with regard to the centers of poetic authority, though minority poets might be gaining ground. Her prediction looks prescient. Mullen’s own work is simultaneously traditional and experimental; I’ll quote a few stanzas from the book-length sequence Muse and Drudge:

     

    hooked on phonemes imbued with exuberance
    our spokeswoman listened for lines
    heard tokens of quotidian
    corralled in ludic routines

     

    slumming umbra alums
    lost some of their parts
    getting a start
    in the department of far art

     

    monkey’s significant uncle
    blond as a bat
    took off beat path
    through tensile jungle (Mullen 49)

     

    The poem is perfectly “teachable”–and teachable within frameworks that Americanists, or African-American literature scholars, will be ready to use. Mullen’s quatrains are densely packed with cultural signifiers of African-American experience, yet almost never become abstract or preachy. Even more crucially, she does not assume the self-possessed speaking subject as the starting point of her verse; rather, the play of language generates positions which are quickly abandoned. The formation of the voice–most often, in this text, the African-American voice–is for Mullen a legitimately lyric subject. For sincerity, she substitutes signifying. The “monkey’s significant uncle” is a creation possible only in poetry, generated, as he is, out of play with concepts–from pseudo-Darwinian racism to African trickster mythology–and phonemes and from their unpredictable overlap. Monkey’s uncle, significant other, signifying monkey, and, finally, signifying other: the chain of displacements finally leads us to the otherness of signification–which is to say, of language–itself: not the “I” that speaks, but the languages that speak us as we speak and, so doing, are spoken for.

     

    Mullen, or her spokeswoman, has heard those who have “found their voice” and are singing its melody (or malady?) on the quotidian stage of the self, the repeat performance of identity playing itself out. And yet offbeat paths are available to us, perhaps more of them now than ever. I won’t attempt to claim that had the Norton chosen such a path, at the turn of the millennium, it might have made all the difference–for how much power can a single anthology, however institutionally buttressed, really have? Rather, I’ll say, with Gertrude Stein, looking at the still-flourishing life of the poetic world that this otherwise admirable anthology has left for dead: “the difference is spreading.”

     

    Notes

     

    1. See Alan Golding’s From Outlaw to Classic (esp. 41-113) for the distinction between poet’s canons and school canons.

     

    2. Joe Amato uses the identical tactic in reviewing Cary Nelson’s Oxford Anthology of Modern American Poetry. Offering a catalog very similar to my own, Amato remarks that “readers are likely to infer from these headnotes the now familiar, if problematic, equation at work throughout: viz., that a poet’s identity, as determined by her social experience–the structural and personal consequences of ethnic or racial lineage, gender, sexual orientation, familial circumstances, class status, occupation, place of birth, and so forth–corresponds to a poet’s social (and sometimes socialist) agenda, and accounts for the work’s having been written the way it is, and published (and critically received, or no), in the first place.” Amato’s review as a whole brilliantly exemplifies the difficulties in articulating commitments to both left politics and experimental poetics within the contemporary academy.

     

    3. Interestingly, the persimmon as signifier of ethnicity (of, in this case, “Japanese-ness”) appears in the (in)famous Doubled Flowering, a collection of poems by the Hiroshima survivor Araki Yasusada–who, it was discovered after their publication in a wide variety of leading literary magazines, was an invented figure (most now would say Kent Johnson, though Johnson, who has been called the “Yasusada-poet,” has not taken credit for the work).

     

     Works Cited:

     

    • Amato, Joe. “It Was the Best of Tomes, It Was the Worst of Tomes: Cary Nelson’s Anthology of Modern American Poetry.” Rev. of Anthology of Modern American Poetry, edited by Cary Nelson. Jacket 11 (April 2000). <http://jacketmagazine.com/11/nelson-by-amato.html>.
    • Ashbery, John. Flow Chart. New York: Knopf, 1992.
    • Bernstein, Charles. A Poetics. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1992.
    • Golding, Alan. From Outlaw to Classic: Canons in American Poetry. Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1995.
    • Guillory, John. Cultural Capital: The Problem of Literary Canon Formation. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1993.
    • Hall, Donald, Robert Pack, and Louis Simpson. New Poets of England and America. New York: Meridian, 1957.
    • Harris, William J. ed. The LeRoi Jones/Amiri Baraka Reader. New York: Thunder’s Mouth, 1991.
    • Hoover, Paul. Postmodern American Poetry: A Norton Anthology. New York: Norton, 1994.
    • Mullen, Harryette. Muse & Drudge. Philadelphia: Singing Horse, 1995.
    • Nelson, Cary ed. Anthology of Modern American Poetry. New York: Oxford UP, 2000.
    • Perloff, Marjorie. “Whose New American Poetry?: Anthologizing in the 1990s.” Electronic Poetry Center. <http://wings.buffalo.edu/epc/authors/perloff/anth.html>.
    • Rasula, Jed. The American Poetry Wax Museum: Reality Effects 1940-1990. Urbana: National Council of Teachers of English, 1994.
    • Tuma, Keith ed. Anthology of Twentieth-Century British and Irish Poetry. New York: Oxford UP, 2001.
    • Wallace, Mark, and Steven Marks, eds. Telling it Slant: Avant-Garde Poetics of the 90s. Tuscaloosa: U of Alabama P, 2001.
    • Yasusada, Araki. Doubled Flowering: From the Notebooks of Araki Yasusada. New York: Roof, 1997.
  • On Media and Modules

    Stephen Dougherty

    Fine Arts and Humanities Division
    Elizabethtown Community and Technical College
    stephen.dougherty@kctcs.edu

     

    Review of: Tabbi, Joseph, Cognitive Fictions. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2002.

     

    Cognitive Fictions is a sophisticated and fascinating book that asks difficult questions about the place of literature and the literary artist in the age of digitized mass media. The answers Joseph Tabbi provides are equally difficult, although the reader’s trouble on this score will depend in part on whether or not he or she ascribes to some of the guiding assumptions that motivate the inquiry. To its credit, this is a book that provokes an emotional response. However, Tabbi’s reliance on the modular theory of mind (more on this later) elicits considerable discomfort even for a reader who does not consider himself or herself a traditional humanist.

     

    But first things first: Cognitive Fictions represents an important contribution to U.S. literary studies. Tabbi rightly insists that in a global culture literary studies must engage more with science and with media studies. Taking issue with what he sees as a predominantly unmediated situation of literature studies in its geopolitical framework, Tabbi suggests another approach: we must develop closer and more detailed “connections with the sciences and with those communications media whose recent expansion and unprecedented integration into everyday life made a global culture possible . . . in the first place” (xviii). Thus, if the novel is to continue to possess a recognizable cultural diversity and historical specificity, and if we are to continue to respect it for such differences, then “it first needs to define itself within and against those more globalizing powers and distribution networks that threaten to erase the novel’s medial difference” (xix).

     

    This is the task that Tabbi has set for himself. In a time when all forms of communication (image, sound, text) can be digitized, and at a point in cultural history when irony, once the hallmark of the postmodern literary, has been wholly subsumed by advertising culture, he asks along with the small group of U.S. writers he investigates: What is the novel for? What does it do? Why does our culture continue to produce and consume works of fiction? For Tabbi, the contemporary novelist’s purpose has nothing to do with nostalgia for the Real; it is not about the recovery of an “authentic” America, because in a world where electronic mass media has penetrated so deeply into the collective consciousness that distinction no longer has any value, if it ever did. The purpose of the fiction writer is rather to re-purpose or re-mediate the complex social/communications systems within which our minds and bodies are enmeshed through the processes of observation, or rather, observation of observation.

     

    Tabbi’s inspiration here is the autopoesis of Maturana and Varela, and the work of Niklas Luhmann as well. Just as “autopoesis describes a way of establishing and maintaining a system’s boundary by selecting meaningful elements (distinctions the system can use) out of an otherwise indistinct, ‘noisy,’ environment” (xxii-xxiii), the writers that Tabbi examines (at least in the latter portion of his book) obsessively observe and take notes in journalistic fashion, or rather their protagonists do. Such close observation of the social systems that constitute them makes (or marks) a difference that becomes useable as a platform for fresh insight about those systems. Tabbi explains:

     

    In recognizing the absolute closure of the system . . . , these narrators create a new distinction, which then enters into the system it describes and alters it. So the moment a narrator recognizes the possibility of keeping a "journal of the journal," or turning one's isolated inconsequential notations into an "absolutely autobiographical novel," the narrator can re-enter the system at another level (and at a later time), and thus keep things going. The distinction (analogous to what cognitive science would term a "gap" and literary theory might call the "aporia") between rhetoric and meaning, the writer/observer and the writing/system under observation, is no longer a distinction between inside and outside. Rather, by imagining oneself as "outside," the observer introduces a new distinction within the writing-system. Hence the possibility of moving the system (not necessarily "up") to a different level of complexity, so that it can function differently within the environment (because it is now structurally capable of making new distinctions and hence seeing things within the environment that were not visible before). (xxii)

     

    Here Tabbi urges that we must distinguish between autopoesis and an autotelic theory of the literary that insists upon the absolute isolation of the literary work from the hum of background noise. Autopoetic art encloses itself in and as a world of words, but it does so in relation to the outside. The distinction between the autopoetic and the autotelic is critical for Tabbi, given his desire to save for the literary artist a purpose or a value that the self-reflexive modernist lost in a hall of mirrors no longer offers us. Writers such as Paul Auster in his New York Trilogy, David Markson in Wittgenstein’s Mistress, and Harry Matthews in The Journalist are not out of touch, and they certainly don’t go about conjuring a world elsewhere in the New Critical sense. But then the real issue for Tabbi is what it means to be in touch, and how one goes about mediating reality (as a novelist) in a world where human perception is already so profoundly mediated: “Reflexivity in contemporary fiction, like autopoetic closure in cognitive science and in systems theory, is not a shutting out of the world,” Tabbi insists. “[I]t is rather a way of establishing an identity that is better able to connect with the world at particular points, when one is able, while writing, to re-cognize and put on hold one’s own literary distinctions and categories long enough to see how they might answer to distinctions in the environment” (80).

     

    The application of systems theory to literary study is promising, and it is likely that Tabbi’s project will prove inspirational for many readers and critics. Nevertheless, the difference between the autotelic and the autopoetic is often quite difficult to grasp in Tabbi’s readings; which is to say that it is hard to tell what practical value his authors and/or their protagonists get out of the close observations that constitute their textual interventions. Perhaps this is inevitable, given that Tabbi’s concern is with states of consciousness, which are of course rather ineffable stuff. Nevertheless, one is left with the distinctly unsettling impression that on Tabbi’s account we are in a world so utterly homogenized through mediation that there is no space for resistance. That is not because of his use of systems theory. If the fundamental lesson of systems theory is that human cognition is a moving blind spot, then as a theoretical framework within which to understand behavior, systems theory converges in some significant ways with other theoretical frameworks that trouble but do no obviate the value of talking about cultural resistance, such as the psychoanalytical. Blind spots are one thing, but Tabbi’s mobilization of the cognitive scientific model of mind represents in itself a discrete aspect of his theoretical strategy, and we must separate this out from systems theory.

     

    My main grouse with Cognitive Fictions has to do with Tabbi’s uncritical acceptance of what is known as the modular theory of mind, the idea that the mind/brain is made up of systems whose resources are site-specific, so to speak, or “encapsulated” with respect to the data that each contains. According to this theory, information in the brain is stored in independent modules which have either very limited or no knowledge of what goes on outside, in surrounding domains. But as Jerry Fodor has most vigorously argued in recent books, while the modular theory may indeed get the architecture of local mental states right–those that pertain to beliefs, desires, and other forms of thought that can be expressed propositionally–it explains nothing about global, or conscious, states. Fodor writes in The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way:

     

    Since the mental processes thus afflicted with globality apparently include some of the ones that are most characteristic of human cognition, I'm on balance not inclined to celebrate how much we have so far learned about how our minds work. The bottom line will be that the current situation in cognitive science is light years from being satisfactory. (5)

     

    Without getting into the considerable complexities of Fodor’s arguments, which in any case pertain mainly to the logical and empirical misgivings he has about the modularity thesis, suffice it to say that Fodor sees far greater virtue in blending domain-specific and domain-general cognitive architectures. For if the mind is entirely modular, as cognitive science is wont to argue; if “there is a more or less encapsulated processor for each kind of problem that it can solve”; and if “there is nothing in the mind that can ask questions about which solution to a problem is ‘best overall,’ that is, best in light of the totality of a creature’s beliefs and utilities,” then for Fodor cognitive science has not gotten us very far in the study of human consciousness (64). This assertion on its own is a powder keg, and I do not want to endorse it so much as to use it to point toward a problem that dogs Cognitive Fictions on another level.

     

    Following McLuhan, Tabbi assumes from the start that our electronic media are extensions of the human sensorium; in effect his book is a complex and sophisticated study of the relation between those media on the one hand and “the human measure” on the other. Whereas McLuhan in the sixties believed he confronted, as Mark Hansen puts it, “‘a situation in which the prostheses we adopt to cognize and intervene in the technologically driven material complexification of the universe only seem to expand our experiential alienation’” (x), Tabbi re-envisions the relation between human beings and their electronic prostheses, or their media environments, based on the discoveries of cognitive science. His next assumption, and it is the value rather than the accuracy of this one that I question, is that the findings of cognitive science refute McLuhan’s thesis that there is a poor fit between our media and our psychical economies. Digital information processors do of course work on the architectural principle of modularity. But instead of accepting neutrally that “emerging sciences of the mind have produced detailed descriptions of similarly communicating agents, modules, and distributed networks in us” (x), Tabbi could have more fully questioned from the start the motivations that have produced these discoveries, which are in effect metaphorical associations. In other words, what Cognitive Fictions lacks is a substantial rhetorical analysis of its cognitive science, because it is by no means a necessary correlative of systems theory. Neither is it necessarily a good fit.

     

    Tabbi’s decision to foreground systems theory and to background the cognitive theory has a practical payoff because it is a relatively safer critical strategy. It is even likely that it was the right decision, given that it frees him to pursue systems-theoretical insights rigorously. We should not be surprised, however, that it produces a big blind spot. For Tabbi fails to see the trouble into which his under-theorized articulation of cognitive science with systems theory gets him right from the start, even in spite of his explicit statement of the problem. Here is the statement, which refers back to the prior announcement of the modularity thesis: “With the coming together of these two systems–call them the mind and the medial ecology–prospects for achieving a critical distance, never hopeful in a postmodern context, seem increasingly unlikely” (x). True enough. But the prospects for achieving the kind of distance from our media ecology that would allow for truly productive critical inquiry into its conditions and effects, which is what Tabbi seems at least wistfully to hope for in this passage, are radically undermined precisely by the uncritical acceptance of the modularity thesis. If we do not assume that the mind is “coming together” with media systems by virtue of deep structural affinities, then we will invariably find ourselves talking about some other kind of interface between them–one perhaps, with more friction at work; and one, perhaps, where there is a greater possibility of achieving a productive critical distance from media forces. Tabbi is not entirely unaware of the problem. In fact he acknowledges it head on in his chapter on Pynchon and cognitive science:

     

    For a humanism that wishes to read signs of community in a multi-voiced and multicultural past, the implications [of modularity] remain disturbing: when consciousness, like corporate power, is itself composed of a collection of partially connected modules or media, what resistance is possible? .... Just as cognitive theories of the modular mind require no self, the proliferating connections among voices and identities in Pynchon's two most recent novels require no community. (52)

     

    But surely it is not only the humanists who ought to worry about the failure of community, or about the dangerous erosion in the postmodern world of any space for meaningful resistance. Tabbi does not claim that we ought to accept such an erosion blithely. Still, the particular variety of cognitive science he chooses to articulate together with systems theory leads him to recreate on the critical-theoretical level some of the same problems he insightfully exposes in the fictions he studies.

     

    Work Cited

     

    • Fodor, Jerry. The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology. Cambridge: MIT P, 2000.

     

  • Postmodern Archaic: The Return of the Real in Digital Virtuality

    Gerald Gaylard

    Department of English
    University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa
    geraldgaylard@languages.wits.ac.za

     

    Our entire linear and accumulative culture would collapse if we could not stockpile the past in plain view.

     

    –Jean Baudrillard, Simulations 19

     

    The standard spin given to digital virtuality in our era, and not just by advertising copywriters, is that of naïve optimism. Jaishree Odin, for instance, describes hypertext as effecting a radical shift “from the linear, univocal, closed, authoritative aesthetic involving passive encounters to that of the nonlinear, multivocal, open, non-hierarchical aesthetic involving active encounters,” adding that this latter aesthetic is more capable of “representing postcolonial cultural experience since it embodies our changed conception of language, space, and time” (599). While one can certainly endorse the call for more polyglot, less rigidly hierarchical modes of practice, we should be skeptical about the role of hypertext in advancing that project. Indeed, as I will argue here, if we look past the utopian hype we can discern a tendency toward the healthy survival, even flourishing, of realist tropes and mores within digital virtuality, a tendency with a number of disturbing connotations for “postcolonial cultural experience.”

     

    Perhaps surprisingly, the digital virtuality industry today often emphasizes its naturalism and realism; it is an industry that currently sells itself less on its ability to abstract than on its increased high-focus representational resolution. In other words, digital virtuality’s initial promise to create the new, to reify the imagination, has often led rather toward more reification and objectifiction than expanded imagination. This is not only visible in some digital technology (for instance, “motion capture” in which actual human motion is the original data for “realistic” animation) and in the leagues of advertising copy in the vein of “never seen before,” “digital reality creation,” “zero defect,” “and everyone’s invited,” but also in the recently prominent quasi-surveillance of home videos and “reality TV”; docu-soapies; documentary films such as The Great Dance; films such as The Blair Witch Project, The Truman Show, The Sixth Sense, Series 7: The Contenders, and The King is Alive; atavistic rhythms in digital techno and trance music; some “new ageism,” as in Terence McKenna’s The Archaic Revival; and so on. I hope that it is clear therefore that I am using virtuality in the widest sense to include any kind of interactive digital cultural products, or any artifacts that utilize digital technology (from miniature cameras to computer games to films to internet web pages). Moreover, I am arguing that virtuality is not confined to technology, but involves a wider set of cultural practices that tend to rework the “real” in the service of commodification. I want to call these cultural practices the “postmodern archaic” because they use the enablements and blandishments of digital technology to test and ratify current notions of virtuality and reality by comparison with a version of the past. How are we to understand this plethora of digital products and practices, all raising in some way reality and realism and the relationship between them?

     

    My sense is that this technology tends to raise issues of representation in the same general way that all technological innovations require cultural adaptation to their potentials. Indeed, it might even be asserted that the quality of cultural production declines when new technologies are introduced as producers have to spend time exploring, understanding, and integrating those technologies. It is a commonplace, for instance, that when “talkies” were first introduced, they were of low quality content-wise; a similar decline from prevailing standards of quality was all too apparent when computer-generated imagery first came into vogue. So my contention is that cultures are perpetually in oscillation, or at least subject to wave-like ebbs and flows, with the rush to new and potentially less representational forms invariably precipitating a resurgence of normative realisms.

     

    To appreciate this curious give-and-take logic in the forms and technologies of representation, it is helpful to survey the major historical analyses of realism. Many of these are concerned with the genesis of modernity, with Renaissance and post-Renaissance painting, and with the novel–in particular the nineteenth-century realist novel of Balzac, Flaubert, Tolstoy, Austen, Hardy, et al. Such critics as Lukács, Auerbach, Watt, Levin, and Alter point out that narrative realism in the novel initially took the form of exhaustive, not to mention exhausting, adjectival description, particularly focusing on domestic minutiae. Typically, such novels were located in the lounge, parlor, and kitchen, although they seldom made it into the bedroom. Hence, despite the different manifestations of realism, from the classical geometries of Renaissance realism to the social realism of the nineteenth century, realism tended to take the form of mimesis or objective verisimilitude: imitation, representation, referentiality. Such belief and practice were also manifest in the early days of the cinema with Kracauer, Bazin, and others lauding celluloid for its unprecedented representationality. Television too has been a mimetic form, reflecting the spread of multinational technocracy for Langer, Kroker, and Cook, among others, and is now the format of a peculiarly postmodern form of realism: the illusion of participatory democracy fostered by “reality TV.” As Bourdon and Fetveit argue, the raison d’être of television is the promise of its being live and therefore authentic, a contract with audiences that involves them in “a specific interpretive community, and, beyond . . . a national audience” (Bourdon 550). Thus realism has been characterized, I think correctly, as the belief in the ability of signs to represent an objectively verifiable world accurately.

     

    Of course, the signs that are taken to be realistically representative are culturally specific, so the heritage of realism that concerns us here was not merely an aesthetic phenomenon but was also the cultural aspect of a massive social upheaval beginning in the West but ongoing to this day throughout the globe; ontologically this belief in disinterested representation was termed empiricism, which was reciprocally reliant upon science, industrialization, and colonialism. As Mary Louise Pratt notes, scientific exploration, involving the systematizing of nature and indigene in the eighteenth century as part of the imperial project, relied upon representation. Hence empiricist and realist disinterestedness was not culturally innocent and produced a systematization or mapping under the hegemony of the Western bourgeoisie and the authority of print. A wide diversity of critics has seen both the novel and film as bourgeois genres in thrall to a realist mode which, as Nash remarks, is “anthropocentric” (13). Realism, at least in its early days, was Western, empiricist, materialist. Readers, viewers, and writers co-founded an ordered and rational world–a world of stability in the midst of industrialism’s maelstrom, a secular humanist substitute for religion’s ontological reassurance. Realism was fuelled by the desire of the rising and insecure bourgeoisie to embed and reify its ideology, a reification perhaps most evident in the technological media artefact of the imagination of mass consumer culture, the novel, a reification that was arguably to find its most recent apogee in television. The point here about realism is not so much that the form is inherently wrong-headed, but simply that it has a specific history, a history which has not been altogether kind to non-Western worlds.

     

    Now it may seem like a large leap from the nineteenth-century realist novel to virtuality, but the essentially materialist critique of realism can still be legitimately invoked in the context of digital culture. Even in the context of new media, realism serves to provide a coherent and comforting narrative by offering an apparent anchorage in actuality. This recurrence of realism within postmodern culture becomes clear if we perform even a very brief materialist critique of Survivor, the exemplary instance of reality TV and “the most popular show in the United States.” Survivor does not utilize digital technology in particularly overt ways, though it is clearly present in the capture and playback of video and audio, editing and title sequences. Rather, as is typical of hypertext and reality TV, the series utilizes notions of accurate representation, surveillance, fame, and democracy.

     

    Survivor attempts to fuse elements of the soap-opera (a compressed series of struggles over friendship, intimacy, and betrayal within a small community, a lot of close-up emotional-response shots), the tourism show (like Lonely Planet), the eco show (wildlife documentaries), the game show (a million dollars are up for grabs in a competitive format), the detective program (“whodunnit,” or perhaps that should be “whowinsit”?), and the newer genre of reality show or infotainment docu-soap-opera (in which events and emotions are apparently spontaneous and unscripted). The plot of Survivor is rather similar to a pilgrim’s progress: via a series of tests and votes, some survive while others are eliminated and eventually, via tasks that supposedly bring the survivors closer to the elements, the environment, and the indigenous culture, the final three are “initiated” into the local tribe, though of course there is only one “sole survivor” who wins the million.

     

    Survivor is not just realistic; its realism has the incontrovertible gravitas of spontaneity under the objective gaze of the unedited lens. So the first aspect of this “new” realism is what I want to call the “illusion of spontaneity.” There was a time when the tag “based on a true story” was a lure for viewers, but now that seems no longer enough; what viewers want is the true story itself. What contemporary realism seems to demand is not only density of description, of space, of objects, in order convey verisimilitude, but also spontaneity of time, possibly because spatiality has become so hyper that time is seldom linear. So the early realist emphasis on place and linear time in the novel or on exhaustive texture in the film has shifted to an emphasis on globalized space and synchronic time, and particularly unmediated time, spontaneity. This is evident if we examine the credit sequence at the end of the show: along with the usual roll-call of post-production and casting for the Africa season were bush managers, psychologists, safety coordinators, as well as fourteen editors, eighteen cameramen, and fifteen audio personnel. At no stage are any of these production personnel or processes foregrounded in the final aired product. The illusion of spontaneity is required for television to appear live and therefore authentic and is an inheritance from the instrumental empiricism that informed the novel. Moreover, credibility fostered by immediacy is further structured by the dramatic tension so germane to novelistic narrative, a dramatic tension that is provided by accidents, revealing comments by participants, and particularly by the tribal council at the end of each episode when participants are voted off the show. The frisson of the unexpected, and therefore the live, that these moments provide further fetishizes the epistemological structures of conventional realist narrative; in other words, consumers are programmed by the rhetoric of spontaneous spectacle, the exceptional, and the individualism that underpins realism. Indeed, the placement of the unscripted, unscriptable, moment of tribal council at the end of the show provides a climax that keeps viewers watching.

     

    The second aspect of this realism, inextricably intertwined with the illusion of spontaneity, is its spatiality, which in this case is the archaic surroundings of what the narrator Jeff Probst calls “a land virtually untouched by the modern world.” The first point about these surroundings is that they are an actual physical location, a place, and physicality is always the last refuge of the authentic, the real. However, this place is also a space, a space which I want to call the “postmodern archaic.” I have chosen the word archaic because it does have a sense of spatiality as well as of time, suggesting the primitive, the old and outdated, as well as ancient habitation, ruins, or simply nature or the bush. Now of course the archaic is nothing new. Indeed, one might say that the archaic is as old as nostalgia, and, therefore, it seems important to keep in mind that the archaic is hardly a new trope in cultural production, particularly Western cultural production, and here one might cite the Bible, through Rousseau to Ruskin, Mollison and beyond. Indeed, nature or “the natural” is an invention of culture and inevitably recurs as culture becomes more and more palimpsestic, recurs as a symbolic ballast to the layered excesses of culture. As Raymond Williams has it:

     

    By "residual" I mean something different from the "archaic," though in practice these are often very difficult to distinguish. Any culture includes available elements of its past, but their place in the contemporary cultural process is profoundly variable. I would call the "archaic" that which is wholly recognized as an element of the past, to be observed, to be examined, or even on occasion to be consciously "revived," in a deliberately specializing way. What I mean by the "residual" is very different. The residual, by definition, has been effectively formed in the past, but is still active in the cultural process, not only and often not at all as an element of the past, but as an effective element of the present. (122)

     

    In the case of the postmodern archaic, the archaic isthe residual, for in its guise as nature and the corporeal it is continually available for the specialized purpose of testing and confirming contemporary culture. To put this differently, we might regard the postmodern archaic as the residual in the guise of the archaic; contemporary repurposing of the residual makes it appear original, archaic, and incontrovertible. In the theatre of this archaic we discover our “roots,” a sense of pristine organic holism, shorn of culture’s detritus. As Marianna Torgovnick argues,

     

    the metaphor of finding a home or being at home recurs over and over as a structuring pattern within Western primitivism. . . . this line of thought about the primitive takes us full circle and returns us to the earliest meanings of the word primitive as the original state of something--biological tissue, church organization, social organization. For "going home," like "going primitive," is inescapably a metaphor for the return to origins. . . . For the charm to work, the primitive must represent a common past--our past, a Euro-American past so long gone that we can find no traces of it in Western spaces. . . . The primitive must be available or our 'origins' may no longer be retrievable, re-creatable. (185-87)

     

     

    So the archaic is a sign of an authentic common past, a home that soothes modernity’s homelessness.

     

    The archaic is visible in the forgeries utilized by artists to obtain the appearance of archaic authenticity: artificial worm-holes in wood, oil paintings darkened by candle smoke, outmoded language in novels. The sense of authenticity was to be particularly important in the Modernist primitivism of Picasso, Yeats, Lawrence, and Joyce. At another level, what child has not imagined what would happen if all the technocultural scaffolding and paraphernalia of contemporary life were to disappear? Hence the archaic has been particularly prevalent in depictions of childhood and fantasy, and the corollary is also true, that the archaic is often infantilized. So the archaic has a past, and its present can be identified in any number of contemporary cultural phenomena, including neo-tribalism, neo-paganism, aspects of the ecological movement, conservation, concern for the endangerment of tribals and their lifestyles, certain religions, reality television, and so on. At the postcolonial level, the long history of the archaicization of Africa, for instance, can be traced back to at least early cartography, nineteenth-century imperial romances as in Rider Haggard, the ethnicization of the female primitive in Saartje Bartmann, the fetishized images of the bushman and frontiersman, the work of Laurens van der Post, wildlife documentaries, recreations of dinosaurs and so on. Such archaicization is also prominent in the frontier theme so dominant in America, particularly in the Western. These images and stories tend to preserve the bush and its aboriginal denizens as pristine, primeval, authentic, and as a commodity for consumption. The archaic can also be found in the reaction of various nationalisms to these imperial images in the valorization of indigenous cultures, traditions and landscapes. Nevertheless, what is postmodern about this archaism in contemporary culture is the extent to which it is reified as a simulation, a Baudrillardian simulation. Jameson notes that

     

    nostalgia film, consistent with postmodernist tendencies generally, seeks to generate images and simulacra of the past, thereby--in a social situation in which genuine historicity or class traditions have become enfeebled--producing something like a pseudo-past for consumption as a compensation and a substitute for, but also a displacement of, that different kind of past which (along with active visions of the future) has been a necessary component for groups of people in other situations in the projection of their praxis and the energizing of their collective project. (137)

     

    What makes this archaic postmodern is the extent to which it is apparently real, spontaneous, live; the extent that technology has become fast enough to capture or outpace reality. The “postmodern archaic” in this case is the utilization of a reservoir of symbolic archaic value as the backdrop and test for “progress”; in other words, the desert island, the outback, the savannah, are yardsticks to measure how far modern people have come from their “roots,” and to determine whether they can still functionally return to them. The pristine is so appealing because in an era of vertiginous change it can be made to be a relative constant, and because it can act as an empiricist, realist litmus test and, hopefully, validation of contemporary hyperculture. In other words, the postmodern archaic might be seen as part of the ongoing human attempt to cleanse and stabilize nature and the visceral, to control the messiness of the flesh, and what is particularly postmodern about this is that it is technology that is the agent of the sanitizing sublimation. Hence I am using a Jamesonian distinction between the postmodern (as in the sociohistorical era) and postmodernism (reflexive cultural production in and about that era) to emphasize Baudrillard’s notion of the “simulacrum” that characterizes the postmodern. Indeed, postmodernity or the postmodern has been consistently characterized as a space rather than a place due to its dependency on globalization and simulation. According to this distinction, Survivor is definitely an example of a postmodern simulacrum, rather than of critical, reflexive postmodernism (which may well be simulacral itself). As John Langer suggests of disaster coverage in Tabloid Television, this simulacrum attempts to forestall the depersonalization and community breakdown that accompanies technocratic postmodernity.

     

    Thus we see that in the Survivor: Africa season, many attempts are made to integrate the contestants with the locale so that challenges and rewards partially involve the local flora and fauna and local practices such as bartering and drinking cow’s blood (as the Masai do). Hence the postmodern archaic is not merely a test, but is motivated by a Luddite consciousness, and in particular by what N. Katherine Hayles calls “corporeal anxiety,” the fear of dematerialization of the body, and a corollary need for community/family/tribal bonds (800). Thus what is also piquantly postmodern about this archaicism is the apocalyptic anxiety that the archaic, our own roots as externalized in primitive societies and locales, is disappearing at an accelerating pace. Baudrillard similarly links anxiety and panic with nostalgia:

     

    When the real is no longer what it used to be, nostalgia assumes its full meaning. There is a proliferation of myths of origin and signs of reality; of second-hand truth, objectivity and authenticity. There is an escalation of the true, of the lived experience; a resurrection of the figurative where the object and substance have disappeared. And there is a panic-stricken production of the real and the referential, above and parallel to the panic of material production: this is how simulation appears in the phase that concerns us: a strategy of the real, neo-real and hyperreal. (12-13)

     

    This nostalgia requires that the viewers of Survivor consume the genetic substrate of the archaic authentic and thus establish its authenticity; the word is made flesh in an act of ingestion, voyeurism enters the body. Clearly Lukács is hardly enough and psychoanalytic analysis is of utility here. Much has been made of the link between cannibalism, vampirism and consumer capitalism, and here I think that we see the same connection in that capitalism involves incorporation via ingestion. Perhaps we might call this canny capitalism? Sparkle Hayter satirizes Survivor as a contained and sanitized capitalism in a short story which postulates that real castaways would have to resort to cannibalism in order to survive. If we consider that money today is virtualized in terms of computer transactions, but we can still make a withdrawal of actual physical cash from the machine and thus confirm the veracity of virtual capital, then via consuming the illusion of spontaneity and the postmodern archaic, the postmodern subject is able to confirm the veracity of virtual culture today.

     

    In the cow’s blood drinking scene in Kenya in the Survivor: Africa season, for instance, the host Jeff Probst comments, “I’m going to tell you up front, when I first saw this done it seemed very brutal to me, but I spent a lot of time with these guys and found out exactly the opposite, cattle are revered . . . cattle are truly a source of life, what’s going to happen is something they do every day and how they live.” While this might be seen as admirable postcolonial foregrounding of cultural position and prejudice, the prejudicial is immediately re-established by Probst’s next comment, “just to assure you, we’ve tested and quarantined this cow, this one is completely clean,” something reinforced by the camera’s lingering glance on the blanching face of one of the women contestants when blood is mentioned. This cultural othering is further compounded when Probst pours the blood into a glass jar while saying “pour it into a serving container that suits you guys,” which might indeed be a metaphor for the postmodern archaic as a whole. Furthermore, such scenes of ingestion are not only characteristic of the “eat or be eaten” ethos of capitalism, but have become a trope in reality television, partly because they appear to be live, but also because the trope of the “gross out” is not just an exercise in multicultural tolerance but in sensationalizing the limits of cultural tolerance through stomach-turning. Scandal is required for the maintenance of viewer interest, but the scandal must always be contained within culturally sanctioned boundaries of acceptability. Thus the postmodern archaic has the double function of both critiquing contemporary culture and retroactively ratifying that culture.

     

    Hence Survivor might well be accused of tokenism, for not only are there no indigenous inhabitants taking part in the show–all the contestants and backing crew are American (the only locals credited in the Africa production were a location manager and carpenters)–but also the gestures toward the indigenous are almost insultingly offhand and exoticizing. The music in the Australian Survivor (composed by Russ Landau and David Vanacore), for instance, alternates between schmaltzy neo-classical in the scenes construed as patriotic to the United States, so that when the contestants chat to their families via the internet in one reward violins swell portentously. On the other hand, indigenous scenes are accompanied by “primitive” indigenous drumming or spooky didgeridoo playing to indicate threatening danger. This contrast is most apparent in the Survivor: Thailand season when in one episode the survivors sing the cheery yuletide song “Sleigh Ride” on a sultry summer’s night, with the camera panning into the moonlit Thai landscape with eerie accompanying music. In fact, the theme tune to the series is called “Ancient Voices” in the credit sequence. This aural sensationalism exoticizes the archaic and appropriates the other. In fact, Africa, Australia, Asia, and so on in Survivor are understood through projections of the repressed of the West, as in Conrad’s evergreen Heart of Darkness. A necessary background in reading realist media production today would seem to be critical postcolonialism alongside formalism and psychoanalytical theory, at the least.

     

    Of course, it is not my intention to disparage these noble attempts, noble savage attempts, to embrace the other, but I cannot get away from the fact that they are merely a façade amounting to no more than local color, for the narrative of the game itself is a capitalist orgy of “democratic” voting, defeat, accumulation, and victory. The initiation into the local(e), this neo-tribalism, cannot be allowed to interfere with a bigger tribalism, a nationalist agenda; hence the triumphal finale ratifying capitalism with a final vote into millionaire status, the golden calf of America. A central transcultural aspect of the game show is its valorizing of competition, materialism, commodity fetishism, and winning. In game shows the linking of specialized knowledge and skills with material reward instantiates the capitalist ideological underpinnings to American value systems. While the “third world,” savage, primitive archaic is apparently there as a test, the game as such is not tested because it embodies the notions of the law of the jungle and survival of the fittest.

     

    Thus the mirage of a test is partially there to quiet the apocalyptic anxieties of a decadent culture; if the United States fell apart or was attacked by its enemies and became a wasteland, Americans and their culture could still survive and flourish because their culture is natural. As Baudrillard notes, “everything is metamorphosed into its inverse in order to be perpetuated in its purged form” (37). In a sense, then, Survivor offers to American audiences not only the opportunity to test and ratify their culture, but also the chance to consolidate a collective identity, the possibility for a Barthesian plaisir, a pleasure in self-recognition and hence validation. Unlike many other game shows, Survivor does not offer substantial consolation prizes. There was one season in which all the players received a car, and the runner-up always receives one hundred thousand dollars. But these exceptions aside, losers are sent home with nothing to show beyond a chance at some publicity and post-production photo opportunities.

     

    But while the show does superficially offer us survivalism, a narrative that confirms the “law of the jungle,” it is carefully scripted and contained. The host, Jeff Probst, maintains center stage as the organizing voice of authority and control, the voice of the father, echoing Chion’s claim that television is vococentric in that the voice “orients the viewers decisively in certain directions of interpretation” (Bourdon 541). It is no mere idiosyncracy of style that has Probst affecting frontiersman khaki fatigues and an imperious manner. This is clearly a patriarchal cultural model, with the father as the voice of authority, the “immunity idol” as phallic talisman, and the contestants as Oedipal children jockeying for his divinely impartial approval or disapprobation in the form of extinction. To take this Freudian model further, the archaic landscape may well be the feminine, a primitive oceanic in which the children find home. Moreover, the show is very ritualized; the same routines are utilized in the same places at regimented times. The off-screen props that actually enable this quasi-survivalism were revealed most dramatically when one of the contestants fell into the fire in the Survivor–the Outback season and was badly burned: he was airlifted out in a helicopter. No doubt one of the rather ghoulish pleasures that the show offers to audiences is the threat of danger that does accompany even such a scripted and supported trip into the apparently wild. Moreover, the audience revels in any sudden changes in the plot or between the characters, much as it would respond to a change of fortunes in a novel or sitcom.

     

    It is in this way that the game appears “natural” and therefore “unquestionable.” In other words, capitalism must be the ultimate culture because it is not a culture as such but in fact unmediated nature, verisimilitudinous naturalism; the divide between nature and nurture collapses. So the totem of the tribe is not the desert island, the outback, or the savannah, but the game itself–competition with winner takes all as its crowning decapitation. The totem is capitalism, the law of the jungle, the constitutive principle of the tribe as such. Indeed, one might be tempted to read this particular brand of hyper-realism as a justification of the pax Americana (or should that be belli Americana?). This is graphically evident in the Survivor: Marquesas season in which Probst informs the contestants at their first tribal council in a picturesque building that “all over the Marquesas there are ancient dwellings like this one, for thousands of years things have taken place here, everything from sacrifice to other rituals; tribal council is certainly a ritual, the vote definitely a sacrifice, because this is where you are held accountable for your actions on the island.” Capitalism must contain the archaic in order both to conceal and to justify its savagery. Here the ancient myths of purification and justice via abasement and suffering are reinforced. As Langer notes of the restoration of order in television news, “these stories reassure us that the social organism has an ‘immune system’ which can expel untoward and even astonishing interference. Risk to the community ultimately offers us ‘faith’ in the community” (125).

     

    The academic who has perhaps written most extensively about this issue of postmodern archaicism is Dean MacCannell in Empty Meeting Grounds: The Tourist Papers. MacCannell makes the point that tourism stages authenticity in order to appeal to exotic expectations that center around temporary escape from the West. He goes on to say that postmodern archaicism which exoticizes the apparently genuine primitive other in an act of identity tourism is not so much a metaphoric guilt expiation, but an actual guilt being expiated, for we have in fact completely wiped out our “savage” ancestors (one might, perhaps uncharitably, construe the neo-tribalism of Survivor as more about an American attempt to obliterate guilt at the colonial genocide of native Americans than about embracing a multivalent global). MacCannell says:

     

    The touristic ideal of the "primitive" is that of a magical resource that can be used without actually possessing or diminishing it. Within tourism, the "primitive" occupies a position not unlike that of the libido or the death drive in psychoanalysis, or the simple-minded working class of National Socialism which was supposed to have derived an ultimate kind of fulfilment in its labour for the Fatherland. Or the physicist's dream of room-temperature superconductivity and table-top fusion. These are all post-capitalist moral fantasies based on a desire to deny the relationship between profit and exploitation. Let's pretend that we can get something for nothing. The fable is as follows: The return on the tour of headhunters and cannibals is to make the tourist a real hero of alterity. It is his coming into contact with and experience of the ultra-primitive which gives him his status. But this has not cost the primitives anything. Indeed, they too, may have gained from it. Taking someone's picture doesn't cost them anything, not in any Western commercial sense, yet the picture has value. The picture has no value for the primitive, yet the tourist pays for the right to take pictures. The "primitive" receives something for nothing, and benefits beyond this. Doesn't the fame of certain primitives, and even respect for them, actually increase when the tourist carries their pictures back to the West? It seems to be the most perfect realization so far of the capitalist economists' dream of everyone getting richer together. (28-9)

     

    The idea here is to give some guilt-expiating value to the primitive, but not enough to invest in its economic uplift, otherwise even the appearance of it will completely disappear, and not enough for the primitive as an aspect of ourselves to disappear. What the consuming public wants is not the archaic but the image of the archaic, because the archaic itself involves too much suffering. So what is demanded is the illusion of authenticity, which at the very least is the condemnation of artifice via an unhistoricized simulation of nature. It seems that a community always requires enough guilt to retain its members; postmodern communities find just this amount of guilt in a peculiar version of the archaic.

     

    We might witness this structuring of community around a belief in its own value in a host of cultural productions today. The postmodern archaic is not merely located within the putatively primitive, but manifests in other sociohistorically specific ways that buttress the postmodern community’s sense of self: for instance, in the previous generation of technology and culture, within classical and neo-classical “style,” inside woman as “the natural,” as a form of neo-Luddism, and so on. This form seldom takes the extreme neo-Luddite manifestation of the American Unabomber, Kirkpatrick Sale, or Scott Savage, who have all written technophobic manifestos, but certainly utilizes nostalgic, technoskeptical, conspiratorial, and/or neo-rural ideas. To cite just one mainstream cultural example, the conservative Hollywood film You’ve Got Mail provides a resolution to the challenges of corporate monopoly through a saccharine romanticism enabled by e-mail in which the locus of value is to be found in the individual and the quaint corner-shop which caters to a small community.

     

    Nevertheless, Survivor does evince some small degree of postmodernism’s reflexivity, a reflexivity which also helps to account for its popularity. The game embodies a sense of doubt about the valency and meaning of progress and modernity, particularly in their relation to the real, a suspicion that the archaic is ineluctable and that ancient cultures are worth sustaining, if only because they have proved to be sustainable and to respect their environments. Thus the postmodern archaic is an embodiment and measure of alienation from contemporary cultures, an instantiation of doubt about the virtualization and digitalization of the real. Moreover, in the Survivor show, contestants are essentially posed a moral dilemma: whether to embrace capitalist survival whole-heartedly, and inevitably to deceive and betray, or to take an ethical standpoint via another value system, and thereby inevitably lose the game. This is complicated by the fact that embracing capitalism requires extreme cunning; some facade of moral righteousness is required in order not to rile the morals of the other contestants or jury who might vote you off. It is this moral dilemma, the complexity and ambivalence of morality in a community which is motivated by selfish greed, which is important in the popularity of soap-operas and helps explain the success of Survivor.

     

    The show does not end there, for there is a final episode in the Australian season entitled “Back from the Outback,” which details how Survivor affected the lives of the contestants. Here realism is taken one step further, for the virtual archaic is shown not only to have profoundly affected people’s lives, but also to have leaked into the contemporary real. Hence, even if the show is not “real,” it has “real,” mundane, everyday, effects and ramifications; contestants are never the same once they have been on the show. For some contestants this is a boon, for they are depicted as able to capitalize on their media exposure and become celebrities in their own right: from siege by autograph-seekers, to popular ministry, to busy Hollywood schedules, to propositions to pose nude in Playboy. For others, this is a nightmare as media exposé renders their private embarrassments public. For most of the contestants, some combination of dream and horror is their aftershock from the show. Further, the show’s official website is interactive and contains a number of articles critical of the series. Hence the series and its peripheral media do reflect upon its status as a show and its ramifications upon the contemporary mundane. However, those reflections are, like the show as a whole, genuflections to the real, and as such efface the mechanisms of their artifice. The audience is given no clue as to the intertextuality of this hyper-realism, for instance, and hence the series eschews the self-reflexivity so prominent in the postmodernism of Tarantino and Lynch, for instance. Even the self-reflexive aspects of the show are part of the feedback mechanism of the archaic; the lessons learnt in the archaic are brought back to the present in order to establish continuity with the past and hence ratify that present.

     

    Thus it appears that without a vigilant self-reflexivity, almost any cultural production in any genre can reassert dangerously reactionary tropes and mores. I am not suggesting that Survivor is the model for all reality TV, let alone for postmodern digital virtuality, but Survivor shows how virtuality can raise issues of “reality,” authenticity, voyeurism, censorship, sensationalism, ethics, postmodernity, and postmodernism, without responding to these issues in a particularly probing way.

     

    A rather more self-reflexive Hollywood production that is based upon, and satirizes, reality TV is Series 7: The Contenders. Directed by Daniel Minahan, this movie involves contenders having to slaughter each other, a comment on the demands of voyeurism, the quest for an authentic reality, and the supposed appeal of “snuff” movies. The film may also be satirizing special effects films and the notion that the screen may be a cyborg training site. The killing theme suggests that murder is the logical result of the lethal combination of the television networks’ desire to make a huge profit (after all, having contestants is surely cheaper than paying a cast in the long term) and viewers’ voyeuristic desire for realistic sensationalism. The dangerous combination of sensationalism and profit leads to the egotistical exhibitionism that reality TV encourages, and reinforces the dictum that all publicity is good publicity.

     

    However, there seems to be a deeper psychological underpinning to what is happening in Series 7: The Contenders. The heroine, Dawn, is a pregnant pragmatist who will stop at nothing to stay with and protect her baby–a protagonist therefore representing the hapless innocence of the physical archaic in the face of the inhumane progenitors of the game. In other words, the film presents a Survivor-type alternative to thrill-seeking blood-thirsty postmodern consumerism in the organic body, female and individualized. The narrative stages the return of our heavily pregnant heroine to her past where she encounters her first, and only, true love, Jeff. The two of them had been the only two outsiders in their middle American school and had collaborated on a school art video project which we are duly shown: to the doom-laden chords of 1980’s noir band Joy Division’s “Love will Tear Us Apart Again,” the young pair cavort in full gothic attire until, in true liebestod style, Jeff ends up dead on the tarmac. Our heroine, pregnant with the future, finds that she is still in love with the authenticity of her past with all of its castration-complex, love-death alienation. So the film suggests that the alternative to the brutality of postmodern hypermedia voyeurism is to be found in Hollywood’s oldest theme: the triumph of the lonely cowboy, the revenge of the nerd, the justification of the modernist cult of alienation. This version of the postmodern archaic reflexively accepts and ratifies the heart of darkness within the West, and in so doing sublimates that darkness into a noble savagery underlying the palimpsestic layers of culture, nostalgically praising that past while simultaneously killing it. As in The Truman Show, the only thing that can save is the authenticity of human reciprocity, a heterosexual love boat that must inevitably drown in the sunset. Thus, while Series 7: The Contenders, like The Truman Show and a number of other examples of “cinema vérité” which expose the truth via virtuality, ostensibly exposes the dynamics of media hype, but its moral grandstanding and revivification of tropes of archaism tend to replicate the melodramatic individualism of the very hype it critiques. Viewers of such exposés can exult along with the director in their intellectual superiority to the mindless consumers of docu-soap operas.

     

    Another film to treat such themes is The King Is Alive, which takes the familiar concept of archaic survival, and runs with it in a characteristic yet challenging way. First, the film, directed by Kristian Levring, is part of the “Dogme 95” concept developed by Levring along with Lars von Trier, Thomas Vinterberg, and Søren Kragh-Jacobsen: a concept that eschews all post-production and anything that is not found on location. This means that the film, shot chronologically on three handheld digital cameras, is characteristic of the survival genre. The plot consists of the stranding of a bus-load of Western tourists in the dune sea of Namibia; indeed a desert island, but without the relief of a blue sea counterpoint to its sand waves. These castaways, as in the Robinson Crusoe tradition, are not alone; the single native inhabitant of a deserted village where they find shelter acts as a choric voice to their attempts to evade the boredom and insanity that accompany their unhingement from modernity and its distractions. These attempts assume an antic disposition via the staging of King Lear. Lear seems to have been chosen because it is a play that deals with the loss of a kingdom, but also because it turns around a tragic moment in which the King asks of language that it embody accurately the realm of feeling and imagination when he insists that his inheritance will devolve to the daughter best able to “say” her love:

     

    Tell me, my daughters
    Since now we will divest us both of rule,
    Interest of territory, cares of state,
    Which of you shall we say doth love us most,
    That we our largest bounty may extend
    Where nature doth with merit challenge. Gonerill,
    Our eldest born, speak first. (Shakespeare, 1.1.48-54)

     

    Cordelia refuses this demand that the language of “rule . . . territory . . . state” embody love, and in so doing rejects the demand for verisimilitude and institutes the tragic action of the play. Her rejection is motivated not only by a child’s rebelliousness, but also by the refusal to use any language, let alone the glossy language of the court, for she feels her experience and love have altogether more gravitas: “I am sure my love’s / More ponderous than my tongue” (1.1.77-78). It would seem that this episode from King Lear has been chosen to cast a reflexive comment upon the plot of the film itself. Plots of this type hold out the promise of verisimilitude, of testing culture against archaic nature, through the castaway theme. Culture, the play within the play, holds out the promise of a defense against, or triumph over, nature through realistic accuracy and resolution, but is unable to deliver on this promise because it is never able to embody the real in speech. The demand that language, culture, embody the actual inevitably leads to tragic results.

     

    In the play, as in the film, these tragic results are a ramification of the linking of sexuality and identity through language. Confronted with the shallowness of languages, and hence exposed to self-revelation and consequent sexual insecurity, a number of the characters attempt to avoid self-revelation through sexual conquest. In the first case, a Western woman attempts to “make her husband jealous” by seducing the black driver of the bus. Her assumptions here are sexist in the sense that she imagines that all men are instantaneously sexually available, and racist in that black men are imagined as particularly sexual and sensuous. She even has the effrontery to tell the driver that her purposes are entirely selfish and then ask whether she is a “bitch.” However, her attempt to elevate her own esteem by subjecting the male backfires when he forces her to her knees in a submissive posture that inverts her original intent, reducing her to anger and further verbal abuse.

     

    In the second case, the woman’s husband precipitately beats the black bus driver for sleeping with her, not realizing that the act was unconsummated. He thus exposes his insecurity as well as an outlook no less racist and sexist than his wife’s–leading her to reject him as a “pig.” These episodes are brought to culmination when the aloof father of the rejected husband sleeps with a flirtatious younger American woman and is deluded by her enthusiastic sexual response into a kind of erotic egotism. In other words, a certain kind of sexualized self-esteem requires realistic embodied confirmations. When she tells him that she faked her response and that she finds him disgusting, his new found inflated ego implodes and he murders her and commits suicide. It is as the other travelers mourn these deaths that their rescuers arrive, an unnamed party of Namibians. The suggestion is, I think, that rescue from the demands for realism, from the external confirmations and embodiments required by eroticized egotism, has as a prerequisite the death of that ego and the silencing of that culture.

     

    While it may be thought that the film takes an arrogantly superior stance to all of these selfish shenanigans, it contrasts with Series 7 in refusing to grant the intellectual a superior status or elite position. This intellectual, the French woman Romane Bohringer, refuses to play Cordelia and join in the action of the play, but despite her critical detachment and skepticism, she is never installed in the position of reliable commentator. The role of commentator falls, rather, to Peter Kubheka, the native inhabitant of the ghost town, who says that the foreigners “speak without speaking to each other” and do so in order to avoid the voice of the desert. In this his commentary is clearly accurate, and is the voice left after the hapless visitors have departed. This is one digital virtuality that offers no easy cultural certitudes for viewers.

     

    The postmodern archaic and hyperrealism are so prevalent in contemporary cultural production, as evident in the especially glaring example of Survivor and in these two rather more reflexive examples, partly because of cultural and corporeal anxiety. Modernity and postmodernity instantiate such accelerated change that anxiety and vertigo are inevitable by-products. This anxiety manifests in viewers who, because they are spending so much of their lives in front of the television or computer screen, demand increasing verisimilitude from their reality generators. It also manifests within the media industry, which is keen to establish its credentials as well as to make money and hence foists, as it were, verisimilitude upon viewers. The result of this is that, on the one hand, there is so much actuality on television that it has tainted the less realistic footage, so that people unconsciously absorb much of what they are watching as true; while on the other hand, the fictional material has similarly pervaded the real so that the real always seems to have an element of the bizarre and predictable about it. Indeed this interpenetration of culturally coded perception and reality may be an index of the predominance of visual literacy in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.

     

    The postmodern audience has become predictable in its demand for unpredictability, yet also requires recognition and comfort as an antidote to anxiety. This demand for the illusion of spontaneity and for comfort is often captured by the collaging of different subtexts, many of them not culturally or historically innocent, in the creation of a “simulacrum” in which a particular consciousness, national in the case of Survivor, is technologically embodied and hence confirmed. The illusion of spontaneity normalizes the panopticon, normalizes surveillance, and the postmodern archaic normalizes culture and patterns of consumption. Even where digitalization enters the realm of the fantastic, it is seldom to confirm the existence of realms of the imagination, but rather to reify the products of the imagination, and, ultimately, to sell them. Of course, what is elided by this illusion is the suturing that sews these sub-texts together and the ideological underpinnings of these sub-texts, the dynamic of the links so to speak. So in a sense, traditional film and literary study and criticism, which are all about exposing the ideological underpinnings of suturing, are more appropriate than ever before. Of course, traditional film/literary critical models now need to be more flexible, multivalent, and open to a far greater variety of texts than ever before.

     

    To conclude, the problem with responses to the dispersal of the subject and the ubiquity of surveillance that tend to characterize contemporary cultural production is that the old verities can sneak in through the back door. As fragmentation and dispersal occur, so anxiety and nostalgia flourish; the dream of depth and authenticity reasserts itself. So virtuality creates its own critique via a postmodern realism, and ironically that critique helps shore up virtuality (indeed, digital communication seems particularly suited to render critique, debate, and difference as display rather than as incommensurability). Within virtuality there is an apocalyptic fear of floating too far from the visceral, and hence ironically a whole strand of current cultural production shies away from the new and shelters within the realist. I think that interest in the archaic is vital at this sociohistorical juncture, because without thinking of ourselves in different spaces in the far-distant past and future we have very little perspective on ourselves now. What we understand by the archaic should not be a romanticized psychological projection, nor a creation of the very corporations whose existence threatens the archaic. Moreover, the future of realism seems assured in the sense that the further away from the archaic and corporeal we move, the more we will need to return to it to ratify our progress. The further from the archaic we journey, the more regular and insistent our trips “back” to it have to become. These trips have to be made because without them we have no sense of “progress”; the body itself enforces them by reminding us of our physicality. As Marianna Torgovnick notes, “our interest in the primitive meshes thoroughly, in ways we have only begun to understand, with our passion for clearly marked and definable beginnings and endings that will make what comes between them coherent narrations. A significant motivation for primitivism in modernism, and perhaps especially in postmodernism, is a new version of the idyllic, utopian primitive” (245). The postmodern archaic is likely to increase in future, and realism is unlikely to disappear. The tribe has spoken.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Baudrillard, Jean. Simulations. Trans. Paul Foss, Paul Patton, and Philip Beitchman. New York: Semiotext(e), 1983.
    • Bourdon, Jérôme. “Live Television is Still Alive: On Television as an Unfulfilled Promise.” Media, Culture & Society 22.5 (2000): 531-56.
    • Fetveit, Arild. “Reality TV in the Digital Era: a Paradox in Visual Culture?” Media, Culture & Society 21.6 (1999): 787-804.
    • Hayles, N. Katherine. “Corporeal Anxiety in Dictionary of the Khazars: What Books Talk About in the Late Age of Print When They Talk about Losing their Bodies.” Modern Fiction Studies 43.3 (1997): 800-20.
    • Hayter, Sparkle. “The Diary of Sue Peaner, Marooned! Contestant.” Tart Noir. Eds. Stella Duffy and Lauren Henderson. London: Pan, 2002. 294-302.
    • Jameson, Fredric. “On Magic Realism in Film.” Signatures of the Visible. London: Routledge, 1992. 128-54.
    • The King Is Alive. Dir. Kristian Levring. Perf. Miles Anderson, Romane Bohringer, David Bradley, David Calder, Bruce Davison, Brion James, Peter Kubhka, Vusi Kunene, Jennifer Jason Leigh, Janet McTeer, Chris Walker, Lia Williams. MGM, 2001.
    • Kroker, Arthur, and David Cook. The Postmodern Scene: Excremental Culture and Hyper-Aesthetics. Montreal: New World Perspectives, 1996.
    • Langer, John. Tabloid Television: Popular Journalism and the “Other News.” London: Routledge, 1998.
    • MacCannell, Dean. Empty Meeting Grounds: The Tourist Papers. London: Routledge, 1992.
    • Nash, Christopher. World Postmodern Fiction: A Guide. London: Longman, 1993.
    • Odin, Jaishree K. “The Edge of Difference: Negotiations between the Hypertextual and the Postcolonial.” Modern Fiction Studies 43.3 (1997): 598-630.
    • Pratt, Mary Louise. Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation. London: Routledge, 1992.
    • Series 7: The Contenders. Dir. Daniel Minahan. Perf. Brooke Smith, Marylouise Burke, Glenn Fitzgerald. Blow Up Pictures, 2001.
    • Shakespeare, William. King Lear. London: Penguin, 1988.
    • Survivor. Seasons 1-5. Survivor: Thailand (2002); Survivor: Marquesas (2002); Survivor: Africa (2001); Survivor: The Australian Outback (2001); Survivor: Pulau Tiga (2000). CBS.
    • Torgovnick, Marianna. Gone Primitive: Savage Intellects, Modern Lives. London: U of Chicago P, 1990.
    • Williams, Raymond. “Dominant, Residual and Emergent.” Marxism and Literature. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1977. 121-127.

     

  • Reading Cultural Studies, Reading Foucault

    Rimi Khan

    School of Media Communication and Culture
    Murdoch University, Western Australia
    rimikhan@hotmail.com

     

    Because there is commonly such a buzz of contradictory comment going on around him–as his friends and enemies push him to the left, right, and centre or sometimes off the political spectrum altogether–Foucault could assert that it proves what he contends: conventional categories really don’t fit him; he is posing an entirely new and different set of questions about a whole range of sometimes unthought of matters. . . . The academic effort to appropriate, correct, or dismiss Foucault has gone on even more intensely–sometimes brilliantly, sometimes stupidly , and sometimes with troubling seriousness.

     

    Paul Bové, “The Foucault Phenomenon” viii

     
    In a commentary on cultural studies’ “theoretical legacies,” Stuart Hall describes the field as “a project that is always open to that which it doesn’t yet know, to that which it can’t yet name” (“Legacies” 278). Proclamations of this sort are easy enough to find throughout cultural studies’ accounts of its own history–they serve as a generalized reference to its self-image as an interdisciplinary, and, consequently, self-reflexive set of pedagogical and investigative practices. Given the currency that such thinking still carries within cultural studies, it is important to continue to ask what it is actually possible to say and do in cultural studies’ name.1 In particular, I want to consider, after Meaghan Morris, “how it comes about that people keep posing problems at a level of generality where you simply can’t solve them” and, in doing so, to point toward less burdened modes of analysis that enable cultural studies to be politically significant in new ways (Hunter, “Aesthetics” 371).

     

    On these questions, I have found Foucault’s work–and a review of the ways in which his work has been received within cultural studies–to be particularly instructive. Deleuze writes that “Foucault is not content to say that we must rethink certain notions; he does not even say it; he just does it, and in this way proposes new co-ordinates for praxis” (30). This article considers some of the ways these investigative possibilities have been put to use within cultural studies. My aim is, in part, to document encounters that precede and enable this present set of counterpoints, but also, I hope, to intervene in this awkward intellectual terrain.

     

    Relatively little has been written on the history of appropriations of Foucault within cultural studies.2 Some works–for example, Gavin Kendall and Gary Wickham’s Understanding Culture: Cultural Studies, Order, Ordering and Tony Bennett’s Culture: A Reformer’s Science–have examined secondary readings of Foucault, commenting generally on cultural studies’ attempts to use Foucault’s insights on power within a broadly Gramscian framework. Both of these works are concerned to demonstrate the problems involved with early Foucauldian influence. As Bennett contends,

     

    in effect, Foucault was admitted into the cultural studies roll-call only on the condition that he brought no troublesome Foucaultian arguments with him. The role accorded his work was not that of reformulating received problems so much as being tagged on to arguments framed by the very formulations he questioned. . . . Quoted extensively, he was used very little. (Culture 63)

     

    I go on to elaborate on such arguments by detailing some of the more revealing moments of this fraught history.

     

    Structure, Power and the “Marx Problem”

     

    In his recitation of the “story” of cultural studies, Hall notes that cultural studies’ adaptation of Marxism involved a certain degree of friction:

     

    There never was a prior moment when cultural studies and Marxism represented a perfect theoretical fit. . . . There was always-already the question of the great inadequacies, theoretically and politically, the resounding silences, the great evasions of Marxism–the things that Marx did not talk about or seem to understand which were our privileged object of study: culture, ideology, language, the symbolic. . . . That is to say, the encounter between British cultural studies and Marxism has first to be understood as the engagement with a problem–not a theory, not even a problematic. (“Legacies” 279)

     

    Procuring a theory of “culture” from Marxism requires that these gaps or “great inadequacies” be resolved. In his Cultural Marxism in Postwar Britain, Dennis Dworkin provides a historical account and details the political and intellectual climate surrounding some of these revisions of Marxism within the cultural studies tradition. E.P. Thompson’s brand of social humanism, for instance, is largely described as a product of the prevailing modes of party politics and their relationship with intellectuals, and an attempt to work against the rigid economism characteristic of leftist orthodoxies of the time. The terms of such debates have not been displaced, however; the discursive limits that defined the intellectual controversies that Dworkin describes should figure significantly if we are to make sense of cultural studies’ eventual uptakes of Foucault.

     

    Raymond Williams is, of course, another crucial figure in this reconstitution of “culture” within British postwar sociological analysis. Williams’s influences vary, and the development of his thought cannot be reduced to a deliberate, straightforward “reworking” of Marxist cultural thought. Williams’s intellectual work carries an urgency informed by his experiences of English working-class life. In the face of this sense of immediacy, the “levels” of culture and various categories of Marxist analysis appear abstract. In this framework, the concept “culture,” as Williams argues in Culture and Society, is conceived within the context of a weak use of “superstructure.” Here “culture” refers to a “general social process” or “whole way of life” and allows for a more ready inclusion of the category of experience (273). By enabling a more pragmatic and quotidian meaning of and use for “culture,” Williams’s quasi-anthropological delineation of “culture” as a “whole way of life” opens up an important analytical space for British cultural studies.

     

    Williams’s later work gives the fluidity implied by this formulation a more theoretical substantiation and speaks in more decisively Marxist terms. For instance, in his momentous “Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory,” Williams explains at length the dilemmas raised by a literal use of the base-superstructure metaphor. By suggesting the possibility of a synthesis between mechanisms of production and “ordinary” forms of consumption and cultural practice, he attempts to account for “deep contradictions in the relationships of production and in the consequent social relationships” (5). What Williams proposes, then, is a revaluation of the concepts of “base,” “superstructure,” and “determination” to include some consideration of “social intention,” while retaining the notion of “social being determining consciousness” (7).

     

    For Williams, Gramsci’s work goes some way toward resolving this tension by offering a useful stylization of Marxism and a new theoretical dimension to his earlier positions. It is especially his notion of “hegemony” that mitigates a rigid Marxist reductionism and guarantees the necessary element of “intention.” “Hegemony” must “continually be renewed, recreated and defended,” so that domination is seen to occur only through the negotiation and shaping of popular consent (“Base” 8). It is this “productive” aspect of power that facilitates cultural studies’ examinations of the contradictory relationships between commodities, meaning, and pleasure–a question that “classical” Marxism can barely pose, let alone answer.

     

    However, as John Frow and Meaghan Morris point out, the apparent merging of idealist and materialist positions that informs Williams’s concept of “culture” entails a certain theoretical paradox. It is premised, they argue, on an “opposition (between culture and society, between representations and reality) which is the condition of its existence but which it must constantly work to undo” (xx). So Williams cannot attempt to reconfigure the relations between “art” and “society” or “culture” and “society” without reifying these very dichotomies. These are well-worn debates, and I do not wish to suggest that the diversity of cultural studies work today–in its various geographical and interdisciplinary inflections–can be traced back to Williams’s work as a single point of origin. But the contours of these debates linger; this alignment between “culture” and “representation” generates an anxiety that continues to have a bearing upon efforts to theorize a material, determining structure and its relationship with an agential, representing subject.

     

    Foucault, it turns out, is situated by cultural studies in a space created by a Gramscian understanding of domination and informed by this structure/agency problematic. John Fiske argues that Foucault “shares with ideology theorists the attempt to account for the crucial social paradox of our epoch–that our highly elaborated social system of late capitalism is at once deeply riven with inequalities and conflicts of interest yet still manages to operate smoothly enough to avoid the crises of antagonism that might spark revolution” (161). Dworkin indicates the degree to which, within the British New Left of the 1970s, the work of figures like Althusser, Barthes, and the intellectuals associated with the Frankfurt School is conflated under the heading “Western Marxism.” Despite the varied positions these continental cultural Marxisms actually occupy, they have been regularly perceived as belonging to a relatively cohesive intellectual tradition and as constituting a singular alternative to the prevailing frameworks of British cultural inquiry. Accordingly, even if Foucault’s divergences from Marxism were to some extent acknowledged, he has, by and large, been deemed to be Marxist in his concerns.3

     

    So it is apparently only by refracting Foucault, particularly his writing in Discipline and Punish, through this Marxist prism that his work is made palatable for certain formations of cultural studies. Geoff Danaher, Tony Schirato, and Jen Webb, for example, in Understanding Foucault, remind readers that “all these disciplinary procedures, and the panoptic gaze, emerged at an historic moment when it had become necessary to produce a pliable, healthy and sober workforce to service the factories of the Industrial Revolution” (57). But by positing “the factories” as a primary determinant for the techniques employed in other domains of discipline, Danaher, Schirato, and Webb engage in what Foucault calls the “simple activity of allocating causality” (“Politics” 58). They invoke a reductionist logic, incommensurate with Foucault’s aim to “render apparent the polymorphous interweaving of correlations” (58). It may be that his description of political technologies as a disparate set of methods prompts cultural studies to account for the incoherent, often contradictory workings of power to some degree. However, if Foucault’s contention that power relations are “not univocal” is to be taken seriously, then any coherence between prisons, schools, hospitals, and factories must be regarded as material patterns of effects of domination. These regularities cannot finally be ascribed to some overall systematicity or generalized source of “ideological control.”

     

    In fact, Foucault’s work can be read to suggest that power exists only as “effects” that are “manifested and sometimes extended by the position of those who are dominated” and that are constituted by a range of techniques and maneuvres “that one should decipher in a network of relations, constantly in tension” (Discipline 26-27). These relations “are not univocal; they define innumerable points of confrontation, focuses of instability, each of which has its own risks of conflict, of struggles, and of an at least temporary inversion of the power relations” (27). Given this instability, power, for Foucault, must be apprehended in its local instantiations or as it exists as particular regimes of practice. Moreover, Foucault asserts that these regimes are not “governed by institutions” or “prescribed by ideologies . . . but, up to a point, possess their own specific regularities, logic, strategy, self-evidence and ‘reason’” (“Questions” 5). “Economic” formations, then, do not determine, but are preceded by, and are just one effect of, these rationalities.

     

    Cultural studies’ concern with popular-cultural sites and “everyday” texts is regularly legitimated–often with Foucault’s concept of “micro-power” as a key reference point–by claiming their connection with “macro” structures of domination and subordination.4 In his discussion of “micro-power” in Discipline and Punish, however, Foucault is wary of lapsing into any straightforward equation of reproduction with systems of rule (27). Rather, according to Hall, Foucault

     

    adopts so thoroughgoing a scepticism about any determinacy or relationship between practices, other than the largely contingent, that we are entitled to see him . . . as deeply committed to the necessary non-correspondence of all practices to one another. From such a position neither a social formation, nor the State, can be adequately thought. (“Paradigms” 71)

     

    However, there are many examples one can cite to suggest that the kinds of associations that exist between manifold instantiations of power were, in fact, at times central to Foucault’s concerns:

     

    The problem that now presents itself . . . is to determine what form of relation may be legitimately described between these different series; what vertical system they are capable of forming; what interplay of correlation and dominance exists between them . . . in what distinct totalities certain elements may figure simultaneously. (Archaeology 10)

     

    What this indicates is a desire to investigate and describe unities, regularities, continuities, and discontinuities as they appear in their positivity; to respond to Hall, then, it is not the “necessary non-correspondence” but the non-necessary correspondence of practices that Foucault is committed to. And this does not constitute a theorization of determination that assumes the nature of the relationship between “micro-powers” and state power and then posits this as proof of the revolutionary potential of “micro-struggles.”

     

    It is worth acknowledging that cultural studies’ turn to Gramsci was, to a large degree, precipitated by what Dworkin describes as “the failures and disappointments of the late 60s and early 70s” (141). He explains that the critical left began to enjoy an unprecedented visibility within British humanities departments, particularly within newer universities and former polytechnics, as part of what appeared to be a process of more general cultural upheaval during the 1960s. But any promise of a serious and enduring political reorientation toward the left was hampered by the kinds of economic and institutional restructuring entailed in the shift toward conservative, liberal governance in the late 1970s. For Hall, Gramsci’s work helps account for these contradictions and disappointments, and it is Gramsci, rather than Foucault, who provides a pertinent framework for understanding and contesting Thatcherism as a cultural and political force.

     

    It is interesting to note, though, that despite Hall’s reservations, expressed in his “Two Paradigms” article, about the ability of Foucault’s work to intervene usefully in contemporary British politics, his work had begun to be used by some at the time (or what has since been referred to as the “governmentality school” of social and political inquiry) to do precisely this. Articles that appeared in journals such as I&C in the late 1970s and early 1980s and later in Economy and Society, (some of which were collected in the influential anthology, The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality) by figures such as Colin Gordon and Nikolas Rose reframed the liberal state by tracing the mobile systems of relationships that provided the conditions of possibility for different orders of knowledge–and in doing so, enabled an analysis of how “governed individuals are willing to exist as subjects” (Gordon, “Governmental” 48). And rather than noting a kind of disabling scepticism in Foucault’s work, the contingent nature of the relations of knowledge described by Foucault is cited as a source of optimism. It indicates the “strategic reversibility” of power relations and the possibility of political counterdemands rather than conceiving of such relations as the inevitable historical outcomes of the liberal state (Gordon, “Governmental” 5). While I go on to discuss some further implications of the “governmentality school” later, I think that this alternative intellectual trajectory indicates that cultural studies’ turn to Gramsci was not a necessary or inevitable response to the political conditions of the time. In fact, this Gramscian reading of Foucault elaborated a Marxist cultural politics, the very terms of which Foucault’s work sets out to question.

     

    From Discourse To Ideology

     

    In order to facilitate a textuality crucial to its examination of cultural forms, cultural studies’ stylization of Marxism has also involved what Hall labels a turn to the “linguistic metaphor” (“Legacies” 283). The contribution of Barthes, Althusser, and Lacan to British cultural studies in the late 1970s could be seen, for example, in the film journal Screen, and in a more general centering of “ideology” and “representation” within the project’s theoretical landscape. In “Two Paradigms,” Hall famously describes how the infiltration of (post)structuralism into the cultural studies toolbox overcame a previous inability to theorize the symbolic as a site of power and identity. This weakness is exemplified for him in the work of Williams, Richard Hoggart, and E.P. Thompson–broadly termed “culturalism”–and their emphases on empiricism and human agency. But while Hall argues that structuralism’s advantages lie in its critique of humanism, he also points out that it risks abstraction and a lack of historicity (“Paradigms” 67). Hall thereby poses the need for a “method which takes us outside the permanent oscillations between abstraction/anti-abstraction and the false dichotomies of Theoreticism vs. Empiricism which have both marked and disfigured the structuralism/culturalism encounter to date” (68). But these two paradigms are not as internally homogeneous as Hall supposes, and it is his very postulation (and reification) of this binary between structure and agency that produces an ongoing indeterminacy in cultural studies.

     

    Foucault’s notion of “discourse” offers one resolution to this dilemma. The operation of this concept is two-fold. On the one hand, it is aligned with a more general structuralist endeavor–Foucault’s account of regulating and regulated discursive formations is apparently comparable to “some of the classical questions which Althusser tried to address through the concept of ‘ideology’–shorn, of course, of its class reductionism, economistic and truth-claiming overtones” (Hall, “Introduction” 11). On the other hand, there is some recognition of the degree to which Foucault’s notion of “discourse” is deployed to think about non-linguistic mechanisms. As Foucault suggests,

     

    discourse is constituted by the difference between what one could say correctly at one period (under the rules of grammar and logic) and what is actually said. The discursive field is, at a specific moment, the law of this difference. It thus defines a certain number of operations which are not of the order of linguistic construction or formal deduction. . . . It consists of a whole group of regulated practices which do not merely involve giving a visible outward embodiment to the agile inwardness of thought. (“Politics” 63)

     

    Consequently, Foucault’s singularity is seen to rest on his effort to place textual analysis in its social and historical context.5 Or, as Frow and Morris put it, Foucault provides a more “institutionally anchored model of discursivity than [is] available in other, language- and text- centred notions of discourse” (xxvi). But while these differences are acknowledged, the belief that Foucault is interested in the realm of the symbolic remains. The result of this bifurcation is that “discourse” is regularly mobilized, not simply to analyze practices, but to turn practices into texts. This translation of “discourse” from a strategic ensemble of practices into a site of formal analysis is exemplified by Danaher, Schirato, and Webb, for whom the term “generally refers to a type of language associated with an institution, and includes the ideas and statements which express an institution’s values” (x). It is this presumed imbrication of “discourse” with processes of signification (and as an expression of “values”) that brings it under the rubric of ideology.

     

    However, Foucault’s notion of “discourse” circumvents the series of binaries–that is, between truth and falsity, reality and representation, and the symmetrical relationship between self and other–from which the concept of ideology derives its potency.6 “Discourse” entails a necessary relation of knowledge and power that means it cannot be employed to describe the false distortion and masking of a putatively “true” configuration of power. Nonetheless, the concept is routinely invoked and enlisted in cultural studies to make sense of the interplay between cultural practices, power, and meaning.

     

    In Frow’s analysis of The Condition of the Working Class in England, Engels’s study is not read as an empirical account but reinscribed as a semiosis of working-class districts in nineteenth-century Manchester. By claiming that “ideology” does not have to resort to an equation of “truth and error” or to an objective, extra-discursive reality, Frow attempts to reconcile his approach with Foucault’s writing on “discourse.” He suggests that by relativizing any critique “to the position of power from which it is enunciated,” “ideology” can be conceived as a “function” or “state” of “discourse” (“Discourse and Power” 194). To arrive at this solution, however, Frow contends that “the signifieds of discourse . . . are generated not from an extra-discursive real to which we may appeal as a final authority but within specific processes and practices of signification”(199). In order to argue against a “dichotomous conception of a ‘material’ economic base and an ‘immaterial’ superstructure,” Frow declares that “all social systems are semiotic systems producing significations realised in material sign-vehicles” (201-2). So everything is seen to be contained within the text, and “discourse” is used to describe these relations of signification.

     

    Yet, Frow’s subscription to an approach in which the social is understood by way of the text potentially involves an indeterminacy, characteristic of what Foucault calls “commentary”:

     

    By a paradox which it always displaces but never escapes, the commentary must say for the first time what had, nonetheless, already been said, and must tirelessly repeat what had, however, never been said. . . . [It] allows us to say something other than the text itself, but on condition that it is this text itself which is said, and in a sense completed. (“Order of Discourse” 58)

     

    “Discourse,” for Foucault, refers to a strategic field of practices, procedures, and operations “not of the order of linguistic construction or formal deduction” (“Politics” 63). But instead of defining “discourse” as a finite practical domain, Frow puts it “at the disposal of the signifier,” resulting in endless acts of interpretation that are, inevitably, a form of repetition (“Politics” 66). And this apparent epistemological dead-end is characterized by Hall as a theoretical drive that provides a defining impetus for cultural studies work:

     

    until one respects the necessary displacement of culture, and yet is always irritated by its failure to reconcile itself with . . . other questions that cannot and can never be fully covered by critical textuality in its elaborations, cultural studies as a project, an intervention, remains incomplete. (“Legacies” 284)

     

    The corollary of this “displacement of culture” is that questions of “theory” and “politics” are held “in an ever irresolvable but permanent tension” (284). For Hall, it seems, this tension fuels cultural studies’ sense of historical urgency–it is a “necessary displacement” and one that must be respected and embraced. Both Hall and Frow’s remarks are symptomatic of a search for what Foucault calls a

     

    locus of a discourse . . . whose tension would keep separate the empirical and the transcendental, while being directed at both; a discourse that would make it possible to analyse man as a subject, that is, as a locus of knowledge which has been empirically acquired but referred back as closely as possible to what makes it possible. (Order 320)

     

    For Foucault, attempting to work outside what he calls the “empirico-transcendental doublet” involves analyzing discourses and their conditions of existence by supposing only the fact of their historical appearance.

     

    However, it is in the gap between these conditions or systems of emergence and the desire to map discourses in their historical specificity that there appears some ambiguity in Foucault’s work. This tension goes some way toward explaining the appropriation and “aestheticisation” of his ideas in cultural and literary studies. Foucault’s early interest in literary figures such as Roussel and Artaud lends itself to such a reading. Simon During’s Foucault and Literature, for example, assesses the implications of Foucault’s work with respect to theorizing the relationship between language and subjectivity. Foucault’s “literary phase” is said to evince a belief in writing that “aims to clear an ideological space; a space for action, experimentation, chance, freedom, mobility” (7). And while it is Foucault’s later work that has most currency in cultural studies, even this, according to During, displays a “residual or manifest aestheticism” and can be put to use in a study of the transgressive possibility of texts (10).

     

    During’s reading relies on the ambiguity in Foucault’s texts concerning the function of the term “discourse.” In his analysis of the concept, Hunter describes the local and non-systemic nature of the relations between institutional operations, surveillance mechanisms, economic imperatives and other regulatory regimes, described in Foucault’s Madness and Civilisation. He contends that these groups of relations are later rendered systematic and formal through Foucault’s delineation of them as “discursive formations” (“Dispositif” 44). Hunter argues that by subjecting these positive descriptions to a “‘critical’ reflection” and attempting to recover their underlying rules or “so-called conditions of possibility,” Foucault displays “the symptoms of an incomplete struggle to expel structuralism rather than its calm supersession” (43). The point is that these hesitations and inconsistencies–conveniently enough for cultural studies–enable “discourse” to “reappear as the general mechanism for the articulation of . . . otherwise contingent relations–as the synthetic medium of their systematicity and necessity” (45). Importantly, as Hunter shows, Foucault later shifts his focus from accounts of discursive formations to localized descriptions of dispositifs or apparatuses involving a more dispersed array of organizational forms.

     

    The effect of this shift in Foucault’s work and his own remarks against “commentary” and textualism is that the products of “discourse” (or what Foucault sometimes refers to as “statements”) belong to the order of “events,” rather than to that of language.7 Foucault explains the approach he calls “eventalisation”:

     

    It means making visible a singularity at places where there is a temptation to invoke a historical constant, an immediate anthropological trait, or an obviousness which imposes itself uniformly on all. . . . A breach of self-evidence, of those self-evidences on which our knowledges, acquiescences and practices rest. . . . Secondly, eventalisation means rediscovering the connections, encounters, supports, blockages, plays of forces, strategies and so on, that at a given moment establish what subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal and necessary. In this sense, one is indeed effecting a sort of multiplication or pluralisation of causes. (“Questions” 6)

     

    This multiplication of causes involves allowing for the interaction of forces of transformation, regularity, discontinuity, and dependence that constitute an event. It requires a certain “polymorphism”–in the elements that are brought into play, of the kinds of relations described, and in its domains of reference (7). An account of this multiplicity of processes must recognize the unpredictability of their interrelation and avoid ascribing objects “to the most unitary, necessary, inevitable and (ultimately) extra-historical mechanism or structure available”–the most common of which are, Foucault suggests, “an economic mechanism, an anthropological structure or a demographic process” (7).

     

    Foucault requires his notion of “discourse,” then, to consider the historicity of the organizational forms that it describes. As I have indicated above, and as Dennis Dworkin’s account of the development of British cultural Marxism shows, disputes over the role of “concrete” historical inquiry within cultural studies have traditionally been split according to the structure/agency binary. So empirical historical work is censured for its naïve humanism and formal analysis attacked for its abstraction from “everyday” struggles.8

     

    The polarity informing these narratives seems to be irreconcilable with Foucault’s notion of the “event.” For Foucault, the “event” is always manifest at the level of materiality but is nonetheless “an effect of, and within, a dispersion of matter” (“Order” 69). Foucault’s work does not set out to “overcome a ‘conflict’ or ‘opposition’ between structure and historical development” (Archaeology 11). Rather, the “event” is intended to dissolve the binary–to account for historical transformations that operate outside the dialectic of the empirical and transcendental. For cultural studies, it seems, there may be genuine practical restraints that preclude this kind of historical work from taking place; the kind of intellectual work Foucault envisages requires “a knowledge of details and . . . depends on a vast accumulation of source material” (“Nietzsche” 140), but, as Morris contends, “methodological desire alone is rarely enough to carry amateurs through thick textual slabs of detail” (“Introduction” 5). Yet, there remains a need to reconstitute “history” so it is not relegated to the role of mere scene-setting. Foucault raises the question of whether the concept of “discourse”–the very tool that is used to facilitate a critique of empiricism–can be mobilized to perform a descriptivist mode of analysis. As we will see, the problems that this incitement, to “restore to discourse its character as an event,” poses for cultural studies are considerable (Foucault, “Order” 66).9

     

    Agency and Butler’s Foucault

     

    Into the 1980s, the elaboration of cultural studies’ critical framework that enabled it to move to the various avatars of identity politics also accorded Foucault’s insights a renewed significance. Reflecting on the pertinence of the concept of “identity” to cultural studies, Hall intimates the dilemma that it presents. The notion of a unitary or originary subject has, as he suggests, undergone an important destabilization, but remains crucial “to the question of agency and politics”; it is “in the attempt to rearticulate the relationship between subjects and discursive practices that the question of identity recurs” (“Introduction” 1-2). It is in respect of this oscillation–that is, both the necessity of “identity” and the danger of its drive toward essentialism–that Foucault’s work is mobilized by cultural studies.

     

    What cultural studies requires, and what, according to Hall, Foucault is seen to provide, “is not an abandonment or abolition of ‘the subject’ but a reconceptualisation” (“Introduction” 2). In an overview of Foucault’s work, Lois McNay, for example, is anxious to show how Foucault informs “feminist and postcolonial critiques of Enlightenment thought as a highly gendered and ethnocentric construct that implicitly naturalises a white, masculine perspective,” thereby clearing a space “for radically ‘other’ ways of thinking and being” (4-5). But the apparent ease with which Foucault is written into this discourse obscures some of the underlying inconsistencies this formula actually entails.

     

    Judith Butler’s contribution to feminist cultural studies is substantially indebted to her reading of the first volume of The History of Sexuality. An example is her work on the transgressive potentiality of gender performativity, where the assumption of a “sex” occurs through significatory practice.10 However, its reception has been marked with a kind of ambivalence–as Vicki Bell points out, “the temporal performative nature of identities as a theoretical premise means that more than ever, one needs to question how identities continue to be produced, embodied and performed, effectively, passionately and with social and political consequence” (2). The challenge for Butler, here, is to ensure that her framework is not a merely speculative one and to “think” agency while retaining the constitutive nature of gender relations.

     

    The apprehension surrounding the deployment of a subject exposes Butler (and poststructuralist feminisms in general) to accusations of theoreticism–where conceptual sophistication is said to compromise a capacity to engage with “concrete” political struggles and the concerns of “real” women. The central problematic for Butler in Bodies that Matter is that if, as Foucault argues, “sex” is a “regulatory ideal,” how is it possible to understand the materiality of “sex”? And, crucially, if norms of sex, gender, and desire are simply performed (that is, they are deliberately or consciously enacted), then how can one avoid a latent version of humanism?

     

    It is in the effort to locate the source of authentic resistance that Butler considers this statement from Foucault:

     

    It is the agency of sex that we must break away from, if we aim–through a tactical reversal of the various mechanisms of sexuality–to counter the grips of power with the claims of bodies, pleasures, and knowledges, in their multiplicity and their possibility of resistance. The rallying point for the counterattack against the deployment of sexuality ought not to be sex-desire, but bodies and pleasures. (History 157, qtd. in “Revisiting” 11, 13-14)

     

    But this injunction presents Butler with a number of obstacles, largely concerning the ontological status of “bodies and pleasures”:

     

    These bodies, these pleasures, where do they come from, and in what does their agency consist, if they are the agency that counters the regime of sex-desire? . . . From where does this break emerge? Is it a break that is performed by a subject? Is it a break in the subject as it were, a certain constituting hiatus on which the subject nevertheless draws? And who are the “we” who are said to exercise this agency against the agency of sex? What are the resources that counter the regulation of sexuality if they are not in some sense derived from the discursive resources of normative regulation? (“Revisiting” 14)

     

    So Butler rehearses the terms of the now-familiar structure/agency binary–again, it involves a movement between the subject, what it is that makes the subject possible, and what in the subject can be said to be genuinely agential. As far as Butler is concerned, Foucault leaves these questions unanswered. She must resign herself, then, to this futile vacillation. Hence, Butler charges Foucault with utopianism: by apparently positing a time when “disordered and non-gendered pleasures abound,” he risks making both “sexual difference and homosexuality strangely unspeakable” (“Revisiting” 15, 12). His work, particularly his introduction to Herculine Barbin is said to harbor an “unacknowledged emancipatory ideal” and indulge in the liberatory discourse he purports to displace (Gender 119).

     

    If we are to take Foucault’s ideas in their broader context, however, we notice that they do allow for the prospect of making tangible interventions into the strategies of domination that constitute regimes of sexuality. Discourses must be conceived as “tactical elements or blocks operating in the field of force relations” that make up a particular strategy (History 101-02). As Foucault contends, “there can exist different and even contradictory discourses within the same strategy, [or] they can, on the contrary, circulate without changing their form from one strategy to another, opposing strategy” (102). This instability and mutability of discourse enables Foucault to account for the way discourses of homosexuality can undermine a certain normativity. He writes that “homosexuality began to speak in its own behalf, to demand that its legitimacy or ‘naturality’ be acknowledged, often in the same vocabulary, using the same categories by which it was medically disqualified” (101, emphasis added). “Resistance” does not necessarily entail an obvious discursive rupture or change in vocabulary. It also does not assume a singular form: “there is no single locus of great Refusal,” but “a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case: resistances that are possible, necessary, improbable; others that are spontaneous, savage, solitary, concerted, rampant, or violent” (History 95-96). So mobilizing Foucault does not, as Butler seems to think, demand a disavowal of the analytical category of gender but enables a description of the shifting relations between particular discursive fields, disciplinary technologies, and (gendered) subjects.11

     

    In Butler’s schema, certain types of representational practice are deemed less legitimately “resistive” than others and, consequently, evidence of “agency” must continually be problematized in order to disclose any perceived complicity with “the discursive resources of normative regulation” (“Revisiting” 14). So we are in a situation where any instance of transgression is always potentially not transgressive enough. Butler cannot reconcile her insights with “concrete” struggles, in part, because she overlooks the unstable and differentiated relation of discourses to power. According to Butler’s logic, “It seems crucial to question whether [any particular instance of] resistance . . . is sufficient as a political contestation of compulsory heterosexuality” (Bodies 106). But within the trappings of this symbolic politics, who is to decide when the contestation of a regulatory strategy is sufficient?

     

    If Butler, following Foucault, conceives of domination as a subjectifying as well as objectifying force, she cannot aspire to a total structural displacement of “compulsory heterosexuality.” As Foucault suggests, power relations depend “on a multiplicity of points of resistance: these play the role of adversary, target, support, or handle in power relations” (History 95; emphasis added). Given this inherent instability, it is not possible to define power as a unidirectionally negative and totalitarian entity, against which it is continually necessary to mobilize “resistance.”12 Yet the opposition between structure and agency that Butler presumes requires “domination” ultimately to be, as Colin Gordon describes, that which “falsifies the essence of human subjectivity” (“Other” 30). And “agency” must then somehow be reclaimed, although in Butler’s case without resorting to the category of an originary subject. So despite appealing to a Foucauldian reconfiguration of power and subjectivity, it is still “the subject” that Butler seeks but must never actually find. It is, in her own words, possible only “to promote an alternative imaginary to a hegemonic imaginary” (Bodies 91).

     

    This impasse characterizes Butler’s attempt to theorize agency and attests to the more general difficulty involved in using Foucault selectively within identity politics as it exists in its present orthodoxies. However, to the extent that any incongruity between the approaches is acknowledged, discussion within cultural studies seems to focus on relatively peripheral issues. In his reflections on postcolonial theory, for instance, Robert Young tries to account for the fact that Foucault’s ideas seem “particularly appropriate to the colonial arena, and yet colonialism itself does not figure” as a specific topic of research in Foucault’s analyses (60).13 But such disparities do not provide any substantive reason why Foucault’s insights cannot be usefully extrapolated and applied to these novel areas of inquiry.

     

    There is usually some attempt to assuage these sorts of anxieties by locating evidence in Foucault’s work of his interest, however fleeting, in a range of research topics. This tendency has imbued his more minor essays and articles, and, in particular, his many interviews, with a renewed significance. It is exemplified in Foucault’s role in some lesbian and gay studies. One article quotes David Halperin to suggest that “‘as a madman . . . as a left-wing political extremist . . . [and] as a sexual pervert,’ Foucault had good reason to want to expose the ways by which normalizing discourses both produce and silence ‘social deviants’” (Halperin 130, qtd. in Taylor 6). But narrativizing Foucault’s ideas by using his private life as an interpretive tool does little to patch over the underlying epistemological inconsistencies between his and Halperin’s critical agendas.14 Significantly, this approach supposes that a shared interest in matters of sexuality or race permits the use of Foucault’s work for these very particular forms of critique. It is assumed that Foucault’s concepts can be unproblematically applied because both Foucault and cultural studies are doing the same thing.

     

    Morris is aware of these points of friction (and her caution would extend to those situated along the various other axes of identity politics): “any feminists drawn in to sending Love Letters to Foucault would be in no danger of reciprocation. Foucault’s work is not the work of a ladies’ man” (“Pirate’s” 152). Notwithstanding these difficulties, however, her provocation is, I think, ultimately a positive one. Foucault’s work enables a study of technologies of subjection at the same time as he speaks of the “insurrection of subjugated knowledges” and thereby manages to bypass the problematics of humanism versus anti-humanism (159). Certainly, such a discourse holds considerable promise for a kind of feminism.

     

    For in a perspective in which bodies and souls are seen as not simply constituted but also invested and traversed by relations of power-knowledge (and that unevenly and inequitably–it is not a question of a uniform distribution or a stable “effect”) what becomes possible in relation to “women . . . is something more than a history of a ‘construction’: it is rather the possibility of a history of a strategic specification . . . and at the same time, a history of that in women which defies specification, which escapes its hold; the positively not specific, the unwomanly in history” (159).

     

    But Foucault is interested in “how” these situations arise rather than in arriving at an immediate account of “why.” To use Foucault in the way that Morris suggests requires the inclusion of an empiricism that dissolves the opposition between structure and agency.

     

    Identity, Identification

     

    A politics founded on the notion of “identity”–and as conceived by some formations of cultural studies–turns (unsurprisingly) on a consideration of the activity of “identification.” That is, according to Hall, any description of disciplinary regulation must be complemented “with an account of the practices of subjective self-constitution” (“Introduction” 13). Hall positions himself within a distinctly Althusserian problematic–one that came to prominence in cultural studies through feminist screen criticism in journals such as Screen and M/F in the late 1970s but, in Hall’s case, was also inflected by Butler and Lois McNay’s work. Hall worries that Foucault does not “engage with the unconscious” or theorize “the psychic mechanisms or interior processes by which these automatic ‘interpellations’ might be . . . resisted or negotiated” (“Introduction” 14, 12). That these are regarded as significant absences is indicative of the supposed need for psychoanalysis in any explanation of “identificatory practices” and their link with power. The considerable number of works that attempt to supplement Foucault’s findings with psychoanalysis attests to this perceived need.15

     

    However, as Nikolas Rose comments, “a genealogy of subjectification takes this individualised, interiorised, totalised and psychologised understanding of what it is to be human as delineating the site of a historical problem, not providing the grounds for a historical narrative” (“Identity” 129). Foucault’s attention to processes of subjectification is not aimed at reconstituting “the subject” as a coherent source of volition. Rather, Foucault aims to investigate the “complex field of historicity in the way the individual is summoned to recognize himself as an ethical subject of sexual conduct” (Use 32). This is achieved only by regarding the self as a relational and not a substantive entity. “Identity” can only be understood by examining the practical fields in which our relations with ourselves are circumscribed. As Rose further points out, these relations assume particular forms because they are the target

     

    of more or less rationalised schemes, which have sought to shape our ways of understanding and enacting our existence as human beings in the name of certain objectives--manliness, femininity, honour, modesty, propriety, civility, discipline. . . . The list is as diverse and heterogeneous as it is interminable. ("Identity" 130)

     

    It is only through a consideration of these technologies–rather than a theorization of what Hall labels “interior processes,” or an appeal to the “imaginary”–that one can comprehend how modes of self-relationship are defined and elaborated.

     

    So while Foucault’s work actually opens up a space of historical inquiry into the multiplicity of rationalities that traverse the self, Hall reads this reworking of “agency”–particularly Foucault’s account of “techniques of the self”–as an incomplete attempt to establish a theory of resistance. Hall regards the last two volumes of The History of Sexuality as a rethinking of the notion of power deployed in Foucault’s earlier work:

     

    The more well established critique . . . has to do with the problem which Foucault encounters with theorising resistance within the theory of power he deploys in Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality; the entirely self-policing conception of the subject . . . and the absence of any attention to what might in any way interrupt, prevent or disturb the smooth insertion of individuals into the subject positions constructed by these discourses. . . . [T]he subjects which are constructed in this way are “docile bodies.” There is no theorised account of how or why bodies should not always-for-ever turn up, in place, at the right time. (“Introduction” 11-12)

     

    But Hall overlooks the inherent conflict between the various practices that constitute regulatory programs–or as Jeff Malpas and Gary Wickham suggest, that governance always falls short of its target, that it “is necessarily incomplete and as a necessary consequence must always fail” (40). To illustrate this point, it is worth dwelling on Foucault’s own account of his analysis of prisons:

     

    the rational schemas of the prison, the hospital or the asylum are not general principles which can be rediscovered only through the historian’s retrospective interpretation. They are explicit programmes. . . . I tried to show that the rationality envisaged in penal imprisonment wasn’t the outcome of a straightforward calculation of immediate interest . . . but that it arose out of a whole technology of human training, surveillance of behaviour, individualisation of the elements of a social body. . . . [T]hese programmes don’t take effect in the institutions in an integral manner; they are simplified, or some are chosen and not others; and things never work out as planned. . . . [I]n fact there are different strategies that are mutually opposed, composed and superposed so as to produce permanent and solid effects that can perfectly well be understood in terms of their rationality, even though they don’t conform to the initial programming. (“Questions” 10)

     

    Foucault is interested in revealing that aspect of chance, or aléa, that exists in excess of a particular rationality but that is always potentially reducible to the operations of that rationality. And this respecification of power and agency is at odds with the liberalistic conception of domination on which Hall appears to insist.

     

    Governmentality, “Policy,” and the Intellectual

     

    As I noted earlier, Foucault’s notion of “governmentality” has motivated a relatively distinct body of work that can be broadly characterized by its interest in redefining “the cultural” as a series of instrumental or administrative measures that are subject to historical investigation. This includes relatively recent scholarship in and around cultural studies that employs a Foucauldian descriptivism in its exposition of cultural phenomena. Such work examines “everyday” cultural phenomena in their mundanity and historical particularity. Eating practices, self-help and etiquette literature, sport, and so on are granted a local and instrumental character.16 Of the array of studies concerned with the governmental organization and specification of “culture,” I focus here on examples that have had some currency in cultural studies debates (particularly within Australia), and which implicate the role of the cultural studies intellectual.

     

    Tony Bennett’s work is indebted to the “governmentality” school and to a definition of “culture” explicable via Hunter’s analysis of the historical emergence of literary education. In Hunter’s schema, the school is not, as is commonly assumed, the “social realisation of the ideal values of culture and criticism,” but “a governmental apparatus able to achieve a certain ‘humanisation’ of the population according to a (supervisory) ‘rationality’ supported by the apparatus itself” (Culture 3). In order to arrive at a historical logic that is capable of describing this rationality, the domain of the “cultural” is reconceived as a sphere of “piecemeal” administrative measures and programs that are not determined by “the dialectics of ‘totality’” (Culture 20).

     

    Bennett proposes, similarly, that it is not possible for cultural studies to comprehend the relationships between cultural practices and power without describing the specific technologies and kinds of knowledge by which populations are managed. Bennett’s historical work on museums at the turn of the century, for example, is careful to consider the multiplicity of administrative objectives that museums pursue and the diversity of programs that comprise them. So rather than cast the museum as an “ideological” instrument whose work is simply analogous to the ideological work carried out within other cultural sites, such as the school or the factory, Bennett is interested in the nineteenth-century museum as one of a series of discrete operators of social reform. And he is interested in how this “multiplication of culture’s utility” is associated with the development of liberal forms of government (Culture 107). Such a study necessarily involves orienting itself toward an examination of government policy, and it is this emphasis that subsequently became the source of considerable controversy within cultural studies debates.

     

    Bennett’s revisionist program involves a reappraisal of the institutional and discursive conditions which “define the limits and forms of the practicable” within cultural studies (“Towards” 42). As Tom O’Regan explains, Bennett’s work calls “for the double reconstitution of policy: both as an object of study in its own right and as a political site for activity and analysis” (411). By way of authority, Bennett cites Foucault’s suggestion that “to work with government implies neither subjection nor global acceptance. One can simultaneously work and be resistive. I even think that the two go together” (“Useful” 395). Such a practice requires, at the very least, an acknowledgement of cultural studies’ institutional moorings and an acceptance of its own imbrication with administrative programs with specific normative goals.

     

    Bennett’s proposal has exposed him to accusations of reformism from the quarters of cultural studies that see disciplinization as a political compromise and “institutionalisation as a moment of profound danger” (Hall, “Legacies” 285).17 Such a view stems from a narrative of cultural studies’ history that defines cultural studies by its position of marginality–both in relation to the rest of the humanities academy and to the mechanisms of the state. And it is from such a position that cultural studies is said to derive its radical, political edge. However, Bennett provides powerful reasons why this history should be reconceived, through his reading, for instance, of Raymond Williams’s work.18 In Culture: A Reformer’s Science, Bennett suggests that Williams’s claim that “culture is ordinary” includes mundane processes such as the administration of cultural resources, on which considerations of cultural policy have a direct bearing.

     

    But while Bennett’s position is provocative, it has been suggested that his mobilization of Foucault’s work is unduly narrow. This is particularly apparent, O’Regan argues, in Bennett’s assessment of what constitutes “useful” cultural analysis:

     

    Here work is to be regarded as “relevant” insofar as it participates in and extends administrative processes. . . . “[S]ocial relevance” is radically limited, narrowed to policy practice: that which can be made governmentally or corporately actionable, can be publicly endorsed, and can be institutionally sanctioned and found useful by government, tribunal, policy-makers and interest-group lobbyists directly involved in forming policies. (414)

     

    By construing “relevance” in such restricted terms, Bennett advocates a direct participation in regulation “as if that were the only socially forceful position to take” (O’Regan 415). But, as O’Regan points out, Foucault is not interested in making such rigid decrees:

     

    he argued that his work should be regarded not so much as providing answers but as providing resources that certain sorts of activists–like prisoners’ rights groups–might find useful in their own practice. It was up to such groups to make Foucault’s work “useful”; he would not legislate how that use should occur. (415)

     

    Bennett’s reconfiguration of cultural studies in terms of its technical administration can be read with reference to the “empirico-transcendental doublet” described earlier. Bennett seeks to terminate the dialectic simply by “cancelling out” the transcendental side. Whether such a move–that is, to operate with half a binary–is useful, or indeed, possible is difficult to say.19

     

    Moreover, Bennett’s position construes “government” as encompassing only the specific administrative technologies collectively referred to as “policy.” Foucault’s work on “governmentality” is aimed at refuting precisely this assumption–he shows us, in fact, that “there are several forms of government among which the prince’s relation to his state is only one particular mode” (“Governmentality” 91). The second and third volumes of The History of Sexuality document how regulation of Greek morality occurred not merely through explicit codification and legislation, but through a range of techniques of the self that situate one as the subject of moral action. So “policy” does not regulate “culture” single-handedly. As O’Regan suggests, policy is not “the structural engine room which powers everything else” but “a particular kind of information practice with its own limitations, potentialities and linkages to other kinds of public discourse, including cultural criticism and journalism, over which it holds no necessary pre-eminence” (416). “Government,” then, describes a complex system of relays and is, accordingly, a more dispersed set of processes than Bennett’s focus on policy would suggest.

     

    It is this reading of “government” that informs Nikolas Rose’s investigations into the organizational character of the “cultural.” Rose is concerned with tracking relations of force “as they flow through a multitude of human technologies, in all the practices, arenas and spaces where programmes for the administration of others intersect with techniques for the administration of ourselves” (Powers 5). So he is prompted by Foucault to pursue, among other things, an investigation of the complex assemblages that circumscribe our relations with ourselves–for example, in the domains of psychology or liberal government–and the various rationalities that traverse these practices. Such a project exemplifies the possibility of an analytics that is concerned, significantly, with historical precision and amenability to practical action, but which has limited currency within dominant formations of cultural studies.

     

    Rose’s reading of governmentality is bound up with a particular way of conceiving the critical intellectual; indeed, the uncertainty surrounding the function of the intellectual underlies, to a large degree, controversies about the role of “policy work” within cultural studies. The seeming political detachment of Foucault’s core historical works indicates that Foucault eschews the kind of teleological critique that is fundamental to certain formations of cultural studies. As Colin Gordon remarks, Foucault’s objective is not, “to arrive at a priori moral or intellectual judgements on the features of our society produced by . . . forms of power, but to render possible an analysis of the process of production itself” (“Other” 29). A question arises, then, regarding the kinds of social inquiry that can be derived from what Gordon calls Foucault’s “rigorous insistence on this particular kind of neutrality” (“Other” 29).

     

    Gayatri Spivak has described Foucault’s purported “neutrality” as that of “the first-world intellectual masquerading as the absent nonrepresenter who lets the oppressed speak for themselves” (292). What prompts Spivak’s disparagement is that Foucault’s supposed neutrality allegedly masks his own ideological allegiances. This neutrality supposedly allows the “complicity of the investigating subject (male or female professional) to disguise itself in transparency” (294). So Spivak sees Foucault’s unwillingness to judge as “interested individualistic refusals of the institutional privileges of power bestowed on the subject” that neglects “the critic’s institutional responsibility” (280). Similarly, albeit in this case crediting Gramsci’s “organic intellectual,” Hall also alludes to the “responsibility” of the critic. For Hall, this involves transmitting ideas and knowledge “through the intellectual function, to those who do not belong, professionally, in the intellectual class” (“Legacies” 281).20

     

    But Foucault does not imagine the intellectual as part of the vanguard, placed “somewhat ahead and to the side” and expressing the “truth of the collectivity” (“Intellectuals” 207-8). He rejects the programmatic nature of this task:

     

    critique doesn’t have to be the premise of a deduction which concludes: this then is what needs to be done. . . . It doesn’t have to lay down the law for the law. It isn’t a stage in programming. (“Questions” 13)

     

    Foucault’s “specific intellectual” derives from a particular understanding of the relationship of the intellectual to power. The specificity of intellectuals comes from their situation “at the precise points where their own conditions of life or work situate them,” but is also linked to “the specificity of the politics of truth in our societies” (“Truth” 126, 132). So the problem for the intellectual is not to change people’s consciousness, but to facilitate the processes of confrontation that engage with and potentially de-valorize regimes of truth-production. Doing so requires, as Deleuze suggests, a “diagram” or “a display of the relations between forces which constitute power,” and the role of the intellectual is envisaged, above all else, as that of a “cartographer” (36, 44). In other words, it is to be descriptive rather than prescriptive: to provide a map of a particular regime without determining in advance what it will be used for.

     

    At the center of this debate lies a methodological question regarding the supposed conflict between critical and descriptive imperatives. For Foucault, the two always implicate each other:

     

    In truth these two tasks are never completely separable: . . . any critical task, putting in question the instances of control, must at the same time analyse the discursive regularities through which they are formed; and any genealogical description must take into account the limits which operate in real formations. The difference between the critical and the genealogical enterprise is not so much a difference of object or domain, but of point of attack, perspective, and delimitation. (“Order of Discourse” 71-72)

     

    As we have already noted, Hunter, following Foucault, characterizes this binary between “empirical recognition” and “transcendental reflection” as a “permanent and unresolvable feature of the figure of ‘the subject’” of modernity (Culture 272). This subject is a projection of a certain rationale or “analytic of finitude” that is the condition of existence for the human sciences. It demands, according to Foucault, that man “is a being such that knowledge will be attained in him of what renders all knowledge possible” (Order 318). This impulse toward “finitude” intimates the need for a structuring or delimitation of the self, which we have observed so far as various manifestations of the structure/agency binary. As Hunter argues, these “debates . . . are quite literally interminable because they simply reproduce the ambiguous space in which the human sciences come into being” (Culture 206). If Foucault is right, then any claims to theoretical openness or interdisciplinarity “do not indicate the permanence of an ever-open question; they refer back to a precise and extremely well-determined epistemological arrangement in history” (Order 346). And it is within the constraints of this framework that we must situate cultural studies’ critical armature.

     

    This compulsion to transcend empirical conditions in order to explain them is described as a practice of the self, central to the formation of cultural studies intellectuals. As Hunter proposes, “the act of theoretical clarification . . . is in fact inseparable from the normative imposition of a certain aesthetico-ethical obligation (to complete the self)” (Culture 25). It is contended that, despite expanding the nineteenth-century conception of “culture” to include political, economic, and “popular” spheres, cultural studies remains caught within the ambit of idealism. It merely grants a materialist ontology to the same dialectical fashioning of an exemplary subject. Hunter suggests that it is not possible to “politicise aesthetics” simply by subsuming this narrow ethical practice within culture “as a whole way of life” (“Aesthetics” 347-48). He arrives at this position by way of Foucault’s inquiries, in the second and third volumes of The History of Sexuality, into the techniques of self-problematization that enable individuals to recognize themselves as subjects of a particular normative code. Hunter argues that the political activity of the cultural critic is just one such site of self-problematization, whose objective is the complete development of “society as a whole” (Culture 70). This depends on an historical thinking–or what Hunter calls a “philosophico-historical projection”–that relates the incompleteness of the self to the figure of the “alienated society” (70). This state of social fragmentation is supposedly eventually overcome, and the ethical division of the subject reconciled, through the intellectual action of the critic.

     

    However, the indeterminacy of textual critique–as we have noted above in terms of the structure/agency dialectic–guarantees that the goals of reconciliation and “complete development” are unattainable. Hunter points out the upshot of this deferral:

     

    the objectives of the aesthetic ethos are not to be found in its official goals but in the entrance to a state of permanent “readiness” or ethical preparation. At the center of this ethic lies a powerful technology for withdrawing from the world as a sphere of mundane knowledge and action. In fact the aesthete does not pursue knowledge of “worldly” activity as such, having subjected them to a problematization that makes them ethically worthless. Instead, he or she seeks to prepare or cultivate the kind of self that will be worthy of enlightened knowledge and action in an indefinitely deferred future. (“Aesthetics” 354)

     

    So cultural studies’ insistence on these critical vacillations means that there is an “imperative to abstain from direct political activity until the reconciliatory movement of the dialectic brings the time to ripeness” (“Aesthetics” 355). But this reconciliation, and the political conditions supposedly ushered in by this moment, can never actually arrive, preventing such intellectual work from solving substantial problems of social fragmentation.

     

    This is not to say, however, that Foucault didn’t describe what he did as “critique” or consider his work to have a “critical” function. In fact, some of Foucault’s musings on “resistance” seem to implicate him in precisely the kind of aesthetico-ethical impulse that he purports to displace. To see this, we only have to look to his assertion that “critique”

     

    should be an instrument for those who fight, those who resist and refuse what is. Its use should be in processes of conflict and confrontation, essays in refusal. . . . It is a challenge directed to what is. (“Questions” 13)

     

    How does such a challenge claim legitimacy without some authoritarian recourse to notions of truth and falsity? And how can this be reconciled with what I have described as Foucault’s explicit efforts to respecify this philosophically fraught space–to configure non-programmatic “maps” of cultural relations?

     

    Of course it is not possible for “critique” to operate unproblematically outside the bounds of normativity and, indeed, that is not what I am advocating. Rather, a “map” describes the disciplinary practices, political technologies, and points of confrontation and instability that constitute “what is.” If we then decide to “challenge” certain of these practices and procedures, and the relations of contingency through which they function, it is possible to do so by mobilizing, where necessary, particular ideals in order to invent provisional strategies of inquiry and criticism. By reconstituting the question of “critique” and “resistance” in this way–and by acknowledging what Foucault describes as the “very tight-knit, very coherent outlines” that form “the immediate space of our reflection” (Order 384)–the door is opened for a pragmatics that can hope to circumvent the problematics of the “empirico-transcendental doublet.” And it permits a discourse that avoids what cultural studies sets up as the anxious opposition between “theory” and “politics.”

     

    Conclusion

     

    The last five years have seen the publication of at least two books that serve as potential cultural studies instruction manuals while claiming a specifically Foucauldian pedigree. One of them–Danaher, Schirato, and Webb’s introductory text, Understanding Foucault–is an exegetical work that filters Foucault’s work through the critical agendas of, to name some key sources, Butler, McNay, Said, and de Certeau. Foucault’s insights are clarified via a selection of secondary texts and examples from popular culture, present-day political events, and everyday phenomena.

     

    We are shown, for instance, how Foucault’s work on subjectivity is readily applicable to issues of identity: Princess Diana’s various personas of mother, style icon, and “people’s princess” are said to exemplify “how our identities are played out within the complex ensembles and discursive flows that produce a multiplicity of subject positions” (43). Foucault’s point, it is argued, is to “problematise the question of truth, and to show the extent to which it is an effect of the work of discourses and institutions, rather than being absolute or essential” (41-42). In another example, Foucault’s notion of “descending individualism” enables a discussion of the class politics of contemporary news media–that is, “how populist newspapers . . . devote coverage to suspected cases of welfare fraud among the poor, naming the perpetrators of such ‘outrages’ . . . while ignoring the more costly fraudulent activities of very wealthy groups and people” (58). Such technologies of surveillance are also said to come in the form of the “male gaze” and can be located in the relations of power that regulate, for example, sporting fields and beauty regimes (54-55). So the book provides us with an overview of Foucault’s work in which his concepts are deemed to complement a cultural studies vocabulary and adhere to the protocols of its critical project.

     

    Kendall and Wickham’s Understanding Culture reproaches this “dominant” version of cultural studies by refusing what the authors call cultural studies’ “obsession” with meanings, power, and resistance. They contend that such a framework assumes that “power, oppression, class and exploitation” are everywhere, without any rigorous investigation into whether this is actually, empirically, the case (15-16). Cultural studies’ very concern with “the control of meanings and their dissemination,” it is argued, requires that it is “frequently anti-empirical” (14). Any such empirical work “would get in the way of this grand theorising, this relentless induction and deduction” that is necessary for the ubiquity that cultural studies grants the “political” (14).

     

    The book’s authors propose, instead, cultural studies as the study of “ordering.” Their conceptualization of “ordering” is premised on a Foucauldian notion of governance that they use to examine the management and control of cultural objects. This involves describing how cultural objects and practices appear in their mundanity, and the authors detail a procedure for such a description. It is in the effort “not to rush to an explanation of the things,” then, that this descriptivist Foucault is given precedence over the speculative one we encounter in Danaher, Schirato, and Webb (56).

     

    For a more dramatic account of this distinction, it is worth reciting a quotation Kendall and Wickham take from Thomas Osborne. His Foucault

     

    is not perhaps the usual, erstwhile trendy one. The sort of Foucault that appeals to [Osborne] is not, anyway, the Foucault that appears in the cribs; the subversive continental philosopher, the arcane prophet of transgression, the iconoclastic poststructuralist, the meta-theorist of power, the functionalist theorist of social control, or the gloomy prophet of the totally administered society. These sorts of Foucault can all safely be forgotten. The Foucault that motivates much of this book . . . is a much more buttoned up animal . . . a good modernist rather than a faddish postmodernist, a rigorous and not so unconventional historical epistemologist. . . . This, then, is not the naughty, transgressive Foucault, but rather . . . Foucault with his clothes on. (1-2 quoting Osborne x)

     

    This conflict, marked by the radical Foucault depicted in Danaher, Schirato, and Webb’s book and this other, more modest Foucault, is, as we have seen, broadly indicative of the tensions that characterize cultural studies’ relationship with Foucault. And what may be a study of culture along identifiably Foucauldian lines is not necessarily identifiable as “cultural studies.” Indeed, Kendall and Wickham’s book prompts us to ask what is going on when a carefully formulated study of “culture” does not feel like “cultural studies,” and can barely plausibly call itself such. Danaher, Schirato, and Webb’s deployment of Foucault is a revealing one–it enables cultural studies to theorize areas that certain versions of Marxism could not, while traversing the interests of the various axes of identity politics.

     

    Of course, it has been necessary to limit my study to a few key readings of Foucault, and I recognize my comments are restricted to those formations of cultural studies that are informed by these intellectual traditions. In much of the work I have discussed, Foucault’s concepts are deemed to adhere to the requirements of cultural studies’ critical agenda and to a methodology marked, as we have seen, by the dialectics of structure and agency. However, to evaluate these positions in the way that I have is not to argue that certain readings of Foucault are not “accurate” because they do not conform to some authoritative, authorial “intention.” My analysis, instead, offers ways of reconceiving some important theoretical problems within cultural studies. And I am arguing that it may not be sufficient for cultural studies’ analyses to gesture toward Foucault’s ideas without acknowledging that these necessarily entail a much broader reconceptualization of cultural studies’ theoretical armature. If cultural studies is to start engaging more meaningfully with specific institutional spheres and material operators of power, then it must do so by describing and analyzing cultural phenomena as they appear within realms of contingency rather than as products of generalized systematicities. This would allow for the present to be reconceived, as Rose suggests, as “an actuality to be acted upon and within by genealogical investigation, to be made amenable to action by the action of thought” (Powers 11). By taking effect in this way within a historical domain, cultural analysis can offer a means for involving oneself practically in the world.

     

    Notes

     

    1. I will not attempt the uncertain task of defining cultural studies here, although Bennett (“Towards” and “Reluctant”) offers some good reasons–mainly regarding the institutionalization of the discipline–why it is possible to do so.

     

    2. See Frow (“Versions”), Bové, and Miller (173-80) for a review of the reception of Foucault within the “history of ideas” tradition coming out of American graduate schools–an intellectual field that, importantly, as Frow points out, “Foucault’s own work has done so much to undermine” (“Some Versions” 145).

     

    3. Michael Sprinker contends that Foucault is interested in “a familiar historical problem: the emergence of modern society and its characteristic instruments of political and ideological control” (4). Similarly, Colin Mercer suggests that both Foucault and Gramsci illustrate how systems of domination are “simultaneously coercive and productive” (51).

     

    4. There are other theorists who figure significantly here. Bourdieu’s characterization of the relation between everyday practices of consumption and broader configurations of power via his notion of “reproduction” has been extremely influential. Also important are de Certeau’s The Practice of Everyday Life and Lefebvre’s The Critique of Everyday Life–see Drotner for a summary of their reception in media ethnography.

     

    5. For example, Callinicos distinguishes between two currents of poststructuralism and suggests that Foucauldian genealogy is preferable to Derridean “textualism” for its inclusion of extra-discursive elements in its analysis of power (86). See also Said’s “The Problem of Textuality: Two Exemplary Positions” for a similar positioning of the two theorists.

     

    6. A good example of this is in Said’s formative work, Orientalism. Here, “discourse” is used to describe the construction and administration of the non-European world in terms of a kind of semiotics. He contends that orientalism is not merely a text but “a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles” (2). But despite this attempt to grant “discourse” some kind of extratextual materiality and historicity, Said is primarily concerned with orientalist texts “as representations, not as ‘natural’ depictions of the Orient” (21). In studying the production of orientalist knowledges and their connection with imperialist power, he conceives of the relationship between the orient and the occident in terms of a “complex hegemony” (5).

     

    7. In “Truth and Power,” Foucault proclaims, “I don’t see who could be more of an anti-structuralist than myself” (114). There are many examples in Foucault’s work–see particularly pages 64-73 of “The Order of Discourse” and the introduction to The Archaeology of Knowledge–that attest to his effort to “find a way around the primacy of representation” (Order 364).

     

    8. E.P. Thompson’s disparagement of Althusser’s synchronicity and supposed depoliticization of history in The Poverty of Theory is probably the most famous example of this conflict.

     

    9. The new historicism offers a good point of comparison here for its attention to historical detail, and is notable for its influence on Foucault’s later work. See The Use of Pleasure (11). However, while During (198), describes it as a “non-mimetic paradigm,” it is still accused by Steedman of harboring an underlying formalism.

     

    10. Bell presents a survey of recent scholarship concerned with “performativity and belonging,” including the implications for discussions of race and ethnicity. Such work involves a consideration of the “ways in which technologies, discursive deployments and power/knowledge networks produce the lines of allegiance and fracture in the various orders of things within which people and objects move” (1). See also Probyn’s Outside Belongings for an example of an attempt to use Foucault to work against rigid notions of identity and determination–it is particularly his concept of “heterotopia” that is said to function

     

    against a certain logic of identity which proceeds through division and designation, ultimately producing polarization. . . . The concept of heterotopia provides an analytic space in which to consider forms of belonging outside of the divisiveness of categorising. (10)

     

    In contrast, Probyn, who is also motivated by Foucault’s work on food, wishes to use it in order to contest the limits of identity politics. She wants to arrive at a “new ethics of existence” that no longer posits sex as a privileged site in the theorization of identity (“Food” 215). Probyn purports to be pointedly Foucauldian in her hope that “through food we may begin to formulate an ethics of living that works against the logics of categorization that now dominate much of the politics of identity” (224).

     

    11. See The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self for historical analyses that deploy the category of gender. Both of these texts consider the ways sexual behavior, the relations between men and women, and instances of masculine privilege came to concern moral experience and regulation in Greek antiquity. For example, the problematization and prohibition of certain behaviours are described as being largely “an elaboration of masculine conduct carried out from the viewpoint of men in order to give form to their behaviour” (Use 22-23).

     

    12. McNay’s reading of Foucault in Foucault: A Critical Introduction is exemplary here. She contends that, even when revised as a “positive phenomenon,” Foucault’s notion of power is “a unidirectionally imposed monolithic force,” leaving no scope for “the possibility of social change and the dynamic and relatively autonomous nature of social action” (3). “The idea that all thought is in the service of dominatory regimes,” she argues, “cannot adequately explain how conflicting perspectives may arise in the same regime” (64).

     

    13. Young suggests that “Foucault’s few explicit writings in these areas are sometimes curious: take his comments on the revolution in Iran, where he discusses the Iranian Revolution in terms of what he considers to be its expression of ‘an absolutely collective will’ which he contrasts to the more mediated forms of European revolutions” (57). Spivak also worries about what she regards as an imperialist tendency in Foucault’s work:

     

    sometimes it seems as if the very brilliance of Foucault’s analysis of the centuries of European imperialism produces a miniature version of that heterogeneous phenomenon: management of space–but by doctors; development of administrations–but in asylums; considerations of the periphery–but in terms of the insane, prisoners and children . . . all seem to be screen-allegories that foreclose a reading of the broader narratives of imperialism. (291)

     

    14. Many examples can be cited exemplifying Foucault’s aversion to this obligation to serve as a personal source of authority for his ideas. This one is found in his explication of the “author-function”: “the author is asked to account for the unity of the texts which are placed under his name. He is asked to reveal or at least carry authentification of the hidden meaning that traverses them. He is asked to connect them to his lived experiences, to the real history which saw their birth” (“Order” 58).

     

    15. Homi Bhabha’s Freudian analysis of the colonial stereotype, for example, is appended onto Foucault’s dispositif. In a more extreme example, Christopher Lane argues that using Foucault with psychoanalysis is justified if one considers that Foucault concludes The Order of Things, in which he is apparently “heavily indebted to Jacques Lacan,” by “supporting Freud’s account of the unconscious” (164-65).

     

    16. I am actually abbreviating a diverse body of work here. For some examples see Arditi, Coveney, Rimke, Miller and McHoul, and Wickham for their varying political imperatives and degrees of “criticalism.”

     

    17. See particularly Fredric Jameson’s “On ‘Cultural Studies.’”

     

    18. See pages 35-38 of Bennett’s Culture: A Reformer’s Science.

     

    19. See Gibson and McHoul for a more sustained analysis of this question.

     

    20. Hall goes on to qualify this statement by suggesting that the “organic intellectual” is only a “hope” rather than an actuality in much cultural analysis (292). Frow and Morris, however, make a strong case to suggest that this Gramscian model is still the prevailing one within much cultural studies work, at least in Australia (xxiv-xxvi).

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Arditi, Jorge. “Etiquette Books, Discourse and the Deployment of an Order of Things.” Theory, Culture and Society 16.4 (1999): 25-48.
    • Bell, Vikki. “Performativity and Belonging: an Introduction.” Theory, Culture and Society 16.2 (1999): 1-10.
    • Bennett, Tony. “Cultural Studies: A Reluctant Discipline.” Cultural Studies 12.4 (1998): 528-45.
    • —. Culture: A Reformer’s Science. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1998.
    • —. “Towards a Pragmatics for Cultural Studies.” Cultural Methodologies. Ed. Jim McGuigan. London: Sage, 1997. 42-61.
    • —. “Useful Culture.” Cultural Studies 6.3 (1992): 395-408.
    • Bhabha, Homi. “The Other Question.” Screen 24.6 (1983): 18-36.
    • Bouchard, Donald. Language, Counter-memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews by Michel Foucault. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1977.
    • Bourdieu, Pierre. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. London: Routledge, 1984.
    • Bové, Paul. “The Foucault Phenomenon: The Problematics of Style.” Deleuze vii-xl.
    • Burchell, Graham, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds. The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1991.
    • Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex.” New York: Routledge, 1993.
    • —. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York: Routledge, 1990.
    • —. “Revisiting Bodies and Pleasures.” Theory, Culture and Society 16.2 (1999): 11-20.
    • Callinicos, Alex. “Postmodernism, Post-Structuralism, Post-Marxism?” Theory, Culture and Society 2.3 (1985): 85-101.
    • Coveney, John. “The Government and Ethics of Nutrition.” Diss. Murdoch U, 1996.
    • Danaher, Geoff, Tony Schirato, and Jen Webb. Understanding Foucault. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2000.
    • de Certeau, Michel. The Practice of Everyday Life. Berkeley: U of California P, 1984.
    • Deleuze, Gilles. Foucault. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1988.
    • Drotner, Kirsten. “Ethnographic Enigmas: ‘The Everyday’ in Recent Media Studies.” Cultural Studies 8.2 (1994): 341-55.
    • During, Simon. Foucault and Literature: Towards a Genealogy of Writing. London: Routledge, 1992.
    • Dworkin, Dennis. Cultural Marxism in Postwar Britain: History, the New Left, and the Origins of Cultural Studies. Durham: Duke UP, 1997.
    • Fiske, John. “Cultural Studies and the Culture of Everyday Life.” Grossberg, Nelson, and Treichler 154-73.
    • Foucault, Michel. The Archaeology of Knowledge. London: Tavistock, 1972.
    • —. The Care of the Self: The History of Sexuality Volume Three. New York: Vintage, 1988.
    • —. Discipline and Punish. New York: Vintage, 1977.
    • —. “Governmentality.” Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 87-104.
    • —. Herculine Barbin: Being the Recently Discovered Memoirs of a Nineteenth-Century Hermaphrodite. Brighton: Harvester, 1980.
    • —. The History of Sexuality: An Introduction. London: Penguin, 1981.
    • —. “Intellectuals and Power: A Conversation between Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze.” Bouchard 205-17.
    • —. “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.” Bouchard 139-64.
    • —. “The Order of Discourse.” Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader. Ed. Robert Young. Boston: Routledge, 1981. 48-78.
    • —. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. London: Routledge, 1989.
    • —. “Politics and the Study of Discourse.” Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 53-72.
    • —. “Practising Criticism.” Michel Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977-1984. Ed. Lawrence Kritzman. New York: Routledge, 1988. 152-56.
    • —. “Questions of Method: An Interview with Michel Foucault.” I&C 8 (1981): 3-14.
    • —. “Truth and Power.” Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977. Ed. Colin Gordon. New York: Harvester, 1980. 109-33.
    • —. The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality Volume Two. New York: Vintage, 1990.
    • Frow, John. “Discourse and Power.” Economy and Society 14.2 (1985): 192-214.
    • —. “Some Versions of Foucault.” Meanjin 47.1 (1988): 144-56.
    • —. “Some Versions of Foucault.” Meanjin 47.2 (1988): 353-65.
    • Frow, John and Meaghan Morris. “Introduction.” Australian Cultural Studies: A Reader. Eds. John Frow and Meaghan Morris. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1993. vii-xxxii.
    • Gibson, Mark and Alec McHoul. “Interdisciplinarity.” A Companion to Cultural Studies. Ed. Toby Miller. Oxford: Blackwell, 2001. 23-35.
    • Gordon, Colin. “Governmental Rationality: An Introduction.” The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality. Eds. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1991. 1-52.
    • —. “Other Inquisitions.” I&C 6 (1979): 23-46.
    • Grossberg, Larry, Cary Nelson, and Paula Treichler, eds. Cultural Studies. New York: Routledge, 1992.
    • Hall, Stuart. “Cultural Studies and its Theoretical Legacies.” Grossberg, Nelson, and Treichler 277-94.
    • —. “Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms.” Media, Culture and Society 2 (1980): 57-72.
    • —. “Introduction: Who Needs Identity?” Questions of Cultural Identity. Eds. Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay. London: Sage, 1996. 1-17.
    • Halperin, David. Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography. New York: Oxford UP, 1995.
    • Hunter, Ian. “Aesthetics and Cultural Studies.” Grossberg, Nelson, and Treichler. 347-72.
    • —. Culture and Government: The Emergence of Literary Education. London: MacMillan Education, 1988.
    • —. “From Discourse to Dispositif: Foucault and the Study of Literature.” Meridian 10 (1991): 36-53.
    • Jameson, Fredric. “On ‘Cultural Studies.’” Social Text 34 (1993): 17-52.
    • Kendall, Gavin, and Gary Wickham. Understanding Culture: Cultural Studies, Order, Ordering. London: Sage, 2001.
    • Lane, Christopher. “Psychoanalysis and Sexual Identity.” Lesbian and Gay Studies: A Critical Introduction. Eds. Sally Munt and Andy Medhurst. London: Cassell, 1997. 160-75.
    • Lefebvre, Henri. The Critique of Everyday Life. London: Verso, 1991.
    • Malpas, Jeff, and Gary Wickham. “Governance and Failure: On the Limits of Sociology.” Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology 31.3 (1995): 37-50.
    • McNay, Lois. Foucault: A Critical Introduction. Cambridge: Polity, 1994.
    • Mercer, Colin. “Complicit Pleasures.” Popular Culture and Social Relations. Eds. Tony Bennett, Colin Mercer, and Janet Woollacott. Milton Keynes: Open UP, 1986. 50-68.
    • Miller, Toby. The Well-Tempered Self: Citizenship, Culture and the Postmodern Subject. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1993.
    • Miller, Toby, and Alec McHoul. Popular Culture and Everyday Life. London: Sage, 1998.
    • Morris, Meaghan. “The Pirate’s Fiancée.” Michel Foucault: Power, Truth, Strategy. Eds. Meaghan Morris and Paul Patton. Sydney: Feral, 1979. 148-68.
    • —. “Introduction: History in Cultural Studies.” Too Soon Too Late: History in Popular Culture. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1998. 1-28.
    • O’Regan, Tom. “(Mis)Taking Policy: Notes on the Cultural Policy Debate.” Cultural Studies 6.3 (1992): 409-23.
    • Osborne, Thomas. Aspects of Enlightenment: Social Theory and the Ethics of Truth. London: U of London P, 1998.
    • Probyn, Elspeth. “Beyond Food/Sex.” Theory, Culture and Society 16.2 (1999): 215-28.
    • —. Outside Belongings. New York: Routledge, 1996.
    • Rimke, Heidi Marie. “Governing Citizens through Self-Help Literature.” Cultural Studies 14.1 (2000): 61-78.
    • Rose, Nikolas. “Identity, Genealogy, History.” Questions of Cultural Identity. Eds. Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay. London: Sage, 1996. 128-50.
    • —. Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought. New York: Cambridge UP, 1999.
    • Said, Edward. Orientalism. London: Penguin, 1978.
    • —. “The Problem of Textuality: Two Exemplary Positions.” Critical Inquiry 4.4 (1978): 673-714.
    • Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. “Can the Subaltern Speak?” Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. Eds. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg. London: MacMillan Education, 1988. 271-313.
    • Sprinker, Michael. “The Use and Abuse of Foucault.” Humanities in Society 3.1 (1980): 1-21.
    • Steedman, Carolyn. “Culture, Cultural Studies, and the Historians.” Grossberg, Nelson, and Treichler 613-22.
    • Taylor, Affrica. “A Queer Geography.” Lesbian and Gay Studies: A Critical Introduction. Eds. Andy Medhurst and Sally Munt. London: Cassell, 1997. 3-19.
    • Thompson, E.P. The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays. London: Merlin, 1978.
    • Wickham, Gary. “Sport, Manners, Persons, Government: Sport, Elias, Mauss, Foucault.” Cultural Studies 6.2 (1992): 219-31.
    • Williams, Raymond. “Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory.” New Left Review 82 (1973): 3-16.
    • —. Culture and Society 1780-1950. Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1961.
    • Young, Robert. “Foucault on Race and Colonialism.” New Formations 25 (1995): 57-65.

     

  • Executive Overspill: Affective Bodies, Intensity, and Bush-in-Relation

    Jenny H. Edbauer

    Department of English
    University of Texas at Austin
    edbauer@mail.utexas.edu

     

    If there were no escape, no excess, no remainder, . . . the universe would be without potential, pure entropy, death. Actually existing, structured things live in and through that which escapes them. Their autonomy is the autonomy of affect.

     

    –Brian Massumi

     

    I’ve changed my style somewhat, as you know. I’m less–I pontificate less. . . . And I’m interacting more with people.

     

    –George W. Bush, 13 February 2000

    Introduction: The Chief Eruption

     

    The President appears and suddenly something goes wrong. He stumbles. He squints. His mouth opens, but the words won’t come. And when they do finally come, they are wrong. The sounds are strangely tangled up, misplaced, tortured. His body jerks just a little, but the camera magnifies the small flinches until they appear larger than life. When watching George W. Bush speak, you are watching an event. It is easy to get the feeling that you are witnessing something fall apart. In front of the cameras and lights, his body cannot contain the linguistic flaws, grammatical blunders, wild malapropisms, and visible confusion that are present. The executive body becomes a wild composition of energies and forces. Something erupts. In a 1999 article for The New Yorker, Joe Klein describes Bush’s body like this:

     

    He will squinny his eyes, raise his chin, lift an eyebrow, and curl his lip slightly–his face seems to be involved in a somewhat painful, quasi-involuntary struggle to prevent itself from erupting into a broad, self-satisfied smile. This facial skirmish is often accompanied by a slight forward bend at the waist and a what-me-worry? shrug, and they often occur after the Governor has delivered a line particularly well, or thinks he has. (“Campaign” 40)

     

    Of course, Bush hardly ever delivers a line particularly well. The phenomenon of spotting and cataloging “Bushisms”–those infamous verbal flubs and failings–has become a kind of sport. His caricature almost creates itself: if Bill Clinton’s stereotype was The Good Time Bubba, Bush’s popular image is The Dumb Jock. Yet, as Mark Crispin Miller points out in The Bush Dyslexicon, this image is hardly a source of shame for President Bush. By playing the role of the folksy American during the 2000 campaign, Bush seemed “a viable alternative to the far more seasoned and intelligent Al Gore–whose very strengths could be perceived, or spun, as weaknesses by contrast with the Texan’s ‘naturalness’ and ‘likeability’” (Miller 13). Bush’s mispronunciations and slips of the tongue are thus rendered as a reflection of his populism. As Miller tells it, “certainly George W. Bush has always postured as a good ole boy, who don’t go in fer usin’ them five-dollar words like ‘snippy’ and ‘insurance’” (13). Indeed, Bush has capitalized on this image quite well. Bush understands that “there is no balm like ‘self-effacing humor.’ Thus he started early on to use that weary little joke about his tendency to ‘stress the wrong syl-LAB-able,’ and told Letterman that he ‘would make sure the White House library has lots of books with big print and big pictures’” (Miller 39). And then there were the President’s self-deprecating remarks at Yale University’s 300th commencement: “To the C students, I say, ‘You too can be president of the United States.’” Waves of laughter erupt from the crowd: he’s got quite a sense of humor.

     

    As Miller astutely observes, however, Bush’s miscommunications are more than rhetorical blunderings. He is not (merely) illiterate, but intensely and viscerally incoherent:

     

    His eyes go blank as he consults the TelePrompTer in his head, and he chews uneasily at the corner of his mouth, as if to keep his lips in motion for the coming job, much as a batter swings before the pitch. Thus prepared, he then meticulously sounds out every. . . single . . . word, as if asking for assistance in a foreign language. (6)

     

    Bush’s incoherence presents an interesting problem for cultural theory, as well as for the political left. If we argue, for example, that Bush is an anti-intellectual–or, at the very least, a thoughtless Head–we might rightfully conclude that any of three factors is at work.1 Perhaps the left has not done a good job of pointing out Bush’s inconsistency and anti-intellectualism (or perhaps they have failed to show why these characteristics are harmful). Or perhaps we might conclude that people appreciate Bush’s ineptness–that his blunders are the mark of a “regular guy.” Or, as a third alternative, we might even conclude that the public feels positive about Bush in spite of his public dullness; his other qualities outshine his apparent dimness. All of these conclusions are strong rhetorical accounts of Bush’s surprising popularity in the face of his public stupidity. Yet I would suggest a further way of mapping Bush’s rhetoric that the political left, not to mention cultural theory, has been slow to consider: Bush’s rhetoric, including the jarring disruptions of thought and speech, creates an intensity that can move others. Bush’s ineptness contains something affective that turns out to be more than its symbolic or meaningful form. In other words, before we can talk about gridded position(ings) either for or against Bush, something intensive occurs in the interstices between our various bodies. There is an affective dimension to Bush’s rhetoric that can be located and mapped in terms of the body and bodily forces. In order to more fully understand this executive body and its cultural effects, we must turn to the concept of affect.

     

    Affect and (Other) Unqualified Bodies

     

    Read across the notion of affect, Bush’s decomposition is quite significant. The fact that you cannot read his lips is important; the Presidential disconnection implies much more than a missed connection. As Brian Massumi argues in Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation, the event of image reception takes place on several levels: there is a level of intensity and a level of qualification. Whereas qualification is the image’s “indexing to conventional meanings in an intersubjective context, its sociolinguistic qualification,” an image’s intensity is “the strength or duration of the image’s effect” (24). For example, Massumi describes an experiment undertaken by researchers after a short, wordless film on German television raised a number of complaints from parents about the film’s tendency to scare children. The film itself, which was originally nothing but filler between programs, was seemingly innocuous: a man builds a snowman, and, after it begins to melt in the sun, drives it to the mountains. There he drops off the snowman and leaves. This scene is hardly the kind of film one would identify as being frightening to children. In their experiments, researchers showed different versions of the film to children: a wordless version, a version that narrated the man’s emotional states at various points, and a factually narrated version. They wired the children to measure various physiological reactions, and asked for responses to the film. (Is this version happy or sad? Is this version pleasant or unpleasant? Which one do you remember the most?) As Massumi writes, the children found the original wordless version most pleasant. Oddly enough, the children also rated this wordless version as the saddest one. The saddest version was the most pleasant. The physiological results are also strange, Massumi points out. “Factuality made their heart beat faster and deepened their breathing, but it also made their skin resistance fall” (Parables 24). In other words, the heart-brain processed information effectively, but it was the skin that had to be excited.

     

    But why would the brain race while the skin is bored? Massumi suggests that these different functions arise from their relation to expectation. Because the heart-brain positions itself within narrative and cognitive continuity, “modulations of heartbeat and breathing mark a reflux of consciousness into the autonomic depths, coterminous with a rise of the autonomic into consciousness” (Parables 25). But intensity–the skin flicks–jumps outside the narrative/cognitive line. Intensity disrupts the linear narrative. The pleasure of intensity is a jump cut, a jolt, a shock that exists on the surface of signification. Judging from such empirical scenes, Massumi concludes that “depth reactions belong more to the form/content (qualification) level. . . . The reason may be that they are associated with expectation, which depends on consciously positioning oneself in a line of narrative continuity” (25). The qualification-meaning level of an image’s reception, in other words, relates to expectation. Yet, the intensity level, which registers on the skin, “is outside expectation and adaptation. . . . It is narratively delocalized, spreading over the generalized body surface like a lateral backwash from the function-meaning interloops that travel the vertical path between head and heart” (25). The level of intensity in image reception is something other than expectation. Indeed, writes Massumi, “intensity would seem to be associated with nonlinear processes: resonation and feedback that momentarily suspend the linear progress of the narrative present from past to future” (26). Intensity is a disruption of the indexing of qualification.

     

    These multiple levels do not merely happen with image reception, however. “Language belongs to entirely different orders depending on which redundancy it enacts,” writes Massumi, “or, it always enacts both more or less completely: two languages, two dimensions of every expression, one superlinear, the other linear. Every event takes place on both levels” (26; emphasis mine). Massumi calls these two halves expectation and suspense. “Approaches to the image in its relation to language are incomplete if they operate only on the semantic or semiotic level, however that level is defined . . . . What they lose, precisely, is the expression event–in favor of structure” (26-27). In short, Massumi concludes, “much could be gained by integrating the dimension of intensity into cultural theory. The stakes are the new” (27). In spite of everything that expectation, the symbolic, and structure allow for, they operate in a realm where nothing new emerges. But the event itself is not prefigured. As Massumi writes, “the expression-event is the system of the inexplicable: emergence, into and against regeneration (the reproduction of a structure). . . . Intensity is the unassimilable” (27). Following Massumi’s lead, therefore, we can redescribe intensity of the event as affect.

     

    This theory of affect–of the event’s doubleness–is important for cultural theory. Massumi notes, “there seems to be a growing feeling within media, literary, and art theory that affect is central to an understanding of our information- and image-based late capitalist culture, in which so-called master narratives are perceived to have foundered” (27). The problem, according to Massumi, is that “there is no cultural-theoretical vocabulary specific to affect. Our entire vocabulary has derived from theories of signification that are still wedded to structure” (27). Thus, we must invent an affective cultural theory as we go along. The stakes are the new and the otherwise unassimilable dimension that shadows our encounters with the event. If our descriptions lack an account of the affective-intense dimensions, they can formulate only a partial cultural theory.

     

    As we see in Massumi’s evocations of the event’s doubleness, therefore, corporality is more than it sometimes seems. A cultural theory of affect is a theory of the body. The affective body is an event; it is implicated in the doubleness of the event. Whereas many readings of the body begin in qualification and ideological realms–in meaning–we must not neglect the body’s total event. That is, we must not neglect both halves of the body: qualification and intensity. It may be true, as Katharine Young writes in her introduction to Bodylore, that “our beliefs about the body, our perceptions of it and the properties we attribute to it, both symbolic and literal, are socially constructed” (xvii). However, we cannot simply reduce the body to the plane of meaning. It is here that the challenge to cultural theory specifically lies: we must come to understand the body as an affective body, as a total event.

     

    I can think of no better exemplar than Bush, who is certainly not describable only in terms of qualification. (Has one ever seen a more unqualified executive body?) Calling on this body, then, I want to extend Massumi’s call for the creation of a cultural vocabulary of affect by tracing three lines, three key terms, of the affective body: relational intensity, the sensation of involvement, and thought-impingement.2 I argue that we must begin to develop a cultural-theoretical vocabulary of and for affective bodies beyond those existing vocabularies of signification. Not only can such vocabularies bring both halves of the event into focus, but this exploration also offers a material re/description of the (political) body as an effect of affect. Moreover, this reading does not apply merely to President Bush’s decomposing body, but to cultural theory as such. In other words, a bodily theory of affect can become a launching pad for a more complete response to current cultural-political scenes. What follows is thus a double gesture of analysis: I want to generate an affective vocabulary via the spectacle of Bush’s decomposing body, as well as a reading of this body across our developing vocabulary of affect. I suggest that such vocabularies can only be generated in a simultaneous co-emergence with(in) sites of cultural analysis. They emerge, that is, through unqualified exemplars.

     

    Relational Intensity

     

    Bush operates most effectively through surprise attack. In his 8 February 2004 appearance on Meet the Press, for example, Bush responded to the growing clamor over weapons of mass destruction (or the lack thereof) with what was slated to be an explanation. “There is no such thing necessarily in a dictatorial regime of iron-clad absolutely solid evidence,” he remarked. “The evidence I had was the best possible evidence that he had a weapon.” And, taking a slightly different tactic, Bush further responded, “in my judgment, when the United States says there will be serious consequences, and if there isn’t serious consequences, it creates adverse consequences.” To put it mildly, these responses jolt their audience. As qualifications, they are meaningless and empty, yet their vacuousness is hardly without intensity–in fact, they come on strong and refuse to evaporate. Bush’s incorrect statements, tautologies, malapropisms, mispronunciations, and bewildering remarks stage a jolt, causing intensity to build up around them. “I don’t care what the polls say,” remarked the President in March of 2000, “I don’t. I’m doing what I think what’s wrong” (qtd. in Miller 134). Miller identifies remarks like this as a surprise for the audience. Miller continues, “For this tendency there may be some physiological explanation; or it may express the muffled protests of a very deeply buried conscience” (134). Bush tells the truth in spite of himself. One’s first inclination may be to explain this jolt as a severe case of intellectual deficit disorder. Yet something more is happening in these veerings and verbal snags. Bush’s pratfalls are not (only) failures, but, perhaps more importantly, they are affectively generative events. It is a mistake, therefore, to underestimate the importance of the event’s doubleness in reading this scene. The jolt of Bushisms exposes the “productivity” of affect as a relational capacity–a function of relations. It might be worth while to spend some probing the idea of relationality for what it can tell us about the event of unqualified bodies.

     

    Consider the Reagan Presidency: smooth and polished, the Great Communicator himself might seem to be Bush’s performative doppelganger. Many commentators have crafted the moment of Reagan’s persuasiveness as a sublime example of charisma-politics. Teflon Ron. Unlike the sticky prose and verbal snags of Bush’s speech, nothing stuck to Reagan. He appeared to be smooth. Massumi points to a story from Oliver Sacks that suggests otherwise. Sacks observed two groups of cognitively dysfunctional patients–global aphasiacs and tonal agnosiacs–watching Reagan deliver a speech. Whereas the first group follows significant meaning through body language, the second group gathers meaning strictly through people’s grammatical and semantic verbal structures. Interestingly enough, notes Massumi, neither group was able to follow the supposedly smoother-than-smooth Reagan. His body language was so jerky and unsmooth that the aphasics could not follow his meaning. At the same time, writes Massumi, “the agnosiacs were outraged that the man couldn’t put together a grammatical sentence or follow a logical line to its conclusion” (Parables 40). The upshot, surprisingly enough, is that Reagan was anything but a smooth talker. This usual rationale for his popularity appears to be somewhat questionable.

     

    The picture of Reagan as the Great Communicator is thus rhetorically troubled for a number of reasons. Even on the surface, Reagan lacked the charismatic qualities to pull off a politics of charisma. As Massumi remarks:

     

    It wasn’t that people didn’t hear the verbal fumbling or recognize the incoherence of his thoughts. They were the butt of constant jokes and news stories. And it wasn’t that what he lacked on the level of verbal coherence was glossed over by the seductive fluency of his body image. Reagan was more famous for his polyps than his poise. (Parables 40)

     

    Paradoxically, Massumi suggests that Reagan’s popularity did not happen in spite of this unintelligibility, but because of it. “The only conclusion is that Reagan was an effective leader . . . because of his double dysfunction. He was able to produce ideological effects by . . . falling apart. His means were affective” (40). Massumi argues that Reagan’s power to attract others was the power of interruption, of suspense: “At each jerk, at each cut into the movement, the potential is there for the movement to veer off in another direction, to become a different movement. . . . In other words, each jerk is a critical point, a singular point, a bifurcation point” (40-41). His movement developed along the lines of the event: Reagan not only embodied qualification, he also embodied the unassimilable intensity of suspense. Massumi explains:

     

    He was an incipience . . . It was on the receiving end that the Reagan incipience was qualified, given content. . . . They [the audience] selected one line of movement, one progression of meaning, to actualize and implant locally. That is why Reagan could be so many things to so many people. (41)

     

    Reagan’s power was precisely his potential: the doubleness of the event was crucial to his ability to move others. At every turn, Reagan’s qualifications were hacked and cut. He communicated via interruption of expectation–he was an affective leader, even if not necessarily an effective one.

     

    This insipience embodied by Reagan is arguably echoed in Bush’s rhetoric. The President’s visceral incoherence that Miller identifies is both more and less than a case of stupidity. He surprises us in a variety of ways–from the disastrous malapropisms to the rather obvious shifts and evasions. In a January 2004 press conference, for example, Bush was questioned about David Kay’s startling admission that weapons of mass destruction would probably not be found in Iraq. “Are you still confident that weapons of mass destruction will be found in Iraq,” the reporter asked, “given what Dr. Kay has said?” The President responded with what might most generously be called a non sequitur:

     

    There is no doubt in my mind that Saddam Hussein was a gathering threat to America and others. That’s what we know. . . . And given the events of September the 11th, we know we could not trust the good intentions of Saddam Hussein, because he didn’t have any. There is no doubt in my mind the world is a better place without Saddam Hussein. America is more secure, the world is safer, and the people of Iraq are free. (Office of the Press Secretary)

     

    The answer hardly follows, yet we should also note that this “surprise” has the effect of a bifurcation point, which veers off into innumerable incipiencies. This veering is not merely a matter of multiple interpretive possibilities (although we can read Bush’s tautologies as such, for example), but it is also the encounter of disruption, of suspense. Bush’s disruptions reflect the jolt of the event and its doubleness. To borrow Massumi’s phrase about Reagan, Bush himself is “a communicative jerk” (Parables 41). Therefore, we might wish to depart from Miller’s reading of Bush’s rhetoric–a qualified reading that seeks to expose the disruption of expectation as a broken line of meaning–and look instead to the event’s doubleness. While Bush’s persuasiveness and rhetorical efficacy may not be locatable in his qualified, indexical meanings, his intensity is another matter. It may not be his linear dimensions that move audiences, but rather the supralinear. Moreover, it may not be a movement of gridded positionality that is effected, but movement as such.

     

    Here we can turn to the work of Spinoza on the subject of decomposing bodies. As Massumi points out, Spinoza’s writings are perhaps the most powerful source of influence for current theories of affect: “on the irreducibly bodily and autonomic nature of affect . . . it is the name of Baruch Spinoza that stands out” (Parables 28). Spinoza is interested in what he calls the affections of the body, where “the body’s power of activity is increased or diminished, assisted or checked” (104). For Spinoza, a body is never a/lone(ly) body. One body is always in relation to another. “The human body can be affected in many ways by which its power of activity is increased or diminished,” writes Spinoza (104). The relation of affect is not a one-way proposition. A body is affected by another body as much as it affects another body. Spinoza explains, “the human body is composed of very many individual bodies of different nature, and so it can be affected by one and the same body in many different ways” (115). Drugs are an obvious example of just such a manifold affectation. While a drug can be quite pleasurable for certain parts of the body, it can also be harmful to others (the liver, brain, etc.). Similarly, Spinoza continues, “different men can be affected in different ways by one and the same object, and one and the same man can be affected by one and the same object in different ways at different times” (134). Spinoza describes this interrelation of bodies and affects in terms of joy and sadness, which are terms central to his ontology. As Deleuze writes in his brief treatise on Spinoza:

     

    When a body “encounters” another body, or an idea another idea, it happens that the two relations sometimes combine to form a more powerful whole, and sometimes one decomposes the other, destroying the cohesion of its parts. . . . We experience joy when a body encounters ours and enters into composition with it, and sadness when, on the contrary, a body or an idea threaten our own coherence. (Spinoza 19)

     

    Moira Gatens and Catherine Lloyd explain Spinoza’s affective poles: “Joy involves an increase in activity–an increase in the striving to persist. . . . there is a corresponding orientation of sadness toward disengagement and isolation” (53). Whereas joy is an increase in active intensities, sadness is the diminishment of that potentiality.

     

    A body is thus a degree of potential for entering certain kinds of relations. As Deleuze points out, Spinoza defines bodies not as a substance but as “a capacity for affecting or being affected” (Spinoza 124). Such capacity certainly relates to the “ideas” that affect us. (For example, I have the capacity for being affected by sad thoughts, thereby changing the intensity of my body at a particular moment of a sad song.) Yet, Deleuze describes this capacity in concrete terms, beyond the ideas that, as we commonly say, affect us. “For example: there are greater differences between a plow horse or draft horse and a racehorse than between an ox and a plow horse,” explains Deleuze. “This is because the racehorse and the plow horse do not have the same affects nor the same capacity for being affected” (Spinoza 124). Spinoza forgoes a substantial definition of a body in favor of its capacities and its potentiality for relations. A (Spinozist) body thus cannot be defined apart from relations with the world. Following this description, we understand the body as those groupings of capacities that are always being affected by (or affecting) another body or bodies. This encounter between bodies is a relation of intensities. Even the body that I substantively identify as my body is a matter of powers: I slip on my headphones to listen to certain music that makes me feel more energetic, more awake. The body of the songs has entered into relation with my body in such a way that increases my intensity. One body enters into a relation with another, changing the potential of both. After listening to sad music, for example, the body’s energy becomes low-key, mellow, and almost pained. Or perhaps I take a tab of acid. In spite of my wishes or desires, my body reveals its own capacities for being affected by psychopharmic bodies.

     

    The body, in its affective relation with other bodies, is thus always in a transition or a passage. “These continual durations or variations of perfection are called ‘affects,’ or feelings (affectus),” writes Deleuze (Spinoza 49). However, such affects do not merely relate to ideas that move us. “It is of another nature,” says Deleuze, “being purely transitive, and not indicative or representative, since it is experienced in a lived duration that involves the difference between two states” (Spinoza 49). Affect marks the lived duration between two states experienced by one body that is affected by another body. The sensation of such a relation is what we might call the encounter of affect. As Deleuze and Guattari explain, “affect is not a personal feeling, nor is it a characteristic; it is the effectuation of a power of the pack that throws the self into upheaval and makes it reel” (Thousand 240). Rather than acting as the emotive means by which to solidify one’s individuality, affect is the sensation of being affected by another body. It is the experience that we are not a/lone(ly), but that we exist in relations beyond what we may recognize or even wish.

     

    Affect is the experience of having the ground pulled out from under our very feet. Few people do this better than Bush, who veers, stutters, misspeaks, hesitates, twitches. We are tempted to take a jab at his failing body, a failing that (we quietly assume with a strange degree of residual Cartesianism) surely reflects a faltering mind. Yet the crashing sounds of the jolt resonate with the encounter of one body affecting/being affected by another body. The camera lights hit Bush–or the questions begin to strike–and we immediately witness a body de/composing as a result of such composition. Likewise, Bush often surprises our narrative expectations with a botched metaphor, fact, or phrase. It is then our turn to experience an interruption–a decomposition–of the (should we say normal?) smoothness of composition. Bush hacks our experience of narrative so easily, and with such a degree of intensity, because we are already in a kind of relationality with this executive body. Bush himself is hacked because he is never a/lone(ly) body, but is rather always open to affectation and compositions. Yet it is a mistake to position Bush’s “hackishness” outside of the event’s relationality. Furthermore, as we will see in the next section, this experience of relationality generates unqualified intensity that is all the more powerful in its productive capacities.

     

    The Sensation of Involvement

     

    We don’t listen to the President. Indeed, it is nearly impossible to listen to the President. Not only does he so rarely speak in public (it is said that he has given the fewest press conferences of any president since the advent of television), but he does not give you much to go on. His speech interrupts itself so frequently that it is almost impossible to find Bush sustaining an articulated thought for very long. As the President himself admits, his reading strategy is a bit disjointed: “I glance at the headlines just to kind of get a flavor for what’s moving. I rarely read the stories, and get briefed by people who are probably (sic) read the news themselves.” Even his description of reading is unreadable. Calling Bush “the unspeakable president,” Salon editor Gary Kamiya wryly remarks that forcing Bush to speak in public is un-American: “what America . . . wanted was a genial, figurehead-type CEO who is incapable of defending or even explaining the decisions made by his corporate masters . . . but who can make ignorance seem charming” (“Unspeakable”). We cannot listen to this President, and yet we experience him. We await his event. We await the jolt of relational intensity.

     

    In describing affects and/as bodies-in-relation, therefore, we are talking largely about sensation, or the sensation of involvement. Yet this is not the personalized sensation that we typically conceptualize as feelings about something. By reading Bush’s body as an affective body, we are not indexing feelings about Bush. By the time such qualification has occurred, we have already bypassed the event’s doubleness and/in the affective body. Instead, we might conceptualize affect as the sensation of the periphery. In What is Philosophy?, for example, Deleuze and Guattari look toward music and painting in order to find the sensation of bordering. “Harmonies are affects,” they write. “Consonance and dissonance, harmonies of tone or color, are affects of music or painting” (164). Harmony is sensed in music or painting, yet it does not belong properly to the listener/viewer. Neither does it reside in any particular place in the material itself. There are combinations of notes and colors, to be sure, yet the harmony exists beyond a mere combination of elements. “It is difficult to say where in fact the material ends and sensation begins. . . . Sensation is not realized in the material without the material passing completely into the sensation, into the percept or affect,” Deleuze and Guattari continue (166-67). The sensation of affect is thus the sensual experience of bordering, of being on the periphery. Or, to put it in other terms, the sensation of involvement is the corporeal experience of being-in-relation.

     

    Although the language may be unfamiliar, this affective encounter of bordering is familiar. One can point to the event of shared eroticism, for example, where sensations belong to no/body in particular. An erotic encounter reflects an involvement of bodies, skin, and those strange relations of the outside. An erotic encounter cannot sustain itself on the mere intimate relation of two (or more) bodies. Eroticism involves an extra, shared element that is outside the range of either body in its “proper” limits. The erotic is neither outside nor inside, but is rather involved in the relation. Eroticism is, perhaps, the primary exemplar of involvement. Echoing the writings of Georges Bataille, Alphonso Lingis remarks that such involvement is an exposure and wounding:

     

    What else is erotic craving but a craving to be violated? In voluptuous turmoil, we are left not simply wounded, but shattered. The violent emotions that are aroused, . . . that push on in a momentum that can no longer derail or control itself, sense also the exultation of risking oneself, of plunging into the danger zone, of expending our forces at a loss. (Dangerous 91)

     

    Lingis suggests that the erotic extends beyond the mere combining of two bodies. Erotic sensation itself is a bordering phenomenon: it is not merely an internalized sensation, but feeds from the intensity of a relation and the body of another. He writes:

     

    Erotic passion is not an initiative of what we call our person–our separate and discontinuous existence, source of its own acts, responsible for what we ourselves say and do. . . . An erotic object functions as the open gate toward which the shock waves of our energies rush, to be . . . intensified and inflamed there, and to break forth into the dazzling darkness beyond. (Dangerous 142-43)

     

    The scene of eroticism is thus a feeling of excess and exposure. It is an encounter with the periphery, or the experience of relationality. Perhaps it is telling that erotic encounters are so commonly described as the feeling of getting lost in another, getting swept away, drowning. The sensation of involvement radically exposes our own being as being-in-relation.

     

    A slightly more banal way of describing this peripheral phenomenon of affective involvement can be found in the body’s reactions to everyday event-scenes. In her reading of the plastic bag pseudo-documentary in the film American Beauty, for example, Gay Hawkins describes her reaction to the short scene as one of intense involvement. It wasn’t a matter of liking the scene, she explains. It’s not quite like that. The scene bowled her over, leaving her breathless. She says, “I was participating in that scene before I knew it, it triggered a different rhythm or process in my watching, one in which I lost my self in a new relation” (“Documentary”). That is, before she could even identify or register some kinds of index–admiration, disgust, semantic meaning, and so on–Hawkins says that she was struck. In her attempt to make sense of this rather unusual visceral reaction, Hawkins turns to the notion of the affective body as relationality. “In other words,” she writes, “affect is a relation, it’s not a self having feelings, it’s a distinctive being in and of the world” (“Documentary”). While we may be tempted to re-index, to reclassify, such an encounter, Hawkins argues that “we are in affect, participating, before this happens, affect precedes these kind of classificatory and cognitive activities” (“Documentary”). Before any qualification of the event, therefore, the affective body registers intensity and breaks expectation.

     

    As both Spinoza and Deleuze suggest, however, this involvement is never of the personal. Affect and bodies-in-relation are always a social matter. In her analysis of conservative Australian ultra-rightist politician Pauline Hanson, for example, Anna Gibbs turns to the notion of affect for an explanation of Hanson’s popularity. It is not (merely) that Hanson persuaded an entire line of voters to support her arch-conservative policies, but rather that Hanson’s affective body entered into particular kinds of joyful relations–in Spinoza’s sense of this term–with other bodies. Gibbs writes that “bodies can catch feelings as easily as catch fire: affect leaps from one body to another” (“Contagious”). Gibbs is especially interested in Hanson’s face and voice (as they are caught on screen) to find what she calls “the affective resonance” of visceral response between bodies (“Contagious”). With her pale skin, green eyes, and red hair, Hanson was a disruption from the ordinary drabness of political faces. She was striking. Her voice was also affectively contagious, wobbly and full of emotional texture. In Gibbs’s astute reading,

     

    Hanson’s voice in the broadcast coverage of the last federal election often conveyed acute distress, as if she was about to burst into tears, and the communicability of this affect in turn set in motion a number of affective sequences in those who listened to it. The distress of the other, if distress itself particularly distresses the observer, often produces an impulse to put an immediate stop to it, as when a baby cries. (“Contagious”)

     

    Trembling and emotional, Hanson appeared less than articulate or self-assured. This performance was not at all harmful to her broad conservative and moderate support, as Gibbs points out. For her inarticulacy “not only communicated the immediate affect of distress, but formed part of a more general attitude . . . of some one who has ‘had enough’, and this attitude, if not the detail of all of her actual ideas, evoked a ready sympathy in many people” (“Contagious”). In other words, it was not political, ideological content that necessarily won support for Hanson, but the sensation of intensification she was able to cultivate for some members of her audience. In addition to these indexical lines, there was a visceral feedback being fed by an interloop of bodies. There was a mutuality between Hanson and the bodies of her supporters.

     

    However, as we have seen, affect is not (always) bound up in identification. Affect as bodies-in-relation–affect in a Spinozist sense–remains outside awareness. Gibbs later concedes that this is precisely what Hanson’s inarticulation “embodies.” Citing Massumi, Gibbs writes, “to the extent that the affects comprising [attitudes] remain outside awareness, they imply desire, or what Brian Massumi has characterised . . . as ‘yearning’ [which is] . . . ‘a tendency without end’” (“Contagious”). Gibbs argues that Hanson’s affective resonance was not ultimately comprised in identification, but in “redintegration.” The difference between the two is a difference between a unifying gesture and a point of decomposition. Gibbs explains, “redintegrative contagion is less organised [than identification], less predictable, less stable. . . . [It is] characterised by disequilibrium rather than equilibrium, punctuated or otherwise” (“Contagious”). Redintegration is a falling apart. Thus, as Massumi says of Reagan (and as we might say of George W. Bush), Hanson was popular not in spite of, but because of, her inarticulacy. While we cognitively prefer linearity and indexicality of the event, the skin is intensified and potentialized by disruption. The body is struck by the event’s suspension of linearity.

     

    The real, material sensation of this immaterial strike cannot be underestimated. The lived duration of affect has power. In deleuzoguattarian terms, the strike of affect–as sensation of the periphery or involvement–marks a real change in our ways of being. The body’s relationality, Deleuze and Guattari write, is “not the passage from one lived state to another but man’s nonhuman becoming” (What 173). Becoming-involved is a process of entering into new relations and zones of proximities. “Becoming is an extreme contiguity within a coupling of two sensations without resemblance. . . . It is a zone of indetermination, of indiscernibility, as if things, beasts, and persons . . . endlessly reach that point that immediately precedes their natural differentiation. This is what is called an affect” (What 173). Here we might recall the experience of listening to music or seeing art that thrives in harmony or dissonance. During the event of hearing a song that jives with your body, you enter into a zone of permeability with other elements that are “properly” outside your own sense. Concerts illustrate this zone of indetermination to an even greater extent. Musicians often describe “feeding” on a crowd’s energy and vice-versa. Commonly perceived delimitations–proper borders of identity and substance–break down in these instances, disclosing the affective sensation of peripheral relations at work. This is not to say that the sensual experience of affect marks a return to a primal scene of origination. As Deleuze and Guattari write, “it is a question only of ourselves, here and now; but what is animal, vegetable, mineral, or human in us is now indistinct” (What 174). We already exist in zones of indetermination; particular events emphasize the sensual reality of such indiscernibility.

     

    The feelings that we once attributed to our selves are thus reattributed to the affective event of involvement and its sensation. The sociality of affect is precisely this relation among bodies. When President Bush opens his mouth to speak, he feeds into this relationality, augmenting the relations within which various bodies find themselves. His speech does not initiate a relation, in other words. As we have seen in the previous section, relationality among bodies precedes his worst blunder or finest moment. Bush’s words are compositional bodies of affect–whether joyful or sad. His words are potentialities. We do not merely listen when the Chief speaks, but we are de/composed and intensified at the peripheral threshold outside of proper corporeal limits. With every jerk, jolt, and flopped joke, we are affected by the doubled intensity of the Presidential event. We are sensually involved in the President’s intensity. Before we can like, love, or loathe Bush–before the space of critique is even opened to us–we encounter his potential for affect(ation).

     

    Thought-Impingement

     

    Bush’s “unspeakability” forces the question that we must inevitably revisit: Is Bush thoughtless? According to a 2003 poll cited in Britain’s Sunday Times, 37% of Brits responded that Bush is “stupid” (Bohan). Likewise, recall how the spokeswoman for Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien felt about Bush: “What a moron” (McIlroy). As Salon‘s Kamiya wittily remarks: “Welcome to the wonderful world of George W. Bush’s brain, where it’s always Casual Friday!” Is Bush thoughtless? Perhaps. But as Gatens and Lloyd point out, it is important to remember that the Spinozist understanding of body is not in opposition to mind. Spinoza does not advocate a turn toward the body in an effort to move away from rationality or logic. Rather, for Spinoza, mind is constituted through the body’s relations and its awareness of those relations through the imagination. Indeed, imagination–a term that is important in Spinoza’s ontology–is the “coming together of mind and body in the most immediate way: mind is the idea of body” (12). Bodies are affected and modified by other bodies, and the mind or consciousness is an awareness of these very modifications. Mind and body are thus involved in various degrees of mutuality, and consciousness is an effect of alertness to bodies in relation. Gatens and Lloyd write, “in being aware of its body, the mind is aware not just of one material thing but of other bodies impinging on that body. . . . This experience of other bodies together with our own is the basis of imagination” (14). Consciousness is awareness of affect: the body in modifying relations with other bodies. “The affects are for Spinoza . . . transitions in bodily power and intensity,” they write. “The awareness of actual bodily modification–the awareness of things as present–is fundamental to the affects; and this is what makes the definition of the affects overlap with that of imagination” (52). The body-in-relation (the affective body) is thus a social body. Affect is a corporeal dimension of sociality.

     

    Spinoza thus suggests that we should be slow to make any pronouncements about the relationship between the mind’s (rational) mastery over the (irrational) body. Although we are often eager to give primacy to consciousness and cognition–thereby also reducing corporality to a secondary importance–Spinoza finds evidence that the noncognitive aspects of the body reflect a kind of thinking. “For nobody as yet knows the structure of the body so accurately as to explain all its functions,” writes Spinoza (106). Spinoza suggests that because the body acts beyond the full control of our cognitive knowledge, “mental decisions . . . [vary] therefore according to the varying disposition of the body” (107). Thinking is a dimension of the affective body insofar as thought registers an awareness of affect.

     

    As we have seen repeatedly, the affective body is a visceral body: the body enfolds sensation prior to all mediation of thought. “Visceral sensibility immediately registers excitations gathered by the five ‘exteroceptive’ senses even before they are fully processed by the brain” (Massumi, Parables 60). In a given situation, the body knows prior to our cognitive awareness. Massumi explains:

     

    As you cross a busy noonday street, your stomach turns somersaults before you consciously hear and identify the sound of screeching brakes that careens toward you. . . . The immediacy of visceral perception is so radical that it can be said without exaggeration to precede the exteroceptive sense perception. . . . [V]iscerality subtracts quality as such from excitation. It registers intensity. (Parables 60-61)

     

    In other words, the affective body acts within relations that are cognitively filtered out from our recognized awareness. Whereas we often only recognize the linear, qualified index of meanings, the body is aware of an event’s doubling. “Viscerality, though no less of the flesh, is a rupture in the stimulus-response paths, a leap in place into a space outside action-reaction circuits,” writes Massumi. “Viscerality is the perception of suspense” (61). Before we can cognitively, consciously register an indexical meaning along a semantic narrative, our body has already encountered the suspension and interruption of the event.

     

    This understanding of situation renders thought as a dimension of the affective body’s relationality. Here we are moving away from a classical epistemology that holds thinking as an effect of observation. Lingis points out that such classical epistemology distinguishes between “the de facto multiplicity of sense-data and their relationships” (Foreign 7). At the same time, he continues, we might follow Merleau-Ponty and take “the sensing to be active from the start. . . . [T]he receptivity for the sensuous element [is thus] a prehension, a prise, a ‘hold’” (7). To sense is already to have the body taken in, so to speak. “To perceive is not for a transcendental agency to extract itself from a drifting mass of sensations; it is to belong to the world one works oneself into,” Lingis continues (Foreign 15).3 The relations of bodies, the sensual experience of being-involved, and thought are therefore all inextricably linked in ways that bypass cognitively recognized dimensions. Instead, the body reflects its own ways of thinking in and through its involvement. Consider those movements that happen too quickly for you to decide, writes Lingis. Consider the slips of the tongue, fast glances, flips of the stomach, jerks of the head, and so on. Or consider a banal gesture, the event of waving to a friend, for example:

     

    The hand that rises to respond to a gesture hailing us in the crowd is not . . . made possible by a representation first formed of the identity of the one recognized. It is the hand that recognizes the friend who is there, not as a named form represented, but as a movement and a cordiality that solicits . . . not a cognitive and representational operation from us, but a greeting, an interaction. (Foreign 8)

     

    The body’s own affectiveness, in other words, is not an effect of cognitive or representational processes. Though we may be reluctant to grant such a status to the body–dumb and inscribed as it may seem–its everyday involvements give the lie to any notion of cognitive primacy. More importantly for cultural theory, the body-in-relation exposes its potentiality for corporeal thought: sensual thinking that exceeds cognitive capture.

     

    Thought itself is thus a force: it hits the body. Steven Shaviro describes this kind of thinking in terms of the cinematic image and the event of “reception.” When watching a film, writes Shaviro, “I have already been touched and altered by these sensations, even before I have had the chance to become conscious of them. The world I see through the movie camera is one that violently impinges upon me, one that I can no longer regard, unaffected, from a safe distance” (46). And beyond the cinematic image, our encounters with other bodies likewise impinge upon us before we have the chance to respond through the grid of the symbolic. In other words, the image grabs us, and not the other way around. “I am solicited and invested by what I see: perception becomes a kind of physical affliction,” writes Shaviro, “an intensification and disarticulation of bodily sensation, rather than a process either of naive (ideological and Imaginary) belief or of detached, attentive consideration” (52). Thought hits the body, haunting it as a force that is with/in us, though out of our grasp.

     

    Such a re/description of situation has an important impact on the way we come to think of particular scenes, especially political-social scenes. As Hawkins writes:

     

    What is valuable about this account of affect is the way it makes trouble for all those epistemologies that begin with a knowing subject ready to act on the world or be acted upon. For the body in affect is not a subjectivity to the world’s objectivity, it is a body in transition, a body in relation. . . . [T]o have a response is to be in a relation. (“Documentary”)

     

    Before we approach a situation cognitively, as subjects, we are already involved in relationality. “Our body thinks with pure feeling before it acts thinkingly,” Massumi argues (Parables 266). We see this primacy in the body’s responses to sudden jolts that are registered somehow before we can make sense of the situation–that is, before we can attach a narrative to the event. Thought itself thus becomes a kind of thinking-feeling that originates in the body. Looking to the work of Deleuze, Massumi explains: “a body does not choose to think, and . . . the supreme operation of thought does not consist in making a choice. . . . Thought strikes like lightening, with sheering ontogenetic force. It is felt” (Shock xxxi). An affective reading of Bush’s (rhetorical) body, therefore, must begin not with any ideological or cognitive effects (although a complete reading necessarily involves these lines), but in a space prior to cognition. It begins in relationality, with the body-in-relation. Something escapes Bush’s language. The excess erupts over his body, rippling across the surface of skin and muscle for us all to see. It is not (merely) that he is lacking coherency, but that he has an excess of qualities. There is too much in his performance to index, to qualify, to hook into coherent meaning. These excess qualities derail from the logical-semantic loops and strike us. They break into a situation and register themselves on the visceral body. Whether or not this involvement becomes a joyful or sad composition, of course, is not determined by such a reading. The visceral registering of excess is not necessarily a positive or negative phenomenon. Affect–and what we might properly call thought–is prior to emotional, ideological, or cognitive indexing.

     

    This means, for one thing, that Bush himself is not thoughtless. The nervous body, the pursed lips, the stuttering, the pauses, the shifting eyes–they all indicate a kind of bodily thinking. A body is struck by other bodies, resulting in its composition or decomposition. It is affected. Beyond what Bush himself may wish, the body leaks and exposes itself in its own intensities. Our visceral reactions also reflect a thinking-feeling that hits us prior to cognitive indexing. Before we can make sense, we sense. Before we react cognitively, we respond affectively. As Avital Ronell explains in her study on stupidity (especially appropriate here), the body’s thinking is not only not coterminous with cognition, but that body’s thinking takes place absolutely otherwise (otherways) than cognition and qualification:

     

    Ever elsewhere when it comes to cognitive scanners, the body evades the regimens of knowledge that would claim to grasp, sectionize, or conceptualize it. Somewhat surprisingly, the site of nonknowledge that the body traverses, and of which it is a part, is related . . . to thought, to acts or contracts of thinking, for the body thinks in a sense, beyond giving or making sense. . . . Thought, which Heidegger unhitched from philosophical operations, weighs in as body. (187)

     

    Ronell explains that the thinking-feeling body indicates a limit to cognitive knowledge. It also indicates the wealth and importance of “sense” that occurs prior to cognition and qualification. We see these two strands well illustrated by the failing, falling, flubbing body of George W. Bush. On the one hand, there is an absolute limit to Bush’s cognitive knowledge. He is, some fear, empty-headed. Yet if his head is empty, his body is stuffed to the breaking point. His is an excessive body-in-relation. The ingress of unqualified intensity hits like a jolt: a body affects and is affected by another body in a compositional overspill. When Bush begins to speak, we the viewers see the suspense–the affect–spill out across the screen. Yet it is not just Bush whose body falls apart. Like Bush, we are bodies in situation. Something slips between subjectivity, language, and scene. Perhaps this something can be called thought, insofar as thought is understood in its affective terms. Excessive intensity hits our body before we have the chance to contain it safely within a story. This excessive punch is what we might call the thought of affect.

     

    Toward a New Cultural Theory

     

    Given these three lines of the affective body–relational intensity, sensation of involvement, and though-impingement–and given primacy of the affective body, how can we give an account of Bush’s persuasiveness, especially in light of his incoherent, poorly performed, and un(der)prepared rhetoric? One could answer this question by looking to relations of power among individuals and the social, examining the ideological construction of relations. This is an important critique, yet an affective reading suggests a space prior to ideological and socially constructed relations of power. As Massumi explains:

     

    It is the event-dimension of potential–not the system of language and the operations of reflection it enables–that is the effective dimension of the interrelating of elements, of their belonging to each other. . . . Belonging is unmediated, and under way. . . . It is the openness of bodies to each other and to what they are not. (Parables 76; emphasis added)

     

    The ability of Bush to move others not in spite of his incoherency but because of it suggests an openness to something beyond semantic or ideological meanings. It suggests that we are open to being affected and affecting other bodies before we know it. Simpler still, we might describe the body of Bush as a gaping hole, a wound: he exposes his and our own exposure as bodies-in-relation. It’s not that nothing comes out when Bush opens his mouth; it’s that too much spills out. Before Bush himself has the opportunity to persuade, and before we can undertake any critical analysis of gridded ideological positionalities, something else comes first. As I have attempted to trace here, this something else is precisely the intensity that is generated outside (or alongside) dimensions of qualification or interpretation.

     

    Two things should stand out to us in an affective reading. First, our cultural-political analyses must begin to include affective dimensions if they are to have any kind of critical effect. That is, we must begin to read the event in its doubling, and not merely in its signifying dimensions. Secondly, we must begin to trace the body itself in its affective and relational characteristics. It is not enough to study the “inscriptions” and symbolic currency of the body. Even at the political scene of the executive body, we must begin to register the suspense of meanings and its effects on the spectator. The primary questions for critical analysis should begin with affect: ask not what the President is (or isn’t, in our case) but what his body is capable of doing. Such readings are a first gesture toward developing vocabularies of affect that can contribute to a revitalization of cultural theory. A viable cultural theory is one that reads both halves of the affective body’s event.

     

    Notes

     

    I would like to thank Diane Davis, Collin Brooke, Jeff Rice, and Thomas Rickert for their feedback on earlier drafts of this article.

     

    1. We should give a nod to those arguments (Miller’s among them) that warn against dismissing Bush as an idiot. As a strategy, this line of argument will not take us very far. And, of course, there are other reasons why we would not wish to adopt the argument that Bush is unqualified because he is somehow not “an intellectual.” At the same time, Bush’s image is clearly that of the dunce. While we can explore the various ramifications and effects of these different media constructions, I want to focus here on his body’s inability to perform smoothly. Whether Bush’s dullness is sincere or calculated, it is clearly his body that seems to come up short in front of the cameras. It is his failing body that I consider in this piece.

     

    2. Note that these keywords are only traces left behind by encounters with the affective body. They cannot form a “map” of affect as such. These keywords are impressions left over from the event’s intensive movement. The terms are traces, and not systematizations, of thought.

     

    3. As Lingis himself writes, this is a Heideggerian notion. We should hear clear echoes of Heidegger’s being-with in this talk of involvement.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Bohan, Caren. “Bush to keep distance from protests on London trip.” Forbes 16 Nov. 2003. Reuters. 6 Feb. 2004 <http://www.forbes.com/work/newswire/2003/11/16/rtr1149618.html>.
    • Deleuze, Gilles. Spinoza: Practical Philosophy. Trans. Robert Hurley. San Francisco: City Lights, 1988.
    • Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1987.
    • —. What is Philosophy? Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell. New York: Columbia UP, 1994.
    • Gatens, Moira, and Genevieve Lloyd. Collective Imaginings. Spinoza, Past and Present. London: Routledge, 1999.
    • Gibbs, Anna. “Contagious Feelings: Pauline Hanson and the Epidemiology of Affect.” Australian Humanities Review Dec. 2001. 20 Feb. 2004 <http://www.lib.latrobe.edu.au/AHR/archive/Issue-December-2001/gibbs.html>.
    • Hawkins, Gay. “Documentary Affect: Filming Rubbish.” Australian Humanities Review Sept. 2002. 20 Feb. 2004 <http://www.lib.latrobe.edu.au/AHR/archive/Issue-September-2002/hawkins.html>.
    • Kamiya, Gary. “The Unspeakable Bush.” Salon 30 Mar. 2001. 10 Mar. 2004 <http://dir.salon.com/politics/feature/2001/03/30/bush/index.html>.
    • Klein, Joe. “The Campaign Trail.” The New Yorker 75.9. 13 Dec. 1999: 40-41.
    • Lingis, Alphonso. Dangerous Emotions. Berkeley: U of California P, 2000.
    • —. Foreign Bodies. London: Routledge, 1994.
    • Massumi, Brian. Parables For the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation. Durham: Duke UP, 2002.
    • —, ed. A Shock to Thought: Expression after Deleuze and Guattari. New York: Routledge, 2002.
    • McIlroy, Anne. “Uneasy Neighbours.” Guardian Unlimited 2 Dec. 2002. 15 Mar. 2004 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/journalist/story/0,,852207,00.html>.
    • Miller, Mark Crispin. The Bush Dyslexicon: Observations on a National Disorder. New York: Norton, 2001.
    • Office of the Press Secretary. “President Bush Welcomes President Kwasniewski to White House.” 27 Jan. 2004. White House. 10 Mar. 2004 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040127-3.html>.
    • Ronell, Avital. Stupidity. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 2003.
    • Shaviro, Steven. The Cinematic Body. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1993.
    • Spinoza, Baruch. The Ethics and Selected Letters. Trans. Samuel Shirley. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1982.
    • Young, Katherine, ed. Bodylore. Knoxville: UP of Tennessee, 1994.